Chapter - II

THE ELITES AND THE FORMULATION OF FOREIGN POLICY
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Although foreign policy links the domestic with the external world, it is the domestic system - its social and political environment, its elites - that play the more important part in the determination and the formulation of the external system.

In every country, the decision-making with regard to foreign-policy is almost the exclusive preserve of a few individuals or groups of individuals generally known as foreign-policy elites [1]. The decision-makers of a country who shape and give effect to the course of a country's foreign policy (on the basis of their assessment of the external and internal milieu of the State), the analysis of "what they think the world is like" becomes important, and as such even the motives and beliefs of the decision-makers become a major determinant in decision-making analysis [2].

1 The term elite is variously defined by scholars. Ralph Dahrendorf distinguishes between those who have authority to make 'decision binding on all' and those (such as bureaucrats) who are merely delegated authority. The former are the elites according to him. See his Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society (Stanford, 1959), pp. 302-303; also see Kenneth E. Boulding, "National Images and International Systems", in James N. Rosenau, ed., International Politics and Foreign Policy (N.York, 1961), p. 391.

2 Richard C Snyder, H.W. Bruck and Burton Sapin, "Motivation Analysis of Foreign Policy Decision-Making", in Ibid., p. 247.
All political elites and the decision processes they establish are different in structure, form and exercise of power. Some elites are blatant about their position and power, others mask their real influence in the hope of maintaining and perpetuating that influence [3].

For the purpose of this study, reference to the term "elite" would simply be an identifiable group of individuals who exercise power, influence and authority over others [4].

PAKISTAN

In Pakistan, the foreign policy elites who have been dominant in the policy-making process over the years include:

(i) The top level military based on seniority in rank, principally the army.
(ii) The bureaucratic elites consisting of the civil services of Pakistan and the Pakistan Foreign Service.
(iii) Members of the large land-owning families of the Punjab and Sind. This category has been a source of ministerial talent for all regimes in Pakistan since 1947.


4 Harold D. Lasswell and A. Kaplan define elite as 'power holders of a society. The type of power held may be political, economic or social'. See Power and Society: A Framework for Political Enquiry (Yale University Press, Newhaven, 1950).
The decision making power in Pakistan was concentrated in the combination of these elites from West Pakistan. A majority of them came from the same social background. Family relationship through matrimony among top civil bureaucrats and military officers was also a factor interlocking them socially [5].

The West Pakistan dominance became so obvious, that East Pakistan slowly started responding to the discrimination. "We have been denied our birth right as the free citizens of an independent state. All decisions of consequence are made in Rawalpindi or Islamabad" [6].

A decision may be affected by the decision-makers consideration of other than elite values, attitudes or advice. This is 'influence', which is the ability to affect the decision-making process directly or indirectly and with or without an elite base of operations [7]. "Power, influence and authority is

5 A more detailed study on the dominance of the military and bureaucracy has been traced out in M.Rashiduzzaman, Pakistan: A Study of Government and Politics (Dacca, 1967), pp.261 ff.


7 Robert La Porte, Jr., n.3, p.6.
usually possessed by all political elites. Also, individuals and groups other than the elite may also possess influence as a result of their perceived or potential importance to the elite. In Pakistan, there have been a substantial number of such individuals, who owing to their association with the leader in power have been able to influence various decisions.

Throughout Pakistan's history, family or personal connections have always been important. The influence structure, therefore, has being highly susceptible to fluctuations in regime styles and to the personal preferences of the Chief Executive of the regime.[8]

Personalities and the Policy Making Processes:

Although, the policy-making structures and processes differ with changes in the regime, "continuity has been maintained through the civilian bureaucracy and the military bureaucracy regarding domestic and some foreign-policy matters[9].

The Pakistan policy-making processes tend to be highly centralised and personalised in the Chief Executive. This was true of Ayub and Yahya and also of Bhutto: political supervision of Government Administration was greater under the Bhutto regime than under Ayub.

8 Ibid.,pp.6-7.
The man who made foreign policy, after the creation of Pakistan were being educated even before the name of Pakistan had made its appearance. They attained positions of influence during the years when the struggle to create Pakistan was a dominant political issue [10]. The real power over the decision-making apparatus in Pakistan, was concentrated in the hands of the Governor-General, Mohammed Ali Jinnah [11]. Jinnah's Chairman and towering personality over-shadowed parliamentary practice, for he exercised his powers with the help of a close group of civil servants, including some British Officers who opted for Pakistani service after 1947 [12]. In foreign affairs, it is believed, Jinnah used to rely heavily upon the British Officers for advice and guidance [13]. Jinnah could not think of real powers being transferred to the Prime Minister as Head of the Cabinet. Although there was a Cabinet when Pakistan came into existence, it was more an advisory body to the President. Jinnah used to ask the Governors and the bureaucrats to send their

12 Jinnah's reliance on the British officers was so heavy that once Sardar Patel remarked in 1948, "Pakistan was still being ruled by the British and its freedom was only in name", quoted in A. Tayyeb, Pakistan: A Political Geography, (London, 1966), p.225.
reports directly to him. The Cabinet, rarely functioned without his directives.

Jinnah’s idealism in the field of state organisation found an eloquent expression in the realm of foreign policy, "our foreign policy is one of friendliness and goodwill towards all the nations of the world. We do not cherish aggressive designs..."[14].

Either out of personal preference, acquaintance or necessity, reliance on non-representative types of political decision-makers began with Jinnah.

Liaquat Ali Khan who emerged as the Leader of Pakistan after Jinnah’s death, possessed neither the Charisma nor the stature of Jinnah. But he worked with tireless energy in conducting the affairs of the state. In the field of foreign affairs, he did take a keen interest, but his role was quite marginal. Addressing an election meeting at Gujranwala on March 8, 1951, Liaquat Ali Khan said "Pakistan has an independent foreign policy and its policy and decisions are not influenced by any consideration except the maintenance of peace in the world..." [15]. He could not become assertive over the departmental


machinery and so long as Jinnah was alive, he had to work under a domineering Governor-General, who had been the real centre of effective power. However, Liaquat Ali was the first to visit United States and his visit was an impressive success. The views that he eloquently propounded, evoked favourable response from the American Congress and the President [16].

Governor-General and Prime Ministers

After Jinnah and Liaquat: A brief survey:

After Liaquat Ali's assassination in 1951, the other Prime Ministers who headed the privileged group of foreign policy elites and who played an important role in shaping and giving definite orientation to the country's foreign policy were Mohammed Ali Bogra and H.S. Suharawardy. Both were anti-communist and pro-Western. While Suharawardy had some support base, particularly in East Pakistan, Mohammed Ali was inducted as Prime Minister in April 1953 from a diplomatic post in Washington.

After Jinnah's death, Khwaja Nazimuddin became the next Governor-General, but he could not leave any distinctive imprint on the field of foreign affairs. Nazimuddin was heavily dependent for advice on Khwaja Shahabuddin (his brother then

16 For Liaquat Ali's speech in U.S.A., see his Pakistan: The Heart of Asia, (Mass., 1950) and for the American response see Congressional Record, Vol. 96, 1950, p. 6403.
serving as the Governor of the NWFP, the Central Minister for Commerce - Fazur Rehman and A. Hussain, the Editor of Dawn [17]. His sole pronouncement of foreign policy was made in response to the withdrawal of the American fleet from the Formosan waters.

The Governor-General whose influence in the shaping of foreign policy of Pakistan was considerable and who played a dominant role was Gulam Mohammed. It was he who became one of the most powerful and controversial heads of state of the country. His influence on policy making was so great, that Liaquat Ali's Moscow visit prior to his visit to the US was turned down, because a powerful clique which included Ghulam Mohammed had harboured no enthusiasm for Liaquat's Moscow visit [18].

During Ghulam Mohammed's tenure, it was widely believed that he was the effective maker of policy. The crucial role played by Ghulam Mohammad along with his Foreign Minister Mohammed Ali of Bogra and also Ayub Khan (then Commander-in-Chief of the army) in leading the country to enter into an alliance with the United States was well-known. Ghulam Mohammed, aided and abetted principally by Mohammed Ali and Ayub Khan, strove to push forward Jinnah's concept (that the security of Pakistan should be

18 Feroze Khan Noon in From Memory (Lahore, 1966), p.246, refers to Ghulam Mohammad, Mirza and Mohammad Ali as constituting the clique that dominated Govt. at that time. Also see M.S. Venkataramani, The American Role in Pakistan, (N. Delhi, 1982), pp.97-98.
ensured through American support for the building up of Pakistan's military forces) to its logical conclusion—the signing of a Mutual Defence assistance agreement with the United States on May 19, 1954 [19]. With an anti-Communist, pro-Western and more specifically pro-American political orientation and world outlook, these elites had little communication with the people. It was even reported that there was an American Advisor to several Prime-Ministers during the 1955-1957 period [20].

The Ayub Era, 1958-1969:

"Neither Jinnah nor Liaquat was in a position to alter either the decision or the influence structure inherited from the British...By not altering the existing decision processes and by not broadening the base from which influence and interests could be channelled, changes in both decision and influence structures were postponed until national circumstances could permit the emergence of another "great leader" who could again be in a position relative to his countrymen to mandate change without being constantly concerned with maintaining his case of support" [21]. Field Marshall Ayub Khan was the next "great leader" and


21 Ibid.,n.3,p.47.
the structural changes introduced by him were in the direction of institutionalising the trend towards concentration of authority and initiative, rather than their diversification.

Samuel Huntington wrote about Ayub that - more than any other political leader in a modernizing country after the Second World War, Ayub Khan came close to filling the role of a Solon or Lycurgus or "Great Legislator" on the Platonic or Roussean model [22]. "A great reformer and an untiring builder of a new society", was the acclaim given by the Iranian Government [23].

Ayub's rise was phenomenal. He was the first Pakistani to be appointed as the Commander-in-Chief comparatively at a younger age. As Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, Ayub was one of the most important decision-makers in Pakistan and a key component of the national power structure.

The fear of India under which Pakistan perpetually laboured was bound to magnify the importance of the armed forces in Pakistan. In his own account of the Indo-Pakistani crisis in the summer of 1951, he states that Liaquat and the other politicians as well as Pakistani troops seemed disposed to accept India's challenge to fight, but "it was my job to hold them back which; --

thank Heaven, I did" [24]. After the death of Liaquat Ali Khan, the fragile situation of the country further enhanced the role of the armed forces.

Ayub Khan's influence was so pervasive that his counsel was obtained before any big or vital decision was taken by the Government. He favoured personal diplomacy, particularly with the leaders of authoritarian governments [25].

Ayub Khan's role in the field of foreign affairs is well illustrated in the United States Military aid to Pakistan. The aid was made possible through the initiative and efforts of General Ayub, who visited the States in October 1953. The idea was born in his mind and it was through his negotiations with American political and military leaders that the United States Government invited Pakistan to enter into a Mutual Defence Pact.

The Eisenhower administration in its system of military alliances, had Pakistan as the most important of the Asian members. Ayub Khan too, as the Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan's armed forces in 1953 (he had not assumed political

power then) was strongly pro-American and believed that Pakistan and the United States should be allies and friends [26]. Ayub had made a favourable impression on the Secretary of State, Dulles and his Chief military advisor, Radford.

Speculation abounds as to why Ayub was so keen to seek U.S. assistance. It has been conjectured that Ayub had a grandiose plan to propel himself to power. The army was his base. He needed to develop that base in order to capture power. The military aid pact thus strengthened the role of the military, indirectly paving the way for the establishment of the military rule [27].

"In the meantime, the late Ghulam Mohammed, who was then the Governor-General of Pakistan, had arrived in Washington and wanted to negotiate personally with President Eisenhower regarding military aid. There was embarrassment all around the State Department, because constitutionally the Governor-General could not negotiate about such matters. Here it was a case of quoting rules, but in the case of Ayub, (who was at that time not in the power hierarchy, for he came to power only in 1958) the issue of constitutional validity was never brought to the fore.

Ayub Khan used to accompany the Prime-Ministers on their important missions abroad. On 17 November 1956, Ayub accompanied the Prime Minister Suharawardy and Mr. Iskandar Mirza to Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia on a semi-official visit. There again I found that the presence of General Ayub proved to be of vital importance for the interest of Pakistan. He was only the Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan army, and not a member of the Cabinet and yet, I could see that the one person who attracted the greater attention of the Iraqi, Saudi and Iranian authorities...was General Ayub" [28].

With the proclamation of Martial Law on October 7, 1958, General Ayub was elevated as the Chief Martial Law Administrator. Ayub Khan became the real master of the nation and declared, "My authority is revolution. I have no sanction in law or constitution " [29].

Creation of Political Institutions

Ayub Khan had no faith in the Parliamentary institutions of the Western type [30]. On more than one occasion he had expressed that it was his desire to see the country as organized

30 Ayub Khan, n24, p.193.
as his army [31] and that he intended to convert the 'Martial Law' into a document which would form the basis of running the country [32].

