CHAPTER IV

REGIONAL SUB-SYSTEMIC SOURCES
Until a few years ago, the level of analysis in international politics was mostly the nation-state. The traditional scholars adopted this approach. It gained rapid acceptance as there was relative abundance of data on the state actor. This focus, micro-analysis, was widely used because "as things stand today...there can be no serious doubt about the paramount position of the nation-state or about the superiority of its influence and power".1 Similarly, there was another perspective which equally vied for acceptance. This focus, macro-analysis, can roughly claim its recognition from late 1940's. One of its early proponents remarked way back in 1944:2

"...We will never reach (a well-ordered world) by ignoring the differences between the elephants and squirrels of international politics."

This focus saw equally the burgeoning of analysis with marked emphasis on Soviet-American relations in post-Second World War years. Its primary thesis rests on the fact that the Super Powers are the only members of the system. Hence,


they determine all or most of the actions of the small powers.

With the advent of the behavioural revolution these two perspectives continued but in different forms. There was an ever-growing tendency to treat the nation-state as the national system and the world as international system. And theorists have spawned various theories how both function. They are, as a result, divided into two broad categories. One group is interested in discerning regularities in the behaviour of actors, the common goals that are sought, in the means and processes through which the goal-seeking behaviour is sustained and in the sources of goals and means selected. They are known as foreign policy analysts or theorists. The other group is mainly concerned with the patterns that recur in the interactions of states, in the balances and imbalances that develop under varying circumstances and in the formation of coalitions and other factors that precipitate changes in international system. They are concerned with the study of international politics. 3

But there are a few scholars who study the interaction among states in a particular region rather

action alone i.e., the foreign policy of one state. While they make the analysis within the "systems perspective," for them the unit of analysis is not the national political system but the subordinate state system. In their view the concept - system - is said to exist in an environment and to be composed of parts, which through interaction, are in relation to each other. Consequently, a system has a structure and encompasses functions through which it is sustained or changed. In their views, if regional international politics phenomena can be conceived in this way, the analyst can focus upon the actions of the states as components of the subordinate system, upon the structure and functioning of the system which emanate from the interaction of the nations and upon the environmental factors that condition both the actions of the states and operations of the system. That it has a basic pattern of relationship, Michael Brecher made clear:


5 Brecher, n.4, p.156.
"But there is an array of inter-state problems, conflicts, and relationships among actors outside the blocs that have nothing or little to do with the bloc system, in America, Africa, Asia and even in Europe; and these are ignored or distorted, by a model that identifies the bipolar bloc system with the totality of inter-state politics."

While there is enough element of truth in this statement, we have recognised this problem in our model as not a problem of levels of analysis but a case of level of aggregation within the broader international system of which it is a regional subsystem. Regarding the problem of conceptualizing the regional international politics for delineating the boundary of the subordinate state system, Rosenau's conceptualization of international politics mentioned earlier is helpful. In the ensuing analysis, an attempt is made to uncover the impact of regional systemic variable on Pakistan's foreign policy behaviour since 1947.
A: The Subordinate System of the South Asia

(i) India:

A most enduring fact of post-war international politics in the South Asian subsystem is the implacable hostility between India and Pakistan since their gaining independence from the British Raj in August 1947. It is usually assumed by scholars that the bases of this hostility are wider. Diverse variables have interacted over the years to condition the psychological and operational environment of the strategic decision-makers of both countries. It has become so basic to their respective domestic and foreign politics that it might continue notwithstanding the settlement of existing disputes. So scholars viewed that this had served to make both the countries factors in each other's foreign policy behaviour, and in case of Pakistan, India was more pervasively a dominant factor. This is clearly borne out in the analysis of a Pakistani author who observed: "The ruling passion in

---


7 M.S. Rajan, "India and Pakistan as Factors for Each Other’s Foreign Policy and Relations", in International Studies, vol.3, no.4, April 1962, pp.349-94.

Pakistan's foreign policy, a passion which has influenced its behaviour towards all other countries, has always been the fear of India. This has engendered, on the part of Pakistan, an agonizing quest for security and independence from India.

In real terms, this quest has boiled down to a search for enhancing power to countervail India's power eminence in the subcontinent. So naturally its efforts to underwrite security and independence became bidimensional because power, as defined by present day theorists, embraces both resource and interaction dimensions. In his book, Pakistan: The Heart of Asia, its first Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan succinctly summed up the main objectives of Pakistan's foreign policy. Coming to the first dimension, he said the goal was to build up a well-trained, and well-equipped army in order to preserve territorial integrity and internal security and to achieve rapid economic development through adequate foreign aid. Dwelling on the second, he said, the goal was to enhance international prestige and obtain strong international support on Kashmir and other major disputes with India. Underlying these was the over-

---

arching policy of meeting the "India Complex" in South Asia; to contain the influence of India in Asia and to achieve an equality of status with India in the international field. This goal in Pakistani foreign policy was also highlighted by a foreign scholar who observed: 10

"Pakistan is an example of a nation having among her neighbours one other nation larger and more powerful than herself with which her relations have been constantly unfriendly. India, therefore, the most important constant and controlling factor in Pakistan's foreign policy... Therefore, the main problem of Pakistan's foreign policy has been: Where to turn for support in her dispute with her neighbour and for some redress of power-disparity between that neighbour and herself."

We have explored elsewhere,11 how Pakistan's drive for security and independence from India has led to a never-ending quest for augmenting the resource dimension of its capabilities that partly explained its foreign policy behaviour. In the ensuing analysis, an attempt is made to reveal how far this very drive has led to a search for

11 See my second Chapter.

325
procuring political and diplomatic support of the Great Powers to shore up the interaction dimension of capabilities for redressing the disparity of power in the subcontinent with the ultimate objective of resolving the Kashmir issue in its terms.

Since the establishment of Pakistan, its foreign policy has been mostly concerned with India. And it is conflict with India which has largely determined its approach to almost every single international problem.  

For reasons already stated, Pakistan looked upon India as the enemy number one and a hegemonistic power. Ayub Khan observed:

"India regards herself as a big power in Asia. Her eventual aim has been and still is, to have her spheres of influence in Southeast Asia. The Indian leaders have often stated that their true border extend from the Hindu Kush mountains to the Mekong River, that is to say, wherever the influence of Hinduism existed in the past..."

12 Gupta, n.6, p.228.

There are other reasons why we apprehend India may launch an aggressive venture against Pakistan. It is well known to the students of the subcontinent's history that the Hindus of India were against the creation of a separate homeland for Muslims in the form of Pakistan, and after opposing it tooth and nail for years, gave in because they could not otherwise get rid of the British. Thereafter, while consolidating and building up their own strength, the Indians have let no opportunity pass for weakening and neutralising Pakistan. The present Indian leadership makes no secret of the fact that it regards Pakistan as India's enemy number one."

Hence, it was natural on its part to assume India to be its adversary. And there was no gain-saying in the fact that right from its birth it cast itself, in its role in international sphere, in the image of "brave little Belgium" of Asia for evoking sympathy and support of the world for its stand on major issues directly or indirectly affecting India. True to its adversary perception, it minced no words in assailing India's much-cherished policy of non-alignment as a policy of blackmail to get aid from both the Communist and the Western Powers. It also decried Nehru's policy of Panchsheel and advanced its thesis of "Seven Pillars of
Peace", in Bandung, which sought to approve military pacts and alliances. In the initial years, it pretended to be anti-Communist with lots of theological and ideological justifications underlying the schism between the world of Communism and Islam. 14 While examples will multiply to illustrate Pakistan's policy of persistent hostility and India-baiting, the initial bonus accrued to it was clear. Pakistan ingratiated itself into the favour of those whom it wanted most - the Americans. By 1960's, the line of divergence in Pakistani and Indian perception of the world system and the question of order and change in the world were clearly drawn when the former subscribed to the ideas of "confrontation" as formulated by Soekarno in opposition to Nehru's idea of "international cooperation" as constituting two opposite ideological poles for the developing world. 15

Now, if one agreed that Pakistan's foreign policy was concerned with India, as a necessary corollary, one must say that it was Kashmir with which it was primarily interested, for Indian control of Kashmir stood as a denial

14 S.M. Burke, Main Springs of Indian and Pakistan's Foreign Policies (Minneapolis, 1974), pp.50-54.

of the 'Two-Nation' theory which was the basis of Pakistan and its continuing raison d'etre. And the clash over Kashmir was symbolic not only of the validity of the 'Two-Nation' theory, but also of the conflict of the two independent nations. So, the main objective of Pakistan's foreign policy in post-independent era was to acquire the territory of Kashmir and the success or failure of its foreign policy came to be bound up with the resolution of this crucial dispute. Besides, as the Kashmir question became the principal factor in shaping Pakistani attitude towards foreign policy questions, it tended to judge over the years many issues in world affairs by the litmus test of how far they contributed to support of Pakistan on this burning question.\(^{16}\) As a necessary corollary, Pakistani ruling elites applied the same yardstick to measure whether a country or individual were friendly or hostile towards Pakistan. This was borne out clearly in the editorial comment of the Dawn which observed:\(^{17}\)

"While those who have been on the side of the truth and justice in Kashmir have forged a new and deeper comradeship with the people of Pakistan, those that stand on the fense in this vital issue, may no longer

\(^{16}\) Rajan, n.7, p.60.

