Chapter I

The Emerging Trends in the Non-Aligned Movement in the Seventies
The years following the end of the Second World War witnessed the termination of the war-time alliances between the Western Powers and the Soviet Union. The United States emerged as a leading economic and political Power. Being armed with political and economic clout, it was prepared to take significant initiatives in world affairs. In the following years, it enjoyed "a margin of superiority" over its rival, the Soviet Union, and tried to manage the international system in accordance with its own national values and interests. Since the Soviet Union was moving along in the same direction, international relations in the post-war period assumed the dimensions of a "bipolar" world, resulting in the politics of bloc formation, arms build-up, and the Cold War.

The United States perceived the Soviet Union as a threat not only to the security of its national territories but also to the security of some of the countries of Western Europe, Africa, and Asia, which shared the American value system. Hence its foreign policy was primarily designed and launched to contain what its policy makers perceived as Communist expansion. Its goal was ostensibly to make the world "free for democracy". Sharing the same perception, the countries of Western Europe joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and coordinated their foreign-policy objectives with those
of the United States.

The Western allies perceived the challenge of Communism as a major threat, and felt that if "democracy" was to survive, they must contain Communism militarily, politically, and economically. The Soviet Union reacted by forging military pacts of its own.

The bipolar division of the world into East and West was not to the liking of the independent nations of Asia and Africa. In their view, a world dominated by bipolar politics and intense bloc confrontation would re-impose the burden of neo-colonialism on them. The West considered these countries to be fit candidates for the membership of the anti-Communist bloc because they had political and economic systems somewhat akin to those of the West. What was more important, they needed the political and economic support of the West for their development. These countries, however, refused to join bloc politics. They made major breakthrough by promoting a policy of co-existence which did not involve them in the military alliances set up by the two blocs. This policy, which eventually became known as non-alignment, was an expression of their individual identity and their overwhelming desire to be independent of all foreign influence. They emphasized that being non-aligned did not mean being "neutral" or "neutralist" in the sense in which the West used those words.
It was, according to them, more a diplomatic philosophy of pursuing individual nationalist perspectives. In other words, it meant an assertion of freedom of action and choice with respect to international issues. It did not mean equidistance from the two Super Powers. Instead the influence of a non-aligned country increased when its policies coincided with those of one or the other Power blocs in the Cold War.

Non-alignment certainly irked the United States. US relations with the various countries which chose to tread the path of non-alignment were largely bilateral in nature (especially from the early 1950s to the early 1960s). For instance, US relations with countries like Cambodia, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Laos and Yugoslavia were based on complex and diverse considerations. Further, these relations were subject to change in accordance with US perceptions of the world scene at any given time.

The attention being given here to the emergence and role of the non-aligned movement in world politics is, however, of a different nature; for any analysis of the US responses towards the non-aligned movement should take into consideration the inter-relationship between the consolidation of political independence by the developing countries and their increasing adoption of non-alignment
in their foreign relations on the one hand\textsuperscript{1} and the considerable changes that have occurred in the "bipolar" structure of the world with the emergence of the non-aligned as a kind of peace-keeping group, asserting and advocating "non-blocism" in world affairs on the other.

Full recognition of the importance of the role of the non-aligned states in world affairs can be related to certain developments that took place in the 1970s - such as the stabilization of the global politico-military situation (\textit{detente} between the two Super Powers) and the emergence of the non-aligned countries as an international pressure group for the reorganization of the international economic system.

The non-aligned countries emerged as a pressure group when they realized the importance of economic development. They were disappointed with the developmental efforts of the 1960s. Indeed they grew sceptical about the continued relevance of the model of development provided

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\textsuperscript{1} The membership of the movement has steadily increased. From a mere twenty-five countries at the Belgrade Conference in 1961, it increased to ninety-two full-fledged members at the Summit Conference held in Havana in 1979. Further, there were no deserters from the ranks of the non-aligned. See Two Decades of Non-Alignment: Documents of the Gatherings of the Non-aligned Countries 1961-1982 (New Delhi: Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, 1983), pp. 11 and 485. Hereinafter referred to as Documents of the Non-Aligned.
largely by the Western nations after the Second World War. Yet another development worth noticing in this context is that the shift of the non-aligned movement towards economic decolonization which coincided with the increasing economic assertiveness of the developing countries towards the West. This in its turn led to the North-South dialogue on various economic issues.

The concepts of a New International Economic Order and a New World Information Order symbolized two important dimensions of the decolonization process. They also marked the beginning of the recognition of the inter-relationship between economic and socio-cultural emancipation. The emergence and growth of the non-aligned movement and its effect on present-day politics thus constitute an important area of political analysis.

The fact that the number of non-aligned countries has steadily increased clearly shows that the non-aligned movement is no transitory phenomenon in world politics. The resilience and durability of the movement is evident from the striking growth of the non-aligned countries not only in terms of membership of the movement, but also as a significant proportion of the membership of the United Nations. In 1961, at the time of the First Non-Aligned Summit Conference held in Belgrade, the non-aligned countries accounted for just a quarter of the votes in the UN General Assembly. Their number
increased gradually, and by 1979 they constituted 58 per cent of the total membership of the UN General Assembly. They were still short of the two-thirds majority needed to dominate the Assembly. 2

Whatever the voting patterns and the positions of the non-aligned countries in the United Nations, it was clear that the movement was gaining converts in Asia, Africa, and Latin America and that the United States would soon be confronted with the demands and pressures of those who subscribed to this new ideology. It is, therefore, necessary to focus on the context in which the non-aligned movement began and on the evolution of the concept of non-alignment.

**Origins of the Concept of Non-Aligned**

From the start, the expression "non-alignment" has been a subject of intense debate. Scholars as well as leading statesmen have regarded it as a positive and predominantly political label which served to unite countries which wished to repudiate the politics of the

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Cold War. The original thrust of this concept was to avoid the bipolar structure of the world (particularly in the 1950s and the 1960s).

India was one of the first countries to gain independence after the Second World War, and the Indian Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, was the first Asian leader to articulate the basic idea of non-alignment. Part of the rationale for India's policy of non-alignment lay in its own historical experience, its struggle against British rule, its sympathy for similar struggles elsewhere, its opposition to racialism and racial discrimination, and its desire for world peace. Nehru believed that India could be true to its historical tradition and at the same time attain its policy objectives if it shunned bloc politics. Just before independence he declared: "We propose, as far as possible, to keep away from the power

3 The literature on the subject generally sought to explain non-alignment by attributing a relationship of causality between non-alignment and the East-West conflict. Further, there is no controversy over the factual aspects describing the rise of non-alignment; it is the attempt to analyse the determinants of non-alignment which seems inadequate. For example, one scholar explicitly stated that "neutralism, or non-alignment ... is primarily a response to Cold War, and only in part a product of rising nationalism .... Afro-Asian neutralism is a function of bipolarity." Ernest Lefever, "Nehru, Nasser, and Nkrumah on Neutralism", in Lawrence W. Matin, ed., Neutralism and Non-alignment (New York, 1962), pp. 93-121.
politics of groups aligned against one another, which have led in the past to world wars and which may again lead to disaster on an even vaster scale.\textsuperscript{4} If, however, a world war erupted anyway, India was to be guided by its own interest: "We are going to join the side which is to our interest ... when the time comes to make the choice."\textsuperscript{5} There was no confusion as to priorities: national interest came first. And it was national interest which dictated that India retain its own independence of judgment instead of subordinating it to the requirements of alliance politics.

