Chapter I

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Foreign policy making is most often thought of as a conscious and deliberate act, one of analysing problems and systematically examining alternatives aimed at achieving a purpose. One assumes that policies are formulated by proper, official and authorised persons, and that the major decisions are made at the top, by the President or Prime Minister, in the formal assemblage of the Cabinet and with the Legislature exercising its full and formal powers, each accountable to the electorate for its action.

The reality, however, is quite different. Many more people are involved in the policy-making process than merely those who hold the duly constituted official positions [1]. The Press for example, is referred to as the fourth branch of Government as it performs a necessary part of the process in shaping opinion on foreign affairs. There are also lobbies and Pressure groups of every kind and description, which try hard to influence the Executive. The academic world and quasi-governmental organizations too, are as much a part of the process as the traditional Executive, Legislative and Judicial Branches of government.

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Government [2]. Personalities within a system and the Foreign Office personnel are also important influential participants in the foreign policy making process in the country [3].

**Political Institutions**

The most important political distinction among countries concerns not their form of government but their degree of government. The differences between democracy and dictatorship are less than the differences between those countries whose politics embodies consensus, community, legitimacy, organisation, effectiveness, stability and those countries whose politics is deficient in these qualities. Communist, Totalitarian states and Western Liberal states have different forms of government, but in all three systems the government governs.

The level of political community a society achieves, reflects the relationship between its political institutions and the social forces which comprise it [4]. A social force is an ethnic, religious, territorial, economic or status group. The more complex and heterogeneous the society, the more the achievement and maintenance of political community become dependent on the workings of political institutions.

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3 J.B.Millar, "On Writing about Foreign Policy" in James Rosenau, n.l, pp.60-62.
In a society which has few social groups, one group tends to dominate the others and effectively induce them to acquiesce in its rule.

Our study is aimed at finding out whether there is, or is not, a pattern in formulating a policy. We are concerned less with the evolution of a policy. We are interested in determining broadly the process/the structures involved in the formulation.

In most of the non-Western countries there is indeterminancy of formal government structures and gross deviations in the performance of the governmental functions from the constitutional and legal norms.

Most of these political systems have had or have constitutions providing for Legislatures, Executives and judiciaries. In the distribution of legal powers they follow either the British, American or the French model. But in actual performance of these institutions, they in no way correspond to these norms. A careful examination of governmental structures and their formal powers yield very little predictive value.

However, a study of the infrastructure-interest groups, media, political culture, socialisation processes yield some insights into the functioning of the political system.

Edward Shils classifies the "new states" of the non-Western world into five groups - political democracies, tutelary
democracies, modernising oligarchies, totalitarian oligarchies and traditional oligarchies [5].

**Political Democracies**: are those systems with functioning and relatively autonomous legislatures, executives, courts and with differentiated and autonomous interest groups, political parties and media of communication.

**Modernising Oligarchies**: are political systems controlled by bureaucratic and/or army officers cliques in which democratic institutions have been suspended or do not exist. The goals of the elite may or may not include democratisation.

**Traditional Oligarchies**: are usually monarchic and dynastic in form, based on custom rather than constitution or statute. The ruling elite and bureaucracy are recruited on the basis of kinship or status. The goals of the elite are mainly maintenance goals. The capacity and mechanisms for adaptation and change are present only to a limited extent.

For the purpose of our study, Ceylon approximates the political democracy, Pakistan the modernising oligarchy and Nepal fits in as a traditional oligarchy.

**The Head of the Government:**

The head of the Government usually plays a decisive role, for, it is he, who generally chooses a foreign minister of his

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5 For detailed classification, see Gabriel Almond and James Coleman, *The Politics of the developing areas*, Princeton, 1960, p53-54.
liking, but sometimes he may be restricted by party priorities or coalition requirements [6]. The Minister is subordinate, but when the head of the Government lacks any special interest in foreign policy and fully trusts him, his may be the decisive voice. A trend which is noticeable now, is that the heads of Government assume personal responsibility for major foreign policy decisions, occasionally combining the two offices despite the crippling amount of work involved.

Even when personally conducting foreign policy, the head of the Government cannot help leaving large areas of activity to his Minister. When the views of the two are in consonance, no problems arise. However, when they diverge, the head either removes him or uses other Ministers [7].