\(^{17}\) Dawn (Karachi), 27 February 1957.
be counted as our friends, however prepossessing their exterior or valuable and traceable their professions. On this criteria of value, we must continue to appraise our international relations."

The first Great Power to whom Pakistan looked for support and sustenance in the post-independent era was Great Britain. Its decision-makers entertained the hope that the Muslim League's preferential relationship with the British Government in the pre-Raj would be transferred to it after 1947 that would actively back Pakistan in its dispute with India. As an Indian scholar wrote: 18

"Just as in the Congress-League Conflict before freedom it was the Muslim League's expectation that the supremacy of British authority in the subcontinent world lead to the settlement of issues in their favour, so in the post-freedom phase it was expected that the influence and power of Britain could still be invoked on her side by Pakistan. Such expectations were obviously based on an exaggerated assumption of Britain's capacity to play a major role in the subcontinent and the British Government itself had no

pretensions of being able to play the role of the arbitrar in Indo-Pakistan problems."

But Pakistan's calculation went awry. Strangely enough, British decision to retain India within the Commonwealth, at the cost of modifying the very philosophy underlying its Constitution, made it awake of its day-dream and finally convinced it that India would always carry greater weight in the Commonwealth. So Pakistan also rebuffed Britain, when, consequent upon the British decision to devalue pound in September, it refused to follow suit unlike India which reduced the per value of rupee correspondingly. If the Pak-British relationship did not slide for worse, though soured for a moment, one has to look for explanation elsewhere. Pakistan's decision not to severe relationship with the Commonwealth was itself a reflection of fact that it still retained the hope in this ideal international forum to manoeuvre support of its members for its stand on Kashmir. On numerous occasions the heads of Commonwealth countries have unofficially debated the issue and made appeals to both India and Pakistan to settle it peacefully. 19 With the passage of time, Pakistan's experience had bordered on frustration. Kashmir still remained a standing challenge

to the Commonwealth conception as an association of equal and peaceful nations. This was expressed by Sir Zafrullah Khan when he ruefully remarked:20

"If that challenge is met, if that trial is successfully withstood, the stock of the Commonwealth as a peaceful association of equal and sovereign nations will rise for ever. But unfortunately that should not be so, the future of Commonwealth is not worth on hour's purchase."

The real reason seemed to be that Britain was still a powerful member of the United Nations in which Pakistan has reposed an unbounded faith for the solution of Kashmir dispute. And given the system of big-power-veto in the Security Council which was a cynical expression of real-politik of world diplomacy, it would be a height of naivety to alienate Britain which with its veto-power could considerably sway the world body's decision in its favour. However, this did not blur the Pakistani vision that in the post-War years Britain was a crumbling world power and could only play second fiddle to the United States in world politics. Hence, the desire of the Pakistanis to court the Americans while at the same time keeping their trump-card

20 Mushtaq Ahmad, Pakistan's Foreign Policy (Karachi, 1968), p.99.
with their old imperial master through which the United States mediated its policy in South Asia in the 1950's. It was in this backdrop that Pakistan began to grope for new allies. Its romantic vision of a United Muslim World prompted it to make a fresh bid to bring all the Muslim nations of the world on the common platform of Islamic religion to weave a powerful political entity under its leadership. But it was a dismal failure for which it was compelled to look for alternative policies.

Under this shadow of frustration, Pakistan made numerous overtures to the United States for an alliance. As argued elsewhere, the alliance was consummated at a time when the United States had a positive motivation of enlisting Pakistan in its global strategy of containing the expansive world communism and was deeply sore with India for its differing outlook on world communist movement. Pakistan took advantage of this by flaunting its anti-Communist pretensions and fear of India. But the fact remained that Pakistan's real motivation emanated more from the aggressive India than from aggressive communism. Mere dislike of India and the hope of augmenting its capabilities through Western economic and military aid made it pretend to be anti-

21 For details see, Olaf Caroe, The Wells of Power: The Oil Fields of South Western Asia: A Regional and Global Study (London, 1951).
Communist which was certainly made of thinnest material of opportunism and political expediency. It was clearly revealed first at Manila Conference, as argued earlier, and in subsequent periods. Now a question crops up as to why it was so desperate to shore up its capabilities vis-a-vis India and for what purpose. And why it gave up its much-proclaimed policy of non-alignment of earlier years to seek alliance with the United States, and to join its alliance system. Part of the explanation for this perhaps lies in the fact that its early decision-makers were clearly disillusioned with the United Nations in the way it handled the Kashmir issue. If one agreed with Liaquat Ali Khan that acquisition of the territory of Kashmir was the permanent component of Pakistan's foreign policy, then it was imperative for it to ally with a Super Power whose unflinching support in the Security Council could make substantial difference to the solution of the issue in Pakistan's favour. Britain's unequivocal endorsement of Pakistani position on the issue was inconceivable for the simple reason that it could not afford to ignore India. And Pakistan, realising that the Indo-American relations had been sufficiently strained, gave that alliance a bitter anti-Indian flavour.

Now as anticipated, Pakistani decision-makers after 1954 received increasing diplomatic support from Western Powers orchestrated mainly by the United States inside the United Nations when Kashmir issue used to be deliberated in the Security Council. The most significant Four-Power resolution in favour of Pakistan was introduced by the Western powers in 1957.\textsuperscript{23} For a time it looked as if Pakistanis would carry the day in the Security Council. Prime Minister Suhrawardy paid glowing tribute to the Western Powers for their role in the Council deliberations. He particularly singled out the United Kingdom for the signal service rendered to Pakistan. The \textit{Dawn} commented:\textsuperscript{24}

"The new resolution... does not fulfil the expectations aroused by the firm action which that body had taken to deal with the Anglo-French-Israeli aggression against Egypt... However, the new resolution does mark an advance from the statement which Bharat desired... The resolution not only "notes" Pakistan's proposals for a UNEF for Kashmir but expressly states the "belief" of the Security Council that the proposal deserves consideration."


\textsuperscript{24} \textit{Dawn} (Karachi), 17 February 1957.
Though Soviet veto nipped all their hopes in the bud and in the words of Noel-Baker the greatest and gravest single issue in international affairs remained unsettled, the story did not end there. The United States went on supporting Pakistan in the years to come. When the issue was subsequently raised in 21 June 1962, the United States supported the Irish Resolution much to the disappointment of India. As before, the Soviet Union (and Romania) killed it by its veto. However, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan expressed his gratitude to the Western Powrs who supported the Irish Resolution. The Indo-Soviet axis succeeded through power politics and pressure tactics in persuading neutral countries to withhold support on such an important question. In India, Prime Minister Nehru bitterly complained that the Western powers were almost invariably against India on matters that created passionate feelings in the country (like Goa and Kashmir).


28 India, Rajya Sabha, Debates, 23 June 1962 (Foreign Affairs Record), vol.8, p.116.
The Kashmir issue which seemed for a time to have been put in cold storage again got a fresh lease of life following Chinese aggression of India on 20 October 1962. When a high-power delegation of Western Powers led by Duncan Sandys, the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations of United Kingdom and Averell Harriman, United States Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, visited India in response to its appeal for military assistance, Nehru agreed under concerted pressure from them to make renewed efforts to settle the dispute bilaterally. The new situation in the subcontinent in the wake of Chinese invasion, certainly increased the West's capacity to influence thinking in New Delhi and paved the ground for fresh negotiation. But unfortunately, seven rounds of talks between the two countries proved infructuous and the issue again reverted to the Security Council. The Security Council took up the matter for a full-scale debate on 10 February 1964.\(^{29}\) It prolonged it for a long period. No tangible solutions could be found. But it was clear while the Western Powers supported Pakistani stand to the hilt by categorically endorsing the proposition of the Ivory Coast representative, a different view was expressed by the delegates of


\(^{30}\) Ibid, yr.19, mtg. 1091, 10 February 1964.
Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union. And things changed radically with rapid political developments in the valley with the release of Sheikh Abdullah and subsequent passing away of Nehru on 27 May 1964.