India's independence was followed by the independence of Burma, Ceylon (now Sri Lanka), Indonesia, and several other countries of Asia, Africa, Europe, and Latin America.

Non-alignment was accepted by Burma, Ceylon, and Indonesia. Yugoslavia, too, after breaking away from the Soviet bloc, proclaimed its allegiance to non-alignment. In a joint statement with Nehru, President Josip Broz Tito of Yugoslavia emphasized that the policy of non-alignment was "positive" and dynamic and that it was a


\textsuperscript{5} Ibid. In his speech to the Constituent Assembly on 4 December 1947 Nehru also explained in detail the policy that India would pursue. See India, Constituent Assembly (Legislative), \textit{Debates}, vol. 2, no. 5, row 14, p. 1260.
constructive policy aimed at achieving collective peace and security. As non-alignment originated in the period of the Cold War, many of the statements issued by the leaders of the non-aligned countries highlighted the aspects of non-involvement in bloc politics and peaceful co-existence and cultivation of friendly relations with all countries.

India's non-aligned diplomacy may be dated from the early 1920s, when there was widespread disillusionment in India over Britain's failure to redeem its pledge to grant any substantive measures of self-government to the people in return for their support for the British war effort. India realized the futility of getting involved in unnecessary foreign entanglements and the need to

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7 In a speech to the UN Political Committee on 13 December 1957, the then Defence Minister of India, V.K. Krishna Menon, remarked that the United States had itself been a champion of the policy of peaceful coexistence and friendship with all. He referred to the Department of State Bulletin of 26 November 1941, which proposed a list of principles, including non-aggression, non-interference in others' affairs, recognition of mutual sovereignty and respect, and mutual economic aid. He contended that the phraseology was similar to that adopted by India and other independent nations pursuing non-alignment. See Foreign Affairs Record (New Delhi: Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs), December 1957, p. 242.
maintain a neutral stand on matters which were of no concern to it. 8

It is, however, important to note that non-alignment does not mean non-involvement in an absolute sense. Nor does it mean avoidance of military action altogether. Non-alignment does not, for instance, forbid the use of force in securing liberation from colonial rule. This is an important dimension of the policy which lends it a touch of dynamism. For example, in 1961, India used its armed forces to liberate Goa. 9

Non-alignment does not mean passivity or "neutrality" when confronted with crucial issues. Egypt's President Nasser characterized it as an independent policy that emerged "from the conscience of the Egyptians and veered neither to the East nor West. It was a policy of positive

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8 See Nehru's "Foreword" to Ram Manohar Lohia's India's Foreign Policy (Allahabad, 1938), p. 2. See also Nehru's The Discovery of India (London, 1947), p. 423. It may be recalled that although the Indian National Congress, which was established in 1885, often passed resolutions on foreign policy which seemed to anticipate the non-alignment of free India, these references to non-alignment had only an illusive similarity to the policy later outlined. They were more in the nature of a criticism of Britain's policy of establishing a "scientific frontier" in India and asked the British exchequer to maintain and meet the cost of military expeditions. See Report on the Seventh Indian National Congress (London, 1892), p. 67.

9 India, Lok Sabha, Debates, cols. 1961-2 (New Delhi, 1961).
Non-alignment just means that the non-aligned countries would judge each issue on its merits, or that their attitudes are not predetermined in accordance with the requirements of bloc politics, or that their membership of military alliances does not place them automatically on this or the other side. Despite its negative connotation, the term "non-alignment" describes this policy best. In the opinion of the non-aligned countries it is best suited to explain their viewpoints and policies in international relations. Once, in reply to the


11 To arrive at a correct interpretation of non-alignment is not easy as there is no consensus on the subject among the non-aligned countries themselves. Indeed, as things stand today, the term "non-alignment" covers Egypt's "positive neutralism", Afghanistan's "equal friendship", Morocco's "non-dependence", and Malawi's "discretional alignment and neutralism". See Crabb, n. 10, pp. 4-5. And yet a perusal of the proceedings of the first three summits of the non-aligned countries would show that the non-aligned countries are agreed that it is an active policy, that it is different from "neutrality", and that it does not mean equidistance from the two Super Powers. Moreover, the speeches of the various leaders in these three summits show that the term "non-alignment" is used very often. The word "neutralism" is sometimes mentioned. "Neutrality", as an explanation appears rarely if ever. See Documents of Non-Aligned, n. 1.
charge that the policy he was pursuing was a "negative and neutral policy", Prime Minister Nehru clarified the true meaning of non-alignment, thus: "It is a positive and vital policy, which flows from our struggle for freedom. When man's liberty or peace is in danger, we cannot or shall not be neutral. Neutrality would then be a betrayal of what we have fought for, and we stand for." 12

Explaining the significance of the term "positive neutrality", Kwame Nkrumah, the President of Ghana, said that it was an independent foreign policy not committed to any ideology. Militarily, Ghana was not aligned with any political power or bloc. It would act according to its own judgment and in the light of its obligation to the UN Charter. 13 The initial years of the movement were thus more concerned with exploring the possibilities of cooperation between the countries of Asia and Africa and eliminating colonialism without either of the Power

12 See Nehru's *Selected Speeches*, n. 4, p. 591.

13 Kwame Nkrumah, *A Speak of Freedom* (London, 1961), p. 143. It must be mentioned that in the late 1960s, when he was in exile, Nkrumah's concern was not just confined to independence of action in the Cold War, but assumed a more radical posture. He declared that the Socialist World and the Third World have common aims and should not be separately treated. *Labour Monthly* (London), October 1968, p. 46. Eleven years later, Cuba took the same posture, and contended that the countries of the Socialist World were the "natural allies" of the Third World.
blocs. 14

Non-Aligned Movement and the
United States in the 1950s

In the early years the West vehemently criticized the behaviour of newly independent countries like India. For example, a Western scholar observed that these nations were finding it "more comfortable to occupy the diplomatic no-man's land between the Western and Communist camps than to attach themselves to either." 15 She also noted their declaration that they had no intention of being a "third force." 16 Nevertheless, it is true that neither the East nor the West took non-alignment seriously until the Korean War. The two blocs were agreed that it was a "rhetorical" rather than an active source of foreign policy.

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14 In this context, it may be useful to recall the Indian initiated Asian Relations Conference of March 1947 and the Asian Conference of January 1949. India displayed a keen interest in consolidating the interests of the newly independent countries. In the United Nations it showed concern about finding solutions for the Palestinian and Indonesian questions. Official Records of the United Nations General Assembly (GAOR), 1949, p. 161. Also Nehru, Selected Speeches, n. 4.


The United States felt frustrated and concerned when the newly independent nations chose the policy of non-alignment. This was due to a feeling that these countries were seeking to equate the international ambitions and conduct of the United States with those of the Soviet Union. The US resentment of the non-aligned countries deepened when they expressed themselves in the United Nations and in other multilateral forums in words which seemed to indicate that they were more bitter towards the United States than towards the Soviet Union.

