Foreign policy does not occur in a vacuum. Nor does it arise exclusively out of the demands that originate within societies. The all encompassing international system of which societies are subsystems also serve as stimuli to external behaviour. One cannot study the external behaviour of nation states independently of the larger international context in which it occurs and towards which it is precisely directed. The linkage between the international system and the various national subsystems has become so pervasive that it has almost become a given datum for any analyst, analysing the behaviour of a state, to proceed on the basis of some estimate of the relative potency of systemic variables.

But the problem that baffles an analyst is how to conceive the international phenomenon in such a way that would lend itself to a systematic comprehension of the impact of its major variables on the behaviour of a State. The earlier efforts of the traditionalists to define the term "world" as "the family of nations" or "the international society" to conceptualize the organization of international relations with a precise empirical referent confounded rather than clarified a sound analysis of international politics. As a result, with the advent of behavioural revolution, this imprecise and value laden
concept "World" was gettisoned. And this unhappy experience was sought to be obviated by the efforts of the behaviourists who conceived the world as "system" and redefined it as the "International system". This betook clearly an expression of their desire to adopt a precise concept, "system", which had already proved its potentialities as an analytical tool of immense utility in the study of social and physical sciences. As is understood in normal parlance in these sciences, the concept, "system", is said to exist in an environment and to be composed of parts which, through interaction, are in relation to each other. Consequently, a system has a structure and encompasses functions through which it is either sustained or changed. If international phenomenon can be conceived in this way, the analyst can fruitfully analyse the major variables of the field under three foci, because a systemic perspective enables him to focus upon the actions of nations as the components of the system; upon the structure and functioning of the system which emanate from the interactions of the nations and upon the environmental factors which condition both the actions of the states and the operation of the system.¹

However, the concept of the international system poses some methodological problems for analysis despite its

tantalizing simplicity. In the first place, while states, or individuals, or groups are considered to be international actors forming a congeries of global systems, for reasons of both substance and manageability, it is necessary to distinguish between the international system and the many national subsystems. The special problems of states of the South Asia can be analysed in systemic terms; it is also possible to place them in the broader context of the international system as they are being affected by it through their membership. So, it is legitimate to view the South Asia as a sub-system as it conforms to the functional requirements of the larger international system. As the latter bears no characteristic of a subsystem, it can truly be called the only one international system.

Secondly, the identification of the units or actors of the international system presents another problem. It is a truism that a variety of units ranging from individuals, like public officials or private citizens, to collectivities comprising groups, governments, states or supranational bodies are considered to be initiators of action that sustains the international system. But, to the analyst, his goal will determine whether he treats individuals or collectivities as international actors. If his purpose is to explain the stability and change in the
international system, he must perform focus on states as actors. But if he is concerned with the behaviour of a single state or with a particular pattern of interaction among several states, he must dwell upon the persons who are legitimate decision-makers for the state. But most analysts combine those two levels of analysis by positing the state as decision-makers model of actors who comprise the international system. This boils down to the fact that action in international system is usually attributed to states, but these states are recognised to be a group of Government officials who act as the strategic decision-makers.

Thirdly, another set of methodological problems that confront the analyst concerns the international environment and its nexus with the international system. While the environment of a system is viewed as consisting of everything that lies outside that system, it is not very helpful when such a conception is applied to a system that comprises all the states of the world. Logically, one can equate outer space with the environment of the international system. But, as a matter of fact, the analyst is mainly interested in the political phenomena. Other kinds of phenomena are also analysed which shed light on the political dimension of the behaviour of the international actors. So, it is legitimate to view the environment of the
international system as comprising all those events and conditions, both human and non-human, which are non-political in nature and which affect the behaviour of states and the operation of the international system. But, as the analyst is primarily concerned with an international political system, it further poses the problem of making an analytical separation from all other overlapping and coexisting non-political systems. This naturally begs the most crucial question as how to conceptualize the politics of international life in such a way that defines the international political system. As the international political relations involve relations between nations, there is a pervasive tendency among the analysts to assume that the boundaries of international political system are delineated by the interactions between the governments. Now a pertinent point arises which must be answered first as to what differentiates an international political act from all those acts that are non-political in nature.

Harold J. Sprout and Margaret Sprout sought to address this task when they defined the international political act in terms of a particular actor - the organized political community - rather than in terms of certain

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qualities of the act itself which made no conceptual room for accounting other international actors that have entered into the changed arena of the global politics. Similarly, Harold Lasswell, Morton A. Kaplan, Robert A. Dahl, Talcott Parsons and Edward C. Banfield attempted to define politics and the common thread running through all their conceptualizations stresses that any political situation is an interaction pattern in which some actors are either producing or attempting to produce behavioural modifications on the part of other actors. As every social role requires that its occupant attempts to modify the behaviour of others in certain ways, the formulation fails to identify criteria for differentiating those behavioural modifications that are attempted in situations with high political content from those that are induced in situations with a low content. In James N. Rosenau's view, the mark of difference between the two situations lies in "functional distance" that separates the controller from the controllee on those issues that initiate and sustain interactions between them. So,

3 Harold and Margaret Sprout, Foundation of International Politics (Princeton, 1962), p.75.
according to him, the boundaries of the international political system are determined by the actions and resources that contribute to the initiation and maintenance of control relations between functionally distant international actors. By differentiating international politics from other types of politics on the basis of much greater functional distance that separates its actors, his conceptualization of the international political system served to draw its much complicated boundary.

Lastly, the systemic perspective still presents another problem. There is a strong conviction that in the systems concept, a bias is built in favour of stability. As a matter of fact, a system analyst never assumes that the requisite functions will be performed always. He willy-nilly makes enough conceptual norm for accounting for instability that leads to the collapse of the system into its environment or to its transformation, so it is possible to view that any international system as located at any moment in time somewhere on a continuum that ranges from perfect stability to perfect instability and to treat the shifts in location that occurs through time as a systemic transformation.

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5 Rosenau, n.2, pp.197-237.
(i) Great Power Structure

If the international system is defined in this way then the most important systemic variable is the pattern of relationship prevailing among Great Powers in any era of human history. As argued earlier, while a seamless web of structures are formed out of interactions of states, individuals, and non-governmental actors, what is most salient is the one that emerges out of the behaviour of Great Powers. But it varies over the spectrum of time depending upon the number of Great Powers involved and distribution of capabilities among them. As a result, the theorists have labelled the various pattern of relationships marking the different phases of international politics in terms of distinct systems. It has been contended by a theorist that when five or more states enjoy the Great Power status on the basis of relative capabilities, the international politics is termed as a balance of power system.\(^6\) Similarly, when the Great Powers dominate the world politics and the lesser powers side with one or the other, with an ideological or emotional commitment that precludes the chances of their breaking away from their blocs, the resulting pattern is viewed as a tight bipolar system.

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\(^6\) These distinctions were first developed in Morton A. Kaplan, *System and Process in International Politics* (New York, 1957).
Further, a new structure of relationship emerges when the hierarchy of the system disintegrates consequent upon lesser states moving to the Great Power status and shifting their intra-bloc loyalties, it is viewed as a loose bipolar system. But, it must be said without any fear of contradiction that, as "reality" of world politics differs in the perspective of the observer, any attempt to trace the exact dates and duration of such systems in the history of modern times, is bound to be arbitrary. Nevertheless, the theorists contend that the balance of power system prevailed during the nineteenth century and continued till the outbreak of the Second World War. From 1945 to 1959, the world was truly characterized by tight bipolar system, and the world became a loose bipolar system during 1960's. But a new pattern reminiscent of the 19th century classical balance of power system emerged in 1970's.

It has been widely assumed by the theorists that the prevailing structure of the international system implies a number of crucial inputs into the behaviour of a state, no matter what order of ranking it holds in the prevailing hierarchy of world politics. The rules governing the conduct of its foreign relations are derived from the dispensations reached by the Great Powers to cope with their international environment for shaping the major issues of any era. Even if, these rules may not be categorically
specified, their salience in shaping decisions on the part of the policy framers of a state is simply overwhelming.

Robert L. Rothstein, who has written a book on the interactions between small powers and their systemic environments notes that small nations are dominated by the system in the sense that the opportunities they have are dependent on the kind of system that exists. They can rarely create their own opportunities. His basic thesis is that the influence of the small states as well as their security primarily depends on the balance of power between the dominant powers of the system and the level of conflict among them. As Pakistan is a new state with marginal international influence on the eve of its creation, the ensuing analysis will serve to highlight the hypotheses: If systemic variable was potent in influencing the formulation and conduct of Pakistan's foreign policy, then its continuity and change are correlated, with systemic requirements and changes from time to time. To prove this, historical details will be subordinated to analytical perspective.

The Second World War came to a close in 1945. It shattered the old balance of power system prevailing in world politics. The configuration of power was yet to take

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a definite shape. But the fact remained, Germany, Japan and Italy lay prostrate, the first divided, and the first and second occupied. France and China, though victorious, were weak and exhausted. The Western Hemisphere was firmly in the grip of the United States of America. Africa and the West Asia were politically controlled by its allies. The Southern Arc was still a part of the British empire while the sphere of influence of the Soviet Union was confined to Eastern Europe, North Korea and North Vietnam. The level of power remained essentially of the order of 1939-45, with the United States and the Soviet Union emerging as formidable powers and the British Empire was down and out. But, there was a notable exception in case of the United States which had acquired an embryonic nuclear capability. With regard to the stratification of power the gap between the two and other international actors was great but less frightening as it assumed a decade later. In systems term, there was only one universal actor, the United Nations, but no formal institutionalized structure of military organization existed either for the system as a whole or for any group of actors. But a number of functional organizations like International Labour Organisation, Food and Agricultural Organisation etc. operated with partial membership attached to it. The Third World was yet to emerge as the process of decolonisation in Asia, Africa and Latin America had just commenced.
The Great War bequeathed two problems which defied solution and hangs fire even today. In the first place, the political vacuum created by the elimination of the hegemones here-to-fore exercised by Germany and Japan over the vast areas of the Northern Hemisphere was to be filled up. Disagreement arose concerning not only of Central and Eastern Europe but also parts of the East Asia overrun by the Japanese and surprisingly too of the Indo-China. And the settlement of the Asian aspect of the problem came to involve not only the United States and the Soviet Union and the people of the affected areas but also the new Communist Government in China after the consumation of the Chinese Revolution. Secondly, as the original inventor and user of nuclear weapon, the United States bore the onus of how to integrate it into the structure of its national arsenal and to define its relationship with the traditional concept of the role of weaponry as a technique of diplomacy. In the coming decades, it faced dilemmas of decision on many related issues of its control, use and denial to other adversaries. For the present, the two problems became mutually interlinked and interacting. On the one hand, the political conflicts arising over the problem of filling up vacuums threatened hostilities with all the potentialities

of escalating into global war while, on the other, the tendency persisted that the exclusive possession of the nuclear weapon would be decisive factor in the solution of these great issues of the day.

The twin problem could have been solved in the post-war years had the Western Powers led by its prima donna, the United States and the Soviet Union carried forward the Grand Alliance of War-time Cooperation. But all such hopes wilted away as the Grand Alliance petered out. President Harry S. Truman recalls in his memoirs that early in 1946, Russian activities in Iran threatened world peace. Instead of leaving Iran on the appointed day, they attempted to instal a "revolutionary Government" in Azerbaijan and vacated only at the behest of the United States. Similarly, in July 1946, the Soviet Union made an open bid to control Turkey by proposing to the Turkish Government that the Dardenelles be placed under the Joint Turkish-Soviet Control. Turkey spurned the offer with the active backing of the United States. Came close on its heel, in early 1947, an attempt by the pro-Moscow Communist faction in Greece to overthrow the national Government. These Soviet designs unnerved the Western Powers. Further, Russian

actions in Central and Eastern Europe also served to harden the Western attitudes. Although the Western Powers, after the conclusion of War, conceded the Soviet Union a dominant position in Europe and Far East, with an assumption that a stronger Russia would prevent the resurgence of a revanchist Germany and Japan, it was soon belied as Russian intention gradually revealed. The Soviet Union turned a political revisionist and tried to communize the whole of Eastern Europe. This was done by making the belt of states between Germany and the Soviet Union into a "Cordon Communiste" which could bloc the corridor through which the Germany army had passed in the past with least topographical resistance.\textsuperscript{10} It had a frightful consequence. The extension of Russia's political and military power into the heart of Europe represented a major alteration in the world strategic and political balance which few foresaw in 1945.\textsuperscript{11}

The Western powers could not view these developments with equanimity. The United States was compelled to shade off its isolationist stance in continental affairs and returned to a more powerful anti-Communist alliance opposed to such Communist advance. The


first American response to the Soviet challenge regarding Greece and Turkey came on 12 March 1947 in the form of an address by the President Truman to a Joint session of the Congress. On 22 May 1947, the President signed a Congressional bill committing the United States to support these two states against the Soviet designs, assuming for the first time total responsibility for the British undertakings in both the countries. This policy soon acquired the appellation of "Truman Doctrine", though conceived in the narrow context of threat to the two states. It, in fact, heralded the process of direct containment of the Soviet influence by laying down the general principles of the United States to support free people who were resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures. Then came in July 1947, the famous address at Harvard by the Secretary of State, George C. Marshall in which he expounded his famous "Marshall Plan" for the speedy economic recovery of the devastated Europe. As it was meant for all, in July, the representatives of Sixteen States - all of non-Communist Europe except Spain plus Ireland and Turkey - met at Paris along with the Soviet Union, Poland and Czechoslovakia. But the Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslov Molotov with its allies left the conference in a huff. This action set the seal to the breach between the West and the Soviet bloc. The history of Europe for years
ahead was settled within these two weeks. It served only to usher in the Cold War whose coming was clearly foreshadowed in the salutary warning of Sir Winston Leonard Spencer Churchill sounded at Fulton, Missouri on 5 March 1946 in words that have become immortal: "From Stettin on the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the continent". Since then international relations have been characterized by extreme hostility and psychological war-fares between the two powers. As time wore on, this assumed the form of a relentless struggle between Communist and Western political ideas each embodied in powerful armed coalition of states that tended to cast its dark shadow over the world politics.

Coming to the various phases of the Cold War, it is clearly deciphered that neither side was directly pitted against the other during the period 1945-47. True, economically United States was stronger as its G.N.P. after the War, was thrice approximately to that of the Soviet Union. Similarly, in the military sphere, the United States had a clear advantage as its ground forces, after demobilization, came roughly to 670,000 men whereas the Soviet Union had 2.8 million and the latter did not possess

a Navy or Air Force comparable to the former. Besides, the Soviet Union had no answer to the nuclear monopoly of the United States. And the combined strength of the Western Powers was overwhelmingly superior to that of the Soviet Union. But what prevented both sides for a policy of direct confrontation, the following explanations seem plausible. In the first place, both were operating without clear-cut policies backed by domestic support. Secondly, the nuclear monopoly of the United States and its vast economic power contained premonitions for the Soviet Union in the event of a prolonged conflict. Similarly, the Soviet advantage on the ground in the context of an European War and the considerable uncertainty as to the destructiveness of the new atomic weapons coupled with the actual ability of the United States to deliver them on the Soviet target to ensure its total elimination compelled the Americans not to contest Russian primacy in Central Europe for its possible push westward, while the Soviet Union remained preoccupied with consolidating its war-time gains and only half-heartedly probed its newly established perimeters, lest the West exploit its weaknesses.\footnote{Zbigniew K. Brezezinski, "How the Cold War was Played", \textit{Foreign Affairs}, vol.51, no.1, October 1972, pp.181-211.}
However, as 1947 wore on, there emerged a form of political consensus within both societies. The defeat of Henry Wallace and the appearance of bipartisan support for an actively anti-Soviet policy ended the post-war uncertainty in the United States, while the imposition of Stalinist terror conjured up the spectre of capitalist encirclement that served to fuel an implacable ideological hostility towards its rival. So, the confrontation took definitely a recognizable shape during the period 1948-52, because by July 1947, the United States goal of fashioning a comprehensive strategy for countering Soviet power was expressed theoretically in the "policy of containment" and the Soviet Union responded in equal measure by bringing all the East European States under its tight hegemonistic control. While United States continued to enjoy distinct advantage in economic power which grew to over $ 400 billion

14 This policy received its most persuasive treatment in George F. Kennan's article in Foreign Affairs of July 1947 entitled: "The Source of Soviet Conduct". The essence of the policy was the conviction that Soviet pressure against the institutions of the Western world was something that could be contained by adroit and vigilant application of counterforce at a series of constantly shifting, geographical and political points corresponding to the shifts and manoeuvres of Soviet policy. If the United States was successful in this, it would force upon Kremlin a far degree of moderation and circumspection that she had to observe in recent years and in this way promote tendencies which must find their outlet in either break-up or the gradual mellowing of Soviet power". Foreign Affairs, vol.25, no.4, July 1947, pp.566-82.
(in 1966 dollars) and enforced a vital political link with the Western Powers by the infusion of massive aid, the Soviet Union also crossed its pre-War G.N.P. reaching $150 billion mark (in 1966 dollars) and became ideologically aligned with the Communist Government in China after it came to power in 1949. But relatively, the military power of the United States worsened when the Soviet Union broke its monopoly by the explosion of an atomic device in 1949.

The above foregoing served as the major strand of development in the international system against the background of which Pakistan acquired international personality as an independent nation on 14 August 1947 out of the undivided British India. So it's founding father was called upon to formulate its foreign policy in an era of confrontation. Enunciating the broad contours of his country's foreign policy, Mohammad Ali Jinnah observed in his broadcast to the people of the United States in February 1948:15

"Our foreign policy is one of friendliness and goodwill towards all nations of the world. We do not cherish aggressive designs against any country or nation. We believe in the principle of honesty and fair-play in

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national and international dealings and are prepared to make contribution to the promotion of peace and prosperity among all nations of the world. Pakistan will never be lacking in extending the material and moral support to the oppressed and suppressed peoples of the world and in upholding the principles of the United Nations Charter".

