CHAPTER VII: DECISION-MAKING

Section A. The Impact of the Cognitive Beliefs of the Decision-Makers

Section B. The Impact of the Bureaucratic and Organizational Variables
This chapter purports to deal with the decision-making in Pakistan's foreign policy. It may be recalled that, as posited in our model, the decision-making process passes through two distinct stages: policy preference leading to decision, and action or output. In the first place, the policy-makers perform broad intellectual task of policy-making and reach a particular policy preference. And the manner in which they accomplish this task determines the boundary of the decision to which their policy preference leads. The influence of the key decision-maker's cognitive styles and belief systems predominates on policy preference though it is also influenced by other variables, and this leads to the final decision which is equally prone to influences of other variables. Precisely for this reason, the policy preference or the option the policy-maker prefers is treated as dependent variable in place of the decision or the option he finally choses. Secondly, between the decision and action or output, the bureaucratic and organizational dynamics distort the decision that shape the resultant action.

Keeping this analytical subtlety in view, this chapter is divided into two sections. Section A will highlight the cognitive beliefs of the decision-makers and their impact on policy preference, while Section B will be
confined to exploring the bureaucratic and organizational variables and how they operated between decision and action. As data on decision-making in Pakistan's foreign policy are scarce, we have proposed perforce to test only one significant event: Pakistan's decision to conclude the Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement with the United States on 19 May 1954. This naturally makes it imperative for us to explore the cognitive beliefs only of those decision-makers who spanned the period 1947-54. As revealed in earlier chapters, Pakistan during the period 1947-51 was dominated by the Hindustanis under the leadership of Mohammad Ali Jinnah and during the period 1951-54, it was controlled by the "hiearch". Intereseecting these two groups and forging a link between them was Mohammad Ayub Khan. Though he played a significant role, it was in his capacity as the Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistani armed forces. So his role during this period will be consigned to Section B, while Jinnah, the architect of the foreign policy, will be the focus of enquiry in the Section A.
Section A: The Impact of the Cognitive Beliefs of the Decision-makers

In the preceding chapter, we have outlined various conditions in Pakistan during the period 1947-71 which are usually assumed to impart sufficient stimuli to its decision-makers to bring to bear their personality characteristics on the foreign policy decision of their country. As we have recognized in our model, that of all the personality traits, cognitive style and belief system are central to the decision-making and the ensuing analysis will adopt the 'Operational Code' approach of Alexander L. George to construct them.

In this connection, it won't be out of place to mention that George was the first scholar who recognized the problem of developing an approach for conceptualizing the cognitive process model for decision-making so that in concrete decision-making situation, the belief-system of identifiable international actors and their impact as intervening variables could be empirically assessed. He successfully developed an approach which sought to generalize a method introduced by Nathan Leites in his two books, published in 1950's, The Operational Code of Politburo and A Study of Bolshevism, whose analytical value
was unknown to Leites. In the introduction to the latter book, Leites remarked that the Bolshevik doctrine is the doctrine of how to conduct the Bolshevik party and added: ¹

"I do not propose to analyse Bolshevik doctrine as fully as possible but rather to take one aspect of it; what I call the Operational Code, that is the conception of political strategy."

This conception of 'political strategy' which he called 'Operational Code' (OC) carried far-reaching implications for the imaginative mind of George. He rejected the term 'Operational Code' as signifying a conception of political strategy and gave a new meaning to it by redefining its function as one of providing the political actor with 'diagnostic propensities' and 'choice propensities'. He made this clear in the following words: ²

"The issues and questions around which the Bolshevik constructed a belief system about politics: They are stated to emphasise the fact that they constitute fundamental issues about which all political actors


must formulate a set of beliefs and premises. The 'answers' other political actors give to these questions will probably differ from those the Bolsheviks gave. But an explicit statement of questions and issues should at least facilitate efforts to find out how different elites and political actors approach the problem of action.  

George then formulated ten questions, of which the first five concerned philosophical issues while the rest are more specifically oriented towards instrumental or policy questions, having to do with goals and means relationships:

(a) Philosophical issues:

1. What is the essential nature of political life? Is the political universe one of harmony or conflict? What is the fundamental character of one's political opponents?

2. What are the prospects for the eventual realisation of one's fundamental political values and aspirations?

3. Is the political future predictable? In what sense and to what extent?

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4. How much control one can have over historical development? What is one's role in moving and shaping history in the desired direction?