The imposition of martial law became a convenient means of Government succession [33]. The first martial law period (October 1958 - March 1962) was a period of unchecked executive rule by President Ayub Khan. During this period, the Central Government attempted to discourage anything approaching Parliamentary politics. It abolished political parties and eliminated the office of the Prime Minister and succeeded in encouraging certain participants in overt political decision-making - the newly emerging industrialist class, military turned civilian politicians and the rural based "Basic Democrats". Twenty days after the takeover, Ayub became the President and appointed a Presidential Cabinet [34]. The new President

proclaimed that his purpose was to "clean up the mess" [35]. However, in the initial phases of the new regime, it was not clear as to what the specific role of the Martial Law administration was. The army which had become conscious of its political role wanted to remain in power, until certain major reforms needing the cover of the martial law were introduced [36].

**Attempts at Projecting Public Involvement in the Process**

In order to arouse and harness the people for national endeavour, Ayub Khan gave to the people the system of Basic Democracies. He wanted these bodies to become the centres of dialogue between the representatives of the people and the officials at the corresponding level. With this objective in view, Ayub issued "the Basic Democracies Order, 1959" [37].

The system of basic democracies could not be a substitute for Parliamentary democracy [38]. Basic democrats were a

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37 Basic Democracies as viewed by the President, (Karachi Department of Films and Publications, Govt. of Pak., nd), p.14.

manoeuverable group of persons who had practically no initiative to express their dissent against the established policies of the Government. In fact, it was a clever innovation of Ayub to keep himself in power in the garb of a model which he called democratic. He is quoted to have said, "Without institutions which the Muslims have never been able to develop so far.... we cannot move from one stage of progress to another stage of progress" [39].

Also, the 1962 Constitution promulgated on March 1, 1962 was an attempt to institutionalize one-man rule through a strong presidential form of Government [40]. In Ayub's words "The President should be made the final custodian of power --Laws should be operative only if certified by the President...No change in the Constitution should be made unless agreed to by the President" [41].


The Constitution introduced an authoritarian regime of the old British Colonial type [42], whereby Ayub would nominate his Cabinet which would be responsible to him and also appoint the Provincial Governors [43].

Legally, Pakistan remained a Federal Republic, but in reality decision-making was an exclusive function of the President and his chosen advisors.

By the introduction of the 1962 Constitution, Ayub transformed his position and that of his Government from an overt military dictatorship into a rule having a quasi-democratic form [44]. Choudary Mohammad Ali rightly described Ayub's rule as "a Government of the President, by the President and for the President"[45]. Thus the first ever General's constitution established constitutional dictatorship. The military had little difficulty in trying to maintain the belief that the existing political institution i.e., the military rule was the most appropriate one in society[46].

45 See Dawn, April 2,1963.
Thus, the introduction of the Basic Democracies and the 1962 Constitution proved the theoretical hollowness of the new system created by the military regime.

The Leadership of Ayub:

The army had left a profound impact on the personality of Ayub and his thinking [47].

Most descriptions of the Pakistani political system since 1958 have emphasized the largely personal nature of executive rule and the extent to which Ayub directly and indirectly influenced events and dominated decision-making. It was no secret that Ayub abhorred competition at either the national or provincial levels and often went to the extreme of politically ostracising those who stood apart from rather than in the shadow of his personality [48]. Just as the military has only one


48 There are a number of prominent examples. President Iskandar Mirza, chief plotter of the Oct. 1958 coup, who after appointing Ayub as Chief Martial Law Administrator, was exiled to England twenty days after the coup; Gen. Mohammad Azam Khan, whom Ayub appointed first to the Cabinet and then as Governor of East Pakistan was asked to resign in May 1962 and Bhutto, whom Ayub dismissed from the Foreign Office in 1966.
Commander-in-Chief, so the state of Pakistan according to Ayub could have only one strong leader [49].

One can perceive how an individual with this attitude initially approached the Governing of a nation by suppressing all opposition and repressing any institution (such as political parties) whose autonomous survival depended upon the constant criticism of Government decision-making [50].

To dismiss Ayub as just another "oriental despot", however, is to take a rather naive view of his personality and development as a leader during his tenure. A fact which emerged over the years in that Ayub generally profited from his own as well as other mistakes and that he could blend with prevailing political winds.

He was a skilled and perceptive politician [51] in that, leadership was characterised simultaneously by acts of repression and the offering of incentives.

Since Ayub's main concern in the initial phase was consolidation of his personal political power, he was not inclined to take any risk. The period from 1958-1962 involved no


major breakthrough in the fields of foreign affairs [52]. Political stability through the suppression of opposition was the means and one of the ends of the Ayub regime [53]. He did take decisions quickly and implemented them [54].

Ayub showed extraordinary skill and leadership in the use of the military to pursue his goals, national unification and political stability [55].

His political instincts were of an extremely high order and the art of management which he had learned in the army and which enabled him to pick loyal, if not necessarily brilliant men for appropriate positions has been invaluable [56].

The Collapse of Ayub's Regime

Ayub, however, was never a popular leader. "Ayub wanted the affection of the people but failed to integrate himself with them. Isolated from the real world by a bureaucratic apparatus, surrounded by experts and advisers, foreign as well as domestic, he could not touch his people, nor they be thrilled by him."


Lawrence Ziring recalls the many times Ayub came to Lahore and how indifferent the population was to his comings and goings [57].

Even the people of East Pakistan were not stirred by the political institutions launched by the Ayub regime such as the Presidential form of Government, and the system of indirect elections, for they viewed it as devices to perpetuate the personal power of President Ayub [58].

The increasing social disorder and strife and the defection of key allies within the Government led Ayub Khan in search of a graceful way to exit the political scene and on March 25, 1969, he resigned and turned over the reins of whatever authority was left to his chosen commander of the army, Yahya Khan [59].

Yahya Khan - The Transitory Phase 1969-1971

For a second time, in a little more than a decade, Pakistan was placed under martial law on March 25, 1969. The first martial law, proclaimed on October 7, 1958, was planned chiefly by President Ayub Khan; the second was ushered in by him.

The constitutionalized rule was ended by the imposition of Martial Law by General Yahya Khan, Commander of the Pakistan Army. But having come to power saddled with commitments to the status quo, Yahya's discretion was limited [60]. However, policy and decision-making at the centre remained the responsibility of the Council of Administration, headed by President Yahya Khan and consisting of three Deputy Chief Martial Law Administrators [61].

However, the general elections took place as scheduled and the Awami League captured all but two seats in the East, whereas the People's party became the majority party in the West [62].

The logic of the parliamentary institutions demanded that Sheikh Mujibur Rehman leader of the Awami league could only be installed as Prime Minister. But this was ruthlessly opposed by Bhutto. President Yahya Khan who failed to negotiate with the warring groups dismissed his ministers with a view to keeping the entire decision-making in the Junta's own hands [63].

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60 At a press conference in New York, Gen. Yahya Khan was quoted as saying, "I believe in democracy and intend to hand back power to my people - I hope to God they take it quickly", New York Times, Oct 22, 1970.

61 M.A. Akhyar, n.59, p.225.


On the night of March 25, 1971, the army was ordered to put down the 'armed rebellion' in East-Pakistan. By now Sheikh Mujibur Rehman who had become the 'virtual ruler' of East Pakistan was arrested at his Dacca residence [64].

During the period from March to November 1971, it appeared that in West Pakistan, a measure of opposition both public and private was developing against Yahya and the military. Bhutto meanwhile had travelled throughout Pakistan making speeches insisting that Pakistan's political and economic problems could be solved only by civilian political leadership and not by the military [65]. Elections were planned for December 23, 1971 to fill the seats of the outlawed National Awami League leaders and on December 23, 1971 the National Assembly was to be summoned to suggest amendments to a new constitution that Yahya would prepare and publish on December 20, 1971 [66].

Meanwhile, the situation in the East continued to deteriorate. On November 17, 1971, Indian troops made their first major incursion into East Pakistan in support of Mukti-Bahini units which continued until December 3, 1971, when a full scale war broke out between India and Pakistan. The traumatic outcome was the partition of Pakistan and the formation of Bangladesh.

66 Hassan Askari Rizvi, n.51, p.XIII.
General Yahya's style

The second military takeover by General Yahya Khan in 1969 brought about a situation much worse than what the first military take over set out to correct. Yahya Khan had neither the personality nor the will of President Ayub, and in addition lacked political wisdom and experience [67]. What seemed to impress the people was his commitment to hold elections.

During the short period that General Yahya Khan had stayed in power, he not only developed a taste for it, but rather started enjoying it. On the one hand he pretended to hand over power to the duly elected representatives of the people and on the other hand started negotiating with the leaders of public opinion and putting up the one against the other [68].

Although the initial stern warning delivered to the bureaucrats in his accession speech echoed the wishes of the mass of the people, he too ultimately wanted to ensure the army, a permanent share of power [69]. In order to strengthen the army

67 Ibid.

68 K.L. Kamal, n.63, p.78.

69 Yahya Khan's keenness on continuing in power, and especially maintaining the dominance of the military is evident in an address to the nation on Mar 26, 1971, when he lashed out at Mujibur Rehman, calling him a traitor. This shows how Yahya reacted to a civilian coming to power and asserting a leadership role won at the polls. Text of the speech contained in Govt of Pakistan: White paper on the crisis in E. Pakistan, 1971, App. A, pp.12-13. Also see David Dunbar, "Pakistan: the Failure of Political Negotiations", Asian Survey, Vol.12, no.5, May 1972, p.444.
further, Yahya Khan decided to act as a conduit between Washington and Peking to explore the possibility of normalisation of relations between the two countries. In return, President Nixon assured Yahya of his goodwill and a place for Pakistan in his emerging strategy [70]. Yahya agreed to carry out the task in utmost secrecy.

His labour bore fruits when the Chinese publicised in November 1970, the offer of a 200 million dollar economic aid to Pakistan. But the gathering storm in the Eastern Wing of Pakistan and his disastrous decision to attempt a military solution to the autonomy problem in East Pakistan, caused the military to lose credibility among the elites and the population.

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto - The Charismatic Personality

Political leadership has always played a crucial role in all political systems; specifically in developing nations, for the simple reason that in these systems, role expectations are diverse and challenging, priorities of the system are to be identified, ordered and implemented with a view to effecting a balance between stability and change [71]. In this context, a study of the leadership of Bhutto, on the scene of Pakistan


politics becomes relevant and interesting. More so, because in Pakistan, leadership whether civilian or military has in different ways and in varying degrees shaped and altered the political dynamics of the system. Bhutto did captivate the imagination of the masses for some time, and in the process capitalised the common man's fallibility for hero-worship.

Bhutto's flamboyant and boisterous opposition to Ayub Khan's leadership was largely responsible for the collapse of the military regime. He sensed the restlessness of the people against Ayub and effectively mobilised it [72]. Consequent upon the victory of the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) in the 1970 general elections Bhutto emerged as a popular political leader in West Pakistan. Popular enthusiasm acclaimed Bhutto as the Qaid-e-Awam (Leader of the People), perhaps equalled in popularity next only to Qaid-e-Azam, Mohammed Ali Jinnah. The people of Pakistan hopefully expected that under Bhutto's leadership the political system would be more viable and stable.

By 1970, Bhutto had emerged as a charismatic leader. His rise to fame was meteoric. He came to public life as Ayub's protege, when he became a minister in Ayub's Cabinet in 1958, and

remained in the Cabinet until 1966, all the while escaping the unpopularly of the other ministers. In part, this was because as Foreign Minister, he was closely associated with Ayub's policy of Sino-Pakistan friendship, which was popular with almost all sections of the people [73].

But it was his anti-Tashkent stand that made Bhutto popular with the West-Pakistani youth in the aftermath of the 1965 war with India [74]. Even though he was involved in the disastrous policy of confrontation with India, by disassociating himself from the Tashkent settlement [75], he managed to escape the anti-regime sentiment emanating from the war, and in fact he became a catalyst of opposition sentiments that helped to unseat Ayub in 1969. In 1971, Bhutto pursued a similar strategy. Though his anti-'Six Points' (of the Awami League) stand and insistence on power sharing, precipitated the military's confrontation with the Awami League, he quickly disassociated himself from the regime, escaped the stigma of the disastrous policy and finally inherited power after the military defeat.

While Bhutto chose an independent course for himself from 1965 onward, he became a leader to be reckoned with only after

74 Ibid, p.580.
75 "We are fully aware of the treacherous nature of India and we do not want to endanger the existence of Pakistan in the name of co-operation", see Times of India, (N. Delhi), June 6, 1966; also see Sharif al-Mujahid, "Pakistan: First general elections", Asian Survey, Vol.11, no.2, 1971, p.167.
spearheading the mass opposition movement in West Pakistan in 1968. His subsequent arrest by the Ayub regime and his release from prison, later in February 1969, increased his popularity and he became the hero of the mass movement.

He was a populist, for he mobilized and politicized the students, the working class, the literate professionals, the industrial masses as well as a section of the ruling civil-military bureaucratic elite who were dissatisfied with the system and wanted a change [76].

During the last stages of the Bangladesh crisis Bhutto had the support of some key personalities in the military establishment who contributed to his rise to power. It was a case of one illegitimate President yielding his place to another [77].

Bhutto's social status as a scion of the land-owning class was also relevant to his meteoric rise to eminence and power. While civilian and military bureaucrats dominated decision-making, landed wealth was the cement between the two classes [78].