We have argued elsewhere how Pakistan was utterly disillusioned with the Western Powers for which Ayub Khan looked increasingly towards the Communist bloc particularly the Soviet Union, and especially China after 1962. It can be surmised with a reasonable degree of confidence that failure of Western diplomacy with regard to Kashmir was partly responsible for this. It was a painful realisation on the part of Pakistan that unless it came to term with the Soviet Union and neutralises its continuing opposition, there would be no substantial change in the situation. As stated in our foregoing pages, Pakistan steadily worked to blunt Russian antipathy for which Russia travelled from a position of complete endorsement of India's stand on Kashmir in 1955 to one of neutrality in the late 1960's. Similarly, Pakistan, through its persistent effort of cultivating friendly relations with China was fully successful in persuading it to veer round to its point of view on Kashmir.

31 See my Third Chapter.
32 Ibid.
(ii) China:

It is aptly remarked that the Sino-Pakistani relation is one of the enigmas of contemporary international relations, as an avowedly Marxist-Leninist State has made terms with a 'praetorian state' based on the most conservative forces of religion, feudalism and capitalism. While scholars have isolated diverse interactive variables to explain this phenomenon, it is assumed in the forthcoming analysis that the regional sub-systemic variable was a potent one influencing Pakistan's foreign policy behaviour during that period. This was precisely for two reasons. In the first place, Pakistan's policy was largely developed, as claimed by its policy-makers, in response to its security needs. And consideration of its security was largely influenced by India from whom the main threat to its basic survival as a nation-state has been perceived to be emanating. Secondly, China and Pakistan, as claimed by a scholar, have discovered in the Indian subcontinent an area of agreement where the two countries had a clear perception of their interests and a coincidence of their basic objectives regarding India which was their common enemy.\footnote{Mohammad Ayoob, "India as a Factor in Sino-Pakistani Relations", \textit{International Studies} (New Delhi), vol.9, no.1, January 1968, p.279.} So, they have consistently followed a cooperative policy to
supplement each other's effort to contain the Indian power. The ensuing analysis purports to test this assumption to prove as to what extent China shaped Pakistan's international behaviour during 1949-1971. Though arbitrary, the entire spectrum of the Sino-Pakistani relations is divided into three broad phases to trace the impact of China on Pakistan's foreign policy.

1949-53:

China was in the throes of a civil war when Pakistan was born. The Kuomintang regime under Generalissimo Chiangkaishek was fast crumbling and the Communist party led by Mao Tse-tung was riding the crest of victory. The situation, though fluid, continued to absorb the attention of world leaders. The Pakistani leadership watched the movement of events with great expectation and concern. The expectation was understandable, for a great and ancient nation which shared the common destiny of long foreign domination, was struggling to be reborn, thus adding a chink in the armoury of the Western Colonial Powers. Similarly, the concern was self-explanatory. In the history of Chinese civilization, the rise of a strong and Unified Central Government had always proved to be expansive and revisionist, and with the Communist ideological underpinning it might lead to the disruption of the existing State-system.
in Asia particularly in the South Asia where states were not only wedded to different political systems but shared traditionally disputed frontiers. With regard to frontier questions, the attitude of the Communist had been similar to that of their predecessors. It was natural that the Pakistani leadership nurtured in the tradition of British parliamentary system, could not view with equanimity the prospect of China going red but at the same time the alternative before them was still worse. They were equally luke-warm in their support to Chiangkaishek regime for historical reasons. As is well-known, Chiang opposed Muslim League's demand for a separate homeland for Muslims during the League's struggle for Pakistan. So, they preferred to view the unfolding drama with a philosophic unconcern which was very characteristically reflected in the statement of a Pakistani author: 34

"Who eventually wins or loses the Civil War (in China) will have a great effect on the future of the whole of Asia. If Nationalists win, China will remain a democracy as we have known it in England and the United States. If the Communists win, the Soviet bloc will become the greatest force in the world. Whatever happens, the fate of China will leave its permanent

marks on the South and South East Asia. We cannot but watch the situation with the keenest interest."

However, with the end of Civil strife and ushering in of the Communist victory, the Peoples' Republic of China was established on 1 October 1949. As a matter of fact, the Pakistani leadership showed remarkable statesmanship in its recognition of the new government on 4 January 1950 within a few days of India's decision to do so and became the first Muslim country and the second member of the Commonwealth to grant recognition. Hailing the Chinese revolution as the opening of a new chapter in the chequered history of Asia, its leadership viewed:36

"Its profound significance for the rest of Asia arises from the fact that it is an indigenous revolution, bred essentially in an Asian environment. Whatever be the sources of its emotional inspiration, it does not owe its birth and fruition to foreign influence".

The press communique embodying the act of recognition said that the Government of Pakistan "trust that friendly and cordial relations between China and Pakistan will be cemented in all spheres to their mutual

35 Mushtaq Ahmad, "Pakistan's Policies in Southeast and East Asia", *Pakistan Horizon*, (Karachi), vol.4, no.2, 2nd Quarter 1951, p.88.
advantages." But the Pakistani gesture of goodwill was not duly reciprocated by the Chinese. It was because the Chinese had no autonomous policy towards Pakistan. Their policy towards the South Asia, during this phase (1949-53), was in tune with their general pattern of policy towards Asia as a whole. Besides, Mao categorically stated in 1949, even before the formal installation of the Communist Government in China, of Peking's determination to "lean to one side in the worldwide conflict." The corner-stone of their policy was the alignment with the Soviet Union. The Chinese were convinced that in the fluid state of post-War Asia, revolution was bound to sweep the entire continent under the impetus of the Communist victory in China. They argued for a militantly revolutionary policy for which they showed open contempt and positive hostility towards the Asian leaders calling them as "the hirelings of imperialism". Because Mao himself stated in 1949. "The world was divided into two camps; no third road existed." So, Pakistan was no exception to this general policy.

In sharp contrast to this, Pakistan worked steadily to blunt Chinese hostility for a good neighbourly

36 Dawn (Karachi), 5 January 1950.
relationship, rejecting the prevailing Western view that the Chinese government was not legitimate and could not be expected to carry out obligations attached to the membership of the United Nations. It, without slightest reservation, supported the Indian Resolution of September 1950 seeking to replace the delegation of the Nationalist China with that of the People's Republic. Speaking in the General Assembly, its Foreign Minister, Muhammad Zafrullah Khan, underscored these points when he observed: 38

"China is not applying for admission to the United Nations. It is a Member State, a permanent member of the Security Council, one of the Big Five... It is entitled as of right to be represented in the United Nations like every other member State until it is expelled in accordance with the provisions of the Charter."

The sole question, Sir Zafrullah, asked as to who was entitled to represent China? 39

"...The delegation from which the delegation present here purports to draw its authority, has for months


ceased to exercise jurisdiction over any portion of the Chinese Mainland... The truth of the matter is that the General Assembly is unwilling to concede the existence of a fact, not because the fact has not been established but because the majority regard it as unpleasant".

Later in the year, Pakistan and China established diplomatic missions between the two countries. In the meanwhile, the conflict in Korea broke out. Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan was on a state visit to the United States. In a statement issued in Boston on 27 June 1950, he declared his government's support to the Security Council resolution of 25 June and 26 June and for any measure that the Council should decide to take to help South Korea against aggression from the north. He said that as loyal member of the United Nations, it was Pakistan's duty to adopt that attitude. But interestingly enough, Pakistan did not contribute its military forces to the Korean War effort on the plea that it was insufficient for its own defence requirement. Besides, while it voted in favour of General Assembly resolution branding North Korea as aggressor in the war, it abstained on the resolution branding Communist China as an aggressor in Korea and as well as on the resolution imposing embargo on export of certain items of goods to Communist China.40 These two incidents showed how sensitive was Pakistan in
earlier years on issues that affected the susceptibility of China. Sarwar Hasan rightly remarked:41

"This independent approach to Cold War issues paved the way for mutual friendship between Pakistan and China. The foundations of that friendship were so firmly laid that later developments in Pakistan's foreign policy did not destroy it."

