Chapter I

Theory and Practice of Intervention
THOERY AND PRACTICE OF INTERVENTION

In the realm of international relations, intervention has been one of the most controversial forms of state behaviour and has in recent times become a serious issue to contend with. In a world of sovereign states whose relationship is governed mostly by power, sometimes by international law, morality or lack of it, and always by self interest, there is a twilight zone where the four meet. It is the area where actions by a government or an international organization assume the specific trait which places them in the wide category of intervention. The problem of intervention is one aspect of the political effects of military measures or of the possession of superior military or economic strength on the nations of the world.

The act of intervention in international relations occurs, when a state interferes in the relations of another state, without the latter's consent. It also takes place when a state interferes in the domestic affairs of another state, in utter disregard to its sovereign character, with the intention of either maintaining or altering the actual condition of things within it.

An act of intervention implies the violation of sovereign rights.¹ "It is the attempt of one or more states, even

by the use of force to coerce another state, in its domestic and external action. Thus when a state directly interferes with the exercise of the lawful state authority in another state, it constitutes intervention."  

Intervention results from a convergence of factors, some of which are located in the intervening and others in the intervened nation. It is an action of a single country, but it stems from a multiplicity of sources not necessarily all of which are attributes, aspiration or needs of the country that undertakes the action. The historic patterns and current tendencies of the target state can be as relevant if not more to whether or not a decision to intervene in its affairs is made. In other words, although interventions are actions undertaken by a single actor they occur in an interaction context and can be fully comprehended only in regard to its context. The internal and external factors from which it springs will also combine in different ways under varying circumstances and for different types of nations. Domestic considerations may be highly relevant in one situation and minimal in another and the systemic nature of these variations will vary in the context of open and developed societies from those of the closed and underdeveloped ones.


Thus while intervention can be constrained or fostered by domestic factors, it is largely based on both the operative internal and external variables, with sometimes the former being more potent and sometimes the latter. The problem is not that of determining whether one or the other is the prime source of interventionary behaviour but one of developing criteria for anticipating when external and systemic variables will be more potent and when governmental and societal variables are likely to be. Most analysts argue that interventions are the result of an interaction between circumstances at home and abroad. They concede that the potencies of internal and external variables fluctuate, giving rise to apparent contradictions. Few tend to resolve the contradictions through a general model that encompasses the fluctuations. Rather, they suggest that these fluctuations stem from unique historical circumstances and thus one can do little more than enumerate both internal and external factors and concede that both interact differently at different moments in time to produce different interventionary decisions.

The concept of intervention has also been sometimes used synonymously with interference. "Not mere interference but dictatorial interference sets intervention apart from other sorts of activity". 4 Interference might be defined as

action taken to affect the actions of others. Interference, then might identify intervention by its use or threat of force. Intervention is therefore synonymous with coercive interference, and the use or threat of force will be taken as a guide to the incidence of intervention. The idea of something imported stepping into an internal situation, will link or use the threat of force to its destination - in the authority structure of the intervened. Further if stepping in is a distinguishing feature of intervention, so also is stepping out after the attainment/failure of the objective.\(^5\)

The evolution of the international system, has transformed intervention from an incident, to a structural aspect of international relations. The traditional inter-state pattern of relations has today been transformed into a global conception. "The conceptional universe of the early nation state system has become too narrow to encompass the phenomena of interference which are a structural characteristic of contemporary international system".\(^6\) In its broadest sense therefore, the concept of intervention refers to any act that invades the theoretical sphere of action of states which in so far as a spatial conception of things can have any relevance in this


context, is confined to relations between states and in no way affects the intra-state territory of other states. It means that externally initiated acts which imply an infringement of that exclusive competence which a state possesses within its territory, are inadmissible from a normative and legal point of view. Each act of intervention is regarded to be a distinct and discrete action, an intervention made permanent transforms itself to something different. Therefore, "one of the defining characteristics of intervention is its convention breaking phenomena, it breaks an established pattern of conduct in international relations and either terminates in the re-establishment of the pattern, or itself becomes conventional". Interventions have at times resulted in war, though more often they have been carried out by great powers against weaker powers unable to defend themselves. They have assumed varying forms, from the direct use of armed force to diplomatic coercion. They have also been motivated by various forces acting in a world dominated by power politics. Viewed in this light "the essence of intervention is force or its threat, in case the dictates of the intervening power are disregarded...... there can be no intervention without on the

7 Vincent, n.5, p.293.

one hand, the presence of force, naked or veiled, and on the other hand, the absence of consent on the part of the combatants.\(^9\)

Whatever may be the theory, the conception that only force or its threat thereof can constitute intervention, is exceedingly restricted in international relations. At the same time it is dangerous because it overlooks and excuses the several types of interference that often occurred, particularly in modern times. Therefore, the actions taken by one state to impose its will upon another—against the latter's wishes with respect to the latter's right to organize its government as it sees fit, to regulate the rights and duties of its population, and to provide for the needs of its people, can be intervention, whether backed by force or a mere threat of it. Thus the concept of intervention covers a whole range of activities which form a substantial part of the day to day practice of international relations. Economic pressures on other states, political threats to force a state to curb freedom of speech, press and radio, fifth column activities, the inciting of another states people to rise against its government and a host of other refined techniques of interference must in several instances come under intervention. Recognizing this particular aspect, the eminent jurist J. Calvo stated:

Certain publicists give the name intervention only to armed intervention, objecting that if

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the interposition on the part of one state in the affairs of another is not violent but peaceful, limited purely to advice, it resolves itself to an amicable interposition, or good offices, or even in mediation which is not intervention. This is according to my view, to take the result for the act itself. The form under which intervention takes place does not alter its character. intervention, which is produced by the employment of diplomatic process is no less intervention, it is more or less direct, more or less dissimulated, which is very often the prelude to armed intervention.(10)

Thus the type of compulsion or constraint used by the interfering state is of little importance. The fact to be probed is as to whether constraint or threat thereof was used, whether by armed force or diplomacy, open or concealed and whether direct or indirect. Reasoning from principles and sources of the law governing international relations, and evaluating acts and declarations of states, it can be contended that an intervention occurs when a state or a group of states interfere, in the internal and external affairs of another sovereign and independent state with the intent of imposing its will upon it, for the purpose of maintaining or altering the condition of things. In other words, the clearest example of intervention consists of an act of interference which is meant or intended to compel certain action or inaction by which

the intervening state imposes or seeks to impose its will on
the intervened state. It is then the constraining nature of
the act of interference which constitutes intervention, whether
the act is one involving the use of force or one involving
another type of compulsion either political or economic.\textsuperscript{11}

Intervention in itself is not an end either good or bad.
A double standard prevails. Most interventions may be undesirable for a variety of reasons but some are eminently desirable for equally compelling reasons. Most interventions probably
invade the privacy of people and undermine the stability of the
international system, but some uphold human rights and preserve international order. It is in other words normally an instrument of action, a means and not an end, and the morality and
immorality of the interventionary behaviour depends upon the
end to which it is directed.\textsuperscript{12} Often however, it is defined
in such a general manner that it appears to be synonymous with
imperialism, aggression, colonialism, neo-colonialism, war and
other such gross terms that are used to designate the non-
cooperative interactions of nations. Imperialism has also
been referred to as action.... that.... are intrusions into

\textsuperscript{11} Ellery C. Stowell, \textit{Intervention in International Law}

\textsuperscript{12} Rosenau, n.8, p.151.
the affairs of another people, a definition similar to the view that intervention refers to conduct with an external animus that intends to achieve a fundamental alteration of the state of affairs in a target nation.

Having defined intervention as the impact that one state has on the affairs of another, logic leads observers to classify inaction as intervention, whenever consequences follow within a state from the failure of another to intrude upon its affairs. Intervention like surgery is not an evil in itself, it must be applied sparingly and with consummate skill. Just as the concept intervention cannot be a guiding principle of diplomacy, similarly non-intervention cannot be observed irrespective of time and place. All situations are not equally important.

Interventions have an empirical existence as well as an evaluational one. They embrace moral questions and legal standards, they also find expression in the activities of identifiable human beings; policy makers plan them, nations sustain them, citizens ponder over them. The Soviets have a doctrine of intervention, so do the Chinese and the Cubans.

