CHAPTER III

ASCENDANCY OF OBJECTIVITY AFTER A BRIEF SPELL OF EUPHORIA (1955-64)
As noted earlier the year 1955 represented an important landmark in the development of friendly relations between Moscow and New Delhi. Yet a distinct improvement in relations between the two countries did not bring about a sudden and sharp change in Soviet perceptions of the class character of the Indian National Congress and the reactionary essence of its domestic policy. As pointed out in the previous chapter the Soviet media took little notice of the Avadi resolution of the Indian National Congress on socialistic pattern of society. The Pravda editorial on the arrival of Nehru in Moscow on 7 June 1955 as also the earlier editorial on 26 January 1955 on the Republic Day of India only highlighted the desire for peace common to both the peoples. In the only reference to the internal policy of the Congress government the Pravda editorial of 7 June 1955 just referred to the Soviet peoples' sympathy with the Indian government's efforts to industrialise the country.

It was only 15 years later that Soviet scholar T.F. Deviatkina in her work published from Moscow in 1970 made an observation on the importance of the "socialistic pattern" resolution adopted at the Avadi session of the Congress. Referring to the adoption of this programme as one of the five important events in the life of the Congress such as the non-cooperation movement in 1920, the resolution on independence in 1929, the quit India resolution of 1942
and the attainment of Indian independence in 1947, Deviatkina wrote, "It evoked great enthusiasm in the country and strengthened the position of the Congress".\(^1\) For some time, she further wrote, it knocked the bottom out of the feet of the Praja Socialist Party which now began to lose its popularity since there was little difference between its programme and the programme of the Congress party. The reorganisation of the states in 1956 which delivered a severe blow to princely feudalism and the completion of the second five year plan also raised the prestige of the Indian National Congress in Deviatkina's opinion. The Soviet scholar observed that all these measures influenced the poll performance of the Congress in 1967 with 47.7% of the total votes polled going to it as against 45% in the 1952 elections.\(^2\)

The adoption of the goal of socialistic pattern of society for the Congress at its Avadi session also brought about a change in the pattern of social groups which voted for it in the elections before 1957. According to Soviet scholar Deviatkina if in the previous election the bourgeoisie and a certain section of the landlords representing an overwhelming majority voted as a single front for the Congress, a crack developed in this camp as a result of the growth of radicalism in the country and adoption of

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2. Ibid., p.136.
the socialist slogans by the Indian National Congress. As a reaction to this the Rightist forces also began to consolidate themselves. The successes of the Communist Party which led a coalition government in Kerala scare the richer and moderate sections of the bourgeoisie which was not prepared to back any party in the struggle for power in the state as also in the centre. Thus the Gantantra Parishad in Orissa which had the backing of the reactionary bourgeoisie-landlord groups agreed to share power with the Indian National Congress.

The panicky response to the advent of the Communists to power in Kerala was, in the opinion of Deviatkina, not confined to the reactionary circles of India alone and the Congress as a whole began to search for ways of removing them from power. Only there was no agreement along all sections of the Congress leadership on the ways of dislodging the Communist Ministry in Kerala. The rightist elements favoured strong direct action methods openly supporting the provocative activities of the Catholic church whereas Jawaharlal Nehru and Indira Gandhi who was then the Congress President favoured action against the communists within the constitutional framework.\(^3\) Jawaharlal Nehru and other leading Congress leaders, wrote Deviatkina, could not take decisive measures to control the situation in the state of Kerala as a result of an unconstitutional

agitation for dismissal of the Communist-led state government launched by communal leaders of the Nair, Muslim and Christian communities.

The danger of spread of the Kerala example to other states became so real according to the Soviet historian of the Indian National Congress that the left-inclined Congressmen gradually gave way to the moderate Congressmen. The prospect of the communists coming to power as a result of the general elections to other states, particularly Andhra Pradesh and West Bengal caused considerable worry to the top Congress leadership. The dismissal of the Kerala ministry did not seriously disturb the leftist groups inside the Congress leadership. Even the emergence of a new reactionary party - the Swatantra Party - was initially viewed as a handy instrument for pushing the opposition forces out of the democratic camp led by the Communists. Deviatkina observed that even Jawaharlal Nehru who never endorsed the Swatantra slogans did not speak out against the emergence of that party. "But very soon", wrote Deviatkina, "the real face of the Swatantras was revealed which came out not only against the Communists but against the Congress as well, exploiting the rising dissatisfaction of the people against the ruling party."

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4. Ibid., p.138.
5. Ibid., p.139.
The situation inside the Congress became more and more tense as sharp differences among the leaders began to arise on the question of paths of economic development for the country. Leading Congressmen holding important posts like Morarji Desai, Manubhai Shah and S.K. Patil launched an offensive against expansion of the state sector. According to Deviatkina groups of Congressmen led by these leaders who represented the interests of big businessmen and monopolists sceptically viewed the slogan of socialism propagated by Jawaharlal Nehru. They opposed any attempt to curb the monopoly capital and raise taxes on its profits. They favoured invitation to foreign capital to take part in the economic developments of the country and demanded a change in the foreign policy of the government with a view to bringing the country closer to the Western powers.

The report of First Secretary, N.S. Khrushchev to the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union also laid the major stress on the peace loving foreign policy of India. It noted that friendship and cooperation with Eastern peoples is growing and referred to their struggle against participation in blocs and for national independence. Observing that a zone of peace has emerged consisting of socialist and non-socialist peace-loving states, Khrushchev referred to India as one of the great powers of the world which had made a big contribution in
strengthening the peace in Asia and the world. Khrushchev's report admitted the possibility of many paths to socialism, including the path of peaceful transition. But the Soviet leader cautioned against the hope for transition to socialism without the "political leadership of working class headed by its vanguard".

There was nothing wrong with the Soviet Union developing relations with newly independent countries like India ruled by the national bourgeoisie within the framework of peaceful coexistence. Indeed the new Soviet policy strengthened a world-wide front of forces against imperialism and had an objective basis in the existence of deep contradictions, even between the detachment of big bourgeoisie constituting part of the national bourgeoisie and the imperialist bourgeoisie. It did not clash with the policy of promoting the cause of social revolution in the newly independent countries. The failure of the Indian communists to come to power through armed struggle and their inability to mobilise the masses behind them ruled out a militant extremist approach to a socialist revolution in India. Cooperation between the newly independent countries and the Soviet Union in the anti-imperialist struggle


7. Ibid., p. 23.
for peace was not without positive beneficial gains for the forces of social revolution in those countries. The extent to which the newly independent countries were able to break away from the stranglehold of imperialism, determined the pace of their advance towards socialism. Their fight for national independence was inseparable from the fight for peace. However, as discussed below the new Soviet approach was not without its pitfalls. It generated euphoric and unrealistic expectations about the possibility of transition to socialism under the leadership of the national bourgeoisie.

At the scholarly level the first major evidence of a positive assessment of the Nehru government appeared in an article by A.M. Dyakov published in the new journal of the Institute of Oriental Studies. Dyakov wrote: "The peace-loving policy of the Indian government is supported even by certain circles of Indian bourgeoisie, including the big bourgeoisie, for this policy not only guarantees India's not being dragged into war, but also secures the possibility of smashing out of the grip of economic dependence on the Imperialist powers."

