Military solution to ethnic and frontiers problems was absolutely contrary to the principle of non-aligned and peace loving countries ... there are problems similar to those between India and Pakistan in most countries of the world.
- President Josip Broz Tito (1965)

... the Declaration of the Second Conference of Non-Aligned countries held in Cairo 1964 as well as others sanction Pakistan's standpoint on Kashmir.
- Z.A. Bhutto at the UN (1965)

... the Arab refusal to accept Pakistan's plea... was a very big political defeat for Pakistan. The Arab countries were the corps of our nonaligned policy.
- V.K. Krishna Menon (1965)

Indonesia gave Pakistan the key to her arsenal (in 1965 war).
- M. Asghar Khan (1979)

In September 1965, barely three years after the Sino-Indian conflict, India fought a major engagement with Pakistan over the issue of Kashmir. However, this time the outbreak of hostilities did not come as a surprise to the international community. In fact, it was the third occasion when the state...
of perpetual "Cold War"\textsuperscript{1} between them had erupted into armed confrontation. The issues involved were not only well known but since January 1948 they had unceasingly occupied the attention of the United Nations.\textsuperscript{2}

However, neither the hostilities following the accession of the state of Jammu and Kashmir to the Union of India in 1947 nor the brief armed clash in the Rann of Kutch in April 1965\textsuperscript{3} could decide the differences between the two states. In contrast, the twenty-two days' conflict\textsuperscript{4} that took place

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{1} India-Pakistan relations have often been described as being in a state of Cold War. See, for instance, Mohammad Ayoob, "India and Pakistan: Prospects for Detente" in K.P. Misra, ed., \textit{Foreign Policy of India: A Book of Readings} (New Delhi, 1977), p. 213.
  \item \textsuperscript{2} It was India which raised the Kashmir issue at the Security Council of the United Nations on 2 January 1948. The developments at the UN regarding this issue are well recorded and analysed. See Rahamatullah Khan, \textit{Kashmir and the United Nations} (Delhi, 1969); and Surendra Chopra, \textit{UN Mediations in Kashmir: A Study in Power Politics}, (Kuruksnetra, 1971).
  \item \textsuperscript{3} Pakistani incursion in Kutch according to the Indian Government was "only a perfidious smoke-screen for her preplanned intrusions in Kashmir". See Chopra, ibid., p. 216.
  \item \textsuperscript{4} While Pakistan called it a war, India officially considered it to be a conflict. See Kuldip Nayar, \textit{Distant Neighbours: A Tale of the Subcontinent}, (New Delhi, Bell Books, 1975), second revd. edn., p. 90.
\end{itemize}
from 1 September to 22 September 1965 was far more intense and in many ways proved to be decisive. It practically settled the fate of Kashmir by thwarting Pakistan's quest for a military solution to the problem and also confirmed once and for all India's determination not to yield to international pressure on this issue.

As was natural, the ramifications of this fiercely fought South Asian conflict were felt the world over and the nonaligned arena was no exception. But the nonaligned countries did neither play a crucial role in this conflict nor offer any mediation as they had done in case of the Sino-Indian dispute. So the India-Pakistan question largely remained confined to the domain of Big Power politics. Yet in course of time the diplomatic struggle over Kashmir had been extended to the larger Afro-Asian and nonaligned forums with both the parties striving to obtain a favourable mandate from the member-countries. Moreover, the Indo-Pak conflict involved certain issues which were considered vital in the nonaligned arena as they related to the very state structure in the post-colonial Third World and thus a large number of nonaligned expressed their opinion both within and outside the UN on these issues.

Although much to India's convenience, Pakistan had been left out of the nonaligned movement as a result of the

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5 Pakistan's admission to the nonaligned movement at the Havana Summit still rankles Indian Foreign Officials. See T.N. Ninan, "NAM Summit: India's Healing Touch", India Today (New Delhi), vol. 11, no. 18, September 1986, p. 41.
Brioni-Belgrade framework, it was Pakistan which set the tone and temper of diplomatic struggle over Kashmir within the larger Afro-Asian nonaligned world. In its quest to embarrass and pressure India, Pakistan made vigorous efforts to raise the Kashmir issue on the agenda of Afro-Asian and nonaligned forums. Its non-membership to the nonaligned movement did not prevent it from doing so because most of the Asian and African countries did not discriminate between a nonaligned and an Afro-Asian country. It also had the open support of China and Indonesia and all these three launched a well co-ordinated diplomatic offensive to discredit and isolate India from Afro-Asian politics.