The United States had chosen China as the sheet-anchor of its Asia policy. Even after the collapse of Nationalist China in 1949, the US Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, continued his preoccupation with Japan, Korea and Formosa and, a little later, with Indo-China. Acheson's views on Asian politics were influenced more by British and French views than by those of new entities like India or Indonesia. The Korean War added a new dimension to the role of the non-aligned countries in world affairs. It forced the two Super Powers to

17. Throughout the Korean War, opinion in America was by and large against, and strongly against, India's "neutralism". So strong was this feeling that pro-Indian groups were totally unable to influence US policy towards Asia. Most people took the view that India's policy "often seems to bear to the Left" i.e. more sympathetic towards the Communist view, New York Times, 2 September 1951. In fact one Congressman angrily remarked that Nehru's "blind neutrality" was a "greater menace to the cause of world peace". USA, Congressional Record, vol. 99, February 1953, pp.1585-6. Nevertheless India played a valuable role as a mediator in the Korean crisis, See CAOR, session 7, plen. mtgs., pp. 376, 431 and 724.
take notice of non-alignment and seek the support of countries which had adopted the non-aligned posture.

Cold War rivalries and a mistrust of Soviet and Chinese activities in the Third World affected US reactions to the emergence of new states during the 1950s and the 1960s. The United States adopted a policy of containment to halt Soviet expansionism in the post-war period. This policy was inconsistent with the basic thrust of non-alignment. As conceived by the Third World, the policy of non-alignment envisaged independence of action in political and military matters regarding all the countries.

The non-aligned states looked upon the Eisenhower Administration's military intervention in Iran (1953), Guatemala (1954), and the Lebanon (1958) and the extension of military alliances to Asia as menacing. They were particularly disturbed by the formation of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and the South-East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) as they felt that they had brought the Cold War to their doorstep. The United States took a tough line towards China, established military bases on the periphery of the Communist World with a view to halting the advance of Communism, and extended its military alliances to Asia and thus placed itself in direct opposition to the non-aligned countries.
The non-aligned countries felt that these measures constituted a threat to their security in as much as they enhanced the possibility of a wider war. They were alarmed at the Secretary of State John Foster Dulles's "crusade" against Communism. It was against this background that the Colombo Powers decided to convene an Asian-African Conference at Bandung in Indonesia.\(^{18}\)

Although as many as twenty-nine countries participated in the Conference, only three of them - viz., Burma, India and Indonesia were non-aligned at that time. These three were expected to play an important role in influencing the decisions taken at the Conference. Communist China was an invitee, though only eight of the countries present had recognized it.

The impact of the non-aligned countries (particularly that of India) on the Conference was considerable. While the resolutions that were passed revealed divergent perceptions of international politics and the conflicting national interests of the participants, it also highlighted certain important common objectives.\(^{19}\) The Conference maintained its opposition to colonialism and called for

\(^{18}\) The Colombo Powers were: Burma, Ceylon, India, Indonesia and Pakistan.

\(^{19}\) For complete information on the Bandung Conference, see David Kimche, The Afro-Asian Movement: Ideology and Foreign Policy of the Third World (New York, 1973), pp. 57-60.
mutual co-operation in the settlement of international disputes by peaceful methods. It also stressed the need for the acceptance of the principles of non-aggression and non-interference in one another's internal affairs. The Conference adopted a declaration on peaceful and neighbourly relations with other countries based on the principles similar to the "five principles of peaceful coexistence" or "Panchasheela" as envisaged by Indian Prime Minister Nehru. It was apparent that the non-aligned countries like India exerted a strong influence over the Conference.

The Eisenhower Administration saw in Bandung, a vehicle for the enlargement of the spheres of Chinese and Soviet influence. At the same time, it also realised that this Conference gave a foretaste of future Third World Conferences. It also gave the Americans an opportunity to realise that they were yet to frame any concrete foreign policy vis-a-vis the countries of Africa and Asia. It was this factor which made the US encourage

20. Panchasheela was first mentioned in an agreement between China and India over Tibet in 1954. (China had later broken the agreement by its action in Tibet). Nehru believed that these principles provided a sound basis for relations between nations as a whole. See Nehru's Inaugural Address to the Asian Legal Committee, Government of India, Foreign Affairs Record (New Delhi, December 1957), p. 86.

21. In a speech before the House of Representatives on 31 March 1955, Congressman Adam Clayton Powell (New York) gave voice to what many were then feeling: "We might as well face the truth that we have no foreign policy in Africa and Asia. The only thing we are stumbling around with is the slogan "Let's Stop Communism". USA, Congressional Record, vol. 101, 31 March 1955, p. 1541.
friendly countries like Pakistan, Turkey and Philippines to participate in the Conference and rebut criticisms of the West made by other countries.\footnote{Richard Jackson, \textit{The Non-Aligned, The UN and the Super Powers} (New York, 1983), p. 211.} In contrast the Soviet leadership took a positive view of the Bandung Conference and sent an official message of good wishes.\footnote{N. Khrushchev, \textit{Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament} (New Delhi, 1975), p. 313. Khrushchev assailed Stalin's policy towards Asia and said that the Soviet Presidium was doing some hard thinking in terms of policy decisions towards the neutralist countries.}

In the mid-1950s the United States forged a system of alliances and took a hostile attitude towards countries which did not join in. At the same time the Soviet Union launched a modest programme of economic assistance to selected countries in the Third World. This alarmed the West. Even if these countries of the Third World were genuinely "neutral", were they "sufficiently alive to the dangers they faced from the Communist side"? Inspite of his hesitation to denounce the policy of non-alignment, the US Secretary of State, Dulles condemned "neutrality" as an "obsolete" concept and "except under very exceptional \textit{sic} circumstances, it is an immoral and short-sighted conception."\footnote{John Foster Dulles, "The Cost of Peace", \textit{Department of State Bulletin} (Washington, D.C.), 18 June 1956, pp. 999-1000.} This view...
governed US policy towards the non-aligned countries throughout the 1950s.

However, the international situation in the late 1950s was complicated by events like the Suez crisis and the Soviet intervention in Hungary. The reaction of the leaders of the non-aligned World made the West more distrustful of it. Many argued that Nehru was noticeably slow in condemning Soviet involvement in Hungary and contrasted it sharply with what they described as his forthright attitude towards the Suez crisis. Nehru, however, defended his policy by saying that it constituted a consistent effort to maintain peace and to oppose colonialism. Thus, even before non-aligned movement was formally launched in 1961, US policy was negative towards the concept of a third political grouping - i.e. a grouping, outside the bipolar framework which then obtained.

About this very time there was a strong upsurge of Arab nationalism. The Arab world had in the past been

25. Nehru, Speeches, n. 4. "Events in Hungary and Egypt", speech to Lok Sabha, 18 November 1956, see Vol. 4 for complete understanding of Nehru's perception of non-alignment and international problems, p. 381. See also D. Eisenhower, The White House Years, Waging Peace, 1956-61 (London, 1966), pp. 106-10 Eisenhower recalled Nehru's visit to the United States and his reaction to the Soviet presence in Hungary. He said that Nehru's verbal and personal reaction was "in contrast to the mild letter he had previously sent me" towards "the Hungarian affair". He also said that Nehru explained India's neutrality in a lucid manner.
the scene of incursions by rival European Powers leading to its fragmentation and loss of independence. To many Arabs, the growing antagonism between the United States and the Soviet Union in the post-war period did not appear relevant to the issue of political independence and economic reconstruction of their homelands.

