CHAPTER IX
We have discussed, in the preceding chapters, the various aspects of Israel's relations with the Third World. We have further discussed the attitude of the Third World towards Israel as expressed in various regional and international forums. An attempt will be made in this chapter to discuss analytically the pattern that has emerged out of our discussion in those chapters. Since our discussion will be based on our findings in these chapters, some amount of repetition will perhaps be inescapable.

The objectives of any nation's foreign policy are two-fold: (1) To safeguard the security and ultimately the existence of the State, and (2) to promote the welfare of the nation and its citizens.\(^1\) This is also true of Israel, but with a difference: the very legitimacy of its existence as a State was being challenged\(^2\) so that security meant securing survival.

\(^1\) M. Margaret Bell and Hugh B. Killough, *International Relations* (London, 1966), p. 121.

\(^2\) In an article published in *The Times of India* on 20 June 1967 the well-known historian, Dr. Arnold Toynbee, expressed his views after giving historical data.

"My point of view, as a British Westerner, By 1948, the Palestinian Arabs had been the inhabitants of Palestine for more than 1300 years. This length of time has given them a prescriptive right to continue to live in Palestine"
survival in the face of that challenge. Economic capability also, thus became a corollary of survival, on the argument that an economically weak and dependent state could easily succumb to renewed hostilities or to other pressures. Thus, every aspect of Israeli life, directly or indirectly, relates to the central concern for national survival and security, and is dominated by it. This state of affairs has prevailed since the day the State of Israel was born - when its declaration of independence was greeted by an invasion of hostile Arab armies - determined to its destruction. The three major Arab-Israeli wars during the period from 1948 to 1968 have left Israel victorious; but no peace has yet been won.

During the early years after Independence, Israel decided that it would be to the best of its interest if it followed a strictly neutral course between the two world blocs. As a matter of fact, Israel's independence and legitimacy (admission to the UN) could be possible because of a unique "co-operation" between the USA and the USSR. Even Soviet-bloc military aid was available to Israel in the early years.\(^3\) It was thus only

logical that Israel would seek to adopt a neutral attitude in the Cold War in order to retain the support of both sides. It is very true that Israel needed economic aid from the West, was dependant on the support from the Jews of the West, was happy to call itself a Western-type of democracy - but all the same, it thought it would be to its national interest to avoid an all-out identification with the Western camp. Israel had stupendous internal problems - not to speak of the defence problem. There was thus little inclination to get involved in the ideological conflict between free world-democracy and Communism. Further, "with the United States applying strong pressure for concessions to the Arabs, the Soviet Union might be needed as a counterweight.\(^4\) Thus, a policy of non-identification was accepted as the best policy to follow.

But, Israel was soon to learn that "lack of commitment in the cold war was permitted only to the self-reliant, the secure, or to those who were being wooed by both sides. Israel was none of those."\(^5\) Further, "if you are not with us, you are against us" attitude of the Americans with the outbreak of the Korean war, and the gradual Soviet espousal of the Arab cause virtually brought to an end the policy of non-identification.

This has been beautifully portrayed by Michael Comay, a senior Foreign Ministry official:

> Even if our non-identification policy was more flexible than the formal neutrality of Switzerland

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\(^5\) Ibid., p. 40.
or the neutralism of a country like India, it became increasingly difficult to steer the small craft in stormy seas. The Korean war (on which Israel took a clear pro-UN stand), the changes in the Soviet attitude towards us, our economic difficulties, the search for physical security, our way of life which made Israel a natural part of the free world - these were amongst the influences which produced a shift towards the West - a shift which has recently become more defined, with the breaking off of relations by Russia.

Further, the situation in the Middle East continued to change. The Czech Arms Deal with Egypt in 1955, made the Israelis feel that the arms balance has been tipped in favour of the Arabs. Further, for the containment of Communism, America came out with a series of pacts like the NATO, the Baghdad Pact etc. Israel made every effort to get into one of those alliances, but none of these efforts met with any success. Furthermore, Israeli requests for armaments from the Western countries met with similar fate. Israelis had to decide to "make it (arms) at home".

Thus, Israel's initial hope of non-identification got shattered. It got alienated from the Soviet Union, and consequently, from the Eastern bloc countries also. Further, in spite of its best efforts it could not get into any Western military


9. For a vivid and interesting description see ibid., pp. 36-108.
alliance or pact and up to 1956 it was not able to get arms from any Western source (military aid from France started in 1956). 10

Up to this period, as is evident from our analysis in the foregoing chapters, we find that the Third World figured only marginally in the Israeli foreign policy. All of Israel's diplomatic efforts were concentrated in the Western capitals; even as late as 1957, of the seven embassies that Israel maintained in the entire world, six were in Europe and North America. For the various economic, security and cultural considerations, priority had to be put on the Western countries for establishing friendly relations. Thus, the Israeli foreign policy during this period - i.e., after the failure of the policy of "non-identification" - is characterized by two factors: (1) Because of the Israeli perception of their security needs, emphasis was put on having extensive and close ties with the Western powers; and (2) corollary (also consequent) to that was the under-emphasis put on having relations with countries which were not perceived as having direct relations with Israel's security situation.

Of the Third World, Africa was yet to emerge. The two independent African countries during that period, Ethiopia and Liberia, could not attract enough attention. Liberia was a far distant country and Ethiopia had not yet given de jure recognition to Israel.

In Asia, Israel made an earnest effort to have friendly

10. See ibid., pp. 60-65.
diplomatic relations; but it could not make much headway because of its failure to have normal diplomatic relations with India.

Thus, in the mid-fifties, the scenario is this: Israel abandoned its policy of non-identification and identified itself with the West. But the West refused to take it in any of the military pacts or alliances. There was no source of supply of arms. The East started espousing the Arab cause and their attitude towards Israel became hostile. Israel lost all faith in the United Nations and came to regard it as a hypocritical and morally bankrupt institution.\[11\] In its immediate neighbourhood, all the surrounding Arab countries were hostile as before—still bent on the destruction of the State of Israel. The closure of the Suez Canal and imposition of economic blockade had put tremendous strains on its economy. And, on top of all that, the Bandung Conference of the Afro-Asian countries took place in 1955.