The three argue vigorously over the behaviour through which the doctrines could be implemented.\(^{16}\) Even the Americans have similar wranglings over interventionary doctrines which govern their behaviour. Although intervention may be conceptualized differently, it does refer to empirical phenomena, and these do constitute a central problem of international relations today. Indeed as technology develops and makes the nations even more dependent, interventionary phenomena will become increasingly important both behaviourally and morally. Two distinguishing characteristics are usually associated with behaviour classified as interventionary. One is what might be termed as the convention breaking character and the other is the authority oriented nature. Stated in brief, the behaviour of one international actor toward another is regarded as interventionary, whenever the form of the behaviour constitutes a sharp break with the then existing forms and whenever it is directed at changing or preserving the structure of political authority in the target state.

The first of these characteristics highlights widespread agreement on the finite and transitory nature of interventions. Virtually all interventions in the history of international relations are concerned to have a beginning.

when conventional modes of conduct are abandoned - and an end when the conventional modes are restored, or the convention breaking mode becomes conventional through persistent use. The consequence of such actions for the target state may be profound and enduring, but once the consequences become accepted and established, the behaviour is no longer regarded as interventionary, even if the presence of the intervening actor in the target state remains undiminished.

In short, the study of intervention is the study of the unconventional in international relations. Since unconventionality becomes conventional and if it persists longer, it is also the study of the finite and the temporary phenomena. For this reason, interventions may be more easily operationalized and measured than is the case with other types of influences. However, it is not always clear as to when the conventional mode of behaviour has been broken, or when the unconventional behaviour has persisted long enough to have established a new convention. Nor is it always clear, as to whether authority structures are the target of unconventional behaviour. Difficulties are bound to arise when an analyst turns to specifying the operations that will be performed to differentiate between conventional and unconventional behaviour on the part of the intervening state and between the authority structure and other aspects of the target state.

In general, interventions are very much the product of the perceptions, calculations and decisions that occur
within the decision making organizations and their leaderships. Since conventions in international relations are not easily broken and if support for such behaviour is sought from other governments, prior to its initiation, the planning of interventions also tends to be cut off from the international system. Therefore it could be contended that interventions are more exclusively a consequence of decision making activity than any other type of foreign policy action. Further, the assessment of the need for, and probable outcome of interventionary behaviour are more subject to the whims of individual leaders and the dynamics of domestic bureaucratic structures than the diplomatic, economic, military and political policies through which nations conventionally relate themselves, to the international system.

Prerequisites of Intervention

Every act of intervention presupposes the identification of the target. The description of the target "the thing which is having something done to it by an outside actor", identifies the target not merely as a sovereign state, but

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17 The target of intervention is also an actor in international relations, albeit one playing a diminished role because of outside interference it is suffering. The choice of term actors for those who undertake interventions should not be taken to mean that the targets are not also actors in some sense.
traditionally seeks to indicate that part of the target at which the intervention is aimed. Thus customary definitions distinguish two broad destinations for the activity termed intervention, the domestic affairs of a state and its external affairs. This distinction is sensitive to divergence between external acts which addresses itself to a state's foreign relations and an internal act which attempts to penetrate and meddle in the domestic arrangements of a state.

The distinction between domestic and international interventions is not always clear. Moreover, since external affairs are the basis upon which international relations are carried on, to identify it as a target of intervention is to deny it, its peculiar characteristic. It is perhaps better to view the target of intervention with reference to the concept favoured by the framers of the United Nations (UN) Charter - Domestic Jurisdiction - if these are matters of a purely domestic concern. Geographically as matters taking place within the territory of a state, personally as matters concerning individuals within the jurisdiction of a state, functionally as matters which could be dealt with conveniently and efficiently by states individually, or politically as matters which could be dealt with by the states individually.

without affecting the interests of others. Given these conditions it might be stated that intervention occurs whenever there is a violation of this principle by a foreign state. But this concept is not totally helpful, for the boundaries of a state's domestic jurisdiction are blurred and the assertion with confidence that any matter is a domestic question, might be confounded in time by international practice.

Thus, the broad notion of domestic affairs will be relied upon to identify the target of intervention, and it will exclude from its purview the entry of a state into a war between other states, and to include as intervention, the participation of a state in a conflict taking place within another state. To further sharpen the perception of the target, it may be added that it is the authority structure of the state suffering intervention and is especially directed at the "identity of those who make the decisions that are binding for the entire society and to the processes through which such decisions are made".

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20 The question whether a certain matter is or is not solely within the jurisdiction of a state is essentially a relative question, it depends on the development of international relations. See H.S. Rajan, *Domestic Jurisdiction* (Calcutta, 1958), p.37.

21 Rosenau, n.9, p.163.
The Purpose of Intervention

Every act of intervention in international relations has a particular purpose inherent in it. The purpose of intervention is the end toward which it is directed, the objective which it is designed to achieve. The balance of power, the interests of humanity, and the maintenance of ideological solidarity are three of the major ends which states have pursued. To several international legal experts, the purpose served by any intervention has been the criterion for assessing its legality. Thus, "if intervention takes place for the purpose of forcing a delinquent state to submit to recognized rules governing international relations, or to punish a breach of the law, or to neutralize the illegal intervention of another, then it is argued that it is lawful".\(^22\) To regard every lawful act of intervention since it never constitutes a violation of external independence or territorial supremacy as a legitimate right is to an extent tenable. However, if any act of intervention whether legal or otherwise tends to be dictatorial then it is illegal, since such an act implies a clear violation of external independence or territorial supremacy of a state. It is necessary to distinguish lawful intervention from the unlawful ones, but the attempt is not advanced by merely excluding 'lawful intervention' from the class of events termed so. Distinguishing interventions according to their purpose is important since the real motive

\(^{22}\) Wilson, n.2, p.119.
of the intervening state might differ from the purpose proclaimed in the official justification, and from the leisured assessment of the scholar after the occurrence of the event. Thus "classification of intervention is as difficult as defining it".\textsuperscript{23}

One of the common purposes of intervention in international relations is stated to be self preservation. As the right of existence is inherent in the state, one of the major purposes of intervention is to uphold this right. It is clearly a matter of policy, as to the means which a state shall utilise for its attainment and if it resorts to intervention rather than other means, it must have sufficient grounds to justify such an act. Intervention cannot be justified by an appeal to general principles which inhere in the act itself. It is justifiable, only in rare cases and less justifiable as the growing dependence of states makes possible the use of less objectionable methods. "Contemporary international law permits intervention to preserve a state's existence, even though such an act contravenes the right of independence of another state".\textsuperscript{24} Intervention for the sake of preserving the existence of a state which is observing its international obligations as a member of the family of nations is a justifiable

\textsuperscript{23} Vincent, n.s, p.12.
\textsuperscript{24} Rosenau, n.1, p.89.
measure. It is not a right but merely a means sometimes justifiable to preserve a right - the right of a state to exist - which alone supersedes the obligations of non-intervention.25

In general, interventions governed by treaty stipulations - even when the state subject to intervention is party to the treaty - is a violation of independence, unless the treaty provides for such measures, in which case the state becomes a protected entity with its powers curtailed. However, as a scholar has pointed out, "it is important that such treaties must be clearly state acts and not the act of individuals; who by virtue of their official status have the opportunity of giving to their personal agreements, the form of a state act".26 Thus while difference of opinion persists as regards the question of intervention under treaty stipulation, the general opinion tends to be that it has no valid justification under the norms governing international relations.

Mediation in a Civil War

The outbreak of a civil war has always been one of the major causes of intervention. Most of the interventions by third states in a civil war are claimed to be by invitation

25 Ibid., p.94.
26 Hall, n.18, p.297.
of the parties involved in the conflict within the state. The fact that it has been necessary to call for an outside help is sufficient proof that the issue of the conflict would without it be uncertain, and consequently the vestige of defacto power within the state would be in a flux. It is apparently clear that an intervention on behalf of the faction within a country is a violation of the independence of the existing power. It is at the same time very clear that the law governing international relations does not give a foreign state the right to judge upon the justice or merits of purely domestic affairs of another state.

Thus the principle may now be regarded as established by theory and practice that the invitation of neither party to a domestic strife gives a right to a foreign state to intervene and also that no state has the right to judge the merits of the contest and to interfere on behalf of the party it thinks in the right. Indeed intervention because of civil war is in no case justifiable, though the consequences of such disturbance may warrant intervention on other grounds. These grounds are in a way specific rules which state that:

(a) Assistance to a widely recognized government is permissible prior to an insurgency. After a conflict becomes an insurgency it is impermissible to increase,

27 Ibid., p. 302.
28 Wilson, n. 2, p. 94.
but permissible to continue pre-insurgency level of assistance.

(b) Assistance to a widely recognized government is permissible to offset impermissible assistance to insurgents if assistance to insurgents or the use of military instrument against another state constitutes an armed attack within the meaning of Article 51 of the UN Charter. It is permissible to respond proportionately against the territory of the attacking state.

