Chapter III

THE INDO-PAKISTANI WAR
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China had hardly warmed its seat at the United Nations, when a conflict-situation, developing in its immediate neighbourhood, took a critical turn. What began as a civil conflict between two wings of Pakistan in March 1971, acquired, with the influx of millions of refugees from East Pakistan to India, a grave international dimension. ¹

It should be noted that East Pakistan had, over the decades, resented its exploitation and domination by West Pakistan. The smouldering discontentment erupted into a widespread violent unrest, which eventually compelled the Pakistani authorities to hold the first ever general election since the inception of the nation. The Awami League Party contested the election on a Six Point Programme which inter alia demanded complete economic and administrative autonomy for East Pakistan. As the West Pakistani military-industrial elites were reluctant to share power with the Awami League Party, which had won with an impressive majority in the East Pakistan, they imposed martial law. Besides arresting Awami League leaders, the Pakistani Army (100 per cent manned by West Pakistanis)

¹ For a comprehensive account of the background to the conflict and events leading to the war and liberation of Bangladesh, see K.P. Misra, The Role of the United Nations in the Indo-Pakistani Conflict, 1971 (Delhi, 1973), pp.9-33.
resorted to ruthless suppression, massacring hundreds of thousands of East Pakistanis. These developments across the border affected India as it had to bear the colossal task of catering to an unending influx of refugees into India.  

As the situation worsened with the mounting loss of human lives and suffering, the Secretary-General in July 1971, took the initiative, through a memorandum, of formally bringing the conflict-situation to the attention of the Security Council. While maintaining the non-partisan character of his office, he expressed his "grave concern" at the deteriorating situation, not only in the humanitarian sense but also as a potential threat to international peace and security. It was stated that he kept the President of the Security Council informed of the developments in the area. The President (first Kosciusko-Moritzet of France and later Ambassador Vinci of Italy) held intense consultations with members of the Council but since they could not agree on any one course of action, no formal meeting of the Council was convened. Further, no

2 India's spokesman at the Sixth UN Committee on International Law said: "If this invasion of unarmed men in vast unmanageable proportions (i.e., the refugees) were not only to impair the economic and political well being of the receiving nation state but also to threaten its very existence, it would have to be categorised as aggression" cited in S.R. Sharma, Bangladesh Crisis and Indian Foreign Policy (New Delhi, 1978), p.45.

Member-State formally brought up the issue for consideration by the General Assembly when it met in September for its regular session.

When the war eventually erupted on 3 December 1971, China took definite steps in support of Pakistan since it viewed the conflict as designed to expand the Soviet Union's influence in South Asia and augment India's power in the region.

Before analysing China's interaction on this question, it is pertinent to briefly recapitulate China's bilateral relations with Pakistan as well as with India in order to understand Beijing's stand and its response to the conflict-situation at the United Nations in proper perspective.

**China-India-Pakistan: A Retrospect**

When the Communist Party of China took over the government at Beijing, India and Pakistan promptly recognized it. India was the second of the non-communist countries to recognize it and Pakistan became the first Muslim state to do so. The welcome accorded to the new regime by Pakistan and India, despite the Western warning of Communist menace in Asia, stemmed primarily from political calculations. India's Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru had envisioned close cooperation among the Asian states and had believed that friendship between the two great Asian nations would bring a good future for Asia in international
politics. India played the leading role in the movement for restoration of China's representation to the United Nations. India took other initiatives to envisage its special friendly relations with China. Initially, because of its subscription to Stalin's two camp theory and its commitment to "permanent revolution", China did not demonstrate much warmth and friendship towards India which it regarded, notwithstanding India's policy of nonalignment, as a follower of Western imperialism.

India's stand on the Korean war along with Beijing's attempt to break isolationism, motivated it to think afresh and move ahead to cultivate friendly relations with India. Their friendship was established on a firm footing by the signing of the 1954 agreement on Tibet on the basis of Pancha Shila (Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence).


