CONCLUSION
In our study the time dimension is vast, covering roughly a quarter century of Pakistan's functioning in the arena of the international system. This is a formidable canvas to trace and uncover the myriad forces acting upon its policy-makers entrusted with the task of formulating foreign policy decisions. In the nature of things, they never lend themselves easily amenable to systematic analysis. Partly the difficulty stems from a lack of free access to data and partly from its very absence itself. Even where data are available there still remains the baffling problem for the student to integrate facts to explain past decisions and to build up general propositions. To overcome this haunting problem and to bring the vast array of data into a semblance of order, a model is applied, which is built upon a set of inter-related concepts and assumptions to justify its analytical utility.

The model is built upon a host of assumptions. In the first place, if foreign policy comprises the external behaviour of states, it is this behaviour which is treated as the unit of analysis. In foreign policy analysis, it means one focuses on the acts of the state. And by adopting the foreign policy acts as the unit of analysis, the study of foreign policy is placed with the philosophical and theoretical tradition of Talcott Parsons, Edward Shils and others. Secondly, there is no levels of analysis problems,
if one adopts this perspective of action theory. While one cannot analyse both national subsystem and international system as comparable units, there is hardly any analytical problem when one deals simultaneously with variables at various levels of aggregation. An explanatory model of foreign policy requires inclusion of independent variables at all levels of aggregations. Once it is recognised, the indicators of foreign policy behaviour of states can be put in a clear format for data analysis. This enables the analyst to make useful references about the relative strengths of variables at multiple levels and to trace the interaction effects among these variables. Thirdly, if regular behaviour defines a system, it is legitimate to view the state as a subsystem in all encompassing international system or a system composed of a network of subsystems, comprising an environment, a group of actors, structures, through which actors initiate actions to respond to challenges of events abroad. They all occur continuously in a circular flow of demands on policy, policy processes and products of policy. The decision feeds back into the system. Fourthly, if the concept of system is used as a distinct method of analysis, some of its characteristics like boundaries, internal elements and others need to be delineated. In sum, it is argued that this will enhance a scientific comprehension of the external behaviour of states.
as a systems model facilitates an analytical construction of properties of action shared by all specific states. The model is a fictional state permitting analysis about the real states regardless of their actual differentiations. It also solves the perplexing problem of goals, motivations in national policy, for the behaviours of the decision-makers is treated as the unit of analysis. Further, the phenomenological issue is resolved as it permits focus on the phenomenal field of policy-makers, since it is assumed that cognitive process and belief systems of key decision-makers are central to the study of decisional output.

The model contains a broad conceptualization of variables at their highest level of abstraction both internal and external which subsume different types of specific inputs. Each variable commences with a sub-variable. We have combined James N. Rosenau's categorization schema with that of the Michael Brecher's with slight modification. Some of their sub-variables are dropped as there was difficulty to establish them for lack of adequate data.

Now coming to the diagramatic representation of the model, we have posited that the decision-making process passes through two distinct states: first, policy preference leading to decision and second, action or output. In the
first place, the key policy-makers, represented as a, b and c, perform broad intellectual task of policy-making and reach a particular policy preference. And the manner in which they accomplish this task determines the boundary of the decision to which their policy preference leads. The impact of the key decision-maker's cognitive beliefs predominates on policy preference though it is also influenced by other variables, and this leads to the final decision which is equally prone to influences of other variables. Precisely for this the policy preference is chosen as the dependent variable in place of the decision. Secondly, between the decision and the action or the output, the bureaucratic and the organizational dynamics distort the process that shape the resultant action, or the output.