Any country, under such circumstances, will be compelled to reorient its policies—domestic as well as foreign. In Israel's case also, an "agonising reappraisal" of Israel's basic policies was undertaken "in order that in the future, the State's foreign policy should be geared to facts, not hopes".\[12\]

On the foreign policy level, Israel's vigorous diplomatic thrust into the Afro-Asian countries of the Third World is the direct result of this "agonising reappraisal". This is


\[12\] Jerusalem Post, 7 June 1956.
borne out by the fact that on 21 September 1956, Moshe Sharett, who had resigned from the government as the Foreign Minister, was sent on a long goodwill mission to twelve Asian countries "to create better understanding in Asia for Israel and her problems. Efforts to establish cordial diplomatic relations with African countries also started and a number of honorary and resident Israeli consuls were appointed both in independent Africa (Ethiopia and Liberia) and in territories not yet independent (Kenya and Gold Coast). In March 1957, when newly independent Ghana and Israel entered into diplomatic relations the Israeli consulate in Accra (established only in November 1956) was promoted to the rank of embassy - the first such high level Israeli representation in all of Afro-Asia.

It was never (and is never) the intention of the Israeli policy makers to de-emphasize its relations with the West or the colonial powers corresponding to its vigorous drive into Afro-Asia. That was made very clear by the policy-makers (Chapter II). As a matter of fact, the Sinai campaign took place when Sharett was on a goodwill mission to Asia. Israel never hesitated to collaborate with the two colonial powers - France and Britain during the Sinai campaign. Thus, Israel has not slackened its diplomatic efforts in the least in the Western

13. Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, Hong Kong, India, Iran, Japan, Laos, Malaya, Nepal, the Philippines and Thailand.


countries. Israel is tied with the West in too many ways to allow it the luxury of doing so. In fact, in order to enhance its bargaining position with the West, it was imperative for Israel to strengthen its international standing. An Israel with high international standing will have attentive ears in the United Nations. "A diplomatically strong Israel could hope not only to deter Arab intransigence and propaganda assaults, but also to have her own evaluation of the Middle East situation give more credence and attention during policy-formulation sessions in Washington and Moscow."16

From our inquiry (in Chapters IV and V) about Israel's relations with Asia, it becomes evident that for the attainment of Israel's major foreign policy objectives Asia played only a marginal role. In fact, Israel could never decide if she was a European country in spirit, tradition, political and economic ties, or an Asian country only because of geography.16a The Israeli policy makers knew from the day Israel came into existence (or even before) that for the survival and continuation of Israel as sovereign independent state, Israel will need military assistance, economic assistance, Jews and political support. Israel's foreign policy, as we have repeatedly stated, is largely a function of its security needs. So, procurement of arms is a major factor in its foreign policy. Israeli policy makers could see and realize that it would be absolutely unrealistic to expect arms from the Third World countries of Asia.

16. Ibid., p. 733.
16a. See Chapter II.
As a matter of fact, even during the days of "Yishuv" and Israel's struggle for national independence, whatever arms and weapons they could bring from outside was never from any Asian country. It never went into the consciousness of the Israeli policy-makers - there never was any feeling - that Asia will be able to supply arms. This contention of ours was very poignantly asserted by Ben Gurion when he said: "From the point of view of our existence and security, the friendship of one European country is more valuable than the views of all the peoples of Asia."17

As for economic assistance and co-operation with the Third World countries of Asia, Israeli policy makers could clearly see that most of these countries are recipients of foreign aid - and not donors. All of Israel's foreign economic aid came from the West - USOM and other forms of aid came from America, reparations came from Germany, gifts and donations came from the Western Diaspora Jewry - thus the entire economic aid to Israel came exclusively from the West. Israeli policy-makers further saw that trade-relations with those countries also did not hold very bright prospects (though, of course, most of the policy-makers spoke of "potentiality" of it). After all, Asian products were comparatively cheaper (because of cheap labour etc.) than the Israeli products and the Straits of Tiran was closed to Israeli shipping till 1956. And because of the competitive nature (and not of complementary) of Israeli exports


* See Chapter I, pp. 43-49, for a detailed discussion.
with the Asian exports, Israel had good reason to prefer the traditional European and American markets. Even now, Asia ranks lowest as far as foreign trade of Israel is concerned.* So, on economic considerations also, Israeli policy-makers were clear in their minds that they could not afford to give so much of attention to Asia.

As for Jews, there were only very small pockets of Jewish communities in Asia. Unlike the Jewish communities of the West, these Jews of Asia were absolutely unimportant and were, in no position to help Israel in any way - neither economically - nor politically - nor militarily - nor even in the field of propaganda. All of Israel's ties were with the Western Jewry and it is only natural that Israeli policy-makers decided to divert most of their efforts to countries where large and influential Jewish communities lived. Moreover, as for immigration, Western immigrant, with capital and technical skill, is much more attractive to Israel than an Asian one (though, normally, Israelis vehemently protest when this point is raised to them). Thus, that Asia would get a low priority with the policy-makers even in the calculation of the "Jewish factor" is only understandable.

Finally comes the question of political support. It is essentially for this reason that efforts were made in the early years of Israel's Statehood to have friendly relations with Asian countries. It appears that it is through the Asian states that Israel wanted to get into the world of non-aligned countries. Israeli policy-makers shrewdly calculated that if

* We have exhaustively discussed this aspect in Chapter I. see pp. 222-36.
they could identify with these Asian countries they would be able to rid themselves of the image that Israel is the creation of imperialist conspiracy - being planted in the heart of the Arab countries to serve the imperialist purposes of the West. (Moreover, the initial foreign policy posture of Israel was one of "non-identification"). For these political reasons, an attempt was made to have relations with Asia - earnestly - and the Israelis calculated that this particular foreign policy goal of theirs would work out well if they can cultivate India. But Israel was soon to realize that political support from Asian countries could not be depended on because of the various considerations that individual Asian country had to take into consideration. Thus, in case of political support also, Israeli policy-makers could not afford to give high priority to Asia.

Thus, for all these various factors the Israeli policy-makers gave Asia a low priority in their foreign policy calculations of having friendly relations with the countries of the world.