Thus completely reversing the dominant Soviet appraisal during the Stalin period which denounced Indian independence as a sham and viewed India as a semi-colony, the

new Soviet approach signified by A.M. Dyakov's article projected India as an example of a sovereign country striving to attain economic independence. Of course, Dyakov, did not care to substantiate his new appraisal by bringing out the shift in the relations between the Indian bourgeoisie and foreign capital and confined himself to Nehru's foreign policy.

A debate began in the Soviet academic circles on the question of the theoretical basis of the progressive character of Nehru's foreign policy, that is, its linkage with the path of independent sovereign development on the basis of a concrete analysis of his domestic economic policy and the character of the Indian economy. A note of scepticism was struck by V.A. Maslennikov of the Institute of Oriental Studies who in one of his research papers asserted that "in certain conditions, the proclamation of independence does not change the essence of the rule of imperialism". Maslennikov reiterated that the bourgeoisie displayed contradictory tendencies between elements interested in independent economic development and those tied to foreign capital and feudal landholding and concluded that Indian bourgeoisie could not be depended upon as a consistent fighter against imperialism and feudalism.


10. Ibid., p.42.
Discussing Maslennikov's views, Soviet scholars aired divergent approaches to the role of foreign monopolies in Indian economy. While Iu. N. Rosaliev emphasised the incompatibility of interests of the native and foreign monopolies, R.T. Akhramovich asserted that even in those countries which had taken the path of independent development the rule of foreign capital had not ended. An editorial in the Soviet journal in the same issue which carried the discussion of Maslennikov’s views, authoritatively stated that foreign capital could no longer be said to exercise "uncontrollable rule" in countries following the path of independent development. Yet the editorial could not prevent the continuation of a critical approach to the new Soviet appraisal of Indian developments.

The same issue of the Soviet journal Sovetskoe Vostokovedenie carried an article by Soviet economist I. Lemin who asserted that as yet no social transformation had taken place in countries believed to be pursuing the path of independent development and that they remained within the world capitalist economy. About India's economic growth


since independence Lemin commented that it was still very low and the country could remain dependent on foreign capital for a considerable period of time. Lemin took a guarded view of Indian economic planning and wrote: "This plan is neither a directive, nor a law. It foresees definite measures for financing and stimulating the development of these and other branches of economy".

Similarly, a critical approach to India's economic development was taken by another leading Soviet economist, M. Rubinshtein who in his article published in Voprosy Ekonomiki at the end of 1955 mentioned the extremely narrow domestic market in India as a factor hindering the industrial development of the country. In this context he referred to the half-hearted character of agrarian reforms in India resulting in continuation of the predominant semi-feudal mode of agrarian relations. Rubinshtein also highlighted the exploitative character of Indian capitalism which used the prevalence of large-scale unemployment to provide poor working conditions and miserably low wages to the workers.

The continuation of a critical approach to Indian developments in Soviet academic circles must have caused

15. Ibid., p.25.
16. M. Rubinshtein, "Ob Ekonomichegkom Razvitii Sovremennoi Indii", Voprosy Ekonomiki, No.10 (1955), p.120.
some anxiety to the Party leadership who felt obliged to cultivate the bourgeois regime in India led by Nehru in the interest of strengthening the struggle for peace. At the XX Congress Anastas Mikoyan reprimanded Soviet orientalists by making a critical remark that "while the entire East has awakened in our time the Institute of Oriental Studies slumbers to this day". Soon the journal of the Institute of Oriental Studies Sovetskoe Vostokovedenie came out with an editorial laying the basic guidelines for Soviet researchers to follow. Soviet Orientalists were told that the Leninist formulation about the general tendency towards decay of capitalism in the era of Imperialism did not rule out the possibility of growth of capitalism in individual countries. The editorial also pointed out that the dominant economic position of foreign capital in the newly independent countries did not imply domination of their political life by imperialism and that political independence served as a pre-requisite for achieving economic independence. It reproached Soviet researchers for representing Indian independence as a "final deal" between the Indian big bourgeoisie and imperialism which amounted to ignoring the contradictions between the national bourgeoisie and imperialism.

17. Pravda, 18 February, 1956.

The *Sovetskoe Vostokovedenie* editorial marked the apo-
gee of post-Stalinist Soviet perspective on the newly inde-
pendent countries. American scholar Richard B. Remnek
projects it as continuation of the old habits from Stalin's
days when the official stand on scholarly research was that
it must "substantiate the pre-conceived positions of the
party leadership". While one may in general agree with
him, it is difficult to share his view that "scholarly
assessments of India during 1956 reflected on the whole
the uncritical euphoria that had already infected the popular
press the year before" and that the official line was only
"occasionally challenged".

In fact, the extensive survey of Soviet academic works
contained in Remnek's scholarly work itself refutes his
observation about "pervasive timidity displayed by most
Soviet scholars". Remnek advances only two clear-cut exam-
pies of Soviet academic writings toeing the euphoric offi-
cial line. Among these he mentions A.A. Guber's article in
*Sovetskoe Vostokovedenie* which noted that the popularity
of socialist ideas in the newly independent states was so
great that the national bourgeoisie of India and Burma were

19. Richard B. Remnek, *Soviet Policy Towards India, the Role
of Soviet Scholars in the Formulation of Soviet Foreign

20. Ibid.

21. A.A. Guber, *Gluboko i Vsestoronne Izuchat' Krizis i
Raspad Kolonialnoi Sistemy Imperializma*, *Sovetskoe
officially advancing the task of creating an economy of Socialist type, as also an article by A. Azizian in *Voprosy Ekonomiki*\(^{22}\) which commented on the progressive aspects of the economic policies of India and other newly independent countries, such as planning and the creation of a heavy industrial base within the state sector. Azizian noted that this secures "more favourable conditions for the further progress of these countries on the path of socialism". The third example given by Remnek - M. Rubinshtein's article in the Soviet Weekly *New Times*\(^{23}\) - wherein the author stated that "in India, which is advancing along the road of independent political and economic development, the objective possibilities exist for obviating the continued growth of monopoly capital and by peaceful methods, in conformity with the will of the majority of the people, taking the socialist path" is scored out by a critical assessment by the same author in an article published in *Sovetskoe Vostokovedenie* at virtually the same time as his article in the *New Times*. Rubinshtein in his article published in *Sovetskoe Vostokovedenie*, brought out the class character of Nehru's economic programme, noting that its burden fell on the working classes while such significant sources as profits of foreign companies and incomes of the

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big bourgeoisie and former Princes remained untapped. Rubinshtein while noting certain positive aspects of the community development programmes, cited Indian press commentary that its benefits were going to the rich landowners. About agrarian reforms also the Soviet economist noted that although middlemen were being eliminated in several states through agrarian reforms, nothing had been done to give land to the landless peasants and that the reforms gave the landlords possibility of evading measures on land ceilings.