So Pakistan adopted an independent foreign policy. True, Jinnah did not live long to see his policy took deep root, but his trusted lieutenant Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan carried forward his unfulfilled task and unswervingly adhered to it till his assassination in 1951. In a forceful reiteration of Jinnah's policy, he observed: 16

"Pakistan was neither tied to the apron-strings of the Anglo-American bloc, nor was it a camp follower of the Communist bloc. It steered clear of the intra-bloc rivalry and had an absolutely independent foreign policy. Pakistan had all along been uninfluenced by the intra-bloc struggle going on in the world and had supported the cause which it considered to be just. The records of the U.N. debates bear testimony to this

16 Dawn (Karachi), 19 March 1951.
fact. Sometimes we agreed with the Western bloc and sometimes with the Communist bloc as the situation and the matter under discussion demanded. Pakistan could pursue such an independent course because it was not under the obligation of any foreign power. So we have not been assisted by any country in the world and whatever we have achieved has been through our own resources. Therefore, the question of subservience in foreign policy does not arise.

Now to test the hypothesis enumerated earlier, it is to be proved how systemic variable influenced the formulation and conduct of Pakistan's foreign policy.

It is a well-known fact of history that the Soviet Union, because of its self-imposed isolation, its relative self-sufficiency and powerful ethnocentric tendencies, was basically ignorant about the non-Western world. From the beginning of the Soviet rule in Russia, the question of proper policy towards developing countries called for an urgent answer. Lenin, right from 1921, had opted for a cautious policy of support to the nationalist but non-Communist regimes. It served Russian interests by strengthening the nationalist regimes in Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan as buffers against a revival of British control
or influence. But during Stalin's time, the dogma that the world is divided into two hostile "camps" was reinforced and it persisted during the initial post-war years when it was viewed that anyone not in the Socialist camp was a stooge of the Imperialists. By 1947, Soviet policy became increasingly militant being reflective of a vituperative attack directed against all non-Communist states and forces. Capitalism and Imperialism were believed to be characterized at the time by the aggravated internal contradictions and on the way out. On ideological ground, it was believed that only national liberation movement led by the communist parties would lead to the emancipation of the people of the colonies. So they were encouraged.17

Came the partition of India. It was natural that the Soviet Union looked upon the independence of India and Pakistan as a convenient arrangement between the British Imperialist on the one hand and the bourgeoisie of the two countries for the exploitation of the masses of the subcontinent.18 Even the country's leaders were not spared. Jinnah's appointment as the Governor-General of Pakistan was


referred to by the Moscow Radio as a clever trick pulled off by the Muslim League.\(^{19}\) To a communist observing the British officers in the Indian and Pakistan armed forces, the British business operating in both countries and their membership in the Commonwealth, it seemed obvious that both remained dependencies of their former colonies.\(^{20}\)

It is usually contended that the Soviet Union's early indifference towards the South Asian States was a reflection of a lack of a calculated Asian policy in Moscow rather than any concentrated effort to foster revolutions in this part of the world. Competent analysts of the Stalin period viewed that the so-called Zhdanov line was not meant to be applied to in any calculated way in the South Asia. It was precisely because of two reasons.\(^{21}\) In the first place, the behaviour of local Communists was no surest indicator of Soviet foreign policy, even if they owed allegiance to it and it was also likely that the nuances of policy were determined by them often in a manner unknown to the Soviet policy makers. Secondly, Stalin's major

\(^{19}\) Glasgow Herald, 15 July 1947.


preoccupation in the post-war period was to determine the Soviet policy in Europe where the conflict was raging and where he had a distinct possibility of advancing the Soviet interests. Asia was peripheral in terms of the Soviet power politics and he could do little to influence events in Asia except keeping himself absorbed in the developments in China.

However, the creation of a state so close to their border must have made an immediate impression on them. Pakistan inherited those parts of the undivided India which had been the traditional source of Soviet interest in the South Asia. They had a systematic understanding of the Southern approaches to their frontiers and generally of the areas that lie between those frontiers and the Arabian Sea. The significance of Karachi sea and airport, as a strategic base and the nerve-centre of communication could not have been lost upon them. As Toynbee pointed out: "Since the days of Tsar Ivan the Terrible (Imperat A.D. 153384) Russia had been seeking an outlet to an ice-free open sea.... for Russia in the twentieth century, an outlet on the Indian ocean was the sole still untried possibility".  \(^{22}\) This was evident from the fact that when in April 1948, Pakistan proposed the exchange of diplomatic relations, the

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Soviet Union responded readily, even enthusiastically. And in 1949, even before formal diplomatic relations could be established, Prime Minister Liaquat Ali was invited to visit the Soviet Union.23

As a matter of fact, Liaquat did not go. Pakistan badly needed economic and military aid, neither of which the Soviet Union was in a position to render. So, Stalin's invitation did not cut much ice with him. Besides, he was not enamoured of the Soviet system. Nor could he contemplate with serenity the idea of an alliance with the Soviet Union, for they have to change their political and economic system, adopt Communism and identify themselves with it in matters of foreign policy goals. They were firmly convinced that Russian policy was one of expansionism designed to create trouble, even to promote revolution because Communism thrives on chaos. So, it was repugnant to Liaquat. Besides, Pakistanis were bitterly disappointed by the indifferent attitude of the Soviet Union in the Security Council towards the Kashmir question during those years.24

But still, from the Soviet side there was no dearth of gestures to improve relations with Pakistan.

particularly in economic and cultural spheres. Till 1952, Pakistan enjoyed a favourable balance of trade with the Russians. In September 1952, when it faced food shortage, the Soviet Union signed a barter deal for immediate supply of wheat in exchange for raw jute and cotton. In April 1952, the Soviet Union also offered machinery and agricultural implements and textiles to Pakistan and also invited an industrial delegation to visit their country. However, despite all these friendly gestures, criticism of the policy of Pakistani leaders continued unabated in Soviet press media. Way back in December 1949, when Pakistan hosted an International Islamic Economic Conference in Karachi in order to find a middle way between Communism and Capitalism for the Islamic bloc, the Soviet Press dubbed this Pan-Islamism as an effort by Pakistan to prepare the ground for a Moslem political and military bloc. But, on the whole, it can be said that the Soviet propaganda offensive was coupled with a desire to maintain and improve relation with Pakistan. There was no demand from the Soviet side to toe its line in foreign policy. Similarly, Pakistan was not keen to go beyond the point of bilateral contact. A line of distinction was made, during this period, in

25 *Dawn* (Karachi), 27 September 1952.

26 *The Hindu* (Madras), 1 January 1950.
Pakistan's policies between anti-Communism at home and an overtly anti-Soviet foreign policy abroad.27

Coming to the policy of the United States towards the subcontinent, one finds that when India and Pakistan emerged as independent states, it, unlike the Soviet Union, greeted the two new members of the Comity of Nations warmly.28 Recognizing the new Dominion of Pakistan, Secretary Marshall wrote that Pakistan, with a population of seventy million persons, would be the largest Muslim country in the world and would occupy one of the most strategic areas of the world.29 Marshall in his usual characteristic style had underscored two points of key importance: a) Pakistan would be the largest Muslim country in the world; and b) Pakistan would occupy "one of the most strategic areas in the world". It meant that when one or both factors became important for American objectives, Pakistan would be courted by them. It exactly happened in the years to come.


28 President Truman's message to India and Pakistan on 15 August 1947 in A Decade of Foreign Policy (1950), by U.S. Senate and State Department (Washington, D.C., 1950) pp.782-83.

29 Memorandum to the President (Harry S.Truman), by the Secretary of State (Marshall), 17 July 1947, Papers of Harry S. Truman, Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.
In the initial post-war years, even up to 1953, the United States was preoccupied, like the Soviet Union with more urgent problems facing Europe, and the Far East. The South Asia was never an area of high priority for Washington. And there was hardly any attempt on its part to evolve an autonomous approach to the region as a whole. The major thrust of its policy was to get along with the Russians. As the South Asia was relatively free from immediate tension. Washington's first phase of policy (1947-53) was confined to pious gesture of goodwill and small amount of economic assistance.\(^{30}\) No major diplomatic, or military investment was contemplated. And its policy on Indo-Pakistani disputes like Kashmir was guided by mostly by the British advice, the subcontinent was still treated as the British "sphere of influence". However, trends in the South Asia were kept under active observation as the United States feared Kremlin may turn to direct involvement and exploitation of what Stalin once termed the great reserves of the revolution in the colonies and dependent territories.\(^{31}\) This was clearly evident from the behind the


31 Quoted in Raymond A. Hare, NEA: South Asia, to Loy W. Henderson, Chairman, SANACC Sub-Committee for NEA, contd...
Scene exercises conducted by the policy planners. Both
Marshall and Forrestal - the chief architects of the
victory in the Second World War - were aware of the Soviet -
German Accord of 1940 which affirmed that the area South of
Batum and Baku in the general direction of the Persian Gulf
was recognized as the centre of aspiration of the Soviets.32
And a comprehensive report of the Joint Strategic Plans
Committee on South and South - West Asia approved by the
Joint Chiefs of Staff on 29 April 1947 (JCS 1769/1) was
under study, which had stressed "the strategic importance of
the area not only because of the great oil resources
processing facilities, but also because it offers
possibilities of direct contact with our ideological
enemies".33 Synchronizing with it, was the record of the
Defence Secretary James Forrestal's diary which revealed his
considered view about the Soviet threat to the oil - bearing
areas of the West Asia, and the possibility of an impending

F.n.31 contd...
"Need for SANACC Appraisal of Possible United States
Military Interests in South Asian Regions", 19 May
1948. Records of the Military Advisor to the Office of
Near Eastern and African Affairs, Record group 59,
National Archives (Washington, D.C.)

pp.251-257.

33 JCS 1769/1, 27 April 1947, "United States Assistance to
other Countries from the Point of National Security",
Foreign Relations of the United States 1947
(Washington, 1972), vol.1, pp.738-50
Arab-Israeli conflict and its likely impact on other parts of the world where the United States interest was certain to be affected, such as Egypt, Pakistan and North Africa.  

But Pakistan, right from its birth, was keenly obsessed with the desire to foster relationship with the United States. The record revealed that its leaders realized the value of American economic and military aid for its development, adopted accordingly a philosophy of growth based on the capitalist pattern of production and turned to it for as a regular source for supply of capital on the morrow of its independence. If Liaquat cancelled his Russian trip and chose to go to the United States, the purpose was too well-known to need elaboration. Speaking in the United States, he remarked that in a world of conflicting ideologies, at least Pakistan did not suffer from such confusions and its people were free from disintegrating doubts and confusion. Analysing the reason why he went to U.S.A. and not to the Soviet Union, a study group of Pakistani Institute of International Affairs wrote:


35 See my Chapter two.

"There are important divergences of outlook between Pakistan, with its Islamic background and the Soviet Union with its background of Marxism which is atheistic.... Pakistan had noticed the subservience which was forced upon the allies of the Soviet Union... Furthermore, there was the question whether Russia could supply the aid, both material and technical, which Pakistan so urgently needed".

Despite ardent desire of Liaquat, the policy planners of the United States were lukewarm to any meaningful tie with Pakistan. India received greater attention till 1949, when Jawaharlal Nehru visited America, the United States government put pressure on him for joining a security arrangement in the East under its leadership. But no exact strategy was defined clearly nor did the United States Government proceed to involve Pakistan or the Southeast Asian States in such a security arrangement immediately. True, in the last years of Truman administration there was a high - level conference held at Nu Wara Eliya in Ceylon on 28 February 1951 presided over by George C. McGhee, where the entire gamut of the United States policy towards the region as well as each individual country was discussed. It was also agreed that the most effective military defence of the South Asia would require strong flanks and Turkey, Iran
and Pakistan were of primary importance on the West and Indo-China on the East. The Truman administration appeared to have toyed with the idea of basing the Western defence of the West Asia upon the control of the Indian subcontinent. And with the appointment of Henry A. Byroade as Assistant Secretary for the Near East and the South Asia talks with Pakistan for a limited arms agreement, which was very much rife in the air, got off the ground and agreement in principle was reached. But as the officials like Chester Bowles, George F. Kennan and Dean Acheson opposed the move, the Truman administration, which was on its last leg, preferred to hold off.

Considering these facts, it is now clear that there was no systemic compulsion weighing with Pakistan policy-makers to align itself with any power bloc. It must be borne in mind that two major variables - its capabilities and its relationship with India - which influenced its foreign policy in the initial years argued that it could have easily cast its lot with the Western Powers, particularly the United States. But as the United States did not consider it as a participant in its global strategic system, Pakistan remained far-off. When Ghulam Mohammad

made strenuous effort for a regional security system in which Pakistan would be the nucleus, the Truman administration did not oblige and simply encouraged it to form a Consultative Organisation of Muslim States to review matters of mutual interest which was politically and strategically a less inflammable proposition for the United States poised for the national election. 38

By mid-1951, there was a hopeful sign that Joseph Stalin was exploring a flexible policy and essentially the Soviet policy was marking time. 39 It was evidently clear in the Nineteenth Party Congress of October 1952, when Stalin's spokesmen abandoned the post-war dogma which divided the world into two hostile camps and pictured a tripartite division: the "imperialists", the Communist bloc of "peace and socialism", and a third group of developing and largely "uncommitted countries". The countries which were gaining their independence were termed as "national democracies". They were in a transitional phase between the earlier stage of "bourgeois nationalist revolution" and the distant goal of building socialism. It was argued that these "national


democracies", by adopting various socialistic measures, would move steadily away from the thraldom of imperialism and take more and more of a socialist content until one day they found themselves in the advanced stage of building the "foundation of socialism". 40

Stalin died on 5 March 1953. Sharp debates ensued over the entire gamut of basic domestic and foreign policy. His successors made an agonizing reappraisal of the world situation, decided to relax tension within the Soviet society and within the non-Communist world and also to take a fresh look at the Asian states. Despite opposition of the "anti-Party group" of Molotov, Malenkov and others, Nikita S. Khrushchev made drastic reorientation by working out a modus vivendi with Marshall Tito's dissident Communist regime, redressing "the overtly irritating aspect of relationship" established between Stalin and Mao Tse-tung in 1949. Further he signed the Austrian Peace Treaty that ended the occupation of her Eastern portion. Khrushchev flew from one state capital to other in Asia and Africa with lavish promises of economic, military and political assistance for the Third World. He also initiated a series of steps for the East-West detente eventuating in the summit

meeting at Geneva in 1955. To cap it all, came the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1956, which set the tone for the process of destalinisation. The Soviet Union now proclaimed that there are many roads to Communism. In some countries Communist can come to power through parliamentary elections. In some they can share power with bourgeoisie nationalist parties.41 This new flexible strategy was codified at the International Conference of Communist Parties in 1957. All these betook the dawn of a new era based on a more realistic appreciation of the world situation and representing a significant process of adoption and adjustment.42 Since Khrushchev laid down the thesis that the principle of peaceful coexistence would govern the relation between states with different social and political system which eschewed interference in the internal affairs of other states for the purpose of altering their system of government or mode of life.43


But by the end of 1957, the leaders of the Sino-Soviet bloc had reverted to a more militant policy in dealing with problems within the bloc and in their approach to the West and other countries allied to it. The shift might have been caused by several factors. The sudden release of pent-up forces within the Communist bloc culminating in the Hungarian revolt presented the Soviet Union an insoluble problem threatening the monolithic Soviet bloc. Besides, Mao's "Hundred Flowers Campaign" led to an eruption of biting criticism of regime which convinced its leaders that little gains would accrue from "soft Line". Besides, the reassessment of the world balance of forces stimulated by Russian success in launching on Inter Continental Ballistic Missile and on earth satellite in late 1957 was also a factor for the shift.⁴⁴ Mao's speech on the 40th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution lent credence to this. He declared on 18 November 1957:⁴⁵

"There are two winds in the world, the east wind and the west wind. There is a saying in China: If the east wind does not prevail over the west wind, then the


⁴⁵ Mao Tse-tung's Speech on 18 November 1957, in Moscow, in Mao Tse-tung on "Imperialists and Reactionaries", Current Background (Hongkong), no. 534, 12 November 1958.
latter will prevail over the former. I think the east wind prevails over the west wind; that is the strength of socialism exceeds the strength of imperialism."

So the Soviet concept of detente changed. In the early 1950's it was primarily designed to shore up a threatened status quo; but in late 1950's it was meant to effect a change in it. The Soviet leaders sought to combine summit from a position of apparent strength with a recourse to open threat. Soviet activity acquired for the first time a distinctly global range being horned by Khrushchev's so-called "national liberation struggle" Speech of January 1961. Its message was clear. Ideologically decisive change could be effected by "national liberation struggles" under the protective care of Soviet power. It became the Soviet version of Dulles's policy of "massive retaliation". But the Soviet Union over-estimated the revolutionary potential for radical global change. As a matter of fact, conditions were not ripe for a Soviet policy that was meant to be both revolutionary and global. Cuban confrontation which reflected the elan of the new spirit made it clear that the policy was based on an insufficient base of power. So the East-West detente, which was going on, received a setback.

46 Brzezinski, n.13, p.190.
It egged on the United States to go for a massive strategic build-up in 1960's.

During this period (1952-61), the Soviet Union became increasingly keen to get a foothold in the countries of the West Asia and the South Asia to counteract the efforts of the United States which was getting entrenched in the region, establishing political, economic and military ties with many countries as British and French power receded. The Soviet Union had two assets to counter the American and British efforts. The Post-Stalin leaders recognized that tension existed between the Asian States and the West on the one hand and between themselves on the other. The Governments of India, Egypt, and Indonesia were opposed to the Western influence in the area. And their policy of "non-alignment" was not only genuine but could be capitalized. By supporting one side or the other in the intra-regional disputes, it would exacerbate the difficulties facing the West and gain some influence. Such a policy would mean abandoning for the time being any hope of gaining a foothold in the countries attacked but a partial position in the area was better than none at all.\(^{47}\)

Another scholar also observed:\(^{48}\)

\(^{47}\) Barnds, n.20, p.115.
"The Soviet policy began actively to woo the Government of India. The essence of that policy was to take advantage of the tensions between India and Pakistan... The Soviet Government appears to have perceived more clearly than the Britishers or Americans ever done that antipathy to Pakistan is the pivot of India's foreign policy."

