PREFACE

Imbued by the spirit of Manifest Destiny even in the early days of the Republic, the Monroe Doctrine came to be enunciated which in the guise of warning the non-hemispheric powers to keep their hands off Latin America also sought to lay the ground work and justification for making the continent an exclusive preserve of the United States. The subsequent efforts to ensure a US role in a futuro inter-oceanic canal, the war with Spain ostensibly in sympathy with Cuban freedom fighters, the annexation of Puerto Rico, the dismemberment of the department of Panama from Colombia, the so-called Roosevelt corollary arrogating to the US a role of hemispheric gendarme and the various interventions in the Caribbean and in Mexico -- all these testify to the determination with which US policy-makers pursued their objectives in the Western Hemisphere.

The world-wide depression and the emergence of potentially hostile centres of power in Europe and Asia led the Administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt to give a new gloss to its Latin American policy without in anyway giving up the traditional US objectives enshrined in the Monroe Doctrine. The so-called "good neighbour" policy no doubt brought to an end the gross forms of direct intervention of earlier years. But the United States was willing to make its accommodation with military juntas and undemocratic regimes as long as they were ready to display a disposition to go along with the US objectives. A new voice of "sweet reasonableness" and assertions of fraternal sisterhood of the so-called hemisphere community did not succeed in
overcoming the fear of the gringo and the suspicion of the "Colossus of the North" that was widely prevalent throughout Latin America.

To meet the changed world situation after the end of the Second World War -- the potential challenge from the Soviet Union and possible complications in the new world organization from an increasing number of new countries -- the US skilfully played its cards in promoting inter-American conferences and supporting in 1943 the establishment of the Organization of American States (OAS). Voicing solicitude for tackling intraregional problems by means of consultations within the regional organization, it lent its vigorous support to Article 52 of the United Nations Charter. The critical events following the Second World War led the US to pay little attention to the economic objectives to which it had committed itself at the Inter-American Conferences at Chapultepec in 1945 and at Rio de Janeiro in 1947 and at the same structure its attitude within the Cold War framework. Inevitably therefore, considerable disquiet over the American course as presented by the US Secretary of State George C. Marshall was voiced by several Latin American representatives in the Ninth Inter-American Conference held at Bogota in 1948.

With the advent of Eisenhower Administration, the possibility that the US may revert to interventionism against regimes that it suspected to be "soft" on communism became a real possibility. At the Tenth Inter-American Conference held in Caracas in March 1954, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, spoke in
a language that clearly constituted a threat directed at radical and leftist groups in Latin American countries and in particular against Guatemala. Speaking on a draft resolution on intervention of international communism in the American Republics, Dulles said, "there is not a single country in this hemisphere which has not been penetrated by the apparatus of International Communism acting under orders from Moscow.... Because our position has not been made clear, the danger mounts. I believe it is time to make it clear". When a delegate frontally posed the question "What is International Communism?", the Secretary of State replied rudely: "It certainly leaves us somewhat concerned to find out that the Minister of Foreign Relations of one of our American Republics is ignorant enough to ask such a question". The Foreign Minister of Guatemala characterized the resolution on intervention of "International Communism" in reality as a scheme for US intervention.

The neglect of any worthwhile efforts to contribute to economic and political development in Latin America and the injection of an interventionist spirit under the pretext of safeguarding the region against communist intervention evoked misgivings among liberal and leftist circles in many Latin American countries, even though most ruling juntas were willing to go along with the US in their own interest. Thus when the US intervened in Guatemala to topple the government of Jacobo Arbenz it was able to enlist the endorsement of the OAS.

In the case of Cuba the links that Fidel Castro was able to establish with the Soviet Union inhibited the US from
attempting direct intervention of the Guatemalan type. The unacknowledged operation that was worked out instead culminated in the Bay of Pigs fiasco. That very failure probably led US policy-makers to conclude that intervention might have to take place before an unacceptable group could win power in a Latin American country and could establish such relationship with the Soviet Union as had been done by Castro. It is in this context that an attempt is made in the dissertation to study US intervention in the Dominican Republic following the civil war there in 1965.

After the assassination of Rafael Leonidas Trujillo, President of the Republic in 1931, there emerged in the Dominican Republic a constitutional and "reformist" government under the leadership of Juan Bosch. But Bosch's government, denounced by its critics as "leftist", was short-lived. In 1933, a military coup ousted Bosch and set aside his constitution. Two years later, on 24 April 1935, some military elements, proclaiming the restoration of Bosch and his constitution, executed yet another coup against the conservative civilian regime headed by Donald Acid Cabral. From that date political events in the Dominican Republic followed in quick succession, resulting in a civil war between the constitutionalists and some conservative and self-styled anti-communist elements within the military. A three-man military junta headed by Col. Pedro Bartolome Bonoit which in the wake of the civil strife came to power, proclaimed a martial law and claimed that its intention was to restore order and peace in the Dominican Republic. The Colonel was
interested in preventing the installation in power of Juan Bosch or any other alleged leftist elements. The United States watched those developments carefully, its objective also being to ensure that power in the Dominican Republic remained in "safe", trustworthy and pliable hands.