India, on the other hand, was staunchly against the Pakistani move to involve external mediation or arbitration on Kashmir, especially after its past experience at the United Nations. This in part explains its reservations about the proposed Second Afro-Asian Conference (Second Bandung) wherein Pakistan hoped to raise the Kashmir issue with the explicit support of Indonesia and China. As is well known, India skilfully employed diplomatic ploys to sabotage the

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6 It was Indonesia which at the behest of Pakistan initially proposed to take up the Kashmir issue at the Second Bandung. President Ayub Khan of Pakistan time and again made specific appeals to the Afro-Asian nonaligned community to intervene in this matter. See, for instance, his address to Sri Lankan Parliament on 9 December 1963, Pakistan Times (Lahore), 10 December 1963.
Algiers Conference of Afro-Asian countries in October 1965.  

Similarly, India resolutely opposed the raising of any bilateral dispute at the Colombo Preparatory Conference of the Nonaligned Foreign Ministers held on 23 March 1964 and at the Cairo Nonaligned Summit it was even more categoric on this count. Fortunately for India, President Tito of Yugoslavia also had reservations about raising contentious bilateral issues at the nonaligned forums and the two countries together prevailed over Sri Lanka which was thinking of introducing some kind of mechanism to resolve bilateral disputes within the purview of the nonaligned movement.

Pakistani propaganda in the Afro-Asian world was primarily aimed at projecting Kashmir as a case of self-determination. Indonesia's open support to Pakistan along with the overall

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7 For a detailed account of India's role in this context, see C.S. Jha, From Bandung to Tashkent: Glimpses of Indian Foreign Policy (Delhi, 1983), pp. 251-75.

8 See the statement of Dinesh Singh, India's Deputy Foreign Minister on 10 February 1964, Times of India (New Delhi), 11 February 1964.


10 Sri Lanka had been mobilizing opinion in the nonaligned arena in favour of such a proposal since the Colombo Preparatory Conference of March 1964. See S. Nihal Singh, "Delicate Task for India at the Colombo Meeting", Statesman, 23 March 1964.
empathy in the Arab and African world with the general cause of self-determination made things difficult for India. The large contingent of newly liberated African states which had entered the non-aligned movement at the Cairo Summit had yet to witness the full repercussions of extending this right beyond its colonial context. India, fearing an indirect mandate in favour of Pakistan at the Afro-Asian and nonaligned forums, found the Cairo Summit a fitting venue for propagating its reservations about applying the right to self-determination blindly in the case of Kashmir. Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri made it clear at the plenary session of the Summit that, "Self-determination was the right of any country dominated by another, but it could not be claimed by different areas and regions within a sovereign and independent country". 11

However Shastri's plea for defining the limits of the right to self-determination did not make much impact. This was evident when the Final Document once again referred to self-determination in general terms. As will be detailed later, Pakistan cited the Cairo resolution at the General Assembly as a non-aligned mandate in favour of its demand for self-determination to Kashmir. In fact the text of Final Document on self-determination was circulated by Z. A. Bhutto at the General Assembly to bolster his case. 12

11 See Cairo Conference of Non-Aligned Nations, Information Service of India (New Delhi, 1965), p. 27.
12 Select paragraphs of Cairo Final Document relating to the right of self-determination were circulated, vide UN Document A/5763, see GAOR, session 20, plen. mtg., vol. 1, p. 62.
The preceding discussion clearly suggests that the Indo-Pak conflict embodying the issue of Kashmir had significant bearing on a large number of nonaligned countries. Subsequently many of them took positions on the merit of the issue ranging from the applicability of the doctrine of self-determination to Kashmir, to the use of force in the settlement of boundary disputes. These responses, though peripheral and casual at times, reveal interesting insights into the major concerns of policy making in the Third World Countries, including their domestic compulsions, regional and religious considerations, Big-Power influence etc.

For a proper appreciation of the various shades of non-aligned opinion generated within and outside the United Nations in the wake of 1965 conflict, it is necessary to highlight the basic issues involved therein and the stands of the two contestants on them. Indeed, it is beyond the scope of the present work to go far deep into various intricate aspects of the dispute which are otherwise well analysed in many studies. Yet, it is imperative to present here a brief resume of

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the international debate over Kashmir as it evolved on the eve of the Indo-Pak conflict.

