CHAPTER VI

IDIOSYNCRATIC SOURCES
It is contended by theorists that the more authority the policy maker has over a nation's foreign policy machinery, the fewer the people there are above him in the foreign policy bureaucracy to change his decision. As Glen H. Strassen notes: "Top-level executives are not under tight hierarchical constraint... They must be persuaded and bargained with rather than simply commanded... Therefore, preferences and belief-sets are likely to be important for top-level executive decision-makers."\(^1\) Similarly, it is also assumed that less well defined the policy-maker's role, the more likely his personality traits are to influence foreign policy. Richard C. Snyder and James A. Robinson conclude that roles are less likely to be well-defined the higher one goes up in an organisation; the role occupant has more responsibility for delimiting or expanding his functions.\(^2\)

Based on this rationale that the personalities of heads of state and foreign ministers will probably have more impact on the foreign policy behaviour of their governments than lesser personalities of the occupants of most other


governmental positions, Margaret G. Hermann has come to the conclusion that 50 per cent (7 out of 14) of the predicted relationships between leader personality and foreign policy were significant or approached significance ($P < .10$; rank order correlations of .44 or greater) using heads of state. The percentage of such bivariate relationship for policy-makers lower in the foreign policy organisation is expected to be much less than 50 per cent. Besides, she has also empirically proved that the personality traits of policy makers significantly influence foreign policy decisions only under certain conditions, depriving them of any autonomous functions or operations.

Keeping the above contention in view, the ensuing analysis will highlight how the personality characteristics of the strategic decision-makers of Pakistan during the period 1947-71 influenced its foreign policy behaviour. In this connection, certain clarifications are in order. In the first place, it should be borne in mind that the personality traits are diverse and the entire gamut of them are operative and influence one way or the other the policy decisions of a country. But we have posited in our model

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3 Margaret G. Hermann, "When Leader Personality will affect Foreign policy: Some Propositions" in James N. Rosenau, ed., In search of Global Patterns (New York, 1976), pp.326-33.
that the belief system and cognitive process are central to the process of decision-making. So, is it pertinent that we should first of all construct their belief systems and cognitive styles and show their impact on various policy decisions, which means they should be treated as independent variables. But in our model, we have also posited the decision-making as the level of analysis which necessitates that the cognitive process and belief systems of policy-makers should be treated as intervening variables. Further, as our purpose is to trace the impact of factors that shape the policy-making process on outputs, it becomes an analytical challenge to treat them both simultaneously as independent and intervening variables. To solve this tangled problem, we seek to analyse in the present chapter the specific conditions (in the form of a few empirically tested propositions) present in Pakistan during the period 1947-71 which must have provided enough stimuli to the policy-makers to bring their idiosyncratic traits to bear upon their policy decisions. In the next chapter, an attempt is made to construct their belief systems and cognitive process and their impact on policy preference.

Secondly, a host of policy-makers presided over the decision-making structure of Pakistan during 1947 to 1971. Notables among them were Mohammad Ali Jinnah, Liaquat
Ali Khan, Sir Zafrullah Khan, Khawaja Nazimuddin, Ghulam Mohammad, Mohammad Ali Bogra, H.S. Suhrawardy, Chaudhury Mohammad Ali, Iskander Mirza, Mohammad Ayub Khan, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, and General Yahya Khan. Though in varying degree many of them have influenced the foreign policy decisions, few of them have directly participated in the decision-making. In the first four years of independence from 1947 to 1951, Jinnah and Liaquat provided strong political leadership to Pakistan. Confronted by the near chaos in the country and war with India, Jinnah increasingly turned to the bureaucracy to help consolidate the new nation and in the process restored the old viceregal system of administration. But he kept the frankenstein's monster at bay, dominated the decision-making structure and laid down the essential thesis of foreign policy. This was faithfully carried out by Liaquat who like Jinnah, assumed the supreme leadership of the party and government and ensured the dominance of the political elites in the political system. But with his death the Muslim League fragmented and there was gradual ascendancy of the Pakistani bureaucracy as a dominant force in the political system. The advent to power of two civil servants Ghulam Mohammad and Iskander Mirza in 1951 legitimized the strong paternalistic tradition and heritage of the Civil Service to restore the viceregal system of administration and marked the eclipse of the
political elites as the articulate interest groups in the decision-making. During the period 1951 to 1958, the decision-making was dominated by the "hierarch" comprising Ghulam, Mirza and Ayub who took to its logical conclusion the major plank of Jinnah's foreign policy-relationship with the United States-though in the process they jettisoned its main thesis of nonalignment. This paved the way for Ayub to intervene. Though he was offered to take over earlier he refused. As a Cabinet Minister in charge of the Defence department, he tasted power and his influence increased, and in 1958 he finally established martial law, completely depoliticizing the political system. The centre of power shifted from bureaucracy to the military-bureaucratic elites, and Pakistan was ruled by a stratum drawn exclusively from West Pakistan. Despite Ayub's introduction of guided or basic democracy and end of martial law, the decision-making became highly centralized in the hands of the military-bureaucratic elites under the overall control of Ayub. The formulation and administration of most important governmental decisions were controlled by bureaucracy with no direct and very little indirect participation by elected assemblies. After the collapse of Ayub regime, Yahya Khan created an inner cabinet of generals