We have talked about the negative image that Asia has about Israel.* With Israel also, there were some problems because of which Israel found Asia an incomprehensible entity. Asia was far away from Israel - spiritually, religiously and politically - not to speak of geographic distance. In our second chapter we have spoken about the Israeli leaders' perception of the Third World. The fact is that all these policy-makers have either American or European background. They were not familiar

* See Chapter IV, pp. 451-61, for our analysis.
with Asian culture, religions, social organization or language. Their perception of Asia in connection with Israel's foreign policy is marginal. The same can be said of the officials of the foreign ministry. Israel's political parties also showed scant interest in Asia (Ahдут Ha-avodah's special interest in India apart). As the political parties did not show enough interest in Asia, Asia has never been a subject of intensive foreign policy discussion. The Israeli Press also, by and large, has not shown any particular interest in Asia. No Israeli newspaper has any particular interest in Asia. No Israeli newspaper has any permanent correspondent in any Asian capital. So, reports about Asian countries are inadequate. As a result, there is little public consciousness and no public debate on government's Asian policy. Consequently, there is no pressure on the policy makers of Israel on its Asian policy.

Further, there are not many Israeli intellectuals in Israel who have taken particular interest in Asia. Though the Hebrew University has pioneered in introducing Asian studies, even in institutions of higher education, interest in Asia was lacking (at least during the period under our discussion). The fact is that the image of Asia has not yet got into the consciousness of an average Israeli.

One indicator of closeness and importance put in the relations between two countries is the number of mutual visits by the leaders of the countries. Every second day there is an Israeli leader (including the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister) going to the West. Not so is the case with regard
to Asia. These visits are few and far between. Prime Minister Ben Gurion went to Burma in 1961; Foreign Minister Mrs. Meir went on a tour of couple of Asian countries in 1962; President Shazar went to Nepal in 1966, and Foreign Minister Eban went on a tour of a few Asian and Far Eastern countries in 1967. The number of visits are obviously not very impressive.

Thus, there has always been a tendency on the part of the policy makers in Israel to put a low-priority to Israel's relations with Asia. The overall situation has not changed in 1968. Further, the Israelis are still estranged from a majority of the peoples of Asia. The Muslim countries like Afghanistan, Pakistan, Malaysia and Indonesia are more or less closed to Israel and the Communist world of People's Republic of China, North Korea, North Vietnam have no relations with Israel. On international level, they are either hostile or indifferent to Israel. As a result, Israel has been put to an awkward position because of its inability to communicate with the large mass of humanity represented by the Muslim and the Communist worlds of Asia.

Accepting this low-priority accorded to Asia for various reasons as a fact, it must also be said in fairness to Israel that it has constantly been striving to develop friendly relations with Asia. Its constant endeavour to establish diplomatic relations with India is a case in point. Of course, it has been maintained that Israel missed an opportunity to establish diplomatic relations with India by insisting on the "principle" of reciprocity. 18

At one stage India was prepared to discuss the opening of an Israeli legation in New Delhi. Sharett's insistence was that India should reciprocate by opening similar diplomatic mission in Israel. India ultimately declined to establish diplomatic relations with Israel. Israel does not have an embassy in New Delhi to this day. An opportunity, thus, seems to have been missed. Whatever the merit of that episode, the Government of India has thought it proper to have no diplomatic relations with Israel. Israel has not given up and has still been continuing the efforts in the fond hope that one day relations would improve. For this reason Israel has used its information efforts to mould public opinion in India. Moreover, it has extended invitations to many prominent personalities in India so that their opinion about Israel may mould public opinion. As a matter of fact, Indian Press has often been critical about India's policy towards Israel.

Israel's diplomacy has been successful on another aspect also. Israel's friendship with Burma developed when Burma was under the leadership of U Nu. Israel's relation with Burma was identified with U Nu. Similar was the case with Nepal. Israel's relations with Nepal started with B.P. Koirala's initiative. But both U Nu and B.P. Koirala were

19. However, Y. Shimoni, Deputy Director General, in the Ministry of External Affairs, who is in charge of the Asian and African Department, told this writer in an interview in early June 1972, that the contention that Moshe Sharett insisted on reciprocity is "not true". He emphatically maintained that "Mr Brecher is not correct on this point."
custed from power. In spite of that, Israel managed to continue its co-operation with these countries successfully.

Israel's contact with Burma initially started because both the countries found a common language of communication - socialism. Further, it was the period when Ben Gurion talked of "light unto nations" concept. But that phase is now gone. Israel's relations with the Asian countries are based now on political, economic and military considerations and Israel's national interest. Ideology is no hurdle. Israel is not bothered about the form of government so long the government is willing to co-operate with Israel. Moreover, the Israeli policy-makers have been aware of the necessity to know about Asia and let the Asians know about Israel. Thus Foreign Minister Abba Eben speaking on the opening ceremony of the Council for Israel-Asia Friendship (23 January 1967) said that he believed that the Council should undertake a two-fold task: to seek to "deliver the Asian nations from their strangelness to Judeo-Hebraic culture" and to disseminate knowledge of Asian culture among the broad masses of Israelis — specially by "giving an Asian dimension to Israeli education".  20

As for Africa, by 1966 itself, Israel was represented in all of sub-Saharan Africa, except Mauritania and Somalia both of which have strong Pan-Moslem and Pan-Arab sentiments.

In 1968, now, Israel holds a very strong position - economic and political - in West Africa - the core of which is the Ivory Coast, but which extends to Dahomey, Niger, Ghana and Sierra Leone. In East Africa, the Israeli involvement is even more evident, specially in countries like Uganda, Ethiopia and Kenya - in spite of cyclical ups and downs. Perhaps right in 1968, the place in which Israeli prestige is highest - though not necessarily most secure - is Congo (Kinshasa).

The fact is that when Israel was singled out at the Bandung Conference for condemnation in 1955, most of the African states were not even born. It was understandable, therefore, that the Government of Israel should try to establish friendly relations with the peoples of that continent, specially after the 1956 Suez crisis, which had identified Israel with dying French and British imperialism. Thus, from 1957 to 1962 there was intense activity on the part of Israel to establish friendly relations with these countries. Israel's earliest success in Ghana tremenously encouraged the Israeli policy makers and consequently efforts in Africa were put to a high gear. It * sometimes so happened that "Israeli ambassadors-to-be arrived in African capitals to present their letters of accreditation immediately following the representative of the ex-colonial power, thus acquiring at one stroke a measure of protocol priority and a ground swell of gratitude and goodwill for the prompt action".21 The fact is that, Africa also responded to

* Checked and found correct.
Israeli initiative quite heartily.

