Chapter III

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A number of social, political and administrative forces influence a policy choice. All of them are not easily identifiable, nor are all motives for a policy clear, nor ever known. It may be an individual's political astuteness or collective decision of the political leadership that may influence a policy.

There is a general, popular view that believes all decisions are politically motivated. There is another view that civil servants have a crucial say in policy formulation. Civil servants view it as their job to recommend a policy within the constraints of the political system and the people in power.

Independent of its pejorative features, bureaucracy has come to stay as an indispensable instrument of all governments. The issue is, however, not whether or not bureaucracy is dispensable, but of emphasis. Should the emphasis be on the technique of administration, on its impersonal and professional manner or should it be on bureaucracy as a class of power elites exercising control over society for its own sake. Competing for a share in power gives it status and power and totally erodes the foundations of the competitive system on which selection is expected to be made in a rule-bound bureaucracy.

According to Max Weber, bureaucracy establishes a relation between legally instated authorities and their subordinate
officials which is characterised by defined rights and duties; authority relations between positions, appointment and promotion based on contractual agreements; technical training or experience as a formal condition of employment; fixed monetary salaries; a strict separation of office and incumbent, and administrative work as a full time occupation [1].

Weber treats "bureaucratisation" as the very essence of the political modernization process. The decisive reason for the advance of bureaucratic organisation has always been its purely technical superiority over any other form of organisation [2].

No public policy can be formulated without the active role and involvement of the civil service. There is no Minister who is not free from 'at least' the advice and opinions of his civil servants while framing policies.

In modern public administration, facts, figures, data and statistics are an indispensable part of decision-making. Civil servants by supplying these exercise substantial influence on the thinking process of the Minister. There is, therefore, an intermingling of politics and administration and it is clear that a Minister cannot ignore the expert advice of the civil service. But a Ministers' capacity to be effective vis-a-vis Bureaucracy depends on how strong his political position is [3].

Appointment to public office on the basis of competitive examinations has succeeded in its primary objective of separating office holding from partisan politics and the vested interest of a social elite. But recruitment on this basis is not 'neutral', as it may not lead to the appointment of officials whose social composition corresponds to that of the general population. There is an unequal distribution of opportunity in the merit system — for people with a professional and managerial background manage to get into the public office while the labour class is under-represented.

For purposeful nation-building activities, bureaucracy must function under the complete control and directions of the political leadership.

- PAKISTAN -

The Bureaucracy in Pakistan, a non-political institution with British traditions of non-commitment, assumed a dominant and decisive role in the affairs of the country. This was because of the weak social base in Pakistan, the disarray of political parties and the isolation of politicians from organised political support [4].

The Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP), despite a revolution in 1967-68, has shown a remarkable ability to survive and has also grown enormously in power and prestige, chaperoning administrations of various hues [5]. The process of the Civil Services ascendancy in Pakistan's political life had started soon after its birth. Jinnah burdened as he was with multidimensional responsibilities could not devote sufficient attention to the task of restructuring the bureaucratic set up and left it entirely to a small coterie of bureaucrats belonging to the former Indian Civil and Central Service who had opted for Pakistan [6]. The post of Governors of three important provinces had been assigned to civilian Bureaucrats by Jinnah [7].

Under Liaquat, the role of the Bureaucracy in making or unmaking of Ministries and dismissing or removing Ministers from high political offices became more decisive and powerful [8]. The senior Civil Servants tended to look upon their role as that of "mentors" of the political leaders whom they held, with the exception of Jinnah and Liaquat, in utter contempt [9].


However, the bureaucracy's direct participation in politics began with Ghulam Mohammed becoming the Governor-General [10]. The bureaucratic elite headed by Ghulam Mohammed wanted to transform the power structure by relegating the Muslim League politicians to a position of insignificance and by introducing new elements into positions of authority in the country [11]. Real power thus came to be vested in the hands of administrators [12].

Members of the CSP, held key positions of decision-making at different levels of Government. Although, theoretically, they were advisers to the Ministers, they in practice, performed the combined roles of Advisors, policy formulators and implementors [13].

In any test of strength, it is the President who emerges victorious. He rules through Governors who have been appointed by him and may be dismissed by him at will. They in turn govern through the Civil Service with officers of the CSP occupying most of the key positions [14].

It was widely known that the top civil servants were divided into different cliques based on provincial or party lines, and had begun to project themselves into public life [15].

Whenever the bureaucratic set felt that its power and privilege were being threatened either by the legislative or by other socio-political forces operating within the country, it would either dismiss the Legislature or play one politician against the other [16]. The powerful clique in the bureaucracy did not want democracy to function in Pakistan and therefore did not want any Constitution [17].

After the promulgation of martial law in October 1958, and assumption of presidency by Ayub Khan, the hold of the bureaucracy on the levers of political power did not diminish. Having no faith in political parties and politicians, Ayub Khan heavily depended on the Bureaucracy to man the political set up. Ramisuddin Ahmed of East Pakistan said in the National Assembly, "I see even now, the present regime....is not the President's rule or administration. It is bureaucracy's rule" [18]. The army came to the fore during crises, but the bureaucracy actively dominated the political scene then and in normal times [19].

16 Bhambri and Nair, n.6, p.87.
The partnership between the army and the CSP was something that developed during the course and not at the beginning of the revolution [20]. Although the Military takeover presented the Civil Services with its greatest challenge, the willingness with which its members accepted their new role made it possible for Ayub to fulfill his promise of returning the Military to the barracks and restoring the Civil Administration to the CSP. The Palace politics of the Ayub Khan regime thereafter came to revolve around the top leadership of the army, air-force and civil service [21].

The civil servants thus came to be actively associated with the Martial Law Administration [22]. Aziz Ahmed was made Deputy Chief Martial Law Administrator and the Advisory Council which was formed to advise the President and the Chief Martial Law Administrator was composed of the Permanent Civil Service heads of the Central Government Ministries [23]. Another Civil Servant Fida Hassan, who was Secretary to President Ayub Khan, had been appointed adviser to the President from January 1, 1968. He had been given the rank of a Cabinet Minister. As Advisor to President, he occupied an important position in the power

structure and thus exercised tremendous influence in the political system [24].

Besides these, many distinguished members of the Pakistani diplomatic corps retained their positions and it would be useful to review their role to assess the role of Pakistani bureaucracy in the country's foreign policy formulation [25].

Some of the members in Yahya Khan's presidential Cabinet and some of the close Presidential Advisors were civil servants. They were Hafisuddin (IPS), Sardar Abdul Rashid (IPS) and M.M. Ahmed, as Minister for Industries and National resources, Minister for Home and Kashmir Affairs and States and Frontier regions and Economic Advisor respectively [26].

Although Pakistan began its independence under an open British-style parliamentary system of Government, the political process from the start concentrated powers in the hands of the Executive. A very small, inexperienced political, bureaucratic and military elite came to dominate the decision-making process through its ability to control the Executive.

The handful of men who managed the chaotic developments after the partition had very limited governmental experience. The political elite was not only small but the social base from which

24 Bhambri and Nair, n.6, p.92.
25 References to the backgrounds of these diplomats have been taken from International Who's Who, 1950-80, (London).
26 Yahya at the end of his regime removed top bureaucrats who had wielded power during Ayub's regime. For details see G.W. Chowdhary, "The last days of United Pakistan: A personal account", International Affairs, Vol.49, no.2, 1973, p.230.
it was also very narrow-landed class, the legal profession, civil service and the business community.

The Governor-General came to occupy a pivotal position in the Pakistani political system. Jinnah the first Governor-General turned increasingly to the Pakistani bureaucracy. Following Jinnah's death in 1948, the position of Governor-General was temporarily eclipsed; as power passed into the hands of Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan. This phase was transitory, as after his assassination, the position of Governor-General was restored, and there was a gradual ascendancy of the Pakistani bureaucracy.