So in the context of Indo-Pakistani subcontinent, the Soviet Union policy came to rest on two premises. First, it accorded respectability to the Indian policy of "non-alignment" which was dubbed by John Forster Dulles as "immoral and short-sighted". To underwrite it as a viable policy intended to achieve a desired foreign policy pay-off, it unflinchingly supported India on the issue of Kashmir dispute in the United Nations. It, thereby, underscored the point which was brought home to Pakistan that policy of alignment with the Western Powers, particularly United States, has not paid it enough dividend in terms of solution of Kashmir dispute in its favour. The Soviet 79th veto on the Four-Power Resolution was a case in point which shelved the Kashmir issue for ever.49 Secondly, it was in a position, because of the state of its economy by mid-1950's,

to spare enough arms, equipments and machinery for the Asian States. So, it relied more on material aid to these countries than on conventional tools of propaganda and diplomacy. This policy was applied to India with a hope that it would reinforce the inclination and ability of India to stand up to the West. The Soviet Union also dangled this bait before the Pakistanis. While bitterly assailing its leadership for their avowed pro-Western policy, the Soviet Union was equally prepared to carry on aid and trade ties with it. Numerous overtures of aid and attractive terms of trade were ignored by Pakistan which had a favourable balance of trade with the Soviet Union. A scholar has argued that as economic consideration was a subsidiary factor in its relation with the United States, it coolly turned down the Russian offer. While not joining issue on this score whether political or economic considerations were more paramount, it can be pointed out on the basis of overwhelming evidence that the Russian aid had no attraction for it for the following reasons. The Soviet aid, during 1954-63, to non-Communist less developed countries was only one-eights, of those of the United States, and the Soviet programme was even smaller in terms of actual aid expenditures. While more than 5 per cent of the Soviet economic

50 For details, Ray, n.27 p.4.
51 Ibid., p.54.
assistance has been extended in the form of non-repayable aid; almost 60 per cent of U.S. aid to developing countries comprised free grants. The following figure will make it clear. While India got $1011 million from the Soviet Union, Pakistan received a paltry sum of $44 million. When it is set against the amount Pakistan received from the United States, one can well express it in a latter day term as "peanuts".

Table 21

Soviet Economic Credits and Grants Extended to Non-Communist Less Developed Countries, 1 January 1954 to 30 June 1964

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area and the recipient country</th>
<th>Million in current U.S.$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burma</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ceylon</td>
<td>30</td>
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<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>1011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>369</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

52 Milton Kovner, "Soviet Aid Strategy in Developing Countries", Orbis (Philadelphia, pa.) vol.8, no.3, Fall 1964, pp.624-40

Besides, Pakistan economic system which was based on capitalist mode of production, had developed certain structural linkage into which the Soviet aid, with its emphasis on public sector enterprises, could not be fitted unless there was a total change in the economic system. In that event, it would have entailed a massive outlay which could hardly be guaranteed by the Soviet Union. To the Pakistanis, the United States with its phenomenal economic growth and political power represented the wave of the future with which an alliance was worthwhile. So, while the first premise helped the Soviet Union making Pakistan realise the value of its political support, the second one failed because of its in-built limitations.

Regarding the United States policy, it is found that with the ushering in of the Republican administration headed by Dwight E. Eisenhower in January 1953, a basic departure from its strategy of "containment" seemed to be in order. It decisively opted for an offensive policy of liberation designed to roll back the Soviet power from its

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54 Moscow asserted that the rendering of aid to newly independent states did not mean that it had money to spare. It warned that it could no longer remain indifferent to the objectives on which its aid funds were being spent. See Pravada, 3 May 1961, p.6. Attacking the ulterior motive of Soviet foreign aid policy, the Chinese said, "They have gone so far as to cancel aid, withdraw exports and, tear up contracts as a means of applying pressure on it", Peking Review, (Peking), 26 June 1964, p.10.
newly acquired East European allies. It progressively possessed a strategic capability for inflicting damage on the Soviet Union. The United States became committed to the Doctrine of Massive Retaliation and expansion of Strategic Air Command (SAC). Given the Crusading mood of Washington, it lent credibility to the offensive character of its policy. It created a situation of high Soviet vulnerability to large-scale American nuclear attack.

But the international situation was turning distinctly less favourable to the United States. By 1960, it found itself in a minority on the China question and defensive on such issues as Cuba or Congo. Cuba became a source of considerable embarrassment. The Soviet Union, assertive and dynamic, was pitted against, "a fumbling and defensive" America. Kennedy highlighted the "missile gap" in his election campaign. And the American weakness was ruthlessly exposed by the abortive invasion of Cuba and its total helplessness when the Soviet Union took unilateral decision to partition Berlin.

Decisive change occurred in the institutional fabric of the United Nations system which, too eroded the

American influence. From an initial membership of 51, the United Nations moved to 84 when 18 members joined in the "African Year" of 1960. The impact was immediate and far-reaching, in style and tone, foci of interest and distribution of influence. The Latin American Group, which controlled 40 per cent of the votes of the General Assembly since its inception, was now reduced to 20 per cent of membership. Its position as a pre-eminent interest group was taken up by this newly emerging Afro Asian Group, which had grown from a dozen votes in 1955 to almost 50 at the end of 1961. They rarely voted in unison. For long the direct Soviet-American confrontation which dominated the Assembly and resulted in "politically unreal but numerically decisive majorities", now got diverted to new and large constituencies with diverse interests. When the West needed their support, to deny this strategic advantage to its rival, they were courted. And the Soviet Union gained even more from this new configuration, as it escaped the near-permanent status of isolated minority in Assembly voting during early 1950's. So the Afro-Asian Group held a clear balance of strength in the assembly voting which contained a lot of implications for Great Power behaviour in global system.

With the advent of Kennedy administration, the defence expenditure went up in the United States. Both conventional and strategic forces were reinforced. The United States was, in fact, widening its strategic base. The asymmetry in power unnerved the Soviet Union and its attempt to introduce Medium Range Ballistic Missiles clandestinely into Cuba triggered off protest from the United States for which it backed down, thereby underscoring American preponderance in strategic sphere. It was a great setback to the Soviet global ambition.

With regard to the Asian political scene, it is found that while the United States had clear-cut policy to counter the Soviet power in Western Europe, it faltered and fumbled for a policy with regard to the great Arch of countries stretching from Morocco to China. Its helplessness was clearly highlighted during the Korean War when its defence position in Japan was threatened by the entry of China in late 1950. During the Truman Administration it was agreed in principle that the immense geographical advantage that the Sino-Soviet bloc enjoyed should be counteracted by the establishment of a ring of bases around its perimeter. American strategists believed that the only way to deter the Soviet attack was to overwhelm it with vastly American air-atomic power targeted.
from bases in countries ringing the Sino-Soviet land mass. During this period, the major task of American diplomacy became one of initiating measures for enlisting the support of the concerned countries for providing facilities sorely needed by the Pentagon. In the fag-end of the Truman administration, the Secretaries of State and Defence and the Director of Mutual Security submitted a report to the National Security Council, entitled "Re-examination of United States Programs for National Security which underscored the following points:

"The U.S. should continue its effort to achieve a Middle East Defence Organisation, initially as a means of gaining the political cooperation of certain of the States of the area. The initial effort in this direction should be concentrated on Egypt. At a later date, the U.S. should consider undertaking more formal commitments to support those Middle East and South Asian countries which give convincing demonstration of their determination to defend themselves and their willingness to cooperate with the West.

57 Venkataramani, n.37,p.214.

The U.S. should be prepared to extend grant of military aid to a number of Middle Eastern countries in addition to Greece, Turkey, and Iran.... it is believed that Pakistan's active cooperation in defence of the Middle East might be obtained without involving unmanageable problems with India. The strengthening of Pakistan on the Eastern flank of Iran, in conjunction with Turkish strength on the North-West, might add to Iranian self-confidence and would exercise a stabilising influence in the area.... The first instalments of substantial military aid to Pakistan should be supplied at an early date, provided this can be done in a manner which does not involve unmanageable problems with India."

The report was salutary for the strategic planners. In the first place, there was a clear need for the United States to make its interest in the Middle East and South Asian region more explicit and to assume increasing responsibility. This could be achieved through the creation of a Middle East Defence Organisation in which Egypt would be the nucleus. Secondly, it also predicted that in Pakistan there would be greater readiness to cooperate. Thirdly, this could be a feasible proposition provided the United States carry out programmes of military and economic aid to a number of Middle Eastern States in addition to Greece, Turkey and
Iran. Fourthly, it made no secret of the fact that India was a key country in South Asia. It favoured for substantial economic aid to India to off-set any negative fall-out from any of its proposed military aid programme to Pakistan. So it seems that the United States was quite keen to retain India's goodwill, even if, Pakistan was cut out for a vital role in this exciting enterprise.

This report with its recommendations became, as a matter of fact, the accepted blue print of policy for the Eisenhower administration whose Secretary of State, John Forster Dulles, gave it an institutional shape not only for the containment of the Soviet power but also for ushering in Pakistan in the American alliance system. In keeping with this policy profile, Dulles gave immediate attention to the West Asia and the South Asia on his assumption of

59 In fairness to Dulles, it must be noted that he only carried to its logical conclusion the policies with regard to Pakistan and the Soviet Union that had been conceived by national security planners of the Truman Administration. As a matter of fact, the American officials, for long, had been toying with the idea of basing the Western defence of West Asia upon the control of Indian subcontinent. And they derived their impulse from the views of Sir Olaf Cqroe set forth in his book, "The Wells of Power. The Oilfields of South Western Asia - A Regional and Global Study", who, as Foreign Secretary of the British India, was intimately familiar with the strategic dimension of the security problem of the Indian subcontinent. See Selig S. Harrison, India, Pakistan and the United States, Part-I, Case History of a Mistake, New Republic (Washington, D.C.), 141 (67), 10 August 1959, pp.10-17.
office. He visited eleven States of the area commencing on 9 May 1953 with the ostensible purpose of getting acquainted with the prevailing political realities and of assessing the extent of possibility for the emergence of the contemplated concept of the Middle East Defence Organisation. On 22 May 1953, Dulles arrived in Karachi and was given a tumultuous ovation. He held a prolonged discussion with Pakistani leadership and was deeply carried away by the spiritual faith and martial spirit of Pakistanis and the geopolitical potential of their country.\textsuperscript{60} He was also highly impressed by their understanding of world problems and their tenacity to fight the menace of Godless communism. He also did not fail to decipher that there was a perceptual convergence of Pakistan and the United States approach to major issues of the era so clearly demonstrated earlier by Pakistan's helpful and cooperative stand on the Korean war in the United Nations and the signing of the Japanese Peace Treaty.

Dulles then visited Egypt which was "aflame with anti-British sentiment", as the British was stoutly opposing any revision of the base agreement demanded by the new regime.

of Naquib. Dulles was fully aware of the strategic significance of the air base as he recorded: 61 "Also there is one air-field which our air people attach much importance to, a base for strategic operations against Russia...." But it was difficult for him to isolate American position from that of the British Government for enlisting Naquib's support. Dulles then promised to bring about a solution to the issues at dispute between Egypt and Great Britain, but he was equally sure, as revealed in his pronouncement before the National Security Council and the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, that the Anglo-Egyptian crisis could not be solved in a clear-cut way at the present time and there was not much chance of "bringing up Egypt in an economic and military way". It could not become the main bastion of Middle East Defence Organisation. 62 Similarly, situation in Iran with Mossadeg at the helm of affairs was inhospitable for the American enterprise as it was locked up in a dispute with Great Britain over the nationalisation of Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. Dulles, though did not visit Iran, tried to effect a compromise through its own ambassador.


Dulles, summing up his impression on the conclusion of his visit, told the National Security Council that the concept of a Middle East Organisation was not a feasible proposition. The United States should, therefore, work out a different sort of arrangement. Presenting his arguments at the close-door meeting of the Committee on Foreign Relation, he concluded that Turkey was really a strong point in the contemplated scheme of Northern Tier, whose fear of Soviet menace was real and deep-seated and they were strong, prepared to fight, and allied with US in spirit. "At another end, here you have got Pakistan... which can be a very strong point... We feel if you have too strong points... it is very difficult, even if Iran cannot be made strong, to go through those mountain passes". Though Syria and Iraq were "firm friends with pretty good Governments", the Arab States would be unwilling to "go along with defence organisation packed with non-Arab countries." In the circumstances, Dulles favoured the idea of a network of bilateral arrangements. He hopefully anticipated that once a Turko-Pak tie was hammered out, then Iran and other Arab states to the South could be enticed to join in future, thus making the security system a reality.

63 Ibid., pp.454-55.
However, two events forced the pace for the implementation of the Northern Tier system with Pakistan and Turkey as the two strong points. In the first place, the Soviet Union's explosion of a thermo-nuclear bomb on 10 August 1953 had a profound psychological grip on the Eisenhower administration. Though the Strategic Air Command was in fine shape to counter the Soviet threat, a quest was on for acquiring bases in countries perching on the periphery of the Sino-Soviet bloc. As Suez base was refused by Abdul Gamel Nasser, Pakistan loomed large as the only ray of hope in the strategic perspective of the United States planners. Secondly, Mossadeq was ousted in Iran and Shah returned to power with a demonstration largely engineered by the Central Intelligence Agency.\(^64\) Shah became and remained, according to Henry A. Kissinger, "an unconditional ally...". So, there was now a better opportunity to achieve the United States objectives with regard to Iran. Iran, with its 1500 miles of common border with the Soviet Union could now more easily be persuaded to join the American alliance structure.

Now, the National Security Council clearly laid down in its "Basic National Security Policy", the task for

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the planners to cope with the emerging situation: 65

"The effective use of strategic air power against the USSR will require overseas bases on foreign territory for some years to come. Such bases will continue indefinitely to be an important additional element of U.S. strategic air capability and to be essential for the conduct of our military operations on the Eurasian continent in case of general war. And the availability of those bases and their use by the United States will depend, in most cases, on the consent and cooperation of the nations where they are located".

It also clearly envisaged the eventual emergence of regional security arrangements in the Far East and the Middle East under the sponsorship of the United States and favoured limited economic and military assistance as the price to purchase the consent and cooperation of the target countries. It laid down: 66

"In the Far East, strength must be built on existing bilateral and multi-lateral security arrangements


66 Ibid.
until more comprehensive regional arrangements become feasible.

... In the Middle East, a strong regional grouping is now feasible. In order to assure during peace time for the United States and its allies the resources (Especially oil) and the strategic positions of the area and their denial to the Soviet bloc, the United States should build on Turkey, Pakistan and if possible, Iran and assist in achieving stability in the Middle East by political actions and limited military and economic assistance."

On 30 October 1953 Eisenhower approved this document which set the tone for subsequent American action for realising its foreign policy goals.

It must be borne in mind that October 1953 was the month of hectic consultation of the American leaders with their Pakistani counterparts. Mohammad Ayub Khan had already had extensive talks before Zafrullah Khan joined him in October. What exactly transpired from their long stay in the United States was not known, but it is fairly inferred that it served to crystallize the on-going debate whether the United States should give military aid in lieu of
Pakistan's joining American alliance structure. And whatever iota of doubt lingered in American mind about the bonafide of Pakistani intention and in Pakistani mind about American sincerity was certainly dispelled after Vice-President Richard M. Nixon's visit to Pakistan in December 1953. In the National Security Council which met on 19 February 1954, Nixon made a strong plea for military aid to Pakistan and for the creation of a military crescent that should include Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Indo-China, Formosa and Japan. Interestingly enough, the NSC tamely endorsed this view and recommended that the United States should give military assistance to Pakistan. But it added one rider that its formal announcement and military implementation should follow the conclusion of a military accord between Pakistan and Turkey. It was clearly in pursuance of such a decision and in response to the American prodding that a


68. During Vice-President Nixon's visit in December 1953, Ayub briefed him that the Soviet Union would use India as a cat's paw for establishing a presence in the South Asia. And concluding his visit, Nixon declared on Radio Pakistan: "A strong independent Pakistan is an asset to the Free World" New York Times, 9, 10 14 December 1953.

momentous decision was taken by Turkey and Pakistan. A Joint Communiqué simultaneously announced in their respective capitals on 19 February said that the Governments of the two countries have agreed to study methods of realising closer cooperation in political, economic and cultural spheres as well as strengthening peace and security. By such a manoeuvre the American planners believed that they could keep Jawaharlal Nehru at bay, as it was not simply an American programme to supply arms to Pakistan, but a Turko-Pak alliance to which Iraq and eventually Iran were likely to accede, and it would take the wind out of the sails of the pro-Indian lobby in the American Congress where military aid to Pakistan would appear no more an indefensible proposition.

Came the historic day of 25th February 1954. President announced that the United States intended to respond favourably to Pakistan's request. Close on its heel, on 19 May 1954, Foreign Minister Zafrullah Khan of Pakistan signed the Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement with the United States. Thus, the dice was finally cast.

While these dramatic developments were taking place in the South Asia, the defeat of the French at Dien Bien Phu and the subsequent conference on Indo-China at Geneva called for new policy response from the Eisenhower
administration to ward off the looming communist danger. The National Security Council viewed that communist domination, with the progressive withdrawal of the French power, by whatever means, of all the South-East Asia would seriously jeopardize in short term as well as in long term the Security interests of the United States. The situational location and the respective equation of the countries of the area was such that loss of one country, Vietnam, would lead to capitulation to Communism by other remaining States. If all of the South-East Asia fell to communism an alignment with Communism in India and the Middle-East would threaten the security and stability of Europe. Pressures would be generated that would make it difficult to keep Japan free of the lure of Communism. So the administration discarded its long-held view that regional defence organization should grow out of indigenous forces, and decided to set up an organisation by rallying as many nations possible as were willing to work with the interested Western Powers. It would not only countervail any Communist aggression but also provide the Western Powers with a locus standi in the area.