The major cluster of societal variables subsumes distinct dimensions, which are categorized as "culture and history" and "capabilities". "Culture and history" are defined as the norms and traditions that underlie the relationship among a society's members, their interpretations of their common heritage, and all other means by which they sustain the ties of the community. So it is hypothesized that a society which is unified by a common culture and historical experience can more
effectively pursue its foreign policy goals than one which is rent with cultural dissension and lacked a shared historical experience. Our enquiry into Pakistani society revealed that it was socially fragmented, ethnically diverse and its people spoke differing languages and dialectics for which the pattern of social and political development, the Muslim response to the British rule and the colonial policy and the character and timing of the Pakistani Movement were primarily responsible. They also did not share a common historical perspective. These factors also hindered the process of national integration in Pakistan as it heightened, within a short time, the subaltern group consciousness pioneered by the Bengalis whose demand for the recognition of Bengali as one of the national languages of Pakistan became strident with each passing day. The end of the rule of Hindustanis also eliminated the fantasy of Indo-Islamic identity of the Pakistani society. The rise of the Bengali vernacular elites coincided with the premature demise of the Parliamentary democracy in Pakistan. As a result, they were denied of any effective channel to make their numerical voice felt in the political system which was completely monopolised by the Civil-Military bureaucracy manned by people drawn from the main stratum of West Pakistan to the complete exclusion of the Bengalis. With the disintegration of the Muslim League, Pakistan lost an
all-Pakistani political party which alone could have aggregated the interests of all sections of Pakistani society. Things worsened during the Ayub era. Political elites, mainly Bengalis, were totally alienated as it established an administrative state controlled by civil-military elites. Regionalism reared its ugly head which was gradually exacerbated.

However, it affected the foreign policy of Pakistan in three distinct ways. In the first place, to promote national integration, they looked for an Islamic identity which fanned Bengali chauvinism and its ruling elites stressed on anti-Indian component of Indo-Islamic identity which ultimately shaped their policy towards India. As a result, India became a major factor in its domestic and foreign policy. Secondly, in the name of Islamic ideology, Pakistan weaved a world of grandeur of Islamic solidarity which influenced its policy towards the Muslim countries and assumed the role of a self-appointed conscience-keeper of Muslims living in India. Thirdly, as the numerically majority Bengalis threatened the political survival of the ruling junta and their social and political hierarchy, they increasingly turned to the external powers to invoke their support for its preservation. Lastly, it led to the sad demise of the territorial state of Pakistan in 1971.
In our treatment of the subvariable "capabilities" we have adopted James N. Rosenau's conceptualization which denotes the resource and attribute dimension of a state. So, we deal with geography, size, military capability and economic development as relational variables of "capabilities". In this connection, it is hypothesized that each of these relational variables shape the capabilities of a state which has conditioned its foreign policy behaviour. In our enquiry into the capabilities of Pakistan during the period 1947 to 1971 the following findings are in order. In the first place, the unremitting sorrow of Pakistan is geography. Pakistan is derisively called a geographical monstrosity as its two wings were separated by thousand miles of Indian territory depriving it of a compact territorial personality, and their vastly differing geographical features perpetuating an uneven economic growth and social mobilization. Besides, it has the unique distinction of being flanked by three great powers China, the Soviet Union and India. Interestingly while its eastern wing was opening out to the countries of Southeast Asia, its western wing joined the peninsula of the West Asia. This peculiar geographical location weighed enormously on its policy-planners, given the Russian traditional quest for the warm waters of Arabian Sea, and its unhappy relation with India with whom it shared long borders and all its major towns and industrial establishments were literally part of.
India's frontier zones. This was further horned by Afghanistan's continued hostility which was manifested in its repudiation of the Durand Line as their common border and in its espousal of the cause of fictitious "Pakhtoonistan". It was really a herculean task on the part of a small country to defend its eight boundaries which compounded its geo-strategic problems. This was clearly highlighted during the 1965 war when East Pakistan was practically left defenceless that served to heighten Bengali sense of negligence on the part of the central authority. As revealed in our analysis, Pakistani ruling elites though predominantly Punjabis had a unified geo-strategic thinking - as India posed the only threat to its territorial integrity. They never feared any aggression from China, though Ayub's offer of joint defence of the subcontinent was made only in the context of the cultural revolution in China as he was deeply unnerved about its final outcome. But their fear of Soviet advance was deep-seated and genuine as was revealed after the U-2 incident. However, geography certainly constrained Pakistan's capabilities in three ways: on the geo-military plane; in the uniform economic development of its two wings and in greater social mobilization.