With the selection of Ghulam Mohammad as Governor-General from 1951-55 and Iskander Mirza from 1955-58, it legitimised the ability of the Bureaucracy to replace the political elite as the centre of power. Both men were formal civil servants. They proceeded to intervene and manipulate the political process in order to centralise power in the hands of the central Government. The National Assembly members could easily be manipulated by the Governor-General's selective use of patronage and coercion.

Because of the failure of the Political elite to establish its control over politics, the civil service although small and inexperienced, came to play a dominant role.

British ICS officers played a critical role in developing and training the post-partition Pakistani bureaucracy. Most of the civil service of Pakistan (CSP) recruits had their training in Pakistan, reinforced by brief assignments in the UK or Australia.
Thus, both the old and the new Pakistani elites, were products of a similar system of recruitment, training and socialisation.

In 1958, a military coup ended the parliamentary era. The military regime was, however, quickly converted into a Civilian-Military system, with Ayub relying heavily on the civilian Bureaucracy.

Ayub ended martial law in 1962 and under the new Constitution, decision-making became highly centralised in the hands of the Bureaucracy under the personal control of Ayub. Key decisions were taken by the top echelons of the Bureaucracy and Ayub himself. Ayub gave considerable freedom of action to trusted Ministers and top civil servants, but was the final arbiter of disputes. The civilian Secretaries of the Ministries had direct access to Ayub and to the Provincial Governors. Ayub became heavily dependent upon his senior secretaries for both advice and policy initiatives.

Ayub controlled his Generals through a system of patronage and by giving them special privileges to supplement their income.

Overall, then, decision-making under Ayub was based on a centralised military-bureaucratic system.

But with the collapse of the Ayub system in 1969, Yahya Khan's regime became distinctly Military in structure, organisation and personnel. As a result, all bureaucratic advisors of Ayub were removed and the services of about 300 top level Civil Servants were terminated.
Yahya created a small inner cabinet of Generals which functioned independently of the cabinet as a whole and took all major decisions. All files had to pass through this inner Cabinet before reaching Yahya. Although key issues of defence, foreign affairs, administration and politics were handled by this inner cabinet, supervision of Defence and Foreign Affairs was by Yahya Khan himself. By June 1970, however, Yahya Khan established a Civilian cabinet, thereby replacing the Military in key decision-making posts.

The Bangladesh war in 1971, and the defeat of the Army brought to power a civilian government under Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. In 1973, it adopted a new Constitution which was parliamentary only in theory. The political system was, in fact, as centralised, personalised and autocratic as its predecessors. Bhutto concentrated power in his hands and became personally involved in every major and minor decision of his government.

Although each of Pakistan's post-partition regimes has concentrated power in the hands of the Executive, each has reflected a slightly different distribution of power among the key political, military and bureaucratic elites.

Under Jinnah, Liaquat and Bhutto, the Political elite was dominant. Under Ghulam Mohammad and Iskander Mirza, the Bureaucracy was supreme. Under Ayub it was a combination of Bureaucratic-Military supremacy and under Yahya the Military was dominant.
One of the leading bureaucrats of his time, Zafrullah Khan had for nearly two decades represented Pakistan in various international fora. During the pre-partition days, he was sent as a delegate to the League of Nations. Having had his early education in Lahore and London in 1912, he began his career as an advocate in Sialkot from 1914-16 and in the Lahore High Court till 1935. In Lahore he joined the All India Muslim League and rose to become its President. In 1938 he went as India's delegate to League of Nations and in 1942 to China as Agent-General of India. On his return from China he was appointed Judge of the Indian Federal Court and served in that capacity till partition. His legal expertise and representation at the League made him an obvious representative at the UN Security Council when the Indo-Pak dispute came up for discussion.

In 1948, Zafrullah was appointed Pakistan's Minister for Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth Relations, a post which he ably fulfilled till 1954. He was the country's Foreign Minister during the most critical time when Pakistan was trying to establish its political identity. In 1954, he was appointed Judge at the International Court of Justice and was made its Vice-President in 1958.

Another interesting personality was Major-General Agha Mohammed Raza. Educated in Simla and the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, he worked in the Foreign and Political Department,
Government of India from 1930-34. He served in the Second World War and on the establishment of Pakistan was appointed Adjutant-General responsible for re-organising the Pakistan Army. He was sent as Ambassador to China in 1951-54 and again from 1962-66. He also served as Ambassador to Iran 1955-59, France 1960-62 and Italy 1966-70. In 1971, he was appointed Ambassador to the USA and on his return in 1972 was made Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. From the fact that he was Ambassador to China, Iran and the USA - countries most crucial to Pakistan's foreign affairs - it is evident that he was one of the most trusted foreign policy advisors to various Pakistani regimes.

Yet another military personality who ably projected the country's image in international affairs was Sultan Mohammad Khan. Educated in Allahabad, he was commissioned in the Indian Army in 1942 at the age of 22. In 1947, he joined the Pakistani diplomatic service and in the following year, was sent as Second Secretary to Cairo and Rome. From 1953-57, he went as Second Secretary to Peking and in 1958, he was sent as Deputy High Commissioner to Canada. Having served there for three years, he was elevated to the post of High Commissioner and served there for another five years. In 1966, he was given a sensitive posting - that of Ambassador to China. On his return in 1969, he was appointed Assistant Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Sajjad Hyder, a graduate from Jullunder and the Indian Military Academy, Dehra Dun, served as a Commissioned Officer
during the Second World War. Following partition, he was sent as Second Secretary to Washington and after serving there for four years went to London as Counsellor in 1952. He served in London for only three years for he was called back to Karachi and was appointed Director of Pakistan's Foreign Office. His appointments as Deputy High Commissioner to New Delhi in 1957 and to London in 1959 shows the reliance placed on his talents by Pakistan's rulers. His appointment as Ambassador to Iran from 1961-65 was important for Pakistan's economic tie-up with that country. In 1965, he was sent as Pakistan's Ambassador to the UAR and in 1968 was sent back to New Delhi as High Commissioner.

A curiously interesting personality is Arshad Mohammad Hussain. Educated in St. Catherine's College, Cambridge and Middle Temple, London, Arshad Hussain rose quickly in the diplomatic service. While a Deputy Secretary in the Foreign Affairs Ministry, he went as Deputy High Commissioner to India in 1956. On his return he was made Joint Secretary in the Ministry in 1957 and served in that capacity till 1959. Other Ambassadorial posts he held were in the Soviet Union from 1961-63, and India from 1963-68. His diplomatic acumen came to the fore during the Indo-Pak war in 1965. However, on his return from India, he switched over from a diplomatic career to that of a politician and was made Minister of External Affairs. In this capacity he also served as advisor to Gen. Yahya Khan.

A different example is that of Ghulam Ahmed, who though not
directly responsible for foreign policy-making, played an important role behind the scene. Having served various Ministries in the pre-partition years, he headed the Pakistan Civil Intelligence Agency following partition. In 1949, he was made member of the Cabinet Secretariat and from 1951-55, he was appointed Secretary, Ministry of Interior and later of Information and Broadcasting. After a short stint at the UN from 1957-58, Chulam Ahmed was appointed Chairman, National Planning Commission till 1962. In 1963, he was sent as Ambassador to the US and served in that capacity till 1966.

Agha Hilaly's tact and diplomacy in dealing with crisis situations earned him a name in diplomatic circles and also a place in the Military junta's advisory circle. Educated in Madras and Cambridge, he entered the Civil Service in 1936. He was appointed Under Secretary in the Ministry of Finance, Government of Bengal and in the Ministry of Agriculture from 1941-47. Following partition, he was appointed Deputy Secretary in Pakistan's Foreign Ministry and subsequently, he was made Joint Secretary. His association with the Foreign Ministry for over a decade made him familiar with political issues which had a direct relevance to external relations.