From this brief track record, it was evident that Pakistan followed an independent policy towards China which undoubtedly justified Liaquat's statement that Pakistan started, on its career without any narrow and special commitments and without any prejudice in the international sphere. It should be borne in mind that it was a very trying period in Pakistani national life. Moreover, during this period, it was frantically trying for a relationship with the United States, the arch enemy of China. It was natural that it should have followed a policy more appealing to the Americans. But as revealed elsewhere,42 there was no systemic compulsion on Pakistan either to follow the


41 A Staff Study, "Pakistan's Relations with the People's Republic of China", *Pakistan Horizon*, vol.14, no.3, 3rd quarter 1961, p.217

42 See my first Chapter.
United States lead in world affairs, or the line of Soviet foreign policy. Pakistan was free to strike out an independent path in its foreign policy behaviour. But as pointed out in the foregoing pages, there was equally no demand from the Chinese to adopt pliant policies to soothe their sentiment. If one were to explain why Pakistan behaved towards China as it did, we are left to explain this behaviour only in term of regional systemic varibale which seemed potent from 1949-53 for the following reasons. First, Pakistan had a rare fortune of having Sir Zafrullah Khan as its Foreign Minister. Zafrullah had served wartime China as the British Agent General and had an intimate perception of the Communist mind. He must have played a key role in fashioning the policy towards China as was evident from his fiery espousal of the Chinese cause throughout his eventful career. As an astute politician and diplomat of distinction, he must have understood that China, in the long history, had always been expansionist and revisionist whenever it had come under, a unified and strong central government. With a Communist ideological dogma, it was bound to prove more disruptive of existing state system in Asia. Besides, being a vast country with boundless resources, though underdeveloped, it was bound to loom large in the Asian politics. Its borders with India and Pakistan were unsettled, being a left-over of the British
imperialism. Sooner or later Communist China would lay claim to regain its old frontiers which included all of the Himalayan regions, along with Nepal, Bhutan and parts of northern India. This would certainly bring it into direct collision with Pakistan, and India. So conflict with India was an inevitability. To add to this, India was a formidable barrier to Chinese ambition to play the role of Asian leadership. Time was not far-off when both would vie with each other to attract other Asian States to follow their competitive model of economic growth and political system. A scholar observed: 43

"The real issue is whether India and China, representing two vastly differing ideological and political systems, can coexist in peace on the basis of equality and respect for each other's vital interests. It raises the fundamental question of the present and future role of India and China in Asia and indeed in the world."

Pakistani leadership acted with the prescience of statesmanship to make China a possible counterpoise to India in its ambition to dominate Asia, particularly the South Asia. Their initial decision to grant recognition to Mao's

government was certainly reflective of these considerations. That it came within a few days of India's decision to do so was certainly impelled by the consideration of denying India any diplomatic mileage in terms of Chinese goodwill. Similarly, subsequent espousal of Chinese cause by Pakistanis showed that India could not be looked upon by the Chinese as the only votary of their cause when they were in a state of isolation in the international community. Lastly, while it would ingratiate Pakistanis into the Russian favour, Americans too would take note of Pakistani ability to come to terms with communists out of sheer necessity of survival in face of India's enmity.

On the basis of the foregoing fact, it can be said that Pakistan's policy towards China evolved as a result of regional compulsions that confronted the policy-makers in terms of security dilemma posed by India. Nowhere there was evidence to suggest that there was any explicit or implicit effort by China to shape Pakistan's foreign policy behaviour. The Chinese policy of "peaceful coexistence" made significant advances following the signing of the Korean truce in June 1953 and the conclusion of the Geneva Agreement in April 1954, and reached its high water-mark in the signing of the Indo-China Treaty on 24 April 1954. This was in consonance with the policy of the Soviet Union. Enunciating the policy, the Soviet Premier Nikita S.
Khrushchev observed: 44

"The principle of peaceful coexistence signifies a renunciation of interference in the internal affairs of other countries with the object of altering their system of government or mode of life or for any other motives. The doctrine of peaceful coexistence also presupposes that political and economic relations between countries are to be based upon complete equality of the parties concerned, and on mutual benefit."

The new Chinese line sought to mobilise Asian sympathies against western-sponsored military alliances, to create a benign image of Communist China and reduce the fear of communists. This policy of sweet reasonableness found adequate expression in the historic Bandung Conference, held in April 1955, where Chou En-lai made a lasting impression on the Asian leaders, broadened China's contact with the Afro-Asians and learned much about them. The Conference really marked the transition of China from the status of a purely Asian power to that of an Afro-Asian power. 45 These


were the years when Asian statesmen, including Chou En-lai, were visiting each other frequently and constantly reiterating their solemn dedication to world peace and cooperation. It particularly heralded a new era of abiding friendship for China and India and the slogan "Hindi Chin Bhai Bhai" rented the air in Peking and New Delhi.

But this phase of Bandung spirit lasted for a very brief period. Towards the end of 1957 China faced heavy odds. The rivalry between the Soviet and the Chinese Communist regime which was latent from the beginning came to surface after Stalin's death and assumed serious proportion threatening the bloc unity. It was in part differing reactions to the events of Polish and Hungarian uprisings that caused the Chinese-Soviet relations to become sour.46 While the Russians found it necessary to absorb the shock and lesson of Hungary, it became intolerable for the Chinese whose revolution was in a different stage and who had different political needs. The Soviet Union under Nikita S. Khrushchev clearly objected to the concept of "way of Mao Tse-tung" with its overtone of Chinese leadership in Asia.47 The relationship reached its nadir in the wake of the Sino-

Indian border trouble when, consequent upon Chinese absorption of Tibet in 1959, the Soviet Union refused for the first time to support a Communist State involved in a quarrel with a bourgeoisie government and adopted neutrality.\(^{48}\)

China gradually felt beleaguered in Asia. Its problem became formidable with each passing year. While its aspiration to bear the mantle of leadership of the international proletarian movement was frustrated by the Soviet Union, its hope of emerging the main spokesman for Asia was equally challenged by the Soviet Union, the United States and India. The Soviet policy of using India as a pawn to counter the Chinese inroads in the South Asia and isolating it in Asia progressed well. Similarly, China found itself pitted against the United States as the leader of the hostile bloc and against India as the pioneer of an alternative system in Asia and its ambition not to play second fiddle to India in Asian affairs. And after 1960, the United States cast India increasingly in the role of a counterpoise to China. So it seemed probable that China's disappointment on external front might have contributed partly to tougher policy abroad.

Coming to Pakistan's foreign policy during the period (1954-57), one found that it underwent dramatic changes following its decision to align with the United States. In quick succession, it joined one military alliance after another and became the major centre-piece of American policy of containment of communism, particularly the Chinese power. But at the same time, record showed that Pakistan had most cordial and intimate relationship with the Chinese. While a facile interpretation attributed this to a master-stroke of diplomacy, serious analyst contended that deeper forces were working underneath. Some scholars argued that this could be possible because Pakistan's pro-western policy was tolerated by the Chinese who were at the crest of their new policy offensive of "peaceful coexistence" at the behest of the Soviet Union, and there was no divergence of policy of the bloc towards the Afro-Asian countries. Further, it was argued, the Chinese maintained that in contemporary international relations all serious contradictions resulted from the conduct of the Western imperialist powers. Relations of Asians with one another were not marked by "mutually antagonistic contradictions". And any contradictions that might seem to exist in their relations were of a non-antagonistic nature and were

amenable to peaceful solution. To prove their contention, scholars have cited the case of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization and the Chinese attitude to it. It is on record that China minced no words to describe it as an aggressive military alliance directed against the people of China and of various Asian countries. But surprisingly enough, it did not even send a formal note of protest to Pakistan against its joining the Pact. Its disapproval of Pakistan's participation was certainly one of marked moderation, while it bitterly assailed the United States. Peking remarked that in establishing SEATO the United States was certainly not aiming at self-defence but at undermining peace in Indo-China and perpetuating tension in the Far East. It came to a definite conclusion that since the creation of SEATO, the United States had been building up its military presence and bases in Pakistan, Thailand and Philippines, interfering in their domestic affairs, and fastening them to the American War chariot. In sharp contrast to this, the main points of criticism of Pakistan, as reported by New China News Agency, were that the acceptance of American military aid and the concomitant obligation would make the country an American satellite and

