Chapter VI

INTERNATIONAL REACTION TO THE INTERVENTION
INTERNATIONAL CONSEQUENCES OF INTERVENTION

Refugees in Pakistan

The migration of Afghans into Pakistan is not uncommon. Most of the undemarcated 1,500 mile Pakistan-Afghan border is inhabited by the Pakhtoons who are known to cross the border at will.¹ According to the information furnished by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) the number of Afghan refugees in Pakistan was 2.5 million in March 1985 and by July 1985 it was about 2.7 million with a purported monthly increase of 6,000 - 8,000 since then.² The majority of these refugees are accommodated in the 306 villages of the North West Frontier Province of Pakistan (NWFP).

The influx of refugees to Pakistan commenced in 1973 when Mohammed Daoud took over power after deposing king Zahir Shah.³ The exodus of the people from Afghanistan increased.

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1 There is a long tradition of mobility among Pakhtoons who live in Pakistan's North West Frontier Province and those in Eastern Afghanistan. The nomads or Powindals, around 60,000 are accustomed to move with their cattle each year between the summer pastures in Afghanistan and winter pastures in Pakistan. Besides them, there are businessmen with connections in Pakistan who move regularly between the two countries. For details see Beverly Male, A Tiger by the Tail; Pakistan and the Afghan Refugees, Four Political Case Studies (Canberra, 1981), p.39.


3 Mohammed Daoud took over power after being out of the Government for a decade.
International Reactions to the Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan

The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan had a profound impact on international politics. The issue was debated in the United Nations Security Council. It was discussed and voted upon in an emergency session of the UN General Assembly. It has been the subject of deliberations twice in the thirty six nation Islamic conference, the Nonaligned meets, the European community conferences and the several legislatures of the world. International reaction to the Soviet intervention was spontaneous, pronounced yet varied. The western nations led by the US were forthright in condemning the Soviet action.

The US had been receiving intelligence reports about the concentration of Soviet troops on the Afghan border but it had no idea as to its purpose. It was on 26 December 1979 that the State Department reported that there was a massive airlifting of the Soviet troops into Kabul. The State Department spokesman deplored the Soviet interference in the affairs of a sovereign state and asserted that "the Soviets are crossing a new threshold in their military deployment into Afghanistan, and that the US was making its view known directly to the Soviets and asked others also to make their views known."1

The U.S. took a grim view of the developments in Afghanistan. On 29 December, President Jimmy Carter used the hot line to convey his strong opposition to the Soviet action and asked for the withdrawal of Soviet troops. He warned "failure to do so would have serious consequences for U.S.-Soviet relations." 2

In a major policy statement on 30 December 1979, the U.S. President's adviser on National Security Affairs, Zbigniew Brzezinski, stated that:

the Soviet intervention was a qualitative new step involving direct invasion of a country outside the Warsaw Pact through the use of Soviet armed forces and an attempt to impose the Soviet will on an independent country. (3)

Referring to the new threat which faced Pakistan, he stated that:

the U.S. would stand by the commitment it had made to Pakistan in 1959 and pointed that if any aggression was committed against it, the U.S. would take appropriate action including the use of force within U.S. constitutional procedures. (4)

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4 In 1959 the U.S. had given the assurance that in the event of an aggression against Pakistan, the U.S. in accord with its constitutional procedures would take such appropriate action including the use of armed force as may be mutually agreed upon and as is envisaged in the joint resolution, to protect and assist the government of Pakistan. For text of the Agreement see Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report (Washington), vol. 38, No. 4, 24 January 1980, p.176.
Brezhinski denied that the US was in an eyeball to eyeball confrontation with the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. However the US did not accept the Soviet explanation for sending its troops into Afghanistan nor did it accept the Soviet assurance that the troops would be pulled back as soon as external interference in Afghanistan ceased. On his part the President of the US declared this explanation and the assurance of withdrawal to be completely inadequate and misleading. He bluntly told the Soviet leader, Leonid Brezhnev, that the invasion of Afghanistan would severely and adversely affect relations between the two countries. He further urged the leaders of the world to make it clear to the Soviet Union that "they cannot have taken this action to violate world peace without paying, suffering, severe political consequences." The US President initiated concrete measures against the Soviet Union as a measure of protest and resentment against the unilateral action of the Soviet Union and urged allies and other nations to follow suit. As the policy of denial

5 The Times, 2 January 1980.

6 As a counter to the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, President Carter in his State of the Union message of 21 January 1980, announced that the US would use all means necessary, including military force to protect America's vital interests in the Persian gulf. Among the other actions to strengthen US defence capability, the President outlined his intention to ask Congress to reintroduce conscription. He also asked for $ 400 million in military and economic aid to Pakistan (f/n.cont...n/page)
could not be effective without the cooperation of Japan and the countries of Western Europe, the US sought their cooperation and sent State Department officials to hold consultations with those governments. Apart from this the President promised to join the efforts of other nations to offer military and economic assistance to Pakistan to help it defend its independence and national security against the serious threat it faced from the north.7

At the regional strategic level, apart from increasing its naval strength in the Indian Ocean, training and initiating steps to deploy a rapid deployment force - in an effort to balance the large Soviet presence north of the gulf region - extending help to the insurgents in

(Previous f/n cont....)

and to friendly or neutral countries on the vulnerable borders of Afghanistan. The other sanctions announced by the President were: an embargo on US grain shipments to the Soviet Union; curtailment of Soviet fishing privileges in US waters; a ban on the export of all sophisticated strategic or technical goods; boycott of the Moscow Olympics if the Soviet troops stayed on in Afghanistan beyond 31 January 1980; deferring of the ratification of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks II agreement by the US Congress. For details see Frances Boyd and George Gretton, "The Americas and the Caribbean - North America", Report on World Affairs (London), No.1, 1 January - 31 March 1980, pp.23-24.

Afghanistan, the Carter administration vigorously pushed on with certain political moves to corner the Soviet Union in various international forums by mobilizing opinion against it.

There is no hard evidence relating to the role played by the US in the emergence of insurgent activity, but the indications are the US actively aided the insurgents from November 1979 onwards.

Soon after the intervention a resolution was introduced in the UN Security Council deploiring the armed Soviet intervention and asking for immediate and complete withdrawal of all foreign troops from Afghanistan. 13 of the 15 members of the Council voted in favour of the resolution, East Germany a fellow member of the Warsaw Pact, was the only one which voted along with the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union used its veto to prevent the adoption of the resolution. As a result of this veto, 17 countries requested an emergency session of the UN General Assembly and submitted an exact copy of the resolution which had been vetoed by the Soviet Union. On 14 January, the Resolution reaffirming the inalienable right of all people to determine their own future and to choose their own form of government, free from outside interference and asking for immediate termination of foreign armed intervention in Afghanistan was adopted. Of the 152 members of the UN, 140 participated, of these 104 voted in favour of the resolutions, 18 against, 18 abstained and 12 remained absent. Among those who abstained were such friendly states of the Soviet Union such as Algeria, Finland, India, and Syria. Rumania abstained itself. Even supporters and allies of the Soviet Union spoke in a low key in defending the Soviet action. It was a diplomatic defeat for the Soviets and the US was immensely satisfied at the outcome. The US also succeeded in getting a resolution adopted by the UN Human Rights Commission on 14 February which expressed serious concern over the Soviet intervention and its likely effect on the rights of the Muslim people of Afghanistan. New York Times, 8 January 1980, 15 January 1980.
The US Reaction to the Soviet Intervention in the United Nations

At the Sixth emergency session of the UN General Assembly held in January 1980 to consider the threat to international peace and security as a consequence of the Soviet action in Afghanistan, the representative of the US McHenry while expressing regret at the Soviet action over a fellow member of the UN stated "the invasion was a violation of the obligation accepted by member states to renounce the use of force against the territorial integrity and political independence of states." Further the act of replacing one regime and appointing another was described as a clear negation of the right to self determination, the core principle of the UN. Thus the intervention, contended McHenry, was no cold war squabble, it demonstrated that the Soviet Union had no real commitment to the principles of international law, territorial integrity, self determination and nonalignment specially when these principles contravened with its national interest.

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10 In terms of the Charter of the UN, nations were duty bound to renounce the use of force against each other. For details see Article 2(3) of the UN Charter in Charter of the United Nations and the Statute of the International Court of Justice (New York, 1980) (Hereinafter Charter of the UN), p.4. Also see United Nations Document (New York), A/ES-6/PV.4, 12 January 1980, p.38 (Hereinafter UN Doc.)

11 Ibid., pp.41-42.

12 Ibid., p.43.
Calling upon the world body to initiate concrete steps to counter the Soviet action he said

the UN cannot remain silent when the only principles safeguarding the small states against self-aggrandizement by larger states were violated, remaining silent would be tantamount to condonation of intervention by a Super Power. (13)

The permanent representative of the US to the UN, Jeane Kirpatrick put forth the US stand on the Soviet intervention at the Thirty Sixth, Thirty Seventh and Thirty Eighth UN General Assembly sessions. Speaking at the Thirty Sixth session she contended that the Soviet invasion, a grave violation of the UN Charter, altered the climate and course of world politics and shook the very foundations of world order. (14) The invasion she stated marked a watershed in the post war era, bringing to a definitive conclusion a period of widespread optimism regarding the evolution of Soviet policy and intentions. (15)

Rejecting all justifications for the intervention, the US representative stated:

13 Ibid.
14 More than any single event in recent years, the Soviet action in Afghanistan impelled a widespread reassessment of the world situation based upon a new and more sober appreciation of the danger that the policies of the Soviet Union posed to global stability and peace. UN Doc. A/36/PV-62, 20 November 1981, p.13.
Neither international law nor Article 51 of the UN Charter could be invoked to justify a blatant aggression of a nonaligned state by a Super Power, especially when Afghanistan was no threat to the Soviet Union.\(^{16}\)

Dismissing the theory of intervention by invitation the US representative pointed out that "there was no evidence to substantiate this theory, and on this basis the Karmal regime in Kabul was reckoned to be a regime lacking legitimacy and a mere appendage of Moscow".\(^{17}\) This argument was buttressed by the fact, stated Kirpatrick, that even after four years (at present eight) of occupation and the implementation of policies leading to death and destruction,\(^{18}\) the Soviets with their 105,000 troops had not succeeded in their attempts to subjugate the valiant Afghans and make them a subservient nation.\(^{19}\)

Speaking about the long term objectives of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, she referred to the economic and

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16 The Afghans are historically known to be tolerant people who have never attempted to impose their beliefs on others. The threat therefore was to and not from the people of Afghanistan, see Ibid., p.17.

17 The regime supported by the Soviet troops is unable to control ninety percent of the countryside and many of the cities are under pressure because of the increasing resistance by an ill equipped Afghan Resistance. For details see, Ibid., pp.21-51.


cultural policies being implemented by the Soviet installed government of Afghanistan. In the economic field, the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) had commenced the export or transfer of its natural resources to the Soviet Union and to aid this effort road and rail links between the two countries is being strengthened. In the cultural field efforts were on to reshape traditional Afghan culture into a Marxist/Leninist mould. "To this end, most of the educational institutions are in the process of Sovietization and several Afghan children were being sent to the Soviet Union and other bloc countries for training and indoctrination", she contended. These measures and the mounting exodus of Afghans to Iran and Pakistan proved that the Soviet installed regime in Kabul lacked popular support she argued. She also said that "with the Soviet intervention, a totalitarian one Party State ruled by the Afghan communists gave way to totalitarian apparatus completely controlled by the Soviet armed forces and its advisers." The mounting opposition to the Soviets and its client regime concluded Kirpatrick is a proof of the oppressive rather

20 Afghanistan's natural resources including natural gas, copper and iron ore was being shipped to the Soviet Union. The power grid of northern Afghanistan was integrated with Soviet Central Asia. see Ibid., p.50.

21 Ibid., p.50.

22 Ibid.
than the claimed liberating role of the Soviet Union. 23

Calling for an immediate withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan, the US government extended all support to the UN efforts to bring about a negotiated political settlement and end the tragedy that had befallen nonaligned Afghanistan. 24

Reaction to the Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan in the Congress of the United States

The barometer of the feelings in the US Congress is reflected in the resolutions passed by both the House of Representatives and the Senate of the United States.

In a joint resolution, the Congress authorized the President of the US to ask the US Olympic Committee to boycott the 1980 Moscow Olympics; encourage other nations to do so and assist in the organization of a free world Olympics at a different place of those nations opposed to the Soviet invasion. 25 The President was authorized the necessary financial powers to execute these proposals. The

23 There are only two realities in Afghanistan today. The Soviet occupation and the Afghan nation; and neither is compatible with the other. The Soviet Union can conquer Afghanistan only by eliminating it. This, the world must not permit to happen, for if Afghanistan is vanquished no independent nation will be safe. For details see Current Document, n.7a, p.231.

24 UN Doc., n.19, p.51.

Senate in its Resolutions 333 and 334 further reiterated the need to boycott the Moscow Olympics. Concurring with the House of Representatives, the Senate strongly condemned the Soviet Union for its aggression in South Asia and its continued presence in Afghanistan.

The President Jimmy Carter in his message to the Senate put forth the following measures to counter the Soviet threat.

a) US aid to the states of the region to develop capability to withstand Soviet pressure.

b) Increased economic and military assistance to Pakistan - which had assumed the status of a frontline state since the Soviet occupation of its neighbour Afghanistan - and also to other states in the region to make them stable and prosperous.

c) Securing access to military facilities in the region, for use during times of need and deter permanently aggression by external forces.

In addition, the House of Representatives on its part suggested the following measures:

a) Financial aid and training to opposition groups, especially in leadership tactics and sabotage.

b) Material aid in the form of equipment suited to the operation in Afghanistan.

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26 Ibid., pp.47,77.
27 Ibid., p.212.
29 Weapons as M-16 Rifles or equivalent light anti-tank weapons as M-72 Low Individual Operated anti-aircraft weapons as Redeye explosives as mines and hand grenades and also plenty of ammunition. Ibid.
c) Major improvement in the ability of the US forces to defend against chemical attacks.

d) Renewed efforts to negotiate a verifiable ban on the development, production, stockpiling and transfer of these weapons and means for their production. A verifiable treaty prohibiting development, production and stockpiling of these weapons was in the enlightened self-interest of the international community.

e) A warning to be accorded that unless the chemical weapons convention was concluded, the US would have no choice but to upgrade its chemical weapons capability.

f) The Soviet move into Afghanistan was interpreted as a move to interrupt western oil supplies, destroy its economy, leaving the west no option but to resort to nuclear war.

Besides these resolutions and statements, a cross sectional representative view of the people was also forth coming through the individual statements of some members of the House of Representatives and the Senate.

Congressmen William Lehman of Florida pointed out that the Soviet behaviour in Afghanistan was not surprising since it had no respect for legal principles. He stressed since this move of the Soviets was unique, it was necessary that the US, its allies and nations which treasured independence to impress upon the Soviets, the cost of such an act. To counter this act of the Soviets Lehman

30 The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan was unique for it was for the first time they had intervened out of Eastern Europe. The Soviets had earlier intervened in Hungary 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968.

outlined the following measures. 32

a) Reduction in the quantum of US trade with the Soviet Union in the consumer, industrial and allied sectors.

b) Embargo on US grain shipments to the Soviet Union curtailment of fishing privileges in the US waters, subsequently lifted by President Ronald Reagan on his assumption of office.

c) US determination not to tolerate any interference by the Soviet Union in the domestic affairs of Afghanistan's neighbours.

d) US readiness and determination to respond to any threat forthcoming upon its vital interests.

e) Lack of ambiguity in future US policy towards the Soviet Union.

Congressmen Edwards of Oklahoma highlighted the advantages the Soviets gained in the region and the threat they posed to US interests there. 33 Congressman John Ashbrook was critical of the US offer of neutrality for Afghanistan and warned of the dangers it posed. 34 Congressman Lee H. Hamilton spoke of the likelihood of super power involvement in the third world conflicts with the possible use and spread of nuclear weapons, after the development in Afghanistan. 35 Congressman Larry Macdonald referred to the

32 Ibid.

33 The Southern border of Afghanistan was 350 miles from the Arabian sea. The Soviet aircraft based in southern Afghanistan, were 500 miles closer to the sea lanes serving the gulf. Further, with the development of the airports at Shindand and Herat, Soviet aircraft had an easy access to the strategic points in the Persian gulf.


support forthcoming for the intervention from several Marxist Leninist organizations in the US. However, he also pointed out that there were certain Marxist groups who did condemn the Soviet action. 36

Senator Edward Kennedy, speaking on the Soviet action in Afghanistan, outlined the following measures, which were to be adopted by the government to deal with the situation. 37

a) The US was to act in concert with the countries depending upon middle east oil to counter the Soviet threat.

b) The US had to coordinate its policy with the NATO allies and the Islamic countries to counter Soviet expansionism.

c) The US had to give due credence to the condemnation meted out by the international community to the Soviet intervention as also to the Soviet loss of credibility in the third world.

d) Enlargement of the US military and naval presence in the region to deter Soviet expansionism.

36 The Communist labour party a small pro-Soviet splinter group justified the Soviet move into Afghanistan as a counter to the US Central Intelligence Agency's activity there. The Trotskyist Workers World Party WWP characterized the invasion as a necessity, which could alone save the people of Afghanistan from the rule of counter revolutionary forces. Maoist and Peking line parties as the Communist Party Marxist/Leninist condemned Soviet social imperialism and termed its move into Afghanistan a blitz krieg of massive proportion. US Cong Record, House, vol.126, part 2 (31 January 1980- 12 February 1980), 5 February 1980, p.1965.

a) Bolstering the economic and political strength of the countries neighbouring Afghanistan with increased assistance.

f) Ensuring regular oil supply with arrangements that enhanced both national security and the energy security of NATO, Japan and the nations of the Third World.

g) Notwithstanding the events in Afghanistan, maintenance of normal channels of communication with the Soviet Union.