He attended several international conferences as leader of Pakistani delegations. He held three crucial postings as Ambassador to the Soviet Union from 1959-61, High Commissioner to India from 1961-63 (at the height of the Sino-Indian crisis) and
Aziz Ahmad is another member of the diplomatic corps who influenced foreign policy making in Pakistan. He began his career as a Sub-Divisional officer in Bengal from 1934-37 and having served in various capacities, gradually rose to the post of Cabinet Secretary in 1952. From 1959-63, he was sent as Ambassador to the USA. This post was important to Pakistan for it was at this time that both the countries were engaged in fostering economic cooperation. His success in this post led to his appointment as Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Under Bhutto, the role and participation of the Civil Services in the national decision making appeared to be restricted. Although Bhutto's Government used the Bureaucracy as a source of information and alternatives for decision-making, the final decision was made by a politician, rather an administrative leader [27].

Just as Bhutto attempted to establish civilian control over the military, he attempted to establish political control (through elected or appointed politicians) over the civilian bureaucracy [28].

28 Robert La Porte, Jr., Power and Privilege, Influence and Decision-Making in Pakistan, (Berkeley, 1975), p.120.
As a result of the Administrative Reforms Commission chaired by Khurshid Hasan Meer, the recommendation to create a Unified Service Structure was accepted by Bhutto and the CSP was disestablished, and the Unified Service structure permitted the opening up of all the Civil Service positions to both "generalists" and "specialists" as well as to individuals who were not part of the Civil Service [29]. This, however, did not substantially or significantly affect foreign policy formulation in Pakistan.

NEPAL

The Nepalese Bureaucracy has a reasonably long history and a powerful living tradition. It has been constituted over an extended period of elaborate but well defined conglomerates of elite families, based on a carefully devised hierarchial scale; and in the absence of a strong party and parliamentary or military institutions, has long been the principal support for the political system [30].


Dating back to at least two centuries, the administrative system in Nepal has certain distinct features. This system was based on hierarchial principles, with precise and inflexible definitions of status, privileges and responsibilities for the participant elite families [31]. There was some circulation due to some established families being done away with because of dissensions and strife within the system, or new families were inducted into the elite status [32]. This hierarchial tradition, although modified to a certain extent continues to be the dominant characteristic of the contemporary political system.

Administrative Reorganization Programmes and its Impact on the Bureaucracy

The revolution of 1950-51 in Nepal introduced new themes. With the programme of modernization after the 1950-51 revolution, two new administrative institutions were set up, the Public Service Commission (PSC) and the Operation and Methods Department (O and M).

The PSC was directed to institute a merit system for recruitment into and promotion within the bureaucracy. The O and M department was instructed to prepare organizational charts of the Secretariat based upon modern principles of administration and to produce new manuals that conformed to Western concepts of

31 Ibid.
32 Rana Prime Ministers, for instance, usually had Brahmin priests as religious preceptors and Newari businessmen as confidential secretaries and financial advisors.
management [33]. But despite introduction of these innovations, the behavioural pattern of the Nepalese bureaucrats have changed only superficially.

However, to further strengthen and popularize Mahendra's regime, a major reorganization of administrative machinery was announced on July 1, 1962, involving the services of top ranking civil officers, "to make the machinery efficient" [34].

It is notable that in this reorganization, an army officer was appointed as the Home Secretary, while another became the Defence Secretary [35]. This amounted to a 'purge' of those civil servants whose loyalty towards the regime was considered dubious [36]. The Administrative Officers thus realised that their survival depends upon the loyalty to the king. Also, the bureaucratic elites preferred the royal regime to the Nepali Congress, for, the ban on party activity guaranteed the monopoly of the bureaucracy [37]. The dominant position of the king was thus accepted by the bureaucracy.

Three major administrative entities can be identified within

33 Rose and Landau., n.30, p.49.
34 Rishikesh Shaha was named Foreign Minister in place of Tulsi Giri, and four assistant Ministers were made full Ministers. See Asian Recorder, Jul 23-29, 1962, p.4669. Also see Pages of History, (A Collection of Proclamations, Messages and Addresses delivered by H.M.King Mahendra), Dept of Publicity, Kathmandu, 1963 (Series 1, p.10).
the bureaucracy;

(i) Palace Secretariat:

The Palace Secretariat consists of the various Secretaries and the assistants to the King, which appears to be a critical institution in the decision-making process. This dominant role of the Palace Secretariat is not defined anywhere in the law or constitution of the country [39]. The Palace Secretariat which also included Investigation and Enquiry Centre functioned not only as a relay station between the king and the Government but also as a policy and decision-making body using the Central Secretariat merely as an instrument for implementation of policy decision [40].

"All established channels of communication to the King are directed through the Palace Secretariat. Its role in policy implementation, however, is minimal. Nor does it exercise any supervisory or investigative powers on a regular basis, although it occasionally engaged in such activities in an "ad hoc" manner" [41].

39 Disclosed to the author by Rishikesh Shaha in an interview.
41 Told to the author by Rishikesh Shaha.
(ii) The District and Local Administration:

The officials of this level of administration are normally responsible to the Central Secretariat and are formally part of the national public service, but they appear to identify themselves as a distinct entity within the service, with their own interests to respect.

(iii) The Central Secretariat:

The Central Secretariat is directly responsible for programme and policy implementation. It is also the primary data gathering centre and provides the Palace Secretariat with the bulk of the data which the latter makes available to the king for the formulation of policies [42].

"King Mahendra employed several means to preserve the control over the bureaucracy. Officials were routinely transferred, in order to weaken their command over their offices. Individuals who fell into royal disfavour were dismissed or were assigned to unpopular posts. There is a political Cabinet Minister officially superior to the "Civil Service" Secretary retaining a certain influence over the implementation of policies, particularly in districts where his political clients are active. In addition fourteen commissioners were responsible for governing the zones and report directly to the Palace. The Central institutions thus create such a maze of overlapping

42 Rose and Landau, n.30, p.52.
authority that only direct palace intervention could cut through the inevitable conflicts and resolve important policy issues" [43].

The King depended on a very select group of faithful and experienced central secretaries to penetrate this institutional maze on all policy issues of importance. These Secretaries acquired such a place both within and outside the bureaucracy, that even delegations from remote places sought their audience. By playing one group against another during policy formulation and implementation, the Secretaries were able to achieve many of the King's (also their own) objectives, while still meeting the demands of groups whose support was important for the survival of the royal regime.

King Mahendra's firm control over the ministers in his Cabinet did not allow differences among them to come to the surface, except with his tacit approval. He often resorted to reorganising the Central Secretariat by dismissing and transferring top civil servants, thereby disallowing any civil servant from becoming powerful and having a say in policy matters [44].

43 As disclosed to the author by Rishikesh Shahā.

CEYLON

The foremost and the most powerful service in the British Bureaucracy which governed Ceylon was the Ceylon Civil Service founded in 1802, which was the Premier Service [45]. It was then an exclusive bureaucratic elite, which set apart the British colonial officers from their Ceylonese subordinates [46].

The Civil Service did not undergo a fundamental change when the country passed through several constitutional changes. It was impossible for a bureaucracy, trained and developed in the imperial tradition to come to terms with the political advancement of the country and adjust itself to the consequent demands of the growing political elite [47]. The character of the administration of Ceylon thus continued to be a centralized bureaucracy. The Ceylonization of the Civil Service began only in the twenties. Though a few Ceylonese were recruited, they occupied only the lower rungs of the public service. The increasing Ceylonization which had started, gave further impetus to administrative restructuring and by 1930, 55 out of 138 civil servants were Ceylonese citizens [48].