50 The Statesman (New Delhi), 5 September 1954.
51 New China News Agency (Beijing), 20 May 1954.
isolate it from the Afro-Asians countries. 52

These facts certainly explained China's attitude towards other Asian countries like Thailand and Philippines but not towards Pakistan. The fact of the matter was that China understood, as record revealed, Pakistan's compulsion for entering into the Western bandwagon, in which regional systemic variable played a dominant role and this partly explain why China behaved so indulgently towards it. To prove this, scholars said 53 that at the Manila Conference which set up SEATO, Pakistan's Foreign Minister Zafrullah Khan opposed the applicability of the Treaty to Communist aggression alone and insisted to bring within its ambit all aggressions including the conflict between India and Pakistan. 54 In the chess-board of international politics, certain words carry implications for the policy-makers of countries for which they are intended. Chou En-lai too knew how to make moves that required no reciprocity. This was clarified further when Pakistani Prime Minister Mohammad Ali Bogra met the Chinese Premier Chou En-lai in the Bandung Conference and assured him that SEATO was a defensive alliance as far as Pakistan was concerned and that Pakistan

53 Sayed, n.49, p.58.
54 Dawn (Karachi), 7 September 1954.
had entered into the pact to defend itself from aggression by India and not because of any hostility towards China. Chou En-lai declared at a meeting of the Political Committee of the Bandung Conference of Bogra's assurance to him that though Pakistan was a party to a military treaty it was not directed against China. Pakistan had no fear that China would permit aggression against it. Bogra further assured him that if the United States launched a global war, Pakistan would not be involved. This led to a mutuality of understanding which was further strengthened when Karachi received a private message from Peking just after the conclusion of the Bandung Conference which read as follows.56

"The Chinese People's Government assured the Government of Pakistan that there was no conceivable clash of interests between the two countries which could imperil their friendly relations; but that this position did not apply to Indo-Chinese relations, in which a definite conflict of interest could be expected in the near future".


56 L.F. Rushbrook Williams, The State of Pakistan (London, 1962), p.120.
Similarly, the Chinese attitude to the most contentious Indo-Pakistan issue - the Kashmir problem - was also a rare piece of shrewd diplomacy. They were well aware of the fact that attitude to Kashmir was "the touch-stone by which friendship and animosity were tested by Pakistan." So, in the hey-day of "Hindi Chin Bhai Bhai", Peking scrupulously refrained from committing itself to any stand that might even remotely be considered as betraying an anti-Pakistan disposition and endorsing the Indian claim that Kashmir formed an integral part of the Indian Union. Its main arguments were as follows: Kashmir problem was the creation of nefarious Western design. It should be amicably settled between India and Pakistan. No tangible gains could be achieved if it was taken to the United Nations which was an instrument of the United States. It accepted the right of the people of Jammu & Kashmir alone to determine their own fate and future. The position remained as usual despite the visit of the Prime Minister H.S. Suhrawardy to China and the return visit of Chou En-lai to Pakistan in December 1956. It was clear on the basis of foregoing facts that while India took Chinese friendship a little too literally and seriously, China showed a particular awareness of the future conflict with India. Chou Enlai had a sense of

history. And history suggests that it is usually advantageous to align oneself with the weaker of two antagonistic partners, because this acted as a restraint on the stronger.\(^{58}\) It was an established fact that India and Pakistan were two antagonistic partners. So, Chinese support to Pakistan was a foregone conclusion despite all its loud protestations of friendship for India. An eminent sinologist has accurately viewed that right from the commencement of the Chinese regime, they had clearly perceived the enormous advantage of exploiting Indo-Pakistani hostility to serve their national interest.\(^{59}\) China's sympathetic understanding of Pakistani predicament was demonstrated on another occasion also. During Prime Minister H.S. Suhrawardy's state visit to the United States in the summer of 1957, he bitterly assailed the Chinese policy as one of aggressive expansionism threatening peace and freedom in Asia. Surprisingly, the Chinese played it cool and took it in their stride. Though they were irritated by his remarks, as expected, The Peoples Daily remarked that Suhrawardy should want to say pleasant things about the Americans in order to get more aid.\(^{60}\) In view of

---


these facts, it is plausible to agree with a scholar that both Pakistan and China had a clear perception of the convergence of their interests and coincidence of their objectives regarding India. So it can be concluded that Pakistan's policy towards China during the period from 1954 to 1957, was partly shaped by the regional systemic variable which was dominant during this period. If a flourishing relation developed between China and Pakistan, it was this benign attitude of the former which predominantly shaped it.

However, during the period from 1957 to 1959 the Sino-Pakistani relations showed a significant deviation from the general run of the policies followed by the respective governments. Scholars agreed that it entered rough weather towards the fag-end of Suhrawardy's Prime Ministership. The down-hill trend which commenced roughly from 1957 onwards continued through the first two years of Ayub Khan's Presidency. But they differed as to the factors responsible for such a sudden cooling off of an otherwise warm relationship which again bounced back in 1960. Some scholars contended that it was Ayub Khan's accession to power which gave a severe blow to an already worsening relationship, for the Chinese were aware of his prominent role in the conclusion of the Mutual Defence Assistance  

61. Ayoob, n. 32, p.279.
Agreement with the United States in 1954. And subsequently, Chinese suspicion was confirmed when Ayub took two important decisions that had considerable bearing on Chinese interest: first, his offer of a joint-defence plan to India to protect the subcontinent from the invasion from North, and, Second, his signing of a bilateral defence agreement with the United States in 1959. These two actions of Ayub soured Pakistan's relations with China.

The question is why Ayub was impelled to adopt policies towards China which were an exception to the general pattern of relationship prevailing between the two states. Interestingly enough, when Ayub came to power he categorically stated that a nation has no eternal enemy or friend but eternal national interest. He also declared to pursue a policy that Pakistan's interests and geography dictated. The Martial Law Proclamation lent credence to his sincere desire when it condemned efforts at creating "bad blood and misunderstanding between US and countries like the U.S.S.R.... and the People's Republic of China". Coming to the specific policy of China, one finds that there was no action of China directed towards Pakistan. This was

62. Mohammed Ahmed, My Chef (Lahore, 1960), pp. 73-76.
64. Dawn (Karachi), 8 October 1958.
corroborated by the fact that China, "unlike Soviet Union," did not send any protest note on the bilateral defence agreement which was being negotiated in 1959 between Pakistan and the United States."65 This showed that China adopted an over-indulgent attitude towards Pakistan. Then why the cooling off process ensued. Probably the explanation for this lies in Chinese behaviour in general.

The Chinese policy underwent drastic changes following 1957 in line with the changed policy of the Communist bloc. Split was yet to occur. By the end of 1957 the leaders of the Sino-Soviet bloc had reverted to a more militant posture in dealing with problems within the bloc and in their approach to the United States and its allies.66 Mao, addressing the Communist parties on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, emphasized strongly the East-West struggle.67 This policy of "hard-line manifested nowhere more clearly than in the Indian Subcontinent when China forcibly occupied Tibet and extinguished their much cherished freedom. This lesson must

67. Mao Tse-tung Speech in Moscow on 18 November 1957 in Mao Tse-tung on "Imperialists and Reactionaries", Current Background (Hongkong), vol. 534, 12 November 1958.
have gone home with Ayub whose fear of international communism got further reinforced. It certainly unnerved him and heightened his concern regarding communist threat to the subcontinent for which he made his famous offer of a Joint-defence plan to India. It is contended to be more of a ploy to extract some diplomatic gains in a Indo-Pak settlement on Kashmir. 68 But it can be stated that any Pakistani policy-maker in place of Ayub would have behaved in the same way, given the general attitude of China, even though evidence suggested that China was not hostile to Pakistan and treated it differently from the rest of the allies of the United States. Given the fact of Indo-Pakistan hostility as a constant factor, the regional systemic compulsion was heavy with Pakistani policy-makers who had no go except to work for seeking a modus vivendi with its foe, India.