The Kashmir Debate

The Kashmir debate since the issue was brought before the United Nations in 1948 became increasingly complex with the passing of time. It virtually assumed the form of a prolonged law suit with millions of words spoken and more than hundred meetings held at the Security Council. However, the issue could neither be resolved by external mediation nor for that matter the various peace-keeping operations of the United Nations could prevent the continuous outbreak of hostilities in the region which eventually culminated in the twenty-two days' Indo-Pak conflict in 1965.

To an extent, of course, it was the meddling of the Western Powers which was responsible for keeping this issue lingering for such a long time and thus Kashmir "far from remaining a bilateral issue between India and Pakistan became a football of international politics".14 But the root cause of this unresolved dispute lay primarily in the very logic of partition of the subcontinent and the peculiar circumstances in which Kashmir was incorporated into India.

The British while withdrawing from India had given an option to the Indian princely states, about 565 in number, to accede to either of the two new dominions. Whereas most of these

14 Jha, n.7, p.186.
states exercised their option by signing the Instrument of Accession as laid down by India Independence Act. Kashmir, the largest of these states with about three-fourths Muslim population and a Hindu Maharaja (Hari Singh), remained indecisive and played for time. Essentially it was the Maharaja's quest for some form of autonomy that prevented him from taking a decision within stipulated time. He preferred a standstill agreement with the two dominions which would ensure that until new agreements were made all existing agreements and administrative arrangements would continue.

15 It is sometimes suggested that "... being a Hindu he must have realized that accession to Pakistan might cost him his throne, while accession to India was bound to lead to the transfer of power to the National Conference". Matinuzzaman Zuberi, "The Problem of Kashmir" in Guy Wint, ed., Asia Handbook, rev. edn., in Penguin Books (Harmondsworth, 1966), p. 506.

16 The offer of a standstill agreement was accepted by Pakistan but the Indian Government did not respond to it as it reached it late. It is suggested that the latter containing such offer was deliberately delayed by the Kashmir postal system which was in the effective control of Pakistani authorities. See Sarvepalli Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography, vol. 2, 1947-1956 (Delhi, 1979), p. 18. Later India claimed that while Pakistan offered to look after postal services, railway communications and supplies and nothing else, India was to look after external affairs, army and defence, etc. See V. K. Krishna Menon, Kashmir: Speeches in the Security Council, January-February 1957, Publication Division, (New Delhi, 1958), pp. 8-9. Also see K. Sarwar Hasan, ed., Documents on Foreign Relations of Pakistan: The Kashmir Question (Karachi, 1966), pp. 43-44.
Meanwhile the accession of Kashmir was gradually becoming a national objective of paramount importance for both the contestants evoking irredentism amongst the masses. While Pakistan claimed Kashmir's accession as the logical extension of two-nation theory, in India, this issue was seen as a test case of 'secularism' and sure enough a favourable mandate from Kashmir with its Muslim majority would have consolidated India's position. It has been aptly observed in this context that, "For Pakistan Kashmir embodied that which it later became for India: the fulfilment of its national destiny". In addition, the geostrategic importance of this state made Kashmir all the more vital to the two contestants.

Naturally the deadlock over Kashmir could not be tolerated by either dominion for long. But, whereas India was willing to wait, Pakistan, impatient with the fluid situation in Kashmir, decided to force the issue. To begin with Pakistan tried to dislodge Maharaja Hari Singh's regime by creating economic crisis in the state. To this end, it placed a ban on the movement of Kashmiri goods through the traditional routes.


18 Kashmir was considered by major powers as some kind of "cockpit" of Asia, a geographic epicentre almost the trijunction of the three largest countries of the continent. Ibid., p.146.
under its control. Shortly thereafter on 22 October 1947 it engineered an armed invasion of the state by bellicose Muslim tribesmen of the North West Frontier, later joined by Pakistani soldiers 'on leave'. The offensive was aimed at paralyzing the Maharaja's civil and military control over the state and thus ignite a civil war therein. If this plan had succeeded the Pakistani army and administration could have moved into the state ostensibly to re-establish law and order.

However, the offensive launched by Pakistan eventually proved to be counter-productive. It virtually compelled the Maharaja to seek India's help in repelling the intruders who had unleashed a reign of terror in the state and after occupying a large chunk of territory were marching towards Srinagar. India's intervention was, however, not possible without a formal accession of the state to its union territory. Thus the Maharaja with the approval of the National Conference, the strongest political party of the state, finally decided to sign an instrument of Accession with India on 26 October 1947. Subsequently, a contingent of the Indian army was airlifted to Srinagar just in time to save the Capital from falling to the Pakistani invaders.