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With the grant of independence in 1948, the Ceylonese Government began to assume responsibility for a wide range of economic and social activities, which created new perspectives for the bureaucracy [49]. The Civil Service found no difficulty in adjusting itself to the new environment because, the political leadership which came to power at independence was not different from that which held power under the 1931 (Donoughmore) Constitution. But the change of Government in 1956 sounded a critical note for the bureaucratic set up, because the election brought to power a new political leadership whose cultural and social orientations were quite different from those of the Civil Service. The Civil Service, although forming a small minority of the administrative officers just after independence, had come to enjoy special advantages and status. But the leadership criticised the bureaucracy as having "colonial features and practices" [50].

Establishment of the Ceylon Administrative Service:

Despite repeated denunciations by politicians and proposals for change, reform was delayed reportedly in part, because of resistance by influential members in the service. However, the post 1956 period witnessed radical reforms in the bureaucratic set up. The most crucial bureaucratic reform was the abolition

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49 Wisawwarnapala, n.47,p.xii.
of the Ceylon Civil Service and the establishment of the Ceylon Administrative Service on May 1, 1963. The Ceylon Civil Service, which was 150 years old, thus passed out of existence. This represented the beginning of a phase of administrative modernization. In this course of reorientation the Ceylon Administrative Service successfully transformed itself from a privileged caste of despots into a modern bureaucracy answerable to elected ministers and the legislature.

The Ceylon Administrative Service, though constituting a minute portion of the country's total bureaucracy, has displayed remarkable ability in retaining both its prestige and status and has also grown enormously over the years. The Ceylon Administrative Service is, therefore, not only the most powerful part of the islands bureaucratic set up, but also a tremendously influential pressure group. Although it represented the most visible manifestation of foreign rule in the times of the struggle for independence the political leadership after independence relied heavily on it [51].

Soon after the installation of the United Front to power in 1970, about half of the Permanent Secretaries (equivalent to Secretaries in India) - the top notch of the Ceylonese Administrative Service had quit [52]. They were replaced by young

51 For details see Wiswawarnapala, n.47, pp.334-369.
ideologically oriented non-C.A.S. men drawn from the academic and other professions. All those who were inducted new, held their jobs on a contract basis and the main qualification was that they were supporters of one or the other party in the coalition [53]. A large percentage of personnel were chosen on basis of patronage. Since this was the criterion for selection, it contributed more towards the strengthening of the office of the Prime Minister than towards formulation of policy.

PAKISTAN'S FOREIGN OFFICE

The conduct of foreign policy often lies in the hands of professionals who are remote from the clash of political life at home and who develop a "foreign office view", which may outlast a whole series of Cabinet [54].

In Pakistan, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth was established in 1947. Commenting on the new establishment Vincent Sheean writes, "I shall never forget that when I first visited the new establishment, there was only one typewriter in the whole Foreign office" [55]. This was a pointer to the difficulties the new state of Pakistan faced at the time of her birth.

55 Vincent Sheean, Nehru, the years of power, (London, 1960), p.93.
Pakistan started with a woefully small number of officers and clerical staff. Although there were individuals who had their early careers in departments such as Defence, Finance, Law, Education and Commerce, there were none who had been involved in the foreign policy process.

A member of the old Indian Civil Service, Mohammed Ikramullah, headed the Foreign office when it was established; assisted by a dozen officers. There was no full time Foreign Minister at that time.

Pakistani missions abroad were equally short of qualified staff. It was only in 1948 that the first batch of young recruits were selected.

The earliest step towards establishing a regular foreign service was taken by a Press Note issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth Relations [56]. On November 18, 1948, it had been decided to create a new service to be known as the Pakistan Foreign Service, consisting initially of 120 persons of the following categories: (1) Fourteen already chosen by a competitive examination held before partition; (2) Twenty two between the ages of Twentyone and Twentysix, to be recruited by competitive examination in January 1949 and (3) Eightyfive, belonging to various age groups (from twentyseven to fifty) to be selected on an ad-hoc basis [57].

56 Since 1971, known as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
The policy of recruitment to the Foreign Office was nevertheless criticized by Syed Abdus Sultan who said, ... matter of recruitment for our foreign offices. A large number of people closely connected by blood with the high officials of our foreign offices have been continuing year after year in the service of our foreign office [58].

At first the grades in the foreign office followed the nomenclature that had been in vogue in the pre-partition Government of India, i.e., Secretary, Joint Secretary and Deputy Secretary. In 1959, these ranks were redesignated, Secretary General, Director General and Director. A research wing under a Director General was added to the foreign office in the same year.

In 1972, an additional post of Secretary for Administration was created to enable the Foreign Secretary to devote all his attention to diplomatic duties. External publicity, which previously was the responsibility of the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting was turned over to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in April 1973.

The young entrants to the foreign office were initially sent abroad for training but since 1960, they are being trained in Pakistan itself.

FOREIGN MINISTER

FOREIGN SECRETARY (Head of the Foreign Office)

Political

Secretary Middle Western Internaional Policy
Asia and East & Europe & tional Planning
Pacific Africa America Organ.

Director Director Director Director Director
General General General General General

DIRECTORS (Between One-Three)

Administration

Additional Secretary

Director Director Director General
General General General (Missions)

Direct Director Director
General General Headquarterers (Budget)

MINE DIRECTORS PROTOCOL DIVISION

SECTION OFFICERS

(Source: Interview with Riaz Khokkar, Minister, Embassy of Pakistan, New Delhi, October 1983).
During the initial years after independence, Pakistan had a handful of highly determined and dedicated men. Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan, already shouldering responsibility as the Defence Minister, carried the portfolio of External Affairs.

Foreign Minister Zafrullah Khan, more than matched anyone in the United Nations; Secretary General of the Cabinet, Choudhari Mohammed Ali was a Civil Servant of considerable intelligence and Foreign Secretary Ikramullah was a man of great charm and compassion, who knew how to get the best out of those who worked for him [59].

"Important foreign policy decisions were, however, made by the Cabinet over which Liaquat presided with great skill. The Prime Minister listened to his colleagues and sought consensus in decision making. Occasionally if the situation demanded, the Prime Minister would take personal decisions, but always referred the question to the Cabinet later. During Jinnah's time every policy decision, including foreign policy, was subject to his approval" [60].

Chaudhari Zafrullah Khan who became the first foreign Minister in December 1947, moved out of the picture very soon with the referring of the Kashmir dispute in the security Council, spending long spells abroad.

The prolonged absence of Zafrullah Khan from the headquarters made the Foreign office at Karachi, and Zafrullah in the United Nations function as two independent units.

Zafrullah's brilliance lay not only in the formulation, but also in the exposition of the country's foreign policy. Zafrullah knew too well what line to take in the Kashmir dispute, in the Arab-Israeli question and in other topics that came up in the United Nations. He needed no briefing from the Cabinet. The Foreign office was manned by the Secretary General and the Foreign Secretary under the control of the Prime Minister.

With the efforts of this well integrated team, Zafrullah won the goodwill of the Arab States for his brilliant backing of their cause in the world organisation [61].

By the year 1951, older members of the Foreign Service, who had been recruited on an ad-hoc basis, as well as the younger men, who had completed their training had begun to relieve the personnel shortage in the foreign office. But just when the problems of partition were gradually wearing off Liaquat Ali was assassinated.

The period that immediately followed, was one of political turmoil. The country became vulnerable internally. In this turbulent situation power gravitated towards two institutions: the Governor General (renamed President, when the

61 Ibid., pp. 350-51.
new Constitution came into force in 1951) and thea commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. This had repercussions on the Foreign office, as the formulation and direction of foreign policy that by right fell within the jurisdiction of the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister now came under their purview [62].