The Five Principles are: i) Mutual respect for each others territorial integrity and sovereignty; (ii) Non-aggression; (iii) Non-interference in each other's internal affairs; (iv) Equality and mutual benefit; and (v) Peaceful co-existence.
their friendship and cooperation, China fell out with India as it perceived India as the principal challenger to its quest for attaining the dominant role in Asia.\textsuperscript{7} China's suspicion and rivalry with India was deepened further with the eruption of Sino-Soviet rift in the late 1950s.\textsuperscript{8} The specific issues like Sino-Indian border, and the dispute over the status of Tibet, which heightened mutual antagonism, were the spill overs of the basic contradiction in their national interests. It inevitably led to the abandonment of Pancha Shila era and began confrontation politics, which eventually led to the Sino-Indian war of 1962.

As the Sino-Indian relations exacerbated, China's relations with India's staunch adversary, Pakistan, improved on the dictum "my neighbour's neighbour (or enemy's enemy) is my friend." The establishment of friendly relations between them was much easier as there were fewer issues that divided them, as compared to China and India. Pakistan, on its part, tried to maintain correct relations with Beijing and supported the call for seating China at the United Nations. After 1953, however,

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\textsuperscript{7}Hinton, n.5, pp.443-52.
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Pakistan changed its voting pattern on China's admission to the United Nations and adopted the US position. Further, Pakistan joined the Western system of alliance by becoming a member of SEATO and CENTO. These caused misgiving in Sino-Pakistani relations but it was subdued by Pakistan's strong affirmation, during the private meetings between Prime Minister Mohammad Ali Bagra and Premier Zhou Enlai at the Bandung Conference, that its membership in these alliances was not in any way directed against China. Beijing voiced its displeasure indirectly but was not prepared to go to extremes in cooling off relations with Pakistan.

However, the major setback in their relations took place from 1958 when Beijing's foreign policy became generally more radical and less tolerant of "reactionary" regimes such as that of Pakistan. This was further complicated by certain factors such as Pakistani military coming to power under the leadership of Ayub Khan, who was known for his pro-Western sentiments;


10 As Zhou Enlai himself put it in his address to the Political Committee of the Bandung Conference that the Prime Minister of Pakistan had told him that, "... although Pakistan was a party to a military treaty, Pakistan was not against China. Pakistan had no fear that China would commit an aggression against her. As a result of that we achieved a mutual understanding." Cited in George Mc T. Kahin, The Asian-African Conference (Ithaca, 1956), p.28.

11 Syed, n.9, pp.61-65.
Pakistan's sympathy for the revolt in Tibet and General Ayub's plan for the defense of the sub-continent. As it turned out, this period was an aberration in the history of Sino-Pakistani relations, for Ayub was quick to realize his mistake. After India rejected its joint defense, Pakistan turned seriously towards improving its relations with China.

Simultaneously with the Chinese precipitation of a crisis with India, Sino-Pakistani relations improved remarkably after the early 1960s. Eventually, Pakistan could achieve the near complete identity of interests with China on the issues involving India. In response to China's positive gesture to its proposal of demarcating the Sino-Pakistani border, Pakistan readopted its pre-1953 position of favouring China's representation in the United Nations. The Sino-Pakistani border agreement of 1963 soon after the Sino-Indian war had far greater implications and indeed was regarded as the first stage in the formation of an informal alliance between China and Pakistan in their common cause against India.

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12 Ayub proposed a Pakistani-Indian mutual defense agreement to contain onslaught of Russia and China in their bid to reach the warm waters of the Indian Ocean. See, for detail, Yaacov Vertzberger, The Enduring Entente: Sino-Pakistani Relations, 1960-1980 (New York, 1983), p.6; see also, Mohammed Ayoob, "India as a Factor in Sino-Pakistani Relations", International Studies (Delhi), vol.9, no.3, January 1968, pp.288-89.