With regard to size, our enquiry reveals that
Pakistan being perched on the rendezvous of Asia and Europe with a population of 80,000,000 was deemed to be one of the bigger nations of the world in terms of demography and geopolitical significance, hence destined to play a potential role in the post-war politics of Asia. A synoptic survey of its size as defined by present day theorist to include both human and non-human resource dimension, showed that it lacked basic ingredients of power - coal, petroleum hydroelectricity, natural gas and also of minerals - iron-ores, chromite, and manganese. Nature was not bounteous, nor government has made any appreciable effort to explore what it possessed. Similarly, despite governmental effort, human resources have not been fully tapped, despite big strides made in the field of education. Pakistan still has to go a long way to catch up with the developed world to become a big power. It has entered only threshold of the scientific, technological and space age. To that extent, it has impressed upon the policy-makers the problems and possibilities of their state to function in a broader operational environment of the world in which both the human and non-human resources set definite limits to any efforts at enhancing its capabilities that indirectly affects the formulation and prosecution of foreign policy goals. Further, functioning in the context of the South Asia, this problem was compounded as India was the major component of
its operational environment. Besides, it is further exacerbated as the operational environment of its successive decision-makers got converged on their psychological environment as their struggling present, enlivened by the fears wrapped in the mantle of the bitter past, projected the hopes of a rosy future. This partly explained why Pakistan never got reconciled to the status of a smaller nation vis-a-vis India in post-independence era. This was itself a reflection of the attitude of its founding father who never agreed to any constitutional formula in undivided India which would have denoted a lesser status for the Muslim League. Hence, Pakistan's continued predicament to outbid India in all spheres in the world politics.

What gives the factor of geography and size of a state its actual importance is its military preparedness and the dependence of the national power upon it is too obvious to need much elaboration. Our enquiry into the military capability of Pakistan showed that it started its military establishment almost from a scratch as the Joint Defence Council failed to make a fair and equitable distribution of the military and material assets of the British Indian Army between India and Pakistan in the ratio of by 36 to Pakistan to 64 to India because of lack of cooperation from India. However, Pakistan moved beyond this as its military

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establishment grew phenomenally over the years, though it adopted voluntary military service. Its defence expenditure sheds enough light on this. In 1947-48, it was less than one per cent of G.N.P. In 1971, it rose to 6.9 per cent. In absolute terms it increased from 32.4 million to 719 million. To strengthen its military establishment it first turned to the United States which became its principal supplier from 1954 to 1965, though it received weapons from the United Kingdom and Germany. Since 1965, when the United States imposed embargo, China has replaced the United States as the major arms supplier, though it has possessed a modest amount of arms from the Soviet Union too. Now, the point that is germane to our analysis is how far it enhanced the capabilities of Pakistan. The answer seems to be in the negative, even if, it is admitted that its military establishment was capable enough to throw off any challenge from any quarter to its territorial integrity.

It should be borne in mind that the subject of military capability is in itself very complex. One cannot account for all the relational variables bearing upon its capabilities. But there are certain built-in structural and functional constraints affecting its operational efficiency. In the first category, it is pointed out that in the specific condition of Pakistan, impact of defence burden on
its economy, the retention of the Junior Commissioned Officer in the military command structure, the exclusive representation of four districts of Punjab to the exclusion of Bengalis and above all their constant involvement in politics and their view of guardianship have militated against its enhanced capabilities. With it was coupled the functional problems which emanated from Pakistan's complete dependence upon outside sources for supply, problems of coordination of diverse systems of weapons, their servicing, lack of friends for finance for their repairs, and replenishment of share parts were the most inhibiting factors. So, it can be said that though it did not significantly spruced up its capabilities, its desperate drive for acquisition of American military aid forced it to shed off its initial policy of non-alignment.

In our examination of the economic capability of Pakistan, we found that being an underdeveloped economy whose main-stay was agriculture, it adopted a capitalist mode of development to enhance its industrial growth. It adopted a developmental strategy which was a product of the interactive influences of a congeries of economic actors to subserve the interests of its ruling elites. As a result it did not contribute significantly to its capabilities. Besides, the philosophy of growth and the developmental
strategy underlying it had high economic contents. And to underwrite it, it was compelled to depend upon the United States which was in a position to render large-scale economic aid. We also noted that its policy shifts towards the communist bloc which occurred in 1960's had no correlation with its actual procurement of foreign aid.

With regard to the systemic sources, it is agreed that one cannot study the external behaviour of states independently of the larger international system in which it occurs and toward which it is precisely directed. And for conceptualizing international political system, we have adopted Rosenau's view that international politics is differentiated from other types of politics on the basis of much greater functional distance that separates its actors. If the international system is defined in this way, the most important systemic variables are the Great Power structure and alliances. While Great Power structure refers to the pattern of relationship prevailing among great powers in any era of human history, the alliances are also derivative from them.