Stressing the need for collective response to the Soviet intervention as also collective effort to restore the independence and nonalignment of Afghanistan, Senator Kennedy proposed certain other concrete measures to be implemented concurrently.38

a) An agreement to be worked out by both the US and the Soviet Union terminating all type of military aid and other types of interference in Afghanistan.

b) The government in Afghanistan, in accord with the Soviet Union, was to establish a coalition government in Afghanistan incorporating all the political and religious factions therein.

c) The Soviet Union was to withdraw all its military forces from Afghanistan before the end of the year 1980 on the basis of a negotiated time table.39

d) An agreement - by the West and the Soviet Union - to support the independence and nonalignment of Afghanistan with an undertaking not to conclude any military alliance with the Afghan government.

e) An independent and nonaligned status for Afghanistan, internationally guaranteed and supervised by the UN or an acceptable multinational peace force.

38 Ibid.
39 The Soviet Union was to make a substantial reduction of its forces i.e. 20,000 men immediately and affirm its readiness to pull out by 1980, before negotiation for a comprehensive settlement commenced. See, Ibid.
f) The use of US influence on the Soviet Union to maintain world peace.

g) Consistent efforts by the US to reduce the risk of war.

Among the others who spoke in the Senate on the situation in Afghanistan Senator Thurmond expressed apprehension about the Soviet Union's commitment to international treaties and called upon the US government to reckon with the earlier Soviet violation of international treaties before reaching an accord on SALT II. Senator B. Bergland reiterating the need to implement the measures initiated by the President to counter the Soviet intervention pointed out that the measures were taken by the US government to drive home to the Soviets that naked aggression against independent nonaligned countries would not be tolerated by the US administration.

US Press and Public Reaction to the US Response

The US government measures to deal with the Soviet action in Afghanistan were widely commented upon in its press. The Editorials on file, printed more than forty editorial

40 The Soviets view treaties as agreements which serve to restrict their enemies and not commitments to which they should subvert their own interests. They have proven this several times see US Cong. Record, Senate, vol.126, part I (3 January 1980 - 31 January 1980), 22 January 1980, p.57.

41 Since the end of the Second World War, it was stated the Soviets had violated seven major treaties or agreements viz. a) the Lend Lease Agreement b) the Geneva Agreement on German Free Elections c) the Berlin Occupation Agreement d) The UN Charter e) The Cuban Agreement 1962 f) The Helsinki Accord g) the Threshold Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. See, Ibid., p.15.

42 Ibid.
comments, a large number of them supported the President's action. "Moving in the right direction at the right pace, deserves support from the American people", a measured response to the Soviet invasion", "judicious blend of firmness and prudence", etc. 43 However, there were also others who assailed the Chief Executive, with comments like "not enough, too little and too late", "spitting against the wind", etc. 44 The Presidents critics were certain that had Carter been firm with the Soviet Union in respect of its involvement in Angola, Ethiopia and Southern Yemen and on the issue of the presence of the Soviet troops in Cuba, the Soviets probably would not have moved into Afghanistan. There was near unanimity that the situation created by the Soviet invasion was very serious and that it would not do for the US to ignore it. A great

43 For the editorials supporting the measures of the President, see Sentinel Star (Orlando, Florida).
9 January 1980, Argus Leader (Sioux Falls, South Dakota),
7 January 1980, Buffalo Evening News (New York)
8 January 1980, Virginian Pilot (Norfolk, Virginia),
7 January 1980, Christian Science Monitor (Boston)
7 January 1980, In Editorials on File (New York)

For all these editorials see Ibid.
majority of these editorial writers advocated similar policy options, coordinated policy with allies, cooperation with China, extension of economic and military assistance to Pakistan, and reduction of trade and other contacts with the Soviet Union.45

Public opinion in the US largely approved of Carter's punitive measures against the Soviet Union. A majority of the Americans endorsed the stand taken by the President on the Soviet action in Afghanistan. They rejected the contention of his critics like Ronald Reagan, the then contender for the Republican Presidential nomination, and Senator Edward Kennedy, who had opined that it was the weakness of the Carter Administration that had invited the intervention. They indicated their strong preference for the use of economic and diplomatic sanctions rather than for sending of troops or even the arming of the Afghan rebels. In the Gallup Poll organized to assess the public opinion, three-fourths of the respondents approved of the imposition of an embargo against the sale of grain and seventy two percent favoured the shifting of the venue of the 1980 Olympics.46

Thus Americans of all shades of opinion were

45 Ibid.
46 One of the most respectable columnists in America, James Reston, felt that it was a carefully balanced response but it only sounded tougher than it actually was. International Herald Tribune (Paris) 7 January 1980. Edward M. Luttwak, a Fellow at George Town University's center for Strategic Studies wrote that the measures would not succeed. According to him the only effective measure was to supply arms to the Resistance. For details see, New York Times, 6 January 1980.
agreed that the Soviet intervention was nothing less than an invasion. Many saw in it a grand design on the part of the Soviet Union to dominate the countries of the gulf region and claim a share in the oil, when its own oil reserves ran out. Some felt that it represented a step forward in the fulfilment of the age-old Russian drive towards warm waters, while others viewed it as a defensive action. However, the American people rejected all theories which absolved the Soviet Union from the guilt of invading Afghanistan. 47 Senator George McGovern, the 1972 Democratic Presidential candidate, wrote in an article that the hazard of the Carter Doctrine lay in the assumption without clear or convincing evidence that the US interests were now threatened by a Soviet grand strategy to consolidate its strategic position in the region and thereby threaten the free movement of oil from the Persian Gulf. 48 He further pointed out that the Soviets understood it well.

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47 The Soviets justified their intervention on the basis of Article 51 of the UN Charter and also on the basis of the Bilateral Treaty between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union of 5 December 1978. For Article 51 of the UN Charter, see, Charter of the UN, n.10, p.27. and for details of the 5 December 1978 bilateral Treaty between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan see Keesings Contemporary Archives (London), vol.25, 16 February 1979, p.29459 (Hereinafter referred to as Keesings Archives).

48 Confronted by an overt attempt to dominate Afghanistan and from that base to threaten Western access to the Persian Gulf - President Carter made the volatile middle east, the focal point of his State of the Union message to Congress on 23 January 1980. In his message, Carter enunciated a new Persian Gulf strategy for the US that came to be called the Carter (f/n. contd...n/page)
that if they threatened the West's oil supply, it would result in a global war. To substantiate this viewpoint, an article by Georgy A. Arbatov, Director of the Soviet Institute for American and Canadian Studies, was cited. 49 Samuel P. Huntington, Director of the Centre of International Affairs at Harvard, stated:

In part, the invasion may have been a defensive action. The Soviets did not want to have another fundamentalist Islamic regime on their border. They did not want to have a communist government overthrown in this manner. (50)

All those who subscribed to this particular argument felt that the Soviets had taken advantage of the prevailing situation in Afghanistan and they did not reckon it as any grand design. For the moderates, the most vital goal was to preserve the peace and this they opined could only be attained in cooperation with the Soviets. Detente they contended was very important and nothing was to be done to jeopardize it. 51

(Previous F/n. cont...)


49 George McGovern, "How To Avert a New Cold War", The Atlantic Monthly (Boston), No. 6, June 1980, p. 45.

50 For an exposition of this point of view see, Leslie H. Gelb and Richard H. Ullman, "Keeping Cool at the Khyber Pass", Foreign Policy (New York), No. 38, Spring 1980, pp. 3-18.

George F. Kennan, the eminent US Sovietologist, wrote that the decision to intervene was so crude that "it decidedly was a move not in character of either Kosygin or Brezhnev." 52 The decision, reasoned Kennan "indicated the recent break through, to positions of dominant influence, of hard-line elements much less concerned for world opinion and with lesser experience." 53 He reckoned the Soviet action to be defensive rather than offensive in nature and as regards the US response he contended that "it lacked balance and was based on the ignorance of the immense complexities of the third world." 54

The anti Soviet lobby rejected these arguments.

Edward Luttwak argued

to term the Soviet act as a defensive action would imply that the intervention in Afghanistan is not an evidence of a shift in the balance of power but merely a symptom of Soviet insecurity and thereby no further acts of aggression need be feared. (55)

This he felt was an untenable argument.

The conservatives had no concrete alternative suggestions to offer to counter the Soviet action. The only thing they insisted upon was a tough stance and power to back it. Some suggested aiding the rebels. A more realistic

53 Ibid.
54 Ibid.
assessment, however, felt that insurgents could never match, leave alone win, against the mighty Soviets. Even an informal alliance with China in this regard could not help for they felt that besides the objective of containing the Soviet Union the US had nothing in common with China.

Whatever might have been the motive behind the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, it left the US policy makers with hardly any choice. In concrete terms they had to think what the Soviet Union could do with the advantage it had gained by its occupation of Afghanistan and not what it would do for intentions could change quickly, not capacity.

The Defence Secretary Harold Brown in a speech in New York emphasising that policy makers cannot afford to take unnecessary risks said:

Perhaps the Soviet Union will never move to threaten the oil supply to the West from the Gulf region. Perhaps the more benign interpretations of their invasion of Afghanistan are correct. But as policy makers and as responsible citizens and world leaders, we cannot safely assume that it is. Indeed the actions that we must take to guard against the consequences of the immediate threat posed by recent aggressive behaviour are probably the most effective way to moderate future Soviet action over the long term. (56)

United Kingdom's Reaction

Reacting sharply to the Soviet intervention in the emergency sessions of the UN Security Council and General Assembly in 1980, the representative of the United Kingdom (UK) Anthony Parsons, termed the Soviet move into Afghanistan an invasion\(^57\) and rejected the Soviet contention of it being a limited military assistance to protect Afghanistan from external aggression.\(^58\) The Soviet action he stated "reflected the primacy of its national interest over international obligations and was in total disregard of the consequences for international peace, security and detente. It also violated the sovereign rights of the Afghans."\(^59\) Teming the intervention a dangerous precedent he felt

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57 The Soviet armed intervention was against an Asian State, a nonaligned State, a member of the UN and above all a State not directly within the Soviet sphere of influence. See UN Doc. S/PV-2186, 5 January 1980, p.31.

58 The existence of an external threat was termed a myth and the trouble in Afghanistan was reckoned as the spontaneous expression of the discontent of the Afghans against their regime and the Soviet intervention was regarded as a flagrant violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Afghanistan without a valid pretext of self defence. See UN Doc. n. 10, p.66.

59 Anthony Parsons viewed the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan as an act of selfish Soviet calculations to safeguard its national interest. He pointed out that the regime to which it had committed itself in Afghanistan was looseing its grip. Since the regime had no popular support and there were signs of its imminent collapse, the Soviet Union by force established its own puppet regime, without any regard to the wishes of the people of Afghanistan. For details see, UN Doc. A/35/PV-66, 18 November 1980.
that a country's sovereignty and independence could be in jeopardy if other nations emulated this act of the Soviet Union. 60 Due to all these factors the UK supported the UN Security Council Resolution on Afghanistan. 61

Reactions in the Parliament

The impact of the intervention on East-West relations was projected by Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in the House of Commons, on 28 January 1980, when she said, "the

60 The Soviet Union had invaded Afghanistan in December 1979 at the invitation of a small minority, for the benefit of the leaders in exile and for reasons of advantage to the Soviet Union. For details see, UN Doc. A/37/PV-9, 27 November 1982, p.51.

61 The draft UN Security Council Resolution proposed by the nonaligned states and supported by UK called upon the Council to reaffirm its conviction that the preservation of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state is a fundamental principle of the Charter of the UN and any violation of it on any pretext is contrary to its aims and purposes. It deeply deplored the recent armed intervention in Afghanistan and reckoned to be inconsistent with the principles of the Charter. The Resolution affirmed the need to uphold and respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and nonaligned status of Afghanistan. The draft Resolution also called for the immediate withdrawal of all foreign troops from Afghanistan, to enable the people there to determine their own form of government, and choose their economic, political social system free from outside intervention, coercion, constraint of any kind whatsoever. See, "Survey of Current Affairs", British Information Service (London), vol.10, No.1, January 1980, pp.15-18.
actions of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan revealed the brutal disregard for accepted rules of international behaviour, for world public opinion and for principles laid down in the Helsinki Act of 1975, an agreement signed by President Brezhnev. The invasion of Afghanistan was thus reckoned to be a deliberate act of Soviet policy which weakened the basis for the harmonious conduct of East-West relations. Afghanistan stated Thatcher "was a warning that could not be ignored because it was for the first time that the Soviet Union had invaded a country outside the Warsaw Pact, an Islamic country, a member of the non-aligned community and a country that posed no conceivable threat to its security or interests." The Soviet Union she further said "had driven a wedge into the heart of the Muslim world and if its hold on Afghanistan were consolidated it would have vastly extended its borders with Iran, acquired a border with Pakistan for more than 1,000 miles and advanced to 300 miles of the Straits of Hormuz which controlled the Persian gulf."

63 Survey of Current Affairs, n.61, p.50.
64 UK, Commons, Parliamentary Debates, n.62, pp.933-45.
65 Ibid.
Referring to the impact of the invasion on Iran she further said:

on account of the intervention in Afghanistan, Iran had assumed the status of a frontline state with the possibility of the Soviet Union capitalising on the political turmoil there. As regards Pakistan, the influx of Afghan refugees sharing an ethnic identity with Pakistanis of the North West Frontier Province (NWFP), into the country was posing a grave danger to its security. (66)

The British Prime Minister also made a reference to Indian anxieties. 67

Adverting to the criticism forthcoming from more than a hundred countries in the nonaligned community she said, "seldom had a great power been censured publicly, so rapidly and comprehensively. With this, the Soviet claim of its being the champion of the developing world was shattered." 68 "Though the countries of the Third world were awakening to the realities of the Soviet foreign policy design, there was the need to develop effective answers to the threat of subversion within these countries" said the Prime Minister. 69

66 Ibid.
67 Ibid., cols. 940-5.
68 Ibid.
69 "Survey of Current Affairs", n.61, p.50.
Calling upon the nations of the free world to be resolute and united in their stand against the Soviet action in Afghanistan, she stated "there was need to impress upon the Soviet Union the folly of its action and the serious consequences which would befall it, if it repeated such action elsewhere."

Outlining the measures to deal with the Soviet threat, Thatcher listed the action initiated by her government. These were:

a) Termination of all British aid to the Afghan government.
b) Non recognition of the new regime in Kabul.
c) Initiation of consultations with the North Atlantic Alliance and the European Community for concerted action to counter the Soviet presence in Afghanistan.
d) Review of the British aid plans to Pakistan for improving stability in the gulf and the Arabian peninsula.
e) Review of the British decision to participate in the 1980 Moscow Olympics.

Emphasising the need for unity in the Western alliance to counter the Soviet move, she said in conclusion we must not give the impression that our indignation is synthetic or short lived. The most pervasive evidence of our determination will be our willingness to sustain our unity and defence effort. (72)

70 UK, Commons, Parliamentary Debates, n.62, col.63.
71 Ibid.
72 Ibid.
The Lord Privy Seal, Ian Gilmour, speaking in the Commons, reckoned the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan to be a breach of all conventions governing East-West relations. The intervention was also termed as a vivid demonstration of the Soviet drive to gain wider influence by propaganda, force and subversion. 73

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary Douglas Hurd, referring to the dangers of the Soviet action in Afghanistan, urged the Western Alliance to draw the right conclusions 74 and initiate measures to restrain the Soviets from pursuing a policy of expansionism in the Third World. 75 He also rejected all allegations of arms being supplied to the rebels by his government. 76

The British Government's stand on the intervention was further elaborated upon in the House of Lords by the former Foreign Secretary, Lord Carrington, who also spoke


74 In the case of Afghanistan he said, "the Soviets had shown vividly that when they gain positions of power in developing countries, they are willing to risk their relations with the west. Nonalignment was no protection against their appetite. Further, Soviet intervention could be anticipated elsewhere, unless the international community categorically rejected and opposed such action by any country. The Soviet action in Afghanistan merits thorough review in the West's relations with the Soviet Union and its allies". See UK, Commons, Parliamentary Debates, series 5, vol. 976, part 2, session 1979-80, 17 December 1979, cols. 1222, 1227.

75 For details see UK, Commons, Parliamentary Debates, series 5, vol. 988, session 1979-80, 7 July 1980, col. 42.

76 Ibid.
about his visit to the troubled region and indicated the points of agreement which had emerged between his country India, Oman, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Turkey.77

Commenting upon the measures initiated by the Government to counter the Soviet action, Lord Carrington spoke of certain other measures which the government had to take. These were: 78

a) A firm commitment by Britain and the Western Alliance to guarantee the independence and security of the region, especially Pakistan.

b) Increased British cooperation with Turkey.

c) Strengthening British links with the Arab countries.

d) Securing a permanent Arab-Israeli settlement.

e) Rebuilding a mutually satisfactory relationship with the people and government of Iran.

Further, to defuse the crisis in South-West Asia, which posed a grave threat to peace, he outlined the following measures.79

a) Initiation of measures by Britain to limit, contain and repair the damage which the Soviet intervention had caused.

b) Maintenance of the lines of communication with the Soviets and the continuance of the negotiations for arms control and disarmament.


78 Ibid.

79 UK, Lords, Parliamentary Debates, n.77, col.1372.
c) Joint efforts with the Soviet Union for the construction of a system of detente, free from the illusions of the past and the establishment of a framework for dealing with future problems.

Stressing the need to secure a Soviet troop withdrawal from Afghanistan in the interest of the world community, he commended the European Parliament's decision to designate 21 March as Afghan Day to bring to the notice of the world the continued presence of the Soviet troops in Afghanistan and the concomitant suffering being heaped on the people of Afghanistan. 80

Concluding his statement he highlighted the strategic importance of Afghanistan and called upon the British government to be ever vigilant and not to under-rate the gravity of the events in that country.

The Soviet action in Afghanistan was condemned by almost all the other members of the House of Lords who spoke on the situation in Afghanistan and some of them outlined measures to be taken by the British government to counter the Soviet action. 81

Lord Stewart of Fulham suggested the following measures:

80 To escape this, several thousands of Afghans have fled their native land and live as refugees in relatively safer places in Iran and Pakistan. Ibid.