Suharawardy was the only Prime Minister during this period, who had the courage to directly invite a vote of confidence on foreign policy in Parliament and to defend it in public. But even during the term of office of this politician of high calibre, President Mirza continued to play an active role in external affairs [63] for he had the backing of the army. From October 1958, until December 1971, Pakistan was successfully ruled by two military dictators, Ayub Khan and Yahya Khan. Ayub Khan was ably assisted by Foreign Minister Bhutto, who articulated the Administration's position with considerable effectiveness.

Bhutto was elevated to one of the highest offices in the President's Cabinet on the sudden death of Mohammed Ali Bogra (Pakistan's Foreign Minister) on January 23, 1963. In selecting Bhutto, Ayub obviously believed he had an obedient subordinate. Bhutto represented Pakistan at the honouring of the accord on the border agreement between Pakistan and Communist China.

This was not to suggest, that the Foreign Minister was just a rubber stamp to the proceedings. As a long time member of the President's Cabinet, his advice had often been requested [64].

The first serious test of Ayub's foreign policy came in the wake of the Sino-Indian border conflict in October 1962, when Pakistan's principal Western allies, the United States and the United Kingdom, disregarded Pakistani protestations, that continuing military assistance to India be made conditional upon a settlement of the Kashmir issue so that India and Pakistan would no longer have any normalized relations with Soviet Union. Normalizing relations with Soviet Union paid dividends in the Indo-Pak War of 1965 for it remained neutral during the war and helped bring about truce at Tashkent. But, the reaction to Tashkent led to the growth of strong anti-Ayub and anti-Tashkent feelings. Ayub's hold over the country after Tashkent weakened significantly for Ayub had failed to live by his own maxim, "You must carry the people with you" [66]. Bhutto resigned from Ayub's Cabinet in June 1966, as a protest against

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64 As disclosed to the author by a Pakistani journalist, Salamat Ali.
65 Ibid.
the Tashkent agreement. However, Soviet support to Ayub against
the opposition and secessionist elements [67] within Pakistan was
forthcoming [68]. The Soviet Union which had euologised and
praised Ayub and had staked much on him did not take long to
switch their support to Yahya Khan , when he took over in March
1969.

Yahya Khan lacked the finesse to successfully handle
external affairs. The Foreign Office was not taken into
confidence to any large extent, for his closest advisers were an
inner circle of army colleagues. Soon, the Soviet Union realised
that its policy to back the ruling military Junta in Pakistan was
not bearing the desired results. On the contrary, it was
receiving rebuffs both at the official level and through Z.A.
Bhutto who blamed the Soviet Union for interfering in Pakistan's
internal affairs and trying to disrupt Sino-Pakistan ties [69].
At a time when Pakistan was in need of international support,
Yahya Khan affronted the Soviet Union, by reminding it of its
atrocities in Czechoslovakia and the Central Asian Republics in
order to justify the onslaught on East Pakistan [70].

67 Sheikh Mujibur Rehman had by then proclaimed his six-point
autonomy plan for E.Pakistan.
69 Vijay Chawla, "Soviet-Pakistan relations, changing
perspectives", in S.P.Varma, Virendra Narain, eds.,Pakistan:
70 G.W.Chowdhary, "The emergence of Bangladesh and the South
Asian triangle", The Yearbook of World Affairs, 1974,
Yahya's decision to use military force in East Pakistan was not only a disastrous error domestically but also a foreign policy blunder, because, given all the circumstances, war with India was a distinct probability and Pakistan was in no position to fight its much bigger adversary. His order for the removal of all foreign correspondents from Dacca was yet another inconsidered foreign policy move which lost Pakistan the sympathy of the powerful world Press and also the Soviet support.

**Bhutto and Foreign Affairs**

With Bhutto taking over the reins of power, the country had in him a leader who could efficiently manage foreign policy at all levels; and to assist him were two outstanding diplomats, Minister of State for Defence and Foreign Affairs, Aziz Ahmed and Foreign Secretary Agha Shahi.

Since Bhutto assumed leadership not by the direct or indirect support of the army, but because of the success at the polls, in his very first broadcast he said, "....Under no circumstances will I move one step in any direction without your approval [71]. ....I cannot do without my people [72]. .. Correct decision always come from the general mass of the people" [73].

72 Ibid., p.137.
73 Ibid., April 1, 1972 - Jun 30, 1972, p.699.
During the debate on the Simla agreement in the National Assembly, Bhutto said, "The people are the final arbiters...and that is why they have accepted it (the Simla agreement)...." [74].

On the eve of his departure to Simla, Bhutto himself summarized in a broadcast, the preparations he had made for the summit conference: "...Apart from the people of our country. I have also consulted our friends and neighbours abroad. As a part of this process, I have also visited Moscow and Peking and sent a special envoy to these two capitals" [75].

He held a press conference in Simla and on his return home, addressed the public at Lahore and Islamabad. He also defended his policy at a specially convened session of the National Assembly.

Both at home and abroad, Bhutto was Pakistan's most assiduous and effective publicist. In the changed circumstances, following the dismemberment of Pakistan, Bhutto did not hesitate to go back on some of his own utterances. For instance, he talked of conciliation and negotiation with India instead of confrontation which was earlier the stand taken by him. Also he kept Pakistan in CENTO, contrary to statements made during the 1970 election campaign that Pakistan would withdraw from all Western Military pacts.

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75 For details see n.73, p.221.
NEPAL'S FOREIGN MINISTRY

The organisation of the Foreign Ministry in Nepal did not receive serious thought till about February 1961. When the Ranas were in power, there was a small unit called the "Munshikhana" which dealt with the country's foreign affairs. The Prime Minister was in charge of this office. Its functions included correspondence with foreign countries, mainly British India, Tibet and China and the maintenance of related records. Since Nepal's external relations extended to only two or three countries, the need for further expansion of this unit was not felt [76].

After the Rana's fall this unit came to be known as the Foreign office and its Director General as the Foreign Secretary. The structure and functioning of the foreign office, however, remained unchanged except that a non-Rana official was appointed as the Director-General of the Foreign Office. The office worked under the Prime Minister till 1954, when a full-fledged Foreign Minister was appointed for the first time.

The change in the form of Government with the restoration of King Tribhuvan to the throne, made imperative the change in the administration [77]. A thorough analysis of the administrative change in Nepal,
system was made by experts from India who had come to Nepal at the request of the Nepalese Government. At that time there were altogether sixteen ministries functioning in the Central Secretariat of which one was the Foreign Affairs Ministry [78].

Immediately after the revolution only a small pool of graduates from Indian Universities could be drawn upon to dilute the autocratic, tradition-bound Rana hold over the new Ministries [79].

Soon after King Mahendra ascended the throne in 1955, the number of Ministries were reorganised on a more rational basis. The first indigenous attempt to re-organise the administration on a systematic and thorough manner was attempted in July 1956, when the Administrative Reorganization Planning Commission was set up. This Commission drafted the first Civil Service Act and Regulations of 1956. The Civil Service Act visualized the formation of a Nepal Administrative Service; several technical services and a separate foreign service [80].

The changeover from Parliamentary democracy to the Panchayat System in 1960, brought about major policy shifts in the political setting. Consequently, the Ministries were regrouped. The re-organization, however, did not reflect any radical departure from the prior one, because, major policies were still in the process of their formulation and they had not crystallized

79 Brown, n.76, p.666.
80 Shreshtha, n.78, p.15.
into well defined programmes.

However, a well knit Ministry of Foreign Affairs was formally established in 1960 in accordance with the Special Management Act, which served to legitimize the royal takeover and streamline administration.

The Ministry personnel were appointed by the Foreign Minister without reference to any fixed Administrative or even political standards, but their numbers were small and their responsibilities quite limited. All important activities were dominated by the King and the Palace Secretariat [81].