(c) The use of the military instrument in the territory of another state, for the purpose of restoring orderly processes of self-determination in an authority oriented conflict involving a sudden breakdown of order is permissible, if it meets the following conditions:

(i) A genuine invitation by the widely recognized government or, if there is none, by a major faction.

(ii) Relative neutrality among factions, with particular attention to neutrality in military operations.

(iii) Immediate initiation of and compliance with the decision making machinery of appropriate regional organizations.

(iv) Immediate full reporting to the Security Council of the UN and compliance with its determinations.

(v) A prompt disengagement consistent with the purpose of the action.

(vi) An outcome consistent with self-determination. Such an outcome should be one, based on internationally observed elections in which all factions are allowed freely to participate on an equal basis, and which is freely accepted by all major competing factions or which is endorsed by the UN.  

The doctrine of intervention by invitation is extremely dangerous. William E. Hall as far back as in 1924 gave the

reasons for rejecting this doctrine, he stated "if intervention is directed against rebels, the fact that it has been necessary to call in foreign help is enough to show that the issue of the conflict would ultimately establish itself as the legal representative of the state. Again, if intervention is based upon an opinion as to the merits of the question at issue, the intervening state takes upon itself to pass judgement on a matter which having nothing to do with the relations of states, must be regarded as being for legal purposes beyond the range of its vision". 30

Apart from the specific purposes outlined above, interventions generally are designed, at least in the eyes of the intervening power, to uphold some established rule of politics, morality or law. The act is addressed to the political structure of the nation or society intervened, and it is not relevant whether it is by invitation or a pre-meditated voluntary act. Here we are dealing with situations or actions in which, one superior nation or an international organization or a multinational combination of states transcends the framework of the existing relations and attempts to impose its will on a weaker state nation in defence of some concept of a

political moral or legal order and with a limited duration in mind. 31

Interventions today are based on two distinct patterns and represent two different political systems. The only common feature of both the systems is that both profess to seek lofty goals and lay their claim to universal validity. While the United States of America (US) and to a lesser degree France and Great Britain claim to carry the old banner of law and order in international relations - mostly through the aegis of the UN - and generally aimed at supporting or establishing governments which would subscribe and adhere to the ideals of democracy, natural independence and free enterprise; the Soviet Union which emerged as a great power with increased politico-military strength and with considerably increased appeal for its ideology brought to the fore a very different conception of intervention. The banner under which the Soviet Union was to intervene in foreign countries and to participate in the contest for international influence was that of Scientific Marxism/Leninism, promising a better world under the dictatorship of the proletariat. This lofty goal was to sustain the struggle between the two opposing social systems. Capitalism and Socialism. This has been further reinforced

by the enunciation of the Brezhnev Doctrine.\textsuperscript{32}

Most interventions aim at modifying the political structure, by changing the ruling power in the target state. These operations are readily recognizable as such, when they use the instrument of military threat of force or apply diplomatic, political or economic pressure. But they may be much more difficult to discover, when they are disguised. One of the most frequently observed methods of disguise is the argument that the intervention has been made on request. The argument that an intervention has been requested or invited and therefore is no intervention at all will always prove irrelevant and can be ignored. Unless a permanent relationship of cooperation exists between the parties concerned, which eliminates the element of opposing sovereignties and the clash of will, and therefore, excludes the concept of intervention, the argument of invitation has to be rejected. In practice, it will never be ascertained whether the request or the invitation was actually issued, and if it was whether or

\textsuperscript{32} Kevalyov Sergei, "Sovereignty and International Duties", \textit{Survival} (London), vol.10, No.11, November 1968, p.375. The Brezhnev Doctrine states "the sovereignty of each socialist country cannot be opposed to the interests of the socialist world and the world revolutionary movement. Socialist countries owe their national independence to the might of the socialist community and, above all to the Soviet Union as its central force, including its armed forces. Therefore the Soviet Union would fail to discharge its obligation towards the working classes and the socialist community if it did not intervene, whenever counter revolution seemed to threaten the achievement of the revolution. Schwarz, n.31, p.92.
not it came from a competent authority. An act can be termed as interventionary, if it is aimed openly or in the disguise at the authority structures of the target state. Actions whereby a government attempts to shape matters across an international border is not an intervention. To favour investment in order to gain control of the economy or parts of the economy of another country, even if operated by government authority, is certainly not interventionary in the correct sense of the term. The deployment of propaganda means in order to win the favour of the public opinion, or to encourage development of certain elements of the infrastructure which may be highly favourable to the foreign governments is not intervention, e.g. building railway lines in foreign countries. On the other hand we speak of intervention, when the operation is being conducted through the government of the target state, and when this government has been changed in its composition, or influenced in its decision, in order to attain the final aim.

It is typical of intervention that its scope is limited. The payment of a debt, the security of a minority, the punishment of a wrong doer, liberation of a prisoner, overthrow of a government or the defeat of a revolutionary movement, all of these are limited objects or purposes of intervention. When an operation goes beyond such limited well defined objects it will not be intervention but rather aggression, war or conquest.
The Feasibility of Intervention

The structural and contextual characteristics of the present international system determine to a great extent the capacity of the states to intervene in each others internal affairs. In other words, the characteristics of the international system place significant limitations on the range of choices with regard to acts of intervention, confronting states, at any given moment in time.

According to some scholars, a 'No Intervention System' exists in an international system wherein the following characteristics are present. 33

(a) The states in the system are territorially based and are homogeneous with respect to basic types; there are no overlapping jurisdictions and no state can claim authority over any other.

(b) Boundaries of states are well defined and clearly specified. Ambiguities regarding the crossing of recognized boundaries do not exist.

(c) States are more or less at par with each other in regard to population, territory, resources, etc. In other words, there is an essential symmetry among them.

(d) The system is bereft of alignments and coalitions.

(e) In matters of armed strength, defense tends to predominate offense.

(f) Internal political viability is a significant feature of each state. No state is subject to civil war or revolution.

(g) The states being relatively independent and self sufficient are not susceptible to being manipulated or punished by each other.

33 For instance see Oran R. Young, "Systemic Bases of Intervention", in Moore, n.29, pp.112-13.
An international system displaying the above characteristics can generally be described as a 'No Intervention System'. Thus regardless of the desires or incentives of the states, intervention in such a system is difficult. This is mainly due to the fact that by conditions (a) and (b), there is a clear differentiation and homogeneity among the states, specially with reference to basic type, and they are clearly identified with specific territorial bases. The system is one of perfect horizontal and non-overlapping authority patterns. Broadly, there cannot be any intervention as a result of the hierarchical authority relations among the states and also because of the ambiguity of their boundaries, and the authority structures of the individual states. By condition (c) and (d) and (e), states being equal in power, will lack the capacity to gang up against each other. The substantial disparities in the power of individual states, to an extent guarantees the adherence to the concept of 'Non-intervention by atleast a few states. Condition (d) goes a step ahead and eliminates the emergence of major disparities in power by discouraging alliances and coalitions. Condition (e) by giving predominance to defense, gives a state resisting intervention an asymmetrical advantage over the intervenor. The absence or reversal of this particular condition, will enable states of equal power to intervene successfully in each others internal affairs because of the differences between offensive activities associated with intervention and defensive
required to resist them. In the absence of a revolutionary and civil war situation.... as per condition (f), the potential base of intervention is almost eliminated. The absence of internal political viability not only reduces the capacity of a state to resist intervention, but it also creates an opportunity for intervention by an outside actor. Lastly, condition (g) eliminates the opportunity of intervention by states in each others internal affairs by making them relatively self sufficient and independent. The relaxation of any one of these conditions determining the 'No Intervention System' are bound to open some scope in contrast to incentives for intervention.