The Arabs asserted their sovereignty in both defence and foreign affairs and refused to accept membership in the military alliances formed in the context of the Cold War. According to an Arab writer, this was "an integral part of the nationalist opposition of Arabs to foreign domination. Non-alignment became an indispensable part of Arab nationalism."26 Under Egypt's Gamal Abdel Nasser, non-alignment became synonymous with the Arab struggle for national liberation. Non-alignment was widely endorsed by the rest of the then independent Arab countries as the heavy Arab attendance at the First Non-Aligned Summit Conference held in Belgrade showed.27 Of the Latin American countries, only Cuba was a member of the non-aligned movement. Bolivia, Brazil and Ecuador


27 Documents of the Non-Aligned, n. 1. The number of Arab countries was four. The criteria for issuing invitations to the non-aligned conference were determined at the preparatory meeting held in Cairo in June 1961, Ibid., p. 2.
were present as Observers. 28

The conference met at a critical time. The Cold War was at its most intense. The conference adopted a 27-point declaration and expressed concern about the developments in international politics which had led to an aggravation of the Cold War. It ended with an appeal to the United States and the Soviet Union to renew "direct negotiations" with each other with a view to peaceful coexistence. 29 The points that the conference emphasized were recognition of the People's Republic of China and representation for them at the world conferences on disarmament. On the whole it was an effort to achieve peace through negotiations and to halt the escalation of the Cold War.

Both President John F. Kennedy of the United States and N.S. Khrushchev of the Soviet Union sent messages of goodwill to the conference. However, in the case of the United States at least, it did not reflect any readiness to see non-alignment as a growing international movement. Nor did it imply a recognition of non-alignment as an

28 Ibid., p. 3.

29 This proposal was made despite the earlier defeat in the General Assembly in October 1960. Particularly illustrating is the negative attitude of the United States to the proposal for talks. For full details, see Eisenhower, n. 25, pp. 586-8. See, for further corroboration, Jean Lacouture's Nasser: A Biography (London, 1973), pp. 213-14.
expression of a deep desire of the newly independent countries to retain freedom of judgement and action, to support the freedom struggles of subject peoples, and to chart out their own path to development. The US attitude towards these countries was a part of its overall perception of East-West relations. President Kennedy was angered at the "ambivalence" of the conference about resumption of nuclear tests by the Soviet Union. However, as the non-aligned countries did not favour the Soviet position on the Berlin issue and turned down the Soviet proposal for a "troika" at the United Nations, the Americans were not totally disappointed. Secretary of State Dean Rusk characterized US official reaction to the Press on 22 September 1961 thus: "... our attitude toward the policies and position of those at Belgrade was mixed before they went there and it was mixed after they came back." In contrast the Soviet Union, despite its failure to elicit support for its "troika" idea, refrained from criticizing the movement.

30 George F. Kennan, then US Ambassador in Yugoslavia, expressed the view that the conference was President Tito's response to the Soviet-Yugoslav rift. Tito wanted to show Moscow that he already commanded the respect of the Third World which the Soviet Union was so assiduously trying to win. George F. Kennan, Memoirs, 1950-1963 (Boston, Mass., 1972), p. 279.


Impact of the Sino-Soviet Rift on the Third World

The second summit conference of the non-aligned countries held in Cairo in 1964 met under different circumstances. Following a war between China and India over the alignment of their common borders India had, despite being non-aligned, asked the various countries of the world, including especially the Western countries, to help meet the Chinese challenge. On the other hand, the Sino-Soviet split had made a significant impact on the Chinese outlook on international affairs. Yet the conference in Cairo called for a recognition of the People's Republic of China. It also called for closer consultations among the non-aligned countries in the United Nations for the achievement of their common objectives and for the implementation of the policies outlined by them. The conference took a strong line against South Africa and Southern Rhodesia for practising racialism. It also called for support for the Organization of African Unity (OAU).

33 The apparent dilemma of "non-alignment versus national security" made the Government of India reappraise non-alignment. Later, in 1967, Egypt too faced a similar situation in the wake of the Israeli attack. Both India and Egypt (in 1962 and 1967 respectively) depended on Soviet arms. Both Nehru and Nasser submitted to the dictates of necessity and came to terms with the simple interest of self-preservation to explain the evolution of their non-alignment.
A large number of speakers attacked US policy towards Vietnam, Palestine, and South Africa. They explicitly asked the United States to lift its economic embargo against Cuba and assailed it for maintaining a military base at Guantanamo (Cuba). Although there was no official US reaction to these speeches, the editorials of the various national newspapers in the United States expressed their frustration in unmistakable terms.

By the mid-1960s the international system had undergone many profound changes. The change that made the greatest impact on non-alignment was the widening rift between China and the Soviet Union. Whereas the Soviet Union strove vigorously to secure acceptance for a policy of peaceful coexistence, China advocated a policy of relentless opposition to colonialism and imperialism. In view of the success of the Chinese line, particularly among the African countries, the Soviet Union thought it expedient to clarify that the pursuit of peaceful coexistence did not exclude support for wars of national liberation in Africa and elsewhere.

34 Documents of the Non-Aligned, n. 1, pp. 20-24.


In the late 1960s the Soviet Union gained considerable influence among many of the non-aligned countries. However, there was no common ideology knitting the non-aligned countries together and reinforcing their cohesiveness as a group apart from their opposition to colonialism and racialism and their determination to keep out of military alliances in the context of the East-West conflict. As the non-aligned movement gained more and more adherents, their ideological differences also increased. The non-aligned movement had within its fold both those who subscribed to Marxism and those who were closer to the Western political thinking. However, on the issue of relations with the two Super Powers, the anti-US group within the movement appeared to be more vocal. Members of this group asked for a closer identification of the non-aligned movement with the Soviet bloc. However, they were firmly opposed by those who insisted that the movement maintain its distance from the Soviet Union. Further, following the Sino-Soviet rift, China emerged as the loudest critic of the Soviet Union. It directed its efforts to promote an anti-Soviet slant within the framework of opposition to hegemonism, colonialism, and racialism within the movement.

37 Yugoslavia was one of the countries which strongly opposed closer identification with the Soviet Union. See Miodrag Harovic, Divisive Attempts in the Non-aligned Movement (Belgrade, 1978), pp. 19 and 30-31.
Following Cairo, there followed a period of general neglect of the non-aligned movement by Washington. Simultaneously there was a growth of Sino-Soviet influence on the movement. The United States, unlike the Soviet Union, sent no unofficial observers to the meetings of the non-aligned. It made no attempt to rebut anti-US references in non-aligned declarations. There were no further presidential or official messages. The perceptions of the era of the Cold War persisted under Kennedy and Johnson, who were otherwise committed to improving relations with the developing world through aid, regular contacts, and the Peace Corps. The Bay of Pigs and the Cuban missile crisis also dampened their enthusiasm for the movement, seeing that Cuba was one of its founding members.

As the movement expanded and became stridently anti-colonial, the African countries, which constituted the majority within the movement, described the apparent indifference of the United States as reflecting lack of commitment to decolonization and a lack of sympathy for the national aspirations of the new states. This view was reinforced by the US interventions in Indo-China, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, the Lebanon, and the Congo. A minority within the US Government perceived the opportunities inherent in the nationalism of the Third World openly and felt that the United States should support
the non-aligned movement. However, it was unable to prevail upon the Government to change its policy.38

The impression that the United States would not help speed up the process of decolonization grew stronger among the non-aligned. By 1970, the non-aligned and the United States were clearly at opposing ends. Mutual suspicions contributed to the isolation of the United States. Most members were willing to go along with those who were seeking to condemn US policy on a wide range of issues.

