CHAPTER X
CONCLUSIONS

Israel's relations with the Third World during the period of our discussion (1948-1968) can be divided into four phases: During the period from 1948 to the Sinai campaign of 1956, the Third World figured only marginally in Israel's foreign policy. Though efforts were made, in general, a low priority was accorded to Asia. The second phase from 1957 to 1962 is the period of increasing involvement with the Third World countries specially with Africa. The third phase from 1962 to 1967 is distinguished by the consolidation and strengthening of diplomatic gains already attained; and the fourth phase is marked by the uncertainty in relations caused by Israel's holding on to the Arab territories occupied in the Six-Day war of June 1967.

In 1968 now, Israel has wide diplomatic missions in Afro-Asia. The importance Israel attaches to Africa can be gauged by the fact that a tiny country with less than three million people, Israel's diplomatic missions there in Africa are next only to the USA, USSR and France. Israel's co-operation programme is so extensive and carried out with so much of earnestness that it has become a vital and positive element in Israel's foreign policy. Apart from the wars that Israel has fought (specially the Six Day war of 1967), its international image is associated with its extensive programme of technical co-operation. Looking
at it from a distance we feel that Israel's desire to establish friendly relations with these countries with the help of the programme of co-operation is not only Israel's "identity card" to the emerging world, but also, in the long run, Israel's weapon to build a "bridge" to the neighbouring Arab countries. Problems Africains on 16 June 1966 said the same thing when it stated: "Africa's friendship is not only a powerful equilibrating factor that works in favour of Israel in the Afro-Asian world, but it is also perhaps the best way of bringing the Arabs to envisage the possibility of coexistence."

It is not an easy task to assess how far Israel's policy goals in the Third World have been served, because it is not often possible to relate the effects to the cause of co-operation. And further, it is difficult to assess the significance of the effects themselves. The Israelis themselves seem to feel that their achievement is rather encouraging. "Africa's friendship has banished the spectre of Israel's isolation in the Third World. The vigorous stand taken by African leaders in advocacy of the peaceful settlement of conflict has strengthened Israel's conviction that the states of Africa are able and willing to play a central part in bringing about permanent peace in the Middle East. President Nasser, in his Philosophy of Revolution insists that the way to Africa leads through Cairo. Everything today points to the likelihood that the way to Cairo may lead through Africa." ¹

But if we look at the entire period, we will find that political rewards of Israel's association with the Afro-Asia have been rather modest. Israel is not included in the Afro-Asian bloc in the United Nations. This is a major disappointment for Israel. Moreover, Israel has not been allowed to participate in the non-aligned conferences. We have seen what "treat" was meted out to Israel in Bandung. In the non-governmental Afro-Asian conferences also, Israel has always been excluded. We have further noted that in the Bandung, Casablanca and Cairo conferences Israel was severely condemned. Moreover, the "First Tricontinental Solidarity Conference of the People of Africa, Asia and Latin America" held in Havana in January 1966, with the participation of delegates from more than eighty countries (Israel was again not allowed to participate) and territories, adopted a resolution which is most severely anti-Israel. The Conference called for:

rupture of political relations... an economic and cultural blockade... expulsion from international organizations... combating Zionist infiltration and penetration... cancelling agreements (with Israel)... material and financial aid to Palestine in its fight against the Zionists... support (for) the Organization for the Liberation of Palestine.

The Conference warned against "so-called Israeli technical and economic aid... a new disguised method of imperialism and neo-colonialism of the U.S." Further, right in 1956, Israel

2. In the early years Israel was not even invited to the annual cocktail party of the African delegation held in the United Nations.

was severely criticized for its part in the Sinai campaign. Moreover, in the early years, Afro-Asia always supported the Arab cause in most of the United Nations resolutions on issues relating to the Arab-Israeli disputes.

These are major failures and disappointments for Israel in its relations with the Third World. But these failures should not blind us to see the Israeli gains in this respect.

That the fact is in assessing the realization of the Israeli goals in the Third World, it would be proper for us to compare the "what is" with "what would have been". That again is a difficult task; but we may as well guess from the disadvantaged situation that Israel is in, that Israel's position would definitely have been very deplorable. Israel's religion and cultural heritage are far away from those of the Afro-Asian countries. The Arabs had some psychological advantage in Asia and that was exploited. In Africa also, it would have been the Arab image of Israel, if Israel had not made tremendous efforts to establish friendly relations with those countries.