Pakistan seemed to be ideal choice as it bordered on the South East and the West Asia and could be linked to a network of other organizations which the United States hoped to set up in future. But the American planners initially did not think of Pakistan as a possible participant. Pakistan was equally lukewarm to the idea because it was loathe to antagonise China. Its rulers were more keen on the formation of the "Northern Tier" system, so also Americans before. But when American requirements and priorities changed and Pakistan's membership of the South East Asia Treaty Organization was deemed desirable, it found itself a member of the organisation, lest it would forfeit its claim on United States' political, military and economic support. On 9 September 1954, Zafrulla Khan signed the famous Southeast Asia Collective Defence Treaty, committing Pakistan, for realization of the Western strategic objectives in Asia.

While this was in progress, the faint outlines of a "Northern Tier" system emerged in the horizon of the Asia. America stood on the sidelines and encouraged Great Britain to take the lead precisely because of the imperatives of the prevailing realities. Any move by the former to entice Iraq in the alliance would have met with stiff opposition from the members of the Arab League, particularly Egypt,
its arch rival. As Britain's agreement with Iran, which enabled it to operate two air bases and station troops, was to expire in 1957, it was believed that the best way to ensure Britain's continued presence in Iraq would be through its induction in the "Northern Tier" system. So the United States encouraged Britain to bear the mantle of Western leadership. As regards Iran, another potential participant, the United States was aware of its treaty obligation to the Soviet Union which entitled it to send its troops to northern Iran if external forces entered. The National Security Council cautioned, in view of the fluid political situation obtaining on the eve of Shah's return to power, that the United States should move warily so as to avoid any policy directly provocative to the the Soviet Union. So Pakistan took the initiative with the blessings of Britain and the United States. On 24 February 1955, the Turco-Iraqi Pact was signed as a first step towards the formation of the regional security system. Five days later Anthony Eden announced the British decision to join the Pact "to forge a new association with Iraq which would


72 Ibid.

73 The Times (London), 22 February 1955.
bring our relations into line with those which already exists with Turkey and other partners in NATO". Pakistan joined in September followed by Iran in October. The Pact came to be known in history as the Baghdad Pact. In 1959, Pakistan signed a bilateral agreement with the United States which was designed to further reinforce the defensive purposes of the Central Treaty Organisation as it was renamed subsequently with the withdrawal of Iraq. 74

The foregoing facts go to validate our hypothesis that the continuity and change in Pakistan's foreign policy can be partly explained in terms of the systemic forces. It became evidently clear that Pakistan's long quest, which started even before its inception for a military alliance with the United States in the hope of enlisting its diplomatic support against India and of procuring economic and military aid for enhancing its capabilities, succeeded only when the global strategic forces underwent drastic configuration that threatened the security interests of the Western Powers, particularly the United States. It was only then that the United States enlisted Pakistan to serve its strategic interests by sucking it into its alliance structure. With the advent of 1957, America's strategic dilemma became more

acute and need for Pakistan became more insistent, as a result relation deepened. 75 So its alignment with the United States was partly a product of systemic compulsions.

In the early 1960's, the trends and developments whose outlines were faintly emerging in the late 1950's crystallized and altered the prevailing configuration of power. 76 The system changed into a truly loose bipolar one. In the first place, the intra-bloc rift took a cognizable shape during the early 1960's. The assertion of independence by France within the Western bloc gradually strained its unity. The French disaffection with the Western alliance structure began with the United States stand on the Anglo-French assault in the Suez Crisis in 1956 and the combined Anglo-American rejection of De Gaulle's proposed triumvirate of the West in 1958. It, however, reached its apogee with the French withdrawal from the integrated military command of NATO, and its rejection of British application for the membership of the European Economic Community. Though it restrained from opting out of the bloc, its attitude became defiant with the passing of years. It achieved a burgeoning and protected missile complex, a delivery system of manned bombers and a few

75. For details see page of this chapter.
76. Brecher, n.56, p.27.
Hydrogen bombs. It refused participation in all formal international conferences on arms control and agreements on nuclear weapons. It staked unmistakably its claim to a Super Power status and criticised everything Anglo-American. Similar was the case with China. Though it started with rift with the Soviet Union which surfaced clearly at the Twenty-Second Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1961 and became implacable after the Sino-Indian War and the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, it really affected every facet of international life. As a scholar observed: 77

"No analysis of relationship between Washington and Moscow, of the problem of nuclear proliferation, of the orientation of the Indian nationalism, of the thrust of the revolutionary movements in the Third World would be complete without taking into account the impact of the increasingly bitter dispute between the one-time seemingly close allies."

While not going into the details of the cause of the dispute, it can be said that the dialogue between the two Communist giants concerning territory, ideology and foreign policy set in motion a pattern of "dynamic

escalation" in which the dispute slided down remorselessly, first into conflict and finally into an irreconcilable rift. As a result, unlike France, it opted out of the Soviet bloc, and challenged the Soviet Union for the leadership of the Communist bloc. Within a brief span of 30 months, it moved from a primitive atomic device to an hydrogen bomb, and staked its claim for a Super Power status. Besides, the events of Polish October and the Hungarian revolt which heralded a new phase of the intra-bloc autonomy reached its culmination in the Czechoslovakia uprising. Though, the hegemony of the Soviet Union remained unchallenged in East European security matters, its control over internal party issues, economic planning and foreign policy was now curtailed by national pressures within the Bloc.

Though this basic structural change was foreshadowed by the behaviour of China and France in the late 1950's, it was consummated by their persistent dissent in 1960's. By the mid-1960's both constituted two autonomous units of decision-making far removed from their Bloc affiliations. During this period, their policies revealed interesting parallelism. Each opposed the Soviet and American global condominium which would freeze the status quo in Asia and Europe. Both went on increasing the stockpile of nuclear weapons, partly as a symbol of Great Power
status, and partly to achieve greater autonomy in international politics. Each encouraged the other's assertion of independence from its Bloc leader. Each penetrated the new States of Asia, Africa and Latin America offering alternatives of aid and assistance to their dependence upon both the Super Powers.  

Secondly, there was a major change in the geographic location and technique of conflict between the two Super Powers. The Third World took definitely a recognizable shape as the process of decolonisation reached its final consummation in 1960's in Asia, Africa and Latin America. It was caught up more intensely in the vortex of Super Power globalism and actively courted and patronised by them. But during 1960's, some of the leaders of the Third World died and some were ousted. Particularly, the removal of Ben Bella, Nkrumah, Soekarno from the world political scene hurt the Soviet globalism which had already suffered its reversal in the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Sino-Indian War of 1962. It sapped the Soviet confidence already eroded by the Sino-Soviet rift. The period saw the rise of the American globalism based on strategic superiority.  

78. Brecher, n.56, p.34.  
ideological differences persisted, they were devoid of the emotional intensity of earlier years. Both recoiled from the prospect of a nuclear war. The new technocratic leadership of the Soviet Union remained deeply committed to Communism but not at the risk of a thermonuclear war. There was also a noticeable shift in the tone and tenor of the functioning of American diplomacy. Under Kennedy era, the need for a modus operandi with the Soviets received top priority. The centrifugal tendencies in both blocs coupled with the "balance of terror" compelled a renewed dialogue between them that commenced with the Khruschev-Kennedy Summit of 1961. The Moscow Test Ban Treaty of 1963 and the Washington-Moscow "Hot-Line" reflected their growing stake in stabilizing the spiralling arms race that would remove threat to the Central Power balance. President Lyndon B. Johnson went a step further when he altered the previous western priorities in Europe by making the East-West detente the basis for an European settlement that would eventually lead to the solution of the most sensitive Germany problem. 80

With the onset of the Vietnam War, situation underwent radical change. It sapped the American economy despite its increased G.N.P. of $762 billion. It also

80 Ibid., p.194.
eroded the post-war domestic consensus concerning foreign policy. The ruling elites were deeply divided. As a result, the American global engagement became devoid of domestic support. In contrast to it, the Soviet economy got a quantum jump with G.N.P. reaching $372 billion in 1967. Defence spending touched $55 billion in 1968, thereby effectively outstripping the U.S. defence spending outside the Vietnam war effort. Thus by 1968, the Soviet Union was well on the way to eroding the margin of superiority. Both sides had a capability to destroy each other as a viable society but neither possessed a decisive first-strike capability. But initiative passed into the Soviet side. This changed relationship imposed on both sides a greater obligation to observe restraints in any unilateral use of force in international crisis.

This affected the Third World adversely in two ways. In the first place, to quote a scholar:

"The very stability of the global power balance and the determination of the Great Powers to avoid a

82. Ibid., p.196.
confrontation makes them prone to seek lower levels of conflict and less dangerous ways of conducting their rivalries, which, in effect, means a concerted attempt to confine their conflicts to problems that impinge on them less directly and to localise them in such areas as are far removed from the areas where their vital interests are involved. To fight out their battles in the Third World is one way of ensuring that their own worlds are not touched by their conflicts and they retain a greater measure of option to escalate and de-escalate these conflicts according to the needs of their relations.

Secondly, it increases the dangers of local clashes and conflicts among the states of the Third World. To quote the same author: 84

"To the extent that the Central power balance has become immune from the contagious effects of Third World conflicts, to the extent that the stability of Great Power relations can be maintained in spite of local and regional disturbances, such conflicts and such disturbances have become permissible... Indeed, the 1967 agreement at Glassboro is of great relevance

84. Ibid., p.135
in this context, as indication of what the Great Power can and cannot do."

So the major strand of the Super Powers' role in the Indian subcontinent particularly in Pakistan has to be viewed in the wider spectrum of their diplomacy in the Third World during this period.

Coming to the United States policy towards the South Asia, one finds that its broader conceptual framework was laid down by the Kennedy administration and was followed by his successor Lyndon B. Johnson. Its main planks were as follows. In the first place, though the American strategic base was widened, there was concerted but simultaneous effort to reach accommodation with the Soviet Union. As a result, China replaced the Soviet Union as the principal enemy of the Capitalist System and progressively the policy of containment of Communism became synonymous with containment of China. Secondly, the non-aligned states were cultivated with greater understanding and sympathy. It was widely believed that their economic development and stable political order would enable them to eradicate their social evil and eliminate their economic inertia. In their effort to achieve these socio-economic goals with the

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85. Barnds, n.20, p.166.
ultimate objective of combating communism, Americans found in them an admirable congruence of interests. So Kennedy enunciated a "new alliance of progress" in lieu of military alliances for the developing countries, and pledged considerable economic aid to them. Thirdly, there was corresponding decline in the value of "allies", because the development of ICBM and Polaris submarine had reduced the strategic importance of military bases and other facilities around the periphery of the Soviet Union and after the Sino-Soviet rift, China became the common enemy of both the Super Powers.

In keeping with this, President Kennedy wanted to reorient the policy towards the Indian subcontinent. As a Senator, he once said: "We (want) India to be a free and thriving leader of a free and thriving Asia." He strongly believed that India and China were engaged in a struggle for the economic and political leadership of the East. So in their global policy of containment of China, India was expected to play a major role. But this did not blur his

86. Chaudhury, n.30, p.102.
87. Ibid.
90. Ibid., p.142.
vision as to the strategic importance of Pakistan and the reason why Pakistan should be accorded a higher priority in the over-all global strategy of the United States. Though he was opposed to military aid and political support to Pakistan, he always favoured economic aid. But on coming to power, he revised his stand as the United States had a network of alliances with it, buttressed by the numerous commitments and assurances. \(^9\)

So, he made almost superhuman efforts to court Ayub and Nehru at the same time. He made it clear that the United States would continue military aid to both Pakistan and India only if the security of the subcontinent was directly threatened and in the event of the latter, Pakistan would be consulted in advance. At the same, he made it crystal clear that he would not withhold the economic aid to India, even if, it refused to agree to a settlement of Kashmir. As it was an emotive issue he thought it would adversely affect the Indo-U.S. relations. This political equation remained basically unaltered despite the visit of both Ayub and Nehru to the United States.

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91. Assurances were also given by Kennedy and Johnson which were contained in Kennedy's letter to President Ayub Khan on 6 January 1962, an aide-memoire presented by the U.S. Ambassador on 5 November 1962 and an oral pledge by Johnson to Ayub on 15 December 1965. See Henry A. Kissinger *The White House Years* (New Delhi, 1979).
The Sino-Indian War of 1962 radically altered the equation. The United States at long last got the opportunity to fulfill its long cherished wish that India should stand up against China and immediately initiated a programme of military assistance on an unprecedented scale. Pakistan bitterly complained as it was expected to be consulted in advance. However, to pacify its ruffled feelings, the Western Powers strove for a settlement of Kashmir dispute. Under concerted pressure, Nehru made renewed efforts to solve the problem. But when Sino-Pakistan border agreement was signed on 2 March 1963, Nehru told the Indian Parliament that it was meant to prejudice the joint talk on Kashmir and again declared in the Lok Sabha on 13 August that the concessions offered to Pakistan must be treated as withdrawn. However, Kennedy in a personal letter to Ayub assured him of American assistance in the event of an Indian attack on Pakistan. He even confirmed in a press conference on 22 November that American aid was meant for the purpose of defeating Chinese aggression.

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Though Ayub remained dissatisfied, the United States' policy makers were firmly convinced that any concession to Ayub on this score would amount to allowing him a near-veto power. By informing him in adequate advance of time of its plan, the United States has fulfilled its part of commitment.

This was too much for Pakistan to stomach. When it joined the alliance, "non-alignment was suspect in American eyes.... Over the years it came to assume a mantle of respectability." 96 Perhaps nothing could be more a quirk of destiny for Ayub than the fact that it was he who as the C-in-C of the Pakistani armed forces, negotiated the military agreement, but now, forced by the turn of events, presided over its erosion as the President of the country. Making an agonizing reappraisal of the situation in the subcontinent after 1962 war, he came to a gradual but painful conclusion that the new trends in the American foreign policy were not a product of cosmetic changes in its policy towards the subcontinent but certainly reflective of broader changes in the international system. "Ever since the Soviet Union and the United States have come closer to accepting the gospel of coexistence, the need for their wooing of the smaller countries for support has receded.

Aid was used as an instrument of the cold war, but in view of the new situation, ... he doubted very much whether it will remain aid at all..."97 He also further reasoned that the war of 1962 coincided with the surfacing of the Sino-Soviet dispute. "Both these events led to a closer association between India and Western countries on the one side and India and the Soviet Union on the other." "Both the Super Powers started competing with each other in supplying arms to India; one to prepare it to face China and the other to maintain the balance in Asia." The net result was: Pakistan stood in the dock, defenceless for none of its fault; the solution of Kashmir dispute went by the Western powers' default because the United States thought that in the existing circumstances a direct U.S. role in the talks would not be productive; and there is an unprecedented accretion of military capabilities of India as a result of massive onrush of Western weapons which Pakistan failed to stop. Ruefully reflecting on his shared anguish and fear with his nation over the relationship which was nurtured and built up with a lavish care of hard work in the fifties, he noted in his autobiography how it had ceased to command respect in the sixties:98

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97 Ibid., p.183.
98 Ibid., p.129.
"The United States' thinkers and planners developed an anxiety to build up certain countries in Asia as bulwarks against China. They selected Japan and India for this purpose. Building upon India meant providing her with vast quantities of military hardware which naturally created a sense of apprehension among her small neighbours. Since Pakistan was regarded by India as her enemy number one, Pakistan was first to be affected by the change in American policy."

It also struck him that India might even turn its newly acquired might against Pakistan when a suitable opportunity occurred, particularly at a time when the Western countries were so preoccupied with their problems that they could not undertake any military commitment in the subcontinent or find it risky to do so for the fear of provoking a world conflagration. The feeling also persisted with him that in the event of India attacking Pakistan, it was most unlikely that the United States would honour its commitment to come to its aid.

Pakistan certainly had reached the dead end, particularly Ayub felt ditched and cornered. For long, he was toying the idea of reorienting the country's foreign policy but odds were heavily against him as his country was an integral part of an interlocking Western alliance
structure from which it was difficult to wriggle out for striking out an independent path in foreign policy, let alone, making terms with the communists. But he was shrewd enough to realise that the changed international system, even if bristled with many problems, had equally opened up new vistas of opportunities which must be cashed in so as to turn them into diplomatic advantages. In the first place, the ongoing process of detente between the Super Powers would make it easier for Pakistan to go for normalization of relationship with the Soviet Union without encountering American opposition. Secondly, the convergence of policy of the Super Powers with regard to China, with the twin objective of preventing it from attaining a status of equality with them and containing its influence in Asia by bolstering up India militarily and casting it in the role of a rival leader in Asia, would certainly force China to come to term with its neighbour Pakistan. So it was pregnant with strategic significance which would be invaluable for Pakistan, it it comes out of the American embrace and refuses to compose its irreconcilable hostility with India. Now, Ayub, at long last, reformulated his foreign policy which he fashionably termed as the policy of "bilateral equations". Its main thesis as laid down by him were as follows: In the first place, geography was the sorrow of Pakistan, for East Pakistan was surrounded on three sides by
India and the only approach was from the sea and "West Pakistan was wedged in between three enormous powers with the Soviet Union at the top, the people's Republic of China in the Northeast and India in the South and East." Ever since its birth, India had continued its implacable hostility, which precluded any possibility for establishing normal neighbourly relation in any conceivable future. Similarly, the Soviet Union and China were highly critical of its membership of the Western alliance structure. The former resenting its membership of CENTO and the latter of SEATO. But, it was possible to normalise relationship with them if doubts and misgivings on this score were removed. Secondly, history had placed Pakistan in the pathway of the conflicting interests of all major powers. Its location gave Pakistan strategic importance both in the South-East Asia and in the West Asia. So the developments of the post-War international politics in Asia in general and in the South Asia in particular could not be viewed in isolation divorced from the politics of Super Powers in the world. It is a truism, that the Super Powers have evolved over the years distinct policies for a particular region which were inextricably interwoven with the framework of their global policy. Besides, they have global strategy and global instruments of power to underwrite that strategy. The South

99. Ibid., p.117.
Asia was one of such regions in their global diplomacy. Lastly, the fact of life imposed another insuperable constraint on Pakistan which it could not transcend. Being a backward and developing country facing a hostile neighbour with rapidly developing capabilities, Pakistan had to bank upon the Western Powers, particularly the United States for enhancing its capabilities to countervail India's power for which it must perforce maintain good relation with those who were in a position to help it both militarily and economically.