The researches of such Soviet scholars as V.I. Pavlov and G.G. Kotovsky on agricultural and industrial production in India and M.A. Maksimov and V.G. Rastiannikov on development of agrarian capitalism published in 1956 can only be characterised as marked by a certain restraint in projecting the intensity of class struggle in India typical of the Soviet writings of the earlier period. However, these writings can hardly be described as subservient to the official party line. Pavlov and Kotovsky stressed that to expand domestic market for industrial production and to

ensure the success of the drive to increase food production, a solution of the agrarian question was needed around which a serious struggle was going on. Similarly, Maksimov and Rastiannikov in their work on development of agrarian capitalism noted the weak development of entrepreneurial capital in Indian agriculture on account of its low technical base and assessed the agrarian reforms positively in so far as they objectively helped the development of capitalism in agriculture.

The Conference held towards the end of 1956 at the Institute of Oriental Studies to discuss the economic and political position of the national bourgeoisie in the countries of the East witnessed sharp differences among Soviet scholars. 27 A.I. Levkovsky described the national bourgeoisie in India as consisting of three groups, the big, middle and petty-bourgeoisie, the Indian monopolists being a sub-group of the big bourgeoisie. He asserted that despite the close ties of the national bourgeoisie with both foreign capital and native landlords, serious contradictions emerged between it and the foreign capital and native feudalism as local capital developed. Levkovsky contrasted the national bourgeoisie with a smaller group of compradore bourgeoisie involved in foreign trade operations and tied to the exploitation of India as a colonial market. Levkovsky's position

was challenged by Soviet scholars L. Gordon, G.G. Kotovskyy, E. Komarov, Schmidt and Shastitko who took a bold independent line of their own. Schmidt and Shastitko, as V. Balabushevich recorded, tried to prove that in India power was still in the hands of the monopolies and landlords and that the Indian National Congress was a party of monopolies and landlords. Kotovskyy noted that the big bourgeoisie was tied more to usurer capital than to landlord elements, whereas the latter preserved close links with the middle and petty bourgeoisie who often invested in land. According to Kotovsky the petty bourgeoisie was less radical at times than the big bourgeoisie on questions relating to abolition of landlordism. Kotovsky was of the opinion that the agrarian reforms in India were meant to preserve the landownership of those landlords who had entered the capitalist path of development. Gordon argued that the native bourgeoisie by its very nature could not become consistent fighters against feudal ownership though it could participate in the anti-imperialist struggle.

The implication of this viewpoint was that while struggling against imperialism the Indian bourgeoisie had tried to prevent this struggle from acquiring an anti-feudal character. Komarov took Levkovsky to task for not giving enough attention to the ties that bound Indian monopolies to imperialism. He maintained that the aggravation of contradictions between the native bourgeoisie and imperialism did not proceed along a straight line.
Summing up the results of the discussions, Balabusevich wrote that the consensus of opinion at the conference was that the native bourgeoisie was a progressive force and that the monopoly layer was a part of it. He also affirmed the progressive character of the Indian National Congress as it represented the native bourgeoisie and the section of the landlords interested in capitalist development. Reiterating the view expressed in the Sovetskoe Vostokovedenie editorial, Balabusevich conceded the possibility of development of capitalism in individual countries even though capitalism as a world system was in a state of decay. This position though representing a total rejection of the earlier dogmatic stand under Stalin which assessed the Indian situation as revolutionary and ripe for hegemony of the proletariat in the national liberation struggle against capitulationist bourgeoisie, did not at all represent a euphoric approach of admiration for socialistic slogans raised by the Indian National Congress in early 1955.

From the above it is clear that notwithstanding a positive assessment of the Congress regime in the period following the XX Party Congress serious reservations about the progressiveness of the national bourgeoisie in India and its political organisation the Indian National Congress continued in the Soviet academic circles. A senior Soviet Indologist R.A. Ulyanovsky published an article towards the end of 1957 projecting state capitalism as "historically
more progressive form of bourgeois ownership" on the ground that it accelerated the rate of economic growth. Besides the economic criteria the political criteria also weighed with Ulyanovsky in his positive assessment of the nature of state capitalism in India. In his view both industrialisation and national independence were opposed by foreign capital and since the latter was opposed to industrialisation of newly-independent states, state capitalism represented an anti-imperialist force as it aimed at economic and political independence which only industrialisation could provide. 28 State capitalism was looked upon as a defensive shield against penetration of foreign capital and identified as a source of progressive foreign and domestic policies of the Indian National Congress led by Nehru.

To be fair to Ulyanovsky it may be noted that he took into consideration both the political and economic factors and did not rely exclusively on the political criteria in pronouncing the progressive character of state capitalism in India. He was also critical of the resort to deficit financing by the government and its reluctance to tax the propertied classes and favoured further curbs on foreign monopolies and government regulation of foreign trade.

The mouthpiece of Soviet Orientalists Sovetskoe Vostokovedenie while reviewing the results of the 1957 Moscow meeting

of Communist and Workers' Parties, denounced the tendency among some Orientalists of considering progressive economic transformations in several young independent states as socialist in character. 29

Divergent views were expressed by Soviet scholars at a conference held under the auspices of Moscow Institute of Oriental Studies in February 1958. 30 The crux of the controversy was the importance to be attached to the external international conditions vis-a-vis the internal economic conditions. A.I. Levkovsky following Ulyanovsky's approach opined that for a proper evaluation of state capitalism internal economic conditions must be analysed with due attention to the international situation in which it arose. Thus Levkovsky argued that the state sector in British India was just an extension of state monopoly capitalism aimed at the colonial exploitation of the country in the interests of the metropolis. Only the attainment of political independence by India gave her opportunity to pursue an economic policy aimed at national independence. Thus by implication Levkovsky appeared to be highlighting the external political factor. Yet Levkovsky dismissed the idea that Indian state capitalism constituted a transitional step towards socialism. To him both the state and


private sectors were part of the same capitalist mode of production with contradictions of a non-antagonistic nature. 31

In the discussion that followed, Soviet scholars A.M. Dyakov, V.I. Pavlov and G.C. Kotovsky stressed the significance of internal class struggle and cautioned against the dangers of penetration of the state sector by the monopolies. 32 Ulyanovsky countered these views by arguing that the progressiveness of state capitalism in India was primarily determined by its anti-imperialist character, its commitment to national independence. He criticised Levkovsky for giving undue weightage to internal economic conditions in evaluating state capitalism. To Ulyanovsky material contribution to the development of a country's productive forces was not the main determinant of the progressive character of state capitalism. 33 Ulyanovsky's views were carried forward by J.M. Dantsig to the other extreme by stating that state capitalism was "progressive only where it bore an anti-imperialist character, and where the country which conducted it, followed a peace-loving foreign policy, and did not participate in aggressive blocs, etc." 34

31. Ibid., p.214.
32. Ibid., p.218.
34. Ibid., p.217.
Ulyanovsky's views met with sharp criticism by scholars of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations. A.A. Poliak and M.A. Maksimov found fault with Ulyanovsky for not recognising that state capitalism was above all an economic and not a political category whose development depended not so much on foreign political conditions as on domestic class struggle. Disagreement continued to prevail among Soviet Indologists on the nature of state capitalism in India. The development of heavy industries in the state sector with Soviet assistance during the second five year plan period gave an added importance to this debate in Soviet academic circles. In his article contained in an anthology on India published in 1958 to mark a decade of Indian independence Ulyanovsky disagreed with the view which saw Nehru's economic policy as governed by the pressure of monopolies.