4 A. Lee Fritschler, "Business Participation in Administration" in Gurthrie S. Birkhead, ed., Administrative Problems in Pakistan (Syracuse, 1966), pp. 63-64.
who functioned independently of the main body as a whole and provided a kind of collective leadership. Though he retained defence and foreign affairs, key decisions were made by the inner cabinet comprising Lt General, S.G.M. Peerzada, Brigadier Rahim Khan, Brigadier Karim Khan, General Abdul Hamid Khan, and Major General Ghulam Umar. In June 1970, he set up a civilian Cabinet consisting of ten members drawn equally from the two provinces. By February 1971, it was dissolved and the civilian secretaries ruled with a Cabinet of sorts. Thus the civil bureaucracy gradually began to replace the military in key decision-making as Pakistan slid on the path of the Civil War. The military regimes of Ayub Khan and Yahya Khan concentrated decision-making power in the hands of a coterie of centralized elites from which Bengalis were largely excluded. These regimes were highly personalized political systems which functioned through cliques and factions within the small governmental elites, and political elites were debarred from the decision-making.

The foregoing facts set against the available historical records make one point clear. In the decision-making structure of Pakistan during the period from 1947 to 1971, two figures dominated: Mohammad Ali Jinnah and Mohammad Ayub Khan. While this may appear a little
arbitrary, one's choice of the key decision-makers is limited in the absence of evidence to the contrary.

Now, for the purpose of delineating the conditions we will take up our first proposition which reads: 5

(a) The more dramatic are the means of assuming power, the more likely the personality characteristics of the head of state are to affect foreign policy behaviour.

It is a truism that Jinnah who became the first Governor-General of independent Pakistan never assumed power as a result of revolution or any landslide victory in a national election which are usually considered dramatic means of assuming power. Nor did he adopt subsequently any democratic process for legitimizing his rule among the Pakistanis. But it should be recalled, the movement for a muslim homeland that ultimately culminated in the birth of Pakistan had all the dimensions of a revolution infused with drama and struggle and certainly held the promise of a new social and political order for the exploited muslims of the Indian subcontinent. Perhaps in this sense it was revolutionary and epoch-making. Jinnah was its author and the architect, and with the creation of Pakistan, he went

5 Hermann, n.3, p.328.
down in the annals of history as an event-making man. Standing at the forking points of history, he created a fork in the historical road. So, it won't be a travesty of truth to say that the office of Governor-General was literally bestowed upon him by the Pakistanis which was a crowning recognition of Jinnah's supreme sacrifice for the cause of Islamic solidarity and his untiring quest to bring the vision of Iqbal to a living reality. With Jinnah, Pakistan was an article of faith, the summum bonum of his existence. As he said to Lieutenant Ahsen, while stepping into the Government House at Karachi after the assumption of office: "... I never expected to see Pakistan in my lifetime. We have to be very grateful to God for what we have achieved." 

That his elevation to the highest office of the land was cheerfully endorsed by the masses and he needed no legitimization could be clearly evident from the way he was greeted on his first arrival from Delhi at Karachi airport on 7 September 1947. Belitho graphically described the touching scene:

8 Ibid., p.195.
"The aircraft landed and Mr. Jinnah was the first to step out, followed by his sister. The people cried "Pakistan Zindabad:" Pakistan Zindabad:" They pressed forward, close, hot and frenzied so that they might be as near as possible to their deliverer."

This statement underscores a simple fact that Jinnah who was the darling of millions of Muslims during the freedom struggle, had become their deliverer in the new state of Pakistan.