Ayub was shrewd enough to judge that the foreign policy conceived in an era of cold war could hardly answer the problems thrown up by the emerging multipolar international system. So he endeavoured "to set up bilateral equation with each one of them (the United States, the Soviet Union and China) with a clear understanding that the nature and complexion of the equation should be such as to promote Pakistan's mutual interest, without adversely affecting the legitimate interest of third parties." He was also acutely conscious of the fact that any bilateral equation could not be established in isolation; other equations would influence its level. In the end, each

equation would be determined by the limits of tolerance of the third party. So each equation would have to be acceptable to third party with whom it might be able to establish bilateral relations of mutual benefit. Ayub knew that difficulties and complications would rise as it was difficult to determine clearly the limits of tolerance within which bilateral equations could be fostered. It would be like just walking on a triangular tightrope. In fact, this policy wore the guise of a quadrilateral tightrope walking,102 because, Indian variable is quite salient in Pakistan's foreign policy which necessarily postulated that in addition to the mutual equations which Pakistan maintained with the three major powers, the equations that each of these powers have built up with India has got to be taken into account in shaping Pakistan's foreign policy. In sum, it boiled down to the fact that while geographical compulsion weighed with him for reorienting his foreign policy, it served more as a rhetorical justification for the policy change than the political constraint which emanated from the multi-polar international system. He himself lent support to this line of reasoning when he stated:103


"... clearly the whole pattern of our relations with others required fundamental rethinking. Some of the essential elements in our geographical situation had not been recognised, nor was there a clear concept of the nature of the political compulsions to which we would be subjected. I think it was the force of events which compelled us to undertake this exercise".

Ayub's revised policy choice was reflected in its new policy towards China and as expected, the United States took strong exception to it.104 It triggered off extensively critical reactions from the Pakistan ruling elites. the Pakistan Foreign Minister, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto emphatically declared:105 "We will undergo miseries but will not barter away our sovereignty which we have achieved after valiant struggle and sacrifice." He went on to say that Pakistan was not going to accept dictation from any power and that no inducement motivated by economic assistance or military aid could allure Pakistan into subjecting itself to alien domination. Similarly, Ayub added in a bitter reparte to

104 For details of many coercive economic and political measures, see Mohammed Ayoob, U.S. Economic Assistance to Pakistan, 1954-65: A Case Study in the Politics of Foreign Aid", India Quarterly (New Delhi), vol.23, no.2, April-June 1967, pp.127-45. See for elaboration my Second Chapter.

105 Dawn, 14 July 1965.
President Johnson: "My reaction to all these was as simple as that of any patriotic Pakistani who values his nation's honour and security more than anything else." 106 Finally, the rupture came when the Indo-Pakistan war broke out in September 1965 and the State Department issued a statement declaring the United States neutrality on the conflict and its policy to run in conformity with the action of the United Nations. 107 Economic aid was halted. On top of it, came the American embargo on military supplies to the subcontinent. Finally, the special relationship was formally broken when Pakistan intimated its decision to the United States to close down its strategic communication centre at Bedabar.

In the mid-1960's, the American attitude and involvement in the subcontinental affairs underwent radical change. 108 The Indian image was badly sullied by the October War of 1962. It finally gave up its long-cherished hope of building up India as a counterpoise to China in the Asian affairs. Similarly, Pakistan's credibility as an ally was called into doubt. And the rationale of the military aid as an effective instrumentality for the promotion of its


107  *Pakistan Horizon* (Karachi), vol.18, no.4, 4th quarter, 1965.

108  Barnds, n.20, p.22.
foreign policy goals was also utterly disproved. The sordid spectacle of the two nations fighting with each other with the American arms confirmed the widespread doubt that the American supply of arms had only contributed to the spiralling local arms race instead of strengthening the security of the non-Communist world. After the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965, the United States kept its hands off and encouraged the Soviet Union to mediate in the subcontinental dispute. As the Sino-Soviet rivalry continued for gaining increasing influence in the area the United States chose the role of a passive spectator looking for an opportunistic crump to fall from their conflicts as it remained pervasively preoccupied with cultivating the Soviet goodwill for winning the Vietnam War. As a scholar wrote: 109

In the mid-1960's, the United States was trying to convey the Soviet Union that if it played the game in other areas of the world (particularly Vietnam) a special position for it in South Asia would be the reward it could expect from its limited adversaries in the West. Tashkent was in all probability a manifestation of this phenomenon... Subsequently the United States seemed to have worked out a model that the

Soviet Union and China should be engaged in a relationship of conflict in the subcontinent because of their relative influence over India and Pakistan. Washington could permit China to be as influential in Pakistan as the Soviet Union is in India, and then derive some advantage from the consequent conflict between the two Great Asian Powers over the future of subcontinent."

Now coming to the Soviet Union's policy towards Pakistan, it should be borne in mind that though the U-2 incident marked an all-time low in the level of relationship, there was deliberate efforts by both sides to isolate this incident which was fairly evident from the fact that continued negotiation concerning Soviet technical aid to Pakistan for exploration of mineral and oil resources was underway even in those crisis-ridden days.\textsuperscript{110} Barely three months after this incident, on 9 August 1960, Pakistan announced that it had accepted an offer from the Soviet Union to help prospect its mineral resources, especially oil. Negotiation to this effect started in Karachi on 10 September 1960 and were carried on in Moscow by Pakistan's Minister for Natural Resources, Z.A. Bhutto. The oil pact was signed in March 1961.\textsuperscript{111}

\textsuperscript{110} Ayoob, n.102, pp.231-50.

\textsuperscript{111} The United States showed deep concern about it, but Ayub went ahead; see, n.96, p.118.
By the end of 1962, the "new trends" in Pakistan's foreign policy which reflected its growing compulsions of improving relations with the Soviet Union and China was clearly discernible to the unerring eyes of the Kremlin leaders. Numerous factors dictated a reorientation of the Soviet policy towards the subcontinent, particularly towards Pakistan. In the first place, consequent upon the Sino-Indian war, Russian anxiety sharply increased, that India might be lured away to the Western camp as Nehru's foreign policy came under blistering attack from the Rightists in India, some of whom pressed for an alliance with the West.\(^{112}\) Contrarily, the more Pakistanis grew disenchanted with the United States, the more acceptable its foreign policy became in the Russian eyes. Secondly, given the Sino-Soviet rift and their acute rivalry in the non-aligned world especially in Asia, the Soviet Union did not relish the idea of a Sino-Pakistani axis emerging in international politics of the South Asia. India's debacle brought home the truth that it was no match to China militarily. Unless she composed her differences with Pakistan, it cannot stand up to China. So, it acted as a mediator between the two countries with the twin objectives of preventing Sino-Pakistan entente and ushering in a rapprochement for weakening Chinese influence in the South Asia.

To underwrite its new policy, a series of dialogues began between the two sides. The first step in breaking the barrier was achieved with the signing of a cultural agreement on 11 June 1964. But the most tangible expression of its desire for a new relationship was its spectacular support extended to Pakistan when Kashmir question was debated in the Security Council on 3 February and 13 May 1964. There was a perceptible shift from its earlier position when its delegates called for a peaceful settlement of the dispute by the two interested parties.

Then came the removal of N.S. Khrushchev from the Soviet political scene in October 1964, which Pakistan heartily hailed. It was primarily because Khrushchev was hated for his unabashed pro-Indian policy, especially on the question of Kashmir. It was felt by Pakistani ruling elites that the removal of Khrushchev from power would introduce new elements in the Soviet-Pakistan relations. It was unlikely that Kosygin would strictly adhere to Khrushchev's policy.


114 United Nations, Security Council, Official Records, 1091st meeting, 14 February 1965. Lal Bahadur Sastri, India's Premier, observing the changing trend in Russian policy remarked: "We are aware that they were changing their policy and that there was nothing we could do about it." See Selig S. Harrison, "America, India and Pakistan", Harper's Magazine (New York), July 1966.
However, the efforts culminated in Ayub's visit to the Soviet Union in April 1965 (at the invitation of Khrushchev but it materialised after his fall). It greatly helped both sides to be intimately familiar with each other's points of view on various issues affecting the relationship, Ayub himself wrote: 115

"It was not until 1965 that Pakistan was able to establish ---years For eighteen levels.  ---her preconceived notions.  ---chance."

He met Kosygin for the first time on 3 April 1965 on a cold and gloomy afternoon. He was greeted by a delegation looking stolid and sullen. Ayub, after the usual exchange of pleasantries, straightaway dwelt on the relation of the Soviet Union with India and the manner in which it affected Pakistan. He also raked up the issues of differences between India and Pakistan and put the onus of responsibility on both the United States and the Soviet Union for massive supply of arms to India. But, Kosygin very shrewdly traced the cause as a product of legacy of imperialism and blamed the Imperialist powers for perpetuating tension in the subcontinent. He ably contended

115 Ayub, n.96, p.168.
that this was due to supply of arms either by the United States or by the Soviet Union. Though Ayub contested his view by bringing home the fact, that India was an expansionist power and not content with its present sphere of influence it failed to carry conviction with the Russian leader like Brezhnev who dismissed it by terming India as "a non-aligned" state which irked Ayub. Kosygin then turned to Pakistan's membership of SEATO and CENTO which as he put it, the "U.S. rules the roost".116 But Ayub very deftly put across his views before the Russians: 117

"The Soviet Union had legitimate cause to complain about the Pacts; but, they had to appreciate our position. India's avowed policy was to isolate us and we had to seek friends somewhere. We had not joined the Pacts to encourage aggression in any direction; our sole concern was our security... I then explained that our presence in the Pacts was serving as a moderate influence and in any case, the Pacts were not hurting the USSR."

To this Kosygin replied, "They may not be hurting us, but they give us no pleasure either".118 However, the

116 Ayub, n. 96, p. 171.
117 Ibid.
118 Ibid.
Soviet leaders appreciated Pakistani predicament with sympathy. Kosygin observed that they had been able to do considerable positive work in less than two hours than what others had done in eighteen years. Ayub noted that "there was general recognition on both sides that the meeting might prove a turning point in the relationship. And they recognised Pakistan's sincerity and came to have a better appreciation of its position." 119 The Kashmir question, which constituted for Pakistan the touchstone for testing the attitude of a Super Power like the Soviet Union, was never directly referred to in the joint communique, but it was couched in sufficiently vague terms for which Pakistan read different meaning into it. 120 However, the major spin-off of the visit was a reversal of the Soviet stand on Indo-Pak disputes. This was clearly reflected during the visit of India's Premier, Lal Bahadur Sastri to the Soviet Union in May 1965. In the Indo-Soviet joint communique issued on 19 May 1965, there was no mention of Kashmir or the Rann of Kutch, where both countries were fighting each other. It not only showed greater understanding of its "respected southern neighbour" but the Tass in a statement circulated on 8 May, urged both Pakistan

119 Ibid., p.173.

and India to settle disputes by bilateral talks through peaceful means. Commenting on the new Soviet behaviour, The Economist, wrote:

"In short, the Russians made it plain that they had no intention of getting involved in India's problem with its neighbours... Though their public exchanges (Shastri's and Kosygin's) were remarkably cordial, Russians reservations were plain enough between the lines. Mr. Kosygin was clearly thinking of Pakistan when he said that peace-loving countries and people need not take any development in Russian-Indian ties as directed against them... The impression left was that the Russians would aim to keep both Pakistan and India looking equally, to Moscow as a friend."  

The same non-partisan attitude marked Soviet stand in the Indo-Pak war of September 1965. Immediately, on outbreak of the hostilities, Kosygin appealed to both Ayub and Lal Bahadur for immediate cessation of military operations. Pravda openly declared: "There is no doubt

121 Asian Recorder (New Delhi), vol.21, 26-27 May 1965, p.6464.
that the conflict in Kashmir cannot benefit either of the parties who are direct participants in the disputes". Interestingly enough, while the Soviet Union did not intend to blame either side for starting the conflict, its basic stand in respect of Kashmir's accession to India was unchanged. Both in the Pravda statement on Kashmir of 21 August 1965 and in the speech of the Soviet delegate in the Security Council on 4 September 1965, Kashmir was referred to as the "Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir."124 It showed that even if the Soviet attitude towards Pakistan had mellowed over the years, its basic stand on Kashmir remained as before. After the cessation of the war, Kosygin played a major role for preserving peace in the subcontinent by inviting Ayub Khan and Lal Bahadur Shastri to come to a common table in its own soil - Taskent and succeeded in making both subscribe to a joint Declaration. As a Pakistani study commented:125

"An important element in the bilateral meeting was the role of the Soviet Government. Mr. Kosygin sought to avoid all interference in their (India's and Pakistan's) affairs but at the same time he strove for


the success of the conference. He played his part not as the representative of the world revolutionary movement but as a classical peace-maker in a classical situation of diplomatic mediation... Mr. Kosygin conducted himself at Taskent in the role of an intermediary with most scrupulous impartiality.

It was a master-stroke of Soviet diplomacy that served to enhance its prestige in the Afro-Asian world where it was vying for influence with China. The Soviet diplomacy long excluded by the Britishers, staged a comeback and became firmly entrenched as a major power in the politics of south Asia.

Another major objective of Ayub to improve relation with the Soviet Union related to countervailing India's power-superiority in the subcontinent. Western arms aid to India had tilted adversely the military balance in its favour. Besides, Soviet arms aid to India was making the situation still worse, for whatever compulsion India had for coming to a settlement, completely evaporated. So he most persuasively made out cases against Soviet arms aid and presented the Russian two plausible alternatives. Either they must stop it or the must supply Pakistan with arms on an equal footing with India. Speaking at an official banquet in the Kremlin during his trip to the
Soviet Union in September - October 1967, he declared: ¹²⁶ "The indiscriminate increase in armaments and the growing military imbalance in the subcontinent is... a danger to peace". But he failed to bring the Kremlin leaders to his point of view. The Soviet Union frankly demanded the closer of Bedbar base as a price for the Soviet supply of arms.¹²⁷ Brezhnev made it pointedly clear that as long as it allowed its territory to be used for espionage by the United States communication centre there would be no change in their policy. Faced with an obdurate Russian attitude, he gave in. He served a notice on the United States on 7 April 1968 that the lease of the base would not be renewed beyond the expiry of 1 July 1968. This certainly removed a major irritant in Soviet-Pakistan relationship. Numerous variables dictated such a course of action by Ayub. In the first place, the upheavals in China during the Cultural Revolution made him nervous and he kept his fingers crossed as to its final outcome and its bearing on the Sino-Pakistan relation. So, he looked to the Russians for protection in any eventuality. Secondly, he was panicked over continued supply of Soviet arms to India on a massive scale. Pakistan took strong exception to it but was helpless when early in

¹²⁶ Keesing's Contemporary Archives (Bristol), vol.16 (1967-68), p.22345.
¹²⁷ Chaudhury, n.113, p.113.

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1968 the Soviet Union decided to supply a hundred Su-7 fighter bombers to India. Pakistan Foreign Minister, Sharifuddin Pirzada made no secret of it when he declared: 128 "This will further widen the military imbalance between India and Pakistan and thereby contribute to the threatening arms race between them to the detriment of their economic development". Thirdly, India was not adversely affected by the American embargo. Within two weeks of Ayub's decision, Kosygin visited Pakistan in April 1968. Ayub succeeded in extracting several commitments from Kosygin on the question of economic assistance, but their talks ran into difficulties on the question of Russian arms aid to India and the United States' use of the Peshawar base. 129 However, the talk was "a good augury for the development of future relations between the two countries but it underscored the divergency of outlook of both countries on the sensitive issues like the supply of arms to India and the Soviet stand on Kashmir." 130 But, on the whole, it paved the way for the lifting of the Russian embargo on the sale of arms to Pakistan which was announced at the end of a visit to the Soviet Union by a Pakistani military delegation headed by the Commander-in-Chief, 

128 Pakistan Times (Lahore), 11 February 1968.
129 The Statesman (New Delhi), 11 February 1968.
130 Ibid.
General Yahya Khan, in July 1968.  Though the supply was resumed, it was never satisfactory nor regular. Ayub resigned in March 1969.

On the basis of the foregoing facts, it can be reasonably concluded that Pakistan, during the period, 1960-69, ceased to be a Western satellite. It attempted to maintain a balance of cordiality between the Super Powers. While expressing gratitude to the United States for the economic aid that has been given to Pakistan, it indicated a deep awareness of the American global interests, and did not venture at all to antagonise the Soviet Union. Ayub convinced the Russians that Pakistan joined the Western alliance system only to ensure its security. He emphatically denied this as a product of a policy of expediency. As he wrote:

"If their global policy is served by our understanding of their problems and not by our not acting against them, well and good. But, if the demand goes beyond that and requires us to do something that is against the interests of another power, then we will have to decline because that would be going against the interests of Pakistan".

132 Ayub, n.96, p.119.
The Time Magazine's comment is appropriate when it observed that the year 1960 might come to be known as the year when neutralism in Pakistan's foreign policy became respectable. 133

On the basis of foregoing analysis, it is possible on the part of scholars to attribute numerous variables influencing Pakistan's policy of "bilateral equations". Pakistan's disenchantment with the Western Powers, particularly the United States, began much earlier than 1960, though horned by the October War. Similarly, Pakistan's desire to improve ties with the Soviet Union was equally reciprocated by the Soviet Union, though there was no love lost between them. If one looks for explanation as to why Pakistan failed to reorient its foreign policy, then it is the systemic variable which provides the answer. Pakistan which was a member of the United States orchestrated Western alliance could not just simply ignore its treaty obligations in an era of Cold War. As systemic changes occurred, when growing East-West detente spelt greater understanding between the two Super Powers and the Soviet Union flaunted the olive branch of Peaceful Co-existence between the two different systems and the values of allies dwindled for them, then it became opportunistic and easy for Pakistan to

133 Dawn, 24 October 1960.
strike out independent posture in its foreign policy behaviour. It got further opportunity as the Sino-Soviet rift deepened and each vied for influence in Afro-Asian world, particularly in the South Asia. Further, as Sino-Pakistani axis was taking shape in the wake of Sino-Indian conflict, it compelled the Soviet Union to come to terms with Pakistan which also found a congenial international milieu to refashion its foreign policy.