81 Ibid., cols. 530-46.
a) Development of closer ties with the countries of the third world.

b) Drawing fresh lines of control in the vulnerable areas of the world in concert with NATO and the European Community.

c) Termination of all British economic, technological and military contacts with the Soviet Union.

Lord Segal apprehending the threat to the Persian gulf as a consequence of the Soviet action in Afghanistan outlined the following measures:

a) Strengthening the countries opposed to the Soviet Union with increased British aid.

b) Securing unity among the Arab states.

Lord Hankey on his part while referring to the various developmental and construction programmes being undertaken by the Soviets in Afghanistan saw it as a pointer to the long term Soviet aims in the region. As the UK he felt was also the target of Marxist and Soviet penetration since a long time he suggested the following measures to deal with the growing threat from the Soviet Union:

a) Improvement of the British defence system.

b) Strengthening and deploying of forces all along the oil routes.

c) Forewarning adversaries of Western retaliation against acts similar to the one in Afghanistan.

The Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Commons, with Conservative members of Parliament in the majority, issued a report about the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.
This committee's report on the events in Afghanistan and its impact on the general situation in the Middle East followed several visits to the region by the committee members. The viewpoints of several experts was also taken into account. One of the major findings of the committee was that the Soviet intervention was a defensive measure which served the opportunist trend of Soviet tactics. However the committee had no evidence or grounds to conclude that the invasion was part of a grand strategy to extend Soviet influence to the Gulf region and thereby threaten western oil supplies.

The other significant findings of the committee was:

a) The realization in the West that there is no quick remedy to the problems created by the Soviet intervention.

b) In proposing the extension of detente beyond Europe to the Gulf and the Indian Ocean, the Committee recognized the need for a searching reconsideration of Soviet aims and objectives. This it felt to be an essential factor in containing Soviet expansionism and opportunism in South Central Asia as well as the Horn of Africa.

c) The Committee backed the British Governments views as regards the presence of Soviet forces in Afghanistan. However, it did not go along with it as regards imposition of sanctions against the Soviet Union. On the contrary it urged for the stabilization

of East-West relations, the resolution of misunderstandings and the rebuilding of bridges between East and West in a mutually beneficial way. (83)

d) The Committee agreed with Professor Erickson - a strong opponent of the "master plan" - that the Soviets having moved into Afghanistan primarily to protect the security of their perimeter, found greater gains than originally aimed. With the foothold in Afghanistan the Soviets are today nearer to the Persian Gulf.

e) Accepting the fact that the Soviet Union is committed for a long drawn out struggle in Afghanistan, the Committee felt it was imperative for the West to work for the total withdrawal of the Soviet forces from Afghanistan.

f) The Committee's main emphasis was on positive actions, going beyond the exhortation, for a coherent policy that would leave no doubt of the Wests determination or ability to resist further military aggression against the NATO countries and the Third World.

g) In a sharp departure from the British Government's policy, the Committee recommended more economic development assistance and other measures to strengthen relations with the Third World.

h) The Committee felt, the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan presented the UK and its allies with an opportunity to build closer ties with the countries of the Third World.

i) The Committee believed that most effective way to counter the geopolitical dangers stemming from the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was to work towards a broad solution of the Middle East problem with the involvement of the Soviet Union.

83 The report added that since all concerned are clearly anxious to minimise the chances of nuclear conflict arising out of confusion and misunderstanding, both within the Western Alliance, and between East and the West, such clarification is an urgent necessity. See Ibid., p.56.
According priority to the solution of the Palestinian problem and securing stability and security in the Gulf region. However, the Committee felt that an overconspicuous extension of the West's military presence in the Gulf could prove to be a destabilizing factor. (84)

Reaction of France

In the UN Security Council the French spokesman who was also the President of the Council during 1980, expressed grave concern at the intervention and defended the sovereignty inhering in every state. Rejecting the theory of intervention by invitation, the French spokesman pointed out the glaring fallacy in the argument. (85) As regards the invoking of Article 51 of the UN Charter (86) as a legitimizing factor of the Soviet action, the French spokesman pointed out that Article 51 established an obligatory link between the exercise of the right of self defence and the

84 For a detailed analysis of the findings of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Commons on the events in Afghanistan and its impact on the Middle East. See Ibid., pp. 56-59. Also see Kuldip Nayar, Report on Afghanistan (New Delhi, 1981), pp. 1, 4, 9, 44, 137, 148, 161-3.

85 According the French spokesman, whereas the Government which made the appeal was set up on 27 December 1979, the Soviets moved into Afghanistan on 24 December 1979. For details see UN Doc. S/PV. 2190, 7 January 1980, p. 51.

86 For details of Article 51 see Charter of the UN, n.10, pp. 27-28.
existence of an armed attack against the state involved. The terming the Soviet action as being unacceptable he sought an immediate withdrawal of the Soviet forces from Afghanistan as the first step towards the restoration of the independent and nonaligned status of the country.

Expressing similar views in the UN General Assembly's Sixth emergency session, the French delegate Jacques Le Prette pointed out that the Soviet action was against the joint declaration of France and the Soviet Union on détente. Further, at the Thirty Seventh session the French delegate P. Jolre besides condemning the Soviet action called for an early end to the crisis by arriving at a political settlement based on the principles of the UN Charter and the strict implementation of the resolutions of the General Assembly.

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87 The absence of any such armed attack forced the Soviets to brand the People's movement as an armed insurrection and thereby claimed justification for the deployment of its forces in Afghanistan. See UN Doc. A/ES-6/PV-3, 11 January 1980, p. 51.


89 The UN General Assembly in its various Resolutions called for
a) An immediate withdrawal of the Soviet troops.
b) Restoration of the free and nonaligned status of Afghanistan.
c) Guaranteed freedom to the people of Afghanistan to determine their own future.
d) Non-interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan.

For details see UN Resolutions in UN Doc. A/ES-6/2-1, 11 January 1980 and A/36/L 15, 11 November 1981.
Reaction in the French National Assembly

The Foreign Minister of France, François Poncet, speaking in the National Assembly on 17 April 1980 condemned the Soviet intervention and termed it as a danger to the policy of detente. While there was a general consensus among the various political groups in France as regards the Governments stand on the Soviet intervention, the French Communist Party leader Georges Marchais by supporting the Soviet action in Afghanistan dealt a severe blow to the 'Union of Left' in France.

The Communist/Socialist Bloc's Reactions to the Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan

The Soviet Union

In the UN Security Council, the Soviet representative, objected to the issue of 'Afghanistan' being raised, he considered it to be a violation of Article 2(7) and 51 of the Charter of the United Nations. Justifying the Soviet troop presence in Afghanistan, he pointed out that the troops were sent to Afghanistan in response to repeated appeals

91 The Union of the Left was the result of the unity between the Communists, Socialists and the Left radicals. Ibid., p.24.
of the DRA to counter the armed intervention in the country's internal affairs, and had no links whatsoever with the change of leadership in Afghanistan. The Soviet action it was also stressed was in accord with the provisions of the 5 December 1978 Treaty between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan.

Rejecting the Security Council's draft Resolution on Afghanistan, Troyanovsky pointed out that "it was a mechanism by means of which the imperialists desired to restore the feudal order, since rejected by the people of Afghanistan." In a categoric statement to the UN Security Council, the Soviet representative stressed that "the Soviet forces would withdraw from Afghanistan, only when the causes which led to its entry no longer existed".

At the Sixth Emergency Special Session of the UN General Assembly convened to consider the situation arising out of the Soviet troop entry into Afghanistan the Soviet delegate Troyanovsky once again questioned the legitimacy of the General Assembly in discussing the issue. Describing the April Revolution as a major milestone in the

93 UN Doc., n.57, p.12.
94 For details of the Treaty Provisions see Keesing's Archives, n.47, p.29
95 UN Doc.,n.57, p.18.
96 Ibid.
peoples liberation struggle against colonial, feudal and imperialist oppression, the Soviet representative pointed out that "it was only after the Revolution that certain Western powers, Pakistan, China commenced intervention into Afghanistan's internal affairs by supporting and backing the so called freedom fighters 'The Mujahideen'. To counter these forces, at the specific request of the Afghan Government and in accord with the provisions of the December 1978 Treaty, the Soviets moved their troops into Afghanistan argued Troyanovsky. Similar arguments were put forth by the Soviet representative at the Thirty Fifth, Thirty Sixth, and Thirty Eighth General Assembly sessions.

As regards the efforts to attain a political settlement Troyanovsky stated at the Thirty Fifth General Assembly session that the DRA proposals of 14 May 1980 could alone form the basis of a permanent settlement in Afghanistan.

98 The Soviets branded these freedom fighters as counter-revolutionary gangs whose sole aim was to destabilize the Government in Afghanistan. Most of them were stated to have been trained in Pakistan. For details see ibid., pp.26-30.


100 For details of the DRA's 14 May 1980 proposals for a political settlement and normalization of relations with Pakistan and Iran see DRA, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Undeclared War: Armed Intervention and other Forms of Interference in the Internal Affairs of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (Kabul, 1981), pp.52-55.
To this, at the Thirty Eighth session he added "a political settlement acceptable to both the DRA and the Soviet Union could alone lead to a phased withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan". In this regard he termed the UN Resolutions of the Thirty Sixth and Thirty Seventh General Assemblies - on the Afghan issue - a one sided document, which ignored the legitimate interests of all the parties concerned, especially the Soviet Union and Afghanistan.

Expressing optimism at the UN Secretary General's effort to end the crisis in Afghanistan, he concluded his observations in the General Assembly's Thirty Eighth session by reiterating the stand taken by Leonid Brezhnev's successor Yuri Andropov on the question of a political settlement in Afghanistan.

**Czechoslovakia**

The Czech delegate to the UN Security Council, Ilja Hullinsky questioned the right of the Council to discuss a matter which was exclusively within the Domestic Jurisdiction of Afghanistan. Defending all the assistance provided

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102 Ibid.
103 The Soviet leader Andropov had stated that the Soviet troops would be withdrawn from Afghanistan only after all types of interference from outside ceased in that country and guarantees for its non resumption provided. See UN Doc. A/38/PV-67, 25 November 1983, p. 61.
by the Soviet Union to Afghanistan, he stated "international assistance of the Soviet Union will be understood and supported by all those who cherish the goals of the Afghan revolution, and respect the efforts of the Afghan people to attain peace and progress." He urged the Security Council to be concerned with more serious issues viz. Arms Race, Detente and not be bogged down with a matter exclusively within the domestic jurisdiction of the DRA.

At the Sixth UN General Assembly's Sixth Emergency special session Hulinsky pointed out that the convening of the emergency session of the UN General Assembly reflected the desire of certain vested interests to misuse the world body to undermine the gains of the April Revolution and to involve the individual representatives of nonaligned countries in the network of the anti-Soviet campaign.

At the Thirty Sixth Session of the General Assembly the Czech representative Stanislav Juja objected to the UN's consideration of the Afghan issue and categorically pointed out that only when all types of interference and armed intervention into Afghanistan ended could the Soviet

105 The imperialist states were determined to undermine the revolution because it had become a part of the general struggle of the people against colonial, feudal and imperialist oppression. Ibid.
Union decide upon a schedule of withdrawal of its troops.106

Highlighting the bonds of friendship between Czechoslovakia and the DRA, Suja expressed the view that cooperation between the two countries was based on the equitable bilateral ties aimed at establishing a society based upon social justice and a state based on political stability, independence and territorial integrity. Concluding on an optimistic note he hoped that a permanent settlement would emerge under the ongoing UN sponsored indirect talks between Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan.

**German Democratic Republic**

Peter Florin, the representative of the German Democratic Republic, speaking at the UN Security Council contended that the deliberations on the Afghan issue were a direct interference into the internal affairs of Afghanistan and a contravention of the provisions of the UN Charter.

Describing the military assistance provided by the Soviet Union to Afghanistan as a legitimate act to counter the mechanisation of the imperialists, he went on to state that "the invoking of the 5 December 1978 bilateral treaty between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union, enabled the people of Afghanistan to continue a course of development".

which ensured a new life for the people. He reiterated this stand both at the Sixth emergency session of the General Assembly and the Thirty Seventh session.

To bring to an end the turmoil in Afghanistan, he urged a political settlement based upon guarantees of non-interference by the counter revolutionary forces in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. Florin expressed the view that the peace proposals of the DRA of 14 May 1980, 24 August 1981 and the mediatory efforts of the UN Secretary General could bring about a political settlement in Afghanistan.

Vietnam

At the UN Security Council meet of January 1980 convened to consider the situation arising out of the Soviet move into Afghanistan, the Vietnamese representative Ha Van Lau objected to the matter being considered by the

107 UN Doc., n.104, p.7.
109 For details see UN Doc. A/37/PV-80, 27 November 1982, p.21.
110 For details see Undeclared war, n.100, pp.52-55.
Security Council since it violated Article 2(7) of the UN Charter.\textsuperscript{113} Justifying the legitimate Soviet military assistance to Afghanistan, Van Lau quoting the Afghan President Babrek Karmal said "it represented the will of the people of Afghanistan and was being used to thwart the imperialist threats creating havoc in Afghanistan".\textsuperscript{114}

Lauding the efforts of the Afghan people to consolidate the gains of the revolution he added

the toll in human lives paid for by the courageous people for their political and social emancipation says a good deal about their determination to put behind them centuries of injustice and end a rule of tyranny which had for long subjected the people of Afghanistan to poverty, ignorance and slavery.\textsuperscript{115}

He also condemned the imperialists powers, led by the US and also China, who he contended were training and arming the enemies of the revolution, whipping up political prejudices within the country and poisoning the religious groups with the sole objective of weakening the revolution.\textsuperscript{116}

The Vietnamese stand on the Afghan issue was also reiterated by Van Lau in the Thirty Sixth General Assembly session of the UN when he pointed out that the role of the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{113} See Charter of the UN, n.10', p.5.
\item \textsuperscript{114} UN Doc. S/PV-2789, 7 January 1980, p.37.
\item \textsuperscript{115} Ibid., pp.33-35.
\item \textsuperscript{116} Ibid.
\end{itemize}
imperialists in Afghanistan was hampering the implementation of the progressive reforms of the DRA.\textsuperscript{117}

At the Thirty Seventh session the Vietnamese representative Nguyen Ngoc Dung condemned the role of the imperialists in Afghanistan stating "the vociferous campaign waged throughout the world on the alleged question of the situation in Afghanistan was a manoeuvre in a policy of uniting the allied forces in anti-Sovietism, against detente, international peace and security".\textsuperscript{118}

Ngoc Dung justified the Soviet troop presence in Afghanistan and contended that only a guaranteed cessation of all external interference into the internal affairs of Afghanistan could lead to a Soviet troop withdrawal and thus bring to an end the conflict.

\textbf{China's Reaction to the Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan}

The Chinese reaction to the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan was categorical and pronounced. At the UN Security Council's session on Afghanistan, the Chinese representative Chen Chu, condemned the Soviet action and

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{117} The imperialist activity in Afghanistan had taken the form of armed attacks against Afghan territory by mercenaries trained, equipped financed and commanded by foreigners in camps located in Pakistan; psychological warfare against the DRA and the pronounced official policy of the United States to impose economic and political pressure on the DRA. For details see, UN Doc. A/36/PV-60, 18 November 1981, pp.6-7.
\item \textsuperscript{118} UN Doc. A/37/PV-79, 27 November 1982, p.58.
\end{itemize}
termed it a brazen provocation against the peoples of the world. He also pointed out that with this act, the Soviet Union had extended its theory of limited sovereignty from its community of nations to a nonaligned country.

Urging all the states under Soviet domination to unite and resist its imperialist policies the Chinese representative sought an immediate withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan. Concluding his arguments in the Security Council Chen Chu stated "all aggressors in history who were formidable for a time could not escape the shameful end of being burnt by the fire which they themselves had lit. It is the people and not hegemonists who will finally decide the destiny of mankind". In the General Assembly of the UN, at its sixth emergency special session he justified the convening of the session and pointed out that the Soviet move into Afghanistan was a well planned move and an action which:

a) violated the provisions of the UN Charter and International Law

b) encroached upon the sovereignty and independence of Afghanistan, and

c) was an escalation of the Soviet Policy of aggression to attain strategic superiority and global dominance.

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120 Ibid., p. 23.
121 Ibid., p. 25.
122 UN Doc., n.108, p. 55.
Rejecting the Soviet theory of intervention by invitation, the Chinese representative pointed out that the Soviet government on its own invited its forces to invade Afghanistan, and by so doing extended use of its theory of limited sovereignty from the Soviet bloc to a nonaligned Islamic country of the Third World. This act of the Soviet Union argued Chen Chu would have serious repercussions for the small and weak nations of the Third World. (123)

To counter the Soviet threat, the Chinese representative urged united action by all states. (124) He also called upon the UN to condemn unequivocally the Soviet intervention, demand the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of the Soviet forces from Afghanistan and support the valiant Afghan people resisting the Soviet forces in their country. (125)

At the Thirty Sixth General Assembly session, the Chinese representative Ling Qing described the events in Afghanistan since the intervention (126) and branded it as a

123 It was particularly stressed that if the Soviet aggression was not checked other nations of the Third World would be faced with a similar situation in the not too distant future, for the Soviets having swallowed one state, watched for international reactions and if it was weak, would swallow another and so on ad-infinitum. Ibid.

124 United action was called for to frustrate Soviet hegemonism and expansionism. Ibid.

125 Ibid.

126 Within two years of its entry, the Soviet Union had laid waste to towns and villages, massacred the inhabitants by means of all types of modern arms short of nuclear weapons. Its mopping up operations resulted in a vast area turning into a no man's land and led to a large exodus of refugees from Afghanistan to neighbouring Iran and Pakistan. See UN Doc.n.106,p.21.
projection of the long term Soviet design in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{127} Averting to the longstanding ties of friendship between his country and Afghanistan, he reiterated his country's intention to restore the nonaligned and independent status of Afghanistan. To attain this, as a first step he urged for the implementation of the UN Resolution on Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{128} Its implementation, he argued, would facilitate the withdrawal of Soviet troops and augment the political settlement.\textsuperscript{129} Opposing any settlement which would acquiesce

\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{127}] The Soviet Union since its entry into Afghanistan had established new and expanded old air bases, built strategic highways, bridges, barracks, oil depots and other military installations on an enormous scale, that far exceeded the needs of the temporary garrisoning of Soviet troops in Afghanistan. For details see UN Doc., A/36/PV-21, 7 October 1983, p.29.