Here in Africa, unlike in Asia, there was no emotional predisposition. The sympathy of the Asian leaders during the nationalist movements was always with the Arabs of Palestine. But in the case of Africans, some of them had no previous contacts with either the Arabs or the Jews. Those who knew the Arabs, knew them more for the slave-trade than anything else. Thus Israeli initiative and African encouraging response resulted in an extensive Israeli "presence" in all of sub-Saharan Africa. African Heads of State started visiting Israel - in 1960-61 itself seven such visits took place. On Israel's part, Israel's Foreign Minister Mrs Golda Meir made her first trip to Africa in 1958 and by 1965 she had made four such trips. Israeli President Ben-Zvi also made a trip to five African countries in 1962 and Israel's Prime Minister Eshkol went on a tour of seven African countries in 1966. Thus all out efforts were made to establish an Israeli "presence" in Africa.

But it must be borne in mind that though Israel has extensive relations with almost all the sub-Saharan countries, Israeli assistance in individual African countries is on a very small scale. After all, there are many other countries

22. "When an Arab delegate complained of a "sell out" the Ivory Coast's Ambassador Arsene Usher reminded him of the Arab slave trade: "The representative of Saudi Arabia may be used to buying Negroes, but he can never buy us."

Who have simultaneously been assisting these African countries and, African students in large numbers have gone to many other countries for training, higher education etc. From our description above (Chapter VI) one is apt to get the impression that Israeli assistance constitutes an important contribution to the development of the African states. But, in fact, in the huge field of awakening Africa, Israeli assistance is not of considerable dimension. "On the very day that a dozen Kenyan trainees came back from Israel, about a hundred others left on their way to Bulgaria. A week earlier a similar group left for Holland, and the following week saw the departure of even bigger groups to various centres all over the globe."23 Similar is the case with Israeli aid. Israeli aid represents only 0.05 per cent of the total aid received by Black Africa. But, as discussed in Chapter III, Israel enters into commitments on technical aid, and exchanges experts, accepts trainees and also concludes financial and trade agreements. Thirty-two out of thirty eight tropical African countries concluded agreements of technical assistance over the period 1961-68.

Israel was thus one of the first countries which was willing to extend this kind of help to the African

countries in the last leg of the colonial rule - prior to these countries' independence. Israel's position was absolutely clear. And it could convince the African countries of its intentions. Israel's assistance is motivated by goodwill - it is the goodwill of a country which attained independence only recently and which intends to help other young countries to develop from the experience it gained in the process of its own development. After all, Israel is a small country lacking both the might and will to reign over other countries - hence no danger of colonialism nor will the Israeli help put these countries under any obligations. The African countries accepted Israel's offer of "goodwill" with open arms - the Israel-African relations started. But was it only "goodwill" that motivated Israel's efforts to establish friendly relations with the Afro-Asian countries?

Let us probe into Israel's policy goals in the Third World.

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24. "Israel's assistance entails no commitments of a political nature. It is available to any country that is willing to accept it in a spirit of mutual comprehension and on the basis of friendly relations." Yaacov Yenney, "Technical Cooperation Between Israel and the Developing World", International Developing Review, September 1964, p. 15.
From the early 60s (and all throughout the period of our discussion) the Afro-Asia has become important in the United Nations and in the general international political arena, both quantitatively and qualitatively. The Israeli-policy makers were aware of the growing importance of these countries and could feel that it is vital for Israel’s "national interest" to identify it with these countries. The Bandung Conference of 1955 brought this home to Israel with a bang. Thus, one of the prime considerations propelling Israel to establish friendly relations with these countries was Israel’s fear of total isolation. This fear created the need for supplementary bases of support. In this context, the urgent and immediate goal is to win support in the thorny problem of its conflict with the Arabs. Thus the basic motivation of Israel’s foreign policy - that is of survival - is extended to the Third World. Under such circumstances, any Israeli diplomatic achievement in the Third World would correspondingly neutralize or eliminate a potential source of support for the Arabs. In this case, the minimal goal for Israel would be to attain a Third World neutrality with regard to the dispute and its many complex issues, that is,

25. See Chapter VI.
voting on the merit of each issue. For this very reason, even a small state like Togo acquires major importance in the calculations of Israeli policy makers. The Israeli policy-makers' all out efforts in Afro-Asia is further motivated by a higher aim which could technically be called a "pro-Israel neutralism". In this case, Israel would want of the Afro-Asian countries to look favourably at the Israeli actions and aspirations. Israeli Government would obviously be happy if they can gain full Afro-Asian support in their dispute against the Arabs; but their initial experience with India have made them practical enough not to have such utopian dreams. Their efforts would continue but a pro-Israel neutralism is the situation that they can expect most under the circumstances. Thus, the Arab-factor is the most dominating factor in Israel's relations with the Afro-Asia. The Arabs, as we have seen, have some psychological advantages in Asia; and they have exploited them to the fullest extent. To "win over" Asia has been tremendously difficult for Israel. In Africa the Israeli technical assistance has established Israel's "presence"; but Arab propaganda and their efforts to cultivate the friendship of African leaders have made Israel's task difficult and correspondingly more important.

But on a practical level what actually we have seen is that Israeli policy makers are making an effort to focus Third World attention on the solution of the Arab-Israeli dispute from the Israeli point of view. Given the options, these countries would prefer to keep away from the Arab-Israeli dispute. And the countries with whom Israel is trying to have friendly
relations, have good relations with the Arabs also, by and large. Thus, the Israeli policy makers perceived those Third World countries as a potential force which will provide moral backing to create an atmosphere by which the two parties to the dispute will be able to have direct negotiations. And, from the Israeli point of view, direct negotiations is the first step towards permanent peace and the Israelis want the process to start with direct negotiations. As a matter of fact, there were quite a few individual proposals showing inclination to mediate in the Arab-Israeli dispute.

The Israelis maintain that the African continent is part of the "second ring" of countries around Israel (the first ring is the Arab states). A further peripheral "ring" would again be the Afro-Asian states. The Israeli policy makers calculated that if the Arabs could be encircled with countries sympathetic and favourable to Israel, a tremendous psychological pressure could be put on the Arabs. The fact is that Israel has been extending the hand of friendship to the Arab countries and assuring them of Israel's technical assistance whereas the Arabs have tried to portray Israel as a "tool of imperialism" or as neo-colonialists etc.

Now, the idea is, if Israel can establish friendly relations with these countries and are "accepted" by them, the Arabs would not be able to persuade these countries to look at Israel in the light of the Arabs' way of thinking; on the
contrary, the Arabs might eventually adjust themselves to these countries' thinking about Israel. Thus, friendship with Afro-Asia is an outflanking manoeuvre to win over the Arab mind.