13 Syed, n.9, p.55; see also Ayoob, ibid., p.294.

Besides the convergence of their interests in animosity and rivalry with India, the other determining factor was their concern of their own security which they both felt threatened from the Indian side. The regional uneasiness had gained global significance when the two Super Powers shared the common objective of building up India to contain Chinese influence in Asia. Pakistan resented the United States military aid to India and it was alarmed at India's growing strength. This prompted Pakistan to pursue its policy of friendship with China in great earnest to serve as counterpoise to threat emanating from India. The Indo-Pakistani war 1965 paignantly brought forth the Chinese lively sense of stake in Pakistan's continued existence as an independent state in South Asia. After the war, Beijing became the major source of defence potential available to Pakistan.

Their friendly relationship remained virtually unscathed even during the Cultural Revolution when Chinese behaviour abroad was nearly as irrational as it was at home. This "entente relationship" provided a useful channel of communication in the process of Sino-American rapprochement in late 1960s, when

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15 Syed, n.9, p.126; Vertzberger, n.12, pp.8-9; see also G.M. Choudhury, "Reflection on Sino-Pakistan Relations", Pacific Community (Tokyo), vol.7, no.2, January 1976, pp.249-50.

16 See for details, V.F. Dutt, India's Foreign Policy (Delhi, 1984), pp.145-47; see also, Rasul Bux Rais, China and Pakistan: A Political Analysis of Mutual Relations (Lahore, 1977), see also, Ayoob, n.12, p.293.

China was compelled to respond to the United States overture in a bid to find an effective deterrent to Soviet threat.¹⁸

Development in East Pakistan, 1969-71

In the midst of intense diplomatic activity and conflicting re-alignment in the global arena, the East Pakistan crisis developed. It posed horns of a dilemma for Beijing. Ideologically, considering itself as a vanguard of liberation movements, China required to support the popular Bengali struggle for national liberation. On the other hand the dictates of national self-interest made it inexorable that they support the West Pakistani ruling elite as a counterpoise to increase in India's and Soviet Union's strength and influence in China's southern flank. In the end realpolitik prevailed over the ideological consideration. However, China was hesitant and refrained from commenting upon the upheavals in Pakistan. For several days after the Pakistani army crackdown in East Bengal, the Chinese government and media maintained strict silence over the East Bengal affairs. Later, the Chinese press started publishing the Pakistani version of report on "Indian interference".¹⁹

¹⁸ For details, see, Choudhury, ibid., pp.48-50.

The first specific Chinese reaction to the East Pakistani crisis appeared in the *People's Daily* on 11 April 1971 which spelt out the Chinese stand on the issue. The article accused that the "two Super Powers, working in close co-ordination with the Indian reactionaries, crudely interfere in the internal affairs of Pakistan." It pledged China's support to the Pakistan Government against "foreign aggression and interference." Soon after this article, Zhou Enlai personally wrote to President Yahya Khan, to make his country's position more explicit. Zhou Enlai expressed the opinion that a united Pakistan was a basic guarantee to Pakistani prosperity. He called for "... wise consultations ... [with] leaders of various quarters" and differentiation of "the broad masses of the people from a handful of persons who want to sabotage the unification of Pakistan." So far as its solution was concerned, he maintained that "it can only be settled by the Pakistani people themselves." He further stated, "should the Indian expansionist dare to launch aggression against Pakistan, the Chinese Government and people will, as always, firmly support Pakistani Government and people in their just struggle to safeguard state sovereignty and national independence." 21

20 *Peking Review*, vol.12, no.16, 16 April 1971, pp.7-8.

21 For the extract of the letter, see, J.A. Naik, *India, Russia, China and Bangladesh* (New Delhi, 1972), pp.139-42.
The pro-Beijing elements in East Pakistan found China's stand ridiculous and sent a telegram to Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai reminding that:

... the ideology of socialism was to fight against oppression and if the Chinese Government do not protest against the brutal atrocities committed on the oppressed people of Bangladesh by the military junta with the help of vested interests of West Pakistan, the world may think you are no friend of the oppressed people. (22)

However, these attempts to denigrate the Chinese stand did not in any way make Beijing to come out openly to support the liberation movement nor did this change the Chinese attitude towards the crisis. In fact, Beijing made it clear that its support was not entirely limited towards, for in May 1971, it offered Pakistan an additional $200 million economic aid.23 This aid came at a time when Pakistan was under heavy pressure as number of governments had suspended economic and military aid to it.