Acting on the basis of a so-called 'request' for "temporary intervention and assistance in restoring order" from Colonel Benoit, President Lyndon B. Johnson ordered four hundred US marines to land in the Dominican Republic. Subsequently the United States justified its action by announcing that it was done "in order to give protection to hundreds of Americans who are still in the Dominican Republic and to escort them safely back to this country". By 2 May, US troops despatched to Dominican Republic reached the huge figure of fourteen thousand marines wholly disproportionate to the purported objective of ensuring the safety of Americans in that country.

It is against this background of the political developments climaxing to a civil strife almost amounting to a political upheaval, the dissertation purports to examine the antecedents, manner and implications of US intervention in Dominican Republic. The work discusses at considerable length the successful effort of the US to induce the OAS to endorse its intervention. The successful bid by the US to present the issue as falling within the purview of Article 52 of the United Nations (UN) Charter and thereby preventing the effective functioning of the UN in resolving the crisis will also be examined. The thrust of the dissertation is to explore in detail the role that the OAS played
through its various instrumentalities such as the Special Committee, the Inter-American Peace Force, the Ad Hoc Committee and the Inter-American Humanitarian Commission and the Technical Assistance Committee on Electoral and other related matters, apparently in compliance with the US government and essentially to endorse US intervention and facilitate safeguarding US interests and objectives in the Dominican Republic.

It is hoped that the study may throw some light on a new and sinister form of military intervention by a major power in the internal affairs of the small nation using the instrumentalities of a regional organization and, on that basis preventing any initiative by the United Nations.

It will be argued in the thesis that an understanding of the basis and nature of US interventionism in Latin America is vitally important to an understanding of US global objective of pre-eminence in the military and the economic spheres.

A pliant, weak and disunited array of states in its own backyard of Latin America, amenable to its influence and manipulation, has for long been regarded as a major objective of the US policy-makers. In the same fashion, continued and secure access to the vast natural resources of Latin America to meet the ever-growing requirements of the industrial and military machine of their country has also been regarded by US policy-makers over the years as a vital national goal. They were clearly aware, though understandably they did not publicly articulate them that the successful fulfilment of US objectives outside the hemisphere depended to a considerable extent on the
efficacy with which the two above mentioned courses relating to Latin America could be accomplished.

With a view to examine the circumstances leading to the landing of US marines in Santo Domingo and subsequent diplomatic efforts that the US initiated both through the OAS and outside, the present thesis is divided into six chapters. The first introductory chapter, following a brief analysis of US policies and postures towards South America in general and Caribbean in particular, chronologically surveys the events leading to the landing of US marines in Santo Domingo. Chapter II examines at length the efforts and circumstances preceding the appointment by the OAS of the Special Committee to investigate the factors that led to the civil war and to effect a ceasefire. Also, it provides an analysis of the actual functioning of the Special Committee, highlighting particularly, its inability to achieve anything concrete by way of defusing the Dominican "crisis".

Chapter III narrates at length the diplomatic efforts of the US in converting its marines into that of an Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF). It also examines the role of the IAPF during and after the civil strife. Chapter IV is devoted to the critical days when the United States attempted to find an amicable solution to the Dominican problem through the appointment of an Ad Hoc Committee under the aegis of the OAS in which it played a dominant role essentially with a view to direct the course of events. The positive achievement of the Ad Hoc Committee and the problems it confronted in working out the Institutional Act are all examined in detail in this chapter. Chapter
V is a brief summary of the activities of the specialised agencies of the OAS, such as the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), the Technical Assistance Mission on Electoral Matters and the events leading to the OAS supervised election of June 1986. The final and concluding chapter, on the basis of the chronological survey of events in the Dominican Republic, beginning with the landing of US marines in April 1985 to the election of 1986, critically reviews US policies towards Latin America and the responses exerted by the Latin American countries, and evaluates the role and the effectiveness of the inter-American regional organization vis-a-vis the OAS in solving intra-regional conflicts.

In the preparation of the thesis, the present writer has had to examine a variety of source materials and where such materials were found inadequate, he had to rely and resort to analysis offered by scholars, officials of the US government as well as that of Organization of American States and informed journalists. After examining all research materials available in the libraries of Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi; Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi; Indian Council of Social Science Research, New Delhi; American Centre New Delhi and American Studies Research Centre at Hyderabad etc., the present writer on the award of field research grant by Jawaharlal Nehru University spent four months in the United States, dividing his time between spending long hours in specialised libraries (Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., Libraries of School of Advance International Service, John Hopkins University, George
Washington University, American University as well as the Headquarters of the Pan American Union, Organization and American States Documentation Centres all at Washington, D.C. and the United Nations library at New York) and interviewing variety of officials, scholars and journalists.

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