This line of interpretation drew its plausibility and strength from the fact that Pakistani behaviour changed abruptly once China recoiled from its aggressive policy and adopted more conciliatory postures in its foreign policy goals. After 1959, the key-stone of China's new South Asia policy was Pakistan and Peking continued to give strong

68 Ayoob, n. 33, p. 281.
political support and increasing amounts of economic aid. 69 Realising that growing tension on the Sino-Indian border was bound ultimately to lead to a military confrontation, China now turned to Pakistan to stave off any trouble from that quarter. As its relationship with the Soviet Union was fast deteriorating, it was keen to lure away Pakistan which was equally looking for a protector. Proverbially, enemy of one's enemy is a friend. So befriending China preeminently suited Pakistan. 70 Now, Pakistan turned seriously towards mending its fences with China and repairing any damage that might have been done to Sino-Pakistani relations by the joint-defence offer to India. It was deeply concerned not to allow the emergence of a situation on the border between Pakistan's Azad Kashmir and China's Sinkiang Province equivalent to that existed on the Sino-Indian border. The Pakistan foreign minister, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto clearly expressed the anxiety of his Government:

"Surely as a Government it is our responsibility to see that such a situation (as one that existed on the Sino-Indian border), God forbid, is not repeated for our people in which we are unnecessarily involved in a misunderstanding with a neighbour and a Great Power.

69 Barnett, n.66, p.316
70 Sayeed, n.8, P.243.
Surely, we would not like to see the tantrums and all the crisis that have been repeated as a result of misunderstanding over the boundary between the People's Republic of China and India."\(^{71}\)

The first opportunity presented itself to Pakistan to repair its ruptured relations with China in 1960. During a Sino-Indian border talk, China flatly refused to concede the Indian demand that the border west of Karakoram Pass between China's Sinkiang Province and Azad Kashmir under Pakistan control should be included. This was a signal for Pakistan which it was intelligent enough to take up. On 28 March 1961, Pakistani Government sent a formal diplomatic note proposing boundary agreement with the Chinese Government. Talks formally started between the two governments on the demarcation of border between them on 12 October 1962.

With the outbreak of Sino-Indian border war on 21 October 1962 and the subsequent Western military aid to India brought about a radical change in the subcontinent and the attitude of both countries towards each other became unusually friendly for reasons already cited. China, after the conclusion of the war, became almost desperate to reach border settlements with all the peripheral countries like

\(^{71}\) Dawn (Karachi), 3 March 1963.
Burma, Nepal, Mongolia. Border talks started with Pakistan in all earnestness. On 2 March 1963 a provisional border agreement was signed between the two Governments. While diverse motives on both sides might have contributed to the signing of the agreement, it was generally agreed that Pakistanis succumbed to the Chinese offer out of a genuine fear that an undemarcated border with China was pregnant with future problems. It admirably answered the needs of both countries. Pakistan got most favourable terms as it was concluded in the midst of a raging Sino-Indian border trouble. The Chinese, "since they had been branded in the West as an aggressor in their border dispute with India", were interested in changing their tarnished profile and presenting themselves as a reasonable and friendly power. What is more salutary in terms of political fall-out was that it served to embarrass India, countered its allegation against China as an aggressive power and fortified their military and diplomatic position with respect to India. Then, close on its heel, came another move to further cement the Sino-Pak relationship in which Chinese influence


was clearly discernible. Pakistan took the most momentous decision to enter into an air transit agreement in the face of stiff opposition from the United States which termed it as "an unfortunate breach of free world solidarity". It remained undaunted when the United States cancelled a loan pledged to Pakistan to build a new airport at Dacca. By now, China changed Pakistan's foreign policy behaviour. In the words of a Pakistani author, "its foreign policy began to move to the pleasure of Peking and to the annoyance and displeasure of the Johnson administration in Washington and to worries in New Delhi and uneasiness in Moscow." This was clearly reflected in Pakistan's voting of the United States on the issue of China's representation and its gradual process of disengagement from SEATO. In 1961 Pakistan abstained from voting in favour of the United States resolution. In 1963 it supported a joint Albanian-Cambodian resolution calling for the seating of China in the United Nations. That Pakistani policy behaviour changed under the stimulus of Peking's diplomacy was also reflected in Pakistan's reservations in the SEATO Communique of 1965 and 1966, particularly with regard to the United States

74 Dawn (Karachi), 7 July 1963.

policy in Vietnam. Chen Yi, the Chinese Foreign Minister, remarked in 1967: 76

"Recently in disregard from countries like Pakistan, the U.S. imperialism took advantage of a SEATO ministerial meeting and raised the clamour that 'Communist aggression' constituted a 'major threat' in Southeast Asia."

Then came the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965 in which China played its part. While it is difficult precisely to trace the role of Chinese in the causation of the war, record revealed that they had a decisive say in the prosecution and conclusion of the war. With regard to its causation, available evidence suggested as follows: During a meeting in 1965, Chou En-lai, was said to have made a remark to Ayub that a just settlement of the Kashmir dispute would not materialize unless Pakistanis were willing to make sacrifices. When Chen Yi stopped at Karachi airport on 4 September (two days before the actual occurrence of war) he was told by Pakistanis that they were now ready to make such sacrifices. 77 While Pakistani diplomats denied this to be treated even remotely as incitement to go to war against India, the fact of the matter was that only Ayub, Bhutto and a few Generals knew the actual plan. But with the onset of

76 Quoted in Choudhury, n.75, p. 122.
77 Syed, n.49, p.117.
war, Chinese stand became quite clear. The People's Daily declared: 78

"In short, it was not Pakistan but India that first crossed the ceasefire in Kashmir. It was not Pakistan but India that first threw its airforce into action and bombed peaceful cities of the other side. It was not Pakistan but India that first crossed the international border.... So India is in every case, the aggressor and Pakistan its victim."

This statement clearly showed that China by putting the onus of responsibility on India for starting the war gave a blanket support to Pakistan. Again by issuing a series of ultimatums, China gave the impression to the world that it was a war of attrition against a common enemy in which they might be involved. On 7 September 1965, it issued a statement condemning Indian aggression: 79.

"The Indian Government's armed attack on Pakistan is an act of naked aggression. It not only is a crude violation of all principles guiding international relations but also constitutes a grave threat to peace in this part of Asia. The Chinese Government sternly


condemns India for its criminal aggression and expresses firm support for Pakistan in its just struggle against aggression and solemnly warns the Indian that it must bear the responsibility for all the consequences of its criminal and extended aggression."

Its protest note on 16 September was in the form of an ultimatum which demanded that the Indian Government dismantle all its military works for aggression on the Chinese side of the China-Sikkim boundary, or on the boundary within three days of the delivery of the present note or be ready to "bear full responsibility for all the grave consequences arising therefrom". On 19 September it extended the deadline by another three days. More important than this was the increased activity of the armed forces of China on the Sino-Indian border with a view to obliging India to keep a large contingent of its army stationed on its border with Tibet and thus taking some pressure off Pakistan. Commenting on this, a Pakistani author observed: 80

"Indeed, one inevitably receives the impression that India's action vis-a-vis Pakistan were as much responsible for occasioning the protest as any injuries that China might herself have sustained at Indian

80. Syed, n.49, p.115.
hands. This linkage of Sino-Indian and Indo-Pakistan conflicts was evident in every note that the Chinese Government addressed to India during this period. The Chinese also found occasion to assert in these notes that, come what might, they would not be stopped from supporting Pakistan's fight against Indian aggression."

Similarly, it was China which was responsible for Pakistan's acceptance of ceasefire. A Pakistani author revealed that Ayub, in the midst of the crisis visited China and had an extended discussion with the Chinese leaders. He was quite anxious that before the acceptance of ceasefire was announced, the Chinese friends must be taken into full confidence, and their reaction must be given the fullest consideration. Ayub was candid enough to admit of "crude pressures" of the two Super Powers. But he took the most fateful decision of ceasefire only at the behest of the Chinese leaders. This illustrated beyond a shred of doubt how China shaped Pakistan's foreign policy decision during the most crucial period of Pakistani history.

Coming to Pakistani behaviour during the period from 1965 to 1971, it is explored elsewhere that it was systemic rather than regional systemic variables which

81 Choudhury, n.75, p.123.
82 See my third chapter.
became very dominant for which Pakistan became the "Courier" of the United States and ultimately became a victim of the interventionary pressures of China and the United States in their search for a new triangular balance of power in the world.