These policy goals in the political-diplomatic level apart, Israeli policy makers could not possibly have overlooked the value and importance of commercial and economic relations with Asian and African states. The Israelis saw that the opening of the Gulf of Aqaba opened up bright possibilities of trade relations with these countries. They perceived that if the Afro-Asian market and raw materials can be exploited, the Arab economic boycott will be weakened. Thus, the Israeli policy in Afro-Asia in this context, in the idea of climbing over the Arab "fence" around Israel and acquiring friendship, sympathy and economic ties with states beyond the cordon of hostile Arab neighbours. Thus, the goal could be described as "the ultimate isolation of the Arab besiegers by a belt of States lying beyond the 'corden sanitaire' among whom Israel will find not only partners but friends and allies."26

This necessarily leads us to discuss the strategic factor the Israeli policy makers had to take into consideration:

Much of Israeli strategic concern with Africa stems from the vital economic importance of the Red Sea area. The fact is, though the Suez Canal remained closed to Israeli shipping, the gulf of Aqaba linked Israel with Asia and East Africa no less effectively. So, a cardinal principle that has characterized Israeli diplomacy since the post Sinai period is to keep this route open to international shipping.  

Enhancement of Israel's status in the eyes of the West was Israel's another policy goal in the Third World. This was explicitly stated by Ben-Gurion as early as 1960: "All these things redound to Israel's honour in Europe and America." The West would tend to look at Israel as a diplomatic liability if Israel were isolated. Israeli policy makers thought that friendly relations with Afro-Asia held the key to attain this goal. One prominent author has put the position like this:

If there is any realistic motive in Israel's programme of foreign aid, it is probably to be found in the hope that it will draw tangible rewards from the United States by serving, coincidentally with her own interests, the same objects that that country seeks to promote through its aid programme.  

27. It may be maintained that the Six-Day War of June 1967 was precipitated precisely because of the fact that Egypt challenged the international character of this water-way.  


Apart from these "national interests", the element of altruism was also there in Israel's desire to have friendly relations with the Third World. Manchester Guardian put it very pointedly: "Israel's policy towards Black Africa should perhaps be seen in wider terms and should be recognized to be not just part of its defence line against the Arab world, but also of a genuine desire to be of help. Africans respond because they recognize this." The sense of mission--this "genuine desire to be of help" is the messianic factor--the "spiritual" component in Israel's policy towards the Third World. It is a desire to share achievements and experience with less fortunate peoples. This "messianic" element is deeply embedded in Israel's national consciousness and affect--though not possible to measure to what extent--the formulation of Israel's foreign policy. In Israel's relations with the Third World it definitely was a factor as is evident by the fact that almost all the policy makers stressed this point (Chapter II). Moreover, that this factor is embedded in Israel's national consciousness may possibly be inferred from the fact that normally in debates about the technical co-operation with the Third World, a remarkable unanimity among the various political parties of Israel is discernible.

30. For an exhaustive analysis of this factor in Israel's Foreign Policy, see Samuel Decalo, Messianic Influences in Israeli Foreign Policy, Occasional Papers in Political Science, no. 2, University of Rhode Island, 1967.

On a narrower level, it also is true that Afro-Asia opens up an outlet for Israeli energies. After the Sinai campaign, when the immediate threat to the survival of Israel abated to a great extent, Israel could devote some of its means and energies to diplomatic activities that bore no immediate relevance to security. Israel had surplus technical know-how. So far it was always on the receiving end. Since the state was established and the immediate threat to security had abated to a certain extent, psychologically it had the urge to show that it also could be of some help to somebody. Africa thus was a challenge to Israel.

The basic idea is that Israel has to have some sort of "presence" in the Third World countries so that those countries can see Israel not through the eyes of somebody else. After all, three or four instructors in some small project in some remote African country cannot influence the policy of that government. But the fact that Israel exists with its programme of some technical assistance - however modest that might be - will make those countries take interest in Israel and may be, it would put Israel in the map of Africa in a favourable light. Moreover, Israel has been likened to the crusaders and it has been attempted to create an impression that Israel is a temporary phenomenon in the
Middle East. If Israel can establish some sort of "presence" in the Afro-Asian countries, it would be able to persuade those countries that Israel is a permanent entity in the Middle East and it should be accepted like that. And Israel's own hope was summed up by one of its top diplomats: "If all the Asian and African states had normal relations with Israel, the Arabs would start reconciling themselves to the facts of international life." Thus, these are the various policy goals of Israel in the Third World.

It has been maintained that Israeli co-operation with the African countries has no intention of competing with that of the Great Powers and as a matter of fact, Israeli assistance was not resented by the former colonial powers, by and large, though there were a few instances of some conflicts also.

32. "There is one Arab nation which lives on a territory stretching from the Arab (Persian) Gulf to the Atlantic Ocean and numbers 100 million souls. The unity of this nation is not a subject for debate... At the heart of this nation a foreign unit has been formed in the shape of a sharp-angled triangle... this triangle separates the eastern Arab territory and peoples from the western Arab territory and peoples... In this way, Israel's geographic location forms an artificial island... in the midst of the Arab Ocean. This situation cannot persist no matter what extraordinary resources are supplied. The waves on both will continue to beat against this artificial island and in the course of time will wear it down until it breaks and falls apart and is swept away in the might expense of the ocean."

H. Beikal, editor of the Cairo Daily, Al-Ahram. For English translation of the editorial, see New Outlook (Tel Aviv), vol. 10, no. 3, November 1967, pp. 52-56.


34. Interview with the officials in the Israeli Foreign Ministry in January 1972.
Because of close French-Israeli relations, prior to 1967, any difference between these two countries in Africa was amicably settled. But, there were clashes of interest even so early as 1958-59 with the British in Ghana. That was in connection with the economic, political and military implications of the Israeli-staffed aviation school. Moreover, it is also stated that the United States tried to prevent the training of Congolese para-troopers in Israel in 1964-65. But, by and large, the Western aid giving powers have taken a favourable attitude towards Israel and some countries (Dutch) have shown interest in co-operating with Israel in extending aid to these countries.