An examination of the contemporary international system suggests that it does not have the conditions of the non-intervention model. Although the system is oriented generally toward horizontal authority relationships, non-territorial actors are becoming a central problem rather than a manageable by-product of the traditional states system, and ill defined boundaries are a major feature of relations among territorial states... let alone interactions involving both territorial and non territorial actors. 34 Similarly, the contemporary

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34 Oran A. Young, "Actors in World Politics" in V. Davis Rosenau and M. East, ed., The Analysis of International Politics: Essays in Honour of Harold and Margaret Sprout, in Moore, n.29, p.115.
system exhibits qualitative differences among its actors with respect to population, territory, resources, etc. Alliances and coalitions are common and influential, even though they may be largely losing their efficacy as defensive arrangements in the nuclear arena.\textsuperscript{35} As regards military activity, offense is evidently superior to defense in the contemporary world. Beyond this, a lack of internal viability is highly prevalent among the actors in the international system; this is a common phenomena both among the less developed countries and the advanced ones. Finally the level of interdependence among the state actors in the system is high. And while the attractiveness of intervention associated with this condition may be mitigated to an extent by the importance of symmetrical patterns of dependence which give the target of any interventionary effort, some ability to fight back through actual or threatened retaliation, the scope for intervention arising from high levels of interdependence can hardly be doubted.\textsuperscript{36}

Thus the scope for intervention in contemporary international system is great, and the various conditions that make it feasible can be expected to interact in a way to produce

\textsuperscript{35} For a discussion of this question, see Klaus Knorr, \textit{On the Uses of Military Power in Nuclear Age} (Princeton, 1966), pp.152, 163.

a wide range of potential channels for intervention. This however does not guarantee that intervention will be widespread in the contemporary international system, this is because each intervening action is dependent upon its utility vis-a-vis the actor who takes the step and resorts to an act of intervention in another state.

The Utility of Intervention

The existence of some scope for intervention is necessary but not sufficient condition for the occurrence of intervention. When an actor finds intervention in the internal affairs of another feasible, the effective decision makers of the actor may decide that intervention is not worthwhile. Thus whenever intervention is feasible, actors in the system through their effective decision makers weigh expected costs against benefits of intervention and opt for intervention when the benefits outweigh expected costs.

The benefits of any given intervention will ordinarily stem from several distinct sources. First, some of the benefits and costs will be determined by the structural and contextual

37 For convenience, intervention is conceptualized here as either or choice. In real world situations, states will often be able to choose among a variety of types or level of intervention.

38 This formulation ignores the problem of opportunity costs. In applying this perspective to actual choices involving intervention, however, it could not be difficult to introduce the influence of opportunity costs.
characteristics of the prevailing international system. Second, some of the benefits and costs associated with any given intervention will generally be a function of the internal political processes of the intervenor, e.g., intervention in the internal affairs of another state may cause severe upheavals in the domestic politics of the intervenor and the use of scarce resources on intervention may impose significant opportunity costs on the intervenor. Third, the internal political processes of the target state also operate in most situations to affect the costs and benefits of intervention for the intervenor. "Intervention in the affairs of a united target state mobilized to resist intervention, will be more costly than intervention in the affairs of a target state experiencing civil strife, in which one of the factions actively seeks the participation of the intervenor". 39

Any formal analysis of the expected utility of intervention for an actor contemplating intervention in a specific situation, would have to take account of the costs and benefits of intervention arising from each of these sources and aggregate them in some explicit fashion.

39 This argument implies a ceteris paribus assumption. Thus it may sometimes be the case that the probability of competitive intervention is greater with respect to any state experiencing civil strife, than with respect to a state that is not characterized by internal upheavals.
The prospect of being confronted by a competitor in a state's interventionary behavior will often be a major determinant of the advantage of intervention. The probability of competitive intervention is, in turn, a function of political interactions between initial intervenor or prospective intervenor and all other states in the system.

The precise impact of this factor varies from case to case. In a competitive interventionary situation, the prospective intervenor must weigh potential benefits of intervening unilaterally against potential costs arising from the fact that intervention on its part may stimulate counter-intervention by one or more in the affairs of the target state. Similar problems arise for a state contemplating counter-intervention in the affairs of a state already affected by outside intervention. "In such cases, the potential intervenor must expect to face competitive intervention, as well as from the possibility that competitive intervention will lead to escalating commitments on the part of several intervenors". But these costs may be outweighed, for the prospective intervenor by

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40 The danger of escalating commitments arising from competitive intervention, undoubtedly accounts for a great deal of scholarly interest in the subject of intervention in recent years.
expected costs of allowing political authority structures of the target to be influenced or even changed altogether by the activities of the actor already engaging in interventionary activities, with respect to the internal affairs of the target state. Under the circumstances, the degree of competitiveness of an interventionary situation may have major impact on cost benefit calculations of prospective intervenors, but it will often be the case that this impact will affect both the costs and benefits of intervention in complex ways. Competitive intervention introduces two new factors affecting decision making of the intervenor.

(a) The prospect of competition will generally necessitate the use of expected value calculations in evaluating utility of intervention.

(b) Further, the relations between any given intervenor and its competitors will be characterized by strategic inter-action. It means that the outcomes for each of the potential intervenors will be contingent upon the actions or choices of the others.

II. Ideological Dimension

The role of ideology can be defined in terms of the value a state places on making the political authority structures of other states more like its own as an end in itself, or conversely, preventing the political authority
structures of other states from taking on the characteristics of states whose authority structure differ radically from its own". The greater the value a state places on these goals as ends in themselves, the more it will become involved in interventionary activities. "Thus a state placing an absolute value on these goals would devote all available resources to intervention in the affairs of others, until it would either succeed in converting the political regimes of all other states to its own model or collapse from exhaustion". States placing no value on these goals as ends in themselves might still engage in interventionary activities for instrumental reasons.

An international system, in which two or more states place high value on these ideological goals, is apt to be characterized by interventionary activities. This is true, in the first case, because number of cases in which cost benefit calculations of states favouring intervention will be high in such systems. Such conditions increase the incidence of competitive intervention and the likelihood of escalation in

41 The emphasis here is on the idea of making the political authority structures of others like ones own as an end in itself. There may, be of course any number of instrumental reasons why this may be regarded as a desirable goal.

42 In fact, however, states are unlikely to place anything like an absolute value on these goals. Perhaps the Soviet Union in the immediate aftermath of the October Revolution came as close to this position, as any state in modern history. And it is interesting to note how rapidly the Soviet Union retreated from this position when these goals began to conflict with domestic needs.
situations characterized by competitive intervention will be relatively high in systems where two or more states place high values on ideological goals they espouse and champion.

III. Side Effects

Any given state in the international system engages in a wide variety of interactions with other states. Simultaneously in most cases and in situations involving intervention, the various interactions in which a state is involved tend to become linked together and to affect each other. Consequently, a state contemplating intervention in the internal affairs of another must consider not only the costs and benefits of the proposed action in terms of its interaction with the target state, but also the probable effects of its intervention on its simultaneous interactions with other states. These side effects may be either positive or negative e.g., other states may be impressed by an intervenor's actions in such a manner that they are more willing to submit to requests of the intervenor directed toward themselves, or they may sympathize with the target state and take steps to drive up the costs that the intervenor sustains, as a result of intervention. Side effects may produce both costs and benefits that a state must weigh in contemplating the utility of intervention.

IV. Iterative Effects

A state in the international system engages in several interactions simultaneously and also participates in a series
of interactions with others over time. And the individual interactions in these sequences are apt to affect each other so that it is important to give some thought to the future consequences of actions taken in the current time period. 43 Though precise prediction of future consequences is difficult, it is evident that interventionary activities can generate a number of costs and benefits affecting future interactions. Thus, an intervention may contribute to a state's reputation either in such a manner as to allow it to intervene more cheaply in future, or in such a manner as to raise the costs of future interventions. Similarly, an intervention may prove beneficial by generating precedents that the intervenor can make use of in later interactions, but it is also susceptible to the developments of precedents, that other states can utilize to frustrate the interests of the intervenor in the future.

V. Technological Factors

Technological resources constitute a necessary condition for the occurrence of intervention and they raise problems of efficiency rather than feasibility. In this context, there are two distinct issues that are relevant. First, technological advances are generally apt to make any given set of interventionar

43 For examples on iterative links see Thomas Schelling, "The Strategy of Conflict", in Moore, n.29. p.119.
activities relatively cheaper to execute. Second, if the intervenor and the target exhibit different levels of technological development, the edge in terms of efficiency is likely to go to the more advanced state. This does not justify any conclusion to the effect that technologically backward or relatively backward states will avoid interventionary activities. Therefore, technological advancement and superiority can cut down cost of intervention. Other things being equal, technologically advanced and superior states will display greater propensity to intervene in the affairs of others, than states that do not exhibit these characteristics.