In the midst of the tense situation in South Asia, India signed the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet


Union on 9 August 1971. From this, it was evident that in case Pakistan attacked India, Moscow would not be expected to remain neutral and would certainly take sides with India. This treaty was viewed as a means to outflank the axis of Washington-Beijing-Islamabad that was developing to encircle New Delhi. However, the Chinese adopted the wait-and-see strategy, and thus initially, maintained a discreet silence on the treaty. Though, the Chinese Government publicly and unequivocally committed to support Pakistan, their policy was marked with restrain and caution until November 1971.

On 5 November, Foreign Minister, Bhutto led a Pakistani diplomatic-military mission to Beijing presumably in an attempt

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24 Article IX of the Indo-Soviet Treaty says: In the event either being subjected to an attack or a threat thereof, the High Contracting Partner shall immediately enter into mutual consultations in order to remove such threats and to take appropriate effective measures to ensure peace and security of their countries. For the text of the treaty, see Foreign Affairs Record (New Delhi), August 1971, p.161.


26 Only in November, for the first time, did it attacked the Treaty at the UN forum. It denounced it as a "military alliance" which encouraged India "to launch a bare-faced armed aggression against Pakistan". See, General Assembly Official Records (GAOR), 26th Session, 1996th mtg., 26 November 1971, p.14.
to persuade Beijing to take a more positive stand with the aim of deterring an Indian attack on East Pakistan. It is said that Bhutto got only a declaration of support from Beijing, without any specific commitment or assurance as expected by Pakistan. Pakistan, for tactical reasons, kept up an appearance of Chinese commitment to give physical support to Pakistan against foreign aggression.

In the meanwhile, the massive exodus of refugees from East Pakistan to India created problems. In the Third Committee of the General Assembly on 19 November, Fu Hao backed the Pakistani Government in condemning India for exploiting the issue of refugee in order to interfere in Pakistan's internal affairs and obstruct the return of the East Pakistani refugee to their countries. In late 1971, when the crisis developed

27 Armstrong, n.14, p.175; see also, Choudhury, n.17, p.255.

28 Bhutto himself revealed in an interview that China refused to Pakistan's request for a defence pact, see William J. Barnds, "China's Relations with Pakistan: Durability Amidst Discontinuity", China Quarterly (London), no.63, September 1975, p.484.

29 General Yahya Khan claimed subsequently that Bhutto had misled him into believing that China would come in if there was war. Even the US administration appeared to harbour the impression that China would act in case of war. See, Dutt, n.16, p.217. While another writer stated that Bhutto and Yahya Khan "misinterpreted China's ambiguous language and committed the sin of wishful thinking". See Vertzberger, n.12, p.58.

30 GAOR, 26th Session, Third Committee, 1878th mtg., 19 November 1971, p.343.
into an explosive situation, it cast aside all inhibitions and came out in full and militant support to Pakistan in its campaign against East Pakistan and India.

**Indo-Pakistani War: Interaction at the United Nations**

After 3 December, as war broke out between India and Pakistan, China effectively utilized the UN forum to launch a verbal attack against the Soviet Union and India. Its stand on the conflict became more pronounced. Speaking at the emergency meeting of the Security Council on 4 December, Huang Hua urged that the Council should strongly condemn "the act of aggression" by the Government of India and demanded the immediate, unconditional withdrawal of the Indian forces from the Pakistani territory. He contended that India was pursuing an untenable doctrine of sending troops to invade East Pakistan to help with the repatriation of refugees. He rhetorically stated:

> At present in India there are a large number of so-called Chinese Tibetan refugees. The Government of India is grooming... the Dalai Lama. Using the Indian Government's logic, is it going to use that as a pretext to invade China? (31)

Although China expressed its reservation about the failure to condemn India's "armed aggression", it voted for the American

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resolution. However, this resolution was vetoed by the Soviet Union. Beijing itself proposed a draft resolution, "strongly condemning the Indian Government's act of creating a so-called 'Bangladesh' and of subverting, dismembering and committing aggression against Pakistan", and called upon India and Pakistan to "cease hostilities" and to withdraw respectively from the international border between India and Pakistan. It was retracted before being voted.