Disagreeing with the view that the Indian state sector was serving only as a base for the development of a capitalist economy, Ulyanovsky observed that "to consider the significance of the state sector as playing only a subservient, auxiliary role, presupposes the rule of monopolies in India". Yet Ulyanovsky recognised that state ownership in India was not in principle different from private capitalist ownership, though a higher form of bourgeois

35. Ibid., pp.218-20.

ownership the development of which depended on the anti-imperialist struggle. He concluded, "In conditions of bourgeois democracy the implementation of the Indian government's economic policy is a step towards socialism, but it still is not socialism and not a preparatory point of departure for the non-capitalist path of development." 37

During 1960-61 the Statement adopted by the Moscow Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties (1960) and the Programme of the Party adopted at the XXII Congress of the C.P.S.U. (1961) provided a new theoretical framework for analysing the stage of development of anti-imperialist national liberation revolutions advancing the concepts of national democratic states and the non-capitalist path of development. The evolution of the 'national democracy' and 'non-capitalist path' concepts created some problems for Soviet scholars' assessment of the Indian situation. In spite of stray examples of projection of India as either following the non-capitalist path or poised on the verge of it by a handful of Soviet commentators, Soviet scholars were by and large objective in their analysis of the developments in India. The Indian development model was projected as the pursuit of "political and economic independence" and not that of non-capitalist path.

The Soviet press and academic circles were not reluctant to voice their criticism of Nehru's domestic and

37. Ibid., p.44.
foreign policies. The brief spell of euphoria that followed in the wake of the 1955 state visits and the XX Party Congress in 1956 was over, replacing the earlier simplistic image of the progressive role of the national bourgeoisie by a more critical appraisal based on increasing class differentiations in the post-liberation period. As early as 1958 Nehru's critique of Soviet society and Communism in general for its adherence to violence and suppression of individual freedom was strongly rebutted by Soviet Academician Yudin in his rejoinder published in the December issue of the *World Marxist Review*. Yudin, in turn, accused the Indian ruling classes of using the state machinery as an instrument of violent repression against the toiling masses.

Yudin wrote, "Violence is a phenomenon. There are two sides of it: who uses it and against whom it is used. In India, the bourgeoisie and the landlords use the state machine as an instrument of violence against the people, the workers and peasants in the first place. The way "democracy" and "freedom" are practised in some of the states is a matter for astonishment; the government organs display marvels of ingenuity in the use of violence against opposition parties and undesirable individuals. For instance, in the State of Orissa the government, headed by the National Congress, retained its "democratic majority" in the Legislative Assembly by arresting the members of the opposition. The facts cited show that in India government
organs use all forms of violence against citizens including arbitrary police rule and lethal weapons against demonstrations and Workers' rallies. In the matter of violence against the people, the Indian state bodies are no different from those in any other bourgeois state."

Yudin's critique of Nehru's policies need not be taken as reflecting the views of a leftist section in the Kremlin leadership. In all probability it was shared by the Soviet leadership which could not obviously openly express its misgivings about India's domestic policies in view of the great importance it attached to Nehru's foreign policy.

It is interesting to note that even Yudin concluded his article by praising Nehru's foreign policy. He observed that the progressive people of the world highly appreciated the "noble and historic role" of Pandit Nehru and valued him as an "outstanding leader of the world against the war-mongers". "We have our ideological differences", wrote Yudin, "but we are united by a fundamental and decisive factor of our times - the struggle for peace, for the innate interests of nations and for the progressive development of humanity."

A gradual change from cautious optimism about the Indian course of independent political and economic development to a more critical stance can be noticed between

1959 and 1964. True, India was bracketed with other more radical young Asian states like Indonesia, the United Arab Republic and Burma in a speech by N.A. Mukhitdinov, an Alternate Member of the Politburo from Uzbekistan at the XXI Party Congress. But Mukhitdinov's praise for India was confined to the general democratic advance of the country. In any case, his admiration for India was far from fulsome. Mukhitdinov said, "The development of India is interesting in this respect. There is no question that India has much to do before she finally eradicates the consequences of colonialism and assures social and economic progress. But it is likewise incontestable that as a result of the farsighted policy of that outstanding Eastern statesman Jawaharlal Nehru and the government that he heads, as well as the activity of all progressive forces, India in a comparatively brief historical period has achieved certain successes in developing industry, agriculture and the entire economy, achieving national unity and enhancing the country's international prestige".41

The tone of cautious endorsement of India's advance under the Congress regime visible in the above pronouncement of an important C.P.S.U. leader began to give way to a more critical appraisal which marked the writings of C.P.S.U. leaders in the subsequent period. Thus we find B.N. Ponomarev, Secretary of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee, avoiding any mention of India in his important article on

the national democratic state. The omission of a reference to India in this article which lavished praise on Cuba, Guinea, Ghana, Mali and Indonesia for their major socio-economic transformations is not without significance. It appears that its criticism of the national bourgeoisie was aimed at the policies of the Indian National Congress. Ponomarev wrote: "The policy of the national bourgeoisie is contradictory. It participates in the struggle against colonialism and tries to weaken the control of foreign monopolies over the national economy, and at the same time it supports ties with the imperialist powers and provides opportunity for the continued flow of their capital .... It advocates industrialisation of the country and is ready to expand the state sector. But the leadership of the national bourgeoisie intends to carry out this entire policy by capitalist methods. It supports the monopolists in their offensive against the working people." Ponomarev warned that "national liberation revolutions can be brought to completion only by a decisive struggle against imperialism and internal reactionary forces. Only through the struggle of the masses is the question of creating national democratic states decided."

Khrushchev's report at the XXII Congress of the C.P. S.U. which adopted a new programme of the Party in October 1961 also struck a note of caution in respect of the newly

43. Ibid.
independent countries. While noting that the achievement of political independence by the former colonies has had a "favourable influence on their economic development", Khrushchev observed that the heritage of colonialism was "still quite strong" and that the major economic tasks still awaited resolution. The Soviet leader observed that "the upper crust of the bourgeoisie and the feudal landlords who have linked their destinies with foreign capital" were seeking to tie the underdeveloped countries to the system of world capitalism. Khrushchev said: "Entering on the non-capitalist path of development cannot be achieved by drifting into it. Only active struggle by the working class, by the masses of working people, and the unification of all democratic and patriotic forces in a broad national front can lead the peoples onto this path." 44

A discussion on the present stage of the national liberation movement in the Party journal Kommunist in 1962 was also replete with critical references to the development in India. 45 Soviet scholar V. Tyagunenko referred to India as an example of extreme concentration of wealth. He observed that 10 financial and industrial groups had in their hands 67% of the country's paid stock capital and continued to grow rich while the condition of the working masses was becoming worse. He quoted Planning and Labour Minister