VI. System Wide Sanctioning Procedures

In any given international system, the presence of system wide sanctioning procedures may affect the costs and benefits of intervention substantially. It may drive up costs of intervention but may not however prevent individual states from engaging in interventionary activities. In fact the issue is more complex sanctioning procedures may be employed

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44 This is of course a crude generalization. It is possible to imagine interventionary activities based on such things as guerrilla infiltration that would not be affected much one way or the other by technological advances.

45 Cases may occur, e.g., in which relatively backward states place an extraordinary high value on the results that can be achieved through intervention. It is sometimes alleged that this position characterizes at least some effective decision makers in certain countries.
to induce states to intervene rather than dissuading them from such actions. Next, such procedures may be set up in such a manner as to manipulate the incentives associated with intervention to favour intervention in similar types of situations, while making it less attractive in others or channel it through some international institution in contrast to unilateral state action. Sanctioning procedures may involve rewards as well as punishments. It is possible to manipulate the utility of intervention by offering rewards for refraining from intervention or engaging in intervention as well as threatening punishment for acts of intervention or failure to intervene. Finally, sanctioning procedures may vary widely with respect to institutional format. Thus sanctioning procedures relevant to intervention may be governed by a formal and centralized institution such as an effective international organization with a universal scope.46

But they may also operate informally and on a decentralized basis as is presently the case with some parts of the system of international law, and various internalized norms associated with the rules of the game of international politics. Thus as an influence on the utility calculations of actors contemplating interventionary activities, the sanctioning

46 Note, the relevant mechanism may also be legal, political or both.
procedures of prevailing international system are apt to constitute an influential but complex factor.

VII. World Public Opinion

Most states, give due weight to the opinions of attentive public, external to themselves, as regards their interventionary activities. Consequently, they can be expected to take this factor into account in calculating costs and benefits of any contemplated act of intervention. The effective decision makers of different states vary with respect to the value they attach to favourable reactions from world public opinion, e.g., it is argued the US and the Soviet Union are totally different in this regard. It is also held that democratic governments are more sensitive to external public opinion than the authoritarian ones. Further, external public opinion always tends to fluctuate from situation to situation, and it is seldom united on issues. The opinion of some external publics may well favour intervention in a given situation, while the opinion of other external public operate in the opposite direction. Consequently, though it is reasonable to expect states to consider world public opinion in calculating cost and benefits of intervention, the impact of this factor will

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47 Both the US and the Soviet Union have often experienced this phenomena. And in general this type of reaction is likely to vary directly with the level of ideological diversity in the international system.
frequently be divided and often prove difficult to estimate with precision.

To arrive at a general conclusion regarding the utility of intervention, it will be necessary to consider the calculations of all actors in the system with respect to whole range of factors governing the intervention. It is worthwhile to note, that while intervention occurs with considerable frequency in the contemporary system, it does not occur in many situations in which intervention is perfectly feasible. That is, even though it is not uncommon for states to conclude that intervention is profitable as well as feasible, there are several situations in which effective decision makers conclude that the costs of intervention are likely to outweigh the benefits.

Types of Intervention

It is possible to shed light on intervention as a type of activity, by setting it apart from other types of activity. Analysts on the subject have referred to intervention as a type of activity which is to be distinguished from war. They have sought to place it in a spectrum between war or the

48 In fact a little reflection suggests that intervention occurs in only a small proportion of the situations in which it is feasible. This in no way reduces the importance of those cases of intervention which do occur, but it does indicate that the costs of intervention are often both high and appreciated as such by the effective decision makers of the actors in the international system.
aggressive crossing of the international frontiers at the one end and mere diplomatic pressures on the other. Intervention thus is a type of activity with distinct categories.

Military Intervention

Intervention into the affairs of another state by military force is evidently the most drastic as well as the legally most vulnerable form of intervention. It is an act generally prohibited by the Charter of the UN. A military intervention takes place when troops are despatched to maintain order or support a revolution in a foreign state. External military assistance is available to the government of a state, which is internally insecure or is in conflict with a neighbour. It is also available to the opponents of a government within the state. The following acts in support of either a foreign government or an insurgent group would be considered as military intervention.

(a) Arms sale or grants.
(b) Making available military training at home and abroad.
(c) Making available military advisers to troops engaged in military operations.

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51 Louis B. Sohn, "Civil Wars: Guidelines for States and the United Nations", in Moore, n.29, pp.582-3.
(d) Making planes and crew available for air observation.
(e) Providing transportation assistance to troops engaged in military operations.
(f) Limited support of military operations by artillery, air or navy.
(g) Participation in military operations by combat units whether composed of volunteers or regular personnel.

Military assistance to a regime improves its ability to deal with external threats. With additional assistance, the regime may be prepared to follow a more determined policy in countering external threats and this in itself may dissuade neighbours from following a belligerent policy. However, the regime may tend to become bolder than is prudent; for it may construe the fact of receiving military assistance as a virtual commitment on the part of the aiding government to come to its assistance if it gets into difficulties regardless of their origin. Thus it may be contended that military assistance like economic assistance, produces a wide range of effect on the recipient nations' external policy.

Military assistance also affects the balance on domestic forces within the recipient country thereby influencing its internal policy. It improves the regimes ability to check extreme forms of domestic opposition and prevents it from gaining political momentum. At the same time this ability - to deal with such opposition - may lead it to ignore legitimate and reasonable domestic grievances. Not needing to be responsive to its critics, in the short run to survive, it
may postpone correcting evils; so long as these do not form the basis for clandestinely organized political movements which can overthrow the regime. "Paradoxically a less secure domestic power base would have imposed a more timely political response to what might have been at the outset, politically manageable resentments". 52

External military supplies help quiet unrest with the army. It also provides military leaders with tools of their trade, giving them increased political leverage in the domestic political arena. Association with foreign military establishments increases the recipient army's modern skills. It also increases its impatience for political change, since it is exposed to the strategy and methods followed by the other states in dealing with not only military matters but also wider political problems. Military deliveries have a long lead time and require sustained and repeated supplies of spares to maintain effectiveness. Hence it can be argued that military assistance of some types do have a stabilizing effect on the relations between the donor and the recipient.

It can also be contended that military assistance provides substantial opportunity for the donor to intervene in the domestic affairs of the recipient country. Military

aid is in several cases the condition for the survival of the political regime in power. The regime would be overthrown if it could not rely on an army well equipped with military hardware from one donor or the other and is at the same time on good terms with the governing circles of the donor. Military aid becomes the most potent instrument of intervention in cases where the donor's use it for destabilizing political power within the recipient state.

Four broad categories of factors have been suggested as causes or conditions of military intervention or its abstention.

(a) Socio-economic development.
(b) Political development
(c) Characteristics of the military establishment
(d) Foreign influences

Socio Economic Development

One of the most common hypothesis links the propensity for military intervention with social and economic underdevelopment. The propensity for military intervention is likely to decrease with increased social mobilization. The concept of social mobilization refers to such developments as urbanization, the rise of mass education, mass communications.

the development of a money economy and increased mass participation in the social and political activities and association. Social mobilization increases the number of potential political actors and diffuses increased political resources to these actors. The assumption underlying this hypothesis is that these actors will be willing and able to sustain civilian political institutions.

"Economic development, especially industrialization, diminishes the propensity for military intervention". This effect of economic development stems partly from the increased socio-technical complexity that puts political activity beyond the skills of the armed forces, partly from the civilian opportunities for social mobility which economic development opens up and partly from greater wealth, which allows and encourages stable civilian government. Another hypothesis postulated is "military intervention is inhibited by the rise of middle strata in the social structure, since these middle strata have in special measure both the motivation and the ability to create and sustain stable civilian political institutions. Further the likelihood of military intervention is greater, the greater the cleavages and the less the consensus is a society".  