\item[\textsuperscript{128}] Paras 1 and 2 of the draft Resolution of the UN General Assembly No.A/36/L 15, 11 November 1981, affirmed the inalienable and incontestable rights of the people of Afghanistan as recognized by international law. Para 3 reaffirmed the rights of the Afghan people in accord with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international law. Paras 4 and 5 stressed upon the humanitarian objectives and responsibilities inhering upon all states and paras 6, 7 and 8 dealt with the role of the UN Secretary General in bringing about a political settlement in Afghanistan. For details see UN Doc.A/36/L 15, 11 November 1981, pp.1-3.

\item[\textsuperscript{129}] UN Doc.A/ES-6/PV-6, 14 January 1980, pp.44-45.
\end{itemize}
with the Soviet stand on Afghanistan, Ling Qing outlined the basic principles of a viable political settlement in Afghanistan. To this end he put on record his country's willingness to cooperate with the UN Secretary General's effort and also provide the necessary international guarantees with other countries to secure permanent peace in Afghanistan.

**Chinese Reaction through the News Media**

Beijing regarded the events in Afghanistan a fresh expansionist manoeuvre by the Soviet Union and Afghanistan as having become a satellite of the Soviet Union. An Agence France Press (AFP) report from Beijing claimed that

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130 (a) Through the DRA Peace Proposals of 24 August 1980, the Soviets insisted that the armed occupation of Afghanistan by the Soviet armed forces was an internal affair of Afghanistan and beyond the scope of discussion.

(b) The struggle of the Afghan people and opposition to the intervention by the nonaligned countries, and the Islamic states was branded as interference and end to it was made a pre-condition for the Soviet troop withdrawal.

(c) A regional conference on Afghanistan was to be convened and adequate guarantee of non-interference and non-intervention was to be provided by several countries. See Afghanistan Wants Peace, n.111, pp.3-4.

131 The problem in Afghanistan is in essence a question of armed intervention and military occupation of a weak third world country by a super power. Therefore, the key to its solution was in the complete and unconditional withdrawal of all foreign troops from Afghanistan and negotiating a political settlement, reflecting the desires of the people of Afghanistan.
China had boosted its forces along the 50 mile long border with Afghanistan in the Pamir region. It said that the Chinese leaders saw the events in Kabul as a new, dangerous manifestation of the Soviet policy of trying to encircle China. 132

A Beijing Radio report commented sarcastically "within less than six months the Kremlin's good friend Taraki was killed by the Kremlin's good friend Amin and Amin was executed by Karmal another good friend of the Kremlin. This clearly shows that Afghanistan is completely under Soviet influence. Not only are Afghanistan's internal, diplomatic, military affairs under Soviet control but even the selection of Government personnel and their life and death and honour and disgrace are all decided by the Kremlin". 133 Moscow's aim in Beijing's view went beyond enslaving and plundering the Afghan people. Afghanistan was only another gate through which the Soviet Union could enter the Persian gulf. 134

For the Chinese, the struggle against the Soviet Union was a world wide struggle against hegemonism. A high level Chinese Communist party functionary warned that "it

133 Beijing Radio Commentary, 29 December 1979 in Ibid.
134 Ibid.
is impermissible to tolerate and connive at the aggressors when they try to stall for time, put forward preconditions or leave part of their troops behind just to achieve their aggressive aims." Reflecting the thinking of the top leadership, he listed three principles for a genuine solution in Afghanistan.

a) The withdrawal of the Soviet troops was not to be subject to any preconditions nor part of a package deal.

b) The internal affairs of Afghanistan was to be the sole concern of the people of Afghanistan. No one should compel the people of Afghanistan to accept the fait accompli achieved by the Soviet invasion.

c) All the countries in the world and their peoples had to firmly support the Afghan people’s current struggle against the Soviet occupation troops.

Thus to Beijing, the events in Afghanistan were neither an isolated nor a regional phenomenon but another step in Moscow’s relentless drive towards global expansion. The major lesson to be drawn from the Afghan crisis according to a Chinese commentator was that


136 Ibid.
"the world should entertain no impractical illusions about the Soviet Union". 137

Albania

Albania was the only country, besides China, which was critical of the Soviet action in Afghanistan. At the Sixth emergency special session, the Albanian representative termed the Soviet action fascist and warlike. 138 The intervention was reckoned to be a pre-planned act and the efforts of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan thereafter, was to confront the international community with a fait accompli. 139

At the Thirty Sixth General Assembly session of the UN, the Albanian representative Goleta Besides once again condemning the Soviet / action, commented upon the long term objectives of the Soviets in Afghanistan 140 and the methods being followed to secure them. 141

138 UN Doc., n.98, p.4.
139 Ibid.
140 The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, was a point of departure and of support for its other expansionist moves, to create extensive zones of influence in South West Asia: the Persian Gulf and between the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean. Ibid., p.54.
141 These are: The use of the latest methods of warfare; the notorious scorched earth policy; the successive mopping up operations; the large scale massacres, the destruction of towns and the countryside leading to large scale exodus of people from Afghanistan to Pakistan and Iran. See Ibid.
Adverting to the efforts of the Soviet Union and DRA to work out a political settlement, Beleta expressed the view that all the schemes initiated by the Soviet Union in Afghanistan were bound to fail because of the mounting resistance to the Soviet backed regime. He was also critical of the US and Chinese action in Afghanistan. The attempts to secure a political settlement in Afghanistan under the aegis of the UN was also viewed in this light.

Concluding his defence of the Afghan cause, Beleta, sought international condemnation of the Soviet action and support for the liberation struggles. An early withdrawal of Soviet forces from the country with guarantees for an end to all types of interference was indispensable for permanent peace, reiterated the Albanian representative.

142 The US and China have been accused by the Government of the DRA and the Soviet Union, for arming and training the Afghan Resistance.

143 Even the efforts at a political settlement was reckoned to be a part of the super power game. This was the contention of Baleta when he said "Events confirm our belief that the true settlement of the Afghan problem cannot be the result of diplomatic bargaining on the basis of east-west relations. History is full with examples which show how the great imperialist powers have trodden on the fundamental rights and the legitimate interest of entire peoples and nations in order to satisfy their selfish interests and by way of solutions to problems that they themselves had for the most part created. See Un Doc., n.117. p.56."
Third World Reaction

Ever since the Soviet combat troops entered Afghanistan at the end of December 1979, several countries of the Third World - in Asia, Africa and Latin America - both collectively and individually have criticised the Soviet action.

Looking at the change in Third World attitudes after the Soviet military intervention, one can confidently assert that the era of unlimited optimism about the Soviet aspirations has ended and a new historical perspective marked by anxiety and uncertainty underlies the fabric of Soviet - Third World relations. The extent of demonstrative annoyance with the Soviets varied considerably and depended on the rules of the political game according to which political elites considered themselves as instruments for legitimization of radical or conservative ideologies. In general the type of frontal attack on Soviet aims was unprecedented and gave rise to a pervasive awareness in the Third World that the realisation of political Utopias came up against the large scale power projection capabilities of a Super Power, albeit a socialist one. The differences in assessments prominently revealed the extent to which the domestic struggle for power in Third World countries had created a network of integrative relationships with the Soviet structure of political and ideological norms.

A distinction should be made between the diminished
payoff available to the Soviet Union from its cautious and subtle diplomacy and the outcomes of the new and more bold assumption about the course of Soviet military policy in the Third World. Suffice it to say that most Third World countries have been engaged in redefining their national priorities as a repercussion of the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan. In many cases, the traditional focus of Soviet ideology and its overriding sense of righteous 'proletarian' purpose has been replaced by new features of the Soviet preparedness to use its military organization. At this stage the key variable in Third World behaviour can only be guessed at but the first reactions clearly showed that pluralism and independence were indispensable ingredients of heterogeneity of the Third World. The justifications advanced even by those who supported the Soviet line showed that the ruling elites could recognize at some level their isolation from the main trend of opinion in the Third World.

The strength of the condemnation of the Third World countries varied. While some were very critical of the Soviet action, a few others chose to soft pedal it for various reasons, either for serving their short term tactical interests or because their foreign policies were in basic agreement with the interests of the Soviet Union.
In order to appreciate the force of these opinions, a review of the reactions of a few select countries from Asia, Africa and Latin America has been made in the following pages.

**Egypt's Reaction to the Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan**

At the United Nation's Security Council deliberations on the Afghan issue, the Egyptian representative, Abdel Meguid, termed the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan as a flagrant violation of the principles of the Charter of the UN and International law. The Soviet action was reckoned an infringement upon the sovereignty, political independence and territorial integrity of Afghanistan.

It was also contended that by its intervention in Afghanistan, the Soviet Union violated several principles of the UN. Further to uphold the values of Islam, Meguid sought united action of the Islamic states to counter

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144 UN Doc.n.119, p.52.

145 It violated the non-intervention resolution introduced by the Soviet Union at the Twentieth UN General Assembly session. It violated Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, besides UN General Assembly Resolutions 2131-XX, 2625-XXV which prohibited states or groups from using force or intervening directly or indirectly for any reason whatsoever, in the internal or external affairs of a state. It acted in contravention of its many pronouncements against interference, aggression and dictation in the affairs of other states. (£/n.cont....n/page)
the Soviet threat. He also urged constructive efforts to bolster the Afghan struggle against the Soviet occupation. Reminding the world body of its responsibility in safeguarding the sovereignty and political independence of small states, he urged immediate international action to secure.

a) The unconditional withdrawal of the Soviet forces from Afghanistan.

b) Termination of the Soviet interference in the affairs of Afghanistan.

c) Respect for the sovereign right of the people of Afghanistan to determine their future and to choose their own economic, political and social system free from external intervention.

At the Sixth emergency special session of the UN General Assembly held in January 1980, the Egyptian representative, Nabil A. Elaraby describing the Soviet action in Afghanistan to be a threat to peace, termed it also as an act which was spreading insecurity among the small states. He urged these states to adopt measures to counter this threat. 146

(Previous f/n. cont...)

It also violated the policy of inadmissibility of hegemonism in international relations which the Soviet Union itself reckons to be indispensable for eradicating tension and instability in international relations. For details of above see UN Doc. GAOR, 20 session Annexes, 21 September – 22 December 1965, pp. 10-11.

146 That is to unite the efforts of the nonaligned countries and affirm the close ties that link their interests to international law, the Charter of the UN. For details see UN Doc. A/EJ-6/PV-5, 12 January 1980, p. 17.
Referring to the increasing resistance to the Afghan regime and the growing number of refugees, he argued that this was a proof of the growing alienation of the people of Afghanistan to the Soviet action and a negation of all justification which the Soviets have offered to legitimize their action. Expressing his country's solidarity with the struggling people of Afghanistan, the Egyptian spokesman at the Thirty Sixth session of the UN General Assembly, Meguid, called for an immediate withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan on the basis of the UN draft Resolution.147 Concluding Meguid reiterated his country's commitment to the UN Resolution on Afghanistan and urged for the total withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan and also sought the cooperation of the Afghan Mujahideen in restoring the sovereign independent and nonaligned status of the country.

Indonesia's Reaction

At the Sixth emergency session of the UN General Assembly, the Indonesian spokesman Purbos Swando, speaking about the Soviet action in Afghanistan, stated that his country was against all interventions and sought an end to the Soviet intervention, to prevent a wider conflagration.148 Recapitulating the Indonesian President's

147 For relevant sections of the Resolution see UN Doc. n.128, pp.1-3.
148 UN Doc. n.129, p.62.
address to the Indonesian Parliament - on the Soviet action - he stated "the external intervention in Afghanistan had shaken the foundations of world peace and infringed upon the principles of peaceful coexistence and mutual respect." 149

Iran

Speaking on behalf of his country at the Thirty Sixth UN General Assembly’s session Mohammed Jafar Mahalati, characterised the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan a grave threat to Islam. Condemning the Soviet action he said: "Islamic Iran was committed to Islamic values and could not compromise with actions of the super powers or its clients." 150

Rejecting the Western proposals for a peace settlement, Mahalati stated that only an Islamic system of government based upon the will of the people of Afghanistan could restore peace in the region. To this end, the Iranian representative put forward his country’s proposals

149 Ibid.

150 Iran refused to compromise with the Islamic principles, more so when the muslims in Afghanistan were being subjected to all types of hardships by the Soviet Union. For details see UN Doc., n.14, p.52.
to restore peace and normalcy in Afghanistan.151 Any settlement in Afghanistan was to be only in accord with the desire and aspiration of the people of Afghanistan, disregarding this and imposing a peace formula on the people there would be counterproductive argued Mahalati.

The African Reaction to the Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan

Ethiopia

At the Sixth emergency session of the UN General Assembly, the Ethiopian representative, Mohammed Hamid

151 In accord with Iran's peace proposal, a thirty member council of committed Muslim Ulamas of the Islamic world was to be set up by the representatives of the Afghan Mujahideen, Iran, Pakistan and a Muslim country committed to counter imperialism and Zionism. This council was to aid and supervise the setting up of a founding council of committed Ulama and notables of Afghanistan vested previously with the following duties:

a) The setting up of a revolutionary council with an executive mandate.

b) Creation of a command council with security responsibilities including formation of an Islamic peace keeping force made up of forces from Iran and Pakistan and a third Muslim country under the general supervision of a thirty member Islamic council.

c) Carrying out legislative duties in the transitional period.

d) The holding of national elections to establish a Parliament which would undertake the responsibility of writing an Islamic constitution for Afghanistan on the basis of which the Government of Afghanistan was to be established. Ibid.
Ibrahim questioned the competence of the General Assembly to deliberate upon the situation in Afghanistan. However, the Ethiopian spokesman was categorical in his opposition to the efforts by external forces to interfere in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. The termination of all such actions, argued Ibrahim, was a precondition for the Soviet troop withdrawal and restoration of peace in Afghanistan.

Ivory Coast

Speaking at the Sixth emergency session of the UN General Assembly, the representative of Ivory Coast, Amoakon Edjaman Thieele, expressed dismay at the action of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. He stated "the country whose soldiers are today encamped on foreign soil is the very one which has convincingly and eloquently proclaimed its mission to establish an egalitarian, democratic and peaceful international system oriented towards cooperation." It was also pointed out that Soviet Union

152 The consideration of the Afghan issue by the UN General Assembly in an emergency session, was regarded as an effort by the imperialists to use the UN to serve their imperialist designs. For details see UN Doc., n.129, pp.41-45.

153 Ibid.

154 UN Doc., n.88, p.38.
from the early days of its becoming a Republic has been against the subjugation of one state by another. 155

Enumerating the various Declarations passed by the UN under the aegis of the Soviet Union, the representative of the Ivory Coast categorically stated that with its intervention in Afghanistan, the Soviet Union has compromised its stature as the champion of the Third World. 156

Calling upon the UN not to succumb to pressures and

155 Ibid.

156

a) The Declaration on the inadmissibility of intervention in the domestic affairs of states and the protection of the independence and sovereignty adopted at the Twentieth UN General Assembly session 1965. Resolution No. 2131(XX) Articles 1-8, 21 December 1965, Articles 1-8, pp.10-11.


c) The World Treaty on the non use of force in international relations, adopted at the Thirty First session of the UN General Assembly 1976, Resolution No.9/31, in UNGAOR 31 session, supplement No.39, A/31/39/ p.31.


e) Adoption of the text relating to the inadmissibility of the policy of hegemonism in international relations adopted at the Thirty Fourth United Nations General Assembly session 1979.
acquiesce with the actions of the super powers, he made a fervent appeal to the world body to take steps to secure the speedy withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan and usher an era of peace, freedom and stability in Afghanistan.

Mozambique

At the Sixth emergency session of the UN General Assembly, the representative of Mozambique Jose Carlos Lobo, questioned the justification for convening the session on Afghanistan when similar events in Angola, Botswana, Namibia, Mozambique and Zimbabwe evoked no such response. Carlos Lobo also contended that since Afghanistan was a free nation, it could make the choice of receiving aid from any quarter. The Soviet aid to Afghanistan was reckoned to be proper, justified and within the purview of the Charter provisions. 157

The Latin American Reaction to the Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan

Brazil

At the Sixth emergency special session of the UN General Assembly, the Brazilian representative Antonio Beeten Court Bueno, pointed out that "his country had

always held the principles of self-determination and sovereign equality of states and non-intervention in international affairs as the basic principles for maintaining international peace and security. Every state had to abide by these principles, argued Bueno. Condemning all types of external intervention in the affairs of small and weak states, he expressed the hope that the UN through its deliberations and efforts would bring about a speedy end to the conflict.

Chile

Speaking on behalf of his country at the UN Security Council's meet to consider the situation arising as a result of the Soviet intervention, the Chilean representative Alfredo Canales stated:

the armed attack on Afghanistan - an Islamic and nonaligned country - made it perfectly clear that the Soviet Union was once again pursuing its interventionist and expansionist policy. What happened in Afghanistan shows that the Soviet Union notwithstanding the leadership it claims in the defence of the principles of the non use of force and in combating hegemonism and other similar principles does not hesitate to violate those principles disregarding the most elementary rules of international life wherever it suits its totalitarian interests. (160)

158 UN Doc.n.10, p.28.
159 Ibid.
160 The action of the Kremlin was in keeping with the ideological and political objectives, i.e. extending its power to an embattled area of the world, whose strategic importance had increased with the existing state of the world economy. For this reason Moscow had no hesitation to use totalitarian methods of the distant past. See UN Doc.n.85, pp.28-30,32.
Referring to the dangers faced by small nations as Chile, whose sole defence was the Charter of the UN and the principle of nonalignment - by the Soviet action, the Chilean representative sought early action by the Security Council to bring to an end the Soviet presence in Afghanistan and restore the independent and nonaligned status of that country. 161

At the Thirty Seventh session of the UN General Assembly, the representative of Chile, Manuel Trucco, speaking on behalf of his country pointed out that "in its thirty seven years of existence, the UN has rarely been shaken by military action so disproportionate and damaging to its character as an organization dedicated to the maintenance of international peace." 162 Describing the conditions within Afghanistan, since the Soviet intervention, 163 he considered the efforts of the Secretary General, the only hope to bring to an end the hostilities in Afghanistan. 164

161 Ibid., p. 32.
162 UN Doc. A/37/PV-81, 29 November 1982, p. 52.
163 The Soviet intervention according to the Chilean Representative, resulted in entire villages being razed to the ground, economy being destroyed and more than half a million being killed or wounded. See Ibid., pp. 53-54.
164 Ibid.
Reiterating his country's stand on the Soviet presence, Trucco at the Thirty Eighth UN General Assembly session, expressed the apprehension that with the passage of time, the Afghan issue in the world body would become a ritualistic exercise without meaning and seriousness of approach. This he contended had to be prevented.165

Commending the role of Pakistan in respect of aiding the Afghan refugees, Trucco sought international cooperation for sustaining a humanitarian effort. Only a political settlement could usher in stable peace in Afghanistan,166 he concluded.