44. Pravda, 19 October, 1961.
G.L. Nanda to make the point that the gains of the workers had been considerably nullified on account of rising prices after 1956, and cited Indian Economist Gyan Chand in support of his contention that rise of prices of agricultural products benefited less than 20% of the rural population. He blamed the situation on an attempt made in India "to create an independent capitalist economy without taking resolute measures against foreign imperialisit capital and without radical agrarian reforms with basic reliance on the big bourgeoisie." 46

The Kommunist also carried an article by R. Avakov and B. Andreasyan on "The progressive role of the state sector". The authors referred to the struggle going on for the expansion and consolidation of the state sector and mentioned the feudal lords and the big bourgeoisie as its opponents, and the working class, the peasantry, the progressive intelligentsia and major part of the national bourgeoisie as its advocates. The main question according to them was: should the state sector be strengthened in the interest of developing the country along a capitalist or a non-capitalist path? 47 Among the countries where the state sector was in the opinion of the Soviet authors "most progressive" were Mali, Guinea, Ghana, Indonesia and the United Arab Republic where "under the influence

46. Ibid.
47. Ibid.
of internal and external factors, the correlation of class and political forces favours the development of the country along the non-capitalist path."

Avakov and Andreasyan expressed the opinion that the formation of the state sector in India was taking place in a "complicated situation" in a peculiar competition with foreign and large scale domestic capital marked by an intensified class struggle. Commenting that "in India the state sector is the basis for a policy of industrialisation of the country that has been proclaimed by the ruling National Congress Party as a major means for India's attainment of economic independence", they observed, that "the state sector still holds a relatively modest place in the country's economy as a whole, even though it plays a decisive role in heavy industry." 48

In another article by G. Starushenko contained in the same issue of the Party journal Kommunist, the author again stressed that the passage to the non-capitalist path and development along it "demanded conscious and purposeful work by the democratic forces". He, however, agreed that "some general democratic transformations" have also been carried out in "young independent states where capitalist relations have already struck roots (for instance, in India)." 49 Yet Starushenko hastened to add, "Experience shows, however, that such transformations carried out under the leadership of national bourgeoisie are usually timid half-measures."

48. Ibid.

49. Ibid.
The sixties witnessed the emergence of a group of radical states such as Egypt, Ghana and Indonesia ruled by "revolutionary democrats" which raised Soviet expectations about possibilities of revolutionary advance in the newly independent countries. This resulted in a natural downgrading of the Indian model of political and economic independence. The mounting pressure on Nehru to revise his policy of non-alignment in the wake of the 1962 border conflict with China further added to Soviet anxiety. Already the relative complacency about developments in India in the late fifties was beginning to give way to an increasing uncertainty. The second five year plan became operative in 1956. Its authors declared that its grand strategy was to make a real beginning towards solution of the colossal tasks of the reconstruction of the country and declare a war against poverty. While noting the success achieved by the plan in raising the level of economic development, Soviet scholars could not help observing that the gains of economic development had not been equitably shared by the vast majority of Indian people. Thus, P.V. Kutsobin, a scholar heading the Indian desk in the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. wrote: "The national income during the years of the two five year plans increased by 43% but this has mainly benefitted the property classes. The important leaders of the ruling party Indian National Congress have been forced to acknowledge this."

Kutsobin further wrote that but for the opposition of big landlords and monopolists which began long before the adoption of the second five year plan and led to a struggle inside the ruling party the economic achievements of the second plan period would have been more notable. The intensity of this struggle according to the Soviet observer was such that Nehru was forced for the second time to declare his desire to lay down the office of the Prime Minister of India. Kutsobin made a reference to the speculation in the Indian press that Nehru's announcement of his desire to resign related to his differences with the Right-wing in the party on the question of goals and character of the second five year plan. The representatives of the big capital, Kutsobin wrote, protested against the expansion of state sector envisaged in the second five year plan as also the subsidies for small and cottage industries.

The Soviet scholar alleged that the representatives of the monopoly circles and their supporters in the ruling party and the government succeeded in getting the draft of the second plan re-examined and altered in the interest of the private sector. The reduced allocation for development of industry and agriculture in the final draft of the plan were advanced as evidence of this revision of the plan forced by the vested interests. According to Kutsobin the allocations for the development of industries in the state sector were reduced by 2.5 billion rupees even though the

51. Ibid., p.23.
total plan outlay was increased by 5 billion rupees.\textsuperscript{52} He also mentioned that a 90\% rise in the allocation for transport was made at the instance of representatives of big capital. Referring to the changes brought about in the 1948 resolution on industrial policy by a new resolution in April 1956 which increased the branches of industries earmarked for state control from 6 to 17, Kutsobin cited the \textit{Times of India} to the effect that the representatives of big capital did not feel particularly disturbed on account of the changes introduced by the 1956 resolution as there were many loopholes in it and moreover it was silent about the time of its implementation.\textsuperscript{53}

The results of the 1957 general elections in India provided some satisfaction to the Soviets. The \textit{Izvestia} correspondent in India, K. Perevoshchkov expressed satisfaction over the Indian National Congress becoming stronger in the Parliament, even though it lost about 2\% of its seats in the State Legislative Assemblies.\textsuperscript{54} He attributed the successes of the Congress Party in election to its association in popular mind with "developing the national economy and liberating people from the heavy colonial yoke".

India's foreign policy based on \textit{Panch Shila} was also mentioned among the "decisive factors" in ensuring the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{52} \textit{Ibid.}, p.24.
\item \textsuperscript{53} \textit{Ibid.}, p.25.
\item \textsuperscript{54} \textit{Izvestia}, April 9, 1957.
\end{itemize}
electoral victory of the Congress Party. The Soviet paper also noted the poll debacle of the right-wing parties including the Jan Sangh which "did not even get 2% of the seats in the State Legislative Assemblies". "The people," it wrote, "have condemned the efforts of this party to strengthen the position of private capital and foist ideas of militant Hinduism and religious intolerance on the country." The low performance of the Praja Socialist Party was ascribed by Izvestia to "this Party's unpopular criticism of the government's foreign policy, its efforts to push the country closer to the U.S. by weakening cooperation with the Socialist countries." Noting the considerable gains of the Communist Party in the general elections and winning of absolute majority by it in Kerala State the Soviet Daily concluded that "the elections brought to life new forces which will exert a positive influence on the country's future progress." 55

Analysing the agrarian policy of the Indian National Congress under the leadership of Nehru in the post-1956 period, Soviet scholar Kutsobin noted its half-heartedness. He observed that the decision taken by the All India Congress Committee at the end of 1957 to take effective steps to vest ownership rights in land in the actual tillers, and fix ceiling on size of the present landholdings as