5. What is the role of change in human affairs and in historical development?

(b) Instrumental or Policy issues:

1. What is the best approach for selecting goals or objectives for political action?

2. How are goals of action pursued most effectively?

3. How are the risks of political actions calculated and controlled, and accepted?

4. What is the best timing of action to advance one's interest?

5. What is the utility and the role of different means for advancing one's interests?

George characterized these beliefs as "Cognitive beliefs" and OC approach is often described as constituting the cognitive approaches to politics. Now, if one adds up the constituent components of George's definition, it amounts to
this: an Operational Code consists of answers to these ten questions. These answers represent cognitive beliefs. They have certain functions in relating an actor's thought and action in decision-making process; by serving as a prism or a filter, they influence the actor's perception of political reality and provide him with 'diagnostic propensities' and 'choice propensities'. The beliefs provide norms and standards that influence the actor's choice of strategy and tactics as well as his restructuring and weighing of alternative choice of action. But it should be borne in mind that the relation between beliefs and these propensities and the actual decision-making is just probabilistic. To analyse the decision-making, other determining variables besides the actor's Operational Code have to be taken into account.

It would not be out of place to mention here that although, George's reconceptualization of the Operational Code has been subject to criticism and a scholar has suggested an alternative set of Operational Code for more adequate and fruitful empirical analysis of decisional phenomena, it has spurred on an impressive array of case studies over the years pioneered first by Ole R. Holsti, Michael J. Shapiro and G. Mathew Bonham. In recent years, Robert Axelrod and others have refined cognitive maps as
analytically more reliable. But Holsti still holds it as valid. Though, controversy was on regarding the units of analysis, whether the individual leader or collective group of decision-makers should be at the starting point of analysis for belief systems and cognitive processes, and continues unabated even to-day, Holsti subscribes to the individual as the unit of analysis.

Coming to data problem, it still baffles the analyst. Whether written sources or interviews are used to reconstruct the perceptions of political leaders, the fundamental issue of validity has to be faced. Does the actor express what he perceives and does he perceive what he expresses? There is no easy solution to this problem which parallels with credibility problem facing actors involved in political interaction. The analyst runs the double risk of either overlooking significant nuances of a message (under-representation) or finding hidden meanings where there is none (over-interpretation). Whereas quantitative content analysis is more prone to under-interpretation, the temptation of over-interpretation looms large in non-

quantitative, contextual analysis. However, we have adopted the latter method of analysis based on written sources.

COGNITIVE BELIEFS OF MOHAMMAD ALI JINNAH:

It is not easy to construct the cognitive beliefs of any decision-maker of a state in the vast stretches of time, specially of one who is no more. Had he been alive, personal interview would have yielded some data to supplement other sources. In his absence, one is perforce left to do this job relying on his speeches, policy pronouncements, personal writings and communications which together constitute the written sources. In case of Mohammad Ali Jinnah who is dead long since, a student seeking to isolate his cognitive beliefs, encounters problem even with regard to the written sources. In the first place, unlike Jawaharlal Nehru who spoke eloquently on foreign policy issue, Jinnah spoke very little; so was the case with the Muslim League unlike the Indian national Congress. His speeches and statements would reveal his pervasive pre-occupation with domestic and national issues and they, by and large, pertained to political matters. Basically they were either reactions to political developments or intended to arouse reactions in political adversaries. He wrote precious little beyond correspondence. However, they provided some clues to his
concerns, feelings, thoughts and attitudes. Secondly, Jinnah, as the key decision-maker of independent Pakistan, though left an indelible impression on the policy-making process for reasons already cited, lived barely for thirteen months which was by any standard too short a period on the part of any political leader to evolve a different set of cognitive beliefs other than the one previously formed over long years of one's political apprenticeship. This was precisely the case with Jinnah whose cognitive beliefs were structured during his years of political life in undivided India prior to 1947. So any attempt at constructing them must be based on extrapolating his personality traits from earlier years as he had no expertise in foreign affairs to call on, no previous experience to suggest alternatives or plans of action when he came to preside over the decision-making structure in Pakistan after 1947. It is very natural and legitimate to assume that his innate problem-solving dispositions and his strong beliefs about the effects of certain strategy acquired and applied in political situations of earlier years must have intruded his formulation of foreign policy decisions after 1947. Lastly, as the cognitive beliefs constitute a sum total of answers to the five philosophical questions (belief system) and five instrument questions (cognitive process), it is not possible to answer them separately. They should be treated as an
integrated whole as both the belief system and cognitive process of an individual are in an interactive relationship and together constitute the profile of cognitive beliefs.

The political career of Mohammad Ali Jinnah spanned almost half a century, from 1906 when he first participated in the Indian National Congress to the time of his death as the Governor-General of Pakistan in 1948. Before he started his political innings in undivided India the most impressionable period of his Youth was spent in England where he came under the benign influence of Lord Morley whose liberalism enthralled him. He had the rare opportunity of watching the lively debates in the British House of Commons over Gladstone's famous Irish Home Rule Bill, the growing ascendancy of the Labour Party in the political life of the country and the election of the first Indian, Dadabhai Naroji - the Grand Old Man of India - to the House of Commons from the Central Finsbury Constituency. Those were the most scintillating experiences for a budding youth trained in Anglo-Saxon tradition of law and jurisprudence with a penchant for British liberal values. Back home in 1896, Jinnah served Naroji as his private Secretary for long fourteen years.