In our enquiry we found that Pakistan achieved its statehood in 1947 under the shadow of Cold War which assumed the form of a relentless struggle between communist and western political ideas each embodied in powerful coalition
of states that tended to divide the world into two distinct blocs. There was no demand on Pakistan either from the Soviet Union or the United States, the two pioneers of the alternative systems, to toe their line in foreign policy, for which it adopted a policy of nonalignment. Though Pakistan was more keen to foster its relationship with the United States, India received greater attention. Between 1952-61, the Soviet Union became keen to get a foothold in South Asia and decided to favour India against Pakistan. And as regards the United States, with the ushering in of the Republican administration, Pakistan loomed large in its global strategic perspective. As a result, Pakistan's long desire to join the Western alliance system, particularly of the United States, was fulfilled. Here we find that its alignment with the United States was a product of systemic compulsions.

In the early 1960's the prevailing configuration of power changed in international politics which became a loose bipolar system, because of intra-bloc conflicts. It was accompanied by a change in the location and technique of conflicts between the two Super Powers, and the emergence of the Third World, which was caught up more intensely in the vortex of Super Power politics. The central power balance became immune from the contagious effects of the Third World
conflicts. With the edvent of Kennedy era, the need for a modus operandi with the Soviets received top priority. Johnson went a step further by making East-West détente the basis for an European settlement which would eventually lead to the solution of the German problem. In this backdrop, the policy of the Super Powers changed towards Pakistan. The non-aligned states were cultivated with understanding and sympathy by the United States and were given considerable economic aid to enable them to foster a stable political order and rapid economic development. Correspondingly, the value of 'allies' dwindled, as the development of ICMB and Polaris submarine reduced the strategic importance of military bases around the periphery of the Soviet Union and after the Sino-Soviet rift, China became the common enemy of both the Super Powers. In its global policy of containment of China, India was expected by the United States to play a major role. But this did not minimise the strategic importance of Pakistan in its over-all global strategy. Kennedy made efforts to keep both Ayub and Nehru in good humour. But, the Sino-Indian war of 1962 altered the equation. The United States gave substantial military aid to India which was too much for Ayub to stomach. As the military balance was drastically tilted against Pakistan, Ayub bitterly complained but to no avail. As a result, Ayub felt ditched. This gave him a spacious plea to reorient the
country's foreign policy. First, he viewed that it would not incur the American hostilities, because of the on-going process of detente, second, China would be forced to come to terms with its neighbour whose strategic value would be cashed in once Pakistan came out of the American embrace. Now, Ayub reformulated his foreign policy which he termed as the policy of "bilateralism" which meant setting as bilateral equation with the Soviet Union, the United States and China, so it can be said that while Ayub justified it as a product of geographical compulsion, as a matter of fact it was a mere rhetorical rationalization. The real reason which compelled the rethinking seems to be the political constraint emanating from a multipolar international system that made untenable a policy conceived in the era of Cold War to serve the national interest.

In the mid-sixties, the American attitude and involvement in subcontinental affairs underwent radical change when it encouraged the Soviet Union to mediate in Indo-Pakistani disputes. Taskent was in all probability a manifestation of this phenomena. It maintained complete neutrality in the Indo-Pakistani war of 1965 and instead imposed the embargo on military aid to both the countries. Its relation with Pakistan remained at the lowest ebb. But the Soviet Union made considerable headway. There was a
perceptible shift from its earlier stand on Kashmir when it called for a peaceful settlement of the Kashmir dispute by the two interested parties. There was further progress after the exit of Khrushchev from power.

In the period following 1969 the United States was following a policy of detente with the Soviet Union in a radically different situation in which the latter had erased its strategic superiority. So its success depended upon a balanced relationship with China that would shore up its bargaining position for striking a strategic deal with the Soviet Union. Khruschev's successors were pursuing a selective strategy for concentrating on the Eurasian continent. Its main plain planks were isolation of China in the East, and flirtation with Japan, and consolidation of their position in South Asia and presence in the West Asia and the Mediterranean. In this backdrop, the growing Sino-Soviet cleavage opened a new vista for the United States to pursue a triangular pattern of global politics. So the main thrust of Nixon's foreign policy was the reinstatement of the Soviet Union as the main rival of the United States and the reduction of the American engagement against China.