Legislature:

Parliamentary powers are generally smaller in foreign than in domestic affairs, but even so they can be important. They vary from country to country, determined by an interplay between fairly stable constitutional arrangements and such other factors as the political climate, the strength of the parties and the characters of the personalities within the system.


7 Patrick J.McGowan and Howard B.Shapiro refer to this as the 'individual' variable. For details, see Ibid. The comparative study of Foreign Policy: A survey of scientific findings, vol.4, (Sage Publications, London), pp.60-62.
Foreign policy cannot be effectively initiated in the parliament, they being large bodies. Their activities are restricted to the exercise of the power of veto over Government policies.

Only those legislatures which wield real power can hold the purse strings, and Governments depend upon them to allocate the funds required for foreign policy. Parliaments are also required to pass any loans which may be necessary to implement international treaties.

Civil Service:

A distinctive line is often drawn between policy making and administration. In theory it is the Ministers who make the policy, while the officials merely carry it out. But in practice, it is hardly so. Members of the bureaucratic machinery preserve the continuity of policy, while Foreign Ministers keep changing as and when the Government changes. Hence, the Ministers naturally become dependent on expert advice.

But to ascertain how far a Minister really takes decisions or merely confirms decisions of his officials is a futile exercise, for when there are differences between the two on issues, it is normally the politician whose views prevail. Nevertheless, where policies are less firm and clashes less pronounced, the advice of the official rules.

The administration of foreign affairs is partly decentralised, since States maintain diplomatic missions in the
capitals of other States with which they have important relations [8]. Prior to the development of modern communications, diplomats heading missions could not receive prompt instructions from their Ministries and were often forced to take decisions on their own responsibility. Today, with modern means of communication, feedback is no problem, yet foreign envoys are much more than mere subordinates following instructions. Not only do they supply and interpret information from the country of their sojourn, but they can still be called upon to make a prompt decision on the spot if faced with an emergency.

Subsidiary Services:

Foreign policy relies not only on diplomacy alone, also heavily on the military forces, intelligence and propaganda services. Military assumes importance, in that, the civilians can ignore military advice only at their own peril and hence do not reject it lightly.

Public Opinion:

Public opinion comes to bear as an unorganised whole, in the form of a "mood", which prescribes the limits within which policy can be shaped and also through organised sectional interests and their leaders and intermediaries. The public generally, is poorly informed, and sometimes even if information is available to them, their judgement is often wrong, for opinions vary. It

8 Frankel, n.6, pp.32-33.
is not always easy to know the reaction of public opinion to any given issue. But in countries where political life has achieved a certain degree of sophistication, public opinion is structured and organised in political parties and pressure groups. Only a small proportion of the citizens may be interested, informed, and active in foreign policy matters, but those who are, assume positions of leadership at various levels. Their opinions are indicative of the way in which public opinion is likely to react and also they are the people upon whom influence can be brought to bear [9].

National Interest:

National interest is the key concept in foreign policy. Referring to the 'essence' of and the fundamental determinant of a country's foreign policy, Hans J. Morgenthau writes, that there is "but one guiding star, one standard for thought, one rule for action" in a nation's dealing with other nations, the national interest" [10] which means "what is best for a nation in foreign affairs" [11] and which may embrace objectives like self-preservation, security, well-being (i.e. economic development and prosperity), prestige, power, the promotion and/or protection of

9 Ibid., pp.34-36.
ideology which is considered as the general, long-term, and continuing purpose which the State, the nation, and the Government all see themselves as serving [12].

Although it is difficult to agree with Morgenthau's basic proposition of the concept of interest defined in terms of power, it is at the same time true that a nation has to "determine its objectives in the light of the power actually and potentially available for the pursuit of these objectives and that the consideration of power is "the motive force" in a country's foreign policy" [13].

This concept of national interest and power considerations are, in turn, determined by various factors such as the geopolitical setting, historical legacies, search for an identity (as in the case of Pakistan), the political structures, images as well as beliefs and motivations of the decisions-makers, and the external environment and pressures, which together constitute the basic foundations on which a country's foreign policy is formulated. It would, therefore, be pertinent and useful to cast a brief look at these factors in the context of the cases chosen for detailed study before proceeding any further.