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Those early influences fired and caught the imagination of Jinnah and shaped his approach to political problems in the beginning of this century. While his innate love for Morley and the British liberalism made him a liberal democrat and a thorough-bred constitutionalist, his profound regard for Naroji made him a nationalist par excellence. His legal background and his assimilation of English liberal outlook on the role of religion in the state and politics helped him to perceive the world to rest upon the pillars of legal order, justice, fair play and equity where religion was purely a matter of individual conscience, nothing to do with the business of the state and the politics. He never condemned Islam or Hinduism or Christianity. Nor, he ever preached or philosophized how people should order their life in the society. His approach to life was essentially one of eclecticism and free play of its genius.  

It was with these settled attitudes to religion and politics, Jinnah made his debut in Indian political movement in 1906. It was natural that he received his political apprenticeship under the shadow of great veteran nationalists of those years who subscribed to British

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liberal tradition and endeavoured to bring about India's self-Government through the evolutionary path of constitutionalism and legalism. As a result, Gopal Krishna Gokhale became his model, W.C. Banerjee his leader and Dadabhai Naroji his political mentor. He imbibed from them the spirit of highest dedication and sacrifice for the nationalist cause. As a result, he came to develop a deep revulsion against demagogy and deprecated the idea that a leader should pander to the fury and fluctuation of the credulous masses. And within a short time, these sterling qualities earned him recognition when in 1909 he was elected by the Muslims of Bombay to represent them in the Imperial Legislative Council, and became the most 'waxing personality' in the Indian National congress.

True to his political and religious philosophy, he called himself an Indian rather than a Muslim. He was concerned with the regeneration of Indian people as a whole rather than that of Muslim Community alone. He worked for the cause of Indian independence in which he felt that

9 Ibid., p.46.
the Muslims were equal partners. He never conceived of Muslim freedom in isolation, even in his wildest dream. But at the same time, he was not oblivious of the plight and predicament of the Muslim community. As they formed the substantial segment of the population, their interests could not be ignored in India's historic march to political independence. As he once remarked:

"I am an Indian first and a Muslim afterwards. But at the same time I agree that no Indian can ever serve his country if he neglects the interests of the Muslims."

This political scenario in the initial years (1906-20) served to shape his cognitive beliefs in the following way. In the first place, descending upon the Indian political scene at the young age of thirty, pulsating with liberal ideas and romantic vision of a free and United India, Jinnah found the political life one of struggle and sacrifice but full of promise. Perhaps, it appeared to him that he was cut out for an eventful role in the exciting drama of India's freedom struggle. Bred in liberal

11 Report of the Proceedings of the Twenty-Second Indian National Congress held at Calcutta on 26-29 Dec. 1906 (Calcutta, 1907), p.120.


adition and tutored by the great nationalists of the time, he found that his fundamental political values were broadly shared and espoused by the Indian National Congress and there was a glowing prospect of its eventual realisation if he continued to give his unswerving loyalty to the organisation and work under its banner. So the political universe for him was one of harmony and peace. Weaved with it was his feeling that he along with his liberal political mentors could change the course of India's historical development in their preferred direction. He was animated with the sublime hope that his twin goals of achieving India's freedom and Muslim's legitimate claim to sharing a slice of political power could be realised through the path of gradualism, legalism and constitutionalism for which he like other moderates, appealed to Britishers, to their magnanimity, their sense of justice and fairplay. So for the realisation of this objective of political action, he adopted an approach which was at once sober, rational, constructive and cautious. In an age, when political terrorism was becoming a fashionable proposition, he definitely eschewed it as he was convinced that the goals of political action could not be effectively pursued.14 This

14 See his speech delivered during a debate on the Criminal Law Amendment Bill in the Imperial Legislative Council in 1913, see n. 12, p. 228; also Saiyid, n.13, pp.74-75.
found its eloquent reflection in the Lucknow Pact of 1916.

But with the advent of Gandhiji in 1920, the nature and character of Indian freedom movement underwent revolutionary change. Jinnah disagreed with Gandhi's avowed method of political action. His call for Civil Disobedience Movement which injected agitational politics into Indian freedom movement unnerved Jinnah who perceived them to be destructive of an orderly world he wanted to promote. As the Congress was firmly committed to Gandhiji's Leadership, he decided to severe his long years of association with the Congress. His letter to Gandhiji in 1920 in response to the latter's invitation to join him in the Civil Disobedience Movement amply bore this out: 15

"I thank you for your kind suggestion offering me 'to take my share in the new life that has opened up before the country'. If by 'new life' you mean your methods and programme, I am afraid I cannot accept them; for I am fully convinced that it must lead to disaster... Your methods have already caused split and division in almost every institution that you have approached hitherto, and in the public life of the country... All this means complete disorganisation and chaos. What

15 S. Sharifuddin Pirzada, ed., Quaid-I-Azam's Correspondence in India (Karachi, 1944), p.81.
the consequences of this may be, I shudder to contemplate...."