76 Told to the author by Salamat Ali, a Pakistani journalist, in an interview in N. Delhi, May 1984.


Negotiating Successfully from Weakness

Bhutto took over the reins of Government as the President of Pakistan, when Pakistan was facing a crisis of survival. Its leadership had proved incompetent and its traditional enemy was now ten times its size [79]. Despite these grave challenges to his leadership, Bhutto controlled the entire political environment which served enormously in safeguarding his political survival [80].

The most striking aspect of Bhutto's character was his passion for power. He would not mind making compromises with his proclaimed principles to maintain himself in power [81], and would not hesitate to resort to unscrupulous politics in the interest of seeking or extending his power. "For instance, Bhutto owed his success at the 1970 polls in West Pakistan largely to the policy of confrontation with India which he had then expounded." Nevertheless, he disclaimed adherence to his policy after he came to power in 1971, for he knew that only abandonment of this policy in favour of normalisation with India alone could sustain him in power for the time being " [82].

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80 S.N. Kaushik, n.71, p.22.

81 Satish Kumar, "Pakistan since the emergence of Bangladesh", South Asian Studies, Vol. 9, no.1&2, Jan-July, 1974, p.78.

82 Ibid., p.78-79.
His obsession with power made him stifle freedom of speech, expression and organisation of those who were against the Government, and in the political system he had wanted to evolve, he preferred high concentration of power in the Chief Political Executive which he knew would be himself for many years. It is generally held that Bhutto was no lover of democracy and would never have allowed democracy to take roots in Pakistan. This was evident from the unscrupulous ways with which he had been ruling the country. He had in his own mind seemed to have rationalized the Pakistani requirement to mean democracy, overridden by as many authoritarian and centralist checks as would be conveniently allowed by the people [83]. Nevertheless, Bhutto did provide the country with a federal Parliamentary system under a new constitution [84]. Initially, the new Constitution in many ways caught the imagination of the people as symbolising a departure from the army bureaucratic stanglehold over the system. But later on, it was given out that the new Constitution was no more than a "quasi-parliamentary framework", not very different from Ayub's "quasi-presidential constitution" [85].

83 Ibid, p.80.
Style of Functioning

Over centralization of decision-making, and not delegation of responsibility had been Bhutto's style. He not only stood at the apex of the Government, but perceived himself as personifying the political system in Pakistan. "His psycho-cultural experience of belonging to one of the well-known families of Sind's landed aristocracy, his education in some of the world's renowned institutions, his status in Ayub Khan's administration, his capacity to build a new political party, where so many other luminaries failed, and ultimately his selection by the Pakistan military establishment to head a new Government following the traumatic dismemberment of Pakistan, all inter-relate to reinforce his pronounced self-confidence" [86]. It was this complex highly skilled, ambitious politician, who was given the mandate to refashion Jinnah's dream, minus the Eastern wing.

Attainments in Bhutto's life were quick. He graduated at the age of 22, became a Cabinet Minister while barely 30, led the Pakistan delegation the UN at 31, became Secretary-General of the Muslim League while still under 34, the Foreign Minister at the age of 35, the most formidable opponent of Ayub Khan at the age of 38, the founder president of the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) at the age of 39, the President of Pakistan at the age of 43 and the Prime Minister at 45 [87].

Bhutto did everything to get power and this quest eventually led to the break-up of the country. He engaged in his share of innuendoes, threats, and sometimes overplayed his hand for political ends. His inflammatory speeches immediately after the elections reeked of his own ambition and certainly added to the mounting tension. When Bhutto assumed power on December 20, 1971, a wide and heterogeneous group of power blocs existed to deter him from grabbing dictatorial powers. They included the industrialists and the urban propertied classes - a growing Islamic group, power hungry bureaucrats, disgruntled politicians far removed from the corridors of the semblance of political power, the rising political consciousness among the masses and more particularly the urban industrial workers which he himself helped to arouse as the PPP leader [88]. But what really scared Bhutto most was the military and he was determined to curb its influence [89].

The armed forces had stayed in power for long and they had developed vested interests in the various aspects of the national life and enjoyed all patronage and authority that go with it [90]. In order to subdue the increasing domination of the armed forces, Bhutto brought about structural changes in the organisation of the armed forces [91]. He wanted to neutralise

88 K.L.Kamal, n.63, p.82.
89 Ibid.
90 Salmaan Taseer, n.87, p.148.
the military, so that it did not involve itself in politics and also wanted to appease it, to keep it satisfied.

Bhutto seemed to be in full control of the situation and hoped to stay in power "longer than anyone else who has stayed in power" [92]. Hence, by dismissing opponents in the military and civil service, Bhutto was on his way to establish and maintain his own power and authority in Pakistan [93].

To counter the challenge of the opposition, Bhutto adopted a coercive approach. He devised policies with a view to diluting the impact and prospects of the opposition. What aided Bhutto in that endeavour was the fact that the opposition parties in Pakistan remained split by internal bickerings and parochialism. The opposition parties could not succeed in providing an alternative to the ruling PPP.

Bhutto time and again overhauled the Governmental structure, and the most trusted persons from the army and the bureaucracy were patronized with influential ranks in the Cabinet. Bhutto centralized the activities of the ruling P.P. Party vis-a-vis the Government. Instead of institutionalizing the governmental activities, he personified himself with the political system of Pakistan [94].

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92 Salmaan Taseer, n.87, p.197.
93 Robert La Porte, Jr., n.3, p.103.
94 At several party meetings, Bhutto repeatedly asserted, "I am the People's Party and they are all my creatures", quoted in Lawrence Ziring, n.86, p.632.
Bhutto could never reconcile to the presence of an opposition inside or outside the party. "His own background and experience was limited to military dictatorship, to conniving and knifing in the back and never trusting anyone. He knew intellectually how to run a democratic government, but emotionally he just could not take these steps" [95].

He lived like an aristocrat and proved to be a status quoist. He talked of democracy but acted like an autocrat, perpetuating his personal power.

"As his power increased, he began to fall predictably into the classic mould of dictatorship. He would rule by whim rather than through institutions. His personality cult was encouraged. Democracy for him was an instrument with which he could exercise his own brand of power. When convenient, he used large Parliamentary majority to back his wishes, but was equally content to avoid the Legislature if necessary" [96].

The charge against Bhutto was that he entered into collaboration with the army in order to hoist himself into power at the cost of the split of the country. The opposition parties went to the extent of saying that Bhutto wanted power even at the cost of liquidation of Pakistan for which history would never forgive him [97]. Bhutto by playing as the main stooge of the

96 Salmaan Taseer, n.87, p.194.
military regime created problems for himself [98]. This constrained his own freedom of action in the field of foreign policy formulation even after he had become the supreme political leader of Pakistan.

NEPAL

Prior to 1947, Nepal had relations only with British India, where representative institutions were introduced very slowly. Yet, in Nepal, even democratic trappings remained conspicuous by their absence. The state power was personified in the Rana Prime Ministers who regardless of their merit held offices by sheer dint of their birth [99].

However, from the time King Tribhuvan ascended the throne, Nepal has been experiencing significant changes in the social, economic and political fields and has been experimenting with various institutional patterns.

The establishment of the personal rule by King Mahendra in 1960 was the period of many institutional innovations in Nepal [100]. King Mahendra who dominated the Nepali scene defined a new dynamic role for the Crown by direct participation in the


affairs of the Government. King Mahendra has not only been a moderator of Nepali politics but has also played a crucial role as an initiator and an innovator. He was disinclined to accept a passive constitutional role and entertained the ambitions of becoming a popular charismatic leader.

To justify the dissolution of parliament, he attempted to create a cultural myth about the Panchayats. He put forward a plea that the panchayat system was better suited to the socio-psychological climate of Nepal than Parliamentary democracy [101].

In the partyless panchayat system, it is the Palace Secretariat which attempts to fulfill the functions of a political party, despite the fact that the Secretariat is not even similar to a political party in form or operation. Because of its key position in the panchayat political process, the Palace Secretariat has a vital role in channelling communications to the King and also those that are vital to the system flow through the Palace Secretariat at some key point [102].

101 Speaking at a civic reception, King Mahendra said, "Unlike in the Parliamentary system, where every branch of Government worked without any regard to the goodwill and contact of the people, in the Panchayat system the case is quite the opposite", The Motherland, (Kathmandu), Jan 30, 1964.

The Monarchy as the Foreign Policy Decisional Unit:

The roots of the Nepalese monarchy go back into the dim reaches of history and are connected to various events, many of which are distinctly religious in nature [103]. By tradition, the King of Nepal is revered as the incarnation of Vishnu - the Hindu God of preservation; and for the countless numbers of the Nepalese people, the restoration of the royal prerogatives in 1951, had meant a revivified faith in the divinity of the king [104].

The lost powers and prestige of the monarchy was revived in 1951, after the overthrow of the Ranas but Nepal continued to be in a period of political instability and chaos until 1958. There seemed an endless struggle for power among the political parties, the political leaders and the king. The king being the repository of the sovereign powers of the State, a constitution awarded by him was finally accepted, which was promulgated on 12 February, 1959.

In the general elections which ensued, the Nepali Congress got a very stable majority of seats, which consequently formed the Government, with B.P. Koirala as its head on 27 May, 1959.

In a country with the tradition of Monarchy strongly entrenched, Koirala as the Prime Minister was emerging as a strong

and effective parallel to the king. At times, perhaps, in matters of public policy, he even tended to ignore the king. The king did not want the emergence of political forces which would undermine the validity and authority of kingship and hence dismissed the Nepali Congress Government on the ground that the Parliamentary system of democracy was not suitable to the traditions of the country [105].

"The king decided to institute a system of Government in which he personally might be able to participate, with only a nominal measure of direct participation by the people. The king thereafter promulgated a new constitution on 12 December, 1962. The distinguishing feature of the new Constitution was that, the king occupied the pivotal position in it, the rest of the institutions being relegated to a subsidiary role" [106].

A shrewd and farsighted politician in king Tribhuvan and particularly in king Mahendra, added fresh dimensions to the institution of Monarchy. They cultivated the army and the civil service and mobilized the popular support to strengthen their traditional base of power and to legitimize their respective constitutional authority [107].


106 Ibid, p.142.

With this strong position, the role played by the monarchy in the foreign policy making depended on the personal attributes and skills of its occupants from time to time, namely King Tribhuvan and King Mahendra [108].

**King Tribhuvan:**

Using the typology of Snyder [109], King Tribhuvan can be termed as "traditionalist". He was desirous of establishing a democratic system under Constitutional monarchy in the kingdom. His choice for democracy can be attributed to his utter dislike for the autocratic regime of which he himself was a victim during the Ranas and in the conflict between the Ranas and the Nepali Congress during their coalition rule, King Tribhuvan had sided with the latter [110].

From August 1952 to June 1953, King Tribhuvan ruled with an Advisory Committee with General Keshar Shamsher as the Chief Advisor, while the others belonged to the army and the civil services. The Special Emergency Powers Act, further strengthened Monarchy. However, the advisory regime was attacked and

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109 Richard C. Snyder, H.W.Bruck and Burton Sapin, have listed six types of personalities among the decision-makers: the communicators, the innovators, the power-seekers, the traditionalists and the career servants. See their Decision Making as an approach to the study of International Policies in Foreign Policy Decision-Making, (N.York, 1962),p.116.

described as a return to Ranacracry. Reacting to this criticism, he terminated the advisory regime in favour of a Cabinet of political leaders.

His apathy towards involvement in foreign affairs was due to his ill-health. Another limiting factor was the Indian influence on Nepal. India's Ambassador to Nepal, C.P.N. Singh functioned as King Tribhuvan's political advisor and even intervened directly in policy and political appointment matters [111]. King Tribhuvan was indebted [112] to the Government of India for having liberated Nepal from the oligarchic rule of the Ranas. This sense of gratitude found its expression in his policy statements which stressed 'very special ties' with India [113].

The physical and environmental factors thus limited the nature and scope of King Tribhuvan's role. The sanctions inherent in them permitted him only a docile participation in the policy decisions. During his rule, Nepal followed India's lead and guidance in the matters related to foreign policy.

King Mahendra

King Mahendra's impact on the decision-making in Nepal in general and foreign policy in particular, presented a great contrast to that of his father, King Tribhuvan. It was largely due to the fact that the limitations applicable in Tribhuvan's

111 Leo E. Rose and John T. Scholz, Nepal: Profile of a Himalayan Kingdom, (Select Book Service Syndicate, N. Delhi, 1980), p.43.
113 Ibid
case were either totally absent or very feebly present to restrain the free play of his idiosyncratic features [114].

King Mahendra was an amazingly strong, single-minded personality, almost fanatically devoted to the progress of his country and determined to implement the ideals of his father, in his own well thought out way [115].

Since the accession of Mahendra to the throne in 1955, the king has become an increasingly important figure in the Nepalese political system. The administrative, legislative and judicial branches of Government are all dependent upon the initiative of the Royal Palace and the king is the key figure in the policy-making process [116].