In the period following 1969, Khrushchev's successors were animated with a belief that the world was moving away from a quiescent state into a dynamic phase conducive to revolutionary upheavals. So they pursued a selective strategy of concentration on the Eurasian Continent. Its main planks were: First, the isolation of China in the East and the flirtation with Japan; the consolidation of their position in the South Asia and presence in the West Asia and Mediterranean. 134 To underwrite this strategy, they relied more on diplomacy and military presence, exploited nationalism and reoriented their foreign economic aid to a few select countries. This strategy synchronized with the reappraisal of American foreign policy initiated by Richard Nixon after the

134 Brzezinski, n.13, p.198.
assumption of Office of Presidency in 1969. It rested on two major premises. In the first place, the United States was pursuing a policy of detente with the Soviet Union in a radically different situation in which the latter had erased the long-held strategic superiority of the former. So, its success depends on a balanced relationship with China that would shore up its bargaining position for striking a strategic deal with the Soviet Union. Secondly, the growing Sino-Soviet cleavage opened up a new vista for the United States to pursue a triangular pattern of global politics. Although it was enunciated as a systematic policy option only in 1972, its bare outlines were faintly visible much before. A scholar aptly observed: 135

"The very success of the Soviet Union in emerging as an equal of the United States and in preparing the ground for a meaningful partnership has at last temporarily made the United States averse to the simple idea of Soviet-American cooperation. It had at one stage fondly hoped to create such a partnership on the basis of the accepted superiority of American power but it is not yet prepared to carry the logic of Soviet-American parity to its full length.

It is not impossible that once the parity of power, between the two is recognized to be the best available situation, the United States... will revert back to the old ideas. But at the moment, Washington appears quite keen to come to terms with a triangular world balance..."

So, the main thrust of Nixon's foreign policy was the reinstatement of the Soviet Union as necessarily the main rival of the United States and the reduction of America's engagement against China around the periphery of the People's Republic. During 1969 and 1970, this reduction of the American presence in Asia began under the so-called "Gaum Doctrine". By the beginning of 1971, the United States and China were both ready to undertake its complement - the improvement of the Sino-American relations as a means of shoring up the position of both against their common rival - the Soviet Union. In response, the Soviet Union (faced with an implacable Chinese hostility) was deeply concerned about the fast crystallizing Washington-Peking ties and made strenuous effort to balance its negative fall-out through its own initiative vis-a-vis Washington designed to convey the greater desirability of an American-Soviet accommodation. But at the same time, it went ahead with
some programmes of acquiring a first strike capability and roughly matched the United States, by mid-1970's, in strategic sector. The result was that both powers were, by early 1970's, checking each other and their power in some cases overlapped (as in Mediterranean). This promoted heightened pressures on them to develop more stable rules of behaviour.

With the assumption of office of Presidency by Richard M. Nixon in 1969, one finds a noticeable shift in the attitude of the United States towards Pakistan. It was made adequately evident in Aid-Pakistan Consortium meeting held in Paris in May 1969. Subsequent visit of Nixon also spoke volumes of his sincerity of strengthening the loose tie of friendship with Pakistan. He made it unequivocally clear that now as President, with somewhat more power and influence, he was going to work hard for the cause he had espoused throughout his political career. As a token of magnanimous gesture, he reversed the earlier policy when, on 8 October 1970, it was announced in Washington that as "an exception to the general policy", the United States had decided to sell Pakistan military

136 For a discussion of these themes, see "Nixon's Philosophy of Foreign Policy", The Round Table (London), no.248, October 1972, pp.403-10.

equipments to replace the equipments previously supplied. It was also to include sophisticated fighter planes. 138

Similarly, the Soviet Union continued, without any let-up, its efforts to bring about a rapprochement between India and Pakistan with the twin objective of enabling India to stand up to China and weaning away Pakistan from the Western and the Chinese embrace. In pursuance of this goal, the Soviet Union stepped up its trade and aid to Pakistan. It also agreed to supply military equipments. President Yahya Khan also visited the Soviet Union twice. But the most interesting development was Pakistan's rejection of Kosygin's plan for a Regional Economic Grouping and Brezhnev's plan for an Asian Security System. 139 It was contended by scholars that the policy framers of Pakistan were aware of the fact that Russian initiative for cultivating friendship with countries on the periphery of China could not be isolated from the Sino-Soviet conflict which became acute after 1969. And the Soviets were working towards some economic and military groupings with the objective of curtailing the Chinese influence and power in Asia, particularly, in the subcontinent. So, Pakistani leadership realised its grave implications, for it would


jeopardize its relation with China on whom they have relied heavily for any potential threat from India. 140

While not denying the underlying reasons, it becomes difficult to reconcile the rejection of the plans as being directed against the Chinese with Yahya's decision to oblige the Russians by closing down the Bedber Intelligence Centre, only in too recent past. The analyst must look beyond. Perhaps, the variable which became dominant to influence Yahya to take such a drastic decision was the systemic changes, of which he was perceptive enough to judge, as in the ongoing process of the Sino-American rapprochement, he was directly involved. This is ably borne out by a scholar who was his foreign policy adviser: 141

"Nixon, during his 22 hours visit to Pakistan in 1969, had an exclusive dialogue with Yahya for about two

140 Kosygin's plan was first announced during his visit to Afghanistan in early 1968. It called for a regional economic grouping comprising Afghanistan, India, Iran, Pakistan and the Soviet Union. Similarly, Brezhnev set forth his concept of "Collective Security for Asia" in an address at the International Meeting of the Communist and Workers Parties in Moscow on 7 June 1969; see speech by L.I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of Communist Party of the Soviet Union at the International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties in Moscow, 7 June 1969, International Affairs (Moscow), vol. 15, no. 7, July 1969, p. 21.

141 Chaudhury, n. 30, p. 107.
hours, and requested him to find from the Chinese the reaction to his new China policy. Yahya... did this job most conscientiously and with utmost secrecy; messages from Peking were delivered directly by the Chinese Ambassador in Pakistan to Yahya who sent them straight to the White House, to Dr. Henry Kissinger and finally to President Nixon... The usual diplomatic channel was avoided. When Yahya visited Washington in October and Peking in November 1970, his main subject of discussion with Nixon and Chou-en-lai was Sino-American relations".

This is also corroborated by Henry A. Kissinger, who observed:^142 But Pakistan was our sole channel to China; once it was sealed off it would take months to make alternative arrangements. We had every reason to maintain Pakistan's goodwill".

In the face of these glaring facts, it is plausible to affirm that Yahya Khan, the channel of communication between the United States and China, understood how the considerations of great power relations would secure for him the American support for spurning all the Soviet proposals. His visits to the Soviet Union, it appears in

retrospect, were mere smokescreen for carrying out clandestine missions for American master.

Similar was the case during the Bangla Desh crisis when Pakistan's response was shaped by equally systemic influence. Although the internal dynamics of Pakistan sparked off the crisis, India's subsequent involvement engaged the subcontinent in a wider pattern of conflict in which major powers got involved because the crisis threatened the very existence of Pakistan. The growing prospect of a new equilibrium of world forces with ominous implications for the South Asia, which was very much implicit in the Sino-U.S. detente, unnerved the Soviet Union. As it betook the ushering in of a new triangular balance in the South Asia, it was feared that the Soviet Union would be pushed into the corner. It meant that it would be left with one-third of the total influence in Pakistan and India marking a total reversal of its South Asian diplomacy which it was vigorously pursuing since the days of Tashkent. All its endeavours and ambitions to bring about a rapprochement between India and Pakistan in order to enlist former's support in its dispute with China and to open the overland route to India via Pakistan and Afghanistan to deepen her influence in the region and to reach Arabian sea were frustrated. Equally, the United
States found its stakes were being jeopardized. It viewed that the strategy adopted by the Soviet Union was to humiliate China, undo its China initiative and to prove the futility of reliance either on China or the United States as an ally. If the Soviet power succeeded too easily, the United States concluded that it might be tempted to adopt comparable tactics in other volatile areas of the world, especially making it difficult for the much awaited West Asia settlement.

At the same time the United States was equally keen to consummate the Moscow Summit. War in the subcontinent should be avoided not least because of the damage it might do to Soviet-American relations on the eve of the "era of negotiation" which it was hoped that President Nixon's visit to Moscow in 1972 would consolidate. So the Americans were concerned to preserve China trip. As Kissinger said: 143 "Without China trip, we would not have a Moscow trip". As both the Chinese and the Americans were gingerly feeling their way towards a new relationship based on the hope that it would usher in a new equilibrium of global forces, their perception converged in an identity of interests in Indian subcontinent. Neither felt confident that the unresolved problems in other areas of world would

143 Kissiner, n.142, p.886.
not throw spanners into their policy of detente. So they were perforce to discover and sustain an area of agreement. The subcontinent remained an area where they would continue to supplement each other's power to limit Soviet influence and Indian power. 144 Kissinger made this point clear: 145 "The festering crisis naturally came up in my conversation in Peking; Chou En-lai's perspective could not have been different from the conventional wisdom in Washington. Chou insisted that China would not be indifferent if India attacked Pakistan. He even asked me to convey this expression of Chinese support to Yahya - a gesture intended for Washington".

So when the stakes of Great Powers seemed threatened with the eruption of crisis, they got willy-nilly involved.

(ii) Alliances:

Another important systemic variable is the alliance structure. Though partly derivative from the prevailing great power relationship, it, too, influences the foreign policy. Usually, it embraces a wide variety of

145 Kissinger, n.142, p.851.
issues and sometimes sets up a formal decision-making organ for underwriting commitment to a chosen course of action. But whatever be its structure, it is assumed that it is one of the crucial variables shaping foreign policy. As alliances are formed to serve specific purpose of its members, it transcends the political upheavals of any particular epoch, and continues till it outlives its usefulness. But one fact is clear. As long as it remains in existence, its obligations are binding on the signatories in the sense that they are under legal compulsion to pursue policy best calculated to promote its rationale and to refrain from activities that are even remotely construed as detrimental to its basic objectives. However, to posit this, is not just to deny the sovereign rights which each member nation zealously preserves to adopt independent stand on foreign policy issues, but to impress upon the fact that, under a dispensation of this nature, the alliance system is not brought into existence fancifully in a fleeting moment. As such, during the period of its existence, it continues to impinge overridingly on the process through which foreign policy is formulated and put into effect by any state. 146

In the ensuing analysis, an attempt is made to highlight to what extent Pakistan's foreign policy was shaped by its alliance structure. To explore this, analysis will be confined to answering the following queries: First, what was the underlying motivation of Pakistan to join the alliance system? Second, what was the basic objective of the alliance to which Pakistan was a signatory? and third, what were the demands made by the alliance system that influenced its foreign policy?

But it should be borne in mind that Pakistan was associated with the Western Powers through an interlocking membership in four mutual security arrangements. In May 1954, it signed the Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement which was purely a bilateral arrangement. Later in the same year, it joined the South Asian Treaty Organisation comprising the United States, France, Britain, Philippines, Thailand, Australia and New Zealand. Close on its heel, in 1955, it became a member of the Baghdad Pact embracing Britain, Turkey, Iran and Iraq. The United States, though declined to join, remained closely associated with it. Again in March 1959, it signed, like Turkey and Iran, a bilateral agreement of cooperation with the United States. Pakistan was only Asian country to be a member of both the SEATO and the Central Treaty Organization and Ayub most
justifiably called his country as "America's most allied ally in Asia". So, it is proposed that the above three questions will be answered conjointly with regard to all the Pacts and Agreements comprising the alliance system.

First, came the Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement. It was a bilateral security arrangement between Pakistan and the United States signed on 19 May 1954. It is explored elsewhere how numerous variables influenced Pakistan to become an ally of the United States. But suffice it to say that it was conceived in an era of Cold War confrontation and marked the culmination of efforts started by Pakistani decision-makers dating back to the morrow of its independence.\(^{147}\) It is also argued in the foregoing that it bore fruit only because of the dominance of the systemic variable. Now, this will be fairly evident if the exploration of objectives of the American foreign policy underlying the formation of the alliance is laid bare.

As argued earlier, the Americans conceived it in the context of frantic efforts made by them for acquiring strategic bases to contain the Soviet power in the fast

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changing international system. This is revealed in the Rand Project report captioned "Selection and Uses of Strategic Bases" sponsored by the United States Air Force Establishment which was finished just one month before the conclusion of the Agreement. 148. It was primarily designed to lay down sound criteria for judging the suitability of a base and isolating the constraining factors. It also proffered its considered suggestions for a peripheral spread of bases for the dispersal of Soviet power, which was concentrated in the North. In terms of its suggested criteria coupled with the necessity of countervailing the Soviet power, it strongly favoured the acquisition of bases in the Indian peninsula, preferably in Pakistan which admirably answered American dilemma. And the Administration lost no time, given Pakistan's eagerness, to suck it into its alliance system.

The American perspective was clearly discernible not only in the provisions of the Agreement but in subsequent documents prepared by the concerned agencies to implement it. In the first place, it was stipulated that the United States would supply such equipment, materials,

services as the Government of the United States might authorise in accordance with such terms and conditions as might be agreed upon. Stated differently, Pakistan, being the recipient, could not impose any terms and conditions for the procurement and uses of the American aid. This was made amply clear that it was not permitted to undertake any aggression against any other nation nor channelise the aid to a third country without the prior permission of the aid-giver. It was exclusively meant for its internal security and legitimate self-defence. In the second place, it was made unmistakably clear that the United States had a larger purpose. Pakistan in lieu of aid, must unequivocally commit itself to serve the strategic goals of American foreign policy which can be gleaned from the provision of article 5 of the Agreement.\footnote{Article 5 reads:

The Government of Pakistan will:
(a) join in promoting international understanding and goodwill and maintaining world peace;
(b) take such action as may be mutually agreed upon to eliminate causes of international tension;
(c) make, consistent with its political and economic stability, the full contribution permitted by its manpower, resources, facilities and general economic condition to the development and maintenance of its own defensive strength and the defensive strength of the free world.

2. The Government of Pakistan will, consistent with the Charter of the United Nations, furnish to the Government of the United States or to such other Governments as parties hereto may in each case agree contd....}
Thirdly, under the existing law, military aid beyond that was required for Pakistan's own security, could not be furnished until there was need for effective participation by Pakistan in regional defence. Title I, Section 105(b) (2) of Public Law 665 laid down:\textsuperscript{150}

"Military assistance furnished to any nation in the Near East, Africa, and South Asia to permit it to participate in the defence of its area shall be furnished in accordance with plans and arrangements which shall have been found by the President to require the recipient nation to take an important part therein."

Stated differently, military aid to Pakistan was made conditional depending upon the American decision-makers' perception of the correlation of systemic forces and their

\textsuperscript{f.n. 149 contd...}

upon, such equipment, materials, services, or other assistance as may be agreed upon in order to increase their capacity for individual and collective self-defence and to facilitate their effective participation in the United Nations system for Collective Security, see, "Mutual Defence Agreement between the United States and Pakistan, May 19, 1954", in Department of States, \textit{American Foreign Policy 1950-1965: Basic Documents} (Washington, 1957), vol.2, pp.2194-98.

\textsuperscript{150} "Top Secret", Memorandum for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Radford) by L. Mathewson, "General Ayub's Meeting with the Joint Chief of Staff on 13 October 1953", Chairman's File, \textit{Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff}, Modern Military Records Branch, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
definition of strategy to control its adverse development. Fourthly, in the context of the present Pakistan's lack of experience, its ability to absorb increased aid and the capacity of its economy to bear increased defence expenditure were also inhibiting factor for any programme of large-scale military aid. American thinking was made clear by a JCS background paper which summed up the situation as follows:

"... it is obvious that current planning and programming must be restricted to a more limited objective, specifically that of developing forces for Pakistan's own security.

... No multi-lateral defence organisation for the Middle East Area has been developed and consequently no coordinated multilateral defence planning has taken place. Therefore, there is no basis for development, on the U.S. side of long range MDAP planning. The process in Pakistan is so new that there is insufficient experience available by which to judge prospects for future progress in the development of Pakistan's military forces. In view of the precarious economic situation in Pakistan... it seems necessary to proceed slowly in the development of military forces in Pakistan..."\[151

\[151\text{Ibid.}\]
In the face of this overwhelming evidence, it is reasonable to conclude that in a world of conflicting ideologies, though Pakistan did not suffer from confusion and its people were free from disintegrating doubts and clashes, its three key decision-makers - Ghulam, Iskander and Ayub - betrayed an understanding of the objectives of the United States underlying the Agreement. The height of naivete of Pakistani policy-makers is clear at least on one account: Pakistan lost no time to ratify the SEATO and Ayub made ceaseless effort to convert the Turko-Pakistani agreement into a northern-tier regional security pact as quickly as possible with the hope that not only aid would flow like honey but also Pakistan would be required by the President of the United States to "take an important part". Besides this systemic constraint, Pakistanis were also blissfully unaware of the functional constraints inhibiting the speedy implementation of the agreement. They did not sufficiently realise that military aid, which was to be doled out to them, and appropriated under the Mutual Defence Assistance Programme came within the rubric of military-security issue area. Hence it constituted the implementing decision of broader foreign policy choice. As a result, it was a product of a congeries of variables of which the bureaucratic politics was most significant in the American context. Expressed in theoretical terms, it meant it was a
net outcome of an interplay of politics within the Military Assistance Advisory Group and the Joint Chief of Staff, between the civilian and military components of the Pentagon and among the Defence, State, and Treasury Departments and also of the Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Council and the Budget Bureau. Because the programme for military aid for any country was first developed by the administration on a yearly basis as the Congress was required to vote the overall mutual assistance appropriations. On behalf of the Administration, Pentagon used to prepare its yearly programme on the recommendation of the United States Military Assistance Group. As the latter worked in close liaison with the prospective recipient's military establishment, and was interested in enhancing its own prestige, its report used to present an inflated requirements of its accredited country and got tainted with local consideration. The Pentagon was deeply aware of this and being constrained by competing sectoral demands, budgetary limitations, and the broad priorities of American foreign policy settled down to an altered programme which was subjected to further cuts by the Congress when the Administration presented it for statutory legislative approval. Now, the amount that was finally granted was not immediately made available to the recipient in the form of military hardware. The intervening period sometimes
stretched to a minimum period of two years. Even when the Pentagon approved a specific force goals for a particular country, it took several years to programme equipment deficiencies within the recommended force bases. The Americans knew fully well how their system works.  