On the other hand, the Eastern bloc countries - Soviet Russia and China - have very sharply criticized Israel's programme of co-operation in Africa. Soviet Russia started this attack on Israel as early as 1960. The Soviet paper Izvestia came out with the following statement on 12 December 1960:

"Peoples freed from colonialism cannot help but feel extreme distrust of Israel, playing the part of a Trojan horse of the oppressive forces of imperialism". Further in October 1961, International Affairs (Moscow) came out with an article

35. Ibid.
entitled "Israel's Perilous Course" in which the writer V. Nikolayev very bluntly accused Israel:

The Israeli Government has undertaken to play the Trojan horse for imperialism in Asia and Africa, and is trying to sidetrack these nations struggling for independence. The colonial powers are using Israel as a tool to retain the levers of economic and political influence in Asia and Africa. Israel's rulers are doing their best to play this part. 36

Nikolayev, as is apparent, has taken the Isvestia line and at the same time, he came out with specific branches of the co-operation programme to show how Israel is playing the "Trojan horse" role. The Afro-Asian Institute of Labour Studies was vehemently criticized for teaching "American neo-colonialist theories" and for being "anti-Communist". The joint economic ventures were considered as "the time tested colonial path of setting up mixed companies." 37 Further, it was maintained that since American interests were the principal stock-holders in the Israeli companies, colonialism was a guaranteed

36. V. Nikolayev, "Israel's Perilous Course", International Affairs (Moscow), October 1961, p. 78.
37. Ibid., p. 79.
motive. Nikolayev further maintained that in spite of Israel's chronic foreign trade deficit, it is showing willingness to extend technical assistance, specialists and even some loans and credits to the African states; this necessity proves that "US monopolies openly finance every move of the Israeli rulers to penetrate into Africa". As an instance he mentions the Afro-Asian Institute which "is to receive $180,000 a year from American trade unions" to carry out its above mentioned tasks.

An extensive discussion on the Arab-Israeli dispute is not within the scope of our thesis. Thus, we would not talk here about Arab-Israeli rivalry in Afro-Asia in the field of technical assistance and co-operation. We just want to mention that there have been meticulous efforts on the parts of the Arabs to block the expansion of Israeli influence in Afro-Asia. As early as September 1960, the Arab League decided to increase the number of Egyptian economic missions to Africa and to appeal to the Muslim population of the African states for Muslim unity as part of a general intensification of its political activities in Africa. Thus, Islam has also been used as an instrument against

38. Ibid.

39. Israel replied to these charges in an Israeli broadcast to Africa in English, French and Swahili. The Israeli radio said: "And here it would not be out of the way to ask Izvestia if Russia would refuse to supply arms to the African countries if it had the opportunity of doing so. Izvestia accuses Israel of trying to impose a new form of colonialism on Africa. There is more than one kind of colonialism. There is the colonialism that is on the way out. And there is a new, more sinister kind of colonialism which sends occupying armies into its neighbours' territories. To put Israel into this category is simply indiscrimate." The New York Times, 14 December 1960.

I are. The sixth World Moslem Conference, meeting in Mogadiscio in 1964, proclaimed that henceforth, Islamic preaching all over the world would include talk on "the danger of Israel" and the need to unite against "Zionism". The Arabs in general and Egypt in particular has taken care to see that all Israeli activities are closely kept under watch. In the words of Remba:

The Cairo Government is reported to have appointed a special official to direct the anti-Israel offensive in Africa and instruct its commercial attaches throughout Africa to keep a close watch on purchases of Israeli goods and if possible, to head off such buying by offering Egyptian and Syrian products at lower prices.

Thus, sometimes it so happens that for every Israeli Ambassador abroad, there are as many as thirteen Arab Ambassadors making efforts to see that the Israeli influence is not allowed to expand. The Arab League has been an influential mission for Arab propaganda. In India, it was awarded diplomatic status in 1966. The Arab League has been engaged in anti-Israeli propaganda in its own way. In July 1963, it stated:

The free African world has in recent times awakened to the danger it is facing from Israel and has been taking precautions to protect itself. The danger lurks under the glittering surface of "trade and aid" offered by Israel to some emerging African states during the last few years. Tel-Aviv's offers have been in reality, a facade for neo-colonialism trying to sneak into Africa

41. See Oded Remba, "Israel's Aid Program in Africa and Asia", KIDSTREAM, vol. 7, no. 2, p. 16.
Having talked about these criticisms, it will now be only proper for us to discuss Israel's policy towards the questions like colonialism, racialism etc., which are crucial factors common to the Third World countries.

In our survey on Israel-Africa relations (Chapter VI) we had noted that during Premier Eshkol’s visit to Africa in May-June 1966, he had identified Israel with the aspirations of the African countries in all the communiques that he put his signature to. That was in 1966. But prior to that, more specifically, prior to 1962, Israel had opposed the Afro-Asians on these questions which had dominated Afro-Asian thought and feeling. We have discussed earlier (Chapter IV) how the Zionists had joined hands with the colonialist powers and had prevented the Arabs from applying the principle of self-determination, all throughout the 1920s and 1930s. Even in 1952, when the UN General Assembly adopted the resolution supporting the principle of self-determination, Israel abstained. But the most glaring example of Israel’s collaboration with the colonialist powers against a Third World country, was the Suez War of 1956. After the publication of Ben Gurion’s official biography entitled "The Armed Prophet" by Bar Zohar, it has now become known to everybody that

42. Arab League Press and Information Department (Cairo), "Israel and Africa", no. 176, 31 July 1963, p. 1.
without Israeli military collaboration, France and Britain would not have attacked. Bar Zohar says: "He (Ben Gurion) was in a very strong position; it depended on him, on his decision, whether or not there would be a Suez War, and so he could dictate his conditions." Thus, with the collaboration of Israel, Britain and France attacked Egypt, in October/November 1956. And, to a very large extent, because of very vocal and vigorous protests from the Third World countries, this tripartite plot failed to wrest control of the Suez Canal from Egypt. Thus, Afro-Asia found Israel on the opposite side of the fence - colliding with or rather actually drawing in two European powers to attack an Afro-Asian country. This stand of Israel - i.e. of supporting the colonial powers against a Third World country - goes as far back as 1949.