This phase coincided with the onset of the Bangla Desh crisis which gave a rare opportunity for the United States, China and the Soviet Union to settle their
respective accounts. On the one hand, the United States was keen to consummate the Moscow summit and without China trip, it would not have a Moscow trip, and on the other hand, it wanted to discover and sustain an area of agreement where both China and the United States would supplement each other's power to limit the Soviet influence and Indian hegemonism. As India's involvement in the crisis engaged the subcontinent in a wider pattern of conflict, the major powers got involved because the crisis threatened the very existence of Pakistan. As a result, Yahya's response to crisis was shaped by the impact of the systemic influences.

Regarding the impact of alliance system on its foreign-policy, our analysis highlights that Pakistan was associated with the Western Powers through an interlocking membership in four mutual security arrangements. Its basic objectives were to procure American military aid and the Western Powers' political and diplomatic support in its dispute with India, particularly Kashmir. But the Pakistani policy makers were unaware of the objectives and the motivations of the Western Powers, particularly of the United States. Their basic objective was to acquire the bases in Pakistan and to enlist its political support for their policy in Asia. Once the importance of bases declined, Pakistan fell from their grace. But it served to
make Pakistan the American Trojan Horse in Asia, alienated it from the Muslim World, antagonised the Soviet Union made it suspect in the eyes of the Afro-Asian world and embittered its relationship with India.

Our enquiry into the impact of regional systemic source shows that India, China and the West Asian countries have deeply influenced its foreign policy behaviour. India remained its principal enemy from which threat is perceived by its successive policy-makers to emanate to its territorial integrity. As a necessary corollary it was Kashmir with which it was primarily interested, for the India control of Kashmir stood as a denial of the Two-Nation theory, the main basis of Pakistan and its continued raison d'etre. As a result, since its birth, the search for security and independence from India and the solution of the Kashmir dispute to its satisfaction had led to an agonising quest for augmenting its capabilities in terms of procuring the military aid and diplomatic support from the Big Powers especially the United States. Kashmir became the litmus test for judging the cordiality or hostility of any country or an individual for Pakistan over the years. Its growing affinity and consequent disillusionment with the Western Powers particularly the United States stemmed mainly from this issue, so also its declining faith in the efficcacy of
the United Nations. Its policy shift in early 1960's towards the Communist world was also dictated by this consideration. the issue still continued to be the main stumbling block for Indo-Pakistan rapprochement, even if the bases of hostility were wider than Kashmir.

With regard to China, our enquiry reveals that China's policy towards Pakistan in the years 1947-53 was in keeping with its general pattern of policy towards Asia as a whole. It was one of militantly revolutionary policy marked by open hostility and contempt towards Asian leaders branding them as the hirelings of imperialism. But Pakistanis have responded with a measure of shrewd diplomacy: they have recognised China, advocated its admission into the United Nations and refused to brand it as the aggressor in the Korean war. It showed that Pakistan was very sensitive on issues hurting Chinese susceptibility. Perhaps this laid down the foundation for future cordiality. Interestingly enough, China on its part has never endorsed India's claim to Kashmir in the hey-day of Sino-Indian relationship, even it played cool, Pakistan's membership of the SEATO, because in the Bandung Conference, Bogra, Pakistan's Primier assured him that it was not directed against them as the real enemy of Pakistan was India.
In the aftermath of Indo-Chinese war of 1962, China courted Pakistan and the vice-versa. And both discovered in the Indian subcontinent an area of agreement as a clear perception of their interest resulted in the coincidence of their objective to contain India which was their common enemy. Henceforward, they followed a cooperative policy which led to the endorsement of Pakistan's view regarding Kashmir by China, and it eventuated in the Indo-Pakistani wars of 1965 which was even terminated at the behest of the Chinese authorities. This was also repeated in 1971 war. China has become a major factor in Indo-Pakistani relation and would continue so till such time unless India and Pakistan composed their differences or Sino-Soviet rift is dissolved or Indo-Soviet relation is weakened.

With regard to the West Asian subordinate system, it is found that Pakistan acquired independent statehood with a growing awareness of its belonging to a community of Muslims that dwelled all over the globe. It also discovered its leanage to a past which was pristine in glory, for long tarnished by the machinations of the Western imperialist powers. As its leadership viewed the successful fruition of their freedom struggle as a manifestation of a renewed sense of Islamic belonging made resurgent in the aftermath of the
Second World War, they made a fervent plea for reviving this world spirit. So, they stressed their natural and religious links, common culture, and identity of economic interests. With this objective, they hosted numerous international conferences to discuss problems of mutual security and economic interests for promoting world Islamic Solidarity. Underlying this, was their desire to bear the mantle of leadership of the Muslim World, and to enlist their support in its disputes with India.