Commenting on the Soviet proposal of allowing the representative of Bangladesh to present its case, Huang Hua said that it was "a sinister attempt to impose upon the United Nations the so-called Bangladesh which they have created." He condemned it as a "stark interference in Pakistan's internal affairs and tramples on the UN Charter with which all countries upholding justice cannot agree." 34

32 SCOR, ibid. This resolution among other things, call for immediate withdrawal of armed forces to their respective territories and call upon both governments to exert their best efforts towards the creation of a climate conducive to the voluntary return of refugee to East Pakistan. See, UN Doc. S/10416 of 4 December 1971, p.90.

33 For the text of the resolution see, UN Doc. S/10421, 5 December 1971.

34 SCOR, 26th year, 1607th mtg., 5 December 1971, p.3.
China used its first ever veto to kill the Soviet draft resolution calling for political settlement in East Pakistan.\(^{35}\) In the same session, China voted for the eight-powers draft resolution with reservations.\(^{36}\) However, this was again vetoed by the Soviet Union. Unable to reach a decision on the deteriorating situation, the Security Council referred the question to the General Assembly.\(^{37}\)

Soon after, a resolution was adopted by the UN General Assembly on 7 December and another by the Security Council on 21 December.\(^{38}\) Although China voted for both the resolutions, as usual it showed its over zealousness by expressing its reservation on the resolutions for their failure to "draw a

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\(^{35}\) Ibid., p.22.

\(^{36}\) Ibid., p.26. Among other things, the draft resolution called for an immediate cease-fire and withdrawal of armed forces to their own territories; urged to intensify effort to bring about conditions necessary for the voluntary return of the refugees to their homes. See, UN Doc.S/10423, 5 December 1971, p.23.


\(^{38}\) The resolution which was co-sponsored by 34-member states called upon India and Pakistan to cease-fire immediately and withdraw their forces to their own side of the border. The Assembly adopted the resolution by a vote of 104 in favour to 11 against with 11 abstentions. General Assembly Resolution 2793 (XXVI), 7 December 1971. The Security Council Resolution 307 (1971), 21 December 1971.
line of distinction between the aggressor and the victim of aggressor and failure to condemn Indian Government."

Speaking in the Plenary meeting, Qiao accused the Soviet Union of supporting India's armed aggression "for the purpose of further controlling India and, as the next step, controlling the whole of the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent and the Indian Ocean in order to contend with another Super Power for world hegemony." An article in the People's Daily stated that the General Assembly resolution sponsored by 34 nations reflected "the common desire of the medium and small nations and the people of various countries to safeguard state sovereignty." It held that the voting in the General Assembly showed "Soviet Revisionist Social Imperialism and Indian expansionism were under attack from all sides at the General Assembly." Further, it warned that if India should "continue to slip down the road of military adventure" because it had "Soviet... at her back", she would "only come to a disastrous end."

The Indo-Pakistani war came to an end on 16 December 1971 with the surrender of the West Pakistanitroops. Commenting on the development, its representative at the Security Council stated, "The fall of Dacca is by no means a milestone of victory

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39 SCOR, 26th year, 1621st mtg., 21 December 1971, p.3.

40 GAOR, 26th session, 2003rd mtg., 7 December 1971, p.29.

for the Indian aggressors, but a starting-point from which they are heading towards defeat. The military occupation of East Pakistan will lead to greater upheaval and intranquility in the South Asian sub-continent."42

The emergence of Bangladesh as an independent state basically altered the power equation in the Indian sub-continent. The creation of Bangladesh was regarded as a great strategic and diplomatic gain for the Soviet Union in the region and re-establishment of the pre-eminence of India in South Asia. On the other hand, China's stand on this issue had considerably tarnished its revolutionary image among the people of the Afro-Asian world as it subordinated its ideals and principles to the game of power politics. This political expediency had conditioned it to continue with its support of Pakistan's position and oppose the very existence of Bangladesh as a sovereign nation.