Jinnah was a charismatic leader if charisma is defined as leader's capacity to elicit from a following reverence devotion and awe towards himself as the source of authority.9 During the penultimate phase of Pakistani freedom struggle, Jinnah succeeded in bringing all differing shades of Muslim political opinion in the Indian subcontinent under a common platform of the All India Muslim League which presented a united front to the Indian National Congress and the British Government. The Muslims henceforth spoke with one voice. As head of the Pakistani movement, Jinnah represented that voice which reflected the entire spectrum of Muslim interests in the subcontinent. And his

voice rose above the welter of voices of many disparate political actors within the Muslim League itself. This naturally bred in Jinnah a disposition to establish a unitarian pattern of leadership which brooked no compromise, no dissent and no subordination to any other authority above him. This in turn spawned a repertoire of beliefs and myths among the political followers which, with the consummation of victory, got engraved in the masses and informed his style of functioning in subsequent period. Attitude and behaviour change slowly but imperceptively and over a period of time. Jinnah did not live long, so he conducted the affairs of the new state of Pakistan as he was accustomed to run those of the Muslim League during the pre-partition days. His subordinates rendered the same loyalty and devotion that were the manifestation of their beliefs and faiths nurtured in earlier years. So when he chose to become the Governor-General rather than Prime Minister, he thereby clearly established the viceregal system of Government which would invest him with a panoply of executive powers and reducing others as mere trappings of the system. Not a single eye-brow was raised, Liaquat Ali, who was chosen by him to be his Prime Minister, acquiesced

10 Saleem M.M. Qureshi, "Iqbal and Jinnah: Personalities, Perceptions and politics" in C.M. Naim, ed., Iqbal, Jinnah and Pakistan: The Vision and the Reality (Syracuse, 1979), pp.11-41.
in the set-up, fully aware of the fact that what he got was the husk rather than the grain of power. Further, by assuming the President of the Constituent Assembly which was the first Parliament of Pakistan, Jinnah became the fountain-head of all power in the political system. To cap it all, he too became President of the Muslim League - the ruling party-thereby ensured that his fiat was only one that must run across all the length and breath of the state of Pakistan. Though he lived for a very brief span of time after partition, the concentration and personalization of all authority and power showed that he alone was the source of legitimacy of the government as he had been of the Pakistan Movement.\footnote{Ibid., p.35.} If the Pakistanis shallowed this without a whimper of dissent, it was precisely because they looked upon him as their only saviour, who has not only freed them from the thraldom of servitude in undivided India, but also held the beacon light for guiding the destiny of the nation precariously poised in the throes of crisis. With each passing day, crisis multiplied and looked menacingly insoluble. So, people increasingly looked to Jinnah for an answer which he alone could provide. It was natural that the masses affectionately called him Quaid-i-Azam or a Great Leader and shared all his beliefs, attitudes, values and desires. Mourning the death of the
Quaid-i-Azam, Liaquat observed: 12

"There is no better way of showing our love for and reverence to our beloved Quaid-I-Azam than to keep before us always that ideal which he placed before us and to make Pakistan as great a State as he wanted to. The Quaid-I-Azam was the symbol of national strength and determination and inspired by it, whatever constructive work the Government or the people of Pakistan do, will be a memorial to our beloved leader."

This simply validates our second proposition:

(b) The more charismatic is the head of state, the more likely his personality characteristics are to affect foreign policy behaviour.

With the death of Jinnah, Khawaja Nazimuddin succeeded to the Office of the Governor-General. Interestingly enough, the office was offered to him by Liaquat Ali, an event which itself gave a foretaste of things to come. Liaquat's first act as Prime Minister, was to divest the Governor-General of the portfolio of States and Frontier Regions which was a clear indication that henceforth Liaquat was to rule the roost in Pakistani

politics. And in cabinet meetings Nazimuddin ceased to preside, thereby paving the way for the working of parliamentary democracy of West Minster model which Jinnah had introduced but never relished. Now the centre of power veered round the office of the Prime Minister. Liaquat, with a clear majority in the National Assembly, established Prime Ministerial dictatorship in the country. As a noted Pakistani writer remarked: 13

"He presided over the cabinet meetings not as a chairman for discovering majority opinion but as a president who could, if necessary, determine the outcome of discussions in the face of an unwilling majority. He took vital decisions, sometimes even without prior consultation with his colleagues, in the knowledge and confidence that they would be endorsed by the cabinet and approved by the Parliament."

His decision to dismiss the Mamdot Ministry in Punjab in January 1949, Pakistan's support to the United Nations stand in the Korean War and negotiations with the Indian Prime Minister in 1951 were cited as instances where he acted without taking the cabinet into confidence. Gradually, Liaquat became controversial in national politics, and

alienated himself from many important regional political actors which reached its culmination in the years following his assumption of the office of President of the Muslim League. Though endowed with sterling qualities of a statesman and he could charm vast and illiterate masses by his gift of the gab, he had all the failings of a politician which gradually surfaced as time rolled on.

Though a powerful personality, Liaquat never waivered from the path chosen by his mentor at least in the arena of foreign policy. Jinnah was its architect, provided its architectural design. Liaquat became its builder. Speaking of their relationship, Begum Liaquat remarked: 14

"They had known each other from 1928 at the Calcutta conference where Jinnah was so humiliated. You will remember how he was cried down as not being in any sense an accepted leader of the Muslims. Liaquat was one of those who stood by him: he had always admired Jinnah and believed in him much then as he did at the end."