**Aspects of Political Development**

A second set of variables, correlated with, but distinct from, those involving social mobilization and economic development may be grouped under the heading 'political development'. The most obvious hypothesis, as stated by Finer, is that "where public attachment to civilian institutions is strong, military intervention in politics will be weak... where weak or non existent, military intervention in politics will find wide scope - both in manner and in substance". 56 Though this proposition is important, it is also somewhat unsatisfactory for it fails to take our search for explanation very far from the phenomena that we are attempting to explain. A better hypothesis is "the propensity for military intervention in politics decreases with increasing popular attention to and participation in politics". 57 Another set of hypothesis relates military intervention to weaknesses in civilian political institutions. Military intervention decreases with increasing strength and effectiveness of political parties, of political interest groups and of civilian governmental institutions. 58 Thus the institutionalization of political

56 Finer, n.54, p.21.
58 Finer, n.54, p.87.
organisations and procedures is indispensable to mitigate the threat of external military intervention.

**Characteristics of the Military Establishment**

The third set of hypotheses concerns the way internal characteristics of a military establishment affect its predisposition for political intervention. Professionalism of the military has its impact on intervention. However, many students of civil military relations have suggested that military interventions decreases with the development within the military of a norm of civilian supremacy.

Similarly, it is argued that the propensity for military intervention increases with the habituation of the military intervention, or more simply, that intervention breeds more intervention. The larger and more sophisticated the armed forces, the more likely that they will have the administrative and technical skills necessary for running a government and

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59 Ibid., p.32.
60 Ibid.
that the military will have a preponderance of armed power over civilians. Thus some have argued that the size and sophistication of the military establishment are positively related to the propensity for intervention in politics. 62

With the increased production of nuclear weapons, the question arises as to whether these weapons will be used as instruments of intervention by the powers. History, however, points to the contrary. Despite several major conflagrations around the world since the end of the Second World War, nuclear weapons have not been used. As long as the strategic equilibrium, the delicate balance of terror, exists between the Super Powers and as long as the interests of one of the world powers are involved, nuclear threats as an instrument of achieving limited goals are out of the question. Further, since both Moscow and Washington conceive their interests and responsibilities as world wide and universal, there is no area outside the territory of the Super Powers, where an atomic threat, preferred by one of them would not be met by opposition from the other.

Another development in modern strategy, which reduces the likelihood of armed intervention - both conventional and

nuclear - is the concept of deterrence. Military power today is conceived as an instrument of deterrence. An instrument to deter antagonistic states from taking recourse to it, and thereby obviating the need for the use of counter force. Even the great powers and emerging powers, whose physical capability to overwhelm the target of intervention is beyond doubt, must practice restraint, if the instrument of deterrence is to be kept intact and stability and order is to be maintained in international relations.

Political Intervention

Notwithstanding the solemn adherence to the principles of non-intervention, intervention in international relations is no longer an exception but the rule and is treated as such in the capitals of the world. Although the traditional military means still figure prominently among the instruments of intervention, the major weight of it today lies in the field of non-military and informal measures. Thus in the contemporary international relations, the concept of intervention enmeshes with the exercise of influence and interference and thereby also with the normal pursuance of national goals. "It is in the wake of this transformation that states today pursue a lesser degree of possession goals than milieu goals, which consists of factors shaping conditions beyond one's boundary". 63 Thus states today resort to a multitude of

63 Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration (Baltimore, 1965), p. 73.
indirect methods of intervention in order to affect the milieu consisting of the total of the domestic authority structures of a given number of countries.

The characterisation of these actions usually depends on the ideology of the state engaging in them, and on its attitude toward the various factions in the state where the activity takes place or toward which it is directed. Such actions have been variously called propaganda, espionage, intervention, counter-intervention, indirect aggression, subversion, infiltration, pre-mature or over-delayed recognition, and neoi-mperialism. They have also been referred to as inciting or assisting civil strife, sedition and guerrilla activity, and as assistance to wars of liberation, to self-determination of peoples, to containment of communism or to the maintenance of civil order. In a general way such actions have been said to manifest disrespect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and domestic jurisdiction of another state.

The contemporary international system is a revolutionary one. Many of its members pursue objectives of radical change that are based on fundamentally different value systems and

64 Such actions are likely to occur during civil strife and are especially frequent when there are many unstable states vulnerable to such strife and a few powerful states ready to assume responsibility for its outcome.
ideologies. These value systems are often mutually exclusive and are the source of one of the most powerful incentives for intervention. In a way they are also widespread because the internal viability of many states is rather weak making them vulnerable to external influence.65

Interference into the affairs of a state is almost built into today's international system. The unilateral or mutual interference of states in each others internal or external affairs has become a constitutive part of certain structures of multinational politics, and these have increased in importance today.66

Three distinct forms or structures of multinational politics leading to increased political interference among states can be identified, they are:

(a) Integration
(b) Transnational politics.
(c) Penetrated systems.

In the case of integration, the preparation, making and implementation of political decisions, shifts from an exclusively national to a joint framework of action e.g. the European


Economic Community. The coalitions formed on this basis are along lines of interest and across national boundaries. The result of such an integration is a multinational intermeshing of the decision making process and of its social and political basis. As an increasing number of issue areas are drawn into the integrative process, any distinction between undesirable intervention and the normal mutual interference becomes difficult and to an extent meaningless.

Transnational politics is a less formalized type of multinational process than integration. It presupposes a transnational society with functional and not geographical interaction between different societies in specific issue areas. Herein relatively autonomous states in the international society - in their activities - can by pass national decision making institutions, and at the same time influence the parameters of their decision.

Thus a decision to export capital increases a balance of payments deficit and potentially influences the stationing of foreign troops. A government cannot master such processes, since they work simultaneously within and without its own society. In trying to cope with transnational processes like the movement of currency, complicated patterns of decision making emerge, in which a number of organisations like the government, public and private banks and international organizations participate. Since it is difficult to draw an
exact similarity between autonomous non-official actors and official actors - national and international - , we are confronted with regularized political interference of states in contemporary international relations.

A penetrated system exists when formally separate nation states or international organizations join together for common decision making in specific areas, or when a formal outsider mobilizes support for decision in another unit. The cooperative relationship between an underdeveloped country that receives aid and the aid donor would be an example. Other cases are military occupation, relationship between hegemonial powers and smaller states or certain forms of military assistance.67

In addition to the above mentioned structural factors, three distinct developments in international relations have led to an increase in political intervention today.

(a) The rapid advances in the realm of science, technology and communication systems which have freed the exercise of power and influence from the restrictions of geography. As range of activity of states and private actors has extended, the capacity and incentive for intervention, has also increased.

67 Kaiser, n.6, p.83.
(b) The relatively open, pluralistic and democratic character of many states today make intervention an easy and effective way of influencing policy and authority structures.

(c) The increased permeability of the modern nation state to non-military political intervention today, is partly because of the hazards involved in the use of contemporary military technology.

The most common type of political intervention is the interference by one state on behalf of either of the parties involved in a constitutional dispute in another state. Internal intervention when it occurs is directed against abnormal conditions resulting from internal strife; and as a general rule today, the expectant treatment of non-intervention has come to be preferred to the surgery of intervention.

Punitive measures adopted by one state against another, to enforce the observance of treaty engagements or redress of illegal wrongs can also be reckoned as a form of political intervention. Such interventions were a common phenomenon of the nineteenth century. All punitive measures employed viz. blockade, embargo, reprisals are measures of redress falling short of war, hence intervention.

The interference of one state in the relations, usually the hostile relations of other states can also be termed legitimately as political intervention. The great majority of such interventions have had as their aim the promotion or
settlement of a war between the states interfered with. In all these cases, the claim of the intervenor may be reluctantly acquiesced in, in which case the act of intervention tends to remain non-belligerent. But if it is taken up at the gauge of war, then it becomes belligerent.

**Bloc Intervention**

The most dramatic forms of intervention are bloc interventions. Intervention within one's bloc clearly is less inhibited than in the opposing bloc or in uncommitted nations. Leading bloc members will not accept radical changes in the political structure of bloc members that threaten bloc stability. Thus US intervention against a communist revolution in France or Italy - at the request of the government - would seem more acceptable than intervention in a communist state as Hungary, in favour of democratic revolutionists. Generally direct military support for rebellions in the rival bloc members territory is unlikely. In Vietnam for instance, the Viet Minh, infiltrated into areas difficult of access and where infiltration - as opposed to indigenous armed rebellion is not verifiable. In Laos in 1962, the recognition of the Souvanna Phouma government gave a legal cloak to Soviet

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air drops. Although it is not clear that US response would have been different in the absence of this guise of legality, at least it reduced the probability of direct intervention by the US including the possible resort to nuclear weapons.\textsuperscript{69}

If an intervention occurs closer to a bloc area, it is easier to deter counter-intervention by the opposite bloc. While this reduces the probability of any kind of intervention from the opposite side, it raises the risk of intervention by the use of nuclear weapons. For the opposing power of the opposite bloc - challenging the intervention may regard it as the only means of punishment available. If expectations can be changed appropriately, the probability of intervention, or of its deterrence may also change. Thus there would be less resistance to intervention in favour of revolution in a state of, the western bloc than to intervention against revolution in a state belonging to the Soviet bloc.