The great divide with Gandhiji epitomized a conflict not of two great personalities over the issue of assuming leadership of the movement but of their fundamental political values and the method necessary for their eventual realization. It was an ideological schism whose gulf widened over the years as the unfolding events further threatened to erode all that Jinnah held dear in his political life. On Khilafat movement in which Muslim India was stirred to the marrow by this highly religious and emotional issue, Jinnah did not take any stand and this proved to be the proverbial last straw for him as mass frenzy was aroused to an unknown depth in the name of religion. A cold-blooded logician, he believed in reason and argument rather than in sheer agitation and propaganda; not in hypnotizing the masses but in convincing them through sheer strength of logic. He deprecated the idea that the masses should embrace an ideal blindly without consciously subscribing to it and launch a programme without making any calculation of its consequences. In the Calcutta Conference of the Muslim League in 1920 which was called to endorse Gandhiji's non-cooperation to redeem Khilafat cause,

16 Mujahid, n.8, p.52.
he remarked: 17

"It is now for you to consider whether or not you approve of its principle and approving of its principle whether or not you approve of its details. The operation of this scheme will strike at the individual in each of you and, therefore, it rests with you alone to measure your strength and to weigh the pros and cons of the question before you arrive at a decision."

This passage reflected one of the outstanding attributes of his cognitive beliefs. Before deciding any political action, Jinnah used to calculate the risks involved, and he used to commend it to his followers with the suggestion that they must assess its pros and cons before accepting it for implementation. In the process he never imposed it from the above. For Jinnah, goals of political action could be pursued most effectively if the means were justified. He was great stickler for means. He warned Gandhiji in the Nagpur Congress: 18 "You are making a declaration and committing the Indian National Congress to a programme which you will not be able to carry out." The only safe course for the Indians according to him, was constitutional agitation rather than civil resistance whose course was

17 Saiyid, n. 13, p. 258.
uncharted and nowhere in the world does a mob respond so quickly or so savagely to a firebrand's call for action, as in India.

Increasingly, for Jinnah the political universe after 1920 became one of unremitting gloom in which the prospect of realisation of his political objectives receded gradually like the morning star. The Calcutta Conference convinced Jinnah of the real intention and character of the Congress party under the leadership of Gandhiji and made untenable the erroneous claim of the Muslim League to represent the Muslims of India. Jinnah withdrew from the League, and stayed in England till 1934 when he came to India and again returned. Finally he left England for good in October 1935. Those were his years of political wilderness, but they were also moments of self-introspection. He vividly watched the political developments in India and being circumspect and cautious he did not intend to jump into the fray and burn his fingers again unless the Muslims of India wanted him to be their leader. As Belitho wrote: 19

"But he listened to Liaquat and in the end he said, you go back and survey the scene; test the feelings of all parts of the country. I trust your judgement. If you

19 Belitho, n. 6, p. 105.
say 'come back', I will give up my life here and return."

While still in England he was elected by the Muslims of Bombay as an independent member to the Central Legislature without his consent. This proved his strength and popularity among the Muslim League. But till then, he had not recanted his earlier philosophy and prepared to work to bring about complete cooperation and amity between Hindus and Muslims. But as argued in our second chapter, the provincial election of 1937, the poor performance of the League, the attitude of the Congress ministries in the provinces, the treatment meted out to the members of the League, Iqbal's call for a Muslim state, the mass contact programme of the Congress to wipe out the League, the gradual dominance of the rightist forces in politics and the outbreak of war, served to alter profoundly the psychological environment of Jinnah who lived so long in the world of his make-belief. The political universe or arena gradually changed to one of bitter conflict and racial disharmony. And political life appeared to be one of unending struggle; of man against man, of man against his environment and it was a struggle on moral and ideological plane. He came to view Gandhiji along many dimensions: no

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longer a secular nationalist, but an avowedly religious person deeply influenced by the ancient Hindu scriptures, mythology and lore. Not only his (Gandhi's) imageries came from them, he also invoked them to justify and substantiate his arguments. He deliberately used the Vedic term Swaraj to denote the Dominion status, he also equated it with "Ram Rajya", the traditional Hindu 'golden age' in order to tap deftly the hidden feelings of emotions at the mass level. And all this Gandhi did with a view to associating them with the Congress Party to energize it for the freedom struggle. Jinnah knew that Gandhiji believed in Hindu-Muslim Unity. As Gandhiji once remarked in 1924: "I agree with Jinnah 'that Hindu-Muslim Unity means Swaraj'". But whereas, Jinnah, because of his legalism, and constitutionalism, wanted it to be incorporated formally in a pact with adequate safeguards for the minorities, Gandhiji instead, wanted to enshrine it in mutual trust, without any formal enactment of law for regulating their relationship in the society. But the credibility of Gandhiji gradually eroded in his eyes after 1937 when he came to view Gandhiji as a shrewd political strategist bent upon out maneuvering him in the game of sub-continental politics. As a result,