Geo-politics is a major factor underlying the foundations of Pakistan's foreign policy. Geo-politics is defined as the study of the outstanding features of the situation and resources of a country with a view to determining its status in world politics, which includes a country's geographical location, physical environment, population, economic resources and other major factors underlying its national power which provides a basis for political analysis to the understanding of its international relations [14]. It is said, "The foreign policy of Pakistan begins and ends at her borders, more particularly at the Indian borders" [15]. A cursory look at the map of Pakistan indicates that roughly half of Pakistan's land frontiers meet with India, about one-third with Afghanistan, about one-sixth with Iran and a very small strip with China. This strategic situation should be constantly kept in view while considering any aspect of the foreign policy of Pakistan [16]. Also, the split of the new

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state into two wings separated by Indian territory created serious problems for the defence planners of Pakistan [17].

The State of Pakistan which was formed in 1947, inherited from the colonial era an extremely backward system and acute socio-economic and political problems [18]. The ruling block of the country, weak in economic and political respects, had to evolve a viable political system out of limited resources. Therefore, the chief driving force of Pakistan's foreign policy for many years was an attempt by its ruling groups to have "friends—powerful friends, who are interested in our freedom, and who are interested in our progress"[19]. Pakistan, therefore, played a pioneering role at Colombo, Bogor and Bandung which led to the launching of the non-aligned movement but did not become a member formally until March 1979 [20].

Pakistan has been suffering from the crisis of identity both internal as well as external which has posed a serious problem before the policy-makers in Pakistan [21].

20 Pakistan and Non-Aligned Movement, pub by Directorate of Films and Publications, Min of Information and Broadcasting, Govt. of Pakistan, Islamabad, Mar 1983, p.3.
Pakistan is a heterogeneous society consisting of Bengalis, Pathans, Baluchis, Sindhis and Punjabis, each having a distinct culture, custom and language [22]. Because of this diversity in culture, Pakistani nationalism has proved to be fragile. In order to strengthen national integration, Pakistani leaders adopted negative methods of projecting an external enemy from time to time [23].

The Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan is regarded by Pakistanis as a symbol of Pakistan's search for national identity [24]. Obsession with India and search for national identity lead to Pakistan's sense of insecurity. Safeguarding its security has remained the main foreign policy concern for Pakistan. Security perceptions of Pakistani leaders get further accentuated owing to the existence of bilateral disputes between Pakistan and its neighbours. This has prompted Pakistan to

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procure arms and seek alliances with countries [25]. Hence augmentation of military strength has become a keynote of Pakistan's foreign policy [26].

The partition of India and the birth of Pakistan has often been explained in terms of elite conflict. "After independence Pakistan continued to be ruled by a small elite with a narrow base of social support. The masses in whose name the new state was created played no role in policy inputs, and even the various pressure groups, whom the elites presumably represented, had little to say in the decision-making process. The ruling elite was remarkably free of constraints arising from its constituencies. Elite bargaining, manoeuvering and alliances were, therefore, relatively easy and flexible: narrow power interests being the general guiding principle "[27].

In the circumstances in which Pakistan came into being it did need a strong leader to shape its political destiny. The Muslim League was not equal to the task, either ideologically or organisationally. The Pakistan movement was too amorphous to achieve cohesion [28]. Thus Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan though

25 Prime Minister Sukrawaridy's statement on Foreign Policy, Dec. 9, 1956, Govt of Pakistan, 1957; AR, 1960, p.3748.
differing in their political approach and styles of leadership, answered the needs of the times. Neither of them, however, lived long enough to establish a system.

During the Liaquat Ali Khan period, collective decision making and consensual foreign policies were managed with reasonable success. Following Liaquat's assassination, however, Ghulam Mohammed, Iskander Mirza and Mohammed Ayub Khan committed Pakistan to Western military alliances and the civil-military bureaucrats, virtually eliminating the influence of the politicians. Whereas the alliances sought to protect Pakistan from the perceived Indian threat, they also isolated the country from its co-religionists in the Arab Middle-East and Afghanistan, while apparently antagonising the Communists.