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19 See Gupta, n.13, p.103.
20 For details, see Invasion of Kashmir, Government of Kashmir (Srinagar, n.d.).
21 For details, see Gupta, n.13, pp.119-26.
Although Kashmir acceded to India technically in the same manner as had hundreds of other princely states, yet the peculiar circumstances in which Instrument of Accession was signed by the Maharaja, in flight himself at the time, led Pakistan to charge that the decision was made "under duress". But it is generally held that "it was a Pakistani inspired duress,... and if it had forced the issue other way it might have been depicted as liberation".\textsuperscript{22} Pakistani allegations that the act of accession was based on "fraud and violence" had been sufficiently repudiated by Lord Mountbatten himself.\textsuperscript{23}

However, what unleashed the real controversy was Lord Mountbatten's pledge on behalf of Indian government regarding the holding of a plebiscite in Kashmir, notwithstanding the unconditional Instrument of Accession signed by its ruler.\textsuperscript{24} After setting a precedent of the plebiscite in Junagarh,\textsuperscript{25} India was quite confident of a favourable outcome of such an

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{22} Heimsath and Mansingh, n.17,p.149.
\item \textsuperscript{23} See Zuberi, n.15,p.510.
\item \textsuperscript{24} This was in line with the democratic ideals preached by the Indian National Congress. Mahatma Gandhi reportedly stated that "Muslims who are in majority in Kashmir would count and not the Maharaja" and on another occasion he declared that "the will of the Kashmiris was the supreme law in Kashmir", Chopra, n.2,p.4.
\item \textsuperscript{25} For details see Das Gupta, n.13, pp.52-80.
\end{itemize}
exercise in Kashmir. Obviously, Kashmir's incorporation into India on the basis of people's will would have been a strong vindication of the secular principle which the Indian National Congress upheld.

It is in this context that the much quoted Lord Mountbatten's letter was written to the maharaja containing an explicit assurance of the Indian government to settle the quest of state's accession on the basis of a referendum. The letter which assumed great significance in course of the Kashmir debate stated:

In consistence with their policy that in case of any state when the issue of accession has been the subject of dispute, the question of accession should be decided in accordance with the wishes of the people of the state, it is my government's wish that as soon as law and order have been restored in Kashmir and her soil cleared of invader, the question of the state's accession should be settled by a reference to the people. Later Nehru clarified that the "reference" intended was to be a plebiscite held under international supervision. This offer according to him was a "pledge to the people of Kashmir

26 However at a later stage India insisted that it was a personal letter from Mountbatten in reply to the Maharaja's covering letter and does not form the acceptance of the Instrument of Accession. See Jha, n. 7, p. 188.

... to the people of the world."

Despite all this, Pakistan kept on assisting the armed invasion of Kashmir. This was the backdrop against which India decided to lodge a formal complaint against Pakistan before the Security Council on 1 January 1948. Immediately Pakistan, relying on the sympathy of the Anglo-American bloc, raised the entire issue of Kashmir's accession to India and since then the matter has been debated at the various forums of the UN.

However, the UN intervention further complicated the issues. Of various resolutions adopted by the UN, the two resolutions of 13 August 1948 and of 5 January, 1949, framed by the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) have special significance as they were perhaps the only resolutions concerning Kashmir which the two contestants had agreed upon. While the first resolution contemplated a series of steps for the establishment of a cease-fire, the other laid down the manner and the stages in which the wishes of the people could be ascertained. The former clearly recognized

28 See Heimsath and Mansingh, n.17, p.149; also see Nehru's letter to Mountbatten, 13 February 1948, Gopal, n.16, p.27.
29 India invoked chapter VI (article 35) dealing with pacific settlement of disputes in its complaint against Pakistan. Later Indians criticized their government for not invoking chapter VII of the UN Charter dealing with breaches of peace and acts of aggression. See A.Appadorai, M.S.Rajan, India's Foreign Policy and Relations, (New Delhi, 1985), pp.93-96.
30 See Chopra, n.2, pp.26-58, and also Gupta, n.13, pp.140-173.
31 The UN Commission was composed by Czechoslovakia, Argentina, Belgium, Colombia and the United States.
India's sovereignty and its right to have troops in Kashmir for the latter's internal and external security and required Pakistan to withdraw its troops from Jammu and Kashmir. However, there could not be any further progress as differences appeared on the modalities of its implementation.