Right from 1927, Liaquat served Jinnah with unquestionable fidelity. In the years that followed, "When Jinnah enjoyed

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14 Belitho, n.7, p.104.
omnipotence, Liaquat Ali Khan did not mind; indeed it was part of his nature that he enjoyed the subtle rewards of second place". Precisely in recognition of this, Jinnah chose Liaquat to be the first Prime Minister of independent Pakistan. Belitho remarked: 15 Jinnah was to find in him the complement to his own talents: together they were to become inviolable because they formed one mind and the trust between them remained absolute to the end." This alone explained, why he chose to visit the United States instead of Stalin's Russia as he was fulfilling the mission left unfinished by his master. In face of these facts, it seems plausible to conclude that at least in major policy preference Liaquat's personality traits had no significant bearing.

With Liaquat disappearance from Pakistani political scene, the Punjabi bureaucratic elite came to dominate the decision-making process during the period 1951 to 1958. The triumvirate that ruled Pakistan was Ghulam Mohammad, Iskander Ali Mirza and Mohammad Ayub Khan. A civil servant by profession, Ghulam was the first Finance Minister of independent Pakistan. He was a man of domineering personality and vaulting ambition. This is amply testified in the way he dismissed Nazimuddin, the

15 Ibid., p.104.
ailing and sickly Prime Minister after Liaquat, and the United Front Government in East Pakistan and subsequently the Constituent Assembly when the latter attempted to curtail his powers as the Governor-General of Pakistan. Though Ghulam established complete sway over the decision-making structure, he ruled through Mirza and Ayub who became defence secretary and defence minister respectively in his Cabinet of national talents. It seems plausible to assume that Ghulam's personality characteristics had little bearing on major policy preference as all the three had a shared perception and there was evidence to suggest that the group characteristics of the "hierarch" was more salient during Ghulam's period. As a scholar noted: 16

"The leading lights of the Ghulam Mohammad Group had one interesting attribute in common in so far as their perception of Pakistan's foreign relations are concerned. They were men who had grown grey in the service of the British and they favoured 'very close' relations with the West, especially the United States. They were men who, even while their Prime Minister was contemplating a visit to Moscow, had impressed on American officials, their desire to associate

themselves with the United States in the long-range defence planning. They constituted a sort of "U.S.-Lobby" at the very centre of Pakistani Government."

After Ghulam, another member of his Group Mirza became the President under the first Republican Constitution. He successfully carried forward the original policy through four prime Ministers out of which Chaudhuri Mohammad Ali and H.S. Suhrawardy were able exponents backed by Ayub Khan who was the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed forces. Though known for political chicanery and intrigue, Mirza was never a forceful personality nor endeared himself to masses. As a result, his foreign policy decisions never bore any imprint of his own. All his attention and energy were consumed by domestic problems. On the whole, Pakistan during the period 1952-58 had a surfeit of politicians who chose to tread the oft-beaten tracks in foreign policy rather than bringing in any innovative departure. Ayub most nicely summed up the position: 17

"Those who followed Liaquat in political office proved unequal to the task. They did not understand the problems facing the country nor did they have the

courage to try to solve them. One after another they made a mess of things by trying to work on an unworkable system of government and the country slipping very fast. The central government gradually lost its grip over the affairs of the state being beset by the constant pressure tactics of parliamentarians and the growing relative strength of the provincial governments, who were virtually holding it to ransom."

In such a state of affairs, it is futile to expect the impact of personality traits of any decision-maker on foreign policy decision as Ghulam and Mirza simply carried forward the policy preference conceived by Jinnah and fulfilled their dream by committing Pakistan irrevocably to the Western alliance system, especially the United States, through the instrumentality of Zafrullah Khan and Ayub.

The third of the trio was Mohammad Ayub Khan. As head of the military establishment, he has consistently played behind-the-scene role in the policy making process right from the time of Ghulam Mohammad till he finally came to power in 1958 through a coup d'e'tat on 7 October 1958. In a sense, it was dramatic, even though there was no bloodshed and Iskander Mirza tamely surrendered power and there was no popular uprising in defence of the coup. "The
language was clearly that of Latin America, not of Bolshevik Russia or Revolutionary France. 18 It was a military operation and aimed at replacing existing civil authority by military. It sought to organise, in coalition with bureaucracy, a new government in support of modernisation and against political confusion.