An active member of SEATO and CENTO, she had especially close military ties with the United States. In an address to the joint session of the American Congress, in July 1961, President Ayub Khan told the legislators that Pakistan was America's most reliably ally in Asia, in fact the only Asian ally on which she could really depend [29]. But in the early 1960's and especially after the Sino-Indian war, Pakistan's devotion to alignment and her attitude towards the U.S. were beginning to cool. In 1963, pro-Chinese sentiments were voiced in official and un-official

circles. Pakistan veered in the direction of a more balanced foreign policy [30].

In the early 1970's in both domestic and foreign affairs, Pakistan's policies have undergone a marked reorientation. The apparent political stability of the early 1960's gave way to instability. Ayub Khan, the strong man for nearly a decade found out that he had lost the people's support in the spring of 1969 thereby turning over power to another military man Yahya Khan.

Yahya Khan who assumed the presidency, insisted, however, that he would remain in power only long enough to arrest the deteriorating situation in the country, and that he would work out a programme which would enable the elected representatives of the people to take over the Government. True to his promise general elections were held.

As a result of the elections two men of divergent types and different background and orientation, one in East Pakistan, the other in West Pakistan emerged as the most powerful leaders.

Mujibur Rehman of the Awami League, had campaigned on a six-point programme that called for an extreme degree of autonomy for East Pakistan which would have stripped the Central Government of almost all powers and functions except foreign affairs and defence. Whereas in West Pakistan Bhutto had advocated "Islamic

Socialism" and offered an alternative to the "Old leadership" and the vested interests. Bhutto was strongly pro-Chinese, anti-Indian and anti-American. Rehman had voiced reservations about Pakistan's ties with China, had favoured reconciliation with India and was considered to be at least mildly pro-American [31].

In the December 1970 polls an overwhelming mandate to the Awami League gave it a clear majority in the National Assembly. This meant that the transfer of power to the elected representatives of the Awami Leagues "Six-Points would enable it to dominate the Centre. "It is a well-established fact that all crucial decisions relating to defence and foreign affairs since early fifties including the one to forge a military alliance with the U.S. in 1954 - was taken by the Army and not the Civilians. It was not surprising that the Army viewed the prospects of Awami League's control as very harrowing" [32].

Therefore, President Yahya's decision to resort to military action to take control of East Pakistan on March 25, 1971 was strengthened by Bhutto. On the following day in a broadcast to the nation, Yahya Khan banned the Awami League as a political party, condemning Mujib as a traitor. Civil war raged in the countryside, and with the intervention of India, the independent State of Bangladesh was proclaimed. These events brought Yahya

31 Ibid., p.360.
Khan's political experience to an abrupt end and dimmed the prospects for the survival of Pakistan as a united nation.

-- NEPAL --

Being a small and developing country, Nepal has been motivated in the formulation and execution of its foreign policy by three strong urges. Using Liska's terminology, they are the urges for: "Security, stability and status" [33].

These objectives have been conditioned by Nepal's uncomfortable position of being situated amidst high Himalayan ranges and sandwiched between two great and ancient nations of Asia - India and China - giving it a place of importance in the South Asian sub-continent [34]. Nepal cannot afford to be hostile to either of the two countries, nor can it be overtly dependent on any one of them, for it can inversely limit the freedom of Nepal. Nepal has no outlet to the sea, which is possible only through India or China. Hence, to obtain transit facilities it has to maintain friendly relations with both China and India [35]. This peculiar land-locked geographical position which compelled her to give foremost priority to the preservation

33 George Liska, Alliance and the Third World, (USA, 1968), p.27.
34 Rama Kant, "Nepal's Foreign Policy and China", India Quarterly, (N.Delhi), Vol. 27, no.3, Jul-Sep 1971, p.203.
of her independence, largely influenced the foreign policy thinking in Nepal [36].

The Kingdom's historical background, its socio-cultural structures, the characters of its leadership and the nature of the political system operating in the kingdom has also played a significant role in the evolution and functioning of its foreign policy [37].

For centuries neglected by time and history, Nepal is a classic example of an underdeveloped country, now humming with activity [38].