From the death of King Tribhuvan at Zurich in 1955, to the setting up of the Government of B.P. Koirala in 1959, King Mahendra took such measures and formed such Ministries as would strengthen the Monarchy and assert his full control over the Central and District Administration [117]. "King Mahendra's


117 The formation of ministries at the instance of any external force was not only against his taste, but was also not in keeping with the interest and prestige of a sovereign state— for more details see Surendra B. Shrestha, "King Mahendra — The Architect of the Nepalese Foreign Policy", Nepalese Council of World Affairs, Jun 13, 1971), pp.32-41.
personalistic features as a "communicator", "innovator", and "power-seeker" could be well observed in the manner in which he started innovating a political system that provided him with a mechanism to legitimate his new role. This policy was according to him in conformity with the new national and international realities. His policies and pronouncements made it clear that he was determined to cast Monarchy in the mould of an efficacious and all powerful institution in the kingdom.

As a "Communicator", before and particularly after initiating a major policy or a programme, he went directly to the people to explain it to them and to mobilize support in its favour. In his speeches made on the occasions of departure for and return from State visits abroad, King Mahendra underlined his role as a "communicator" between Nepal and the world outside [118]. Through these speeches, he also shared the experience he gathered during his tours abroad, with the people [119].

The "innovatory" character of King Mahendra was evident in his preference for the politics of deviation, policies of drift and experiments with the system in existence. He was contemptuous of the democratic system and aimed at discarding

118 S.D. Muni, n.114, p.98.

whatever democratic institutions which had come into existence after the fall of the Ranas [120].

It was, therefore, not surprising that King Mahendra did not seek the cooperation of political parties and announced on 14 April 1955, the formation of a council of royal advisors who had been associated with the old Rana order to assist him in the discharge of his administrative duties [121]. He also took a number of steps to tone up the Administration.

He was determined to crush any opposition to his personal rule [122], and therefore placed those whom he liked in key positions in the Central Secretariat [123].

Projection of Nepal's identity, independent of India on the international front through diversification of foreign aid, trade and strengthening its diplomatic contacts constituted the major objectives of the king's foreign policy [124]. Nepal had long


124 M.P. Koirala, in 1954, then the Prime Minister observed, "Nepal does not want to join any block, and according to Buddha's ideals of peace... we have adopted our own foreign policy", see Hamro Par Rashtra Sampark (Our External Relations), Publicity Dept., Central Secretariat, Kathmandu 1954, Govt of Nepal, p.57.
been seeking ways in which to break the stronghold India had over its economy as the necessary pre-requisite for political independence [125]. This came in the form of a 'road-treaty' with China which Mahendra concluded in October 1961. It further rebuffed India in October 1962, by signing a trade treaty with Pakistan, which was followed by a transit and trade agreement on 26 January 1963 on a reciprocal basis. With this it was made clear that Nepal had other outlets to the outside world [126].

The power seeking tendency was quite apparent in the way King Mahendra conducted politics. The stress was, however, on accentuating and exercising power, an evidence of which can be located in his trying to strengthen the feudal base in the country. To fortify the monarchy, the king systematically gave importance to the Army, the Bureaucracy and the Feudals. A large contingent of army personnel was always posted within the palace premises, which was at the beck and call of the King [127].

"He was a shrewd politician too, for, when the people got disillusioned with the king's empty promises of efficient administration, he formed the Praja Parishad Government headed by

125 Yadunath Khanal expressing the same said, "Nepal is never prepared to play second fiddle to any country and will never lag behind in thinking out ways and means of her own welfare". See his Background of Nepal's Foreign Policy, Dept of Publicity and Broadcasting, Min of National Guidance, HMG, Kathmandu, n.d., p.10.


127 The Army was then called the 'Shahi Sena'. 
T.P. Acharya, much to the annoyance of the political parties. He had entrusted power to a week, segmented and a faction ridden political group with little followings" [128].

The urge for self esteem in King Mahendra found a vivid expression in his conduct. He closely identified himself with his country and people and made his name almost a synonym of the Nepalese nationalism. "My country", "My people" and "My Government" had appeared as the most favoured phrases in his speeches at home and abroad. To every programme introduced by him, the word 'National' was added as a prefix [129]. B.P. Koirala's rising stature in the international domain caused consternation in the mind of King Mahendra who had entertained the ambition to play an important role in world affairs. Conscious as he was of his 'pre-ordained' role, he could not allow anybody to step into his domain [130]. This led to his dismissing Koirala and dissolving parliament.

His extensive tours of the countryside and the world capitals, and his participation in international conferences earned him social recognition. The personal tours he undertook of the countryside, not only enabled him to have first hand knowledge of the problems of the country, but also created a lasting impact of a benevolent monarch on the minds of tradition-ridden villagers, particularly when the monarch was accompanied

128 Rishikesh Shaha, former Foreign Minister of Nepal told this to the author in an interview in Apr 1984.
130 Joshi and Rose, n.104, p.387.
by a mobile dispensary, a mobile court and a mobile film projector, benefitting thousands on the spot.

The king also used to despatch multi-purpose tour commissions to various parts of the country. The commissions publicized the king's political philosophy, redressed local grievances and reported to the king on the working of the political system.

King Mahendra took undue interest in the decision making and frequently interfered in the day to day administration. The ultimate authority in all matters lay with him and it was he who finally confirmed the policy even if proposed and formulated by others.

As regards formulation, he took keen interest in it ever since he ascended the throne and played a dominant role except for a brief period of Parliamentary Government. During the pre-1960 Government, he initiated or restricted certain policy measures through the independent members in the cabinet who constituted his lobby.

In the post 1960 period, King Mahendra was his own Prime Minister, and his keen interest, assertive personality and central position in the power hierarchy, did more than making a formal final say [131]. During Cabinet meetings, the Ministers always attempted to put forth views which could find favour with

131 Rishikesh Shaha in an interview with the author.
the king. He often laid down the fundamental objectives of the policy and chalked out details regarding its implementation [132]. During the tenure of the Parliamentary Government, the King used to delay giving consent to certain measures and thereby used to impose himself.

All appointments and dismissals in the foreign ministry, major transfers like that of Ambassadors, Secretaries and Deputy Secretaries in the Foreign office passed through the king. In order to supervise the coordination and functioning of the External Affairs Ministry, he intervened directly to look into the affairs of particular departments. On some matters of importance, king Mahendra even established direct communication with the Nepalese ambassadors stationed abroad and also allowed easy and direct access to him even to the lower officials of the Foreign office [133].

The following incident would highlight these aspects of the role of the king in formulation and execution of policies:

The dismissal of the Parliamentary system in 1960, and

132 Royal directives at a special meeting of the Council of Ministers, 30 Aug 1964. See Proclamations, Vol.2, pp.262-66. Yadunath Khanal, Nepalese Diplomat, described three sources from where the policies emanate in Nepal. They were the King, the External Affairs Ministry and Embassies of the Nepalese Government. However, all the guidelines and the fundamentals of the policy came from the first source; cited in Muni, n.114.

Nepal's relations with India and China following the dismissal, had aroused keen interest and anxiety about Nepal in world capitals. Possible review and readjustment of these relations, as well as satisfactory explanation to the queries about that became essential in the interest of Nepal's international relations and domestic peace. To meet this demand, a conference of the Nepalese ambassadors was called in the Royal Palace in 1962. King Mahendra opened the conference and took the chair in some of its meetings. In short and crisp inaugural remarks, he underlined the objectives of the conference and invited comments from its participants. During the course of its meetings, the king met the ambassadors individually as well as in batches of two and three. The Foreign Minister was not present all the time. The conference paid special attention to the political and strategic implications of Nepal's growing cordiality with China, her deteriorating relations with India, her international image and her position in the newly installed Panchayat system [134].

The conference was concluded with a 17 point memorandum. It was given out that the appointment of the Ambassadors should be made on the basis of their capability and talent and that the present ambassadors had failed to secure the much needed foreign

aid and inadequate quantity from the countries to which they were accredited. It was further impressed upon the Ambassadors that the changes brought about at home and the policies pursued towards the neighbours should be defined and defended accordingly. The memorandum also included guidelines for the Ambassadors and stressed the need for having a better system of communication between them and the capital [135].

The king's all pervasiveness is more glaring in another incident. This was when Rishikesh Shaha attended the first international conference on landlocked countries in Geneva in 1958. Before leaving for Geneva, Shaha had met the king who told him, "you can use your discretion in the light of the conversation you have had with me". What this meant was nothing but that Shaha could not go against the wishes of the king [136].

This personal involvement of King Mahendra in the policy process projects a unique example wherein the King's attempt to define and defend his policy objectives, formulate details for the execution of the policy and exercise supervision over the implementation were revealed.

The king used to spell out his own perception about the basic theme of a particular aspect of a policy and then invite comments from the available sources to finalise the policy [137].

135 Ibid
136 As disclosed to the author by Rishikesh Shaha.
137 Proclamations, n.119, Vol.2, pp.9-12,100-102.
In the new set up of the Panchayat system, although King Mahendra had repeatedly emphasised decentralisation as the most important feature, both in the Constitution and his public pronouncements, there was an unmistakable trend towards the increasing centralisation and concentration of all powers in the hands of the king. The political parties and political activities were outlawed under the Panchayat System, giving the monarchy a central position [138].

With the increase in the intra-bureaucratic conflict under the Panchayat system, the Royal Secretariat has assumed a more significant position and role in the policy formulation and collection of important information, issuing the direction and guidance for management of the country's affairs [139].

Besides directing and supervising the execution at home, King Mahendra also represented his country at various international conferences. He personally led the Nepalese delegations to three summit conferences in Belgrade, Cairo and Lusaka, underlining the fundamental principles of Nepal's policy [140]. In the form of State visits, apart from conveying the


139 According to Rishikesh Shaha, there have been two secretariats functioning in Kathmandu - the Central Secretariat and the Palace Secretariat. Since the King was personally controlling, directing and supervising the administration of the country under the new set-up, the Palace Secretariat assumed a more important role.

good wishes of the people and Government of Nepal to the respective host countries, the King also explained the attitude of Nepal towards various important international as well as domestic issues [141]. The king also negotiated on behalf of his country, participating in high level negotiations and discussions between Nepal and other countries. Nepal's election to a seat in the Security Council was attributed to the successful foreign policy adopted by Nepal under the leadership of King Mahendra [142].

In the field of foreign affairs, the Mahendra era witnessed a gradual assertion of the international personality of Nepal. The new ferment had resulted in aspirations for Nepal to play her dual role in the international society, which is avowedly founded upon the sovereign equality of States, irrespective of the size and strength [143].

King Mahendra had acquired Charisma, not merely due to his political acumen, but owing to his ability to exploit the situation in his favour. Three situations had helped him in enhancing his stature: "First, prevailing antagonism between Nepal's two big neighbours China and India, whereby it became

141 See Proclamations, n.119, Vol.2, pp.35-42,270-276. Also see Rising Nepal, (Kathmandu), 19 Feb, 1969, an article by Tajendra Pratap Rana on "Our external relations".
easier for the king to play one against the other and secure benefits from both. Secondly, the fragile domestic structure enabled the king to destroy it. Thirdly, the wrong policy adopted by the opposition to launch a movement against him from foreign soil, provided him with an excuse to denounce them as anti-national and thus to win over the confidence of the people" [144].

We thus find that King Mahendra's contribution to the foreign as well as domestic affairs of Nepal has been singly the largest. Through the system King Mahendra evolved after he ascended the throne in 1955, the Monarchy played the most impressive and assertive role in the decision-making in Nepal. With the amendment of the Constitution of Nepal in 1967, the dominant role of the King was further reiterated [145]. The era inaugurated by him in the Nepalese politics did not come to an end even after his death in 1972. The system, the ethos and the styles of Governance initiated and nursed by him seem to have struck firm roots in Nepal [146]. The weakness of other

decision-making units like the Cabinet and the legislature and also intra-party cleavages heightened the symbolic image of the king.

The elite in Nepal, under these circumstances, plays only a limited advisory role in foreign policy formulation. Some of the most distinguished politicians, professionals, academicians and loyal retainers have been incorporated in the decision making process on either an ad-hoc or a continuing basis. Specialisation in bureaucracy is in an embryonic stage and the process of consultation is unstructured. This is borne out by even a brief survey of the career and experience of the principal foreign policy advisors to the Nepalese monarch during the period under study.

The king relies on various persons to assist him in the task of foreign policy formulation drawing on their diverse talents and experience. These include serving bureaucrats, retired diplomats and even important political personalities. In the Nepalese context, it would not be improper to consider members of this elite group as most significant for the analysis of foreign policy formulation. A few examples would illustrate and elucidate their role [147].

147 Background material on all personalities of the Nepalese elite group discussed hereafter has been taken from the International Who's Who, 1954-80 (Europa Publications Ltd., London).
To facilitate a better comprehension of the role played by the elite in Nepal in foreign policy-making they can be divided into different categories.

First come those who shared the values cherished by the leaders of the Indian National Movement and who had actively participated in the Indian struggle for independence. They broadly subscribed to the Nehruvian world-view.

One such figure was B.P. Koirala, who while studying for his degree in Law joined the Socialist Party of India in 1935 and associated himself with the Indian National Movement. Being greatly motivated by the Quit India movement, he led the armed insurrection against Ranacry from 1948-50. In the coalition government that was set up in 1951, he was appointed Minister for Home Affairs. King Tribhuvan's failing health and a low profile in foreign affairs gave Koirala a greater say in foreign policy formulation. His quest for the establishment of democracy in the country was fulfilled when he became Prime Minister in 1959 and under him the institution became powerful, nearly eclipsing monarchy. This spell, however, did not last long for, following the royal takeover, Koirala was imprisoned and was granted amnesty eight years later. He then went into self-exile in India in 1968.