Relations Between the Various Participants in the Movement in the 1970s

With the beginning of detente in the 1970s, the Super Powers started settling almost all matters between them through bilateral negotiations. The need for mediation between them almost disappeared. However, if the number of countries participating in non-aligned conferences is any indication of the importance of the movement, then detente did not lead to any reduction in its importance. To be sure, there was a qualitative shift in the movement. At the Third Non-Aligned Summit Conference held in Lusaka (1970) several members underlined the need to steer the

38 For details, see Maevern Sears, Years of High Response: From Trusteeship to Nationhood (Washington, D.C., 1980), pp. 95 and 135.
movement away from political and ideological issues to economic emancipation. Others drew attention to the threat of neo-colonialism as a "dangerous means of economic and political domination over the developing countries". The conference also stressed the need for continuity through establishment of adequate machinery. "This would ensure continuity in the development of the non-aligned movement and implementation of our decisions."

The movement, which had hitherto given a political voice to the demands of the developing countries, began to emphasize the economic problems facing them. It examined the causes for underdevelopment and came to the conclusion that the economic situation needed to be politically debated as it would involve global issues. An assessment of the sixties also contributed towards the growth of this trend in the movement.

The unchecked growth of population in the 1960s had rendered the economic situation of most developing countries deplorable. Further, poverty levels rose sharply in the developing countries as an assessment of

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39 Documents of the Non-Aligned, p. 1, p. 46. The economic overtones were unmistakable. The "Declaration on Non-Alignment and Economic Progress" asked for greater cooperation from the developed world to lessen the growing gap between rich and poor nations. The non-aligned countries also appeared to be determined to support the demands of the Group of 77 at UNCTAD III.

40 Kenneth Kaunda, "Inaugural Address", ibid., p. 57.
per capita income showed. For example, whereas the income (at 1970 prices) of the developed market economies increased from $2,000 to $3,000 during the period 1965-70, it rose by a mere $91 to $260 in the developing countries. According to the World Bank, nearly half the world's people lived in relative or absolute poverty as development in world food production declined in 1972. Agricultural growth rates in many of the developing countries began to slow down. The growth in per capita food production in the countries of the Third World narrowed from 0.7 per cent in the fifties to 0.2 per cent in the sixties. The situation was further aggravated by the disadvantages facing the Third World in international monetary and trading systems. As early as 1961, the rich market economy countries agreed in principle to target 1 per cent of their Gross National Product (GNP) to the poor nations with 0.7 per cent in the form of "Official Development Assistance" (ODA) (concessional resource transfers from or guaranteed by Governments). However, by 1975, the flow of ODA from the rich North only amounted to 0.30 per cent of their combined GNP. Where international resource transfers had taken place, interest payments on loans and profit outflow from direct


42 Ibid., pp. 35-6.
investments increased.

It was thus clear that the regional and international developmental efforts (or, more generally, the mechanisms of the international economic system), had failed to contain or eliminate poverty. The first UN Development Decade, launched with high hopes in 1961, had fallen short of the expectations, and a proposal made to extend it had not evoked enthusiastic response in 1970. The UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) also had not made perceptible progress although it had got off to a promising start in 1964. The Group of 77, which had demanded an UNCTAD, was feeling increasingly frustrated at the lack of progress.

The disappointment with the functioning of the international economic system came at a time when the politico-military developments between the two Super Powers had made the implications of the failures of the international economic system explicit to all concerned. Besides, the countries of the Third World felt that the developmental strategy then being pursued tended to accentuate structural underdevelopment. In other words, they expressed doubts about the prevailing "development model" given by the Western economists. In their views the economic prescriptions for speedy development of an economy were heavily oriented towards Western Aid and
exports. If it worked at all, the best that could be achieved was dependent development.

These doubts found their expression in the emergence of the concept of individual and collective "self-reliance". This concept became one of the main planks of the economic programme of the non-aligned countries. At the Algiers Conference of Heads of State or Government in 1973, the economic aspects of developmental questions addressed by the non-aligned countries became a political issue to the other countries of the world.

While the old divisive debate on the relationship of the movement with the Soviet Union and the Socialist bloc continued, the Algiers Conference, in a remarkable show of unity, highlighted the economic demands of the members. A scathing attack was mounted on the affluent countries, and attention was drawn to the glaring inequalities promoted by the existing international economic systems.

Before adjourning, the conference adopted an Economic


Declaration and an Action Programme for Economic Cooperation. It called upon the UN Secretary-General to convene a special session of the General Assembly to discuss the role of the United Nations in the removal of obstacles lying in the way of economic development.

There can be no doubt that the Algiers Summit represented a new beginning towards greater organization and institutionalization. It also made the earlier tendency of the movement to blame the West for the under-development of its members more explicit and emphatic.

The increasing practice of using the terms "Third World", "non-aligned", and "the developing countries" seemed to testify to a new solidarity among the under-developed countries regardless of their membership in the movement.

Economic Priorities

The non-aligned movement included economic development among its principal objectives. Earlier, i.e. before the Lusaka Summit, the perspective of the non-aligned countries was mainly political. At the Lusaka Summit the question of development received considerable attention for the first time. This shift was even more pronounced at the Georgetown Foreign Ministers' Conference (1972), and it was officially confirmed during the Algiers Summit. The economic programme adopted at Algiers called for a number of fundamental reforms in the international economic
system. It was, in fact, the basis of the resolutions adopted several months later during the Sixth Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly.

At the Algiers Summit the decision-makers of the developing countries formally recognized that their problems were not a function of their political status alone but also of their economic status. The "Economic Declaration" and the "Action Programme for Economic Cooperation" and the economic resolutions, therefore, constituted in the words of President Boumedienne of Algeria, "a decisive turning-point" in the history of the movement, "which determined henceforth to work towards the constitution of a New International Economic Order".45

The importance of the Algiers Summit thus lies in the fact that it politicized the problems of development and made them a priority item not only on the agenda of the non-aligned movement but also internationally. And it was at this conference that specific mention was made of the impact of colonialism on the cultures and societies of the Third World. The movement voiced a demand for a "new world information order" as it felt that it was

45 Documents of the Non-Aligned, n. l, p. 98. As a consequence of the high politicization of developmental issues special session of the UN General Assembly was held to discuss them. It was at the Sixth Special Session of the UN General Assembly in 1974 that a resolution calling for the establishment of a New International Economic Order (NIEO) was passed.
through communication monopolies that the West had managed to dominate the less developed countries.

The Algiers Summit formally recognized the importance of "socio-cultural" emancipation and its relationship with economic "decolonization". To quote from the Summit's Economic Declaration, "it is an established fact that the activities of imperialism are not confined solely to the political and economic fields, but also cover the cultural and social fields, thus imposing an alien ideological domination over the peoples of the developing world".46

In the aftermath of the Algiers Summit in 1973 the developed countries were faced with a concerted demand for introducing changes in the World order, and reshaping it. At the Sixth Special session on Raw Materials and Development held in New York in 1974 the United States found itself isolated on a number of issues. It also

46 Documents of the Non-Aligned, n. 1, p. 103. For a review of the literature on economic dependency and "cultural imperialism", see Chin Chuan Lee, Media Imperialism Reconsidered (London, 1979), pp. 29-30. The author also gives a critique of a "rhetorical" and uncritical use of the "dependency" model to explain underdevelopment, particularly in the cultural field.
found that its influence in the United Nations had eroded considerably. It was, therefore, obliged to reassess the non-aligned movement and reformulate its policy towards it.