Since the Royal takeover in 1960, the role of the Palace has increased, and Nepal's relations with the outer world have gradually expanded and its foreign service has grown and established self-protecting rules and regulations.

The foreign service regulations drawn up in 1962 by the Foreign Secretary, gave special privileges to the service in relation to the Administrative and Technical Services. Before these regulations came into effect the Foreign Ministry maintained embassies in Delhi and London and employed about twelve officers at home in the Government Secretariat [82].

81 Told to the author by Rishikesh Shah in an interview.
82 Brown, n.76,p.668.
The Foreign Service

A re-organisation of personnel in the Ministry in 1961, creation of the foreign service in 1962 and promulgation of the foreign service rules in the same year prepared the ground for the development of a specialized service in Nepal to handle the foreign relations of the country in the complexity of the modern world [83]. Till then all appointments, transfers and promotions in the foreign service used to be made in a haphazard manner without taking into account the academic background and service experience of the persons recruited [84]. Ever since then, the history of the Nepalese foreign service has been the history of its growth and expansion. Although as compared to the foreign services of many other countries, Nepal's foreign service is small, its members are well versed in the skill of their profession [85].

With the establishment of the foreign service, there were four categories of personnel:

(a) Distinguished or Special Class;
(b) 'A' Class;
(c) 'B' Class;
(d) 'C' Class.

84 Author's interview with Jagdish Rana, Nepal's Ambassador to India, May 1984. Also see Bishwa Pradhan, Foreign Policy and Diplomacy, (N. Delhi, 1964), p.88.
The Foreign Secretary and the Ambassadors belonged to the special class, while the Joint Secretaries, Under Secretaries and Section Officers belonged to A, B and C class respectively. There have been cases when Ambassadors other than belonging to the foreign service have been appointed. Among politicians, former Prime Minister M.P. Koirala and also former ministers, Anirudha Prasad Singh and Rishikesh Shaha have been appointed as Nepal's Ambassadors abroad. Educationists, army personnel [86] and judges too have been appointed as Ambassadors.

The recruitment to the foreign service was made by the Public Service Commission. Owing to lack of proper facilities inside the country, nothing much could be done to impart necessary training to the foreign service officers. Since 1964, selected candidates were sent abroad for training. In 1966, for the first time, a group of eight candidates selected by the Public Service Commission was given pre-service training conducted by the Central Training Department of the Government for four months [87].

Expansion of the Foreign Ministry:

The years following 1962 were marked with a large degree of expansion both in the foreign ministry as well as the Missions

86 Padma Bahadur Khatri, who served as Foreign Secretary for two terms and was also the Permanent Representative of Nepal to the United Nations, had an Army background. For his diplomacy at the UN see his Nepal's Foreign Policy, Min of Communications, Dept of Information, HMG, Kathmandu, 1972, p.5.

87 Annual Report, n.83, p.5.
### Structure of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, HMG, Nepal

**H.M. The King**

- Secretary, Foreign Affairs (Palace Secretariat)
- Foreign Minister

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**Foreign Secretary**

- Private Secy., to the Foreign Secretary
- Administrative Division
  - Under Secy., -1
  - Section
  - Officers, -2
  - Senior
  - Accountant -1

- Budget and Accounts Dvn.
  - Under Secy., -1
  - Section
  - Officers, -2
  - Senior
  - Accountant -1

- Indo, China & Pakistan Dvn.
  - Under Secy., -1
  - Under Secy., -1
  - Section
  - Officers, -3
  - Officers -1

---

**Joint Secretary**

- Europe & America Division
  - Under Secy., -1
  - Section Off. -2

- Economic Relations Division
  - Under Secy., -1
  - Section Off. -2

---

**Chief of Protocol (Joint Secretary)**

- Asia and Africa Division
  - Under Secy., -1
  - Section Off. -1

- Protocol Division
  - Under Secy., -1
  - Under Secy., -1

- Consular Dvn.
  - Under Secy., -1
  - Section Off., -1

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(Source: Annual Report, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, HMG, Nepal, Kathmandu, Appendix I(A) 1967-1968)
abroad. Its expanding diplomatic contacts were to a large extent dependent upon the amount of likely inflow of economic aid and assistance [88]. From 1964 onwards a large number of new recruits had been inducted which was necessitated because of the opening of new Missions abroad and because of the need for organising the Ministry on a scientific and modern line which required a bigger staff [89].

The number of Joint Secretaries was raised to two. (Before reorganization, the Ministry had only one Joint Secretary). They were put in charge of the Protocol Division and Nepal's permanent mission at the United Nations. The rest of the members were under the direct control of the Foreign Secretary who was at that time the Secretary of Defence too [90].

The Ministry had two divisions, each of which was in charge of an Under Secretary. The two Divisions were: The Economic and Political Division and the Mountaineering Survey Border Recruitment and Establishment Division. There were also two Directorates of Hospitality and Protocol respectively.

Further measures undertaken to consolidate the Ministry


89 Annual Report, n.83, p.2.

90 Shreshtha, n.78, p.34.
were, rules which made it obligatory on the heads of Missions to send regular reports to the Ministry on financial, political and other relevant matters. Besides, each head of the Mission was expected to submit a comprehensive annual report to the Ministry on the Mission's activities during the year [91].

A beginning in external publicity was also made. Special efforts were made to feed the Missions abroad and also in Nepal, with important speeches of the King having a bearing on foreign policy.

The Ministry underwent rapid expansion and re-organization after 1964. The offices of Foreign Secretary and Defence Secretary, so far held by one person was separated in 1964.

By the end of 1965, the functions of the Foreign Ministry had expanded enormously in volume, variety and complexity. The Foreign Secretary was assisted by three Joint Secretaries. The Ministry was divided into three divisions: Political, Protocol and Administration, each of which was placed under the control of a Joint Secretary.

In 1966, a separate Finance Division with an Under Secretary as its head was created which was responsible to prepare and submit the annual budget estimate of the Ministry and subordinate departments and Missions abroad.

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91 Ibid.
Another high power committee was formed to advise the Foreign Minister on policy matters and other issues concerning foreign affairs. This committee was headed by the Foreign Secretary and included the Defence Secretary, Economic Planning Secretary and Home and Panchayat Secretary as its members. Although Joint Secretaries could report to the Foreign Minister, the Foreign Secretary being the principal official of the Ministry had to be kept informed of all important developments, for he is ultimately responsible for the conduct of Administration [92].

As of 1971, Nepal had diplomatic representation in 16 countries [93]. However, it was only in New Delhi and Lhasa, that the Royal Nepalese posts could directly contact the foreign ministry. The Permanent Nepalese Ambassador to the U.N. had no direct means of contacting Kathmandu and vice-versa [94]. The broad outlines of foreign policy were set and hence consultations with the ministry was rarely considered urgent.

The annual despatch of delegations to the General Assembly, provided a chance to expose usually fine high ranking Ministerial

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94 "We cannot send daily news briefs to our embassies abroad. Events in Nepal are generally not carried by foreign newspapers and hence the Foreign Ministry has to send local newspapers to our missions abroad. Also the weekly news digest prepared by the Ministry is received late by the missions." See Padma Khatri, n.86, pp.12-18.
Secretaries, members of Parliament or professors, to the international community. The quality of these delegations according to Shaha "has not been too good since delegates are rarely sent a second time, their educational experience is brief and unprofitable for Nepal's diplomacy at the U.N." [95].

Also, a meagre budget for training personnel in foreign languages was considered a handicap by the Permanent Mission in New York. Also, the five man mission which is sent to New York, is incapable of independent research and political stock taking on the host of issues coming before the U.N. and relies upon the advice of the U.N. Secretariat and the United States Mission with respect to Security Council issues [96].