55. Though welcoming the advent of the Communist Party of India to power in Kerala in April 1957, the Soviets did not shed any tears when the Congress-led Central Government imposed Presidential rule and sacked the Communist Ministry in that state from office in 1959.
also for their future size and the decision taken by the national council of development to complete the task of laying down the ceiling on landholdings by 1961 have not been implemented till date. The Soviet scholar also referred to the sharp struggle which took place at the annual session of the Indian National Congress held in Nagpur in January 1959 where Nehru moved a resolution on further regulation of agrarian relations and cooperativisation of the Indian village. According to him the feudals, the landlords and big capitalists gave a hostile reception to this resolution. The circles expressing the interests of the landlords demanded complete rejection of the idea of ceiling on landholdings and it was only through a majority vote that a resolution on further transformation on agriculture was adopted. Quoting from the Indian press the comments of some delegates at the Congress session in Nagpur that the Congress had a tradition of adopting resolutions but doing nothing to translate them into practice; Kutsobin noted that the drafts of the bill on agrarian reforms were drastically changed during discussion in the State Legislative Assemblies to serve the propertied classes and when adopted their implementation was in every possible manner delayed. He also made a critical reference to fixation of ceilings on land in the states at 100,

57. Ibid., p.35.
200 and even 300 acres when on the whole more than 60% of all present holdings were confined to 5 acres. 58

In the late fifties the emergence of the Swatantra party which opposed the growth of planned economy and state sector and pleaded for closer relations with the United States began to cause certain anxiety to the Soviets. Their media denounced the tirade of the Swatantra Party against the large size of the Third Five Year Plan. Soviet Weekly, New Times mentioned that the annual target of 15 million tonnes of steel by the close of the third five year plan period was lowered to 10.2 million tonnes on account of strong opposition by leading Indian monopolist Jamshedji Tata who did not favour establishment of new steel plants in the state sector. 59

The Soviets felt concerned over the new turn the political developments took following the India-China border conflict in 1962. In the third general elections held in 1962 the Congress party secured 46.02% of the votes polled. The already cited work on Indian National Congress by Soviet scholar Deviatkina interpreted it as a distinctly visible proof of a trend towards weakening of the position of the ruling party which had secured 47.8% of the votes polled in the 1957 elections. The fact that the Communist Party managed to poll about 10% of the votes cast and preserve its position contrary to the expectations of the

58. Ibid., p.36.
Congress about its failure following the dismissal of the Kerala ministry and rabid anti-Communist propaganda in the press in the wake of armed clashes on the border with China in 1959 was given due importance in the first Soviet work on the Indian National Congress in the post-independence period which also noted the considerable unexpected successes of the Swatantra Party receiving 6.8% of the votes polled as well as of the Jan Sangh polling 6.4%. The work also observed that the election campaign of the Congress was to a considerable extent directed against the leftist forces outside the Congress and was based not so much on publicity of ideas and programme of the Congress as on agitation for its candidates. It alleged that unlike the previous elections popularisation of the ideas of socialism through the election campaign was relegated to the background. This was attributed to the growing contradictions between the slogans of the Congress and their implementation, objective difficulties in the struggle against the monopolistic aspiration of the big bourgeoisie as well as intensification of the inner-party struggle.

The border conflict with China delivered a major blow to Nehru's foreign policy. Soviet weekly, *New Times*, wrote that "unprincipled politicians, men like Kripalani, who thrive on handouts from the rich" had come out to attack the government's policies at an opportune moment.

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60. T.F. Deviatkina, *op. cit.*, p.147.

"Pleading 'national defence' these 'pocket book patriots' worked up a jingoist war hysteria and started a vicious campaign against non-alignment and all its supporters", commented the Soviet weekly which further observed that "elements within the Congress" echoed their sentiments and have succeeded by combined efforts in securing the resignation of Cabinet Ministers Krishna Menon and Malaviya, "both staunch supporters of the course India has chosen". The agreement giving the Voice of America broadcasting facilities in India also came in for strong criticism by the New Times which noted that in the face of attack by the Communist Party of India and a large section of the press including some bourgeois papers, Prime Minister Nehru had agreed to reconsideration of the agreement. It also charged the 'reactionaries' with doing every thing possible to save the agreement in contact with U.S. Ambassador Chester Bowles.

During the last years of Nehru affairs of the Indian National Congress began to figure prominently in the Soviet press which paid particular attention to the inner-party developments between the period November 1963 to January 1964, that is, from the Jaipur session of the All-India Congress Committee to the Bhubaneswar Annual session. Soviet scholars G. Kotovsky, V. Pavlov and I. Redko analysed the developments inside the Congress Party during this period. Writing in the New Times Kotovsky, Pavlov and Redko described the Jaipur session of the All India Congress
Committee as "one of the most important developments in Indian politics in the latter part of 1963." Tracing the history of the development in the Congress since its Avadi session in 1955 when the Party adopted a programme envisaging a "socialistic pattern of society" the Soviet scholars commented that this programme was "further detailed" at the 1957 and 1959 Congress sessions.

The Soviet scholars observed that "none of the Congress decisions visualises nationalisation of monopoly concerns, banks and wholesale trade, which constitute the foundations of the developing capitalist relations in India". They, however, acknowledged that the public sector had "definite anti-imperialist and anti-feudal features" and was helping "to carry the country towards economic independence". They also noted that the mixed economy based on simultaneous development of public and private sectors had not resulted in a "substantial lessening of social inequality". Quoting Krishna Menon's declaration at Jaipur - "we must recognise that we have a capitalist economy" - Kotovsky, Pavlov and Redko observed that the Jaipur discussions had brought to the surface the "accumulated and sharpening differences over the path India should follow in social and economic development".

The New Times article by three prominent Soviet scholars ascribed the differences within the party to mainly

63. Ibid.
"its heterogenous class composition". According to them, "all groups of the national bourgeoisie, including monopoly interests, the petty urban and rural bourgeoisie and the urban middle stratum, notably, intellectuals" were represented in the Indian National Congress whose influence extended to the "broad mass of the labouring population - workers, peasants, artisans". The old Congress policy of smoothing out inner-party differences, the Soviet scholars noted, was meeting with diminishing success on account of the economic and political situation. The New Times article noted a number of negative features of Indian developments such as India's close ties with the capitalist world market (trade with the USSR making up only about 5% of the total trade), strong survival of feudalism and tardy progress in implementation of land reforms, obstruction of industrial development primarily by business and foreign monopolies and the inequal distribution of the tax burden. They also quoted Nehru's statement in the Parliament about 60% of the Indian people earning less than one rupee a day.

The emergence of the Swatantra Party in 1959 was attributed by Soviet scholars to growing class antagonisms and sharpening contradictions within the Indian bourgeoisie over fundamental issues of socio-economic development. Charging the reactionary forces with the launching of an onslaught on the people's democratic rights and national gains, the New Times article noted that many leading personalities of the Indian National Congress got involved into
the campaign for the ouster of the Communist-led government in Kerala, "failing to see the danger emanating from the extreme right". It expressed concern over the Indian National Congress losing a "substantial number of seats to Swatantra and other rightist parties" in the 1962 general elections and the fresh offensive mounted against the democratic forces by the reactionaries after the elections. The authorities were criticised for arresting trade union and communist leaders following the border conflict with China. The victory of Kripalani, Masani and the "Socialist" Lohia in the by-elections to Parliament in May 1963 was mentioned as evidence of continuing reactionary onslaught. The Kamaraj Plan which brought about important changes in the Union Cabinet removing Morarji Desai and S.K. Patil was hailed by the Soviet commentators who expressed the hope that it would make possible a "revitalisation of non-alignment".