In keeping with their limited objective, a secret Aide-Memoire indicating the military aid to be given to Pakistan over a period of three and a half years was handed over to Ayub Khan on 21 October 1953 after his first meeting with the Joint Chiefs on 13 October. The Aide-Memoire gave a figure of $171 million as the estimated cost of the programme. An annexure to it bore the possibility of fresh induction of an additional 40,000 men into the Pakistan army. But it contained no formula on how the amount was to be distributed among three branches of the services. As MAAG started preparing the equipment deficiency lists for the implementation of the force goals,

152 See for details, Venkataramani, n.37, pp.303-5.

153 Memorandum for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Admiral Arthur W. Radford) by the special Assistant to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for MDA Affairs (Major General Robert M. Cannon), "Pakistan MDA Program", 23 November 1955, "The current MDA Program for Pakistan", briefing paper prepared by the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, October 1954, Chairman's File, Records of the Joint Chief of Staff, Modern Military Records Branch, National Archives (Washington D.C.).
it found that the contemplated force goals would not be realised with an approved outlay of $171 million. In a fresh exercise, it came to the conclusion that an amount of $301.1 million would be required. This was also agreed to by the Joint Committee on Programmes for Military Assistance which termed the earlier figure as an error. The US Army Department stuck to the overall figure of $301.1 million as the target to be kept in mind while proceeding with the implementation of the scheme within the fixed ceiling of $171 million. Despite Radford's effort to cut through the bureaucratic inertia for the fulfilment of the United States commitment to the support of 40,000 additional troops during the programme period, by mid-1956 it was made evidently clear that there could not be any significant increase beyond the $171 million figure stipulated in the Aide-Memoire. 154

However, with the approaching 1957, things looked up for Pakistan as much water in the meanwhile had flown down the Potomac. It was transpired that the Soviet Union had fired a long-range Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles that could carry a thermo-nuclear warhead 5000 miles and hit a target. The opinion of the strategic analysts, politicians, academic converged on the view that the Soviet

154 Venkataramani, n.37, pp.315-16.
military doctrine gave primacy to offensiveness and to the element of surprise as a factor in the event of a Third World War. To counter this, the United States tried to strengthen the Strategic Air Command whose mission was "to be prepared to conduct strategic operations on a global scale so that in the event of sudden aggression, SAC could immediately mount simultaneous nuclear attacks designed to destroy vital elements of aggressor's war-making capacity to the extent that he would no longer have the will to wage war". In such a contingency, bases in Pakistan could be used as a jumping pad for the United States bombers and for installing electronic surveillance system for collection of vital intelligence data.

This was exactly how Pakistani soil was used by the Americans. C.L. Sulzberger of the New York Times wrote in his diary dated 18 February 1957 that a US construction company was building a secret project in Peshawar which became the famous U-2 base. Work was also started "on a communication site of Badabar, near Peshawar." As a matter of fact, the Central Intelligence Agency was


commissioned to entrust the Lockheed Corporation to produce the famous U-2 reconnaissance aircraft fitted with powerful cameras and electronic surveillance techniques which was made operational from the Pakistani base. It flew with impunity over Moscow and gathered invaluable strategic intelligence.

Inherent in this situation was the fact that the use of Pakistani base for strategic purpose is of limited duration which might come to an end for any of the following reasons. In the first place, when the operation got blown up by one or other of several possible developments including its likely shooting down by the Soviet Union. Secondly, the operation itself would be rendered useless once the United States place a satellite in orbit that was capable of performing the U-2 function in a much more sophisticated way. As a matter of fact, the U-2 plane was shot down by the Soviets in May 1960 and the United States, in the years following the launching of an earth satellite "Sputnik" by the Soviet Union on 4 October 1957, embarked on a massive satellite programme. It was expected in 1960 that the United States would possess before long an effective satellite reconnaissance capability.

Interestingly enough, this line of reasoning underlined the thinking of the American policy planners.
and unambiguously reflected in their decision to give military assistance to Pakistan under the Pact. The various documents of the National Security Council and of the Pentagon threw ample light on the intention of the planners. In the first place, the old ceiling of $171 million was scrapped. The earlier commitment to the force goals contained in the Aide-Memoire was to be fulfilled. It included also support for the addition of 40,000 men to the Pakistan Army. The programme was estimated to cost $450 million according to the revised estimate. It was to spread over three years until 1960. In a note to the NSC, the Defence Department stated that this revised commitment to Pakistan did not extend to the maintenance of the modernised forces, after the completion of the approved build-up in 1959.157 Secondly, NSC 5701 specifically laid down certain directives:158

In providing military aid to Pakistan, the United States should:

(a) Resist any Pakistani effort to persuade us to increase the present military aid program.


(b) Encourage the effective use of military resources by Pakistan to the end that the necessary force goals can be met with a progressive declining reliance on US aid.

(c) Avoid becoming committed to assuming any fixed share of Pakistani military maintenance policies in the post-build-up period.

Thirdly, NSC 5701 also stipulated that the United States should encourage improved relations between Pakistan and India and Afghanistan as a means of reducing demands for its aid. It also supported for increased economic aid to both the countries in order to neutralise adverse criticism sparked off by its aid to Pakistan. The American planner also took deep note of the surfacing Sino-Indian dispute and tried to turn it to its advantage. So, while Pakistan's cooperation was kept a closely-guarded secret away from the glare of the press and the legislature, and its contribution downplayed, India was portrayed in a very favourable light in the Congress. Senator John F. Kennedy and John Sherman Cooper introduced an amendment to the Mutual Security Bill of 1958 to the effect that "it is in the interest of the United States to join with other nations in providing support of the magnitude and duration, adequate to assist
India to complete successfully its programme of economic development." The Senate Foreign Relations Committee approved the amendment as a statement of policy to vouchsafe American support for India's efforts. In contrast, Pakistan was not defended adequately when the military assistance given to it came up for debate in which Senator William Fulbright and Senator Wayne Morse bitterly assailed the administration. Lastly, the Secretary of State, Dulles made it clear before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that he himself was of the view that military establishments of some of American allies were more than required for their security. The United States Government was working very hard in a number of quarters to effect a reduction in those countries. The Secretary's policy statement was a clear message to Ayub that his efforts to get the American support for two and a half additional divisions beyond the five and half division force goal accepted by it might not succeed, as there was no disposition in the State Department or the Pentagon to launch any major new programme for Pakistan after the completion of the previously envisaged build-up by the end of 1959.

Now, in the face of these foregoing facts, if one is tempted to answer the first question, then the following observations seem to be appropriate. In the first place, considering the state of military establishment of Pakistan in 1947, the American military aid had sufficiently enhanced its military capabilities, though it tapered off gradually beyond 1960's. According to consolidated statistics published in December 1979 by Comptroller of the Security Assistance Agency, Department of Defence, total deliveries or expenditures on military assistance programme for Pakistan (excluding training) amounted to $650.28 million during the period 1950-1969. Assuming that all deliveries had been made by 1965, and deducting the figure of $377 million released during 1950 - 30 June 1958, one gets $273.28 million as the maximum amount of grant military assistance which Pakistan could have received from the United States during the period 1 July 1958 to September 1965 when the embargo was enforced. This is no small amount for a country like Pakistan. Secondly, the figures below would indicate that in the strategic perspective, Pakistan never loomed very large, in comparison with other allies considered more indispensable for American security.

requirements.¹⁶¹

Table 22

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Amount (million $)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>650,280,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>2,566,747,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>2,388,232,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>2,985,402,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>1,203,784,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>1,178,056,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>689,570,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thirdly, as argued earlier, if Pakistan's objective was to achieve a military parity with India it failed, for the United States continued with its economic aid to India and after 1962, increased its arms aid to India that served to preserve the adverse military balance in the subcontinent, though Pakistan's spruced-up military strength acted as a deterrent for any adventurist action by India. Fourthly, if Pakistan's objective had a politico-diplomatic dimension, it too gained very insignificant mileage. The Agreement contained no commitment by the United States to come to Pakistan's aid in the event of aggression against Pakistan by a third country, particularly India. The United States

was hardly interested in lending its unqualified support to Pakistan on the Pakhtunistan issue or to regain the control of the States of Jammu and Kashmir. It was rather determined to prevent the eruption of conflict between the two countries that would weaken their economic and political system. At the same time, the United States was acutely conscious of its stake in preserving a strong and united India. "India has a culture, an influence, a prestige in the area which, if it were an asset in the hands of Communism, would greatly endanger all the rest of the free countries of Asia," declared Dulles, testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. This perception gradually got engraved in the psyche of the American policy-planners in subsequent time. The Pakistani leadership seemed to have an inadequate appreciation of the American mind and sailed with their stories.

Now, coming to the South East Asia Treaty Organization, one finds that the Chief of Army Staff prepared a "Top Secret" memorandum for the Secretary of Defence on the eve of the Manila Conference which clearly set forth the objectives of the United States:

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162 See, n.159.

The United States Far Eastern policy should be directed towards securing the following objectives:

(a) Development of the purposes and capability of the non-communist countries of the Far East to act collectively and effectively in opposing the threat of aggressive communism;

(b) eventual establishment of a comprehensive regional security arrangement among the non-communist countries of the Far East, with which the United States, United Kingdom and possibly France, would be associated.

(c) Reduction of the power and influence of the USSR in the Far East, initially through containment, and reduction of the relative power position of Communist China and ultimately the detachment of China from the area of Soviet Communist control.

(d) ..... The United States will react with force, if necessary and advantageous, to expansion and subversion recognisable as such, supported by communist China, and will react with immediate, positive armed forces against any belligerent communist move.
It also further stipulated: 164

(a) .... that no commitment by the United States to support the raising, equipping, and maintenance of indigenous forces or to deploy US forces in such strength as to provide for an effective defence of all of the national territory of each signatory is implied...

(b) that military aid by the United States to the South East Asian countries who are members of the Pact should be limited to that necessary to permit the countries concerned to raise, equip, and maintain military forces as necessary to insure internal stability to contribute toward a reasonably effective opposition to any attempted invasion and to instil national confidence.

And with regard to the treaty, the memorandum also suggested:

While the United States is not prepared to commit itself in advance to take specified actions against communist infiltration, or subversion, both the wording of the treaty and the machinery of any organisation

164 Ibid.
established to counter Communist subversion should be such as to enable the United States to take action as it considers necessary. The United States should be able, under the treaty, not only to count upon moral justification for its action, but also to the extent feasible, to be insured of political support by other parties.

These 'policy guidelines' which Dulles scrupulously honoured in concluding the Treaty revealed clearly the objectives of the American planners. In the first place, the treaty was not cast in the mould of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. So it did not envisage any scheme for the stationing of the United States force or any commitment on its part to enhance the capabilities of the indigenous forces of the signatories for the purpose of defending their national territories. The military aid to be provided by it would be within the framework of bilateral arrangements with the respective members. The military aid was meant specifically to enhance their capabilities only to insure internal stability and deal with any attempted communist subversion. Secondly, it was geared towards applying a variety of pressures on the People's Republic of China in order to promote its detachment from the Soviet Union thereby successfully checkmating the Soviet power. But in
the event of communist aggression, the signatories were required to put up stiff resistance, and await eventual liberation by the United States application of the strategy of massive retaliation. Lastly, underlying all these objectives, was the overarching option of the United States to retain broad areas of freedom of action for any commitment on specific actions to be taken in the event of communist aggression or subversion and to elicit moral justification for its action and political support by other signatories. Stated in concrete terms, it virtually amounted to this: the United States was contemplating seriously for a military intervention in the Indo-China. So plans were afoot to revise the strategy in which it was secretly envisaged that the Asian members would play a crucial role. So the United States expected that the Asian members, in the event of such a contingency, would provide moral justification and extend their political support.

These objectives were ultimately incorporated into the various provisions of the treaty, and contained many important implications for the Asian members, particularly for Pakistan. Pakistan's motive was clear from the very outset of the signing of the treaty. In the first place, it should be borne in mind that it never joined SEATO out of fear of the Chinese aggression, nor its action was directed
against the Chinese.\textsuperscript{165} And the Chinese never took serious exception to its membership. The real problem was India's aggressive design and the American aid and Western political support for the solution of Kashmir dispute. Ayub made this point clear in his autobiography where he wrote:\textsuperscript{166}

"I do not quite know the reasons that prompted the government of Pakistan to join this organisation. One must really ask Chaudhry Zafrullah Khan, who was then Foreign Minister.... Perhaps the main consideration was to oblige the United States, who had been giving us considerable economic help. Beyond that I see no any purpose for our being a member. If anyone that membership of this Organisation would in any way strengthen the position of the Eastern part of Pakistan then he was obviously overlooking the fact that the real danger to East Pakistan was from India which surrounded it on all sides".

Though Ayub was free to raise his accusing finger against Zafrullah, the fact remains that the latter left no stone unturned to impress upon the Americans the real motive of Pakistanis to join the Pact. At the Manila conference which

\textsuperscript{165} See my Chapter four.

\textsuperscript{166} Ayub, n.96, p.157.
commenced on 6 September 1954 and initialled the Treaty, he asserted, "the aggression is an evil and that a peace-breaker is an international outlaw, irrespective of the label under which he chooses to operate. Actions against aggression under the Treaty should not be restricted to communist aggression alone."\(^{167}\) Dulles was equally adament in his contention that SEATO's only purpose was to draw and hold a Cold War frontier in South East Asia; it was defined in the Treaty by the words to prevent, or to counter by appropriate means, any attempt ... to subvert freedom or destroy sovereignty or territorial integrity."^{168}\) The only significant threat to South East Asian sovereignty in the Treaty area was the Communist bloc with Communist China as the primary power. So, as Richard G. Casey recalled, Dulles did not want his country to get mixed up and embroiled in Indo-Pakistani conflict. He almost religiously stuck to the original guidelines prescribed by the Pentagon for retaining the freedom of action for his country and the limits of its obligations to the signatories under the Treaty. Though a concession was made to Pakistan as the word Communist was not prefixed to the term "aggression" in the Treaty, but

\(^{167}\) *Dawn* (16 Karachi), 7 September 1954.

under the terms of an appended understanding, the United States' action in the event of armed aggression is limited to communist armed attack. This point was reemphasised in the Department of State Bulletin: \(^{169}\) "We stipulated on behalf of the United States... that the only armed attack in that area which we could regard as necessarily dangerous to our peace and security would be a communist armed attack". As a matter of fact, faced with Pakistani opposition, the United States accepted this limitation as an understanding applicable to itself. The reason advanced was that, since the United States was the only one of the powers that has no territory of its own in the treaty area, it would be straining things too much to say that any aggression other than communist would endanger the security of the United States. Thus, Indo-Pakistan conflict would not require United States action. Specifically, this reservation meant that the United States has no commitment to act against aggression which was not communist. Though it took the position that in the event of armed attack or aggression other than communist, it would consult with other powers under the provision of article 47, para 2, it was hamstrung by the limitations of para 1 of this article which required that action in the event of attack in the treaty

area could be taken by the United States only in accordance with its constitutional process. When questioned in the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Dulles took the position that normal process would be to act through the Congress if it were in session and if not in session to call the Congress. Given the history of the American reluctance to engage themselves deeply in Asia, it is not unreasonable to suggest that dependence on the Congressional approval made the United States obligation under SEATO less certain and less precise. Secondly, though Pakistan was disillusioned, it still pinned hope that an early ratification would ingratiate it into American favour. But as argued earlier, this too failed to cut much ice with the American planners who took their own priorities into account to decide the timing and quantum of military aid to Pakistan. Thirdly, it was an unequal treaty in the sense that the United States never shared with Asian members vital military intelligence. In a memorandum for the Secretary of Defence, JCS chairman, admiral Arthur Radford, made


171 A British view that both American and British commitments under the treaty are fluid. Study Group of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Collective Defence in South East Asia (London, 1956), p. 13.
categorically clear:172

"In order to retain... freedom of action it is considered that the United States should not enter into combined military planning for the defence of the treaty area with other Mainla Pact powers nor should details of United States unilateral plans for military action in the event of Communist aggression in South East Asia be disclosed to other powers."

The policy adopted by the United States permitted the release to Pakistan only of military information, "classified no higher than confidential". Release of information of a higher classification of the State Defence Military Information Control committee.