**Nepal and the Pre-Rana Period**

The geo-political confines of the present day Nepal are the outcome of King Prithvinarayan Shah's foresight and wisdom of launching a vigorous campaign for the political unification of

36 For a further elaboration of the stand taken by the elites on preserving the independence of the country, see T.R.Taladhar, Mahendra, The King of Nepal, Dept of Publicity and Broadcasting, Min of National Guidance, HMG, Nepal, Kathmandu, 1961, p.10; also see King Mahendra's address to Second Conference of the Non-Aligned Nations in Cairo, Oct 1964, H.M.King Mahendra, Proclamations, Speeches and Messages (hereafter referred to as Speeches), Vol.II, Dept of Publicity, Min of Information and Broadcasting, HMG, Nepal, Kathmandu, Jun 1967, p.2.


Nepal through territorial expansion [39]. His mission was kept alive, by his able successors, especially Bahadur Shah who acted as the Regent of his nephew, King Rana Bahadur Shah [40].

The Gorkhas might and expansion continued to grow with alarming proportion, capturing some areas in the West and Sikkim in the East [41]. The political career of Bahadur Shah, however, came to an end, when in the invasion of Tibet, they came into conflict with China in 1791-1792 [42].

In 1804, Nepal moved Southwards, but as a result of the Anglo-Nepalese war of 1814-16, Nepal's Western, Southern and Eastern boundaries were more or less defined.

Hereditary Monarchy:

A strong and centralised Government emerged under the Shah Kings during 1742-1846, establishing a political system which was essentially military and despotic in character, the King wielding supreme authority, in both civil and military affairs of the State. Monarchy became the hereditary institution, with every

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41 Chauhan, n.39, p.11.

monarch assuming the title of "Shri Panch Maharajadhiraaja", on his accession [43]. The King thus became the source of all power [44].

For the purpose of administration, however, the King employed Ministers from higher caste noble families with whom he had intimate contacts.

Another feature of the political system was militarism. All major resources of the country were mobilized to create a colossal war machinery which was geared for expansionism.

The setback to militarism in 1792 and 1816 at the hands of China and British India respectively had a deep impact on Nepal's political system for those who had led the armies in the battlefields, decided to capture the levers of power. Thus internal power struggle triggered off instability, violence and foreign interference, rendering the monarchical system impotent.

The event that changed the course of Nepalese history at least for a century was staged by a courtier -Jung Bahadur, on 14 September 1846 in which a large number of the nobility was massacred. He pushed the King into the background [45], brought

43 Gupta, n.40, p.6.
45 "The King was confined to his palace and all communications in the name of the King were censored by the Foreign Ministry of the Rana Government", Satish Kumar, *Rana Polity in Nepal: Origin and Growth*, (Bombay, Asia Publishing House, 1967), p.55.
all the sources of power under his control and established a family rule by making the prime ministership hereditary from brother to brother [46].

The Political System Under the Ranas

With the rise of Jung Bahadur in 1846, the institution of Monarchy was completely eclipsed, paving way for Rana oligarchy. The Nepalese monarchy was deprived of all its power and significance. Even the King's personal life and the organisation of his household were under the strict control of the Prime Minister [47]. Foreign observers described the King as a "Prisoner in the Palace" [48].

The executive head of the Government was called Prime Minister, a designation to which the title of Maharaja was prefixed after a few years [49]. The Maharaja Prime Minister occupied the highest and the Central position in the Government structure. He was the mainspring of political power in Nepal.

The Maharaja Prime Minister was a peculiar institution of the Rana political system. It combined the functions of a Prime Minister and those of a king, having full sovereignty over a part of Nepal and in the sense sharing with the King the sovereignty over the rest of Nepal.

The Prime Minister being the Chief Executive had the power of patronage extending to all civil and military offices. Since appointments to the civil and military offices were open to the Ranas only, the administration thus became highly centralised, personalized and despotic. This autocratic political system continued for a century, as there existed no other centre of power that could challenge its supremacy [50].

The Delhi Settlement:

The end of Judha Shumshere's rule in November 1945, marked the beginning of the Rana's fall. After him, Nepal had two more Prime Ministers, Padma Shumshere and Mohan Shumshere. Although they too were motivated by the desire to cling to power, political developments within the kingdom, as well as in the region around, gave way to another system in Nepal.

A small urban elite class began to make its presence felt which organised a movement for political liberalization against the Ranas in Nepal which got the support of Indian leaders, particularly the socialist leaders [51].

Since Britain nursed Nepal's external relations, the presence of the British in India became a decisive factor for the Ranas to keep themselves in power. But the withdrawal of the British in 1947, considerably weakened their position.