The Soviet analyst expressed satisfaction that the first draft of the resolution on socialism and democracy which contained some anti-Communist undertones was rejected by the Congress Working Committee meeting on the eve of the Jaipur session and that a new draft was submitted by a sub-committee headed by Home Minister G.L. Nanda which declared that the Congress was working for a revolution in the economic and social relationships in Indian society. The reference to the predominant role of
the public sector and the need for agrarian reforms and maximum limits to the size of landholdings, though in a very general manner, was hailed by the above-named Soviet scholars. They, however, regretted that as in previous policy documents, Congress did not "concretely indicate the measures required to achieve this". A sympathetic reference was made to amendments moved by K.D. Malaviya and other members of the All India Congress Committee calling for concrete measures like state ownership of commanding sectors of industry and commerce, nationalisation of banks, state trade in grains and certain other essential commodities as well as radical agrarian reforms to make the peasant owner of the land he tills.

The Jaipur session did not adopt a final decision on these issues. It only approved the draft resolution in principle and decided to circulate it, together with proposed amendments, to Congress Committees in the various states after which it was to be placed before the Congress session at Bhubaneswar in January 1964. Noting that the Jaipur All India Congress Committee session manifested that inner-party differences over important policy issues were widening, the New Times article expressed the view that it was too early to say how the struggle for policy would end.

The results of the Bhubaneswar Congress session held in January 1964 were analysed by Soviet scholars V. Pavlov

64. Ibid.
According to them the discussion of the Jaipur draft resolution by the Congress organisations in the states was "expressive of the grave differences between the progressive forces and the Congress Right, which speaks for Big Business and the land owners." The Soviet scholars noted that the Delhi, Orissa, Assam, Rajasthan, Maharashtra and Bihar States Congress organisations had put forth proposals for nationalisation of private-owned banks, foreign trade and trading in food whereas the Gujarat State Congress Committee as also the leadership of the Bombay Congress had expressed views sharply critical of nationalisation. The connection of Morarji Desai and S.K. Patil with the Gujarat and Bombay Congress Committees was prominently projected by the Soviet commentators who found the resolution on democracy and socialism adopted at Bhubaneswar inadequate and hazy though "to some extent expressive of peoples' aspirations." Pavlov and Redko wrote: "The concrete economic and social measures envisaged by the resolution are indicative of its deep-going contradictions - the inevitable result of an ideological compromise between various trends within the party." 66

66. Ibid.
The Bhubaneswar resolution's omission to mention nationalisation and its silence on land for agricultural workers came in for criticism in the said article. The failure of the resolution to even mention nationalisation was taken by the Soviet scholars as an evidence of the advocates for a capitalist path for India gaining the upper hand in Congress policy-making circles. They, however, speculated that Nehru's illness affected the outcome of the Bhubaneswar session. Despite the success of the right-wing in deleting from the resolution concrete demands for democratic reforms, the Soviet commentators endorsed the assessment of the Communist Party of India Central Executive Committee that the Bhubaneswar session was "indicative of more intensive activity by the Left forces within the Congress."

From the above discussion it is evident that an under-current of anxiety characterised the Soviet perceptions of the realignment of forces within the Indian National Congress. The prevailing Soviet view was that the right-wing forces had gained an upper hand in the Indian National Congress following the India-China border conflict. Moscow's persistence in renewing its economic and defence commitments to India inspite of an adverse ideological perception of the Indian National Congress can be explained largely by the growing Sino-Soviet schism. The Indo-Soviet relations continued to develop on a pragmatic basis of mutual national self-interest. Convergence in
the field of foreign policy rather than positive perceptions of the programme and class character of the ruling Congress Party buttressed the continuing friendly relations between the two countries. Even such an ardent fan of Nehru and one of the most favourably inclined Soviet Party intellectual as R. Ulyanovsky had to say the following in his obituary on Nehru's death: "Socialism can not be built ... through a 'socialist pattern society' as an 'intelligent combination' of socialism and capitalism, as an embodiment of 'cordial relations' between capital and labour in the interest of national progress. Ulyanovsky further observed, "The methods Nehru and the National Congress had chosen in an attempt to abolish inequality without revolution, that is, without a fundamental change in the system of ownership and in relations of production, and eliminate the contradictions between labour and capital were bound to fail." 67 While noting some positive features of Nehru's domestic policy and political outlook like opposition to the big Indian monopolies and criticism of all the negative aspects of capitalism, etc., Ulyanovsky mainly highlighted Nehru's memory as "a noble and courageous fighter against imperialism, colonialism and war, as the architect of new India."

Almost all Soviet works on the Indian National Congress express in unison the bourgeois class character of the

Indian National Congress. It is agreed by all Soviet scholars that the Congress Party represented the interests of the national bourgeoisie as a whole, of all its strata. They also recognise that among the national bourgeoisie, its more developed monopolist groups succeeded in exploiting in their interest the results of the national reconstruction effected under the rule of the Indian National Congress to considerably strengthen their influence in the economy and politics of the country which led to an aggravation of the crisis during the sixties and the first half of the seventies when the struggle of the popular masses demanding improvement in their conditions of life and redistribution of the major gains of independence was intensified.\(^6\)

Yet in their treatment and approach the two major works by Soviet scholars on the Indian National Congress widely differ. Their differences are particularly noticeable if one were to compare their analysis and appraisal of the period following the passage of the Avadi resolution on the socialistic pattern of society upto the Bhubaneswar session of the Indian National Congress in January 1964. These differences may also be noticed in their respective assessment of Nehru's concept of socialism. According to T.F. Deviatkina the Indian National

Congress underwent serious changes in the different periods of its nearly hundred years old existence. Different social forces advancing different political tasks came to the fore during various periods. The broad strip of revolutionary democratisation which began in the period of ascent of the liberation struggle during the 1918-22 period was replaced by moderate liberalism of the 1923-27 period. From the end of the twenties and early thirties under conditions of a new ascent of the national liberation movement the democratisation of the Congress was strengthened and developed with new traits until the mid-fifties when there appeared on the one hand a trend, in the beginning latent but becoming more and more obvious with time, towards the narrowing down of the social base of the Indian National Congress, in the direction of its transformation into a parliamentary type bourgeois party on the one hand, and on the other towards preservation and expansion of the democratic basis in the development of the party.69

The development of Nehru's concept of socialism was subjected to a detailed analysis by Soviet scholar Deviatkina. According to her Nehru's concept of socialism was formed during the course of several decades, acquiring new traits under new conditions.70 She noted that in 1936 in his speech at the Lucknow session of the Indian National