It was deemed inevitable by the masses as it was the logical culmination of events prior to 1958. In the country there was "ruthless struggle for power, corruption, the shameful exploitation of... simple, honest, patriotic and industrious masses, the lack of decorum and prostitution of Islam for political ends." 19 And the ruthless adventurers and exploiters were "getting richer by their nefarious practices and the politicians were talking of "bloody revolution." Traitors were approaching foreign countries for support and government action was necessary as well against smugglers, black-marketeers and hoarders. As Ayub rode to power on the crest of utter disenchantment of people with the prevailing system of government and the breed of politicians running it, he was welcomed by all


and sundry, because the alternative was "chaos and confusion". Now, under Ayub's new dispensation, power was monopolized by the civil-bureaucracy. As a perceptive scholar of Pakistani scene remarked:

"Bureaucratics, which emphasised blind obedience, unconditional grants of authority and arbitrary decision-making, replaced an incipient form of politics that the very least could not stifle factional competitiveness, a broad range of choice and an unusual flow of information. The Pathan period by contrast with the Punjabi thus emphasised the bureaucrat's penchant for law and order, and the soldier's code of discipline and efficiency. Material development became an all consuming concern and political activities were sacrificed on the altar of stability and national growth."

This statement truly sums up the characteristic of the regime presided over by Ayub for long ten years. So, it was natural that his thoughts and beliefs must have influenced the foreign policy decisions as he strode the decision-making process like a big colossus with pliant

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subordinates, and the masses gave him landslide majority when he sought legitimacy for his regime by openly contesting to the office of Presidency in 1965.

Now coming to our second proposition, we find that Ayub was never a charismatic leader. Nor he ever tried to employ devices for acquiring those qualities that would have clothed him with an apparel of charisma. A few reasons can be cited for this. In the first place, he neglected to enlist the support of the public and leaned too heavily on the conventional bureaucracy. He also persisted in widening the gulf that separated his government from the youth. Secondly, it was a great paradox that while his attention was focussed on the mechanics of social mobilisation, his policies were never effectively communicated to the masses. As a result, it only served to stimulate fragmentation and alienation. Partly his personal habits complicated the task with all strata of society. As a scholar observed:

"Ayub's powerful personality and dominating presence would inevitably have commanded some public attention irrespective of his chosen profession, but popularity

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was a gratification that increasingly eluded him. Authoritarian values, an undemocratic nature, and erect and suggestively aloof bearing, an oratory fluctuating from a dry prosaic to a contrived informality, and an absence of charisma made him a respected but not universally loved figure."

Lastly, though Ayub undertook many basic and innovative reforms embracing all sectors of national life, he never believed in whipping up a public euphoria. He shunned the idea of adopting any sensational and eye-catching measures and preferred to work quietly. As he noted in his book:23

"I was not looking for dramatic results. The enthusiasm of the people could have been easily maintained at a high pitch by adopting sensational and extreme measures. I think there was some expectation that the revolutionary regime would provide dramatic openings and sequences... I was prepared to face a certain amount of dissatisfaction among the people and a measure of pessimism within the army itself. I was determined to go about my work in a moderate and rational way..."

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23 Ayub, n.17, p.79.
This clearly shows that he never believed in rhetorics and if, he resorted to image-building it was only after the outbreak of 1965 war in which the victory was doubtful and he wanted to restore the tarnished image of the army which had become by then the self-styled guardian of the nation.

Though lacked charisma, he enjoyed the obedience of his followers and secured their loyalty. Generals like Mohammad Musa, and Yahya Khan and bureaucrats like Aktar Husain, S.M. Yusuf, Fida Hasan, Altaf Gauhar, served him with all fidelity. The political figures like Malik Amir Mohammad Khan, Abdul Monem Khan and Z.A. Bhutto also gave him many valuable advice and strengthened his rule. The intellectuals like Manzur Qadir, I.H. Qureshi, Z.A. Suleri played vital roles. These prominent personalities influenced Ayub's decisions. They advised him and often he acted with their advice but only in rare occasions and for brief periods did they ever sway him.\(^2^4\) He remained his own decision-maker to the last.

The third proposition is: The more general interest the head of State has in foreign policy, the more likely his personality characteristics are to affect foreign policy behaviour.\(^2^5\)

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24 Ziring, n.21, p.2.

It is a matter of historical record that the Muslim League, which under the stewardship of Jinnah brought into being the new state of Pakistan, had never played any significant role in the broader issues of peace and war affecting the mankind during the inter-war years. Though it liberally supported the Muslim causes in the world and passed many resolutions to that effect, it never committed itself on such vital issues as Spain, China, Abyssinia, and Czechoslovakia, Communism and Fascism like the Indian National Congress.26 The demand for Pakistan and its realisation was a brief period overwhelmed by the Second World War, and there was considerable uncertainty as to the final outcome.27 The entire energy of the Muslim League leaders was absorbed in the internal politics of manoeuvring against the Congress leader and the British authority. Set to achieve an impossible goal in the face of heavy odds, Jinnah's only ambition was to weld together the disparate muslim elements into a unified whole under the banner of the Muslim League. His appeal to religion and his support to the muslim causes in the world was reflective of the unique social structure that the Indian Muslims have evolved at the time: the old