Question of Bangladesh Membership

Initially, Beijing acted very tough on Bangladesh membership issue. It ignored Bangladesh's overtures to Beijing to forge friendly relations. It opposed the Bangladesh membership to the United Nations, despite the Dacca's request to China for
support. At the Security Council on 10 August 1972, Huang Hua firmly opposed the consideration of Bangladesh's application on legal grounds, on the basis of the non-implementation of 1949 Geneva Convention; the Security Council Resolution 307 (1971), the General Assembly Resolution 2793 (XXVI) and incompatibility with the criteria laid down in Article 4 of the UN Charter. Huang Hua flatly stated that Bangladesh was not qualified for membership "under the present circumstances." He also put certain conditions for the considerations of Bangladesh's membership:

Only when the relevant United Nations resolutions have been truly implemented and only after a reasonable settlement of the issues between Pakistan and 'Bangladesh' has been achieved, can the Security Council consider 'Bangladesh's' application for membership. (44)

A fortnight later, the issue of Bangladesh's membership came before the Security Council through a joint draft resolution sponsored by India, the Soviet Union, Britain and Yugoslavia, China, while exercising its veto against the resolution, said:

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44 SCOR, 27th year, 1658th mtg., 10 August 1972, p.8.
... 'Bangladesh's' application for membership in the United Nations can in no way be examined in deviation from the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council concerning last year's war of aggression on the South Asia...

China further stated that:

What really concerns them [India and the Soviet Union] is not whether 'Bangladesh' will be admitted into the United Nations... They are deliberately taking advantage of the consequences of the war of aggression... for the purpose of blackmailing Pakistan and pressuring the United Nations. (45)

After Beijing vetoed Bangladesh's entry into the United Nations, the prospect for improving Sino-Bangladeshi relations became more remote. On 27 August 1972, in reacting to the Chinese exercise of veto in the Security Council, the Foreign Minister of Bangladesh, Abdu Samad, said, "China was playing the role of a big Power in blocking the entry of Bangladesh into the United Nations."46

However, China's position on the question of Bangladesh membership did not seem to be dogmatic and uncompromising. Perhaps sensing the mounting pressure for the admission of Bangladesh, China's tone on this issue was considerably softened.

46 Cited in Mohanty, n.43, p.148.
On 3 October 1972, while speaking at a general debate in the UN General Assembly, the head of the Chinese delegation, Qiao Guan-hua, expressed friendly sentiments for "the people of East Bengal". He, however, made clear that China favours postponing the consideration of the issue "in order to promote a reconciliation among the parties concerned and the implementation of the United Nations resolutions, which are the very immediate concern."\(^{47}\) At the General Assembly, two draft resolutions were submitted -- one sponsored by Yugoslavia and 22 others expressing the desire that Bangladesh be admitted to the United Nations at an early date. The other 116 power draft resolution, reiterated that the parties concerned should make all possible efforts to reach a fair settlement of pending issues.\(^{48}\) Huang Hua, while continued to maintain that Bangladesh was not qualified for membership, said that his country harboured no permanent objection to Bangladesh's membership. He said:

> We are not fundamentally opposed to the admission of Bangladesh into the United Nations. China always cherished profound friendship sentiments for the people of East Bengal. We hope that the 'Bangladesh's' authorities will make their own decisions independently and meet with Pakistani leaders at an early date so as to reach a reasonable settlement of the issues between Pakistan and

\(^{47}\) GAOR, 27th Session, 2051st Plen. mtg., 3 October 1972, p.15.