Intervention may continue to be a feature of the loose bipolar period. But some efforts have to be made to give legal colour to the intervention, and much of the political struggle in this period may lie in the effort to define acceptable norms favourable to one bloc or the other. Thus there is the continued probability of the incitement of internal wars and of bloc aid to internal wars begun for indigenous reasons.

\textsuperscript{69} Ibid., p.118.
This is an age in which bloc conflicts necessarily give incentive to aiding or assisting internal war. But this is also a revolutionary age in which new and modern nations are appearing on the scene. These nations also have the incentives to intervene in internal wars. And the instability of the social, economic and political structures in these areas provide ample opportunity for those who have the desire and incentive to intervene. 70

To an extent these opportunities existed in the nineteenth century, but during that period the balance of power, supra-national political organizations was not operative and the major nations of the system had an overriding incentive to discourage such interventions. In contrast, there is a great incentive in the bipolar age to intervene. The danger of nuclear war and some interests of the uncommitted states are the dampening agents. But these factors serve not so much to prevent as to regularize and normalize intervention and also providing the conditions and opportunity under which it may be resorted to. These conditions cannot be stated precisely and are subject to change. They are established as a consequence of political bargaining and international legislation. "Much of the stuff and flavour of international relations lies in the regularization of intervention". 71

70 Ibid., p.120.
71 Ibid., p.121.
including the one's resorted to by the super powers.

Economic Intervention

Economic intervention is a very old form of involvement by one state in the internal affairs of another. In the post Second World War era, economic intervention has become a major concern of national governments, largely because of the emergence of numerous new states from colonial and semi-colonial status to political and legal independence. Its importance has increased further because of the importance given to the concept of economic sovereignty and its being considered an essential and integral part of legal sovereignty. Economic intervention has greater relevance today because of the increased relevance of international development aid. The several international aid giving institutions like the World Bank have attained a primary position in contemporary international relations. Further the several international commodity agreements, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, are the new international institutions that incorporate the concern with economic development and seek to regulate - the instrumentalities of - international legal tenets of the erstwhile private relationships between foreign investors and recipient countries. The UN resolution of December 1962, on

the permanent control over the natural resources symbolises the change in emphasis and standards. Its key concept is that of economic sovereignty over natural resources. This concept has resulted in the claim to economic as well as legal control over such resources and the consequent transformation of formerly private concession agreements into economic development agreement. These agreements despite their being concluded between private investors and the government do pertain to the realm of international law than private law.73

Thus a number of complex investment transactions, usually between a government and one or a group of foreign private investors, have transformed international economic and commercial relations into a major concern of the law governing the relations of nations. This has led to an increase in the modalities of economic intervention.

Thus any form of private, public or fixed investment in another country is in a general sense a type of intervention. So is developmental aid given in the form of grants, loans at low interest or commercial rates for general budgetary support or specific projects. All forms of developmental aid, raise the problem of the legality of economic assistance, because all grants, loans or intermediate forms of assistance are subject to certain conditions which curtail the freedom

of action of a recipient country, thereby rendering it vulnerable to external intervention.

However, it is imperative to point out that in the present state of international relations, the conditions imposed by international development agencies as - the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, while granting loans are not reckoned as direct intervention by the recipient states. Thus today only physical coercion, lack of legal or political freedom of decision making and perhaps exceptional situations of economic emergency due to natural famine - when exploited by the donor, for the imposition of oppressive conditions could be regarded as an illegal form of economic intervention.

The law governing international relations acknowledges the right of each state to pursue the course of economic policy best suited to it. The choice of a foreign economic policy which a government feels will best benefit its national economy, is a matter within the domestic jurisdiction of a state. Nevertheless, the external economic policy of a nation has an international character. If a state uses its economic policy to impose its will upon another, or to coerce it to take a particular course of action, then such an act clearly falls into the category of intervention and may be

regarded as legal or illegal as intervention may be con-
sidered legal or illegal.

**Humanitarian Intervention**

Humanitarian intervention is a threat or use of armed
force by a state, a belligerent community or an international
organization, with the object of protecting human rights.
In diplomatic usage the term humanitarian intervention has
been used more widely to describe diplomatic intervention
on behalf of non-nationals or on behalf of nationals in matters
which are in law within the domestic jurisdiction of the
state of their residence or sojourn. 75

Intervention on humanitarian grounds superficially
has a wider appeal. Since it is detached from nationality,
it has the widely approved purpose of saving individuals,
ethnic or political, from suppression or extinction. Although
humanitarian intervention has a wide appeal in international
relations, and the UN Charter postulates in Article 55,
respect for human rights 76 and Article 56 pledges all the

75 Hall, n.18, p.307.
76 Article 55 of the UN Charter postulates the creation
of stability and well being which are necessary for
peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on
respect for the principles of equal rights and self
determination of peoples. It further states that the UN
shall promote (a) higher standards of living, full
employment and conditions of economic and social progress
and development. (b) Solutions of international economic,
social, health and related problems and international
cultural and educational cooperation (c) universal
respect for and observance of human rights and fundamen-
tal freedoms for all without distinction as to race,
sex, language or religion. See Charter of the UN,n.74,
p.30.
the members to take joint and separate action for the attainment of the purposes set forth in Article 55, the provisions of the Charter dealing with political independence and territorial integrity of states clearly militates against all acts of unilateral intervention.

Intervention based on the broad and indefinite ground of humanity have been common during the twentieth century. However later the criteria adopted to categorise certain acts as humanitarian, began to be governed by each nation's perception of it. "For a state to set itself up as a judge of the actions of another state and its assumption of the right to extend its powers to settle issues of religion and morality in another state, on the grounds of maintaining the rights of mankind as a whole, is to take a ground which the conduct of any modern and civilized state would not warrant". 

At the same time while it is admitted that a state or states may sometimes interfere to prevent one state from unduly oppressing another, it is generally held that to interfere in the internal affairs of a given state - in turmoil - is to accord sanction to an act that would result in greater evil than good.

77 Article 56 of the UN Charter states that all members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in cooperation with the organization, for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55. See Ibid., p.31.
79 Wilson, n.2, p.92.
80 Ibid.
Intervention for the protection of human rights, it is contended, is permissible if it meets the following conditions:

(a) An immediate threat of genocide or other widespread arbitrary deprivation of human life in violation of international law.

(b) An exhaustion of diplomatic and other peaceful techniques for protecting the threatened right to the extent possible and consistent with the protection of the threatened rights.

(c) The unavailability of effective action by an international agency, regional organization or the UN.

(d) A proportional use of force which does not threaten greater destruction of values than the human rights at stake and which does not exceed the minimum force necessary to protect the threatened rights.

(e) A proper disengagement, consistent with the purpose of the action.

(f) Immediate full reporting to the UN Security Council or any appropriate regional organization, and compliance with Security Council and applicable regional directives.

Examining the Charter of the UN as a whole, it is apparent that its two major purposes are the maintenance of peace and the protection of human rights. Article 2(4) of the Charter, relevant to both these purposes, prohibits "the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the UN. Since humanitarian intervention by states, far from being inconsistent with the Charter purposes, actually may further one of the
world organizations objectives. However, in many situations, such interventions run counter to Article 2(4), only if they are thought to affect the territorial integrity or political independence of the state against which they are directed.