50 For further details on the Rana period see M.S. Jain, Emergence of a New Aristocracy in Nepal (1837-1858), (Agra, Shri Ram Mehra, 1972).
Indian leaders had manifestly exhibited their desire for the introduction of progressive measures by the Ranas in Nepal so that the country could keep pace with new developments in the world [52].

The democratic movement which was already underway came into action when on 6 November 1950, King Tribhuvan and the royal family, except crown prince Mahendra's son Gyanendra, left the palace under the pretext of a hunting excursion and took asylum in the Indian embassy in Kathmandu and finally flew to India on 11 November 1950. The infuriated Ranas then crowned Gyanendra as the King of Nepal and sought his recognition as King from India, the USA and the UK. India refused to oblige [53] and the delay caused by the British in extending the recognition, left the Ranas with no alternative. They started negotiations with the King under the supervision and mediation of the Government of India, the outcome of which was the Delhi Settlement. In accordance with the settlement, King Tribhuvan issued a royal proclamation on 18 February 1951 which terminated the Rana monopoly of political power. A coalition Rana-Nepali Congress cabinet was formed, with Mohan Shumsher as Prime Minister.

52 See Jawaharlal Nehru, Speeches, 1949-1953, (Second impression), (N.Delhi, Publications Division, Min of Information and Broadcasting, Govt of India, 1957), p.176.

53 The decision to non-recognise Prince Gyanendra as the King of Nepal was officially communicated to the Rana Government on Nov.22, 1950, see Hindu, (Madras), Nov 23, 1950; also see Nehru, Speeches, n.62, p.127.
B.P. Koirala, however, commanded majority support in the Cabinet and possessed real power [54].

This marked the turning point in the history of Nepal as the long family rule of the Ranas was overthrown and parliamentary democracy was established [55].

**Experiments in Democracy**

With the dawn of democracy, Nepal turned a new leaf in its history, giving up its policy of isolationism. The royal proclamation of 18 February 1951 restored the supreme authority of the crown. Most Nepali leaders assumed that the reinstatement of royal powers was a legal formality providing the base for the emergence of a democratic constitutional monarchy. The king also reiterated his pledge of following democratic procedures and as an earnest of his intentions the king in the Interim Government of Nepal Act 1951, established a king-in-council system under which the Cabinet served as the real centre of political authority.

By mid-1952, two Cabinets had disintegrated and King Tribhuvan was forced to introduce as a necessary expedient a

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55 Mohan Shumshere announced measures to "set the people on the road of orderly progress towards the goal of a free and independent democracy" - English text of a Declaration by His Highness the Maharaja on Jan 8, 1951, (cyclostyled), ICWA (Sapru House), New Delhi, n.d.
system of direct rule with an advisory council, the effects of which were to reaffirm the crown's supreme authority and to place its right to delegate authority beyond the reach of the courts. The Cabinet had perforce become totally dependent upon the crown.

The trend towards centralization of power in the monarchy continued after King Mahendra's succession to the throne. One of his very first acts was the dismissal of the Cabinet and the reinstitution of a period of direct rule in which he acted as his own Prime Minister. Later, the king appointed a series of Cabinets under successive party leaders, but he maintained a much more direct and immediate role in Governmental affairs than his father.

In the interim period between the dismissal of the popularly elected Nepali Congress Government in 1960 and the promulgation of the new constitution in 1962, King Mahendra was an absolute monarch both in law and in fact. Special legislation enacted during this period, further strengthened the powers of the monarch.

Constitutional monarchy had thus been given a totally different dimension which distinguished it from the system projected by King Tribhuvan and the leaders of the 1950 revolution. King Tribhuvan had preferred to keep the crown as free as possible from day to day political and administrative duties, his primary objective being to create conditions enabling him to retire to a role of constitutional monarch. King Mahendra
on the other hand visualised an active role for the crown as he considered it to be an institution capable of providing the dynamic leadership required for national integrity and political progress [56].

--- CEYLON ---

Geography is an important determinant underlying Ceylon's foreign policy objectives. Ceylon is strategically placed in the Indian Ocean being the half-way house between the East and the West, separated from India by a narrow strip of water - the Palk Strait. Being a detached portion of India, its evolution bears an unmistakable impress of the Indian sub-continent.