Pakistan's intentions were revealed and became suspect when it joined the Western alliance system orchestrated by the United States which was directed to divide the Arab world. Its stand on the Suez crisis was deplored by the Muslim countries. As it encountered increasing opposition, it gave up its pet idea of promoting economic integration as a prelude to political integration of the Muslim World. It progressively discovered its pluralistic character, and as there was no reverse flow of stimuli from them, it abandoned the idea of treating them as an organic entity and instead followed policy at the level of individual countries with the acceptance of the concomitant compulsions of international diplomacy.

Now coming to our enquiry into the governmental structure, it is found that Pakistan adopted a domestic
system of the west minister variety from 1947 to 1958 and functioned as an open society. But the parliamentary democracy had a sad demise in October 1958, when Mohammad Ayub Khan imposed martial law, ruled for four years without a Constitution. He completely depoliticised the political system by banning political activities and proscribing political parties. In 1962, he promulgated a new constitution, established presidential democracy with all the trappings of the Parliamentary system. He called it "guided democracy" best suited to the Pakistani genius. He also revived political parties, who were permitted to carry on political activities under stringent laws. In 1965 he himself contested for the office of Presidency from a political party owing its origin to his inspiration. After his fall, in 1968, Pakistan again reverted to Martial Jaw administration under Yahya Khan who held a general election on the basis of universal adult suffrage in 1970 but it was still-born as civil war broke out leading to the break-up of the country.

Now, it is revealed that various legislators of Pakistan have taken keen interests to debate policy issues, though it was the preserve of the executive. The debate ranged from broad policy goals to specific details of the foreign policy.
The first Constituent Assembly (1947-54) debated many vital policymatters which included Pakistan's membership of the United Nations, Kashmir, China's recognition, Pakistan's policy towards the Arab world, its stand on Korea, Liaquat Ali's proposed visit to Russia and above all its relation with India. It showed that the fundamentals of foreign policy laid down by Jinnah had a broad national consensus and the legislature gave a support to the executive. It also continued during the tenure of Liaquat Ali Khan. However, his India policy was bitterly assailed, while his policy towards the Muslim world received enthusiastic endorsement. But this broad national consensus broke down during the tenure of Khawaja Nazimuddin with the split in the Muslim League and its disintegration in the East Pakistan and it was further eroded during the premiership of Mohammad Ali Bogra with Pakistan's conclusion of mutual security treaty with the United States. The Second Constituent Assembly (1954-56) never debated any important foreign policy issue. It was rechristened as the First National Assembly of Pakistan when election to the new House took place under the first republican constitution of 1956. During the term of Suhrawardy who became the Prime Minister on 12 September 1956 the first major foreign policy debate was initiated. The pent-up feelings of the legislators gave way in a blistering attack on every facets
of Pakistan's pro-Western foreign policy. Though Suhrawardy made a spirited defence of the policy of the previous government, and the House approved it, its government fell subsequently when the pro-Chinese Maulana Bhasani withdrew support and formed a new political party. It revealed the lack of consensual basis in Pakistan's foreign policy.

During the tenure of the Second National Assembly, debates generated much heat and passion. This period coincided with the large-scale supply of Western arms to India in the wake of the Sino-Indian war of 1962. Indian policy of non-alignment was bitterly assailed. Pakistan's membership with the Western alliance system came under heavy fire and members argued for a more realistic policy. The pro-Chinese sentiment of the nation came to sharper focus. In the debate that started in the aftermath of the Indo-Pakistani war of 1965, members profusely praised China and condemned the role of the United Kingdom and the United States. And the relationship with the Soviet Union found a responsive chord. This certainly served Ayub's objective to underwrite his policy of bilateralism. On the whole, it can be said that legislative debate in Pakistan has reflected the national consensus or its absence in different times. Even in the Ayub era it has not abdicated its moral responsibility despite the fact that it was not truly
representative of the nation as a whole. However, like all countries, whether democratic or authoritarian, open or closed, foreign policy remains the preserve of the executive.