The question now arises that, if in the absence of UN action, in serious human rights violation cases, should the states today sit by and do nothing merely because Article 2(4) of the UN Charter precludes unilateral humanitarian intervention. Doctrinal analysis of this Article - much of it written shortly after the Charter's adoption or based upon attitudes and expectations formed during the immediate post Second World War period - frequently fails to mention that, to the extent that states consciously relinquished the right to use forcible self help, they took such action under the assumption that the collective implementation measures envisaged by Chapter Seven of the UN Charter would soon be available. Since the UN has not been able to provide such measures except in exceptional cases, a rational interpretation of the Charter must conclude that Article 2(4) suppresses self help in so far as the organization can assume the role of enforcer; when it cannot, self help prerogatives revive.81 Further, since a unilateral humanitarian intervention seeks

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neither a territorial change nor is it a challenge to the political independence of the state involved and is not only inconsistent with the purposes of the UN but is rather in conformity with the most fundamental peremptory norms of the Charter, in so far as it is precipitated by intense human rights deprivations and conforms to the general international legal regulations governing the use of force, economy, timeliness, lawfulness of purpose and so on, it represents a vindication of international law, and is in fact a substitute for functional enforcement.82

The United Nations and Intervention

The UN has been vested with wide powers to maintain or restore international peace and security. The ends and means permissible for the UN differ from those of states acting individually.83 The Charter forbids the UN to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state, while general international law, in principle forbids a state to intervene in the domestic jurisdiction of another state or in relation between other states.84

Charter, however, expressly authorizes the UN to make recommendations in a wide variety of economic, social, human rights and self determination matters, on disputes or situations endangering international peace and security, and on conditions which are likely to impair the general welfare or friendly relations among nations.\textsuperscript{85} All of these matters are normally regarded as domestic affairs by the states. The Charter also authorizes the UN to make decisions enforceable by collective measures to maintain or restore international peace and security, in case of threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression, or to enforce decisions of the International Court of Justice.\textsuperscript{86}

If all UN recommendations were regarded as 'interventions' the latter's activities in the social, economic and peace keeping fields would be largely eliminated. But if, on the other hand, recommendations were never regarded so, the prohibitions of Article 2(7) would be reduced to practically nothing, particularly since this Article expressly excepts "enforcement measures under Chapter Seven from its prohibition. Consequently, a distinction has been made between recommendations of a general character, addressed to all or several members of the UN, which are not considered as

\textsuperscript{85} Articles 11, 14, 39, 55, 73, 87 of UN Charter, in Charter of the UN, n.74, pp.9, 11, 22, 30, 37, 46.

\textsuperscript{86} See Articles 39 and 94, of UN Charter in Ibid., pp.22, 48.
interventions, and those directed to a particular state which are so considered, and are, therefore, forbidden to the UN if they concern matters not affected by the international obligations of the state and therefore within its domestic jurisdiction”. 87

Further, it is clear both by implication and by express statement in Articles 2(7) and 39 and 94 that a state's threat to the peace, breach of the peace, act of aggression or failure to observe a decision of the International Court of Justice are not considered matters within its domestic jurisdiction. The UN, therefore, is free to take effective action, if it reaches the conclusion that conditions of civil strife, disorder, gross violation of human rights, minority oppression, subversion, or infiltration are of such gravity as to constitute a threat to international peace. States, however, are barred by general principles of international law,88 and by basic Charter principle of “sovereign equality of the members”89 from taking any such action.

88 Hyde, n.84, p.245.
89 Traditional international law, has employed the term intervention which is also used in the UN Charter, which requires respect for the sovereign equality of states and prohibits the use or threat of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of states and intervention in their domestic jurisdiction. See Article 2(7) of the UN Charter in Charter of the UN, n.74, p.5.
The concept 'Domestic Jurisdiction', embraces all matters in which a state's discretion is not limited by its obligations under general international law or a treaty to which it is a party. Diplomatic protests are permissible by an injured state if another state ignores such an obligation, and probably other measures not constituting a threat or use of force - prohibited by Article 2(4)90 of the Charter - can be taken by the injured state in case the delinquent state persistently ignores such protests and all available means of rectification through the UN or otherwise have proved unavailing. But in the absence of such conditions, the UN Charter forbids states to take measures of self help amounting to dictatorial interference in the affairs of another state or in its relations with other states. However, this does not preclude the states from intervening collectively through the UN to end civil strife wherever and whenever in the judgement of the UN, it threatens international peace.

Intervention today in all its forms is essentially an instrument of power politics. Most, so called justifications are rhetorical arguments, more or less skillful disguises of national policy actions. The collectivization of intervention through the UN can become an effective alternative only when the nation states will - perhaps as a result of another

90 Ibid., p.4.
disaster - come to recognize that common interests of mankind must prevail over the divisive policies and actions that has brought the world to the brink of disaster.

Other Types of Intervention

Counter-intervention

Counter-intervention is an act of intervention designed to help free a country from the interventionists manipulations of another power and help it regain its sovereign integrity and independence. "It is coercion intended to create options rather than foreclose them".91 Easy to justify, it is not at all easy, to successfully execute. Counter-intervention involves, not merely a manipulation of power, but a sharing in the historical trials and tribulations of others.

Indirect Imperialist Intervention Through Indirect Imperialist Rule

Indirect imperialist intervention through indirect imperialist rule closely resembles that form of colonialism known as indirect rule. It has been a morally pernicious act because it has invariably been invoked against nationalist-neutralist and non-communists; on the notion that not being pro-western is being pro-communist. In the realm of international relations, indirect imperialist intervention has alienated rather than won people. It has never been preventive

and in no instance was power devoted to the creation of the
dynamic stability that produces resilience and immunization
to subversion by extremists elements. In future, indirect
imperialist intervention may prove less pertinent as an
exercise of power in international relations than before.

As stated earlier, intervention is a major feature of
contemporary international politics. Moreover, there is good
reason to suppose that this will continue to be the case in
the foreseeable future. As a result, there is a clear need
to come to grips with the problem of regulating it. This
does, not, however, imply that extensive intervention must
inevitably continue to characterize international politics
indefinitely. The international system is presently under-
going rapid and far reaching change. Under the circumstances,
there is considerable room for efforts to alter the character-
estics of the system which tend to generate interventionary
activities. From a long term perspective, therefore, there
is reason to think in terms of reducing prevalence of inter-
vention should this seem desirable in normative or instrumen-
tal terms. In the light of the ever increasing threats to
international peace the world over today, it seems reasonable
to suppose that widespread support could be found for the
desirability of minimizing the prevalence of certain types
of intervention. It should not, however, be assumed that
this is the case with reference to all types of intervention.
Although the point is rarely articulated in explicit terms,
many individuals hold views of international politics which
are incompatible with undifferentiated concepts of non-intervention. The existence of this long term prospect nevertheless in no way reduces the importance of coming to grips with the problem of regulating intervention in the immediate future.

The picture that emerges however from the historical experience of the UN and the workings of the world system is far from one of optimism, especially with regard to small states of the third world with a pro-imperial and pro-anti-state bias, inherent to the existing international order. Unfortunately small states, are left with few options except, either recourse to self help measures or alignment with a bigger state. But the danger remains, that no foreign country can provide an umbrella effective enough to ensure a small state's territorial integrity. Despite these hard realities, it is important that third world states, particularly the weaker ones, strive toward greater respect for international law by the big powers through public opinion and diplomatic pressures. A totally nihilistic notion of the principles for the respect of state sovereignty, while reflecting the true state of affairs, can be suicidal. Small states need to exert whatever pressure they can, to establish

92 There is a pro-imperial and a pro-governmental bias built into modern international law. This double bias is a natural consequence of the fact that states dominate the global scene and some states dominate others. An editorial comment in American Journal of International Law (Lancaster, y.a.), vol.74, No.2, April 1980, pp.411-17.
an international regime where intervention becomes a highly costly enterprise for the potential interventionist state, if not banish it altogether from international relations.

Unless conscious and determined strategy to prevent intervention is pursued, the future of a number of small states could be bleak. Ultimately it is not the state that suffers, but innocent people living in the threatened territory who have to bear the tragedy which intervention usually brings. The beginning of the 1980's saw for the first time in South West Asia, an act of intervention by a Super Power. The Soviets had entered into Afghanistan in December 1979 and even after eight long years of conflict and resistance, the Soviet forces continue to remain in that beleaguered country. Apart from the suffering it has brought to the millions of Afghans, the Soviet action has far reaching regional and global dimensions. The occupation of a weak and poor nonaligned country by the mighty Soviets has a far reaching security implication not only to the immediate neighbours of Afghanistan in South Asia, but to the entire nonaligned and developing third world. Besides a set back to the process of normalization of East-West relations and detente, the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan has further exacerbated the ever growing tensions in international relations. The continued occupation of Afghanistan by the Soviet forces and the ever increasing pockets of resistance to it portend a serious threat to both regional stability and global peace.
In the following chapters a political study of the Soviet Union's intervention in Afghanistan has been attempted.