Cuba

Terming the Sixth UN General Assembly emergency special session on Afghanistan a pre-arranged farce and castigating the imperialists led by the US, the Cuban representative to the session Roa Kouri stated:

it is ironic that the US which is guilty of armed action in South-East Asia and Latin America, which remains unconcerned by the Israeli violations in Lebanon, South Africa's actions against Angola, Mozambique, Gambia and Botswana, should at once make an issue of the assistance of the Soviets to a fraternal state in its vicinity.(167)

165 For details of the Chilean representative's speech to the 38 UN General Assembly, see UN Doc. A/38/PV-68, 26 November 1983, pp. 26-28.
166 Ibid.
167 UN Doc., n.157, p.78.
Condemning the imperialists and their role in Afghanistan, Kouri reaffirmed his country's faith in the right of peoples to uphold their sovereignty, socialism and internationalism. 168

At the Thirty Seventh General Assembly session the Cuban spokesmen Kouri and Rosa Rio Navas once again criticised the imperialist forces for creating instability in Afghanistan. Concluding they assured all support to the people of Afghanistan to attain their independence and sovereign rights. 169

Pakistan's Reaction to the Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan

At the United Nations.

At the UN Security Council's session in January 1980, the representative of Pakistan, Niaz Naik, pointed out that the Soviet intervention was a grave threat to peace and stability in the region. Adverting to the existent fraternal ties between Afghanistan and Pakistan, Naik stated "the two peoples since time immemorial had struggled in the cause of maintaining their freedom and independence." 170 He also referred to the aid provided

168 Ibid.
169 UN Doc., n.162, p.7.
170 UN Doc., 119, p.27.
by the Pakistani government to Afghanistan since the revolution and the continuing cooperation between the two countries. Referring to the after-effects of the Soviet move into Afghanistan, he added "a major fall out of the Soviet action was the influx of Afghan refugees into Pakistan. The refugee influx affected it directly and imposed a burden on the already strained and scarce resources." Naik also refuted all allegations of Pakistan's involvement in the internal affairs of Afghanistan.

Condemning the intervention, he rejected the theory of intervention by invitation. Tarring the use of force, as counter-productive, the Pakistani representative opined that it would only prolong the agony of the Afghan people. To bring this to an end, he called for the immediate withdrawal of the Soviet forces from Afghanistan.

171 Pakistan offered Afghanistan, resources and technical skills available in Pakistan for the successful implementation of development programmes in Afghanistan. It also undertook measures to facilitate the transit of goods through Pakistan to enable the new Afghan Government to overcome the economic difficulties facing it. Ibid.
172 Ibid., p. 31.
173 Ibid.
174 This argument was untenable according to the Pakistani representative, since the person who was purported to have issued the invitation was eliminated by the invading Soviet forces. Ibid., pp. 31-32.
"The withdrawal of forces alone could guarantee the freedom, sovereignty and independence of Afghanistan argued Naik."

Reactions in the General Assembly

At the Sixth Emergency Special Session of the UN General Assembly, held in January 1980, another representative of Pakistan Aga Shahi, described the situation in Afghanistan as dangerous and fraught with negative implications for international peace and security. Rejecting all justifications put forth for the Soviet action in Afghanistan, he argued that there was no evidence forthcoming to substantiate the allegation of foreign interference or armed attacks into the country especially from Pakistani soil. Adverting to the assistance rendered by Pakistan to the refugees, Shahi contended that "Pakistan’s assistance to the refugees was in accord with universally accepted principles and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights".

Terming the Soviet action Unwarranted, the Pakistani representative urged the General Assembly to take steps to facilitate the withdrawal of all the armed forces of the

175 This viewpoint was shared by a majority of the countries of the Islamic and Nonaligned group of nations. For details see Ibid., pp. 33-35.

176 UN Doc., n.97, p.61.

177 For details see GAOR, session 3, vol.1, pp.71-77.
Soviet Union from Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{178}

At the Thirty Fifth Session of the UN General Assembly Shahi once again reiterated his country's stand on the happenings in Afghanistan. Commenting upon the increased resistance to the Soviet regime, he argued that it was an indigenous phenomenon spread over the country and not an externally engineered act. Voicing the concern of the Islamic nations, Shahi apprehended that "if the intervention in the long run attained its objectives, could become a precedent for similar interventions by major powers against smaller nonaligned neighbours".\textsuperscript{179}

To aid the process of normalization Pakistan, he said, was committed to adhere to the following principles:\textsuperscript{180}

\begin{enumerate}
\item The principle of non-interference.
\item Granting permission for international inspection of refugee camps on its territory.
\end{enumerate}

\hline
\textsuperscript{178} This was because the principles of respect for state sovereignty, national independence, territorial integrity of states, non-interference in the internal affairs and non-use of force in international relations are sacrosanct and these principles could in no manner be qualified or compromised in favour of the export of ideology or the consolidation of its gains. See UN Doc.n.97, p.63.

\textsuperscript{179} The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan set back the process of detente, reversed the trend toward the relaxation of international tension, darkened the prospects for disarmament, opened an ominous new chapter in the history of super power rivalry for spheres of influence and hegemony and vitiated the spirit of peaceful coexistence. See UN Doc.n.99,p.3.

\textsuperscript{180} Ibid., p.4.
c) Stationing of Organization of Islamic countries and Nonaligned observers on the Afghan side of the border to monitor trans-border movement.

Rejecting all justification for intervention, both political and geo-strategic, Shahi called upon the Soviet Union to abide by the verdict of the world body and withdraw its forces from Afghanistan.

To aid the process of a political settlement he suggested the following measures.

a) Neutralization of Afghanistan on the model of the Austrian State Treaty or through appropriate international guarantees.

b) Convening of an international conference under the auspices of the UN.

c) Establishment of a standing committee of the UN General Assembly to facilitate a political dialogue.

d) The convening of an international pledging conference to provide urgently required humanitarian assistance for the Afghan refugees to ameliorate the burden of Pakistan.

Shahi also gave full support of his country to the implementation of the UN General Assembly's Resolution to bring to an end the crisis in Afghanistan.181

181 The elements of a political solution as identified by the UN Resolution A/35/159, 12 December 1980 were:

a) The preservation of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and nonaligned character of Afghanistan.

b) The right of the Afghan people to determine their own form of Government and to choose their economic, political and social systems free from external intervention, subversion, coercion or constraint of any kind.

(f/n.cont... n/page)
At the Thirty Sixth Session of the General Assembly, the Pakistani representative, Naik, categorically put forth his country's adherence to the principle of non-interference.182 Referring to the front-line status of Pakistan, Naik termed it a consequence of circumstance. Seeking the cooperation of India, in the light of the changed security environment, Naik tried to allay the Indian fears of the consequences of his country's acquisition of sophisticated arms from the West.

(previous f/n.cont...)  
d) The immediate withdrawal of the foreign troops from Afghanistan.


182 In this regard he pointed out 'the allegation that the Pakistani authorities and armed forces are in any manner involved in the struggle of the Afghan people against the present regime in Kabul is preposterous. If Pakistan had permitted its territory to act as a conduit of arms, the Afghan Resistance would not be using primitive weapons. It is a known fact that the relatively more sophisticated weapons in the hands of freedom fighters have either been captured in the course of fighting or supplied to them by elements of the regular Afghan troops who continue to defect and join the national struggle. See UN Doc. A/36/PV-61, 19 November 1981, p.113.
At the Thirty Eighth session of the General Assembly, the Pakistani spokesman, its foreign minister Shahabzada Yakub Khan, referred to the instability created in the region due to the mounting resistance to the Soviet installed regime in Kabul. Rejecting the Soviet allegations of the Resistance being a counter-revolutionary phenomenon, Khan stated:

the stark reality of ruthless suppression and heroic resistance, the bombing of villages and the flight of innocent men and women and children from their hearth and home, was proof of the fortitude of the Afghans. The Afghan Resistance he said was an indigenous phenomenon spread across the length and breadth of the country including the Northern provinces of Afghanistan. (183)

Describing the intervention, as a negative phenomenon in the fluid international, political environment Khan contended that “the Afghanistan crisis has dealt a severe blow to detente and has been one of the principal causes for the deterioration of the international climate”. (184)

Stating that a political solution was the only panacea to the crisis in Afghanistan, the Pakistani foreign minister identified the outstanding issues which remained:

184 Ibid., pp.6-7.
unresolved at the UN initiated indirect talks at Geneva.\textsuperscript{185} He also referred to the steps taken by his country towards a political settlement which he contended reflected his country's positive approach towards the ongoing indirect negotiations to bring about a political settlement in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{186}

\begin{enumerate}
\item These were:
\begin{enumerate}
\item The time frame for the withdrawal of foreign troops from the country.
\item Consultation with the refugees regarding their return to Afghanistan.
\item International guarantees of non interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. Ibid., p.9.
\end{enumerate}
\end{enumerate}

\textsuperscript{186} An early end to the crisis in Afghanistan and the conclusion of a viable political settlement was a must for Pakistan, because of its national interest and the need for a stable security environment. It was also indispensable to bring to an end the refugee influx into Pakistan, a problem which was posing a grave threat to Pakistan's domestic environment and economy. Thus to end the crisis, the Pakistani foreign minister introduced a Resolution in the Thirty Eight General Assembly session which interalia provided for:

\begin{enumerate}
\item an appeal to secure the withdrawal of foreign forces,
\item a call for the creation of conditions for the voluntary return of the refugees to their homes,
\item reaffirmation of the right of the Afghans to determine their own form of government and to choose their economic, political and social system,
\item support for the UN Secretary General's efforts to attain a political settlement with the hope that it would be the first major step towards a general easing of global tension and towards lasting peace and detente. For details see Ibid., pp.18-20.
\end{enumerate}
Pakistan's Reaction at the Conference of the Organization of Islamic Conference

President Zia-Ul-Haq of Pakistan led the Islamic world and the Organization of Islamic Conference in its condemnation of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Addressing the foreign ministers of OIC during their meeting at Islamabad, 27-29 January 1980, President Zia exhorted the Islamic world to join hands, "not only to make the Soviet Union withdraw its troops from Afghanistan, but also consider measures for the collective defence of the Islamic Umma (Brotherhood)."

Terminating the intervention, a violation of international norms, he further pointed out "it was for the first time since the Second World War, a super power made a sovereign and independent Muslim country, the target of its attack. This trend had to be checked, if not the independence of small states would be in jeopardy."

Urging a coordinate Islamic effort to force the Soviets out of Afghanistan, he


188 Pakistan Times (Karachi), 28 January 1980.

189 The anti-Soviet resolution adopted by the Islamic Conference Organization, its decision to deny Kabul a seat and hearing; its decision to seat and hear insurgent Afghan leaders, its demand for a complete and unconditional withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan and its resolve to render all help to the rebels were victories for the Pakistani President. See., Sen Gupta, n.187, pp.144-5.
contemplated the formation of a peace keeping force consisting of the contingents from India, Pakistan and Iran, to oversee the Afghan border. 190

India's Reactions to the Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan

When the Soviet's sent their forces into Afghanistan in December 1979, a caretaker government with Charan Singh as prime minister was almost coming to an end of its tenure with the elections being held in January 1980. After the General elections of 1980, Indira Gandhi's Congress (I) Party was back to power. With the return of Indira Gandhi a clear cut policy on the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan was also forthcoming.

The inaugural foreign policy actions of Indira Gandhi's government was one of clear and incisive choice. In a fresh out break over pieces of real estate in South Asia, Indira Gandhi chose to remain with the Soviet Union. It was not that no other option was available to her. She could condemn the Soviet intervention, and join the US.

190 The Peace Keeping Force was to look after Afghan affairs, prevent external forays into Afghan territory and encourage the Afghan refugees in Pakistan and Iran to return to their homeland.
China and Pakistan in a concerted effort to contain the Soviet influence from extending to the inter-linked geo-strategic regions of the Persian gulf and South Asia. She could fasten Indian diplomacy on persuading Pakistan not to act as a proxy of the US and China but to work with India, Nepal and Bangladesh to protect the independence and integrity of the region and reduce the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan.

By making India's pro-Soviet stance clear to all, Indira Gandhi believed that she made an immediate contribution to stability in the region. Any ambiguity on her part would have seriously destabilised the strategic relationship which had stood India in good stead in the past and was expected to pay dividends in the future.

In no conceivable circumstances could India line up with Pakistan, China, and the US against the Soviet Union. This would have gone against the grain of India's foreign policy since independence. "Any measured censure of the Soviet action in Afghanistan, could only have cost India's valued and tested friendship without compensation from any quarter, isolation would have increased Soviet intransigence. India would have no occasion to influence Moscow's thinking and action as a friend. US arms would

192 Ibid.
have flowed to Pakistan, in large quantities, the Chinese would have trained the Afghan rebels, the Soviets with the help of the Afghan Government would have determined to destabilise Pakistan. Pakistan would conduct its nuclear explosion.... what could India have gained in such a baroque situation". 193

The objectives of India's diplomacy with regard to the Afghan crisis were determined by three fundamental premises in Indira Gandhi's Foreign Policy strategic thinking.

a) The Soviet intervention, though unfortunate and regrettable, was essentially a defensive move to secure the Afghan Revolution and defeat the US sponsored efforts to destabilise the international situation.

b) For India, far more dangerous than the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan would be the rearming of Pakistan by the US and China and the conversion of Pakistan into a cold war base.

c) In a new cold war confrontation in which the US, China, and Pakistan joined forces to contain the Soviet Union, India's national and regional interests dictated the pursuit of a single policy to try to defuse confrontation in the South Asian region by keeping close to the Soviet Union without fully identifying India with Soviet policies and actions.

Besides these, certain other factors influenced the pro-Soviet stance of India on the Afghan issue. These are:

a) The Government of India felt that the Soviets acted on the request of the Government then existing in Afghanistan.

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b) It trusted the Soviets and their assurance that the troops would be withdrawn as soon as Afghanistan requested it.

c) India perceived greater danger to its security from the existent cold war type responses of the US and China than from the Soviet action.

d) Any Sino-US move to arm Pakistan and destabilize the region would compel India to renew its strategic collaboration with the Soviet Union.

e) India's pro-Soviet stance on the Afghan issue was due to the strategic division between India and Pakistan and the concomitant security considerations in the region. (194)

Thus New Delhi's historically consistent stand of avoiding condemnations and recognizing realities in such situations in this case external subversion in Afghanistan, undeniable Soviet interest there and the fact of the Soviet Union's recent substantial commitment - again points less to the exercise of Soviet influence and more to the conclusion that the views of India and the Soviet Union on the Afghan situation were in a way similar. Therefore, New Delhi developed a two pronged approach. On the one hand, it adopted a low key and largely behind the scenes effort to bring about a Soviet withdrawal while,

194 India's security concern is primarily regional. Afghanistan might have been a global issue, but it attained regional importance for India because it led Pakistan into the US orbit. The issue of a rearmed Pakistan assumed significance, while the Soviet role in Afghanistan, since it did not directly affect India's security perceptions became secondary. It was not Afghanistan, but a rearmed Pakistan, that was the crux of the issue. This widened the perceptual gap between India and the US. For the US maintains a global perspective on security relationship in the region.
on the other it assumed a much higher profile programme of seeking to limit the global and regional response that might threaten India's interest. New Delhi's argument was that only if a major military build up in South Asia and the Indian Ocean was avoided, it would be possible to secure the Soviet pull out from Afghanistan.

India's position on the Afghanistan question was of utmost importance to the Soviet Union. The UN General Assembly vote on the Afghan resolution was an indicator of the desperate situation in which Moscow found itself. Therefore, the Soviets were quick to point out to the Government of India the direct threat which the US and the Peoples Republic of China represented to India.195

Indira Gandhi therefore concluded that India had to act primarily to defend and promote its national interest. Choosing to invoke India's core relationship with the Soviet Union in an ambience of a renewed regional conflict, she sought to prevent a consolidation of the Sin-US alliance in this region. The decisive

195 It was stated that 'Washington is again providing Pakistan with sophisticated weapons which can be turned against India, at any moment, building up its fleet in the Indian Ocean and expanding its base on Diego Garcia. Further, the US-Chinese friends continue to train and arm saboteurs recruited from among separatists in the North-Eastern states of India, seeking to use them to destabilize the political situation in the country and secure some regions of India. Peking has not yet turned over the 36,000 sq.kilometres it seized from India in 1962, see Boris Ghekhonin, "Looking into the Future", New Times (Moscow), No.4, January 1980, pp.10-11.'
and clear cut choice made by her had a sobering impact on strategic decision makers in several capitals. It opened several channels of diplomatic dialogue between India and Pakistan; India and the US; Pakistan and the Soviet Union. "The finality of India's decision to stay with the Soviet Union, did not foreclose the possibility of a regional initiative, it opened it." 196 Thus the Government of India, notwithstanding its profession of the principles of nonalignment, stood apart from a great many nonaligned nations and a major section of the third world on the Afghan issue.