\(^{48}\) GAOR, Resolutions 2937(XXVII) and 2938(XXVII), 29 November 1972.
'Bangladesh' thus demonstrating that it is truly independent state. However, China cannot agree to the admission of 'Bangladesh' under the present circumstances. (49)

After a prolong discussion, it was decided that the two draft resolutions be adopted together without vote. This was regarded as a gesture of consensus on the issues involved. While expressing satisfaction over the adoption of these resolutions, the Chinese representative said:

The Chinese delegation hopes the parties concerned will truly and speedly implement the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council in the spirit of the decision made at this plenary meeting and thus make it possible for 'Bangladesh' to be admitted to membership of the United Nations at an early date. (51)

A close examination of the above statement indicates that China's opposition against the issue of Bangladesh's admission was a passing phenomenon. Commenting on Pakistani National Assembly decision of 10 July 1973 to recognize Bangladesh, Beijing's official journal welcomed it as "an important step by Pakistan to normalize the situation in South Asia." (52)

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51 GAOR, n.49.
Meanwhile, the situation on the Indian sub-continent took a healthy turn with the signing of Indo-Pakistani agreement on 29 August 1973 to tackle the problems relating to the repatriation of civilians and POWs detained in India since the 1971 war. The Chinese Foreign Minister, Ji Pengfei spoke of the agreement as having created "favourable conditions... for detente in the South Asian region and the normalization of relations among the parties concerned." 53

Other outstanding issues were settled when a "Tripartite Pact" was concluded between India, Pakistan and Bangladesh in April 1974. All these speedy developments in the sub-continent paved the way for China to further play down its hostility without any embarrassment to its foreign policy.

Subsequently, on 10 June 1974, when the Bangladesh membership issue came up again in the Security Council, China supported it, thus Bangladesh was admitted to the United Nations. The Chinese representative, Zhuang Yan, expressed his satisfaction over the implementation of the "relevant resolutions" and over the agreement between the concerned countries. He expressed the hope that Bangladesh would "make positive contributions towards upholding the basic principles of the Charter of the United Nations." 54 However, China's recognition of Bangladesh

53 Cited in Mohanty, n.43, p.150.
was announced after the bloody coup of August 1975 in Bangladesh. The new President, Mushtaque Ahmad, while proclaiming the policy of the new government, said that it would maintain friendly relations with Islamic and nonaligned countries. He also pointed out that Bangladesh would tolerate no outside interference in its internal affairs.\footnote{55} This statement was taken by Beijing as an indication of Dacca's desire to disengage itself from the Indo-Soviet orbit. Beijing thus seized the opportunity, not only to recognize but also establish an intimate relationship with that country.

**Summary Observations**

From the above analyses, one could draw inference that China's stand on the conflict-situation was determined by geopolitical consideration. China did not consider the East Pakistani movement as a genuine liberation movement and classified it as a separatist movement that had been launched by a bourgeois party, not the broad masses. The analogy drawn by China was to the events in Tibet in 1959 and the Japanese-installed puppet regime of the Manchukuo Government in the 1930s.\footnote{56}

\footnote{55} For extract of the statement see, *Peking Review*, vol.18, no.35, 29 August 1975, p.19.

\footnote{56} *SCOR*, 26th year, 1608th mtg., 6 December 1971, pp.13-14; *GAOR*, 26th session, 2003rd mtg., 7 December 1971, p.29.
Its support to the Bangladesh freedom movement, besides being contradictory to the compulsion of power-politics, would be tantamount to admitting the legitimacy of Tibetan demands for self-determination and of Taiwan's right to be an independent state. Accordingly, the situation was considered as Pakistan's "internal affairs which can only be settled by the Pakistani people themselves, no country has the right to interfere." Beijing used every occasion to give strong verbal support in the form of active pro-Pakistan, anti-India and even stronger anti-Soviet pronouncement at the United Nations.

Apart from numerous statements denigrating the Soviet Union and India, the Chinese delegations at the Security Council served as a counterpoise to Soviet support to India in the conflict. China's vetoes on Bangladesh's admission into the United Nations and its non-recognition of the new nation, served Pakistan as a diplomatic leverage in its negotiations with India and Bangladesh.

This stand had considerably tarnished China's revolutionary image. Beijing tried to redeem its damaged image by trying to project itself at the United Nations as a champion of national integrity and state sovereignty of small and medium countries.

57 Syed, n.9, pp.149-50.
Once the crisis subsided, China set out to normalize its relations with Bangladesh and India in an attempt to distance them from the Soviet influence. Thus, the entire Chinese policy towards the conflict-situation can be explained by its rivalry for influence at regional level with India and at the global level with the Soviet Union.