the political arena appeared to him as one of status conflict, where he, as the supreme leader of Muslim masses, was locked up in a political battle with Gandhiji, the undisputed leader of the Indian National Congress. To determine this status would automatically resolve the problem of parity of twenty-five per cent Muslims with the rest of Indian population. Besides, it called for a new strategy of political action, for, in the present state of things, Gandhiji, symbolizing the Indian National Congress, was the main stumbling block to the realization of the fundamental political values of Jinnah, the President of the Muslim League. And to challenge Gandhiji not a only renewed strategy was called-for but also a reorientation of one's fundamental political values was needed. So Jinnah under the stimulus of Iqbal invented his 'Two-Nation' theory. Within less than a decade, 1940-47, his goal of political action embraced a new state of Pakistan in the Muslim majority areas in the undivided India. His political strategy underwent a fundamental rethinking, for he wanted to pursue his political action in such a way that while the Muslim masses gave it a hospitable reception, the opposition and resentment of the large segment of Hindu minority in the six provinces claimed for the new state of Pakistan were effectively kept at the lowest ebb. Otherwise, it would give the Congress and the Britishers a political axe to
grind against the Muslim League. Though, in a Speech at Aligarh in March 1944, he asserted that23 "...Pakistan started the moment the first non-Muslim was converted to Islam in India long before the Muslims established their rule," and Islam figured prominently in most of his writings and speeches, as a part of his new political strategy, he never organized or mobilized the Muslim masses by an appeal to the "Islamic state". The Islamic content of Pakistan had to be downgraded to suit this. So he presented the demand for the state of Pakistan not so much as answering the emotional and politico-cultural needs of the Indian Muslims but as a rational solution to the tangled problem of Indian constitutional settlement arising out of its multi-national and multi-linguistic society. This certainly did not make his position indefensible when he declared in the new Constituent Assembly of Pakistan on 11 August 1947:24

"You are free: you are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques or to any other places of worship in this state of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed that has nothing to do with the business of the State."

23 Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad, ed., Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah (Lahore, 1954), vol.2, reprint, p.2.

This strategy not only brought to fruition his political goal in life - the state of Pakistan - but also revealed his political acumen as it yielded rich dividends in the following years. So, it is plausible to view that Jinnah had a clear perception of the risks involved in any political action. As politics is always the art of the possible and the risks therein cannot be eliminated, it is got to be calculated, and minimised through an adroit management and manipulation of political situations for which a sound strategy is called-for. The ends must be related to means and the best must be made up of what is beyond one's power to change. With an unerringly instinct he could foresee that the Britishers were ready to quit. Once they depart, the Muslims would be the hewers of wood and the drawers of water in Hindustan. So, in the prevailing constitutional tussle, partition plan would at least concede him the minimum, even if, it was a truncated Pakistan. So, he settled down for the scheme.

Always confident of a predictable future, with a resolute faith in moving and shaping the forces of historical development, he was cautious and compromising and earnestly believed that through a carefully calculated strategy, which minimises political risk, he could pursue his political objectives most effectively. As a result, he
was not only flexible and relied upon his royal supporters, sometimes he used to make complete volte-face of his position in order to put the adversary in an awkward and embarrassing situation and reap maximum political mileage. This exactly happened when he accepted the Cabinet Mission, Plan in 1946 after giving the clarion call to the Muslim masses: "Pakistan or Perish". This also revealed another facet of his "choice propensities". He had a masterly sense of timing how to advance one's interest in the face of an all powerful political opponent. His breach with Gandhiji in 1920, though an expression of his revulsion against his methods, was itself a reflection of his belief that the Muslim League could only chalk out their political destiny if they go their separate way, instead of being tied to the apron-strings of the Congress. This very fact also explained his deliberate aloofness from the Khilafat Movement. He never relished the idea of his playing second fiddle to Gandhiji and the Muslim League to that of the Congress. Secondly, this was also evident in his decision to fight the election in 1946 which established his claim to speak on the behalf of the Indian Muslims. In conclusion, it can be said that Jinnah was a historic personality fashioned not only by his environment and by the cultural and ideological influences he inherited, but also more importantly also by the way he reacted and reshaped that environment and that
tradition by a consciously manipulated strategy of action with a fine sense of timing in application. Speaking of Jinnah, Sarojini Naidu said:25

"But the true criterion of his greatness lies not in the range and variety of his knowledge and experience, but in the faultless perception and flawless refinement of his subtle mind and spirit; not in a diversity of aims and the challenge of a towering personality, but rather in a lofty singleness and sincerity of purpose, and the lasting charm of a character animated by a brave conception of duty and an austere and lovely code of private honour and public integrity."