Now, the very fact that the Afro-Asian countries decided to accept Israeli technical assistance and decided to establish diplomatic relations, points to the fact that it constitutes a break from political isolationism. Further, quite a few Heads of State visited Israel, thus showing overt friendship for Israel.
As early as September 1960, President Nkrumah of Ghana, at the "Summit" United Nations General Assembly, called upon the Arab states to accept a "realistic and practical solution" of the Palestine problem based upon the acceptance of "the political realities that prevail there to-date". This is a clear neutral stand. This trend became increasingly apparent in the following years at the United Nations. At the General Assembly (United Nations) in 1961, 1962 and 1963, Israel mobilized its friends to support a resolution calling for direct negotiations between the Arab states and Israel to solve all the problems outstanding between them - an object which had been fervently sought by Israel for years. The list of nineteen sponsors in 1963 included ten African (5 Latin American and 4 European) countries. In all these three years the resolutions lacked necessary majority support; but the fact that the African countries took initiative on a resolution favourable to Israel was enough reason for Israel to be happy. Moreover, in a number of executive position in the UN agencies and other organs, Israel has been chosen to represent the entire Afro-Asien bloc, in spite, obviously, of Arab opposition. Further, the attitude demonstrated by the Afro-Asien world in the United Nations on the question of the Six Day war of June 1967, was very crucial and important for Israel; because, as a result of

4. The Israel Digest, vol. 3, no. 21, 14 October 1960, p. 5.
5. Year Book of the United Nations, 1963, Department of Public
   Information, United Nations, New York, p. 61.
the war Israel not only thoroughly defeated the Arabs, but also brought under occupation Arab territories three times as big as the size of Israel - and they were occupying these territories. On our analysis, we had found that Asian reactions reflected strong pro-Arab sentiments. The support Israel received from Asia was just marginal. Even traditionally "good friends" like Burma and Nepal also did not go along with Israel. On the other hand, Africa's reaction to the Six Day war was mixed. But taking all the factors that came into play during the debate and voting in the General Assembly into account, we may maintain that to the extent that diplomatic success is measurable, Israeli diplomacy appears to have paid off.

Of course, it should be borne in mind that there have been numerous resolutions on issues like the Palestine refugee problem, the status of Jerusalem etc., which have gone against the stand Israel has been adopting and all these resolutions have been adopted with the Afro-Asian bloc, by and large, supporting them. But on the most major issue that came up for discussion in the UN (during the period under discussion) - the Six Day war - gave us an opportunity for evaluation of Israel's standing in the Third World. We found that a considerable number of countries demonstrated their friendship to Israel.

In cases of regional, Afro-Asian and non-aligned conferences, we noted that at the Bandung and Casablanca conferences, Israel was condemned. But Bandung was no hurdle in the
African continent's establishing friendly relations with Israel. And, in case of Casablanca Conference, even the African countries who were signatories to the anti-Israeli resolution, continued to have close relations with Israel on the bilateral level. And later on, at the major Organization of African Unity Conferences—at Addis Ababa in 1963, at Cairo in 1964 and at Accra in 1965—and even at Kinshasa in 1967 (after the Six-Day War) no serious anti-Israeli resolutions were adopted. In the first conference of the Non-aligned Countries at Belgrade in 1961, Israel's friends saw to it that no anti-Israeli resolution is adopted. In the second Non-aligned Conference in Cairo in 1964, the resolution adopted with regards to the Middle East was open to interpretations (see Chapter VIII) and it did not appear to have much effect on Israel's relations with the Afro-Asian world. The Israeli Press—specially the ones that are of the opposition—has sometimes shown impatience at the anti-Israeli resolutions adopted at conferences where the Afro-Asian countries friendly to Israel have participated, though by and large, the Israeli Press has been sympathetic to Israel's association with the Third World.) Under such circumstances also, the Government of Israel has kept its calm, exercised that in making its attitude known through diplomatic channels and has admirable refrained from giving the slightest hint that Israeli aid would be withdrawn in retaliation for the actions of those countries when such actions are not to the liking of Israel.
As discussed above, Israel went to Afro-Asia with a couple of set goals. Diplomatic relations and effective technical assistance combined to form a promising beginning. Israel later spread the technical assistance programme extensively and it became Israel's tool of developing close relations with these countries. From our analysis, it might appear that the rewards Israel has received in return for its technical assistance programme with the Third World have not been commensurate with so conspicuous an effort. But it should not be expected that aid and assistance will result in rewards in one to one proportion. If it were so, the USA (and also the USSR) would have had every reason to expect all the support from the recipient countries on whatever it does. It appears that the Third World, stirred by the revolution of expectations, has accepted aid and assistance not always with gratitude. Looked at from this standpoint, Israeli efforts in the Third World, by and large, has been successful. This extensive co-operation programme has brought about a notable enhancement in Israel's international standing. As a result, one of the policy goals of Israel in the Third World - that of enhancing its status in the eyes of the Western Powers - have been achieved. Israeli assessment of the Middle East situation is given more weight now than was the case before. This may be evident from the fact that after the Sinai campaign, Washington put pressure on Israel and Israel had to withdraw from Sinai. But after the Six Day war Israel occupied vast areas of Arab territory. To this day, it has not vacated these territories. Many factors have contributed
to this situation; but that Israel's international standing has gone up and that this new status has resulted in its asserting itself, cannot be denied.