Another such personality is Kirti Nidhi Bista, who too, during his student days in Lucknow took an active part in India's struggle for independence. His shared values with the members of
the Indian National Movement inspired him to rise against the autocratic Ranas in 1950. The post-revolution period saw him work in close association with King Mahendra, accompanying him on most of his State visits abroad. In 1961, he was sent as member delegate to the UN and later in 1962 and '64 as leader of the Nepalese delegation to the UNESCO. His administrative acumen and association with the king was instrumental in his being appointed Vice-Chairman, Council of Ministers in 1965. In 1966, he again represented Nepal at UNESCO and on his return in 1967, was appointed Deputy Prime Minister. In 1968, Bista was sent as the King's emissary to Peking for renewing the Sino-Nepalese trade treaty. His constant exposure to the complex functioning and diplomatic nuances at the world body strengthened his candidacy for the post of Prime Minister. In 1969, he was made Prime Minister and was given additional charge of Palace Affairs, Finance and General Administration.

Another curiously interesting political personality is Tanka Prasad Acharya, an Indian educated Brahmin of Kathmandu. He was a founder-member of the first ever organised anti-Rana group, the Praja Parishad in 1933. Involved in a case of treason during the Rana regime, he survived a death sentence in 1936, by virtue of being a Brahmin, but was imprisoned till 1950. Isolated and neglected after the 1950 revolution, he developed an anti-Indian and anti-Congress posture and came close to the communists. In 1956, however, the king sprang a surprise by
appointing him Prime Minister. His pro-China lobby, at a time when the king wanted to establish diplomatic relations with China and the Soviet Union to counter-balance the influence of democratic countries made Tanka Prasad a suitable candidate for carrying out a 'policy of balance'. His leftist outlook made him the most pliant tool for implementing the policies framed by the Palace. By establishing diplomatic relations with Peking, Acharya played the role for which he had been cast by the King. He was also responsible for bringing a new orientation in Nepal's foreign policy by creating a separate Nepal desk at the UN.

Maitrika Prasad Koirala is yet another example illustrating this nationalist-politician elite group. Inspired by his father who was closely associated with Indian freedom fighters, he too became involved in the Indian independence struggle from his student days in Bihar in 1928. In 1946, he joined the Nepal Rashtriya Congress and by 1950, became its President. He came close to King Tribhuvan who appointed him Prime Minister in 1951 and continued till 1954. His relations with King Mahendra were not too cordial and his desire for power and awareness that he could not continue as Prime Minister without the desire of the Palace made him a staunch campaigner for the Panchayat system. In 1960, however, the king appointed him Ambassador to the USA. From this posting, one can most certainly assume that the king did value his advisory role.

Surya Bahadur Thapa is yet another example illustrating this
group who played an important advisory role in the field of foreign affairs. A graduate from Allahabad, he began his political career by participating in the first underground student's movement in Kathmandu in 1950 and in 1954-56 joined the Nepal Congress Party. In 1958, he was elected member of the Advisory Assembly and was later made its Chairman. In 1959, he was appointed Minister for Agriculture, Forest and Industry and in 1962, Minister for finance and economic affairs. As Vice-Chairman, Council of Ministers in 1963-65, he came directly under the king, thereby becoming a link between the king and the Ministers. He was made Chairman of the Council of Ministers in 1965 and in the subsequent year was elected member of the Rashtriya Panchayat. In 1967, the king appointed him Prime Minister with the portfolios of Palace Affairs and Finance. In 1969, he was re-elected member of the Rashtriya Panchayat for four years, thus coming closer to the Monarch.

In the next different category may be put the educated, professionally qualified persons, doctors, lawyers and educationists, whose loyalty to the throne is not suspect and have become exceptionally influential as advisors. Not directly involved in politics, they are a class which is politically aware and are hand-picked for playing an advisory and implementational role in Government. Many of them have subsequently joined the political mainstream and entered the highest echelons of foreign policy administration.
Tulsi Giri illustrates this type very well. An MBBS from Darbhanga College in Bihar, he joined the Nepali Congress Party in 1955 and became its General Secretary two years later. In 1960, he was appointed Minister-in-attendance to the king and came very close to him. He was one of the few men who was taken into confidence by the king during the 1960 coup. In early 1961, when the king nominated a new Council of Ministers, Giri found a ministerial rank and was even sent to New Delhi for informal talks with Nehru. In 1963, he was appointed Chairman of a new Council of Ministers. Although eased out of the Ministry in 1964, he was reappointed Chairman in 1965. In effect, these exits and entries did not make much difference, for Giri continued to be the king's key lieutenant.

Another case is that of Pushkar Nath Pant, who though played an advisory role at a comparatively lower level, functioned as a financial expert. For a country heavily dependent on foreign aid and wanting to reduce its dependence on India, Pushkar Nath was found capable to help the king formulate policies on trade and related administrative regulations. A post-graduate in Economics from Benares and the USA, he began as an assistant economic advisor to the king in 1958. He was appointed Under-Secretary in the Ministry of Finance in 1961 following the signing of the Trade and Transit Treaty in 1960 with India allowing Nepal to play an independent economic role geared to its economy. He was sent to the US as Ambassador in
1962 and on his return in 1964, was made Additional Secretary and subsequently Secretary in the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning in 1969. He also attended several international conferences dealing with financial and economic developments.

Kalyan Bikram Adhikari, one may with justification assume, is another such person who was able to influence the king on economic matters. To activate a stagnant economy, the only way was to fall back on foreign assistance. In the early 50's, Nepal knocked at the doors of Washington for getting assistance and sent Adhikari, then a fresh graduate from Patna and a gazetted officer in the Ministry of Planning, as Liaison Officer to the USA in 1954. On his return two years later, he was made Assistant Secretary in the Finance Ministry and later Deputy Secretary, Budget and Foreign Aid, in 1960. The early 60's saw Nepal benefitting substantially in the aid field by the rivalry between power blocs. It was at this time that Adhikari was appointed Finance Officer, UN Special Fund. In 1968 he was appointed Secretary, Ministry of Finance at a crucial time when Nepal was canvassing American contributions to the country's Third Plan. His financial expertise helped Nepal secure additional aid from the USA and Adhikari was appointed Principal Advisor to the king in 1970.

Then there are those career bureaucrats who do not easily fit into any of the above mentioned categories but have been very influential in foreign policy-making.
Padma Bahadur Khatri is one such example. Belonging to the Nepalese Army and having served in World War Two, he was sent as Military Attache to London from 1947-49. By 1956, he had risen to the rank of Major-General. Since the Army was considered the most useful organ of Government in crushing any internal uprising against the king, he was made Secretary, Ministry of Defence in 1962. He was also associated with the signing of the Nepal-China boundary treaty and accompanied King Mahendra to Peking in his capacity as Chairman of the boundary commission in 1962. In 1963, he was given yet another important charge, that of Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Since all Secretaries heading the Administrative Departments are the king's chosen few, Khatri's appointment to this post indicated that he was very influential in matters of foreign policy formulation. From 1964-69, he functioned as the country's Ambassador to the USA and was concurrently accredited to the UN as Permanent Representative. On his return from the USA in 1969, he was reappointed Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, clearly indicated the importance given to him by the king in matters of foreign affairs.

Yadu Nath Khanal is another such seasoned diplomat who was closely associated with the king in matters of foreign affairs. A post-graduate in English from Calcutta and London, he began his career as a lecturer in Trichandra College, Nepal. He was made Home Secretary in 1956 and later Chief Secretary to the Prime Minister in 1958. He went as member delegate to the UN from
1959-60, and in 1961, accompanied the king to the Belgrade conference on non-alignment in his capacity as Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 1962, he was sent as Ambassador to India, a time when Sino-Indian relations were at a low ebb. On his return in 1967, he was re-appointed Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and continued in the post till 1970. He was later sent to the USA as Nepal's Ambassador. These various posts he held indicated that the king relied on his advisory role extensively.

A different example is Govind Raj Pandey, a graduate belonging to an aristocratic family in Nepal. He began his administrative career as an assistant in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and in the next year was sent as Second Secretary in the Nepalese Embassy in Washington. On his return in 1961, he was made Under-Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. From 1964 to 1969 he was sent to the Soviet Union as First Secretary. Although not representing his country in a senior position he however, played an influential role since he was consistently appointed in various posts in the same Ministry. In 1970, he was appointed Joint Secretary in the Foreign Ministry.

Lastly, there are those who through their sheer force of experience in some field or the other exercised considerable influence in the field of foreign affairs. Govind Prasad Lohani is one such example who during his post-graduate days in Benares joined the Nepal Communist Party in
1953. Although following a different ideology from the ruling elite, the king preferred the cooperation of the Communist party over the Nepali Congress. He not only wanted to achieve the political purpose of giving the Nepali Congress a blow, but also in the process wanted to placate the Peking regime. Taking advantage of this situation, the Communist underground cadres were appointed in some of the layers of administration. Govind Prasad was made Chief Research Officer in the Nepal Rashtriya Bank in 1960. In 1961 he was sent as an advisor to an IMF meeting at Vienna and on his return was appointed Economic Advisor to the Rashtriya Bank in 1966. Subsequently he was made Chief Economic Advisor and in 1970, he was made member of the National Planning Commission.

Another interesting member of this elite group is Rishikesh Shaha who during his post-graduation in Allahabad in 1950, joined the Nepali Rashtriya Congress and became its General Secretary in 1953. In 1953, he also became Leader of the Opposition in the nominated Legislature. From 1953-56, he was made General Secretary for the combined front of the Nepali Congress and the Nepali Rashtriya Congress Party. Although in the opposition, the king sent him to the USA as the country's Ambassador and also as the permanent representative at the UN where he served till 1960. At the peak of the insurrectionist activity for the revival of Parliamentary democracy in 1961, Shaha was sent to New Delhi as the royal emissary to reconcile Nehru. Although he succeeded in
softening New Delhi's attitude towards the king, the king thought otherwise and he was dropped as Minister. He was, however, given charge as Minister of Finance in 1961 and in 1962, the king appointed him Chairman of the Constitution Drafting Commission, for he was then a staunch supporter of the Panchayat System. He was in the same year entrusted with the important portfolio of Minister of Foreign Affairs and in 1967, was elected member of the National Panchayat for four years.

CEYLON

Most of the politicians who were preening themselves to take power in the newly acquired political set up of Ceylon had already acquired considerable experience in political affairs. The political institutions being Western and the conduct of affairs being mainly through the medium of English, it was the English educated intelligentsia that produced the political leaders from the time that these representative institutions were introduced. They were the product of the economic, social and intellectual influences that had emanated from the Western Colonial rule [148]. Some had the added advantage of having previously functioned as Ministers under the old Constitution and thus had already tasted power.

The Westernized political elite that took over power, was thus naturally inclined towards the West, and had all the characteristics of the colonialists in their attitude [149].

It could boast of experienced leaders who had shared political power with the British and who had been the architects of the country's constitution and who since 1931, had been holding Ministerial posts [150]. Moreover, it had an adept and experienced bureaucracy which was in the service of the Ceylonese Government [151].

It was also natural for the British to take them into confidence, for else Ceylon would have moved closer to India [152] to which it looked for inspiration in its march towards freedom. But Ceylon had always been apprehensive of its next door neighbour — India — although geographically and culturally Ceylon is closely linked to India. The presence of the migrant labourers from India working on Ceylonese plantations created occasional irritants in the relations between the two countries [153]. In such a situation, Ceylon found in the United Kingdom,

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a dependable ally who had granted independence to Ceylon without much struggle on Ceylon's part. The long association of the leaders of the UNP with the British may have inspired them to move closer to the British [154].

A quick glance at the political structure in Ceylon shows that the Westminster model has been functioning successfully. It has had universal suffrage since 1931, has a well developed party system and fulfills all the pre-requisites of a successful Parliamentary democracy [155].

But looking behind the facade, one can observe that the island has been governed throughout by a small elite, the composition of which has cut across political, religious, ethnic and caste divisions.

"In the configuration of politics during the 1948-72 phase, membership of one of two leading Sinhalese Buddhist Goigama families enjoying great political prestige and influence, the Senanayakes and Bandarnaiikes was a sine qua non for premiership. All Prime Ministers save two (kotelawala and Dahanayake) had a measure of charisma which gave a boost to their party's image. D.S. Senanayake was acclaimed "the father of the nation", Dudley

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Senanayake's image was that of the honest liberal democrat and Bandarnaike was identified with the ushering in the age of the common man. Srimavo Bandarnaike inherited her husband's charisma but soon developed one of her own" [156].

"The political leaders to play the Parliamentary game divide themselves into sides calling themselves Trotskyites, Communists, Democratic Socialists etc. But these political groupings are far outweighed by the one unifying factor, that of their Western-oriented education and their elite ways of living. The educational background of the political leaders is Western. For instance, S.W.R.D. Bandarnaike (SLFP) was from Oxford, Dudley Senanayake (UNP) was a product of Cambridge, the President of the Communist Party, Wickremasinghe - a British trained doctor and N.M. Perera (leader of the Trotskyites) was from London School of Economics. Also several others had a Western educational background" [157]. Since they are from the same social elite, there has been no significant broadening of the base of power, despite four decades of electoral politics [158].