When Mohammad Ali Jinnah became the Governor-General of independent Pakistan, he was already seventy and slowly dying, though full of euphoric spirit, as he rode to power on the crest of a victory which appeared so uncertain, so elusive for long agonizing years. The nation was in the throes of crisis unparalleled in magnitude in human history, thoroughly disorganised and beleagured. With numerous challenges looming large, he came to steer the destiny of the nation pitted against a powerful adversary, the new resurgent India, awake to life and freedom, under the

25 Quoted in Belitho, n.6, p.214.
stewardship of a young and dynamic Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, hardly fifty-seven. With the venerated Gandhiji gone, the old India was dead, marking a watershed in the history of the subcontinent. For Jinnah, the political universe remained a continuing and perpetual strife. It was a conflict between two sovereign independent states minus the British Empire. India, out to dismember and absorb, thus to falsify the 'Two-Nation Theory' - the very basis of Pakistani nationhood. So the new conflict took on the garb of a status conflict in the international system between the two unequal nations hardly distinguishable from the old rivalry of the two unequal partners, the Indian National Congress and the All-India Muslim League. No longer the arena of conflict nor its fall-out remained confined to the subcontinent but in the nature of things got projected to the wider spheres of world politics because the issue was not the determination of the relative status of two communities but of the two nations vying for recognition and influence in international politics. Political life has become one of acrimony, got new dimension as Mohammad Ali Jinnah had to confront Jawaharlal Nehru, known for his secular democratic outlook and international standing. So the fundamental character of the political opponent changed to a considerable disadvantage and embarrassment of Jinnah tainted with the
authorship of the Two-Nation Theory, a derivative from religion. To chalk out a distinct identity for Pakistan in the world, and to prove that it was a going and growing proposition and to make it a great nation became his fundamental values for realisation. But Independent India, under Jawaharlal Nehru, acted as the spanner. Jinnah must take up the gauntlet, but the game was new, the rules of the game were different and the old impartial umpire gone. So, he had to fight alone. It called for new strategy of political action if the adversary was to be outwitted in the changed arena of political battle with changed set of rules. So, it was his cognitive beliefs which impelled him to turn to a new master, for succour and support, of whom he knew little. Having spent his entire energy and time in the freedom struggle in which the Britishers were the key factors, he had never developed any familiarity with the Americans because of absence of direct involvement of the latter in Indian affairs. As he was trained in British legal jurisprudence and had developed over the years some participatory experience in the working of British Parliamentary System, he was unaware of the workings of the American political systems and its decision-making process. Besides, Jinnah had over the years courted many influential Britons in its governmental structure who were sympathetic to his cause and have acted as pro-Pakistani lobby in the
British Government during the freedom struggle. In contrast to this, he was almost a foreigner to the key American decision-makers so also his prime advisors, like Liaquat Ali Khan, Zafarullah Khan and others. With these political constraints he faced his new political adversary, Jawaharlal Nehru.

As argued in our second and third chapters, he first took the decision to make the United States its leading patron in post-independent era. In this crucial policy preference, it seemed, he had taken the decision all by himself, even if other trusted decision-makers might have been consulted subsequently and communicated to implement his decision. The following evidence stood out in retrospect in support of this line of thinking. In the first place, Jinnah met Raymond A. Hare, Head of the Division of South Asian Affairs, Department of State and Thomas E. Weil, Second Secretary of the United States Embassy in India on 1 May 1947 at his Bombay residence. In this exclusive interview in which he alone was present, he made no bone of his intention to drive home his point that a new Muslim state was imminent, and it would join other Muslim states to act as a bulwark against the Soviet aggression which would be in conformity with the avowed
American objective. He also expressed similar hope that America would assist Pakistan "in its many problems", when Henry F. Grady, the American Ambassador to India met him at the time of his departure to Karachi. When his Excellency enquired to indicate any specific matter, Jinnah bided for a later date. That he definitely decided this course of action for Pakistan, there was absolutely no iota of doubt, as further progress of his policy was revealed in the records of subsequent periods. Secondly, interestingly enough, he decided such a crucial policy preference when his closest associate Liaquat Ali did not know that he would be picked up by his master to be his Prime Minister, nor Zafrullah Khan ever thought of becoming the Foreign Minister of Pakistan, being a Quaidin. Similarly, Ghulam Mohammad, who was a member of Indian Audits and Accounts service never dreamt of assuming the office of Finance Minister. Stated differently, Jinnah decided his policy towards the United States even before his Cabinet formally assumed the office. With regard to the bureaucracy, it was well-known that there was hardly three Muslim officers of Indian Civil Service with the rank of joint secretaries to the government of India who opted for Pakistan. They were Iskander Mirza in