In our focus on personality characteristics of Pakistani decision-makers, we have chosen only Mohammad Ali Jinnah and Mohammad Ayub Khan out of a host of many, as these two figures provided strong leadership in Pakistan during the period 1947-71. In this connection, we have delineated the specific conditions (in the form of a few empirically tested propositions) present in Pakistan during 1947 to 1971 which have provided enough stimuli to these key decision-makers to bring their idiosyncratic traits to bear upon their policy decisions. In the first place, we have proved that though Jinnah never assumed political power in a dramatic way, the movement for Pakistan of which he was the author and architect had all the dimensions of a revolution. But in case of Ayub Khan he assumed power in a dramatic way. Secondly, Jinnah was a charismatic leader while Ayub had never the appeal of a charisma, though he enjoyed the obedience of his followers and secured their loyalty. Thirdly, both Jinnah and Ayub had general interests in foreign policy. Lastly, both dominated the decision-making structures and held complete sway over the policy-making.
In the concluding part of our enquiry, our main objective was to prove that of all the personality traits, the cognitive beliefs is central to the decisional phenomena, while the bureaucratic and organizational variables are not without potency.

It is hypothesized that the foreign-policy decision-making in every political system proceeds in two distinct stages: policy preference leading to decision and action or output. The cognitive beliefs of the decision-makers become weighty on policy preference, while decision that is arrived at is again subject to the vagaries of the bureaucratic and the organizational variables. We have taken Pakistan's decision to conclude the Mutual Security Assistance Agreement with the United States in May 1954 for empirical testing. On exploration, it is found that Jinnah's cognitive traits dominated the policy preference which was reached by himself even before 1947. And it led to a decision when he formally decided to send his special emissary to the United States to present his case before its Government. Jinnah did not live long. So it was left to his successors to implement his decisions. Mohammad Ayub Khan, the Commander-in-Chief of Pakistan armed forces, who enjoyed complete trust of Liaquat Ali and subsequently of Ghulam Mohammad was intimately associated with the task of
negotiating with the United States as the agreement had more of military dimensions. In the process, Ayub distorted it to subserve his political ambitions.

Now, all our seven hypotheses taken up in seven chapters are happily proved. It can be asserted that Pakistan's foreign policy behaviour during the last span of twenty-four years had been deeply influenced by domestic, systemic, regional systemic, governmental and idiosyncratic variables. As revealed, it has sometimes been affected by a combination of one or more of these variables and the presumed interaction among them. In some situations, we have successfully isolated them though taking recourse to historical facts. In one particular decision, we have found that the cognitive beliefs of Jinnah affected the policy preference, and the decision that was taken by him was subsequently distorted after his death by Ayub Khan out of sheer personal motivations. This clearly validates our model. But we have not attempted to build up these seven hypotheses into nomothetic generalizations as the model was applied only to Pakistan, not to any cross-nation comparison which is required in a theory-building enterprise. It is now left for the future students to apply the model for the analysis of foreign policy of states in a cross-level perspective to reap its theoretical pay-offs.
In conclusion, it can be said that India continued to be the main bugbear of the policy-makers' perceptual world. For this, responsibility partly lie with India. Being a powerful neighbour, larger in size and greater in resource, it needs to adopt a more benign attitude towards Pakistan by a sympathetic understanding of its predicaments and plights that emanate from the travail of its nation-building efforts and its psychological persecution to elevate itself as a dignified member of the international community carrying some political clout commensurate with its capabilities. Pakistan on its part, should bear in mind that it has to function in the complex politics of Asia in general and the South Asia in particular, where the interventionary pressures of Great Powers in the nature of the situation cannot be eliminated for which it must sooner or latter, come to terms with India, however, its hostilities are implacable. This is an inescapable reality which the policy-makers of Pakistan will take in their stride, either to modify the South Asian environment or to live with it. Our findings clearly showed that Pakistani policy-makers have no qualms to stoke anti-Indian sentiments, perpetuated in the form of Kashmir dispute and ideological cleavage between the two religions, among the masses to preserve their own dominance in the political system right from 1947. The new generations of politicians
and peoples have come upon the scene in both the countries of the subcontinent. But unfortunately, the policies followed by the respective governments over the years unmistakably reflect that they have been blinders in the old perceptual prisms of the past. But what is the desideratum of the present is a quantum jump on the part of the policymakers of both countries from the psychological environment of their predecessors who have brought untold misery to three generations of Indo-Pakistanis by their blighted policies resulting in three otherwise avoidable wars.