India's stand on the situation in Afghanistan was put forth succinctly by the President in his address to Parliament in January-February 1980, when he said,

the intervention of outside forces and the induction of armaments in the region as well as in our neighbourhood have created a dangerous situation not only for ourselves but for the entire area. Recent developments in Afghanistan, highlight the re-emergence of the cold war. This is a matter of grave concern. The countries of the region should be permitted to devote their energies to the promotion of regional stability and cooperation with one another. The resources of the region are enormous and should be utilised for the welfare of the people there. To subject these countries to big power rivalries is totally unacceptable to us. The Government intends to initiate consultations and action to foster cooperation for the well being of the entire region. (197)

The Minister of External Affairs P. V. Narasimha Rao speaking in the Rajya Sabha on the Afghan crisis, contended that the events in Afghanistan were the consequence of the manoeuverings of the super powers. Hoping for a solution without external interference he stated "India is against the presence of foreign troops and bases in any country and it hopes, the Soviets will not stay put in Afghanistan and would pull out from Afghanistan early". He also stressed the need to view the developments in Afghanistan in their totality and not in isolation.

Thus India's stand on the Afghan issue, according to its Foreign Minister, was based upon the following factors:

a) India's opposition to the presence of foreign troops in any country.

b) India's understanding that Soviet assistance to Afghanistan was limited in time, purpose and scale.

c) The continued interference by external forces in Afghanistan was hampering an early Soviet withdrawal.

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199 Issues leading to the Revolution of 1978. Events after the Revolution, especially the efforts of the vested interests to ham the Revolution. External imperialist interference, Pakistan's role, arms programme etc., were all to be taken into account. For details see Ibid., col.95.

India was against the freezing of the Afghanistan problem in favour of either of the super powers. It wanted an immediate political solution.

India viewed the Afghan problem in the local, regional and also the global context. It was of the view that the regionalization/globalization of a purely local problem was hampering a viable political settlement.

These broad outlines of India's policy on the Afghan situation were close to the Soviet stand, the latent contradictions notwithstanding.

The Reaction of the Indian Opposition Parties

The opposition parties in India, especially the non-communist, while not assailing India's friendship with the Soviet Union, deprecated Indira Gandhi's support for

201 The Soviets felt the Afghan issue had been exaggerated by external forces who were perpetuating the aggression by training insurgents on Pakistani territory. Though the DRA had spelled out terms for a political settlement, a settlement leading to the withdrawal of troops could only be based upon guarantees precluding all outside interference in Afghan affair; and the Soviet Union was ready to withdraw its troops once such a settlement was arrived at. For details see Afghanistan Wants Peace n.111, pp.3-4.

202 The latent contradictions between the Soviet and Indian attitudes to the Afghan crisis are the following:

a) While India was keen to secure peace in the region the Soviet Union, inspite of its championing the cause of peace had willy-nilly entered Afghanistan.

b) Both the countries are keen to secure a political settlement in Afghanistan. However the perception of the two on securing a Nonaligned Afghanistan varies. See India, Rajya Sabha, Debates, vol.114, No.8, 18 June 1980, col.214.
the Soviet action in Afghanistan and questioned if the friendship with the Soviet Union was hampering it from taking an independent stance. Atal Bihari Vajpayee, the President of the Bharatiya Janata Party, in a statement on 5 September 1980, stated:

it is highly regrettable that instead of raising a powerful protest against the Soviet interference in the affairs of Afghanistan, our traditional friend and nonaligned neighbour, the attitude adopted by Indira Gandhi's Government on this issue, from the very beginning has lowered India's prestige and reduced its credibility among the nonaligned nations and isolated it from its neighbours. (203)

Although the Bharatiya Janata Party supported strengthening of Indo-Soviet ties, it did not believe that the bonds of friendship between India and the Soviet Union was fragile. 204 It disapproved the continued presence of the Soviet forces in Afghanistan and urged the Government of India to pursue an independent foreign policy. 205 The General Secretary of the party also criticized the call for a political solution in Afghanistan and characterized the Soviet Union, a modern colonial power, whose next victim he contended could be Baluchistan where divisive forces were


204 Indo-Soviet friendship is not so fragile as to be shattered merely by calling a spade a spade. See Ibid.

205 Ibid.
at work. If Baluchistan were also to come under the Soviet
domain, the Soviets would be on India's borders he argued.206
The Party's national executive in April 1981, passed a
Resolution and charged the Prime Minister, of 'imparting an
undimensional tilt towards the Soviet Union and thereby
foro-saking the principle of credible nonalignment'.207

The Janata Party's reaction was somewhat akin to the
Bharatiya Janata Party's. It urged the Government of India
to forsake the policy of passive acquiescence in the military
occupation of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union and to work
actively to mobilise the international community, the non-
aligned countries, the countries of South Asia to secure
the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan.208
Syed Shahabuddin a Janata Member of Parliament stated:

The Russian action and our reaction thereto
cannot but revive the memories of Hungary
and Czechoslovakia and the ambivalent atti-
tude adopted then. (209)

206 See Times of India (New Delhi) 14 April 1981. (All
references to the Times of India in this chapter are
to the New Delhi edition of that newspaper).
207 Times of India. 24 April 1981.
208 See Zaidi, n.203, p.736.
209 Indian Express (New Delhi), 15 January 1980. (All
references to the Indian Express in this chapter are
to the New Delhi edition of that newspaper).
Speaking in the Rajya Sabha he castigated the Government for its acquiescence with the Soviet action in Afghanistan and stated that

we have been a passive spectator to the rape of a noble and friendly people. The situation has not been defused. But in the process the Afghan people have lost their freedom and they are today under the jack boot of military occupation of a foreign power which does not spare women and children. We are spending our time thinking up new excuses and looking out for new alibis for the Soviet intervention and presence in Afghanistan. We seem to have become, i.e. our foreign office has become a think tank for the Soviets. As for the political solution, if a political solution meant slavery for the Afghans, if it means acceptance of a government backed by a foreign power, the people of Afghanistan will not accept it nor will the people of Mahatma Gandhi's India. A political solution will have to mean the take over in Afghanistan of a government which enjoys the confidence of the people of Afghanistan, a Government which is created by them, exists to serve them and which exists because they want it to exist. (210)

Urging a positive stand on the Afghan issue, he called upon the Government of India to evolve a collective subcontinental response - to the Soviet threat - by taking into confidence all the countries of the South Asian region by consulting them and convening a conference of

South Asian States in order to secure the withdrawal of the Soviets from Afghanistan. He also called upon the government to take concrete steps to defuse the simmering crisis in Afghanistan. Madhu Dandavate of the Janata Party, speaking in the lower house of the Indian Parliament, advocated extreme caution in dealing with the crisis. However, he went on to point out that an attempt might be made to justify the Soviet intervention on the grounds that the Government of Afghanistan invited the Soviet Union to overcome opposition from counter revolutionary forces, but he called upon the Government to reject such theories and maintain its nonaligned stature. (212)

The Lok Dal - at its national executive meeting on 19 January 1980, adopted a resolution which stated that the armed intervention by the Soviets in Afghanistan was unwarranted and was a threat to regional security. It expressed the hope that Moscow would withdraw its forces soon and leave the Afghans to settle their issues as best as they could. (213)

211 He urged the Government to promote a dialogue amongst all the political elements in Afghanistan, for establishing a regime which is truly nationalist, which is patriotic and represents all sections of political opinion in Afghanistan, make efforts to build public opinion against the intervention, to work for the neutralization of Afghanistan - not Finlandization - as a guarantee for Afghan freedom and independence. See India, Rajya Sabha, Debates, vol.118, No.9, 30 April 1981, col.272.


In contrast to the above parties that disapproved Indira Gandhi's policy on the Afghan issue, the Congress (U), by and large supported it. At the working committee meeting of the party held at New Delhi on 31 January 1980 several members referred to the developments in Afghanistan and expressed concern over the prospective re-arming of Pakistan. Like the Prime Minister, they were prone to view the problem more in the strategic perspective.\(^{214}\)

The Communist Opposition too endorsed the Prime Minister's stand. Both the Communist Party of India and the Communist Party of India (Marxist), viewed the Afghan crisis against the background of the global divide between the progressive and reactionary forces. They implicitly extended full support to Indira Gandhi's stance on Afghanistan.

The Communist Party of India characterized the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan as fraternal support extended by the Soviets to the Afghans. The Communist Party of India trained its guns on the Sino-US-NATO axis and termed it a danger to international peace.\(^{215}\) It

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\(^{214}\) Times of India, 1 February 1980.

\(^{215}\) For details of the meeting of the National Council of the Communist Party of India, New Delhi, 30 January - 3 February 1980, See Zaidi n.203, pp.331-2.
also attacked the US imperialists and their Chinese collaborators for their global strategy of attempting to weaken India's policy of non-alignment, anti-imperialism and friendship with the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries.  

The CPI leader Indrajit Gupta, speaking in the Lok Sabha, recounted his conversation with the Afghan President, Karmal during his visit to Afghanistan and said

there was justification in the Afghan demand for the continued presence of the Soviet troops because of the mounting insurgency and external interference - being launched - from Pakistan. Only a viable political settlement, with adequate international guarantee could lead to the Soviet troop withdrawal contended Gupta.(217)

The Communist Party of India's (Marxist) stand on the Afghan crisis could not be distinguished from that of the Communist Party of India. It endorsed the Soviet

216 At the meeting of its National Council held in July 1980, the Communist Party of India, was critical of the Government of India's reluctance to support the Soviet Union, wholeheartedly on the Afghan issue. See Proceedings of the National Council of the Communist Party of India (New Delhi) 12-15 July 1980, Ibid., p.367.

intervention as well as Moscow's broader global policies. On 1 January 1980 four days after the intervention, the Communist Party of India (Marxist) - politburo in a statement said "to come in opposition to this Soviet help to Afghanistan, is to give an alibi to the US imperialists and the Pakistani military dictatorship".218

In the Lok Sabha, on 1 February 1980, the CPM leader, Samar Mukherjee criticized US imperialism for instigating insurgency in Afghanistan and called upon the Government of India to assert its opposition to these activities more boldly.219 Chitta Basu of the Forward Bloc, a partner of the CPM Left Front Government of West Bengal, called upon the Government of India to condemn the action of the US, China, and Pakistan and thereby brighten the image of India's nonalignment.220 In April 1980 the CPM politburo, in a press communiqué, pointed out that "the hysteria that is sought to be worked up against the Soviet Union over the Afghan issue, the brazen threat issued by President Carter that force will be used against Iran, if its Government and people did not

218 See Zaidi, n. 203, p. 485.
219 India, Lok Sabha, Debates, n. 212, col. 322.
220 Ibid., col. 312.
submit to US dictates, the open encouragement of Israel's aggressive activities against Lebanon and the Arab world, and the threats that are hurled at India, that they would heavily arm the militarist regime of Pakistan, all speak eloquently of the dangers that the US imperialists are posing to peace and stability in the entire region including the sub-continent." 221

Thus while enunciating the Government's Afghan policy, the Prime Minister did not reckon with any serious political opposition. The Bharatiya Janata Party, the Janata and the Lok Dal which opposed her Government's policy, accounted for only 28.35 percent of the votes at the 1980 polls. 222 The Bharatiya Janata Party's position was further weakened because it denounced the Soviet action in Afghanistan but it did not renounce the Indo-Soviet friendship. Had the Bharatiya Janata Party been in power, the new government could retort, and it would have found it difficult to reconcile this contradiction particularly when on the one hand the Sino-US combine was actively bolstering Pakistan and on the other, the Soviet intervention was a fait accompli.

In contrast to the position of other parties, the support extended by the CPI, CPM carried weight, for

221 Zaidi, n. 203, pp. 503, 530-1.
they accounted for 47 seats in Parliament and held as on 1 March 1980, 400 seats in the Legislative Assemblies of the various States and Union territories which was more or less equal to the combined strength of the Bharatiya Janata, Janata and Lok Dal. 223

Reaction of the India Press

The reaction of the Indian Press to the Government's response to the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, was basically an endorsement of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's Afghanistan policy. A survey of the editorials and signed articles appearing in the editorial pages of some of the leading English dailies from January through March 1980, when Indian opinion was the most pronounced, over India's response to the Soviet intervention shows that the Press even though generally critical of the Soviet action in Afghanistan was also prone to see the propriety of the Indian response in the context of the destabilizing forces that the Afghan crisis had unleashed. Thus, while on the one hand they disapproved of the Soviet action, on the other they did not endorse the US policy of bolstering Pakistan militarily.

From the outset the Indian Express was highly critical of the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. It demanded that

223 Zaidi, n. 203, pp. 28-29.
the Soviets should be firmly told that the longer they remain in Afghanistan, the stronger will be the forces which may endanger India's security. Agreeing that the Soviet intervention was the core of the trouble, concern was expressed over the US proposal to provide arms to Pakistan and the possible return of the cold war. Reacting to the enunciation of the Carter Doctrine, the paper editorially exhorted the need for caution to provide scope for efforts to defuse the crisis. This was an implicit endorsement of Indira Gandhi's perception of the problem which was reiterated during the visit to New Delhi by the President of France, Valery Giscard D'estaging, when the Indian Express in its editorial pointed out:

neither side feels happy over the intervention, both have steered clear of political histrionics and have instead stressed the urgency of avoiding actions that would enlarge the issue to envelop other countries and continents. (226)

The Times of India, also did not hesitate to criticize the Soviet Union for its action in Afghanistan but

224 Indian Express, 14 January 1980.
225 For a detailed analysis of the Carter Doctrine, see Crabb Jr., n.8, pp.328-70.
226 Indian Express, 29 January 1980.
expressed concern at the changing strategic environment
to the detriment of India's security. The paper
noted the perceptual gap between India and the Soviet
Union that was revealed during Andrei Gromyko's visit to
New Delhi. It approved the Prime Minister's balanced
and responsible approach on the Afghan issue. The Times of
India contended that "New Delhi would not join in an
anti-Soviet tirade under the Sino-US auspices, but would
continue to pressurize Moscow to withdraw its troops from
Afghanistan." 228

The Calcutta based daily The Statesman, was rela-
vively silent on the Afghan question. Although it strongly
criticized the intervention and sarcastically called it
"Russia's present to the New Year." 229 It did not edito-
rially comment on Indira Gandhi's policy, however.

The Madras based daily The Hindu was the most tre-
chant in its criticism of the Soviet Union even to the
extent of questioning the basic premises of the propriety
of the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. 230

227 The Times of India, 1 January 1980, 12 February
1980.
228 Times of India, 15 February 1980.
230 The Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation
signed on 9 August 1971 at New Delhi envisages
immediate consultations to counteract any threat
to the security of either country. For text see,
Asian Recorder, vol.17, no.35, 27 August - 2 September
when the Indo-Soviet communique, after the Gromyko visit, revealed divergence between the two countries, the paper expressed its satisfaction and stated that "India must exert every diplomatic pressure in the immediate period ahead to get the Soviet Union to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan." 231

Thus it appears that while the Indian press was critical of the Soviet intervention, it was prone to see the validity of Indira Gandhi's policy in the context of subcontinental peace and security issues, thereby giving credence to Gabriel Almond's theory that "whatever policy the Government chooses to follow, before long acquires popular approval." 232

India's Reaction at the United Nations

At the UN General Assembly's Sixth emergency special session on Afghanistan held during January 1980, Brajesh C. Mishra, India's permanent representative, expressing grave concern over the happenings in Afghanistan - a country with which India had close and friendly relations - hoped that "the nonaligned and independent status of Afghanistan

231 The Hindu, 16 February 1980.

232 Gabriel Almond argues that very often a Government takes a decision and public opinion supporting that decision is built up subsequently. See Gabriel Almond, American People and Foreign Policy (New York, 1950), p.105.
would under no circumstances be jeopardised.”\(^{233}\) While condemning the presence of foreign forces in Afghanistan, Mishra pointed out that “India would not remain silent at the attempt of certain outside forces to interfere in the internal affairs of Afghanistan by training, arming and encouraging subversive elements. Justifying the Soviet entry into Afghanistan given the situation there, he did not doubt the Soviet assurance of its inclination to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan, when the Government of Afghanistan so desired”\(^{234}\).

However, expressing concern at the intervention and the danger it posed to regional and international peace, Mishra stated:

while the reality of the situation in the region still remains grim, the developments of the past months have seriously affected the entire climate of international relations and set back the process of detente. Indeed, Afghanistan today has become a flash point for a virtual return to the polemics and paranoia of the Cold War. Successive efforts aimed at defusing the situation have been frustrated by the continued adoption of unrealistic attitudes and inflexible positions.\(^{235}\)

At the Thirty Eighth General Assembly session, the Indian spokesman V. Ramachandran, termed the discussions

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233  UN Doc., n. 88, p. 13.
235  Ibid., Annexure VI, p. 86.
in the UN on the Afghan situation an exercise in futility. Opposing the presence of external forces and its direct and indirect interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, Ramachandran urged freedom for the Afghans suited to their genius so that they could effectively contribute to the security and prosperity of their country and the region as a whole. Rejecting the one-sided UN resolution on Afghanistan, he urged the international community and the countries directly involved in the Afghan crisis to demonstrate a strong and sincere disposition to attain through negotiations a comprehensive settlement. In this regard he commended the efforts of the US Secretary General to attain through indirect negotiations, a framework for a fair and lasting political solution in Afghanistan.

The twists and turns in Soviet-Indian relations over the Afghan issue has proved that neither has been able to fully influence each other. India has not been

236 UN Doc., n.165, p.13.
237 Ibid., p.15.
238 For a detailed account of the UN Resolution ES-6/2, on the situation in Afghanistan, see Keesings Archives, vol. 26, 9 May 1980, p.302.
239 A lasting political solution had to take into account the concerns of all the parties involved and had to be based on the twin principles of non-interference and the non-use of force. For details see Indira Gandhi's address to the General Assembly's Thirty Eighth session in UN Doc.A/38/PV-9. 29 September 1983, p.12.
able to obtain a Soviet withdrawal and the Soviet Union has not been able to obtain an Indian endorsement of the Soviet occupation. Moscow's intervention has not been fully supported by New Delhi, but neither has it brought about a rupture in relations.240 That the reality has wandered between these two extremes bears testimony to the strength of Soviet-Indian relations and their need for each other. However, on her visit to the Soviet Union in 1983, the Indian Prime Minister was reported to have told her hosts that India would like to see the Soviet troops withdrawn from Afghanistan.241 This statement of the Indian Prime Minister did not lead to any substantive progress on the issue.