U.S. Reaction

Secretary of State Henry Kissinger complained about the "alignment of the non-aligned". He nevertheless was forced to recognize the movement's impact. Speaking in New Delhi in October 1974, he admitted that the United States "recognized" the non-aligned movement and that "our relations with the non-aligned countries are another pillar of our foreign policy". But he also struck a note of caution, and said; "It is a corollary of this, however, that bloc diplomacy of any kind is anachronistic and self-defeating. We see a danger of new patterns of alignment that are as artificial, rigid, and ritualistic as the old ones." Ambassador John Scali also attacked the "tyranny of the majority" in a speech to the UN.

47 Daniel P. Moynihan, "The United States in Opposition", in Commentary (Philadelphia), March 1975, p. 41.
General Assembly in 1974. 49

The result of a continuing review in Washington was a new tactic both towards the non-aligned movement and the United Nations in general. This tactic consisted essentially in rebutting forcefully the charges brought against the United States. It was particularly evident during term (1975-76) of Daniel P. Moynihan as US Ambassador to the United Nations. In 1975, a leading daily in Washington reported that in Moynihan's opinion, the United States would do well to drop its defensive attitude towards its critics and "go into the United Nations and every other international forum" and "raise hell" and that it should display a "new spirit of initia-
tive and leadership attacking the majority on all fronts, criticizing its shortcomings and hammering away at its weak points." 50  There were two assumptions underlying this strategy. One was that the hostile unity of the countries of the Third World against the United States

49 See editorial in the Baltimore Sun of 15 December 1974. The Sun was of the opinion that the "current majority in the UN was an unstable one" and that these disparate interests would in time shake the majority apart and hopefully put the control of the General Assembly back in the hands of a nation with proper respect for the rules and aspirations of the UN Charter. See also Editorial in Christian Science Monitor (Boston, Mass., 9 December 1974).

was counter-productive in that it would alienate the American public, and the other was that US "belligerence" would help break up the "unstable majority".

The Americans perceived Moynihan's statement as standing up for US interests against a hostile Third World majority. In the aftermath of Vietnam and Watergate, it struck a responsive chord in the Americans disillusioned with the United Nations. It failed, however, to alter in any significant way the positions of the non-aligned countries or to break up the non-aligned movement. Mutual suspicion between the non-aligned countries and the United States grew; so much so that the more radical groups in the movement started portraying the United States as a major enemy of the Third World.

The Fifth Non-Aligned Summit in Colombo (1976) adopted important political and economic declarations. The Political Declaration, however, did not particularly concern itself with the relationship between the West and the Third World. On the other hand it focussed its attention on the relationship with the Soviet Union, ironically attempts made by some member states to bring

the non-aligned movement closer to the Soviet Union by using anti-colonialism were defeated. Every possible allusion to the "natural allies" thesis was deleted. Instead the Political Declaration called for cooperation with the "forces of freedom, peace and progress". There was no direct mention at all of the Soviet Union.52

The Economic Declaration carried a 7-point programme for a new economic order. The demand for a New International Economic Order envisaged a planned transfer of capital and technology from the developed countries, and a controlled international price system for primary commodities favourable to the countries producing them. The non-aligned countries were successful in highlighting these dimensions internationally; for the Sixth and Seventh Special Sessions of the UN General Assembly made a Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order and adopted a Charter of Economic Rights and Duties. The US responded by stressing the importance of the free market forces in reply to the proposal.

The United States seemed to be more restrained in its approach to the movement during Sri Lanka's Chairmanship.

52 Documents of the Non-Aligned, n. 1, p. 192. The Summit stressed (Point 21) that the non-aligned countries should be on their guard to "resist the political, economic and ideological pressures of the Great Powers".
The new approach, adopted during the Ford Administration, seemed to be the result of Secretary of State Kissinger's visit to non-aligned countries like India in 1974. This approach bade fair to succeed better than the traditional Cold War approach of dividing the world into the US and Soviet spheres of influence. Further, it created a constructive atmosphere for dialogue between the countries in 1975 at UNGA. Henry Kissinger, in a speech read by the US Ambassador to the UN went so far as to tell the Third World that America would join the efforts to change the economic situation. The Third World countries however, found it difficult to accept the US proposals when they viewed the U.S. Trade Act introduced earlier in 1975. By this Act, punitive measures were to be taken against those countries which attempt to increase their control over their natural resources by nationalization. It also outlined restrictions on countries attempting to improve their bargaining position with industrialized countries by acting collectively as members of raw material cartels.

The Colombo Summit took a firm stand on the questions relating to information and mass communication. It emphasized the gap that existed in the communication capacities of the non-aligned countries and advanced nations. This was felt to be a major source
that contributed to the economic disparities characterising the present economic order. It stressed the role of the national mass media, unshackled from the Western domination, in aiding the task of development. It highlighted its concern over the prevalent information system in the world and linked the demand for the New World Information Order to that of NIEO. The Summit maintained that changes had to come about in both economic and communication fields.53

In the years between the Colombo and the Havana Summit, the non-aligned movement continued to focus on the building up of a new information order. It clearly perceived it as an aspect of the overall decolonization process. The Ministerial Conference of non-aligned countries held in 1976 specifically reaffirmed "that the establishment of a New International Order for Information is as necessary as the New International Economic Order."54

The movement established the necessary organizational infrastructure to ensure that this subject received continued attention. To achieve momentum at the international level, it politicized the NWICO issue in the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural

53 The Documents of Non-Aligned, n. 1, p. 205.
54 Ibid., n. 1, p. 179.
Organization (UNESCO). Shortly after the Twentieth General Conference of UNESCO, the United Nations General Assembly decided to take up the issue. By 1979 it established a Committee on Information "to promote, inter alia, the establishment of a new, more just and more effective world information and Communication order".

The Carter Administration continued the policy of moderation towards the movement and sent a message of goodwill to the Non-Aligned Foreign Ministers Conference held in Belgrade in 1978. This formed part of a larger effort to improve relations with the developing countries and to encourage awareness of human rights. Improved dialogue with the Third World majority seemed to be an important aspect of US policy towards the non-aligned countries. The emphasis on US participation in the United Nations and the appointment of Andrew Young as US Ambassador to the United Nations reflected President Carter's concern about crafting a more constructive approach to the movement.

In a joint statement issued by the White House on the visit of President Tito of Yugoslavia on 9 March 1978,

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55 The organizational infrastructure of the non-aligned countries included the Non-aligned Press Agencies Pool, the Coordination Committee of the Press Agencies Pool, the Inter-Governmental Council for the Coordination of Information among the Non-Aligned Countries and the Committee for Cooperation of Radio Broadcasting Organizations of the Non-Aligned Countries. Documents relating to these activities may be found in ibid., n. 1, pp. 257, 283, 314 and 315.

56 UN, Doc., 33/115 of 18 December 1978; and 34/182.
Carter agreed that non-alignment was a significant factor in world affairs. He shared Tito's view that the non-aligned countries could and should make an active contribution to the resolution of international issues and to the evolution of international relations. Therefore, instead of continuing a posture of confrontation over North-South issues, efforts were made to find an alternative strategy and to restrict the growth of Soviet influence on the non-aligned movement. However, the policy-makers in Washington were still uncertain as to the positive role the movement could play in terms of US interests. Sceptics argued that the continuing anti-colonial bias of the movement and its opposition to Israel and other issues made only for hostility. Nevertheless the US Government kept up its informal contacts with certain selected non-aligned capitals. It recognized the need for moderation on the issues that the next summit was going to take up - such as the equation of Zionism with racism, questions on Puerto Rico, Guantanamo, and the Panama Canal, and the continued presence of US troops in Korea.