Pakistan by demanding parity with India in the matter of withdrawal of forces sought to preserve the so-called Azad Kashmir forces in the area. India, on the other hand, insisted on the meticulous observation of the UNCIP resolutions and demanded the vacation of northern areas by Pakistan, the disbanding of the Azad Kashmir forces and the withdrawal of Pakistani forces from Azad Kashmir. Unless these preconditions were met India was not willing to comply with the second UNCIP resolution.

Right from the beginning of the UN debate over Kashmir India felt sore over the fact that whereas its basic complaint regarding Pakistan's aggression remained unattended, the Council members belonging mostly to the Anglo-American bloc were trying to impose a plebiscite in Kashmir on terms favourable to Pakistan. Expressing India's disappointment Nehru

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33 See Chopra, n. 2, pp. 72-74.
felt:

I could not imagine that Security Council possibly behave in the trivial and partisan manner in which it functioned .... The United States and Britain have played a dirty role, Britain probably being the chief actor behind the scene.34

India also became disillusioned about the numerous mediatory missions sent by the United Nations in the fifties as most of them failed to come to grips with the real issues. Initiatives taken by General MacNaughton of Canada, Sir Owen Dixon of Australia (1950) and Frank Graham of the United States (1951-53) failed to narrow the differences between the two disputants over the modalities of a plebiscite.35

It is sometimes suggested that India's case at the UN was not so well represented till the arrival of V.K. Krishna Menon on the scene and had an element of inconsistency on as much as its claims of legal validity of Kashmir's accession could not reconcile with its firm pledge of a plebiscite in the state.36 This had given an edge to Pakistani propaganda which projected India's reservations regarding various peace missions as the main obstacle to a popular vote in the state.

From 1953 to 1956 Kashmir as an India-Pakistan question did not figure on international forums as the two disputants

34 Gopal, n.16, pp.27-28.
35 For details see Chopra, n.2, pp.79-115 and Gupta, n.13, pp.202-54.
36 See Heimsath and Mansingh, n.17,152.
tried to sort it out bilaterally. In the meantime national and international developments completely altered India's stand on this issue. On the one hand, Sheikh Abdullah's quest for an independent Kashmir took away whatever enthusiasm India had for a plebiscite in the state. On the other hand, Pakistan's entering a military alliance changed the whole complexion of the dispute. India was now almost getting averse to the idea of a plebiscite and during the bilateral discussion with Pakistan in 1955, it preferred to discuss a settlement based on partition and not plebiscite. At the same time it had also made sure of the Soviet Veto in its favour at the Security Council. This was the background against which India turned down a revised formula proposed by Frank Graham in March 1958, though it was most favourable to India's preconditions regarding the issue of plebiscite.

By 1962-63, when Pakistan once again tried to move the Security Council to force India to honour its so-called international commitment regarding plebiscite, India was no

37 See the details in Gupta, n.13, pp.255-309.
38 For details see B.N. Mullick, My Years with Nehru: Kashmir, (Agra, 1972), pp.48-74.
39 Pakistan's arms deal with the US ruined the settlement which was reached in New Delhi between Nehru and Pakistan's Prime Minister Mohammad Ali Bogra in August 1953. See A.G. Noorani, "Kashmir: The Lost Opportunity", The Illustrated Weekly of India (Bombay), 7 October 1986, p.50.
40 After their visit to India in 1955 Khrushchev and Bulganin declared that Kashmir was a part of India, see Mullik, n.38, p.51.
more on the defence. Krishna Menon making a **volte-face** declared that India's so-called commitment was no more valid and that Kashmir's accession to India was final (earlier it was legal) and was effected by an unconditional Instrument of Accession duly signed by the Maharaja in conformity with the provisions of India Independence Act.