As a colony, Ceylon had no foreign policy of its own [159]

158 This came about because of the inter-marriage amongst the elites, says C. Gunasingham, Additional Secretary and Advisor to President Jayawardene, in an interview with the author in Colombo, Mar 1984.
and hence, when it attained independence, it did not inherit any sort of foreign policy tradition. Even as late as 1944, the ruling elites did not show any interest in dealing with international affairs, and external relations was controlled by the United Kingdom [160]. Even when attempts were made to legitimize their claims over external affairs, there was little success [161]. Whatever interest that was shown was with regard to the issue of trade and Indian indentured labourers [162]. It was only after Ceylon gained independence in 1948, that Ceylonese leaders evinced interest for external affairs.

The success of the British model in Ceylon must be viewed in the context of power politics being essentially an elite affair. Pareto's classic dichotomy between an elite and a non-elite [163] can be elaborated here for a better understanding of politics in Ceylon.

There are the elites (who wield power) and the non-elites (who have no access to areas of crucial decision making). The

160 In 1944, the Ceylonese ministers accepted an Imperial Directive that they could draft a Constitution which only dealt with matters of internal civil administration. See Govt of Ceylon, Colonial Office, Ceylon: Report of the Commission on Constitutional Reform, 1945, (Colombo), pp.12-25. Henceforth referred to as CMND 6677.

161 D.S.Senanayake did make efforts in this direction, but was unsuccessful till 1947. See Ivor Jennings, The approach to Self-Government, (Boston, 1956), pp.117 & 190.


elite and non-elite can be further sub-divided. The elite can be divided into the Governing elite and the non-governing elite. The non-governing elite does not enjoy direct political power, but has a considerable influence on the governing elite [164].

The formal and legal responsibility for foreign policy is bestowed upon the official elites, with the Cabinet at the apex. "Actually, it is the Prime Minister who till 1977, was mainly responsible for the formulation of foreign policy. Under his charge are the professional foreign policy bureaucrats headed by the Permanent Secretary to advise the Prime Minister and carry out the policy. Till 1972, the strategic elites - the Chiefs of Army, Navy and Air Force were also under the Prime Minister who was incharge of defence too, but under the 1972 Constitution this has been somewhat relaxed" [165].

The governing elite consists partly of the progeny of traditionally respectable families in terms of criteria such as caste and nobility. It also includes the new rich who have divested in politics, "the professional politicians (specialists at winning mass rapport), some high governmental officials and some close relatives of leading politicians" [166].

On the other hand, the non-governing elite comprise those who share most of the privileges and fringe benefits of the governing elite and have a direct access to the governing elite.

164 Ibid., p.372.
165 As disclosed by C. Gunasingham.
166 Tissa Fernando, n.157, p.372.
as compared to the non-elite who have to seek an audience [167]. Amongst them the most dominant are the leaders of the political parties and groups within and outside Parliament. The interest group elites in the foreign policy context include:

(a) Awareness building institutions and associations like, Ceylon Council of World Affairs and Bandarnaike Institute of International Affairs, whose primary aim has been the dissemination of information on the subject; to inculcate a more involved participation by the people. The Ceylon Council of World Affairs conducts seminars on foreign policy issues [168].

(b) Leaders of auxiliary organizations representing ideological, economic, religious and ethnic diversity of popular organisations like the All Ceylon Buddhist Congress, Planters Association, Estate Workers' Association and Indian Mercantile Chamber.

(c) Those groups that spring up to mobilise and articulate views on certain issues and events;

(d) Finally, the Communicational Elites have been important which comprise foreign affairs commentators, journalists and academicians [169].

167 Ibid., p.372.
168 Told to the author in an interview with Ray Forbes, formerly of the Ceylon Foreign Service and currently Director of the Bandarnaike Institute of International Studies, Colombo.
169 Ibid.
The SLFP era brought in its wake in 1956, a rural Sinhala speaking intelligentsia, comprising of Buddhist monks, Ayurvedic physicians, village school teachers and village heads. These rural notables functioned as intermediaries between the rural population and the urban elites [170].

Although unofficial, non-governing elites have exerted influence to a certain extent on foreign policy issues, it is the Prime Minister who is the key figure in all foreign policy matters.

The Prime Minister

Under the old Constitution, External Affairs and Defence was the preserve of the Prime Minister [171]. Even after independence, the Prime Minister stood at the apex of the foreign policy decision-making process in Ceylon. The nature of the transfer of power itself enhanced the position of the Prime Minister. The Soulbury Constitution required the Prime Minister to hold the portfolios of Defence and External Affairs. The Soulbury Commission Report said, "...there should be a portfolio of Defence held by the Prime Minister. He as the Head of the Government, would be the most suitable repository for the information in Imperial Defence Policy which would in the course of his duties inevitably come his way and the natural advisor to

170 A.J. Wilson, n.156, p.152.
the Governor-General in all these defence questions in which local political considerations are involved" [172].

Even when this Constitutional requirement was done away with under the First Republican Constitution in 1972, the then Prime Minister Mrs. Bandaranaike continued to hold these portfolios until the change of Government in 1977 [173].

The Prime Minister enjoyed enormous powers because no provision in the Constitution made it obligatory for the Prime Minister to seek the consent of the legislature except on matters relating to finance. The absence of Parliamentary checks could be attributed to the British Parliamentary traditions and partly to keep the Communists at bay as they were critical of the Defence and External Affairs arrangements [174].

The manning of Prime Ministership and foreign affairs seemed quite burdensome, as is evident from what D.S. Senanayake said in the House of Representatives - "...foreign work is becoming much heavier than I expected" [175]. A similar suggestion was voiced by Keuneman in the House in 1961, almost twelve years later - "How could Mrs. Bandaranaike carry responsibility for a large number of important functions in addition to keeping track of what is going on in external affairs" [176].

172 CMND 6677, n.160, p.95.
174 For details see Lucy M. Jacob, From dominion to Republic, (Delhi, 1973), p.21-57.
175 For details see Lucy M. Jacob, From dominion to Republic, (Delhi, 1973), p.21-57.
After the change of Government in July 1977, J.R. Jayawardene as Prime Minister retained the office of Minister of Defence, but for the first time appointed a separate Minister of Foreign Affairs. When the new Government instituted a Presidential form of Government in place of the West Minister model [177], Jayawardene as first executive President, Head of State as well as Head of Government, continued to impart initiatives and give directives on important foreign policy issues [178] apart from conducting personal diplomacy in his official capacity [179].

Although a presidential form of Government was established by the Second Republican Constitution, the tradition of the Head of the Government taking major policy decisions has remained unchanged [180].

In this aspect Jayawardene was further consolidating a long established tradition in foreign policy decisionmaking in Sri Lanka, where the Head of the Government has contributed the most in the foreign policy formulation.

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177 First by a Constitutional Amendment, then by an entirely new (Second) Constitution. For details, see Kodikara, n.173.
178 S.U. Kodikara, formerly of the Ceylon Foreign Service and currently Head of the Political Science Department, Univ of Peradeniya, Kandy, in an interview with the author in Mar 1984, said, "Sri Lanka's condemnation of the Soviet Union's intervention in Afghanistan, is believed to have emanated from a Presidential initiative".
179 He led the Sri Lankan delegation to the Sixth Non-Aligned Conference.
180 As told to the author by C. Gunasingham, n.158.
From the time Ceylon got its independence, it has had eight Prime Ministers and one President. Excluding the present Prime Minister (who has no formal foreign policy responsibilities and the caretaker administration of W. Dahanayake (September 1959 to March 1960), every other Head of Government has had his or her personal style and personal influence on foreign policy decision-making [181].

The premiership has been occupied in almost continuous dynastic succession from D.S. Senanayake to his son Dudley and from S.W.R.D. Bandarnaike to his widow Srimavo.

Sri Lanka's relations with the outside world can be easily classified, because of the well-known stances of her Prime Ministers and the attitudes of the main political parties (UNP and SLFP) under whose banners each election is won [182].

In many respects it is the Prime Ministers who lend form and substance to matters of foreign concern, while the other Ministers seldom show interest in what takes place beyond the boundaries of the island. Some of the Prime Ministers showed considerable enthusiasm in involving the island in questions of international importance, because they were quick to perceive, the role a non-committed nation could play as a mediator in the conflicts engulfing the larger nations.

Depending on the personal skills, initiative and

181 Ibid.
182 The policies of the leaders have more or less compartmentalised under the two parties.
acceptability of their proposals, they foresaw in such a role, the opportunity for boosting the image of their country in the world and the benefits it could reap by way of enhanced international prestige for themselves. D.S. Senanayake was a retiring statesman and used to get deeply involved in local matters. Dudley Senanayake's administrations (1952-53), (March-July 1960) and (1965-70) adopted a low profile in foreign policy. However, both father and son, had an interest in maintaining the Commonwealth connection.

Kotelawala's rule (1853-56) was marked by a strident anti-communism, and this was a time when the country came closest to complete alignment with the West [183].

S.W.R.D. Bandarnaike (1956-59), articulated an eloquent, often rhetorical Nehru-style non-aligned philosophy, while Mrs. Bandarnaike developed a special relationship with the communists, but at the same time emerged as one of the non-aligned movement's most ardent advocates [184].

D.S. Senanayake

Ceylon was fortunate that at an important stage of her history, that of gaining independence, it had a man of wisdom and balance, the father figure of D.S. Senanayake. Although, he claimed to follow the "middle-path" in foreign policy, there was

183 Told to the author by Park Nadesan, Secretary to former Ceylonese Prime Minister, John Kotelawala, in an interview in Colombo, Mar 1984.
184 Ibid
no doubt that most of the actions of his Government were directed at giving support to the West [185].

His desire to remain in the Commonwealth arose from various reasons. Firstly, his faith in the democratic way of life; secondly, Ceylon's trade was largely with the nations in the Commonwealth and thirdly, it gave strength to a small nation like Ceylon to be a partner in a large comity of nations [186].

Since Ceylon had no army, navy or airforce to defend herself, the fear of being left defenceless made Senanayake enter into the Defence Agreement which was signed simultaneously with the passing of the Independence Act [187].

Ceylon, therefore, began her foreign policy by entering into an alliance for her protection with a country which had been associated with her for almost 150 years and whose ways of Government she had accepted [188]. D.S became the symbol of the country's unity, for he sought the reconciliation of the majority and minority ethnic and religious groups within the context of an all island policy [189].

185 For his speech on the "middle path", see Ceylon Historical Journal, (Colombo), "Some notable speeches of D.S.Senanayake", Vol.5, nos 1-4, pp.110-114.
188 Ibid.
A lively nervousness about Communism fashioned D.S. Senanayake's foreign policy which also kept Dudley Senanayake and Kotelawala aloof from the Communist block [190].

However, despite the refusal to have any dealings with Communist countries, the people's Republic of China was recognised in 1952, and an agreement with it was signed to sell specified quantities of Rubber in return for Chinese rice [191].

Senanayake confined his interest to the subject of relations with Britain in particular and the Commonwealth in general. In other matters, he allowed a free hand virtually to two of his Ministers at that time: Bandarnaike, a neutralist and J.R. Jayawardene who was known for his pro-American and pro-Western leanings [192]. By and large, it was the Commonwealth framework within which Senanayake and his Government functioned [193].

John Kotelawala (1953-56)

Kotelawala's policy was similar to that of D.S. Senanayake, that of being pro-West. At conferences convened or attended

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191 This was Ceylon's first contact with an Asian country.

192 A.J.Wilson, n.156, pp.296-297.

by him, he openly and frankly expressed his opposition to communism at the local and international levels. This was expressed at the five-nation conference of South-East Asian Prime Ministers in Colombo, over which he himself presided in April 1954 and at Bandung in 1955 April [194].

Kotelawala's pronouncements drew strong protests from the opposition in parliament [195]. He made it clear that relations with Communist China was strictly for business purposes [196]. He even refused permission to a Chinese goodwill delegation that had wished to visit Ceylon in 1953 [197].

He, nevertheless, enjoyed a distinct advantage in that, neither the local elites nor the general public, except for the Marxist groupings displayed any abiding interest in the foreign involvements of their Governments [198]. The traditional view prevailed that matters of external concern were best left to the care of Government's in office, or better still to the Prime Ministers, a view reinforced by the fact that the portfolio of Defence and External affairs was vested in the Prime Minister [199].

197 Ibid.
198 As disclosed by Park Nadesan.
199 Ibid.
The Bandaranaike family was one of the earliest families to become associated with the British rule [200]. But, despite a Westernized background, Bandaranaike rejected the Westernising elements. The advent to power of the Government of Bandaranaike in 1956 ushered in a new era in Ceylon's foreign policy.

The General election of 1956, which overthrew the UNP out of office, represented a revolutionary upsurge of the aspirations of the Sinhalese Buddhist masses [201]. Bandaranaike who had identified himself with these aspirations emerged as the Chief leader in the new context, with the Marxist giving him support [202].

He took office at a time when the Colombo powers had expanded into including the Afro-Asian Community. Ceylon can credit itself for making an original contribution to the idea of Afro-Asian solidarity. It was Bandaranaike who took the initiative to propose an economic Bandung to complement the work of the Bandung Conference of 1955, although he did not live to see the fruition of his idea.