26 Jawaharlal Nehru, Discovery of India (Calcutta, 1946), p.447.

aristocratic and conservative attitudes persisted in isolation from the new attitudes and trends which the western impact on India had created.\(^\text{28}\) In a period of growing cynicism about religion, it projected Jinnah in a unique role; as one more interested to solve internal problems of the Muslims in the subcontinent than the common external problems faced by the Asian and African countries. Besides, as all the states, including India, adopted the broad anti-imperialist front advocating the cause of all the subject people in the world, Pakistan's growing emphasis on the Muslim causes gave the League leadership a nationalistic flavour. As a result, Jinnah never acquired the status of a political leader with an international repute, nor for that matter anyone in the higher echelon of the League. But this should not be misconstrued to give the impression that he had no intellectual understanding of the changing forces of world politics or the importance of pursuing an active and rational foreign policy for the new state of Pakistan.

This is clearly evident for the following reasons. In the first place, it is reflected in the way he structured his governmental organisation. Immediately on assumption of office, he created two separate departments to deal with foreign affairs: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and

\(^{28}\) Nehru, n.26, pp.563-67.
Commonwealth Relations and the Ministry of Kashmir Affairs and Frontier Regions. While the first one looked after the general aspect of foreign relations, the second one dealt specifically with Kashmir. Kashmir, being an emotive issue, needed his personal attention for decision. Secondly, he lost no time in choosing Sir Zafrullah Khan, a veteran diplomat, to plead the Palestine case in the United Nations. As Palestine was a burning issue with wider implications for Pakistan's relations with the Muslim world, his choice of Zafrullah was an ideal one as later events bore it out. And his subsequent decision to induct him to the Cabinet as the Foreign Minister assured the country of the services of man who, with his background of outstanding legal knowledge and long years of distinguished diplomatic career, became an unfailing champion of Pakistani cause in the world forums and perhaps more than anyone else put Pakistan on the world map. M.A.H. Ispahani wrote to Jinnah: 29

"I can briefly tell you that the Pakistan Delegation to the United Nations has acquitted itself more than well. Sir Zafrullah delivered one of the finest speeches heard in the United Nations on the Palestine question... Pakistan is right on the map .... He is one of our able men and an asset."

Besides, his choice of Chaudhuri Mohammad Ali to head the foreign ministry and M.A.H. Ispahani to represent Pakistan in the United States showed his keen interest and primacy he accorded to foreign policy as both were his closest confidants. Thirdly, he came out with a clear and categorical enunciation of the country's foreign policy whose essential thesis were laid down by him that dispelled many a concerning entertained in many quarters of the world.30 As he opted for policy of non-alignment with the contending power blocs, it showed that Jinnah had an acute perception of the operational world in which Pakistan would function in coming years. Lastly, his secret diplomatic move to court the Americans for military and economic aid also proved that he was not oblivious of the poor capabilities of a nascent state pitted against a powerful adversary.31 This revealed that though internal task before Jinnah was staggering and absorbed his attention, he had a sustained interest in foreign policy and took all major decisions of the period. Jinnah was impelled by two dominant considerations. Pakistan must emerge as a full-fledged territorial personality before the glare of world public in order to refute the Indian charges that it would collapse before long. Secondly, the threat of Indian

30 Quaid-e-Azam Speaks (Karachi, n.d.), p.93.
31 Venkataramani, n.16, pp. 33-128
aggression would be countered to ensure its security and development. As regards Liaquat, he took many vital and bold decisions, put across the case of his country most effectively before the western world particularly the United States,\textsuperscript{32} actively sponsored many Islamic conferences to foster solidarity with the muslim world and made strenuous efforts to ensure peace with India. But he stuck to the original framework of policy laid down by Jinnah and never made any significant departure. Intra-party squabbles and domestic problems consumed a major slice of his tenure which was also very brief. Despite his general interest, he could not make much impact and allowed Zafrullah to handle most of the foreign policy issues, who was constantly engaged in giving the benefit of his advice to the Prime Minister, so much so that in the realm of foreign policy, he came to symbolise Pakistan before the world audience. But with the advent to power of Ghulam Mohammad, the basic postulates of foreign policy were changed. The way he worked, as revealed by records, to commit Pakistan into the western alliance system showed that foreign policy was his most obsessive concern,\textsuperscript{33} though the decisions were made by the "hierarch". As a result, as argued in the foregoing, there

\textsuperscript{32} Liaquat Ali Khan, Pakistan: The Heart of Asia (Karachi, 1976), pp.4-10.
\textsuperscript{33} See my third Chapter.
was dominance of group characteristics in the decision-making with Ayub having major voice, leaving little lee-way for the impact of the personality traits of Ghulam Mohammad on policy decisions.