In the foreign ministry itself, the most significant continuing issue of foreign policy is not effectively under its control. The negotiation of foreign aid agreements with a variety of foreign Governments and international institutions lies at the heart of Nepal's external relations; yet the crucial Ministries for formalising these relationships are Finance and Economic Planning (it is now a Commission) [97]. The Nepalese Ambassadors have not been expected to play much role in generating aid and they generally remain in ignorance concerning the

95 Rishikesh Shaha who also functioned as Nepal's Permanent Representative to the UN expressed this view.
96 Ibid.
97 Brown, n.76, p.668.
arrangement worked out in Kathmandu. By the same token the Foreign Ministry had been isolated by the Economic Ministries, even though an inter-Ministerial Committee had been formed to coordinate the negotiation of assistance agreements. A reform commission described the relationship of the Foreign Ministry to the Finance Ministry as one of "total ignorance" on some foreign aid matters [98].

The Economic Relations Division of the Foreign Ministry which was in early 1970 new and hence relatively inexperienced, rarely penetrated the jurisdictional defences of the Finance Ministry. Notwithstanding casual contacts at the Minister or Secretary level there has been no systematic review of the overall political implications of the successive foreign aid agreements. Only when negotiations involved more adversary relationships than merely the bargaining over foreign aid, the capability of the foreign ministry become more crucial [99].

The representational function in Nepal's diplomacy has been played most significantly by the King himself and the members of the Royal family by State visits abroad and receiving of Heads of Government in Kathmandu.

99 Brown, n.76, p.672.
King Mahendra had visited several Western and East European countries. He personally addressed the conferences of non-aligned states in Belgrade and Cairo in 1962 and 1964. His occasional visits and participation in international conferences and frequent exchange of cultural and trade delegations, strengthened Nepal's position in the international front.

"Preparations for these diplomatic occasions, and the ensuing return visitors, fall heavily on the Palace Secretariat and disproportionately on the Foreign Secretary and the Protocol Division within the Foreign Ministry.

Critical negotiations are managed by the King or through the Palace Secretariat. Foreign Ambassadors to Kathmandu recognising that decisive power rests in the Royal Palace, prefer to deal directly with the King or the Palace Secretariat's Secretary, although the Foreign Ministry is kept informed. It is, therefore, interesting to see, in official parties, foreign dignitaries hovering around the Palace Secretary. It is the King, however, who is the ultimate factor in the country's foreign policy projection "[100].

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100 Disclosed by Rishikesh Shaha in an interview with the author.
CEYLON'S FOREIGN OFFICE

When Ceylon achieved its independence in 1948, its leaders had very little experience in foreign relations. Defence, finance and external affairs had up to then been the concern of the colonial Government. D.S. Senanayake was content to let this situation prevail in Independent Ceylon. He thought it was safe to let the British do the thinking on foreign policy. There was no individual contribution to foreign policy formulation. The Defence and External Affairs agreement which Ceylon had signed with the U.K., had a clause according to which the facilities of the diplomatic and consular Missions of U.K. would be available to Ceylon, where Ceylon did not have such missions. Ceylon, therefore, availed itself of these facilities in the early years of its independence.

Ceylon's membership of the Commonwealth of Nations, the regular meetings of Commonwealth Prime Minister and the paraphernalia of the Commonwealth Relations Office helped her in her initial years of inexperience in world affairs. The United States had not come into the orbit of Ceylonese thinking, as the U.S. had not picked up South Asian threads [101].

The Foreign Ministry

Ceylon's original Ministry of External Affairs and Defence was a post independence set up which drew its original cadre from

101 Park Nadesan, Private Secretary to John Kotelawala, in an interview with the author.
the Ceylon Civil Service at the higher level and at the lower level from the General Clerical Service. Because of the problems of finance and personnel, the manning and functioning of this Ministry was at a very rudimentary level. Diplomatic relations was confined to a select number of countries only.

**Structural Organisation:**

They key official of the Ministry's institutional structure is the Secretary. So also, the Foreign Ministry came to be known as the Foreign Office after 1970. The Secretary was responsible for coordinating the activities of the Missions abroad and that of administering the external affairs department as a whole and advised the Prime Minister adequately. Besides, he accompanied the Prime Minister on foreign tours and attended receptions hosted by Foreign Diplomats and managed the visits of Foreign Dignitaries [102].

Surprisingly, the office of the Secretary has always been filled by civil servants. The first permanent Secretary, Kanthiah Vaithianathan (1948-1954), was responsible for organising the Department of External Affairs, particularly the career Diplomatic Service. The next Permanent Secretary, Gunasena de Soyza (1954-1959) was less flamboyant and usually acted according to the wishes of the then Prime Minister, N.F. de S. Jayaratne

102 Told to the author by C.Gunasingham.
had a very short innings at this post, but within this short duration he succeeded in eradicating many unhappy practices in the Department. The next incumbent N.Q. Dias who was in office from 1960-65, tried to "Sinhalise" the foreign office set up". He was succeeded by G.V.P. Samarasinghe (1965-1970) who headed the Department of Immigration and Emigration. He was succeeded by Ratnavale who served for a brief period, before he was posted as Ambassador [103].

The internal Organization of the Ministry has developed structurally from the time of independence, when the Department of External Affairs was constituted into only two Divisions under Assistant Secretary, viz. (a) Foreign Relations and (b) Protocol and Nationality and these Divisions were further subdivided into a limited number of geographical and functional areas. In 1965, two posts of Director of Foreign Relations were created as an intermediate cadre between the Secretary and the Assistant Secretaries, and a Publicity Division with an Assistant Secretary was added.

After 1966, the Ministry was further subdivided reflecting the increase of activities of the Ministry. There were disadvantages in combining the two offices of Foreign Affairs and

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103 Told to the author by Ray Forbes, formerly of the Ceylon Civil Service. Also see Marshall R. Singer, *The emerging elite: a study of political leadership in Ceylon* (Cambridge, 1964), p.49. For more details on these civil servants refer to Chapter 2.
Defence in one person, for equal and effective attention could not be given. But the advantage of having one person manning two offices was that there was no gap between the apex and the lower rungs of the hierarchy in decision making [104].

The Functional Perspective

Since the 60's the Director General of Foreign Affairs has functioned immediately below the Secretary and the number of Directors working under him have increased with the functional and geographical diversification of the Ministry's responsibilities. The absence of Historical Division has made the Ministry officials to seek the assistance of Foreign Embassies in Colombo in the preparation of their briefs correspondingly the Foreign Affairs Minister is also handicapped in getting relevant information from his officials [105].

This is not to completely devalue the Ministry's role in foreign policy formulation. In the negotiations leading upto the Sirimavo-Shastri agreement of 1964 and the negotiations preceding the signing of the Maritime Boundary Agreement with India, Ministry officials have played an important role. But these apart, important initiatives in foreign policy decision-making are mostly politically inspired [106].

104 C.Gunasingham, in an interview with the author.
106 Told to the author by S.U.Kodikara, Head of the political science dept., Peradeniya University, Kandy.
The Foreign Office was re-organized as follows by 1970*

Prime Minister (Minister for Foreign Affairs** & Defence)

Parliamentary Secretary for Foreign Affairs and Defence

Secretary

Director General

Divisions

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<tr>
<th>Protocol</th>
<th>Legal</th>
<th>Foreign Relations</th>
<th>Overseas Administration</th>
<th>Archives</th>
<th>Publicity</th>
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| Protocol Assistant |

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<th>West Economic</th>
<th>Africa And Asia</th>
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<td>Director (2)</td>
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<th>Assistant Director</th>
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<th>Assistant Secretary</th>
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<td>Secretary (1)</td>
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* Staff List of the External Affairs Ministry, Colombo, Sri Lanka, 1971

** It existed as a separate entity only since July 1977.

The top decision makers in foreign policy, whether Prime Minister, Foreign Minister or President may consider it insufficient to place reliance on official channels of information alone. Outside the Foreign Office, unofficial channels of information and sources of influence may be located in the Press, in personal relations with foreign emissaries or Heads of State, or from pressures emanating from the domestic environment. For example, D.S. Senanayake and Sir John Kotelawala used to give a weekly breakfast appointment to the Political correspondent of the Ceylon Daily News [107].