Writing in the mid-forties, K.M. Panikkar advocated an extended Indian security sphere in the Indian Ocean [57]. Commenting on this, one Ceylonese Prime Minister went so far as to assert in 1954, that Panikkar's writings were tantamount to an Indian proclamation of a "Munroe Doctrine" for South Asia [58]. Although Nehru himself sent messages to the Government of Ceylon repudiating any suggestion, the perception of a threat from India has been a significant element in foreign policy decision making

56 Rose and Fisher, n.54, pp.40-41.
in Ceylon, because of the socio-cultural linkages between both the countries [59]. Also, India's own strategic concerns regarding Ceylon's foreign policy posture and alignments have been continuing [60].

Further, Ceylon's strategic placement in the Indian Ocean, which provides vantage point for nuclear submarines to hit at Moscow and Peking may appear a blessing to their adversaries [61], and a desirable prize for any big country, but is still vulnerable to external pressures and pulls.

**Ethnic and Religious Rivalries**

Sri Lanka is a mosaic of ethnic, religious and social groups. Despite such distinctiveness, one could discern some amount of cohesion and solidarity amongst the colonial elites due to their similar socio-economic background [62] till the advent

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of adult franchise [63] and the emergence of left parties in 1930's [64]. Underlying such a cleavage has also been the Sinhalese Buddhists -Tamil relationships. There are historical, educational and sociological factors besides barriers of language and psychology that divide the two communities. Most important economic contraction generates sharp antagonisms because of competition for the limited employment available in the public and private sectors. The Tamil labourers are looked upon as aliens and usurpers of economic opportunities, which otherwise would have been available to them (Sinhalese) [65].

63 In 1927, by introducing adult franchise, the Donoughmore Constitution created some differences in Sri Lanka because the Ceylon Tamil leaders requested for separate Tamil seats in the Western province and the Sinhalese rejected it on the grounds that it was a communal demand. Despite protests, it did not have any immediate effect. See N.Sanmuganathan, A Marxist looks at the History of Ceylon, (Colombo, 1972), pp.38-42.

64 The Left parties like the Trotskyite Lanka Sama Samaja party (1935) and Communist Party (1943) attempted to mobilize masses on ideological grounds and challenged the politics of notables. But internal conflict led to the weakening of the movement. See Leslie Goonewardene, A Short History of the Lanka Sama Samaja Party, (Colombo, 1960), pp.1-34, also Peter Keuneman, 25 Years of the Ceylon Communist Party, (Colombo, 1968), pp.1-12.

65 S.W.R.D.Bandarnaike remarked, "The fact that in the towns and villages, in business houses and boutiques most of the work is in the hands of Tamil speaking people will inevitably result in a fear, and I do not think an unjustified fear, of the inexorable shrinking of the Sinhalese language". "Towards a New Era", selected speeches of S.W.R.D.Bandarnaike made in the Legislature of Ceylon, 1931-1959 (Ceylon, Dept of Information, Colombo, 1961), p.395.
On the other hand, the promulgation of Sinhala as the only official language, following the 1956 elections, the special treatment meted out to Buddhism in the 1972 constitution, have been perceived by the Tamil minority as measures which have been detrimental to their interests and have posed severe threats to their identity as a community [66].

Added to this is another important factor. The Ceylon Tamils are a national minority, but in the northern and eastern parts of the island they are in a majority. That the majority-minority cleavages have further widened is evident from the formation of the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) whose leaders demanded a separate Tamil State [67]. This majority-minority confrontation poses serious challenges to the makers of foreign policy in Ceylon.

Nationalism

Since independence, Ceylon has experienced three successive phases of nationalism. The first phase was that of the UNP (United National Party), which was essentially pro-Western in outlook and the perception of the leaders during the period was of territorial nationalism on basis of multi-ethnic harmony [68].

During the UNP rule, the demands of the majority Buddhists were not viewed with sympathy as a result of which, discontent grew against the UNP which culminated in the religio-linguistic nationalism [69]. This cause was, however, strongly supported by S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike who had left the UNP fold to form the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP). This was the second phase of nationalism through which the island passed.