Now, if one operationalises interest as the percentage of events in which the head of state participates relative to the bureaucracy, then Ayub's era, which was crowded with many significant events, certainly carried indelible impact of his personality traits as he participated directly in the formulation and execution of numerous policy decisions. His offer of joint defence of the subcontinent to India and conclusion of the Indus Water Treaty, his effort to develop amicable relations with Afghanistan, his decision to legalise Pakistan's borders with China, Burma and Iran to forestall any possible sources of conflict, his attempt to develop satisfactory relations with the Soviet Union without undermining Pakistan's commitment to the Western alliance system and above all his decision to declare war against India in 1965 were some of the crucial decisions in which he was directly involved. 34 This was plausible for two specific reasons. In the first place, he received his initial stimulus when he was chosen as the Commander-in-Chief of Pakistani armed forces by the

34 Ziring, n.21, p.60.
Prime Minister superseding many distinguished and senior generals which showed that he enjoyed complete trust of Liaquat Ali. And in subsequent infighting between politicians he maintained strict neutrality and only invoked his support in the favour of ruling authority. Though, for a brief period he was the Defence Minister he again left the office to head the armed forces. He was deeply committed to enhancing the professional skill of the armed forces and within a short time, Pakistani armed forces became an impressive fighting force in Asia. As a result, Ayub earned the complete trust of the politicians, the public and the soldiers. When Ghulam Mohammad came to power and intra-party fighting threatened his authority and with it the challenge of Bengali nationalism to the dominance of Punjabi elites, Ayub's support became the most crucial factor for the continuance of Ghulam Mohammad and Punjabis in power structure. This phase coincided with Pakistan's decision to join the American alliance system in which the military dimension of the relationship assumed major importance. With it, the stock of Ayub went up. As the closest confident of Ghulam Mohammad and his known penchant for the American military hardware, Ayub was pre-eminently suited for hammering out a deal which he did with too much of secrecy and diplomatic finesse. As Ayub came to be progressively accepted in the military circles of the United
States, the Pakistani government gave him a free hand in negotiating intricate military issues. The whole process became one of reinforcing Ayub's indispensibility. As a result, he emerged as the strong man and the key decision-maker which gave him access to the inn and out of the government though he was just an army chief. This stood him in good stead in later years when he came to power, for he brought to the office of Presidency a wealth of experience and knowledge about the military and foreign policy issues and many of his settled views and beliefs influenced his decisions. While this could be proved in many cases, at least in the Indus Water Treaty it was clearly evident. As he wrote in his autobiography:

"... I should like, to describe the confrontation I had with our own technical experts and administrators. I sensed that they did not fully realise the gravity of the situation, and were asking for the moon when we were in a position of weakness all along the line. They were also trying to dictate policy and were taking up extreme positions. Some thirty or forty of them were assembled in the Government House, Lahore, where I addressed them. I said: 'Gentlemen' this problem is

35 Ayub, n.17, pp.11-12.
of far-reaching consequences to us. Let me tell you that every factor is against Pakistan....

The responsibility does not lie on any one of you let me tell you very plainly that the policy is going to be mine. I shall consult you whenever I am in doubt regarding technical details, but if any one of you interferes with the policy, I shall deal with him myself.

Secondly, Ayub like Jinnah, completely dominated the decision-making structure. Though his cabinet contained people with differing political convictions, his word was the final decision. Any difference with him meant the forfeiture of ministership, or voluntary resignation. And without any scruple Ayub could sack his trusted and talented colleagues. This certainly inspired awe and fear among the incumbents and "the political machinery became a conduit of his dictatorial psychology."36 In one instance this was clear. In the fall of 1966, not a single member of Ayub's first presidential cabinet remained. They all departed for different reasons. Bhutto who represented the anti-U.S. faction in his cabinet first challenged the wisdom of

President's Taskent decision and was sacked. And to balance it, Mohammad Shoab, the Finance Minister, known for his pro-Western sympathy was dropped. Ayub did this only because Pakistan's international posture threatened his control over the policy-making machinery. These facts served to validate another important proposition:

The more authority a head of state has over foreign policy, the more likely his personality characteristics are to affect foreign policy behaviour.