The United States had chosen to attempt to redress what it perceived as the non-aligned bias at a time when Cuba's influence on the movement was bound to be strong. The Sixth Summit Conference in Havana (1979) was in fact "the most critical in the history of the non-aligned
movement". As on the earlier occasions there was overwhelming accord over economic issues. Concern was expressed about the failure to establish a New International Economic Order. However, serious discord arose over the ideological tone of the movement. At the time when the decision was taken to hold the conference in Havana, thirty-eight countries made between them a total of ninety-five "reservations". Thus, although it had evinced relatively little interest in the movement in the 1960s, Cuba was able to assume active leadership in the mid-1970s and won recognition and prestige.

In the 1970s, a variety of issues served to unite the Third World against the West. Portugal was waging war in three colonial territories in Africa; there was a deadlock over the issue of Zimbabwe; President Allende of Chile wasoverthrown; Cambodia was plagued by serious disorders. Only the use of the oil weapon and the Arab-Israeli War seemed to be positive developments. The


58 For an analysis of the economic assertiveness of the Organization of Petroleum and Oil-Producing Countries of the Arab World (OPEC) and world trade in crude oil see a report in Third World Quarterly (London), vol. no. 1, April 1981, pp. 324-37. See, particularly, the map for a good idea on net imports and exports (1978) in world oil trade. According to an editorial in Los Angeles Times (27 November 1974), even in political terms "Arab oil money is a demonstrably potent instrument". The paper highlighted the role of the Arab countries in UNESCO in the ouster of Israel for its action against Arab holy sites in Jerusalem.
end of the Portuguese wars and the war in Indonesia, Kissinger's mediation in the Middle East and Southern Africa, and the impact of the rise in oil prices on the poorer countries, however, deprived the "radicals"\(^{59}\) of their strong position in the movement.

Controversy over the Cuban leadership was highlighted by the theory (advanced by Cuba and other Communist countries like Vietnam) that the Soviet Union and the countries of the Socialist bloc were "natural allies of the movement". For some time these countries had been arguing that "the attempt to return to the movement's initial objectives, to emphasize the principle of independence and of standing clear of blocs ... is in essence aimed at making the non-aligned movement deviate from its anti-imperial objective".\(^{60}\) According to them, the Western Powers had always been obstructive on all major issues of concern to the non-aligned movement whereas the Soviet Union had been helpful. The Socialist countries were, therefore, the movement's "natural allies". Yugoslavia was even afraid lest a split should occur. It argued that the "proponents of the thesis of a 'natural alliance'

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59 The term "radicals" refers to the non-aligned countries espousing a closer link with the Soviet Union and preferring a Communist path to development.

60 Speech by Pham Van Pyong (Vietnam), *Addresses Delivered at the Sixth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries* (Havana, 1979), p. 746.
of all progressive forces are striving in fact to narrow the movement of non-alignment and to 'purge' it of the 'conservative elements'.

The declaration of the Foreign Ministers' Conference at Belgrade in 1978, proclaimed the need for "unceasing vigilance" to preserve intact the essential character of non-alignment and to counter the attempts that were being made to weaken the movement. President Tito in his opening address to the conference stressed the need to fight the pressures that were being exerted to break the unity of the non-aligned movement. He cautioned against attempts to jeopardize the solidarity of the movement and blunt the "edge of its basic orientation .... They must allow no one to dilute the policy of non-alignment .... Divisions based on ideological, religious, and other criteria and motivations are unacceptable no matter what slogans they hide behind."

61 B. Savic, *Yugoslavia in the Struggle for Action Unity in the Non-Aligned Movement* (Belgrade, 1979), p. 34. See also an article published after the Summit by R. Pektovic, "The Lessons and Impact of the Sixth Conference of Non-Aligned Countries", *Review of International Affairs* (Belgrade), vol. 30, no. 708, 5 October 1979, pp. 1-5.


63 *Documents of the Non-Aligned*, n. 1, p. 343.
Since the Bureau meetings are held preparatory to the Summit, the constraint felt over the Cuban initiative was reflected in the agenda.64 The Bureau instructed the host country to circulate a draft final document by the first week of July 1979 and called upon the members of the movement to submit their observations by the first week of August 1979.65

Thus, a variety of mechanisms were all ready and poised to prevent a Cuban line from overtaking the movement. At the Summit, Cuba, as the host country, vehemently criticized the United States and also the members who were pro-US.66 By the time the Summit ended, the final draft was toned down to accommodate the "independent" moderate view. The original Cuban draft had sixteen references to the "natural allies" thesis; eleven of them were deleted. The five references that were retained

64 Ibid., pp. 355-6.

65 Ibid. The Ministerial meeting in Colombo in June 1979 stressed the fact that any attempts to raise divisive issues and to exploit the movement for narrow national objectites, jeopardising the unity and solidarity of the movement must be resisted". Ibid., p. 372.

66 Speech delivered by Fidel R. Castro at the Havana Summit, n. 60, pp. 3-17. Cuba accused the United States of plotting against it by carrying on propaganda against the conference being held in Havana and by trying to get the original draft prepared by Cuba modified. By implication it suggested that such non-aligned countries as were opposing the Cuban point of view were doing so at the instigation of the United States. For details, see New York Times; 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, and 10 September 1979.
related to specific requests for support in the conflicts in Southern Africa and in the Middle East. Arab-Israeli relations entered upon a new phase as the result of the changed approach of the Egyptian President, Sadat. Sadat’s first visit to Israel did not evoke any direct response from the non-aligned countries, whether at the annual Bureau meeting in May 1978 or at the Foreign Ministers’ meeting in June 1978. However, on both occasions, the demand for Israel’s withdrawal from occupied Arab territories and support for Palestinian rights were reaffirmed, and a warning was issued “that any solution failing to take those two basic conditions into account could not serve to further the cause of peace”.

Even the Camp David Agreements of September 1978 found many Arab Governments unwilling to split irrevocably from Egypt. The signing of the Peace Pact in March 1979, however, resulted in the adoption of sanctions against Egypt. The Arabs also decided to work for Egypt’s suspension from the movement. They raised the issue at the Ministerial Meeting of the Coordinating Bureau in

Colombo in 1979. The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) too lobbied for the suspension of Egypt. However, the members of the Coordinating Bureau "felt that it was beyond their competence to deal with this matter". The matter was thereupon taken up at the Summit.

President Castro of Cuba strongly condemned Egypt in his opening speech. The leaders of Syria, Iraq, and the PLO also voiced their opposition to Egypt. The Libyan Minister called upon the Summit to suspend Egypt. Even the UN Secretary-General implicitly argued that the Camp David Agreements were inadequate. In the end, however, the Summit condemned the Israeli-Egyptian Treaty, and said that it constituted "a partial agreement and a separate treaty that means total abandonment of the cause of the Arab countries and an act of complicity with the continued occupation of the Arab territories and violates the inalienable rights of the people of Palestine". It did not expel Egypt but entrusted the matter to the Coordinating Bureau, which meant shelving the problem till the Ministerial Conference scheduled to be held in

69 However, the radicals who proposed this action had also to contend with the OAU's withholding of its support for the suspension of Egypt as well as the reluctance of some of the Bureau members like Angola to break off relations with Egypt. See Keesing's Contemporary Archives (London), 21 September 1979, p. 29843.