At the time when the Prime Minister was also foreign minister, the Secretary to the Prime Minister, although outside the structural framework of the Foreign Office often became a policy advisor in his own right, and at times even played a role in international conferences where the Prime Minister participated [108]. Felix Dias Bandaranaike when he was Parliamentary Secretary for Defence and External Affairs in Mrs. Bandaranaike's first administration (1960-1965), played a very important role in foreign policy making because of Mrs. Bandaranaike's inexperience and lack of training in public affairs [109]. Even during the second administration of Mrs.

108 S.U.Kodikara, in an interview with the author.
Bandaranaike (1970-1977), Felix Bandaranaike was entrusted with important foreign policy responsibilities and functioned almost as her foreign minister. There have also been instances particularly in the case of S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, when he did not dependent on anybody's advise, but was his own advisor. For example, Sri Lanka's stand on several issues at the General Assembly seems to have been directly guided by Bandaranaike. This is quite clear from his public statement at the U.N. on November 22, 1956, on the Suez and Hungarian crisis. He described how he gave instructions to his representative at the U.N. at 3 a.m. at night [110].

The Ceylonese Missions Abroad:

Because of inexperience in foreign affairs and a lack of proper institutional structure, Ceylon had in 1955, diplomatic representation in only nine countries with accreditation in twelve other countries. This could be attributed to the policy of the respective Governments in Ceylon until 1956, not to have diplomatic missions in the communist countries. After 1956, there was a marked change, for Ceylon had diplomatic representation in China, USSR and Yugoslavia with accreditation of representatives in Eastern Europe. After her admission to the United Nations in December 1955, she also established a mission at New York. The number kept increasing, so much

so that by 1980, Ceylon had established missions in some twenty
five countries with accreditation to a further thirty eight
countries [111].

Appointment of the Ambassadors:

Prior to 1970, only non-career personnel manned the foreign office. The Ambassadorsial level appointments lay within the jurisdiction of the Prime Minister, political patronage being the
criterion. During the UNP rule, many of the Ambassadorsial
appointments were made from party ranks, either dislodged
politicians or from the cabinet itself. R. S. S. Gunawardena
was appointed Minister to Rome in 1952 after being unseated in
the elections of 1947. C.W.W. Kanangara, who went to Indonesia
as Consul General was also defeated at the 1947 polls. There
were certain members of Cabinet too, who held diplomatic posts.
Amongst them, were T.B. Jayah, who went to Pakistan as High
Commissioner, Sir Claude Corea, Oliver Goonetillike and Sir
Eduline Wijeratne who were appointed as High Commissioners to
London [112].

Most of the appointees were Western oriented and men of long
political experience. Religious sentiments were also a basis
for appointment, as is evident from the appointment of Jayah, a
muslim who was sent to Pakistan. Similarly Susantha de Fonseka,

111 See Directory of the overseas missions of the Republic of
Sri Lanka, Min of Foreign Affairs, (Colombo, 1980).

112 See Indhumati, "Tissa Wijeyaratne - Exit from office",
a Buddhist was sent to Burma.

This partisan nature of appointing ambassadors was criticized by the Opposition [113]. But defending his stand in the House, D.S. Senanayake said:

"We must send representatives who will represent the views of the existing Government, not the views of any other party..." [114].

During 1956-65, when the Bandaranaikes were in power, Ambassadorial appointments were wide based, although S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike also appointed UNP members who were defeated in the 1956 elections, solely because of their political expediency. Richard Aluvihare was one such member who was appointed as High Commissioner to India, as he was well versed with the Indo-Ceylon problem [115]. This practice continued more or less in the same manner till the United Front came to power.

United Front Radicalism in Foreign Affairs

Within weeks of its taking over, the United Front Government recalled virtually all its Ambassadors on the plea that, as political appointees of the former Government, it did not feel too sure about the capabilities of these persons to project the United Front foreign policy abroad [116]. The recall was

114 Ibid.
115 Ceylon Daily News, Mar 22, 1957. For more details on such appointments, refer to Chapter 2.
followed by a two tier orientation course for the Ambassador's designate. After a briefing at "Temple Trees" [117] which lasted for a week, emphasising the importance of the right image projection of Ceylon abroad, the diplomats were to have separate sessions with the personnel of the various Ministries [118].

This was the first time that an attempt at projecting Ceylon's image abroad was made. Apart from drawing on the professionals and politicians, the new diplomats also included some senior members of the Ceylon Overseas Service [119].

The Ceylon Overseas Service Personnel:

In the years immediately following independence the foreign office was faced with the problem of finding personnel to man it especially at the lower rungs. Initially Civil Servants belonging to the Ceylon Civil Services were being taken on deputation, but this could not continue on a permanent basis. As such the Ceylon Overseas Service (C.O.S.) was created by the External Affairs Ministry in 1949 and recruitment to the career service began on the basis of the same competitive examination as was conducted for the COS, with an additional interview for applicants of the overseas service [120].

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117 The Prime Minister's residence.
120 See Kodikara, n.105, p.11.
Occasional innovations have been experimented with to select suitable candidates. For instance Prime Minister S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike took special interest in the selection of C.O.S. recruits, as he felt that the previous scheme did not call forth suitable candidates. Even Mrs. Bandaranaike in 1970 tried to radicalise the foreign office by allowing candidates to appear in the examinations in either Tamil or Sinhala [121].

In order to enable the trainees to gain expertise in international and diplomatic practices, arrangements were made with U.K., U.S.A. and Australia. But because of high expenditure on such a venture, this practice had to be discontinued. The C.O.S. is not an integrated service as a whole because the affairs of trade and commerce are looked after by personnel and not from Foreign Ministry but from the Commerce Ministry [122]. Also, the publicity and other related matters were sometimes managed by the personnel belonging to the Information Service instead of being part of the foreign office.

Although the number of personnel in the Foreign Ministry has been on the rise, the role of bureaucrats and the representatives abroad has not been too significant. Whatever contributions they have been able to make has been in relation to the influence the Prime Minister has been able to command. However, Ambassadors

121 As disclosed to the author by Park Nadesan.
122 Told to the author by C. Gunasingham.
like Oliver Goonetilleke, Claude Corea and Vaithianathan had quite a say in the foreign policy making under the premiership of D.S. Senanayake.

"The case was different when Bandaranaike was the Prime Minister. He is said to have remarked once to the Press, "My dear fellow, as for my Ministry's top brass is concerned first I shall have to show them Lebanon on the map".

During Dudley Senanayake's and Sirimavo's rule, senior officials, like G.V.P. Samarasinghe and Gamini Corea seemed to have a perfect understanding with the Prime Minister in projecting the view of their respective regimes. But these were rare instances for with every change in Government, the policies of one Government would not have found favour with the other" [123].

The foregoing review clearly indicates that of the cases studied here, in Pakistan, there has been a steady erosion in the role of bureaucracy in foreign policy formulation. In Nepal, the embryonic bureaucracy continues to lack the skill and self-confidence to carve out its own role or to project itself as useful if not indispensable. In both places, bureaucratic tasks and privileges have been usurped by others. In Ceylon, the case appears to be different, but only superficially is this true.

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123 Told to the author by Ray Forbes.
Senior civil servants have established their own authority only after establishing a rapport with the Prime Minister or President. One may suggest that the relative freedom of action has been granted not as a right but as a privilege which can be withdrawn at the pleasure of the political masters.