The last condition responsible for the impact of the personality traits of the decision-makers in Pakistan was the lack of a developed and scientifically structured foreign policy organisation. In any political system, whether democratic or authoritarian, the importance of a foreign policy organisation is too well-known, on account of the far-flung and highly complex nature of foreign policy in the modern world. Not only it serves as the instrument for carrying out the policy decision and administrative directive of the political executive whose prerogative is foreign policy, but also its role as the agency for assimilating, and evaluating data, shifting and sorting out of intelligence analysis for a recommended policy option has become vital and indispensable. It is now thoroughly probed

37 Ziring, n.21, p.4.
that in a developed and highly differentiated foreign policy organisation, prior policy commitment, organisational memory, parochial interests, standard operating procedure, normal bureaucratic inertia, and conflict resolution by bargaining, all of which are deeply rooted in the complex bureaucratic organiszation, serve to limit the impact on policy ouputs of the decision-maker's personality traits, private prejudices and other cognitive traits,\textsuperscript{38} because individuals with varying individual characteristics behave similarly when placed in common situations.\textsuperscript{39} Realising this, the developed and highly industrialised countries of world expend enormous money for maintaining a well structured and scientifically planned foreign policy organisation.

This was singularly lacking in Pakistan. The administrative system was in a state of disarray, virtually it collapsed at the time of partition. The most formidable problem it faced was an acute shortage of administrative talent which was experienced in the complexity of decision-making at the highest level of government. This was equally applicable to the sphere of foreign policy. Though two


\textsuperscript{39} Greenstein, n.25, p.54.
distinct departments were created on the eve of independence, there was a dearth of diplomatic personnel to man them properly and to represent effectively the country in the various chancelleries of the world. Out of a total strength of 157 Muslim and other officers belonging to Indian Civil Service and Indian Political Service who opted for Pakistan at the partition, only 6 preferred diplomatic assignments.40 Besides, being a poor and backward country it could not afford the luxury of spending huge amount of money that was initially needed for a well-planned and comprehensive foreign policy organisation and establishing diplomatic legations in every part of the globe. Ispahani's correspondence with Jinnah gives enough revelation of the condition of the Pakistani government.41

"I need not tell you how necessary it is to have the minimum staff, composed of individuals who may be expected to function effectively as a team. We are receiving little cooperation from the Finance Ministry... We cannot work indefinitely without sanction being given to essential expenditure and you have no idea what we have to put up with sometimes."


41 Ispahani, n.29, p.557.
This shows the abject poverty of a nascent government. The appointment of a few eminent personalities to run the diplomatic service like Malik Feroz Khan Noon, Sir Mohammad Zafrullah Khan, M.A.H. Ispahani and others, while for a time, improved Pakistan's diplomacy, it was certainly not a substitute for a cadre-based permanent diplomatic personnel. All that they did was to carry out faithfully the policy decisions of Jinnah, for they were his most trusted friends.

Though in 1949, regular recruitment started for selecting officers to run the diplomatic service and their number considerably increased over the years, and the Foreign Office expanded, specifically during the Ayub era, it became more a flabby body. No attempt was made to restructure it on the basis of some rational and sound principles of administrative organisation. During the Ayub era, it simply became an appendage of the President's cabinet and failed in the task of policy-making. It came in for bitter criticism on numerous occasions during the parliamentary debates. The failures of the foreign office as evident in the legislative commentary consisted such phenomena as behaviour of diplomats, insufficient concern for Pakistani abroad, or lack of attention to a visiting delegation of distinguished members of Parliament, weakness
of the foreign publicity and sheer in competence. Most crucial debates were concerned with the organization and training of the foreign office and the diplomats. Starting with educational qualifications, the legislators have literally questioned every aspect of the organization of the foreign office and the diplomatic service, which included the criteria of appointments, provincial quotas, expenditures, organization of the decision-making structure and goodwill missions abroad for effectively projecting country's image. Legislative attempts to deal with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs through a Standing Committee have not been successful. Once during the tenure of the Constituent Assembly and again once recently, brief references could be found to legislative attempts to make such Committee function. For all practical purposes, its incumbents like Manzur Qadir, Mohammad Ali Bogra, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, S. Sharifuddin Pirzada, and Mian Monem Khan served as errand boys for the great master Mohammad Ayub Khan.

In our focus on personality characteristics of Pakistani decision-makers, we have chosen only Mohammad Ali


43. The Committee consisted of five members and was expected to advise on matters with which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was concerned.
Jinnah and Mohammad Ayub Khan out of a host of many, as these two figures provided strong leadership in Pakistan during the period 1947-71. In this connection, we have delineated the specific conditions (in the form of a few empirically tested propositions) present in Pakistan during 1947 to 1971 which have provided enough stimuli to these key decision-makers to bring their idiosyncratic traits to bear upon their policy decisions. In the first place, we have proved that though Jinnah never assumed political power in a dramatic way, the movement for Pakistan of which he was the author and architect had all the dimensions of a revolution. But in case of Ayub Khan he assumed power in a dramatic way. Secondly, Jinnah was a charismatic leader while Ayub had never the appeal of a charisma, though he enjoyed the obedience of his followers and secured their loyalty. Thirdly, both Jinnah and Ayub had general interests in foreign policy. Lastly, both dominated the decision-making structures and held complete sway over the policy-making.