70 Addresses Delivered at the Sixth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, n. 60, pp. 70-71.
New Delhi in 1981.71

The Kampuchean question was more complicated. The movement was unable to decide whether to give the seat to Democratic Kampuchea or to People's Kampuchea. Vietnam's action in installing Heng Samrin in office after the overthrow of Pol Pot and the re-emergence of Prince Norodom Sihanouk after being under house arrest under the Pol Pot regime further complicated matters. Sihanouk denounced both the Vietnamese invasion and Khmer Rouge's atrocious violations of human rights. As the dispute was far from being resolved, the Summit decided by consensus to keep the Kampuchean seat vacant.

According to a report, the Cuban handling of the Kampuchean issue annoyed some of the delegates.72 However, a vote in the United Nations some two weeks later showed that the non-aligned countries were split over the Kampuchean issue: just over one-third of them supported Pol Pot,

71 Documents of the Non-Aligned, n.1, Havana Summit, "Political Declaration", p. 414.

72 See Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 18 January 1980, p. 30038. Sixteen Foreign Ministers reportedly signed a letter of protest against the Cuban Foreign Minister's ruling that there was a "consensus" in favour of the Kampuchean seat being kept vacant. It is not quite clear whether this meeting of 5 September decided to refer the question to the Conference Bureau or whether the protest led to the Conference Bureau meeting on the following day. These countries were Bangladesh, Bhutan, Cameroun, Gabon, Indonesia, Malaysia, Nepal, Nigeria, North Korea, Pakistan, Senegal, Singapore, Somalia, Yugoslavia, Zaire, and Zambia. For a substantiation of Singapore's protest, see UN Doc. A/34/PV.3.
another one-third opposed him, and the rest abstained. It was claimed that the failure to seat the delegate from Democratic Kampuchea represented a victory for Vietnam (and, by extension for the Soviet Union). However, the differences among the non-aligned countries were not due to the East-West split. Rather the issue produced many unexpected cleavages in the General Assembly voting.73 The Kampuchean question no doubt received considerable attention from the delegates in Havana, but never was it sought to be judged from the East-West angle.

The discord within the movement and the attempts made to mitigate it were certainly highlighted at the Sixth Summit. Conflicts between and among the non-aligned states appeared to weaken the movement. The failure of the movement to influence the hardliners of the North, particularly the United States, on such matters as the formation of a New Economic Order or a New Information Order made it appear as though the movement had lost its dynamism.

The Summit in Havana received heavy coverage in the American media. The hostility towards Castro spilled over to affect public opinion on the non-aligned movement itself.

73 Newsweek (New York), 17 September 1979, p. 14. The non-aligned countries are shown as belonging to three different ideological persuasions according to their voting behaviour - the conservatives, the moderates, and the radicals.
The reaction of the White House and of State Department spokesman was uniformly negative. The policy-makers appeared to have been persuaded that there was no real prospect of influencing the movement. The crisis in Iran deepened the perception of a weakness in US foreign policy, and in an election year, there was not much enthusiasm for evolving a better policy towards the non-aligned movement. The issue of Soviet troops in Afghanistan had the effect of turning US attention away from the movement. In the US view, the Soviet presence in Afghanistan underlined its ability to project its military power. A foreign policy based on improved relations with the Third World as envisaged by the Carter Administration became more and more vulnerable to charges of irrelevance and weakness.

Armed with an electoral mandate to reverse the erosion of US influence abroad, the Reagan Administration promptly trained the focus on East-West issues, solidarity of the Western alliance systems, and military strength. As for world economic development, Reagan gave a preview of what was to be the US stance towards the countries of the Third World. He laid particular emphasis on the "free market approach". He also suggested that international financial institutions should ask for "further safeguards for multilateral investment in developing nations".
Speaking at the opening session of the 36th Annual meeting of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, President Reagan asked the Fund to demand "strict monetary and fiscal policies" from the borrowing countries. After this speech, a representative of the Third World voiced some doubts about the US stance. However, IMF officials did not seem to find the US message unwelcome. The IMF endorsed the US call for "strong and comprehensive" measures by the borrowing nations to stabilize their economies while seeking loans.74 At the Cancun Summit the United States emphasized its hard line.

In political terms the US response to the movement was made clear after a non-aligned Ministerial Conference was held in February 1981. The conference was a comparatively minor meeting. The conference called upon the Soviet Union to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan; it also wanted Vietnam to recall its troops from Kampuchea. The United States was quick to praise and highlight these decisions. It, however, continued to be unhappy with the position of the movement on questions relating to the Middle East.75

The decision to comment on lesser Ministerial meetings can be construed in two ways. One was the assumption of an aggressive posture in terms of rebutting direct criticisms, and other was the envisaging of a role for the non-aligned in the overall context of East-West relations. There was, besides, a willingness to react and stay informed on non-aligned developments.

In contrast, officials of the Reagan Administration in the United Nations followed a policy of not dealing directly with, or even referring to, the non-aligned movement in order not to further enhance and legitimize its status in the UN system. Nevertheless, it was implicitly acknowledged that the isolation of the United States in the United Nations was in part due to the hostility of the Third World, whose voting behaviour often shaped the positions taken at the non-aligned conferences. Faced with the need to deal with the non-aligned in the conduct of day-to-day business in the United Nations, Ambassador Jeanne Kirkpatrick of the United States attempted to curb "unbalanced" criticism of the United States by holding individual states responsible for consensus positions of the movement. She quoted the communiqué issued in September 1981 by a meeting of the non-aligned countries and charged that the tone was overtly anti-US with "no more claims to being truly non-aligned than does the permanent mission
of Cuba which issued it.\footnote{Richard Jackson, \textit{The Non-Aligned, the UN and the Super Powers} (New York, 1983), p. 220.} The US mission further warned friendly non-aligned countries to dissociate themselves from the communiqué.

This expression of official displeasure served to highlight the nature of US strategy. It demonstrated that the Reagan Administration officially recognized the organization's role and that it took the positions of the non-aligned movement fairly seriously. It also made it clear that it treated the positions of the non-aligned movement in a wider context and was seeking to persuade the non-activist majority of the movement to keep their relations with the United States constantly in mind. It was also a warning that the United States would be among the "hardliners" in its policy towards the developing countries.

The preceding summary of the trends in the non-aligned movement and of US policy towards it shows that there are many turning-points in that policy. The movement has experienced considerable growth and evolution since its inception, but the changes in US policy have not necessarily corresponded to the developments within the movement. It has in fact been characterized by intense and sometimes contradictory reactions. It does seem as
though US initiatives have lacked a coherent framework towards the non-aligned. The responses have been more in the nature of crisis management with references to specific issues. The non-aligned movement has also been prone to differences and discord within itself. The emergence of a "radical" group among the non-aligned has had a considerable impact on the US review of its options towards NAM. Changes of government in the United States have also tended to inhibit the growth of an awareness of the significance of the movement as a whole.

Throughout the history of non-alignment three issues have dominated the agenda: the middle eastern question, Southern Africa, and the conduct of global economy. In recent years the economic issue has tended to dominate the agenda. The increasing importance of the economic issue has tended to isolate the United States. The creation of a New International Economic Order is now one of the objectives of the movement. The United States has taken firm positions against what it considers to be unrealistic demands on resource transfers, debts, commodity prices, technology transfer, and the reorganization of the world's primary financial institutions. As the movement has sought in recent years to focus on improving information and communication infrastructures as a basis for the New International Economic Order,
differences have arisen between the movement and the United States almost inevitably.