Now, though Israeli diplomacy has "paid off" with regards to its relations with the Third World, there are quite a few factors which are likely to work against Israel's friendly relations with the Third World. First of all, there is the Israeli occupation of Arab territory which Israel has refused to vacate. The fact is that almost the whole of Afro-Asia has experienced foreign domination. Now, the anti-colonial experience of these countries would never allow them to accept Israel who has become a foreign occupying power over large areas of Arab territory. Corollary to this attitude is the sympathy these countries show towards the Palestine Liberation Organization because this Palestinian movement evokes memories of the national liberation movements of these countries. The second one is the Israeli insistence that they would under no circumstances return some particular Arab territories - that is, a demand for some boundary changes. This demand for boundary changes touch on the sacrosanct principle of the holiness of the "existing frontiers" (though sometimes they are 'colonial frontiers') of the African states which have been
included in the Charter of the OAU. Thus, the Third World countries, quite a few of whom have boundary conflicts, cannot afford to view Israel's insistence with any sympathy. The Third World, further, is not happy with Israel's stand about Eastern Jerusalem, with its Christian and Muslim Holy places—which Israel had annexed during the Six-Day war. The Security Council resolution of November 1967 proclaimed the inadmissibility of military conquest and the Israeli obligation to evacuate conquered territory. The Third World countries are highly sensitive to anything open to interpretation as an act of aggression. Thus, the principles that frontiers must not change and aggression must not pay, have weighed heavily in the Afro-Asia's evaluation of the Palestine problem. Therefore, until Israel withdraws behind fixed and mutually agreed frontiers, Israel will represent an unsettling factor to practically every single Afro-Asian country.

Moreover, after the Six-Day war, the images of the Arabs and the Israelis have changed. So long, Israel was regarded as the underdog; but after the Six Day war, the defeat of the Arabs
was so complete and thorough that the sympathy of these countries with limited military capability, has come to stay with the Arabs. And under such circumstances, if the Israelis hold on to the territories conquered in the War, it is only natural that the Third World countries will have reason to change their opinions about Israel. In future, Israel will have to take these factors into consideration if it wants to maintain good relations with the Third World.

The above factors apart, Israeli policy-makers must take into consideration quite a few other factors if it wants its policy goals to be realized. The first thing Israel should do is to establish itself as a force for peace. In the long run, it would not pay Israel if its relations with Afro-Asian countries result only in extending the Arab-Israeli dispute to these countries. So, it is required of Israel to undertake broad and constructive activities so that these Afro-Asian countries feel that Israel is genuinely helping them out in their progress. If this genuineness can be established, it would pay Israel in the long run. Now for this purpose, Israel not only will have to become a source of genuine assistance, but its policies will also have to commensurate with the aspirations of the Afro-Asian people. Israel's alliance with the Western colonial powers is likely to give the image that Israel is working for the colonialsists only. In that case, these Afro-Asian countries would go for Israeli assistance alright, but they would all the same suspect Israel and consider its help as a temporary phenomenon.
Israel must identify itself with the aspirations of the Afro-Asian peoples. National liberation, struggle against racial discrimination, etc. are aspirations dear to the hearts of the Afro-Asians. We, of course, have observed a gradual tendency in Israel to adjust its foreign policy with these aspirations; and that is a positive approach. At the same time, Israel's own national interest requires that Israel takes not of the following fact: The Afro-Asian countries have been trying to solve the burning problem of the minorities of various types in their countries by working towards a secular, pluralistic society. Israel, on the other hand, insists that she is a "Jewish State" and that the 'Jewishness' of the State must be preserved. This contradiction in approach is only too obvious to the Afro-Asians. On the other hand, it is also understandable why the Afro-Asian states have gradually been sympathetic to the Palestinians: The Palestinians speak for the creation of a multi-racial, multi-religious, democratic, secular State.