The differences over Afghanistan between the two countries persists. However, there is no indication that either side is going to jeopardize its relationship with the other over the Afghan issue. A break in Indo-Soviet relations over Afghanistan is as unlikely as an Indian policy transition from realistic to pro-Soviet. Dramatic changes in Indo-Soviet relations have not been the rule since the end of the 1960s and it is unlikely in the future.

240 Several observers in the West forecast either one of this happening.

241 Times of India, 23 September 1982.
The Response of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan

At the UN Security Council's Special Session on the Afghan situation, the Foreign Minister of the DRA Shah Mohammed Dost, expressed displeasure at the convening of the session to deal with the situation in Afghanistan.\(^{242}\) Describing the events in Afghanistan as an internal affair and a matter purely within its domestic jurisdiction he said: "to permit consideration of the matter would be to accept the diversion of world public opinion from the real threats to world peace and security posed by anti peace designs of the imperialists."\(^{243}\)

Detailing the progress in Afghanistan since the April Revolution,\(^{244}\) Dost spoke of the efforts of the imperialist

\(^{242}\) UN Doc., n.119, p.37.

\(^{243}\) Ibid.

\(^{244}\) Following the April Revolution of 1978,\(^{7}\) the people of Afghanistan were liberated from the tyranny of a medieval type of regime connected with imperialism and international reactionary forces: a) Political power was transferred from the exploiting classes to the exploited in the country. b) Drastic revolutionary measures were taken in the interest of the working people of the country, which in turn aimed at totally eliminating the vestiges of economic and social backwardness and the feudalistic relationships from the socio-economic structure of the country. Ibid., pp.38-40.
forces to hamper it. 245

Referring to the presence of limited contingents of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, DoSt stated: "I would like to emphasize that those contingents have been sent to Afghanistan in response to a request by the Afghan side, initially made during the official visit of the late Nur Mohammed Taraki to Moscow in December 1978 in conformity with the provisions of the Soviet-Afghan Treaty of December 1978. This request for assistance was

Imperialist and anti-DRA circles, as part of their large anti-peace and anti-people's designs and conspiracies, increased their armed attacks and infiltrations into Afghan territory, causing death and destruction of several innocent men, women and children. Further, to supplement this planned conspiracy and these plots against the Revolution, on 16 September 1979, Hafizullah Amin playing into the hands of US imperialism, engineered a plot, with the helping hand of anti-revolutionary, anti-people reactionary elements. In the wake of increasing foreign interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan and armed attacks on Afghan territory, the coming to power of Amin, opened a new dark era of fascist oppression in the country. As the oppression of the Amin regime reached its inhuman height inside the country, foreign aggression, armed attacks by groups from abroad and interference in the internal affairs of the DRA continued and intensified. Thus the Afghan National Liberation Army rose on 27 December 1979 against Amin and overthrew his fascist regime. Ibid.

For a detailed account of the 5 December 1978 Treaty between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union. See Keesings Archives, n. 47, p. 29459.
repeated by the Government of Hafizullah Amin as also by the Government of Kamal. The request for assistance, it was specially stated, was authorized by the Loya Jirga (Grand Assembly) comprising the elected representatives who represented all strata and will of the people— to eliminate the threats to the country's independence, national sovereignty and territorial integrity. The military assistance he argued was justified, on the basis of the provisions of Article 51 of the UN Charter.

247 The main purpose of the limited military assistance was to remove the threats posed from abroad to the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Afghanistan and to repel foreign armed attacks and acts of aggression against Afghanistan. The dispatch of limited contingents of the Soviet Union's armed force had nothing to do with the 27 December developments, including the change of leadership and government, which is a matter entirely within the domestic jurisdiction of the country. For details see UN Doc. n.119, p.41.

248 Ibid.

249 Besides having acted under the provisions of Article 51 of the UN Charter, it was pointed out by the Afghan Foreign Minister that a) The limited contingents came to Afghanistan after numerous requests from Afghanistan since 1978, b) The new government upon taking over power on 27 December 1979, promptly reaffirmed those requests, c) The sole purpose of the limited presence of the Soviet military contingents in Afghanistan is to assist Afghanistan in removing the threats posed from abroad to the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Afghanistan, d) The Soviet armed forces were not involved in the internal events of 27 December 1979, e) The Soviet contingents were not stay in Afghanistan a day longer than required, f) The request for limited military assistance by the DRA and the compliance by the Soviets was in accord with the 5 Dec. 1978. Soviet-Afghan Treaty besides UN provisions see UN Doc.,n.85, pp.33,36.
and it was pointed out that it would be terminated when the reasons which prompted it no longer persisted.

In the General Assembly of the UN, at its Sixth emergency Special Session, held in January 1980, soon after the Soviets moved into Afghanistan, the Foreign Minister strongly objected to the issue being taken up by the UN. He termed it an open and flagrant interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. In condemning the role of the small contingent of the Soviet Union, sent to Afghanistan at the request of the DRA, he said "it has stabilized peace in the region and countered the armed attacks by the counter revolutionaries, armed and trained by Pakistan." Condemning the role of Pakistan against the DRA, Dost opined that with its alliance system and its strategic and armament programme, Pakistan had become a potential threat to the neighbours. Reiterating his Government’s commitment to peace, the Afghan Foreign Minister called upon all his fellow countrymen who were misled into leaving


251 By so doing, it was opined Pakistan, was acting as the last out post of imperialism and reaction in Asia. The imperialists on their part were committed to distorting facts only to further their nefarious designs in the region. See UN Doc., n.157, pp.93-98.
the country to return and live in dignity and honour. Concluding, he stated that his country would adhere to the policy of nonalignment, good neighbourly relations and cooperation with all and above all struggle for the maintenance of peace and stability in the region and the world over. 252

At the Thirty Fifth session of the General Assembly, Dost detailed the happenings in his country since the April 1978 Revolution. 253 Commenting upon the several problems being confronted by the DRA since its inception he said, "the imperialists led by the US were behind the so called freedom fighters, who were none other than the representatives of the overthrown exploiting class, feudal lords, big land lords, usurers, smugglers and the like, who fled from Afghanistan after the April Revolution and took refuge in the neighbouring countries viz. Pakistan.

252 Ibid.

253 The April Revolution carried out by the toiling people and the heroic Afghan army, under the leadership of the PDPA did away with the corrupt regime and put the country on the track of democratic and progressive change in the political, economic structure of the country. For the first time in the history of Afghanistan, power was transferred from the despotic exploiting ruling class to the toiling people of Afghanistan led by the Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan. The Government of the DRA, since its take of power ensures the most respectful approach to Islam as a sacred religion. The progressive reforms being initiated in the country by the DRA being unpalatable to the imperialists was the sole cause of the mounting resistance to the regime and the waging of the undeclared war against it. See UN Doc.,n.99 , pp.19-20.
These representatives of the exploiters, he said, "are nothing but mercenaries of the imperialists and hegemonists." 254

Referring to the popular support forthcoming to the DRA regime, Dost referred to the achievements of the regime since its take over. These were: 255

a) Release of prisoners.
b) Steps to adopt a new progressive and democratic constitution.
c) The conduct of elections at all levels.
d) Attaining the goals of the Saur Revolution (April 1978 Revolution), to build a society free from exploitation of man by man.
e) Cooperation with fellow nonaligned countries, to attain the objectives of the Nonaligned movement.
f) Cooperation with the Islamic states to strengthen the Organization of Islamic Conference.
g) Adherence to the principles of peaceful coexistence.

Referring to the US and Chinese involvement in Afghanistan's affairs, Dost pointed out that the US and China had commenced its direct involvement in the affairs of the country since May 1978, with the instigation,

255 Ibid.
armed provocation and subversion against the DRA. Besides this he said the imperialists were also responsible for establish­ning military training camps on Pakistani soil. Describing the weapons being supplied to the counter revolutionary bands, Dost pointed out that “the Afghan counter revolutionary bands invading Afghanistan, were being supplied with various weapons of US, British, Chinese, Egyptian and Pakistani make—small arms, automatic guns, bazookas, anti aircraft surface to air missiles, lethal chemical weapons, armoured carriers, jeeps, etc. Most of these weapons were shipped to Pakistan through

256 Following the April Revolution, US subversive activities against Afghanistan were intensified. A five man CIA team began coordinating with the Pakistani secret service and Afghan counter revolutionary ring leaders. The Chinese also began working hand in hand with the CIA. They became very active in northern Afghanistan. They turned the 50 mile long Chinese-Afghan border into a source of permanent tension and provocation against the DRA. Each day armed bandits accompanied by Chinese began crossing the border, killing local people and re­sacking their villages. See Ibid., pp. 27-30.

257 There are about 30 major training camps and 50 military bases for Afghan counter-revolutionary elements in Pakistan. At these bases mercenaries are trained and they spearhead the armed invasion against Afghanistan. The major training centres and bases for Afghan counter-revolutionary groups are located in the areas of Peshawar, Bajaur, Mohmand, Chitral, Bannu and Quetta. The total capacity of all the centres and camps for training and equipping Afghan counter revolutionaries is about five thousand. The period of training being one to three months and is imparted by instructors from Pakistan, US and China. The Pakistani army authorities besides being involved in training the counter revolutionaries are also directly involved in the acts of subversion being carried out in Afghanistan. See Ibid.
ports of Karachi, Gwadar, sent by the Karakoram highway and also by air. Further some of the arms were transported by US naval ships in the Indian Ocean, from where it was sent to the forward training camps in Pakistan by transport aircraft and helicopters.258

It was to counter these threats to the regime, argued Dost, that the Soviet Union was requested to send a token of its armed force to Afghanistan which he pointed out was proper and legal.259 Commenting upon the urgency for securing a withdrawal of the Soviet forces from his country, he specified the conditions under which this could be achieved.260

258 Ibid.

259 The Afghan Government's request to the Soviet Union for military assistance and the latter's positive response are in full conformity with the Afghan-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation and Good Neighbourliness, the Charter of the UN and the rules of international law, which has been confirmed by the UN Security Council Resolution No.387/1976. For details see Ibid., p.33. Also see UN Doc.3 RES/387/1976, 31 March 1976, p.1.

260 As was pointed out in the joint Afghan-Soviet declaration of 16 October 1980, "the question of the timing of the withdrawal of the limited Soviet military contingent can be examined only in the context of a political settlement of the situation around Afghanistan. It cannot be resolved before the aggression against the DRA has been fully terminated and guarantees given as regards the non-resumption of subversive activities from outside against the people of Afghanistan and their government" stated the Foreign Minister of Afghanistan. UN Doc., n.99, pp.33-35.
At the Thirty Sixth General Assembly session the Afghan spokesman again reiterated the efforts being undertaken by his government to develop the living standards of the people. This he pointed out was being carried out notwithstanding the disruptions caused by the armed aggression from outside. 261

Commenting upon the activities of the so called freedom fighters, most termed them as ex-feudal lords and their lackeys, who like their predecessors sucked the blood of the Afghan people and lived in luxury, leaving the people in misery and gloom. "They do not fight for the freedom of the Afghan people, but for freedom to exploit them for the restoration of the lost privileges". 262


262 According to the Afghan Foreign Minister, these bandits daily invade Afghanistan, disrupt normal life in the country, kill people, women, children and destroy property, hospitals, schools, etc. The Afghan army, police and the security forces supported by the people deal blow after blow to the bandits, capture and disarm them. The Afghan army and people would have wiped out the counter-revolutionary bands long ago, had it not been for the support forthcoming to these groups from the imperialist and hegemonist quarters, as well as from the reactionary Islamic regimes. The counter-revolutionary gangs are paid in US dollars, British pounds, West German Marks, Saudi Rials, etc. They are armed with American, Chinese, Egyptian and Pakistani weapons. Some western countries have declared the policy of interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan as their official policy. The President of the US Ronald Reagan had announced that his Government would hence forth supply the Afghan Mujahideen with weapons and ammunition. Thus the covert CIA operation of support for the Afghan counter revolutionaries initiated by President Carter, has become an overt policy of the US Government. For details see Ibid., pp.118-20.
Adverting to the tense situation prevailing within the country, he stated that it was the result of the anti DRA activities of the imperialists.263 Reiterating his Government's commitment to peace, Dost besides referring to the DRA's peace proposals of May 1980 and August 1981,264 stressed that the DRA was willing to hold direct negotiations–either bilateral or trilateral–with Pakistan and Iran to bring about normalcy and stability in the region. While welcoming the efforts of the UN Secretary General in this direction, he sought adequate international guarantee for non-intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, in particular from the two super powers.

Mohammed Zarif, the DRA's representative at the UN continuing with the arguments in the Thirty Sixth General Assembly Session on the situation in Afghanistan, once again castigated the imperialists for their anti-DRA activities and propaganda. Dismissing the allegation of the DRA being un-Islamic Zarif referred to the concerted efforts of his Government to strengthen Islam and provide

263 Ibid., p.119.
Commenting on the progress made on the economic front since the coming into power of the DRA, he pointed out that to improve the economy the Government had increased the technical and financial assistance to the farmers, augmented the scope of the Agricultural Development Bank, Afghan Chemical and Fertilizer company, Afghan Seeds Company and also initiated concrete measures to improve the overall agricultural standards in the country. Further to improve the lot of the workers, the Government had enhanced the wages, salaries, food allowance and initiated measures to upgrade the living conditions of the toiling people in the cities. Referring to the activities of the so called Resistance forces from Pakistani territory Zarif said:

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265 As part of the efforts of the DRA in the interest of the sacred religion of Islam, a supreme council of clergy and religious scholars was established for the first time in the long history of Afghanistan. Similarly, the establishment of the Islamic affairs Department, manifests the Government's desire, to preserve Islam as a sacred religion. The department since its inception has carried out constructive and important measures to provide facilities for religious rites for the muslim people of Afghanistan. Efforts are being made to protect and maintain religious establishments, mosques and large places of worship are being constructed in various cities and the ones damaged by the anti-Government rebels being repaired. All these measures being in accord with Article 29, of the Fundamental Principles of the DRA which guarantees to the people of Afghanistan full freedom to practise Islam, the sacred religion of the muslims. See UN Doc.,n.261,p.23.

266 Ibid., pp.22-24, 26.
Immediately after the April revolution, most of the Afghan counter revolutionaries and their ring leaders fled to Pakistan and with the support of the US, China, and certain reactionary Muslim regimes began to form armed bands for armed aggression and subversive activities against the DRA. At least six counter revolutionary organizations are located in Pakistan; Hizb-e-Islami, Jamiat-e-Islami Afghanistan, National Front of Islamic Revolution of Afghanistan; Front of National Liberation; Revolutionary Islamic Movement of Afghanistan and a group of Yumous Khalis, which split from Hizb-e-Islami. The ring leaders of these groups with the tacit agreement of the authorities move freely about the country recruiting mercenaries. Further having regular contacts with all the western missions in Islamabad, China and other Muslim countries, these groups receive abundant supplies of all sorts of modern weapons, ammunition and military equipment from the imperialists, hegemonic and reactionary Muslim quarters. The major centres of counter-revolutionary terrorist activity is in the border areas of Pakistan around Peshawar, Chitral, Bajaur, Miran Shah and Quetta. The anti-Afghan armed terrorists have complete freedom of movement in the frontier areas and across the border. They are allowed to hold meetings and carry out recruiting campaigns. They use Government printing presses and radio transmitters to disseminate anti-Afghan propaganda. The inflammatory and slanderous allegations of the enemies of Afghanistan are broadcast daily from Peshawar and Quetta by government transmitters. In Peshawar counter-revolutionary groups publish propaganda sheets and hostile leaflets for distribution in Afghanistan. Hizb-e-Islami alone publishes in Pakistan and Iran eight newspapers and magazines. The Jamiat-e-Islami also has publications from Pakistan. Thus full scale propaganda warfare against the DRA is being waged from Pakistani territory with the connivance of the authorities there. Besides these activities, the Pakistani authorities and army command are directly involved and take an active part in forming counter revolutionary bands and despatch them across the border in Afghanistan. Pakistani frontier troops and their headquarters also help to smuggle all kinds of weapons and ammunition across the border for terrorist bands operating
in Afghanistan. A network of hospitals set up in border areas of Pakistan for the terrorists and mercenaries wounded in skirmishes with the Afghan army and security forces. The head of State and other top level Pakistani officials pay regular visits to training camps and bases of the counter-revolutionary organizations located in the Peshawar, Quetta areas, and reassure them of Islamabad's official support for their anti-Afghan activities. Further, with the connivance of the authorities in Islamabad, all the western and Chinese dignitaries visiting Pakistan go to the mercenary camps near the Afghan border, make provocative statements and promise all types of assistance to them. Thus with the connivance of the Pakistani authorities, the NWFP has been turned into a bridgehead used by world imperialism, Chinese hegemonism and Muslim reaction to wage an undeclared war against the DRA. (267)

Referring to the Egyptian involvement in the anti-Afghan activities, Zarif referred to the statement of President Anwar Sadat to the NBC news on 22 September 1980 wherein he pointed out that the US had been buying Soviet made arms from his country for more than 21 months and sending them to rebel forces in Afghanistan. These weapons were flown from Cairo in US aircrafts to Pakistan and from there clandestinely smuggled to Afghanistan. (268)

To substantiate these facts, Zarif quoted the report of Carl Bernstein of the New Republic. According to Bernstein's report, "since the very beginning of the events" in Afghanistan, the counter revolutionary bands

267 Ibid.
268 Ibid., p.36.
have received weapons worth more than $100 million. The weapons are delivered not only from Egypt but China and are supplied to the terrorist groups. Peking has secretly undertaken to permit US aircraft to overfly Chinese territory and to provide a land communication network to supply the bandits in case the Afghan-Pakistan border is closed. The major part of the expenses Bernstein pointed out is covered by the US and Saudi Arabia. Egypt apart from supplying arms, provides instruction facilities for counter revolutionaries. However, the majority of the instructors are American and Chinese. Each month about 2,000 to 3,000 trained and armed mercenaries are sent from Pakistan into Afghanistan. 269 All this stated Zarif proves, "the DRA is a prime target of a wide international conspiracy, spearheaded by the US and China—using Pakistani territory". 270

Referring to the Soviet military assistance to Afghanistan Zarif expressed confidence that the Afghan army and the security forces assisted by the people can achieve the aims set out by the April Revolution notwithstanding the support given to the counter revolutionaries by those in the imperialist and hegemonist quarters.