The Indonesian struggle against the Dutch was the first big problem of decolonisation the UN had to face. Nehru called a Special Asian Conference in Delhi in January 1949, to consider the issue - so vital was it for the Asians! But, because of "the traditionally good relations between the Dutch and the Jewish people and the valiant record of the Dutch during the Second World War when many of them helped Jews at the risk of their very lives...Israel preferred to abstain from participating in the ceremonious debate on the Indonesian problem," Israel also abstained on the Afro-

44. See Chapter V, p.
Asian resolution supporting Indonesia on West Irian. 45

Then again in 1961, an Afro-Asian resolution called for the democratic procedure of one-man-one-vote to be applied to Southern Rhodesia. Israel abstained. Moreover, Israel voted against all the resolutions that were introduced by Afro-Asia giving support to the liberation movements in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. It is true that France at that time was Israel's principal supplier of arms; but the fact remains that Israel voted against the Afro-Asian aspirations. Similarly, on the Afro-Asian resolutions demanding the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, the suspension of nuclear tests and the demilitarization of Africa, Israel abstained from voting.

And, in case of South Africa's apartheid policy, Israel abstained for long 12 years from condemning South Africa and even when she did so in 1961, she has not been adhering to the UN embargo on trade with that country as is clear from the fact that El Al, the Israeli Air Lines flies into South Africa and most of the diamonds for Israel's diamond cutting industry comes from South Africa (and cut and polished diamonds comprise no less than two fifths of Israel's total exports). 46 Thus, from the pattern of Israeli voting in the United Nations on every major international question in which the Afro-Asians are concerned, it is clear from

45. Ibid.

46. Statistical Abstract of Israel, Table 1/4, annual.
the above that Israel has voted against the Afro-Asians at least up to 1962.

Though attempts have been made to explain this attitude out by saying that "Israel's African friends must understand that just as they must sometimes disregard our interests, we must sometimes also vote against them because of matters of vital importance to us" (in an obvious reference to Israel's voting with France on colonial issues of intrinsically French interest), the fact remains that Israeli solidarity with Afro-Asian aspirations was sacrificed to safeguard Israel's strong links with Europe and the interests of Jewish communities in the Diaspora. And this discord of fundamentals threw suspicion on Israel's aid programme and deprived Israel of any solid basis of friendship with Afro-Asia.

Now, what we found above, necessarily leads us to probe into a particular phenomenon that was observed in our study of the relations between Israel and some Afro-Asian countries: Normal relations - sometimes close - develop between Israel and some particular countries and, almost all on a sudden, this relationship takes a turn adverse to Israel. It is true that there are always ups and downs in

47. See Middle East Record, The Reuven Shiloah Research Centre, Tel-Aviv University, vols. 1 and 2, 1960, Gl.
49. See Chapters V and VI.
the relations between two countries. But the pattern of phenomenon we are referring to is something like this: The process begins with an initial period of very busy and extremely cordial relations between Israel and the second country. Such friendly relations continue for a couple of years; then there comes a time when the Afro-Asian government draws back. Ultimately, the relations remain at a purely formal level even though there may not be any open breach. During the period of our discussion (till 1968) the countries which had this pattern of relations with Israel are Burma, Ceylon, Ghana, Guinea Tzananzia and Turkey. A couple of reasons account for this phenomenon. But the basic one is to be found in the nature of Israeli approach to her relations with the Afro-Asian countries. We have stated above that "the urgent and immediate goal is to win support in the thorny problem of its conflict with the Arabs". Very obviously this is a negative approach, and it is only natural that relations based on such negative approach do not last long. The fact is, because of the politico-psychological necessity of escaping from isolation, Israel, over anxious to find openings in the Third World, swarms into any country, with a host of aid projects, at the first opportunity. This has tended to give the recipient country the impression that they are being taken over by foreigners telling them what should be done and what should be regarded as their own interest! On the other hand, such aid programme also gives a distorted
picture to the Israelis at home that their aid is the main—
or even sole-prop of certain Afro-Asian countries. This is
very naturally resented by the recipient country when they
come to hear of it. Thus, paradoxically, the very
effusiveness with which Israel offers her aid results in the
recipient country's turning away from her. Further, the
more these countries develop in confidence and self-reliance
the more cool they become towards Israel.

Added to this basic reason, there were a few others
which contributed to this phenomenon. One such was the
growth of indigenous feeling. From our survey in Chapters
V and VI, we could see that Burma wanted to introduce 'Burmese'
socialism which ultimately worked against the link with
Israel. Similar were the cases with Ghana and Tanzania where
joint-ventures were prematurely closed down.

Further, it was also noticed in our survey that "now-
a-days to be an Afro-Asian radical or leftist, implies,
automatically, an anti-Israeli position". This was discer-
nible in the cases of Ceylon, Guinea and Burma. In these
countries, when the "cooling off" in the relations started,
the Governments were more leftist or radical and less pro-
Western than their predecessors.

51. G.H. Jansen, Zionism, Israel and Asian Nationalism
(Beirut, 1971), p. 270.
52. The Indian Government under the leadership of Mrs Gandhi
has been more anti-Israeli than it was during her father’s
period. The reason is attributed to "the increasing
radicalisation of Indian political thought and feeling".
Jansen, ibid.
And, this leads us to talk of another factor - a corollary to the above one. We have seen in Chapter I that Israel is very heavily dependant on America. Now, the perception of this association has been so deep that to be anti-America has necessarily resulted in being anti-Israeli also. Thus, it has so happened that a country, who was friendly to the US at a particular time and later turned hostile, takes a hostile attitude to Israel also, though earlier such a country had friendly relations with her (Israel). Turkey is a case in point. (Later Cambodia and Philippines also seem to have followed suit).

Now, whatever the nature of Israel's approach towards its relations with the Third World, the fact remains that in 1968, Israel has extensive relations with the Afro-Asian world. And this fact turns our attention to the question as to why these relations have been successful in the case of many Afro-Asian countries. (We have discussed exhaustively in chapters V and VI the various reasons why the Afro-Asian countries agree (or refuse) to have friendly relations with Israel).

To start with, Israel's programme of technical cooperation has been conspicuously successful. From the figures of the trainees that we have mentioned in Chapter III, it becomes very clear that for a country of Israel's size, the number is very high. Israel's success in this regard may be attributed to the facts that the Israeli experts
assigned to particular jobs, are really experts in their subjects, are hard-working, and live and work alongside the local people (unlike the experts from most other countries who maintain some sort of separateness), and accept salaries at the local rates. Consequently, the Israeli experts turns out to be a valued friend in many Afro-Asian countries and that earns a great deal of credit for his country. While accomplishing his task, the Israeli expert must quickly train his replacement, that is, an Afro-Asian capable of taking over from him. In Africa, Israel was interested in the quick Africanization of all her enterprises. This policy of rapid Africanization was welcome to the Africans and increased the demand for assistance. This assistance, even though sometimes limited in results, had a feeling of sincerity. Moreover, the Israelis seem to start from the basic assumption that all the races have the same potential. "The British will tell you" they said "that it takes anything from ten to twenty years to train a captain." "This may be true, but they could not wait that long. They wanted ships' officers trained in a year or two, as we had done. We agreed to help." Thus, in its offer of assistance and co-operation, Israel shows remarkable adroitness and an excellent sense of psychology.