(B) **WEST ASIAN SUBORDINATE SYSTEM:**

Pakistan acquired independent statehood with a growing awareness of its belonging to a community that dwelled all over the globe right from Singapore in Asia to Morocco in Africa. It was too, placed in an historical setting which related its pitiful present to a past which was pristine in its glory of which it gradually discovered and became legitimately proud. So, it was natural on the part of the Pakistani leadership to view the successful fruition of their freedom struggle as a clear manifestation of a renewed sense of Islamic belonging which became resurgent consequent upon the Second World War. Muslim unity was long shattered by the machination of the Western imperialist powers. And with their fast retreat from the peninsula of Asia and Africa, it was again rising like a phoenix from its ashes. So, in the aftermath of the

---

independence, the Pakistani leadership made a fervent plea for reviving this world spirit, for which they increasingly stressed their natural and religious links, common culture and identity of economic interests between Pakistan and other Muslim countries.  

Animated with this sublime faith, they hoped that the Muslim countries of the world would one day draw closer to it and might move towards a Pan-Islamic grouping of states. A.B. Rajput made this point amply clear when he remarked:  

"Thus with the birth of Pakistan, the hope of Pan-Islamic unity and brotherhood brightened afresh amongst the Islamic states of Asia." It is a truism, that Pakistan's quest for a world Muslim unity was born out of its deep ideological conviction underlying the formation of its statehood and its subsequent reorganization. It was made abundantly clear in one of the directive principles of state policy under the new constitution of Pakistan which provided: "The state shall endeavour to strengthen the bonds of unity among Muslim countries."  

As a matter of fact, the analysts isolate diverse variables that influenced its policy towards the Muslim


world out of which two appear most dominant. In the first place, as Callard viewed, "...Pakistan could find no single country which could be counted as an unfailing friend and ally willing to lend aid and comfort in time of need. In this bleak situation Islam appeared to Pakistan to offer the only bond of belonging in whose name she could appeal for other nations' support.\textsuperscript{87} This line of argument is easily intelligible when one viewed it in the context of India's hostility right from its birth, against which Pakistan endeavoured to present a United Muslim world as a balancing counterpoise. A Pakistani author lent considerable support to this view behind Pakistan's fiery espousal of the Muslim cause when he observed: \textsuperscript{88}

"It is, however, not correct to say that the ideal of pan-Islamism has been an active force in Pakistani politics. The basic considerations in Pakistan's foreign policy have been fear of Indian aggression and the liberation of the Muslims of Kashmir."

Secondly, there was also an over-arching ambition to bear the mantle of leadership of the Muslim world for which they constantly referred to Pakistan as the biggest Muslim country and the natural leader of the fraternity of the


\textsuperscript{88} Choudhury, n. 84, p.343.
Muslim world. "In the laboratory of Pakistan, we are experimenting with the principles and ideals of Islam and hope to put before the world a progressive code of life." Though, the love of Pakistanis for Islam was genuine, they made no bones about their much-cherished wish to lead the world Muslims along a new path.

If the above two hypotheses are valid, the forthcoming analysis will serve to highlight the fact that Pakistan which initially treated the Muslim world as a single unity, received no input for the realisation of its objectives for which it was forced to treat the Muslim world at the level of individual countries with the acceptance of the concomitant compulsions of international diplomacy.

It is a matter of historical record that Pakistan, right from its inception, espoused the claim to independence of all Muslim countries which were once part of the colonial empires. It supported inside and outside the United Nations the right to self-determination of the Muslim populations of Palestine, Indonesia, Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria and Libya. As a Pakistani author wrote:

---


90 Hasan, n.19, p.165.
"With the exception of the Kashmir question, no issue that has come up before the United Nations has so stirred the people of Pakistan, or has called forth such exertions from its representatives as the question of Palestine."

The point that needs further clarification here is that there was no positive stimulus either in the form of pressure or persuasion from the Muslim world for Pakistan to advocate their cause. Rather, King Farooq of Egypt was reported to have ridiculed Pakistan's devotion to Islamic causes by saying to his courtiers, "Don't you know that Islam was born on 14 August 1947?" Similarly, Indonesia, whose struggle for independence moved Zafrullah Khan to remark that Pakistan "felt like a bird one of whose wing was free but the other was still nailed to the ground", described Nehru as the "second father of the Republic of Indonesia." Its poor opinion of the Pakistanis was also noted by a member of Pakistani Parliament on 23 March 1950.

"I have met many Indonesians, high and low, in Karachi, Calcutta, and Rangoon. Many of them still hold the


375
mistaken notion, so ridiculously spread by Bharati propagandists, that the Muslims of this subcontinent have made no sacrifices for the freedom of their country and it is the Congress and the Hindus alone who fought against foreign domination."

Pakistan's effort to set up an institutionalized structure for promotion of world Islamic solidarity also met dismal failure for lack of any reverse flow of stimuli from the Muslim countries. True, Pakistan revived the old Motamar-e-Alam-e-Islami (Moslem World Conference) which held its first session at Mecca in 1926 and remained dormant since then. Under its auspices, the third session of the Motamar was held at Karachi in February 1949 with delegates from seven countries participating in its deliberations. Its fourth session was held subsequently in February 1951 at Karachi and the representatives swelled up to thirty-six countries. Delivering the inaugural address, Liaquat Ali affirmed, "To Pakistanis nothing was more dearer than the prospect of strengthening of the world-wide Muslim brotherhood." Though Motamar started functioning on a permanent basis at Karachi and proved most enduring of all, yet when, on return from London, Liaquat Ali wanted to convene an Islamic Conference at the governmental level, the Arab and non-Arab states did not show much enthusiasm
because, as reported in the Dawn in its issue of 30 May 1949, Pakistan wanted a treaty of formal alliances to be signed between the Muslim countries.

Their lack of interest was evident when Choudhury Khaliquzzaman, the President of the ruling Muslim League Party, went to the West Asian countries in September 1949 to explore the possibility of the formation of a peoples organisation representing all the Muslim countries of the world with a view to discussing common factors among themselves as also evolving, if necessary, a common policy which would benefit Islam and the Muslim world as a whole. Though, he started with the humble mission of working for an Islamic bloc to cement muslim solidarity on a people to people basis, he exceeded his brief, visited London and discussed "Islamistan" with the responsible British officials for concluding a security pact with British blessing.94

However, it was an irony that this governmental effort at Pan-Islamic integration failed miserably to materialize. But, an International Islamic Economic Conference was held at Karachi on 25 November 1949, under the non-official auspices, in which twenty-one countries

participated. The notable absentee was Indonesia. At the conference the Prime Minister of Pakistan said in his inaugural address:°5 "We all belong to the great brotherhood of Islam. Islam alone can solve some of the problems facing the world today". In his presidential address, Finance Minister Ghulam Muhammad echoed the same sentiment when he exhorted the Muslim countries to go beyond economic cooperation and become an organic whole in which each part strengthen the whole and the whole imparts life to each part and also develop a system of collective bargaining and collective system. He also underscored the necessity of an ideology to form the basis of World Muslim Unity. And Islam was such an ideology, as he remarked:\96

"We cannot put implicit faith in the Western democratic system nor can we subscribe to Communism, although there are some aspects of this vast and comprehensive experiment which we must appreciate... Islamic society has never been subject to the stresses and strains of class war and morbid hatred of the rich has never been one of its characteristics... Islam is the golden mean between these two extremes; it is a

non-violent method of rectifying unsocial and detrimental inequalities."