Moreover, Israel should be very careful about the relations that exist between the former metropolitan powers and the newly independent countries of Afro-Asia. France generally maintains close and cordial
relations with its former colonies. These countries are dependent on France economically and French cultural influence in these countries is very easily discernible. Not so is the case with the British or other colonial powers. Moreover, these relations depend very much on how these countries attained independence, i.e., whether they attained independence through mass struggle or they were just granted independence by the colonial powers. We have talked about the "Brazzaville group", the "Monrovia group" and the "Casablanca group". These groups further represent the "moderate" countries and the "radical" countries of Africa. Because of the changing international political situation and inter-African relations, it would be good for Israel's national interest if it does not try to identify itself with any particular group among the African states nor should it take it for granted that friendly relations with any of these metropolitan countries would automatically result in good relations with the former colonized countries. After all, there have been clashes of interests between these powers and Israel. The fact is that, in spite of the close relations with the metropolitan countries, the general process of evolution itself ultimately will result in these countries' trying to
strengthen their own ability to maintain themselves and to develop. Taking these factors into consideration, it would be proper for Israel not to prefer ties to one country over those of another. Israel should present itself in Africa as a force acting in its own right and in its own name. Its motivation for co-operation should be presented as that of a country which desires solidarity with the aspirations of these countries. It will be a irreparable setback to its national interest if its image turns out to be a country which is an ally or representative of any other power; because, as we have said above, from the Israeli point of view, this relation of co-operation is important primarily for the potentiality it holds to allow the Africans to evaluate Israel from its constructive co-operation and not through the image somebody else presents about it.

Israel should also realize that like it has its own national interests, these Afro-Asian countries also have their own national interests and these national interests may put some Afro-Asian countries in the hostile Arab camp. Some such state might consider Arab support in some Afro-Asian issue very important and crucial. Consequently, to gain such support, they have every reason to put friendship with Israel on a very low priority. The radical African states form their image of Israel
according to its political position, by whether they consider that Israel is lending support to the militant forces of Afro-Asia or has taken no side or even the opposing side when matters come to a head between an Afro-Asian state and imperialist or colonialist factors. These different situations of the African countries Israel will have to take into consideration and act accordingly.

This study cannot provide a definite answer to the question of the future relationship of Israel to the Third World in Africa and Asia. Israel's relations with the United States and its perception of the serious and patent dangers from its Arab neighbours, do not dispose the Israeli decision-makers to fashion their foreign policy thinking with the kind of imagination which has shaped the dialogue between political strategy and social ethics in the Third World. The limited agreements between Israel and Third World countries could not play a preponderant role in adapting Israeli foreign policy to the changing realities of the world situation. Israel's Third World "doctrine" never constituted a radical departure from the pragmatic Israeli calculus of "limited war". Israeli domestic considerations do not conspicuously contribute to create action in the immediately foreseeable future for re-opening questions about the existing security system. This study has, however, illustrated some of the problems where the prospects for positive developments have been retarded through a narrow-eyed scrutiny by Israelis who have only learnt "how to live with conflict".
The following conclusions may be drawn for the purposes of formulating general guidelines for Israeli policy for reaching greater political understanding with Afro-Asian nations if military technology and strategy are not to become substitutes for long-term diplomatic effort:

(1) Israel's "readiness to go to war" only emphasizes the limits of diplomacy to the Western world when it deals with the Arab-Israeli conflict. Political judgement and diplomacy in the Afro-Asian world attaches less importance to purely military aspects of international problems. To the extent to which ideas of "negotiations" and "peaceful settlement" gain ground over the ideology of "strategic frontiers" among Israeli policy-makers, this would tend to strengthen the fabric of reciprocal confidence between Israel and the Third World.

(2) It is obvious that the conceptual elaboration of non-alignment leads Afro-Asians to see a fundamental clash between the United States guarantee to Israel's independence and the strengthening of American and Soviet self-restraint which non-aligned countries have been seeking. A greater sense of discrimination and discretion in securing American commitments would help highlight the positive character of Israeli policies to the Third World.

(3) It has been psychologically difficult for the Israelis to avoid being labelled as belonging to the United States constellation. Many developing countries have been attracted to the Israeli economic model. There can be little doubt that Israel can develop stable and productive relations
with developing countries by avoiding direct involvement in the American-Soviet ideological rivalry.

(4) Israel has tended to exaggerate the deficiencies of the United Nations system and has thus gone against the trend in the Afro-Asian countries which look upon the UN as a source of protection against great power interventionism. To develop greater community of thought with the Third World countries, Israel could choose not to proclaim its rejection of moral obligation to the UN system and consider long term strategies which recognize the position of the UN in political, security and economic matters.

(5) No long-term economic or development aid relationships can be created unless these are put on a self-sustaining basis. Israel’s political maturity will be demonstrated if such economic relationships with Third World countries are not perceived as passing phenomena relayed to winning support against the Arabs but as comprehensive programmes which are not vulnerable to manipulation.

In the last analysis, when the whole question of the role of military power in Israel’s foreign relations is seriously reviewed in favour of broader horizons, new possibilities may open up for Israel in the Third World. The present ambiguities in the Israeli conception of Third World policy only underline the need for wiser actions and new initiatives.