201 See Robert N.Kearney,Communalism and language in the politics of Ceylon,(Durham, NC, 1967), Chapt. 4.

At the Afro-Asian conference, Ceylon was represented by Bandarnaike. Although he had received no prior instructions on how to conduct himself at the conference, he nevertheless became prominent at the proceedings of the Conference by strongly deprecating colonialism [203]. The significant achievement of his term as Premier was the personal contribution made by him to the ideals of non-alignment and dynamic neutralism [204].

He had earlier advocated a "Switzerland type of neutrality" for Ceylon [205], but later came to the conclusion that the policy of non-alignment practised by Nehru was best suited for all Asian countries [206].

He wanted Ceylon's foreign policy to be neither 'anti-West' nor 'anti-Communist', but 'pro-Ceylon' [207]. In a statement to the House of Representatives on July 24, 1957, he explained what his concept of Non-alignment meant. "We prefer what we call a neutral state which is nothing more than what we like to be friendly with all and obtain what is advantageous to our new society - while following our own way of life - and at the same

207 Ibid., col.434.
time, prevent misunderstanding between two opposing camps which brings us close to another war in which all mankind will perish [208].

Although 'non-alignment' was stressed upon, the SLFP Government headed by Bandarnaike, shifted to a slightly pro-communist bias [209]. The policy of Non-Alignment or "dynamic neutrality" was in harmony with the eternal law of the Middle way and was best suited for Ceylon [210]. The emphasis on Ceylon's Buddhist traditions, gave the Government's foreign policy pronouncements an indigenous Sinhalese nationalist slant and at times tended to provide the motivation for its activism on foreign policy issues [211].

As Ceylon was admitted to the United Nations on December 14, 1955 [212], it intended to make the maximum use of this position "in making its contribution to the preservation of world peace" and "the furtherance of friendly relations with other countries" [213].

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209 For details on the pro-Communist stand, see D.M.Prasad, Ceylon's Foreign Policy under the Bandarnaike's 1956-65, (N.Delhi 1973), pp.61-65.
Bandaranaike's World View

During the short tenure of office, Bandaranaike sought to give meaning to his policies by making his Government's views on the imposing world issues known internationally. He believed in borrowing "some ideas and some principles from this side and some from the other", until a coherent structure could be evolved [214]. His world view had a distinct security orientation, envisaging a definite role for a small and weak state like Sri Lanka.

He was a brilliant orator and his acknowledged mastery over language, spurred him on to make speeches when attending to any matter. It was his inspiration and leadership that led to the success of his party. But with all these qualities, his regime came to an end on a discordant note. Racial riots were sparked off when Sinhala was introduced as the official language of administration in place of English [215] and surprisingly enough it was a Sinhalese Buddhist monk who put an end to his life. This deprived the highly ambitious leader of the opportunity to make his mark on the international stage.


The assassination of Bandarnaike on 25 September 1959, culminated in the disintegration of his Government and for the time being of the SLFP. The ensuring chaos could hardly be contained by the unanimous choice of Prime Minister, W. Dahanayake and his Government disintegrated within a very short period of time. The elections in 1960, brought Dudley Senanayake into power, but his was also a short lived Government and equally unstable. The Government of Dudley Senanayake rested on such a weak basis that he had to resign when the speech from the throne was defeated. However, his 'national Government' from 1965-70 worked reasonably well. In its policy pronouncements, the Senanayake Government declared its adherence to non-alignment and friendship with all nations as the guiding principle of its foreign relations.

Although Dudley Senanayake did not herald a complete return to the anti-communism of the pre-1956 period, relations with the Communist world did deteriorate steadily. Three Communist Embassies in Colombo were requested to reduce their staff to the barest minimum and the Foreign Ministry also refused entry Visas to two Indonesian Communist Party members [216].

216 The Hindu, (Madras), Apr 12, 1965.
The Pakistan war of 1965 with India put to test the Ceylon-Pakistan relations. Soon after the flare-up of armed clashes in the Rann of Kutch area, Dudley Senanayake sent messages to President Ayub Khan and Prime Minister Shastri urging them to "desist from the use of Military means", and to seek every means and opportunity available for the very early and peaceful settlement of this dispute.

The Government, however, refused to discuss the merits of the questions and to identify the aggressor in the conflict for it did not wish to "interfere in the internal affairs of either country" [217].

"Generally, a low profile was adopted by Dudley Senanayake in foreign affairs and the personality factor was played down.

The Vietnam issue was perhaps, the only international issue on which he showed interest, as it had an immediate bearing on the domestic scene" [218].

Srimavo Bandarnaike:

The decision by Srimavo Bandarnaike to accept the leadership of the SLFP, after the assassination of her husband resulted in a massive emotional impact on the country, at the sight of a widow emerging from seclusion to further a cause which her husband had left partially unfulfilled [219]. The electorate

218 Told to the author by S.U. Kodikara.
thus voted the SLFP to power in the elections in July 1960 and Srimavo became the world's first woman Prime Minister.

This courageous lady was at a terrific disadvantage from the very start. Neither did she have any experience or training in public affairs [220] nor any political ideology of her own but followed her husband's policies. Her party politics too, were determined by the rural middle class, comprising among others the rural intelligentsia, who had been quite influential [221].

Policy of Non-Alignment:

Srimavo continued the policy of non-alignment as initiated by Bandarnaike [222]. She closely identified herself with the Afro-Asian group, condemning racism and colonialism, and gave diplomatic recognition to new independent states in the communist bloc [223]. But, there was evidence of a shift towards an anti-Western position within the existing framework of non-alignment, for in 1961, Srimavo visited China, with a view to forging a closer relationship with China.

222 For her official pronouncement on non-alignment, see Governor-General's speech in Ceylon Parliamentary Debates, House of Rep, Vol.39, Aug 1960, col.51.
223 Ceylon became a member of the Belgrade conference in 1961, and since then, assertive foreign policy has been associated with Srimavo.
A Shrewd Politician

Mrs. Bandarnaike knew very well how to win over the sympathy of the religious class. During the early years of her rule as Prime Minister, she persistently espoused the cause of the Buddhist in South Vietnam [224]. Not only did she personally appeal to President Kennedy to use his good offices in South Vietnam, to ensure the grant of freedom of worship and religious equality to the Buddhists there, but she also directed U.N. initiatives in this respect [225]. She canvassed support for these initiatives from other Buddhist countries and also met the envoys of India, Burma, Japan and Thailand in Colombo [226].

During the earlier period of her regime she had carried on the Government fairly peacefully, due to the fact that the large majority of members of the Government party had realised that they owed their return to Parliament entirely to her. But gradually and perceptibly her once unquestioned influence over Government party meetings became uncontrollable [227]. Strikes gradually began to hinder the progress of her rule which greatly hampered economic development. Added to this was the abortive coup attempt in January 1962, which pressurized Oliver Goonetilleke to leave and with this she lost him as an Advisor.

224 Atrocities were being committed by the Roman Catholics of South Vietnam over Vietnamese Buddhists.
order to tide over the period of crisis after the coup, Mrs. Bandarnaike prorogues Parliament for four months in 1964, to avoid a possible defeat in the House and to negotiate with the parties of the Left to get the support from them. The outcome of this move was that the Left parties rallied to her support.

**Individual Initiative: Sino-Indian War and Mrs. Bandarnaike's Role:**

In the Sino-Indian Border Conflict which flared up in October 1962, Ceylon played a very active mediatory role. In the midst of the conflict, Srimavo was in communication with the Prime Ministers of India and China with a view to exploring the possibility of ending the armed conflict.

At the initiative of the Ceylonese Premier, representatives of six Afro-Asian non-aligned countries, Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, Ghana, Indonesia and U.A.R. met in Colombo in December 1962 to discuss the possibility of making a joint effort to prevent further deterioration in the situation. At the request of the members of the conference, Mrs. Bandarnaike was asked to convey the results of the deliberations [228].

Srimavo left for Peking with some members of her Cabinet and she also visited Delhi. She held discussions with the Premiers of both India and China. In China, she was assisted by the Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio to conduct negotiations [229]. In India she was assisted by Kofi Asante Ofori Atta,

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Her visit to these two countries evoked great interest and received wide coverage in the world press [231] and her personal initiative was greatly commended [232].

The Indo-Ceylon Question and the Shastri-Srimavo Agreement of 1964

The 'Indo-Ceylon Question' dealt in the main, with the political status of those persons of Indian origin in Sri Lanka who had migrated from South India during the British colonial period, to work on plantations [233]. Soon after attaining independence, the Government of Sri Lanka enacted certain citizenship legislation under which most of the Tamil Estate labourers failed to qualify for the Sri Lankan citizenship [234]. As they did not apply for Indian citizenship, they fell into the category of "stateless persons".

Notwithstanding the legal debate on the issue, the Governments of India and Sri Lanka were acutely aware of the necessity of a solution. After several futile efforts, it was in October 1964, that the Prime Ministers of both India and Ceylon

230 Ibid., Jan 12, 1963.
231 Ibid., Jan 13, 1963.
233 For details see Urmila Phadnis, n.211, p.289.
were able to come to an agreement. A numerical formula was devised whereby a certain percentage received Ceylonese citizenship and the rest, Indian citizenship [235].

The 1964 agreement was a personal victory for the Prime Minister. She had achieved what five other Prime Ministers before her, including her husband had failed to achieve [236]. Srimavo was extremely calculative in her moves in dealing with this sensitive issue of "Stateless". She had included T.B. Illangaratne in her team, to have the benefit of the Kandyan opinion too on this issue [237].

Mrs. Bandaranaike's initial years in her first term showed a very subdued personality, "a person who could not independently pull together the threads of the foreign machinery" [238]. She depended heavily on her two Advisers, Felix Dias Bandaranaike [239] and Sam P. Fernando. They were politically unknown at the time of Bandaranaike's death. They along with Mrs. Bandaranaike, virtually became a de facto Foreign Minister- Mervin De Silva, editor of Lanka Guardian, in an interview with the author, in Colombo, Mar 1984.


As told to the author by S.U. Kodikara.

Bandarnaike wielded more power than any Prime Minister of Ceylon ever did [240]. The public had no knowledge of the working of this triumvirate as Srimavo was to a large extent isolated in the "Temple Trees".

Mrs. Bandarnaike in her second term in office

Mrs. Bandarnaike's Left inclined Ministry which took office following the 1970 General Election, showed evidence of taking Ceylon well on the path of a socialist type democracy [241].

Despite a gap of five years between her first term in office and the second term, Srimavo continued to maintain an active interest in International Affairs and made a significant contribution to the Non-Alignment Movement. At the commonwealth conference in Singapore in January 1971, she pressed her proposal to turn the Indian Ocean into a nuclear free zone guaranteed by the big powers [242], disapproved of the proposed Anglo-American Communications base on the Indian Ocean atoll of Diego Garcia [243] at the Conference. Mrs. Bandarnaike had become very assertive in her pronouncements on issues of international importance. The dominance of the personality factor in Sri

243 Ibid.
Lankan politics became very obvious. She wanted to stamp Ceylon's foreign policy as 'Srimavo's foreign policy' [244].

The apex of the foreign policy making structure gained importance with Srimavo at the helm of affairs. The process of policy making became a closed affair, except when international affairs had an immediate impact on the domestic affairs of the country, calling for the suggestions from various interest groups [245]. Neel Quintas Dias, who was one of the Parliamentary Secretaries during Srimavo's first term, came closer to her, as an Advisor, during her second run in office [246].

She personally attended international conferences and also invited leaders of other countries to Colombo, in a bid to project herself as the leader of a country, which because of its strategic location could not be ignored.

She built up strong relations with her neighbours and continued efforts to keep it up.

The Marxist alliance had some bearing on the foreign policy issues; for Sri Lanka established diplomatic relations with German Democratic Republic. Ceylon also gave recognition to the Democratic Republic of Korea and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam [247]. With these

244 As disclosed by S.U.Kodikara.
245 Ibid.
246 Told to the author by Ray Forbes.
actions Ceylon wanted to identify herself with the non-aligned movement at large and anti-colonial movements. Her Government also suspended relations with Israel and entered into a new agreement with Communist China and requested the U.S. Peace Corps and the Asia Foundation to wind up their operations in Ceylon [248].

The authoritative stable rule was, however, jolted, when a coup was attempted in 1971. She declared a national emergency, and called in the armed forces to handle the situation.

She appealed for assistance from the Western and Soviet blocs and also from the non-aligned States. Mrs. Bandarnaike claimed that military assistance which was offered by countries so vastly different in outlook from each other, was evidence of the success of her policy of neutralism [249].

Despite several challenges Mrs. Bandarnaike faced in her two terms as Premier, her international outlook was "dynamic, critical and outspoken in its non-aligned, anti-pact, anti-colonialist and anti-militarist" approach to foreign policy.

It would not be out of place here to cast a brief look at the foreign policy decision making procedure in Sri Lanka in a broader perspective shifting our focus from the supreme leader/Individual.

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248 Ibid.
There has been no particular system of decision-making on foreign affairs followed by Sri Lanka up to 1976. It was not customary to hold regular cabinet meetings nor were there any sub-committees on foreign affairs. H.S.S. Nissanka, a journalist and member of the research unit on foreign affairs who has had access to decision makers in the country and some of the records at the foreign ministry says, one reason for this seems to be that cabinet members, had little or no interest in foreign policy matters. Only during Mrs. Bandarnaike's second tenure of office could one see a handful of cabinet members showing a constant interest in World affairs and in Sri Lanka's foreign policy.