The third phase of Ceylonese nationalism witnessed the 1971 insurrection which questioned the very legitimacy of the existing state system [70] coupled with Tamil nationalism which questioned the validity of the territorial boundaries of the State, thereby posing a threat to the security and stability of the polity itself.

These three phases have variedly affected the foreign policy of Sri Lanka calling forth action commensurate to it.

During the course of the Second World War, while defending her extensive empire in Asia, the British Government made attempts to negotiate a settlement of the Constitutional problem with nationalist leaders and to give stability to the administration in these colonies.

69 Ibid., p.69.
Ceylonese leaders thus drafted a constitution along lines which were agreeable to the colonial Government [71]. On the basis of this, the Soulbury Commission drafted a Constitution whereby "fully responsible status" was given to the Ceylonese Government [72]. The hope was expressed that within a short space of time the desired Dominion status for Ceylon would also be achieved [73]. But events overtook the new constitution and when independence was given to India and Pakistan in 1947, it was impossible for Britain to withhold similar rights from Ceylon and consequently Ceylon became an independent member of the Commonwealth on February 4, 1948 [74].

Ceylon did not have to struggle for its independence [75]. The transition from colonial rule to independence, was smooth, for it had enjoyed a great degree of internal self-government based since 1931 on a State Council elected by universal adult

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71 The scheme was entitled, "The Constitutional Scheme formulated by the Ministers in accordance with HMG's Declaration of 26 May, 1943", Ceylon Sessional Paper XIV, Sep 1944, Govt of Ceylon.


75 Ivor Jennings, Nationalism and Political Developments in Ceylon, (N.York, 1950), pp.15-16.
suffrage [76]. Thus the Ministers who took office after independence had already served in a democratically elected legislature.

Political Institutions in Ceylon

The political institutions functioning in Ceylon were thus evolved during more than a century of British tutelage [77].

The political scene in Sri Lanka has been one of an open society set in a framework of parliamentary democracy, changing its Government from time to time by means of free elections [78].

The Ceylonese people are wedded to Parliamentary methods, Ceylon having no revolutionary tradition, no revolutionary party worthy of the name and a tiny army whose occasional political incursions have been farcical rather than threatening and most of its political leaders have had British legal training [79]. The administrators too, have a long background of experience in working constitutional democracy [80].

The Ceylonese Constitution

The Constitution of Ceylon (after Independence) maintained allegiance to a foreign monarch represented by a Governor-General instead of instituting a Republic. It introduced the system of Parliamentary Government with a bicameral legislature, comprising the House of Representatives and the Senate [81]. The House of Representatives was directly elected by popular vote and the Senate was in part elected by members of the Popular House and in part nominated by the Governor-General. The Ceylonese Governor-General occupied a position akin to that of the British monarch and exercised similar constitutional function [82].

Today, a Cabinet subject to dismissal by a popularly elected parliament, makes ultimate decisions in consultation within itself, with its professional civil servants and spokesman of different interests within the electorate [83].

Since Ceylon was governed by the Soulbury Constitution it was merely modified removing any obstacles which were hindering the independent Status of Ceylon. This resulted in the enactment of Ceylon Independence Order-in-Council of 1947 which remained one of the basic documents of Governance of the country till its

83 Howard Wriggins, n.89.
repudiation on May 22, 1972 [84].

The 22 of May 1972 goes down in history and marks a new era in the political development of Ceylon. On this day the Constituent Assembly adopted a new Constitution, thereby snapping its 157 years old ties, with the British Crown to emerge as a Republic [85].

Electoral Politics

Ceylon has had longer experience of the franchise than any former colony. The parliamentary system has also proved far more viable here than in most newly independent nations [86]. Since 1931, in each of the general elections, the proportion of voters going to the polls has risen [87].

Members of Parliament in order to survive have to continually look to their performance on behalf of their constituencies and most provide an effective channel between the electors and Colombo. The nation's political life is still dominated by the success with which the parties can make personal contact with the voter and convince him of their concern for his basic problems [88].

88 Ibid., p.380.
Two dominant parties - the UNP and the SLFP - have always been at the helm of affairs and have formed Governments in successive elections alternately. This led to the establishment of a two party system of governance [89] resulting in a clearly identifiable bipartisan approach towards many foreign policy issues.

89 Urmila Phadnis, "Trends in Ceylon Politics", India