269 Ibid.
270 UN Doc. A/36/PV 23, 5 October 1981, pp.32-34.
Describing all the UN Resolutions on Afghanistan, as being ineffective, Zarif winding up his statement to the world body said "only direct negotiations, on a basis of equality between the Governments concerned i.e. Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran could aid the process of normalization in strife torn Afghanistan".\(^{271}\)

At the Thirty Seventh session of the General Assembly, Zarif once again castigated Pakistan for its clandestine activities against his country.\(^{272}\)

Speaking on behalf of his nation at the Thirty Eight UN General Assembly session, the Foreign Minister reiterated his nation's commitment to promote friendship, detente and cooperation among nations. Ascribing the undeclared war being waged against his Government by the imperialists as the only impediment to a political settlement Dost, stated "this unholy conflict is in fact a regional extension of the global imperialist plot to destabilise and subdue independent, sovereign nations and force them into the imperialist orbit."\(^{273}\)

Describing the hardships being undergone by the Government and people of Afghanistan since the imperialist

\(^{271}\) Ibid.

\(^{272}\) UN Doc., n.162, p.79.

\(^{273}\) UN Doc., n.127, p.33.
intervention in the affairs of Afghanistan. Dost categorically pointed out that despite these hardships the people and Government of Afghanistan would stand steadfast and work for the achievement of the goals of the April Revolution. 274

Ascribing the continued armed incursions from Pakistan as the sole problem persisting in and around Afghanistan he stressed their termination through direct negotiations as the only panacea for the ills confronting the people of South West Asia.

Commending the role of the Secretary General of the UN and his efforts to bring about normalcy around Afghanistan — through the process of indirect negotiations — Dost sought reliable international guarantees as a first step to permanent peace. Reiterating his country's commitment to the principles of the UN he in conclusion stated

... Afghanistan pursues an independent, peaceful and active nonalignment. We are determined to follow that course in future in conformity with the aspirations and the potential of our people. This position is based on our overall analysis of the increasingly crucial role being played by the nonaligned movement in international relations. We shall spare no effort individually and in cooperation with others to give effect to the decisions of the Seventh Nonaligned Summit at New Delhi in conformity with the principles and objectives.

274 Ibid., pp. 2-3.
of the movement. 275

Reaction of International Organizations/
Regional Groupings or Alliances

The United Nations.

Within a week of the Soviet armed invasion of Afghanistan, in December 1979, the UN Security Council met to consider the issue. However, on 8 January the Council was stymied by a Soviet veto which blocked a resolution deploiring the recent armed intervention in Afghanistan and which called for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of the Soviet troops.

The resolution sponsored by Bangladesh, Jamaica, Niger, and the Phillipines, Tunisia and Zambia received 13 votes in favour and 2 against (i.e. the Soviet Union and East Germany). Within twenty hours of the Soviet veto, Mexico and the Philippines invoking the 'Uniting for Peace resolution' devised when the UN forces were authorised to land in Korea in 1950, summoned the General

275 The Seventh Nonaligned Summit held at New Delhi in March 1983, expressed grave concern at the situation in South-West Asia, particularly Afghanistan, reaffirmed the call given by the Nonaligned Foreign Ministers at New Delhi in 1981, for a political settlement based on the withdrawal of foreign troops, which would enable the Afghan refugees to return home. The summit extended all support to the UN Secretary General to attain this goal in Afghanistan. See Keesings Archives, vol.29, No.8, 8 August 1983, pp.32351-53.
Assembly into emergency session. 276

The General Assembly on 15 January 1980, adopted by 104 votes to 10, with another 18 abstaining, a Resolution sponsored by twenty four nonaligned nations which called upon the Soviet Union to abide by the principles of the UN and withdraw its forces from Afghanistan.

The General Assembly's second session on the situation in Afghanistan was held in November 1980. On 20 November 1980, the General Assembly adopted a resolution calling upon the Soviet Union to withdraw its troops. The vote was 111 in favour, 22 against with 2 abstentions. The resolution was sponsored by forty Islamic and nonaligned countries. The Assembly also requested the Secretary General to appoint a personal representative to promote a peaceful settlement of the crisis. India did not support the resolution.

For the third time the General Assembly issued a call on 18 November 1981, for the immediate withdrawal

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of all foreign troops from Afghanistan. Sponsored by forty four Islamic nonaligned countries, the resolution was adopted by 116 votes to 23 with 12 abstentions (including India), by the 157 member Assembly.

The resolution preceded by a three day debate in which fifty members of the Assembly took part, urged the creation of necessary conditions for the return of the 2.5 million refugees to their homeland and asked the UN Secretary General to continue his efforts to secure a settlement in Afghanistan in accord with the principles of the UN and its several resolutions on Afghanistan.

The general principles, enshrined in these resolutions inter-alia included:

a) Immediate withdrawal of all foreign troops.

b) The preservation of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and nonaligned character of Afghanistan.

c) The right of the Afghan people to determine their own form of government and to choose their economic, political and social system, free from outside intervention, subversion, coercion or constraint of any kind whatsoever.

d) The creation of necessary conditions to enable the Afghan refugees to return voluntarily to their homes in safety and honour.

The Assembly also requested the international community to contribute towards the provision of humanitarian relief assistance to the several Afghans who had left their homes and were living as refugees in Pakistan and Iran.
The Secretary General's initiative

Of the several initiatives that got off the ground and was acceptable to the Soviet Union, Afghanistan and Pakistan and is currently holding the centre stage in the bid to find a political settlement has been that of the Secretary General and his personal representative.

The story of the UN’s efforts for a political settlement in Afghanistan is best told in the words of the former UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim in his report on “The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security” released in November 1981, on the eve of the Assembly’s third debate on the issue. 277

The report stated 278

The present Report is submitted in pursuance of the General Assembly Resolution 35/37 of 20 November 1980 in which the Assembly once again pronounced itself on the principles involved and the action required with regard to the situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security.

Since the adoption of that resolution, I have continued to be engaged in intensive efforts aimed at facilitating negotiations among the


278 Ibid.
parties concerned so as to achieve a political solution. To that end, I have maintained close contacts with all interested governments. In particular, the Third Islamic Summit Conference in January 1981, and the Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Nonaligned countries held in February 1981. I appointed Javier Perez de Cuellar, the Under Secretary General for Special Political Affairs, as my Personal Representative responsible for following up my efforts.

At my request and in consultation with the Government's concerned Perez de Cuellar travelled to Pakistan and Afghanistan in April 1981. On 12, 13 and 14 April he visited Islamabad, where he met with President Zia ul Haq, Foreign Minister Agha Shahi and senior officials. On 15 and 16 April, he visited Kabul, where he met with President Kamal Foreign Minister Shah Mohammed Dost and senior officials. In the course of those meetings, both governments emphasised their desire for a peaceful solution and welcomed the representative's visit and termed it as a positive step for attaining peace in the region.

In the course of a visit which I paid to the Soviet Union in May 1981, I had occasion to exchange views on the situation. The Soviet Government stressed that it favoured a political settlement and expressed its support for a continuation of the efforts towards a peaceful resolution of the problem.

In the following weeks I and my representative continued our contacts with the parties concerned, and in July '81, it was agreed that Javier Perez de Cuellar should again visit the area on 4, 5 and 6 August, he visited Karachi and Islamabad, where he met with President Zia, Foreign Minister Shahi and senior officials on 7, 8 and 9 August, he visited Kabul and met with President Kamal, Prime Minister Sutan Ali Kish Tamand, Foreign Minister Dost and senior officials. Perez de Cuellar held extensive discussions touching upon all relevant aspects. As a result of his talks in both capitals, an understanding was reached on the substantive issues to be negotiated, but differences still remained on the question of the format of the future negotiations. Both governments reaffirmed their interest in decreasing tension
in the area and in continuing the search for a peaceful solution. It was also agreed that the talks would be continued in New York on the occasion of the Thirty sixth session of the General Assembly.

On 24 August 1981, the DRA issued a statement in which it explained its position on a number of substantive questions and, with regard to the format of future negotiations, indicated its readiness to hold trilateral negotiations if Pakistan and Iran expressed such a desire. Subsequently, during, the general debate at the Thirty sixth session of the General Assembly the Foreign minister of Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan elaborated upon the respective positions of their governments.

In the second half of September and early October, I and my representative had the opportunity to meet several times, separately, with Foreign minister Dost of Afghanistan and Agha Shahi of Pakistan. The two foreign ministers, while acknowledging the close inter-relationship between the various issues involved, stressed their respective priorities regarding the substantive positions on some of the present diplomatic process. The parties agreed to a preparatory discussion through my representative on the issues to be negotiated. The two foreign ministers designated their respective permanent representatives to the UN as interlocutors with my representative. It was also agreed that Perez de Cuellar would visit the area again at an appropriate time.

The steps taken in the course of the recent consultations have shown the approach adopted can indeed facilitate the search for a fair political solution which will ensure that the Afghan people will be able to determine their own destiny, free from foreign intervention and interference. I will continue to pursue all possibilities for a peaceful settlement of the problem. (279)

279 Ibid., p. 41.
More than five years have passed since this statement was issued. Since then Javier Perez de Cuellar has taken over as the Secretary General and with Diego Cordovez as his special emissary on Afghanistan the effort is still on to secure that elusive political settlement in strife torn Afghanistan. In his report on the working of the UN to the Forty first session of the UN General Assembly Cuellar referring to the conflict situations in the world in 1986 especially Afghanistan and the need for resolving it stated:

the UN continues to be engaged in intensive efforts towards a negotiated solution of the situation relating to Afghanistan. While valuable progress has been made, I must emphasize that delays in the successful conclusion of these negotiations can only aggravate the suffering of the Afghan people. Political decisions of considerable importance have to be taken if this diplomatic process is to yield positive results. Such results would also favourably affect a far wider range of international relationships. (280)

To bring to an end the crisis in Afghanistan and other conflicts Cuellar urged all the nations to strictly adhere to the provisions and intent of the Charter of the UN. (281)

280 Report of the Secretary General of the UN Forty first UN General Assembly, Session 1986. See UN Doc. A/41/1, supplement No.1, 9 September 1986, p.2.

281 Ibid.
The European Community

Following the meeting of the Foreign ministers of the European Community on 15 January 1980, a statement expressing grave concern over the Soviet action in Afghanistan was issued. Rejecting all Soviet justification for the intervention, the Foreign ministers stated that "it constituted a flagrant interference in the internal affairs of nonaligned countries belonging to the Islamic world which posed a grave threat to peace, security and stability in the region." 282 Expressing concern at the Soviet veto in the UN Security Council on the resolution on Afghanistan, urged the Soviet Union to act in conformity with the General Assembly's Resolution calling for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan.

To counter the Soviet action in Afghanistan the European Community announced the following measures against the Soviet Union.

a) Cancellation of the community's food aid programme for Afghanistan, including the termination of subsidised sale of butter, meat and sugar to the Soviet Union.

b) Non replacement by the European Community, directly or indirectly, of US deliveries of agricultural products to the Soviet Union.

282 Survey of Current Affairs, n.62, p.54.
c) Provision of European Community's aid to the Afghan refugees in Pakistan and Iran (283)

North Atlantic Council Meet

A meeting of the North Atlantic Council held on 15 January 1980, to assess the impact of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan on East-West ties expressed full support for the UN General Assembly Resolution Afghanistan (284) and attacked the Soviet Union for its contravening fundamental principles of international behaviour (285).

To counter the Soviet action the members of the alliance in consultation with each other decided to initiate individual counter action against the Soviet Union (286).

The Organization of Islamic Conference

After the UN, the first international organization to spring into action and exercise itself over the tragic events in Afghanistan was the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC).

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283 On 5 February 1980, emergency aid of $14 million was approved for the Afghan refugees, this excluded the aid of 12,000 tons of cereals, 300 tons of skimmed milk powder and a thousand tons of sugar. For details see Ibid.

284 For a detailed analysis of the UN General Assembly's Resolution on the situation in Afghanistan and its implication for international peace and security, see UN Doc., n.89, pp.1-2.

285 The Council reckoned the intervention to be a set back to the process of normalisation with the Soviets and also a set back to the process of detente.

286 Survey of Current Affairs, n.62, p.54.
Within thirty days of the Soviet intervention, the Foreign Ministers of the OIC held its first ever extraordinary session at the Pakistani capital, Islamabad, on 27-29 January 1980. The session took no initiative to attempt a solution of the crisis. It passed a resolution couched in the strongest language ever used against the Soviet Union at any world forum.\textsuperscript{287}

In the resolution, the Islamic Foreign Minister's conference condemned the Soviet military aggression against the people of Afghanistan, denounced it as a flagrant violation of the UN and the OIC Charters. It demanded the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all Soviet troops from Afghan territory, suspended the membership of Afghanistan in the OIC till the Soviet troops pulled out, invited all member states to withhold recognition of the illegal regime in Kabul and directed them to sever diplomatic relations with it. It called upon all states to stop all aid to the DRA and urged all states and the people throughout the world to support the people of Afghanistan and provide generous aid to the Afghan refugees who have been forced to leave their hearths and homes.

At the subsequent meets of the OIC, because of the increasing burdens on some member states due to the continued presence of the Soviet troops in Afghanistan, the OIC abandoning its negative stance attempted to bring about a negotiated political settlement in strife torn Afghanistan. In a unanimously adopted resolution at the end of the Sixteenth OIC Foreign Ministers meet at Fez (Morocco) on 11 January 1986 the ministers stated "the muslim countries were seriously concerned over the

288 The Islamic Foreign Ministers met on 17-22 May 1980 at Islamabad and put forth proposals to end the conflict in Afghanistan. These were:

a) Withdrawal of the Soviet troops.

b) Respect for the political independence, sovereignty and nonaligned status and Islamic identity of Afghanistan.

c) Respect the inalienable right of the Afghan people to choose their own political and socio-economic system and form of government without outside interference or coercion.

d) The creation of the right condition that would permit and facilitate the early return of the Afghan refugees to their homeland in security and honour.

e) The committee envisaged arriving at a permanent settlement in Afghanistan after consulting all the parties concerned, viz., the Soviets, the Kabul authorities and above all the leaders of the Afghan Resistance.

The OIC took further steps for a political settlement at the Third OIC summit at Taif held from 25-28 January 1981. A five member Islamic Foreign ministers committee was directed to cooperate with the UN Secretary General and work to arrive at a political settlement in Afghanistan. Ibid., p.41.
continued Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and the consequent impediments which stood in the way of the muslim people of Afghanistan to exercise their right to determine their political future according to their free will." 289 The ministers reiterated the stand adopted by the OIC in January 1980, the fourth OIC summit at Casablanca January 1984 and the Fifteenth OIC foreign ministers meet at Sanaa in December 1984. 290 They also took into account the Resolutions adopted by the UN General Assembly at the sixth emergency special session, January 1980 and the other regular sessions ever since then. Upholding the decisions adopted by the ministerial conference of the Nonaligned countries held in New Delhi, February 1981, Havana June 1982, Luanda September 1985 and the Seventh summit of the Nonaligned, New Delhi, 1983 the foreign ministers in their resolution called upon all states to respect the sovereignty of Afghanistan, its Islamic identity and its nonaligned character. 291

The Nonaligned Movement’s Reactions

At the Seventh Nonaligned summit meet held at New Delhi in March 1983, the Malaysian Prime Minister Datoseri Mahatir Mohammed called on the nonaligned movement to

290 Ibid.
291 Ibid.
condemn the Soviet Union by name as the aggressor in Afghanistan, where he said the Soviet troops had marched in to prop up an unpopular regime. He made a fervent appeal for the withdrawal of the Soviet forces to allow the people of Afghanistan to determine their own future.292

The former Prime Minister of India late Mrs. Indira Gandhi in her speech as Chairperson of the movement described as intolerable and unacceptable all types of intervention, overt or covert, taking place in Asia, Africa and in Latin America. She also said that "You cannot condemn one instance but condone another."293 On specific conflicts she appealed to Iran and Iraq to end their tragic war and expressed the hope for early normalcy in Afghanistan.294

In its final political and economic declaration the New Delhi summit noted with great concern the situation in South West Asia, particularly in Afghanistan, it reaffirmed the call made by the Nonaligned Foreign Ministers in New Delhi in 1981 for a political settlement based on the withdrawal of foreign troops facilitating the return of the Afghan refugees to their homeland. The summit extended its full support to the constructive steps being taken by

292 Keesing's Archives, n.275, p.32352.
293 Ibid., p.32351.
294 Ibid.
the Secretary General of the UN to bring about a political settlement in Afghanistan. This position was reiterated at the ministerial meet of the Nonaligned countries held at New Delhi on 19 April 1986.

At the eighth Nonaligned summit meet held at Harare in September 1986 there was a spirited demand by some members for the Soviet troop pull out from Afghanistan. The Yugoslav President Sinan Hasani called for the urgent withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan and enable the Afghans to decide their own future. The Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi on his part reiterating India's stand on Afghanistan said that "India had made it known it would not like intervention and interference. That applied to all and they must stop playing their game there. We would like Afghanistan to be a Nonaligned nation".

The international reaction to the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan was thus varied—while a majority of the countries were critical of the Soviet action and called for the withdrawal of the Soviet troops, the allies of the Soviet Union justified its action and in turn held the

295 Ibid., p.32354.
297 The Statesman, 4 September 1986.
west led by the US responsible for the happenings in Afghanistan. India on its part while not supporting the Soviet action, called for an end to all types of external interventions in Afghanistan and urged the restoration of its nonaligned status.