Fourthly, in terms of solution of the Kashmir dispute, its membership yielded dividends which became counter-productive. At the SEATO Council meeting in Karachi, Pakistan raised the issue of the Soviet support to India and Afghanistan on Kashmir and Pakhtoonistan and succeeded in including them in the final communique which

172 Memorandum for the Secretary of Defence (Wilson) to the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff (Radford) "Concept and Plans for Implementation, if necessary, of Article IV, I of the Manila Pact", 11 February 1955, Records of the Joint Chief of Staff, Modern Military Records Branch, National Archives (Washington, D.C)
stated that SEATO members recognised the Durand Line as the international boundary line dividing Pakistan and Afghanistan, and Pakistan's territory upto Durand Line was covered by the security provisions of the Treaty.\textsuperscript{173} On Kashmir, the members felt the need for an early settlement through the good-offices of the United Nations or by direct negotiation. The inclusion of the reference to the Kashmir dispute, unfortunately, boomeranged Pakistan in the sense that Nehru, who at one point of time was mellowing down for concession under persistent American pressure, got a strong plea to declare that the offer of negotiation stood withdrawn and the issue of plebiscite rendered irrelevant as the status of Kashmir had undergone material change and Pakistan's membership of the Western alliance system had brought cold war to the door-step of the subcontinent. As a matter of fact, whatever slender hope was there for a peaceful settlement, wilted away like morning mist with Pakistan's imprudent decision. Lastly, SEATO only brought disappointment to all sections of Pakistani society which deemed it as a sell-out of country for serving United States' global strategy. Perhaps no commentary was more tragic than the one made by M.A.H. Ispahani who had a long and distinguished record in Pakistani diplomatic service, as he ruefully reflected on the value of SEATO:

\textsuperscript{173} See for details, Venkataramani, n.37, p.361.
"As you know, Pakistan, for reasons best known to our rulers at that time, became a signatory to the South-East Asia Treaty Organisation in September 1954. Although we made a certain reservation, SEATO was absolutely of no value to us because the power behind the Pact, i.e., the US made it abundantly clear that it would not go to the aid of a SEATO member that was attacked by a non-communist country... In the circumstances, SEATO so far as Pakistan was concerned, was a complete write-off... SEATO was primarily created to safeguard the United States' global interests and to add another link in the chain which was being forged to encircle the communist bloc. At SEATO meetings, our representatives acted as stooges of the United States and obeyed American dictates without demur. They spoke more harshly against socialist countries that had done no harm to Pakistan, indeed in such strong words as even the delegates of the United States did not use." 174

Now coming to the CENTO, it is pointed out earlier how it was sponsored by the United States to establish a counter-pose to communism in the Middle East, an area which

was both strategically and economically vital to its security interests as well as of the Western powers. Though the United States was the prime-mover, for reasons already cited, it remained on the sidelines during the entire period of its formation and encouraged Great Britain to become the pall-bearer as the latter was equally keen to reinforce its influence and voice throughout the West Asia.

Once the Pact was consummated, expectancy rose higher among the Pact members about the role to be played by the United States at whose behest they have joined this alliance structure. At the same time, all the members also were agog with hopes about the specific commitments they would be asked to make for the defence of the area and crumbs that would fall from this. Of all the members, Pakistan was most insistent and excited too. Ayub's role in the entire drama was too well-known, spending many sleepless nights, shuttling from capital to capital in the world chancelleries, his tireless efforts brought the fruition of his dream. And all his hopes and aspirations centred on one fact that it would lead to a significant increase in arms supply promised by the United States under the Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement and some spin-offs of diplomatic support for the resolution of the Kashmir dispute. In addition, he also expected the enhancement of
Pakistan's present capabilities by the United States' contribution under the Pact's multi-lateral arrangements. But this in turn depended squarely on one vital fact: The United States' adherence to the Pact and its clear-cut earmarking of role in strategic planning for Pakistan in the defence of the Middle East.

Ayub attended the first meeting of the Bagdad Pact members on 20 November 1955 with lots of gusto and euphoria, for being its architect. At the meeting, W.J. Gallman, US Ambassador to Iran, was present as an observer. When queries were made by the members regarding the United States adherence, he kept mum, which dismayed the Pakistanis who were unaware of the directive under which Gallman was asked to conduct himself. In a 'Top Secret' memorandum to the Secretary of Defence on 14 June 1955, the Joint Chiefs of Staff made the position clear. It read: 175

"... As to whether the United States should adhere to a Northern Tier" Pact, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that should such a pact be consummated and hold promise of viability, the United States having from the outset stimulated its development, could not

175 "U.S. Position Regarding Middle East Defence" (Enclosure to J.C.S. 1887104), 16 June 1955. Records of the US Joint Chief of Staff, Modern Military Branch, National Archives (Washington, D.C).
indefinitely .... abstain from adhering to it in some form. It envisaged that our adherence would be on the broadest basis possible, carrying no obligations for the earmarking of United States forces for the Area, nor any implied commitment as to the order of financial or material support we might extend."

They also suggested that the timing of actual adherence to the Pact should be decided in the light of future developments in the West Asia. This instruction was scrupulously adhered to by all the observers and members of the delegates of the United States in all meetings of the Pact. And its subsequent membership in the Economic Committee and in the Counter-Subversion Committee and the establishment of the US Military Liaison Group only served to take the heat off its immediate adherence to the Pact. It was also revealed that even this modicum of participation was actuated by its sole motive to ensure that planning is essayed along correct and realistic lines and the members do not deflect their attention from the basic objective of the Pact and fritter away in sterile and unproductive narrow individual concerns. 176

176 The Senior US Military Advisor (Admiral Cassady) to the Chief of Naval Operation (Executive Agent for the JCS with regard to the Baghdad Pact), "Bagdad Pact Council meeting", 27 April 1956, Records of the Joint Chief of Staffs, Modern Military Records Branch, National Archives (Washington, D.C.).
Over the years, the position remained basically unchanged and more the real intention of the United States was revealed and its stand articulated, the more Pakistani frustration bordered on disillusionment with the Pact and its sponsor. In the first place, though it was clearly recognized that "the Middle East cannot be defended without the more positive use of the fighting manpower of Pakistan in a mobile offensive", the Army Department was always skeptical of any arrangement that might involve specific troop commitment. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, instead, advised the Secretary of Defence that US adherence "will constitute a new commitment implying a willingness to provide a substantial increase in military and economic aid to support the Pact's defence objectives". This gave a rude shock to Pakistanis who expected substantial assistance by way of military and economic profferment for joining the Pact. But the United States was chary of any further enhancement of aid under the multi-lateral arrangement to Pakistan which was covered under MDAA. Regarding strategic


planning, the United States did not seriously consider any proposal as it viewed that "the Pact planners themselves suffer from a lack of experience and detailed knowledge of military affairs." So, Pakistan failed to make any dent on American strategic thinking.

Secondly, reflecting on the motive of Pakistan, Ayub wrote in his autobiography:

"The crux of the problem from the very beginning was the Indian attitude of hostility towards us. We had to look for allies to secure our position."  

Another objective which he added was:

"Then there was the strong desire which has always existed in Pakistan that we should forge closer relations with our neighbours in the Middle East and particularly with other Muslim countries, not only because of the existence of common bonds of faith but because we have an identity of attitudes and values and we share the same historical experience and face similar problems."


180 Ayub, n.96, p.154.
Now, with regard to the first, it is argued elsewhere how Ayub was thoroughly disenchanted with the Western Powers, especially his original mentor - the United States - and revised the country's foreign policy. If the diplomatic support of the Western Powers on Kashmir was the touchstone for Pakistan to judge their friendship, then they failed miserably to live up to its expectations. The mere mention of the dispute in the Communique of the CENTO meeting at Teheran that it should be settled early was simply a reiteration of platitudes and pious wishes. ¹⁸¹ The Western Powers, particularly the United States, did nothing tangible in terms of solution of the dispute to its satisfaction. Rather Pakistan's joining of the Western alliance system, specially its membership of CENTO triggered off sharp protest from the Soviet Union. The Pravda had asserted earlier that its formation had many ominous forebodings: ¹⁸²

"This is a military treaty. Utterly false are the statements that Turkey and Iraq want to build up the security of the area. All these mechinations cannot be ignored by the Soviet Union which has warned the Arab countries of the grave consequences of participation in American dominated aggressive blocs. The organisers of

¹⁸¹ *Dawn*, 16 April 1956.
¹⁸² Quoted in *Asian Recorder* (New Delhi), vol.11, 1955, pp.33.
these blocs and their agents should remember that the Soviet Union cannot remain indifferent to the intrigues of American aggressive circles and their accomplices in the vicinity of the USSR borders."

The Soviet Union now charged Pakistan that it had become a member of "an aggressive Western alliance" and it responded radically by reversing its earlier stand of neutrality on Kashmir dispute. It veered round the Indian view that no plebiscite was possible or necessary in Kashmir which was "integral part" of India. 183 In pursuance with this new stand, the Soviet Union has, since then, vetoed every resolution of the Security Council on Kashmir to which India had objected regardless of its merit. Though for some time it took a realistic stand that Kashmir dispute was a creation of imperialist powers and it should be solved bilaterally without the intervention of those powers, it surprisingly vetoed the Security Council Resolution of 22 June 1962 which, in essence, merely called upon both the parties to settle this through bilateral negotiation. So one is tempted to say that instead of solving the problem, Pakistan's membership has only contributed to fortify Russian support to India whose attitude to the dispute, which for a time mellowed down, got increasingly hardened to

183 Ayub, n. 74, p. 198.
the point of denial of the very existence of the dispute. In the process, Pakistan got totally estranged from the Soviet Union. As Ayub regretted later: \(^{184}\)

"Another major loss we suffered in joining the Pact was that we were deprived of the opportunity to understand the Soviet Union earlier. The Russians were our neighbours and, as later events proved, we would have been able to understand each other better if some contact had been established between us. Because of the absence of any contact, many misunderstandings cropped up and leaders of the Soviet Union decided to give full support to India. This more than nullified whatever economic and military advantages we gained from the Pact."

This candid confession of the man who shed sweat and tear for ushering in his country into the security relationship with the Western powers, particularly the United States spoke volume where "Pakistan's love has gone". His subsequent Russian visit and his ready compliance, which is highlighted elsewhere, bore eloquent testimony to the sage of his frustration.

\(^{184}\) Ayub, n.96, p.156.
Pakistan's unremitting misfortune does not end with this if one takes into account the behaviour of its allies at least in two crises in which Pakistan had a nightmarish experience. In 1965 war, the British Prime Minister Harold Wilson clearly recognized, in his statement issued on 6 September 1965, "India first crossed the international boundary". Of course, British joined the US in expressing grief at what had happened and in proclaiming to the world that it and the US were doing everything in their power to end the conflict. And they did this by talking in the Security Council and stopping aid, to both the aggressor and to the victim of aggression. Only Iran and Turkey did come to the rescue of Pakistan in a big way.

In the crisis of 1971, which resulted in the break-up of Pakistan, it learnt a lesson never to be forgotten. After 3 December, the United States backing to Pakistan no longer remained continued to the level of political and scanty military supplies support. The tilt towards Pakistan became more pronounced, and a concerted effort with China was made to counter Soviet and Indian joint strategy in the crisis. Anderson's papers had thrown considerable light on the development of this policy of the United States.\footnote{New York Times, 5 and 14 January 1972.} It was revealed that the meeting of the
Washington Special Action Group was in session at 11.00 hours Washington Time (10.30 IST) on 3 December 1971 to discuss the Indo-Pakistani conflict. Henry A. Kissinger drew attention to Article I of the 1959 bilateral agreement between the United States and Pakistan to vouchsafe the obligations of the United States towards Pakistan in the present crisis. 186 It is interesting to know the State Department argued that no binding treaty obligation existed between the two countries in the event of Indo-Pakistani war. It viewed that the so-called Article I only spoke of appropriate action subject to constitutional procedure of the United States. 187 It did not specify any concrete action to be taken by the United States in the event of war between India and Pakistan. Further, the State Department vehemently argued that the obligation was qualified by its context: the 1959 Middle East Resolution better known as

186 Pakistani Ambassador Raza delivered a letter from Yahya Khan to President Nixon on 1st December invoking Article I of the 1959 bilateral agreement between the United States and Pakistan as a basis for the support of the United States; Henry A. Kissinger, The White House Years (New Delhi, 1979), pp.851-912.

187 The Article-I reads: The Government of Pakistan is determined to resist aggression. In case of aggression against Pakistan, the Government of the United States of America, in accordance with the Constitution of the United States of America, will take appropriate action, including the use of armed forces, as may be mutually agreed upon and as is envisaged in the Joint Resolution to promote peace and stability in the Middle East, in order to assist the Government of Pakistan at its request; n.186.
Eisenhower Doctrine, which clearly intended to exclude from its operational perview any Indo-Pakistani war. Again, Kissinger pleaded that in case of Pakistan it was buttressed by assurances of Kennedy and Johnson (referred to earlier) through letter, and an aid-memoire and verbal support. Nothing concrete emerged despite Kissinger's best of efforts. When the naval task force was moved, it was thought that the United States was poised to intervene in favour of Pakistan. But in the hindsight of time it seems more plausible to hold the view that it might be a part of their strategy just to soothe the ruffled feelings of the military junta and the new incumbents of power, that by sending the "Enterprise" as a deterrent, they saved the Pakistanis from a disastrous defeat in the West, though they could not intervene in time to influence the results of the war in the East. Kissinger wrote in his memoires which lends support to this line of reasoning. He said: 188

"To provide some military means to give effect to our own strategy and to reinforce the message to Moscow, Nixon ordered the task force to move into the Bay of Bengal. Moving the task force into the Bay of Bengal committed us to no final act, but it created precisely

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the margin of uncertainty needed to force a decision by New Delhi and Moscow."

Now, with regard to the second objective of fostering a fraternal link with the Muslim world, it is argued elsewhere how Pakistan's membership distorted and how it alienated the Arab world. There is no need to highlight them again here. But suffice it to note that the anti-Western sentiment reached its culmination in the brutal killing of the young king of Iraq, his uncle and some members of his family, including the Prime Minister Nur-el-Said. As a result, when Brigadier Kassim took office, his first task was to pull his country out of Bagdad Pact. Nothing could be more ironic than this, for the very country whose name the Pact bore as its nomenclature was first to quit the alliance. With Iraq out, the word, "Bagdad" lost its meaning. And it was rechristened as CENTO - Central Treaty Organization. When all said and done, the remark of M.A.H. Ispahani is most appropriate: 190

"CENTO, the original military pact, is now, to all intents and purposes, a dead organization. For this change, no Pakistani will shed a tear of sorrow. CENTO was a useless organization, as our people found out to their deep disappointment."

189 See my Chapter Four.

190 Ispahani, n.174, p.200.
The most important systemic variables influencing the foreign policy behaviour of a state are the Great Power structure and the Alliances. While Great Power structure refers to the pattern of relationship prevailing among great powers in any era of human history, the alliances are also derivative from them.

In our enquiry we found that Pakistan achieved its statehood in 1947 under the shadow of Cold War that tended to divide the world into two distinct blocs. There was no demand on Pakistan either from the Soviet Union or the United States, to toe their line in foreign policy, for which it adopted a policy of nonalignment. Between 1952-61, the Soviet Union became keen to get a foothold in South Asia and decided to favour India against Pakistan. And as regards the United States, with the ushering in of the Republican administration, Pakistan loomed large in its global strategic perspective. As a result, Pakistan's long desire to join the Western alliance system, particularly of the United States, was fulfilled. Here we find that its alignment with the United States was a product of systemic compulsions.

In the early 1960's the prevailing configuration of power changed in international politics which became a loose bipolar system, because of intra-bloc conflicts. It
was accompanied by a change in the location and technique of conflicts between the two Super Powers, and the emergence of the Third World, which was caught up more intensely in the vortex of Super Power politics. With the edent of Kennedy era, the need for a modus operandi with the Soviets received top priority. In this backdrop, the policy of the Super Powers changed towards Pakistan. The non-aligned states were cultivated with understanding and sympathy. Correspondingly, the value of 'allies' dwindled. China became the common enemy of both the Super Powers. In its global policy of containment of China, India was expected by the United States to play a major role. But this did not minimise the strategic importance of Pakistan in its over-all global strategy. But, the Sino-Indian war of 1962 altered the equation. As the military balance was drastically tilted against Pakistan, this gave Ayub a spacious plea to reorient the country's foreign policy. First, he viewed that it would not incur the American hostilities, because of the on-going process of detente, second, China would be forced to come to terms with its neighbour whose strategic value would be cashed in once Pakistan came out of the American embrace. Now, Ayub reformulated his foreign policy which he termed as the policy of "bilateralism" which meant setting as bilateral equation with the Soviet Union, the United States and China, so it can be said that while Ayub justified it as
a product of geographical compulsion, as a matter of fact it was a mere rhetorical rationalization. The real reason which compelled the rethinking seems to be the political constraint emanating from a multipolar international system that made untenable a policy conceived in the era of Cold War to serve the national interest.

In the mid-fifties, the American attitude and involvement in subcontinental affairs underwent radical change when it encouraged the Soviet Union to mediate in Indo-Pakistani disputes. It maintained complete neutrality in the Indo-Pakistani war of 1965 and instead imposed the embargo on military aid to both the countries. Its relation with Pakistan remained at the lowest ebb. But the Soviet Union made considerable headway. There was a perceptible shift from its earlier stand on Kashmir.

In the period following 1969 the United States was following a policy of detente with the Soviet Union in a radically different situation in which the latter had erased its strategic superiority. So its success depended upon a balanced relationship with China that would shore up its bargaining position for striking a strategic deal with the Soviet Union. In this backdrop, the growing Sino-Soviet cleavage opened a new vista for the United States to pursue
a triangular pattern of global politics. So the main thrust of Nixon's foreign policy was the reinstatement of the Soviet Union as the main rival of the United States and the reduction of the American engagement against China.

This phase coincided with the onset of the Bangla Desh crisis which gave a rare opportunity for the United States, China and the Soviet Union to settle their respective accounts. On the one hand, the United States was keen to consummate the Moscow summit and without China trip, it would not have a Moscow trip, and on the other hand, it wanted to discover and sustain an area of agreement where both China and the United States would supplement each other's power to limit the Soviet influence and Indian hegemonism. As India's involvement in the crisis engaged the subcontinent in a wider pattern of conflict, the major powers got involved because the crisis threatened the very existence of Pakistan. As a result, Yahya's response to crisis was shaped by the impact of the systemic influences.

Regarding the impact of alliance system on its foreign-policy, our analysis highlights that Pakistan was associated with the Western Powers through an interlocking membership in four mutual security arrangements. Its basic objectives were to procure American military aid and the
Western Powers' political and diplomatic support in its dispute with India, particularly Kashmir. But the Pakistani policy makers were unaware of the objectives and the motivations of the Western Powers, particularly of the United States. Their basic objective was to acquire the bases in Pakistan and to enlist its political support for their policy in Asia. Once the importance of bases declined, Pakistan fell from their grace. But it served to make Pakistan the American Trojan Horse in Asia, alienated it from the Muslim world, antagonised the Soviet Union made it suspect in the eyes of the Afro-Asian world and embittered its relationship with India.