Very few members of parliament followed world affairs and foreign affairs became the domain of the Prime Minister. However, over the years the different Prime Ministers began to have advisors on foreign affairs. They served in various capacities - as ambassadors, high commissioners and permanent secretaries.

Generally, the advisors and critics of Sri Lankan's foreign policy belonged to three major categories - pro-western, pro-communist and non-aligned. This tri-partisan attitude is well-reflected in the foreign policy of Sri Lanka during the periods of influence and advisorship.

The personnel of the Sri Lankan foreign services are men, who for the most part have been nurtured in Western educational traditions or values associated with such tradition.
The Soulbury commission made it almost compulsory for the Prime Minister of Sri Lanka to hold the portfolio of both Defence and External Affairs. This legal requirement has been faithfully followed by all establishments upto 1976, and due to the pursuance of this practice, the island could not develop a separate and independent ministry of foreign affairs.

The first four prime ministers of Sri Lanka had to draw on the personnel from the Ceylon Civil Service to serve in the External Affairs Division. The tradition of appointing a civil service man as the top officer or the secretary of the Ministry of Defence and External Affairs has been continued till 1975 and there seems not much change in this tradition. The individuals who have held the post of permanent secretaries show that their post has always been held by civil service men.

Kanthiah Vaithianathan is one such person who was picked up by British and was made responsible to look after the department of External Affairs started in 1948. D.S. Senanayake relied heavily on and gave much freedom to this civil servant to organise and conduct Sri Lanka's department of External Affairs. From 1948-1954, during the time of first three prime ministers, Kanthiah influenced the recruitment of personnel of the External Affairs department, laid its foundations and built it up. Kanthiah assisted S.W.R.D. when he attended the conference on Indonesia in New Delhi in 1949 and the country's response to the first international crisis was effective. Kanthiah's selection
for accompanying Bandarnaike was a Cabinet decision, which itself is an indication of the importance given to his advisory capacity.

Merenna Francis des Jayaratne is another member of this group, who, educated in Ceylon and London, joined the Ceylon civil service in 1927. Of the various administrative posts he held were as Director of Commerce and education 1948-51; permanent secretary ministry of commerce and trade 1953-57; of transport and power 1959. He was appointed permanent secretary, ministry of Defence and External Affairs in 1960. That he was closely associated with foreign policy making was further established when he was appointed Advisor to Prime Minister Srimavo in 1961. Subsequently he was sent as Ambassador to the USA. He played a crucial role in persuading the U.S government to intervene in the crisis that followed persecution of the Buddhists in Vietnam in 1963. In 1965, he was sent to U.N. as permanent representative where he served for five years.

Another personality is Funasena de Zoysa who joined the Ceylon civil service in 1926. Having served in various administrative capacities, he became Permanent Secretary, Ministry of health in 1951. In 1953 he was appointed secretary, Cabinet Planning Committee and later Chief Planning Commissioner. He became directly involved with foreign affairs when in 1953, he was appointed Permanent Secretary, Defence and External Affairs. During his tenure as permanent secretary, he functioned as policy
advisor to Prime Minister Kotelawala. In 1958, he was sent as High Commissioner to U.K.

**Neel Quintas Dias** is yet another example whose administrative ability characterised his stewardship of a number of ministries. He commanded a position of importance amongst all the close advisors of Mrs. Bandarnaike. That he was a key man of Srimavo is evident from his appointment as Permanent Secretary to the Ministry of Defence and External affairs from 1961-65. During Mrs. Bandarnaike's second term in office in 1970, Dias was sent as High Commissioner to India in 1971.

Openly pro-western in outlook, **Oliver Ernest Goonetilleke** began his career as an assistant auditor in the Railways in 1921, and rose to the post of Auditor General in 1931. While continuing to work as auditor he was made Home Minister in 1947 when the country's administration was still under the British. In 1948, when the British handed over power to the UNP under Prime Minister D.S. Senanayake, Goonetilleke was sent as High Commissioner to U.K. He was one person who figured prominently in negotiations for the island's independence. On his return in 1951, he was again appointed Minister of Home Affairs - an important post considering the fact that the island had just got independence and had signed the defence agreement with Britain. He served Dudley Senanayake's government as Minister for Civil Defence in 1953. From 1954-62, he served as the Governor General of Ceylon. Even while serving as Governor General, he functioned
as advisor to Prime Minister Kotelawala. From 1962 he was appointed Vice-President of the Royal Institute of International affairs.

R.G. Senanayake, a cousin of Dudley Senanayake, was also one of those UNP leaders who followed the "democratic policies" of the West. A junior minister of Defence and External Affairs, during Dudley's first term, he evinced keen interest in foreign affairs. He was opposed to Ceylon joining SEATO. Therefore when Kotelawala was to visit U.S., Senanayake resigned from the post of Minister of Commerce (in the Kotelawala government). He represented Ceylon in the Baguio conference in 1950. In 1958, he served as Trade and Commerce minister in Bandarnaike's cabinet after leaving the UNP and joining MEP (left it too) and became leader of the opposition in 1964.

In another category, there are those who had a pro-communist tilt, and accordingly influenced Sri Lanka's foreign policy formulation.

One such person is R.S.S. Gunawardena. Educated in Colombo and London, he practised as an advocate in the Supreme Court of Ceylon from 1930-36. He later joined the Ceylon State Council as a member and in 1947, and when the Council was dissolved, joined as member of the first Ceylonese Parliament. Till 1952 he functioned as the Chief Government Whip. He went as the leader of the Ceylonese delegation to the FAO from 1952-53 and in 1954 was appointed Governor of the World Bank. In 1956, he was
entrusted with the post of Permanent Representative at the UN—at that time considered a sensitive post, for the world body was confronted with two international crises—the Suez Crisis and the Soviet attack on Hungary. Ceylon's positive role in the Colombo power's conference in New Delhi, Bandarnaike's shuttle diplomacy, ably assisted by Gunawardena pleased the Arabs and Egypt in particular.

In the Hungarian crisis, Gunawardena was appointed member of the special committee to look into the problem. From 1958-61, he was sent as Ambassador to the U.S. and from 1961-63, as High Commissioner to the U.K. In 1963, he was again sent as Permanent Representative to the UN where he served till 1965. In 1965, the issue of US armed intervention in Vietnam was paramount and the appointment of Gunawardena was proof of his ability to deal with such crises which had a direct bearing on the interest of Sri Lanka.

One more personality is Hamilton Shirley Amerasinghe, who joined the Ceylon Civil Service in 1937. Having served various ministries from 1941 to 1946, he was appointed Resident Manager of the Galoya Development Board. He was exposed to the intricacies of diplomacy at the World Body when he went there as Ceylon's delegate in 1953. During Kotelawala's Premiership, he was sent to the US as Counsellor. In 1963, he was appointed High Commissioner to India and was in India till 1966—a crucial time—for relations between India and Pakistan had deteriorated
and war broke out between the two.

In 1967, he was sent as Permanent Representative to the UN where he was actively involved in the deliberations on the Indo-Pak issue, acting as the country's spokesman.

His candidature for the post of Secretary-General of the UN was given full support by Mrs. Bandarnaike, who personally appealed to all Heads of States. This was clear indication of the influential position Amerasinghe enjoyed as foreign policy Advisor.

Gunapala Piyasena Malalasekara is yet another example of a case where a pro-communist tilt is utilised to establish relations with the Eastern bloc.

A Ph.D in Pali from St. John's college, and D.Litt from University of London, he began his career as a lecturer in the department of Pali and Buddhist civilisation in the University of Ceylon in 1927. In the course of his academic career he rose to the posts of Head of Department, Vice Principal and subsequently Principal in 1957. In 1957 he was appointed the country's first Ambassador to the Soviet Union, being also the first Buddhist to be sent on an ambassadorial post. Trade and economic cooperation—an important consideration in Sri Lanka's foreign policy—between the two countries was started during his tenure in the Soviet Union.

His pro-communist leanings were evident in the cable he sent to the Ceylonese premier during the Hungarian crisis in 1956 to
prevent Ceylon's Permanent representative to the UN from signing the UN Special Committee Report on Hungary denouncing Soviet intervention.

In 1961, he was sent as High Commissioner to Canada and was concurrently Permanent Representative to the UN. South Vietnam's atrocities on the Vietnamese Buddhists had created a bitter feeling between the Catholics and the Buddhists. Because of Malalasekara's lobbying in the UN, religious organisations in the USA, drew the attention of the Pope towards the issue of granting freedom of worship to the Buddhists. From 1963-67 he served as High Commissioner to the UK and while there he was appointed as a member of a fact-finding mission in 1966 to look into and prepare a report on the conditions of the Vietnamese Buddhists who were being persecuted in Vietnam.

From 1967-72, he was appointed Chairman of the National Council for higher education.

Then are those who do not fit into any particular category of foreign policy formulaters but had a definite advantage because of their professional background.

Oliver Weerasinghe is one such example who, from a city planner, rose to became a diplomat. Weerasinghe had his education in the University of Liverpool. While associated with planning and development of Anuradhapura from 1940-56, he functioned as head, Town and country planning department and later, Chief of Planning and Urbanisation section, Department of Social Affairs.
UN from 1956-64. While at the UN he went to Tokyo, Stockholm and Moscow for various conferences on planning. In 1965, he was sent as Ambassador to the US and to Mexico from 1967-70.

T.B. Subasinghe is yet another illustration of this category. Having studied in Colombo and the London School of Economics in 1940, he began his career in the Ministry of Supply from 1942-46. Having served in various other ministries he was appointed Parliamentary secretary to the Ministry of Defence and External Affairs in 1956. The same year he joined the Mahajana Eksath Peramuna (MEP) party. In 1957, he was sent as member of the Ceylon delegation to China under S.W.R.D's premiership and from 1961-65, he was sent as Ambassador to the Soviet Union.

Another interesting personality is William Gopallawa, who with a degree in Law from Colombo, enrolled as a Proctor of the Supreme court in 1924. From 1927-39 he functioned as the Chairman of the Matale Urban Council and from 1940-52, as Commissioner as Kandy and as Commissioner of Colombo from 1952-57. Despite this totally unconnected profession from foreign affairs, he was posted as Ambassador to China from 1958-61 and the USA from 1961-62. From these two posts as Ambassador, one can most certainly assume that he was given an important place in foreign policy formulation. On his return from the US he was appointed Governor-General of Ceylon, post in which he served for a decade.

Then there are those who have been strong critics of the foreign policy of Sri Lanka under different establishments
and have influenced foreign policy in some way.

P.G.B. Keuneman - educated in Colombo and Gray's Inn London began his career as a journalist in London in 1934. In 1940, he joined the Ceylon Daily News as assistant Editor. In 1942, he founded the Ceylon Communist Party and later became its General secretary and subsequently Chairman. As a member of Parliament, he never missed any opportunity to express his views on foreign policy matters and has been the strongest critic on foreign affairs in parliament from 1947 onwards.

Yet another figure who fits into this category is N.M. Perera. A Trotskyite leader of the Lanka Sama Samaja party, he too was committed to the cause of Marxism. Having got a Doctoral degree from the London School of Economics, he began as a lecturer in Ceylon university in 1935. While teaching he founded the LSSP and was imprisoned in 1940 for his party activities. On being released in 1947, he joined as Member of the Ceylon House of Representatives. From 1947-60, he, as the leader of the opposition, was strongly critical of the foreign policy of Sri Lanka. From 1964 onwards, however, he became a silent critic of the Government's policies as he joined the coalition government of Mrs. Bandarnaike. He also served as minister of Finance from 1964-65 and also from 1970-75.

Felix Bandarnaike is a curious example of one of those trusted advisor's of Prime minister Srimavo who became an influential figure in foreign policy formulation, only because
of his family connections. A nephew of S.W.R.D, he became a member of Parliament at the young age of 29. In 1960, he was appointed Parliamentary Secretary to Minister of Defence and External Affairs. From 1963-65, he was Minister without portfolio. In 1965, when Dudley Senanayake came to power, Felix Bandaranaike became a strong critic of the UNP government. In 1970, when Mrs. Bandaranaike was elected back to power, he was made Minister of Public Administration, Local Government and Home Affairs.

In Sri Lanka, the ruling elite of either the upper or lower strata had never shown any great interest in foreign policy matters. During the tenure of the different Prime Ministers, one could identify only one or two individuals interested in foreign affairs— but by no means can they be identified with the ruling elite. At no general election has the foreign policy issue emerged as a crucial factor. As general procedure, decisions on foreign policy matters have come directly from the prime minister.

The elites are the most important contributors to the foreign policy decision making process in any country. In some countries it is possible to differentiate between different sections of an elite with varying world-views and alternative prescriptions for policy. In the cases studied here, however, things are different. It is a homogeneous, limited elite, in most cases anglicized and sharing similar cultural values which
is exceptionally mobile in spheres of administration and politics. In many cases, even the charismatic personality of the supreme leader also emerges from this elite background. Understandably, in such circumstances, foreign policy decision making becomes largely a subjective phenomenon.