27 The ambassador in New Delhi (Henry F. Grady) to the Secretary of State (Marshall), ibid., pp.160-61.
Ministry of Defence and Mian Aminuddin and Mohammad Ikramullah in the Ministry of Commerce. They had had never seen diplomatic service in their career. Similarly, Chaudhuri Mohammad Ali, a member of Indian Audits and Accounts service who was the Financial Advisor to the Government of India before partition, became the Secretary-General and Ikramullah, the Foreign Secretary of independent Pakistan without any stint of diplomatic service.28 Considering their background, it is futile to assume that they could have ever influenced Jinnah's policy preference which was certainly conceived by him much before these officers opted for the new state, because partition plan was announced on 3 June, 1947, and they became a part of Pakistan's bureaucratic system only after 14 August 1947. Thirdly, M.A.H. Ispahani's correspondence to Jinnah revealed that the Secret mission of Mir Laik Ali, Prime Minister of Hyderabad, to the United States and its detailed progress was directly communicated by Isphani to Jinnah, even Prime minister Liaquat Ali and the Foreign Minister Zafrullah Khan were not kept posted with detailed information, even if they were in the know of his visit.29 This showed that the negotiations with the United States were carried on in a

thick veil of secrecy which was one of the facets of Jinnah's cognitive beliefs. To posit this is not to say that his prime advisors like Liaquat Ali Khan, Zafarullah Khan and Ghulam Mohammad were not involved. It was Ghulam Mohammad who originated the programme of massive dependence on the United States for meeting the administrative expenses of Pakistan, especially in the field of defence. But true to his cognitive beliefs, it was Jinnah who conceived the idea and like his previous style of functioning during the pre-partition era, he must have presented them as a post-facto approval for working out its details which, as records revealed, was done by Liaquat Ali, Ghulam Mohammad, Chaudhuri Mohammad Ali and Ikramullah and M.A.H. Ispahani. At least, it appeared that they have a shared beliefs about the necessity for Pakistan's reliance on a new master. The very fact that Jinnah bided for time to specify the requirements of the country during his first meeting with the United States ambassador, Henry G. Gaddy, was a clear indication of the fact that he wanted to work out the details in consultation with his associates, though his policy preference was final. This policy preference led to decision when in October 1947 Jinnah's special emissary, Mir Laik Ali, submitted a memorandum to the officials of the Department of State.\footnote{30 See my second chapter.}
Section B. The Impact of the bureaucratic and the organisational variables

It is argued that the bureaucratic and the organisational variables have acted as intervening variables between the decision of Jinnah to procure American economic and military assistance and the outcome which resulted in the signing of the Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement on 19 May 1954. There is a strong assumption that had Jinnah been alive, his decision might have resulted in different form of output. In support of this, it is argued, how categorically he declared that Pakistan did not want to be a camp-follower of any Big Power even if he was making all-out effort to impress upon the Americans the desirability of his country's friendship in order to get their assistance for enhancing its capabilities. Besides, it is also said, that given his masterly choice of strategy for political action and his cautious approach of never committing to a step irrevocably which he could not retrace and his careful calculation of the political risk involved in such actions, he could not have carried his policy to this conclusion. While it is very difficult to prove or disprove this, the fact of the matter is that both these variables have dynamics of their own, and they are bound to operate as they are the implementing agencies and they operate independently
irrespective of the calculation or the desire of one who makes the policy preference leading to decision. This dynamics take myriad forms and includes not only parochial subconstituency interests of the various implementing agencies like the Defence Ministry, the Foreign Ministry, the Armed forces but more significantly the personal motivations of those who head them. In case of Pakistan, the record revealed that Ayub Khan, the Command-in-Chief of the armed forces, had played the key role in consummating this decision into the Agreement, assisted by Iskander Mirza, the Defence Secretary at the behest of Ghulam Mohammad, though Chaudhuri Mohammad Ali, and Ikramullah had played marginal role in the initial years. We have explored the role of Ayub Khan and others in our third chapter.31 But what is now crucial that is missing in our previous analysis is their motivations that impelled them to distort this decision in terms of a Defence Agreement whose far-reaching implications for the Pakistani society was never understood by them as later events proved.

In the first place, it should be borne in mind that the decision-making in Pakistan came to be monopolized by Punjabi bureaucratic elites with the advent to power of Ghulam Mohammad which spelt the end of the Hindustani domination in Pakistani political life. This was itself a

31 See my third chapter.
reflection of broader political trends in the country. The Punjabi landed gentry had, over the years, slowly worked their way into the inner portals of power, capturing the central apparatus of government and the Muslim League. Their values and interests were totally incompatible with the outlook and interests of the newly emerging Bengali bourgeoisie who in the provincial election of 1954 destroyed the League in East Pakistan. This nascent bureaucratic military elites, comprising Ghulam Mohammad, Mohammad Ayub Khan, tortured by its own insecurity vis-a-vis the politicians and goaded by a growing feeling that a vast political change was in offing because of rising vernacular elites in East Bengal, consistently accorded top priority to the involvement of the United States on their side.  