Despite all the eloquent protestations of world Islamic brotherhood, the conference never fulfilled the expectation of its patrons for economic interaction among the Muslims as a prelude to a contemplated political integration. The Conference set up International Islamic Economic Organisation which convened its second session in Tehran. At its third session at Karachi in 1954, the Foreign Minister Zafrullah Khan rightly voiced his disappointment in his presidential address, when he said that it was a profound pity that the progress achieved did not match the high expectation and early euphoria and it gradually petered out after the first conference. But one crucial point thrown up by the whole process was that Pakistan's effort to assume the leadership of the Muslim countries, met a premature demise. The wider question, as The Economist commented,97 behind the whole meeting was, "whether Pakistan will be able to assume the leadership of widely flung peoples who, however much they may have its common, have hitherto been more noted for their "agreement to disagree" than for any effective co-operation. Pakistan undoubtedly has ambition of this sort." The forced abandonment of the project of convening a Muslim Prime Ministers' Conference at
Karachi on account of inhospitable reception of the idea by the invitees illustrates the above point. The Economist further observed that Pakistan's latest initiative in international politics has disillusioned them and there would be an end to the Pan-Islamic trend in Pakistan. A Pakistani writer analyzed a few years later that owing to lack of enthusiasm for it, the project had to be abandoned. This period commenced with the death of Jinnah in September 1948 and ended in 1953 with the dismissal of Khwaja Nazimuddin as the Prime Minister. Pakistan now rediscovered the Muslim world where political realities were radically different from those envisioned by it. Each Muslim country had its distinctive history and political ethos. Except religion, the Arab and non-Arab Muslims had nothing in common. Mecca might be the past or present symbol of Muslim religious unity but certainly not the hub of political gravity. A Pakistani author underscored this split personality of the Muslim world when he wrote:

"The mythical Arab nationalism itself was torn by territorial loyalties, divergence of economic


99 Ahmad, n.20, p.69.
interests, and differences of political outlook. There was not one Arab nationalism but as many nationalisms as there were Arab states. Some of them were bitterly anti-west and others were well-disposed towards it, depending partly upon the character and composition of their governments and partly on their economic interests. The ill-equipped monarchies had to seek external support in the face of the challenge from powerful republics."

So, one found that after 1953, a trend was discernible in Pakistan's foreign policy that took account of the pluralistic character of the Muslim world and accordingly underwent radical reorientation as it received stimuli from different countries from time to time. Perhaps in this on-going process, two factors further served to leaven its policy towards each country with distinct individualistic flavour. In the first place, political transformation in West Asia consequent upon the Egyptian Revolution of 1952, had opened up new vistas of Arab nationalism and brought about a complete secularization of Arab politics. Pakistan was caught up in the web of contradictions which was revealed between the interests of these countries and the Western powers, symbolized by the Mossadegh's nationalisation of the Anglo-Iranian oil
company. Secondly, Pakistan’s membership of the Commonwealth and its generally Pro-Western policies culminating in its alliance with the Western-sponsored pacts projected it in an entirely different role in the West Asian politics than the one advocated by its early decision-makers. Egypt under Nasser was not only the symbol of Pan-Arabianism but the main bastion of opposition to Western ambition. In the crescendo of this movement, Pakistan’s policy was deemed to be an attempt to divide the Arab world and to throw a spanner to its unity of Nasser’s conception for perpetuating the Western domination. Perhaps Nasser treated it as a challenge to his claim of leadership of the Muslim world with Egypt as the political nerve-centre of the Arab and not of the Muslim West Asia which Pakistan had tried to build but in vain. Certainly, “Pakistan fell in the estimation of the Arabs who are strongly opposed to alignment with the West.” As a Pakistani author summed up:

"The Baghdad Pact undoubtedly divided the Arab world; Pakistan by its membership in that pact was held responsible for contributing to that division. By

---


101 Hasan, n.19, p.76.
destroying Arab unity and by making the Arabs more suspicious of Western intentions, the Bagdad Pact increased instability in the region."

The net outcome of this development was a clear configuration of powers in the West Asia. While Egypt spearheaded opposition to the Western alliance structure, Turkey and Iran lent unqualified support. Accordingly Pakistan drifted with the prevailing current. It was clearly evident with the onset of the Anglo-French action in Suez, the countries which supported the Dulles plan included the Bagdad Pact States of Turkey, Iran and Pakistan and those who opposed it were Indonesia and India. Defending the Western action, Suhrawardy was said to have viewed it as an attempt on the part of these powers to see that the Suez canal remained free for international navigation. The invasion aimed at restricting the sovereignty of one country for the benefit of the world. He also admitted with characteristic frankness that the days of Pan-Islamism were over and Pakistanis should first safeguard the legitimate interests of their own Muslims.\(^{102}\) On another occasion he also ran down Nasser. This was more or less a patterned behaviour, except for a brief interlude during April 1960, when Nasser visited Pakistan.

\(^{102}\) For details see my Fifth Chapter.
In sharp contrast to this, Turkey and Iran moved closer to Pakistan. At the initiative of Ayub Khan, a Regional Cooperation for Development with the headquarter at Teheran was set up in July 1964 which envisioned a joint collaborative programme of development in the spheres of industry, agriculture, mineral resources, communication, education, health and cultural exchanges. A number of "joint Enterprises, i.e. industrial and manufacturing projects were run by two or all of the partners."103 For this also, Ayub got more inspiration from the legislators who suggested for a confederation of the RCD countries.104 It is clear beyond doubt that Pakistani gesture for utilizing religion as a force for alliance with Middle Eastern countries has never been reciprocated, for which dissatisfaction was expressed by the legislators regarding the response to "...emotions and sentiments which we display towards them at all times".105


104 Pakistan (Second) National Assembly, Debates, vol.2-11, nos.2-8, 21-29 November 1962, pp.3-261.

Our enquiry into the impact of regional systemic source shows that India, China and the West Asian countries have deeply influenced its foreign policy behaviour. India remained its principal enemy from which threat is perceived by its successive policy-makers to emanate to its territorial integrity. As a necessary corollary, it was Kashmir with which it was primarily concerned, for the India control of Kashmir stood as a denial of the "Two-Nation" theory, the main basis of Pakistan and its continued raison d'être. As a result, since its birth, the search for security and independence from India and the solution of the Kashmir dispute to its satisfaction had led to an agonising quest for augmenting its capabilities in terms of procuring military aid and diplomatic support from the Big Powers especially the United States. Kashmir became the litmus test for judging the cordiality or hostility of any country or an individual for Pakistan over the years. Its growing affinity and consequent disillusionment with the Western Powers particularly the United States stemmed mainly from this issue, so also its declining faith in the efficacy of the United Nations. Its policy shift in early 1960's towards the Communist world was also dictated by this consideration. The issue still continued to be the main stumbling block for Indo-Pakistan rapprochement, even if the bases of hostility were wider than Kashmir.
With regard to China, our enquiry reveals that China's policy towards Pakistan in the years 1947-53 was in keeping with its general pattern of policy towards Asia as a whole. It was one of militantly revolutionary policy marked by open hostility and contempt towards Asian leaders branding them as the hirelings of imperialism. But Pakistanis responded with a measure of shrewd diplomacy: they recognised China; advocated its admission into the United Nations and refused to brand it as the aggressor in the Korean war. It showed that Pakistan was very sensitive on issues hurting Chinese susceptibility. Perhaps this laid down the foundation for future cordiality. Interestingly enough, China on its part had never endorsed India's claim to Kashmir even in the hey-days of Sino-Indian relationship, it played cool Pakistan's membership of the SEATO, because in the Bandung Conference, Mohammad Ali Bogra, Pakistan's Primier assured him that it was not directed against them as the real enemy of Pakistan was India.

In the aftermath of Indo-Chinese war of 1962, China courted Pakistan and the vice-versa. Both discovered in the Indian subcontinent an area of agreement as a clear perception of their interest resulted in the coincidence of their objective to contain India which was their common enemy. Henceforward, they followed a cooperative policy
which led to the endorsement of Pakistan's view regarding Kashmir by China, and it eventuated in the Indo-Pakistani war of 1965 which was even terminated at the behest of the Chinese authorities. This was also repeated in 1971 war.

With regard to the West Asia, it is revealed that Pakistani leadership viewed the successful fruition of their freedom struggle as a manifestation of a renewed sense of Islamic belonging made resurgent in the aftermath of the Second World War, they made a fervent plea for reviving this world spirit. So, it stressed their natural and religious links, common culture, and identity of economic interests. With this objective, its hosted numerous international conferences to discuss problems of mutual security and economic interests for promoting world Islamic Solidarity. Underlying this, was its desire to acquire the mantle of leadership of the Muslim World, and to enlist their support in its disputes with India.

Pakistan's intentions were revealed and became suspect when it joined the Western alliance system orchestrated by the United States which was directed to divide the Arab world. Its stand on the Suez crisis was deplored by the Muslim countries. As it encountered increasing opposition, it gave up its pet idea of promoting
economic integration as a prelude to political integration of the Muslim World. It progressively discovered its pluralistic character, and as there was no reverse flow of stimuli from them, it abandoned the idea of treating them as an organic entity and instead followed a policy at the level of individual countries with the acceptance of the concomitant compulsions of international diplomacy.