53. See Chapter III.
It is maintained that "Israel's military gains, more than her achievements in Science, Industry, Agriculture... influenced the leaders of the smaller Asian (and African) countries who faced similar problems to turn to Israel". The countries referred to are all small and had border troubles with their neighbours and some of them were isolated by hostile neighbours. Since they are small states, their leaders always had the fear in their mind that they would become pawns in the Great Power struggle, but at the same time, they were not sure of the total Great Power support. Therefore, these countries had to decide on a policy of self-strengthening and reliance on their own capabilities.

In Israel's victory in the Sinai campaign, these countries saw how a small country was able to train and maintain a large powerful, mostly reserve, army. Hence the interest in Israel. Israel has provided military and police training to quite a few Afro-Asian countries. This military assistance, further, is of particular importance in Afro-Asia where the Armed Services potentially or actually are the governing authority. Thus, Israel's military assistance has been a factor in having good relations with some Afro-Asian countries.

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56. See Chapter VI.
57. See Chapter VI.
Another factor, is the bond of socialism. Israel was a very active member of the Asian Socialist Conference - and influential also. Though ultimately the Asian Socialist Conference faded away, pro-Israeli sentiments in the approach of the Asian socialists did not entirely die down. The impact of Israeli socialism was also there on the ruling parties of Kenya and Tanzania.

The Israelis are new-comers to the Afro-Asian scene. Therefore, unlike the other countries, Israel has to justify herself. After Israel's failure to establish meaningful relations with India, Israel takes no friendship for granted; and so they make an all-out effort. Sometimes even going out of their way, they make their case with diligent and unremitting energy. In short, Israel takes the trouble to make herself known. At the earliest opportunity available (discussed elaborately in Chapters V and VI), Israel establishes diplomatic missions irrespective of the size and importance of the state concerned. And Israel sees to it that dedicated and efficient persons are appointed to staff these missions. Further, it was also found that a constant flow of delegates of various types to and from Israel, kept the relations between Israel and these countries, concrete and live. Thus, it can only be expected that such enormous sincere advances will be responded by some Afro-Asian countries.

We have also noticed that the endless stream of Afro-Asiyan leaders who visit Israel see enough to be admired
in that country, and they express it in absolute unequivocal
terms. The fact to be noted here is that "much of Afro-Asia
may be politically hostile to the West, but the whole area is
striving desperately towards westernization".58 The Afro-
Asian leaders after their visit to Israel go back with the
impression that Israel is a well-organized, disciplined and
efficient country vibrating with activity and enthusiasm and
her people are working with determination for the success of
her national goals. In short, Israel seems to have achieved
what Afro-Asia has been striving for. Hence the desire to
maintain meaningful relations with Israel.

In our discussion in Chapter VI, the fact that
President Banda of Malawi and emperor Haile Sellassie of
Ethiopia had held the belief that the creation of Israel is
justified as the fulfilment of Biblical prophecy, had not
escaped our notice. Further, though light-skinned, Israelis
do not behave with the arrogance the Afro-Asians normally
expect of the whiteman. Afro-Asians feel admiration towards
the Israelis for this attitude.

On the other hand, negatively speaking some Black
African countries feel friendly towards Israel because of
the memory of the Slave Trade of the Arabs. The anti-Muslim
feeling may also be discernible in countries like Ethiopia
and Sierra Leone. Further, UAR's support to the Somali people

antagonized both Kenya and Ethiopia. Consequently, Israel obviously became the “enemy’s enemy”.

Now, from our survey, it also becomes evident to us that Israel, because of its extensive relations with the Afro-Asian countries, is gradually identifying itself with the aspirations of these countries and bringing its foreign policy in closer accord with the interests of the developing countries. The most poignant illustration in this case is Israel’s stand vis-a-vis South Africa. South Africa has been, in the pre-State period as well as in the post-state period, a true friend of Israel – proving its friendship in deed. Besides, the Jewish community in South Africa is about 100,000-strong; and they are very wealthy and strongly Zionist. But Israel condemned the apartheid policy in unmistakable terms. Not only that, Israel voted in the United Nations for economic sanctions against South Africa.

The fact is that the objective situation changed in 1960-61, with the coming of independence to many African states. Consequently, there was pressure for stronger action against South Africa. This, in turn, led to the General Assembly’s sanctions resolution of November 1961. Israel supported the resolution, except for (an abstention on) the paragraph recommending the expulsion of South Africa from the UN - unless she abandoned the policy of Apartheid. Later,

Israel withdrew the head of her diplomatic mission to Pretoria - though diplomatic relations were not severed, Israel retained her weekly El Al flight to South Africa. 60

Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion, in giving the reasons for the vote of the Israel Delegation in the United Nations Political Committee against the policy of apartheid, told the Knesset, inter alia, on 27 November 1961: "Now is the State of Israel able or entitled to ignore the feelings of its friends in Africa, Asia and elsewhere who would be quite unable to understand its failure to join in this protest." 61 He further said: "It is the duty of the United Nations Assembly to raise its voice against this discrimination. We would not have been true to ourselves, to our moral heritage, to our position in the family of Nations, if we had not joined this protest." 62

Though it has been maintained that "only the Israeli government's almost desperate desire to win the friendship of the new states of Africa obliged her to switch from abstention to a condemnation of apartheid", there is, at the same time, no doubt that the vote was, first and foremost, a gesture towards Israel's new friends - a reflection of the aim to meet the new African countries more than half way.

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60. See The Israel Digest, vol. 4, no. 25, p. 2.
61. Ibid.
62. Ibid.
This was further evident when Premier Eshkol made his trip to Africa in May-June 1966. We might as well repeat here once again that Eshkol identified Israel with the aspirations of the African countries in all the communiques that he put his signature to. Thus, on questions like apartheid, anti-colonialism, anti-imperialism and racial discrimination, Israel has gradually but very cautiously moved closer to the position of the non-aligned countries.