These dominant leaders, on 30 May 1954, in their efforts to curb the rise of Bengali nationalism, brought about the disintegration of the United Front Ministry headed by the Lion of Bengal, A.K. Fazlul Haq, just to create a favourable impression in Washington. And Ghulam Mohammad sent Iskander Mirza to quell down the Bengali protest against the American alliance which was assailed by all the East Bengali


33 M.S. Venkataramani, The American Role in Pakistan (New Delhi, 1982), p.269.
leaders belonging to different political hues. This was preceded by the dismissal of the Bengali Prime Minister Khawaja Nazimuddin by Ghulam Mohammad even though he was commanding a clear majority in the Assembly. In his place, Mohammad Ali Bogra, Pakistan's ambassador to the United States, a man known to be a great votary of the American alliance was installed to eliminate any chances of opposition to the impending agreement. Thus, to preserve the new elite structure with its highly graded social and political hierarchy Ghulam Mohammad took the most unprecedented step of courting Americans in such a way that they would develop a stake in it.

Secondly, the position of this dominant elite could be further strengthened by the creation of a massive war machine. The sub-continental military imbalance and persisting tension with India argued in favour of such a proposition which was skillfully capitalized by them and they knew, the Americans would never settle down for any marginal concessions from their clients unless they become their stooges by entering into a Defence Agreement. The American policy-makers also knew where their support should lie in the tussle of political power in a country. In case of Pakistan, they were well-aware of their henchmen in its highest decision-making structure. The Intelligence Report
prepared by the State Department's Office of Intelligence Research made this amply clear:34

"... After 1952, a small group of British-trained administrators and military leaders from West Pakistan centering around the then Governor-General Ghulam Mohammad, gradually assumed political power. In addition to Ghulam Mohammad this clique included Iskander Mirza and Chaudhury Mohammad Ali, both former civil servants, and General Ayub Khan, Commander-in Chief of the Army....

Ultimate political power in Pakistan continues to rest in the hands of (the clique)...."

Though this position was summed up in 1957, it was a part of the conventional wisdom of Washington since early 1950's.

Lastly, the personal motive of Ayub Khan to come to power was one of the decisive factors. His contempt for politicians and greed for political authority were kept shrewdly camouflaged under the thin veneer of his political neutrality. As he wrote in his diary dated 22 May 1958.35

34 Department of State, Office of Intelligence Research, Intelligence Reports, No. 7459, "Prospects and Problems of Pakistan's Ruling Group", 8 March 1957, Diplomatic History Branch, National Archives (Washington D.C.).

"The elections, of course, are drawing near. The politicians... are trying to get back into power by hook or by crook. And having got there, they know that they will have nothing to show for themselves except working for the disruption of the country further. In that case they will come face to face with the army and me.....

......It seems that we shall have to have a system of government for a generation or so which prepares the country for democracy and solves some of our major problems. Under the present Constitution no one seems to have any power except to destroy discipline and to do harm.

His blue-print for a new political system which he wrote in a London hotel on 4 October 1954 also gave ample testimony of his lewd lust for political power. 36

"I was pacing up and down the room when I said to myself: Let me put down my ideas in a military fashion: What is wrong with the country and what can be done to put things right. I approached the question much in the manner of drawing up a military appreciation: What is the problem, what are the factors involved, and what is the solution, if there is

a solution.... In a few hours, I had produced a document which contained my thinking and set out my approach to the problems facing the country. I came to the conclusion that the affairs of the country, though in a desperate state, were not beyond redemption."

Over the years he worked with single-minded devotion to fraternise the Americans with the ostensible purpose of enlisting their backing and invoking them in his side for any future contingency. And the Americans also over the years developed their appreciation for Ayub as their strong supporter in Pakistani political system.37

... He has a reputation for knowing what to look for and insisting on results. He reportedly has great confidence in himself and his forces... The General is reportedly pro-American (...), strongly opposed to Communism; he is a great admirer of the American armed forces... His shortcomings are believed to be over-ambition and a predilection to mix politics with his military career.

37 The Director of Naval Intelligence to the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff (Admiral Arthur W. Radford), 23 September 1953, Chairman's File, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
In view of all the foregoing facts, it is difficult not to agree that Jinnah's decision was distorted by these bureaucratic and organizational actors to subserve their vested political interests.

In the concluding part of our inquiry, our main objective was to prove that of all the personality traits, the cognitive beliefs is central to the decisional phenomena, while the bureaucratic and organizational variables are not without potency.

It is hypothesized that the foreign-policy decision-making in every political system proceeds in two distinct stages: policy preference leading to decision and action or output. The cognitive beliefs of the decision-makers become weighty on policy preference, while decision that is arrived at is again subject to the vagaries of the bureaucratic and the organizational variables. We have taken Pakistan's decision to conclude the Mutual Security Assistance Agreement with the United States in May 1954 for empirical testing. On exploration, it is found that Jinnah's cognitive traits dominated the policy preference which was reached by himself even before 1947. And it led to a decision when he formally decided to send his special emissary to the United States to present his case before its
Government. Jinnah did not live long. So it was left to his successors to implement his decisions. Mohammad Ayub Khan, the Commander-in-Chief of Pakistan armed forces, who enjoyed complete trust of Liaquat Ali and subsequently of Ghulam Mohammad was intimately associated with the task of negotiating with the United States as the agreement had more of military dimensions. In the process, Ayub distorted it to subserve his political ambitions.