Congress Nehru had stated that he did not see any other way for mass upliftment, for liquidating the poverty, degradation of the Indian people except through socialism, and that he had also said that socialism signified liquidation of private property and substitution of the existing system of domination of profit by the higher ideals of a cooperative society. Nehru believed that the capitalist system was founded on the basis of acquisitiveness which has to some extent become an important trait of the people. He pleaded for freeing the people from this tendency by changing it with cooperation under the socialist society. But not finding concrete ways to change it, Soviet scholar Deviatkina observed, Nehru on several occasions declared that continuation of means of production in private hands makes the task of socialist transformation difficult. Deviatkina referred to Nehru's hesitation in resorting to nationalisation and mentioned the position he took in 1956 at the National Council of Development where he stated that at the given moment he did not see the need for squandering the national resources to pay compensation for nationalisation unless it was an hinderance in our way. Nehru, according to her, believed in the possibilities of transformation of society through democratic means though even in this respect, she noted, his position was far from consistent for he also took the stand that political democracy was only a means to an end and not an end in itself,
the real goal being the objective economic transformation failing which the political structure would not be strong.\textsuperscript{71}

Deviatkina highlighted the change which occurred in Nehru's ideas about socialism in the post-independence period. One does not find subsequent Soviet works dwelling upon this change. This change was attributed by her to the conflict which arose after the achievement of independence between the desire of the young bourgeoisie which had felt squeezed in the colonial period to make the maximum use of the new possibilities opened up by the country's independence and the efforts of the ruling party in pursuit of its ideals to somewhat curb the spontaneity of private enterprise in the interest of independent development. These efforts to curb the growth of big capital and support the small entrepreneurs did not, in the opinion of the Soviet scholar, lead to establishment of a society radically different from the existing capitalist mode of production. The more powerful section of national bourgeoisie in whose hands the key positions in the economy of the country were concentrated influenced the government policy and the ideology of prominent leaders among whom a struggle was going on between those who favoured throwing out of the elements of socialistic essence from the slogans of the Congress and those defending and somewhat modifying them.\textsuperscript{72}

\textsuperscript{71} Ibid., p.116.

\textsuperscript{72} Ibid.
According to Deviatkina this approach opposing capitalism with socialism became gradually softened with the founding of the concept of a third path of development. Examining the question of freedom of private enterprise and state control over the development of industry, Nehru in 1950 declared that in its pure form private enterprise did not exist anywhere, not even in a country like the U.S.A. and that "the current international situation creates forces which compel the country whether it likes it or not to take progressive steps in some directions." At the same time, Nehru, according to the Soviet scholar under reference, also observed that the specific character of India prevented it from taking either the path followed by the United States or by the Soviet Union where they had established a state exercising full control over industries. Thus Nehru favoured the middle path for countries which wanted to avoid both the extremes. The so-called mixed economy formed the basis of this path. According to Nehru, there were many extraordinary difficulties in India where the private sector did not possess large enough resources to cope with the problems of economic development and hence the state sector must play a big role. Favouring mutual interaction between the public and private sector, Nehru, Deviatkina noted, stressed that the private sector was not less important.

73. Ibid., pp.117-18.
In contrast with the later works (which shall be discussed below), Deviatkina underscored the difference in Nehru's approach in the thirties to the construction of socialist society and his approach to this question in the fifties, noting that if in the thirties he had stressed abolition of private property, he now emphasised the idea of effectiveness of private enterprise and put forth the view that the state sector could not develop sufficiently quickly without competition from the side of the private sector. She quoted Nehru as saying in 1963 that there were many roads to socialism and not just a single and permanent one. Referring to the words of Lenin that "good intentions to be socialist do not exclude bourgeois democratic essence", Deviatkina observed that on account of their prolonged struggle against capitalism in the form of British colonialism the nationalist leaders of the Indian National Congress were subjectively oriented towards the creation of a society other than capitalist, but the objective measures envisaged by them cleared the way for the development of a capitalist system and had a bourgeois-democratic character.

Another notable feature of Deviatkina's work on Indian National Congress was its projection of the formulation of the concept of democratic socialism by the Congress leadership between 1962 and 1964 as an attempt to highlight the

74. Ibid., pp.118-19.
75. Ibid., p.119.
difference between Indian socialism and the socialism practised in countries of the socialist bloc in the wake of emergence of strong reactionary forces in the country following the border conflict with China. The Bhubaneswar session which adopted the resolution on democracy and socialism laying equal stress on both was described by the Soviet scholar as the culmination point in the development of the concept of a special form of Indian socialism. She called the Bhubaneswar session as a peculiar kind of movement of legs while standing at the same place (toptanie na meste) after which began a visible and open retreat from the earlier positions.  

A subsequent Soviet work on the Indian National Congress by A.I. Reginin* to which a short reference has already been made above, makes an altogether different assessment of Nehru's concept of socialism and developments inside the Congress Party during the 1957-64 period. This later study draws heavily on the works of Soviet scholar E.N. Komarov whose evaluation of Nehru is highly positive. In Komarov's view the correlation of socio-political forces in the national liberation movement particularly inside the Indian National Congress placed a "limit on the progressive activities of Nehru and determined his politico-ideological

76. Ibid., p.125.

* It is actually the D.Sc. thesis of A.I. Chicherov of the Institute of Oriental Studies, Moscow, published under the pseudonym of A.I. Reginin.
positions." Unlike Deviatkina, Reginin does not distinguish between the pre-independence and post-independence ideas and policies of Nehru. Nor does he view the Bhubaneswar session as the beginning of retreat from socialism. In fact, he treats the resolutions of the Congress sessions at Avadi, Nagpur and Bhubaneswar as reflecting the basic stand of Nehru, though he feels that these documents did not adequately express the position of the Prime Minister which was opposed by rightist forces both inside and outside the Congress. 77 According to Reginin in Nehru's strategy of industrial development of independent India an important place belonged to the state sector which Nehru wanted to dominate in the key branches of the national economy. While conceding that Nehru was opposed to immediate general nationalisation, he hastens to add that Nehru also believed that with the passage of time the government would be compelled to nationalise "the banks, insurance companies and mines". 78 In the opinion of the Soviet scholar, Nehru's strategy also gave due attention to the problems of utilising foreign capital under state control and protecting through state measures small production and agricultural handicrafts from competition by big capital and that during the latter half of the fifties and early sixties a "democratic interpretation" of these

77. op.cit., p.48.
78. Ibid., p.54.
problems found its expression in the second and third five year plans and the decisions of the Congress at its Jaipur and Bhubaneswar sessions.

Thus Reginin describes socio-economic and political outlook of Nehru as having a "progressive democratic character". To him Nehru was convinced of the superiority of the socialist system and saw India's future in it, though his understanding of socialism differed from the Marxist-Leninist approach to it. He subscribes to Komarov's appraisal of Nehru and concludes by quoting from Komarov who goes even beyond Lenin's characterisation of Sun-Yat Sen as "subjectively socialist" in evaluating Nehru's programme which in his (Komarov's) view included a substantial element of a realistic approach based on recognition of law-governed historical character of socialist transformation of society and creation of direct material pre-requisites for it. 30 Notwithstanding all his above-noted positive appraisal of Nehru's concept of socialism, Reginin had to acknowledge that the "deep socio-economic contradictions of bourgeois development in the multi-structural society of India found their reflection in the content of Nehru's policy and in the practical results of its implementation by the ruling party" 31