India further consolidated its diplomatic position by arguing that in any case the letter of Mountbatten had not promised self-determination or plebiscite, but only an ascertai-nment of the wishes of the people which could be done in ways other than holding a plebiscite or referendum. It also cited the holding of elections in Kashmir as an instance of such ascertainment. Nehru's earlier stand that the plebiscite offer was a pledge "to the people of the world" was now downgraded by Krishna Menon as "an expression of a wish" which could no longer be carried out in view of constant presence of invaders and the Pakistani army, a point which had been reaffirmed in Part B of the UNCIP resolution of 13 August 1948.41

Krishna Menon expressed India's intentions categorically when he stated, "The Security Council could hold 200 meetings but under no circumstances would India trade its sovereignty!"42

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41 See Jha,n.7,pp.188-90.
42 See ,ibid.,p.178.
With the passing away of Nehru in May 1964, Pakistan lost all hopes of a negotiated settlement over Kashmir. In the meantime, Pakistan by signing an agreement with China in March 1963 had further angered the already humiliated public opinion in India. The Indian government, now under tremendous domestic pressure, finally decided to close the chapter on Kashmir. This was confirmed when in December 1964 India took away the special status granted to Kashmir by Article 370 of the Indian Constitution and also abolished the title of Prime Minister for the head of the Kashmir cabinet. Pakistan's hopes that India, now dependent upon American arms aid against China, would be persuaded to reopen the issue also came to naught. All this brought Pakistan to desperation and by 1965 Ayub Khan's government prepared for a war.

Meanwhile, the brewing discontent in Kashmir with the Awami League espousing accession to Pakistan and the arrest of Sheikh Abdullah after his abortive attempt to internationalize the Kashmir issue emboldened the Pakistani rulers to venture a military solution of the problem. A decade of heavy

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43 America was less hostile to India now as it saw a possibility of a military pact with India to contain Chinese design in Asia. See J.K. Galbraith, *Ambassador's Journal* (London, 1969), pp. 455-512.
American arms aid had inflated Pakistan's confidence to do so. The successful culmination of their probing operation in the Rann of Kutch leading to a limited skirmish with India finally convinced the Pakistani rulers that their military help to what they perceived to be an anti-Indian revolt in Kashmir might turn the tables. This was the setting against which 'Operation Gibraltar' was launched in 1965 and armed infiltrators sent to Kashmir.

The infiltration continued through August and Indian estimates put the final total of the intruders at around 5,000. These infiltrators sent to fan an anti-Indian rebellion in the state through local acts of terrorism and sabotage, however, did not get the desired response. Most of them were captured by the army with the help of the local people. Claiming the imperative of cutting off the route for infiltrators, the Indian Army too crossed the cease-fire line and occupied strategic positions within the Pakistan held Kashmir. Of these the Haji Pir pass on the Uri-Punch road was of great strategic

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44 Russel Brines considered Pakistani incursion in Kutch as "a low cost test of India's will and capabilities" See Brines, n.13, p.288.

45 The eventual failure of Operation Gibraltar and Operation Grand Slam which were launched subsequently has generated considerable controversy within the Pakistani circle, see especially M. Asghar Khan, The First Round Indo-Pakistani War 1965, Indian edn. (Ghaziabad, 1979), and Mohammad Musa, My Version: India-Pakistan War, 1965 (London, 1983), also see critical comments on General Musa's version in Strategic Digest, vol.14, no.7, July 1984, pp.719-46.
significance to Pakistan as it brought India within striking distance of Muzaffarabad—the capital of Azad Kashmir.

Pakistan, disconcerted by these setbacks, eventually struck at the Indian lines of communication at Chhamb on 1 September 1965. The Pakistani thrust was so powerful that it left no option for India but to open new fronts on the Lahore and Sialkot sectors as a diversionary move. With the involvement of the Air Force and the Navy, the war reached its peak. But India's counter-offensive not only compelled Pakistan to abandon its plans of occupying Kashmir but also exposed its overall limitations of achieving its goals through military means. India's main objective was thereby achieved. The twenty-two days' war in a way settled the issue of Kashmir in India's favour by revealing to the international community the impossibility of changing the status quo there.

The Indo-Pak conflict, of which the Security Council was seized, was not brought before the twentieth session of the General Assembly. However, a fairly large number of countries including most of the nonaligned referred to this question, particularly in the course of the General Debate of September–October 1965. This was obviously the result of intense campaign by Pakistan to turn international opinion in favour of its long-standing demand of self-determination to Kashmir and to censure

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46 For the Indian version of conflict see D.R. Mankekar, Twenty-Two Fateful Days: Pakistan Cut to Size (Bombay, 1966); B.M. Kaul, Confrontation with Pakistan (Delhi, 1971) and Pakistan's New Attempts to Grab Kashmir, Government of India (New Delhi, 1965).
India for dishonouring its so-called international commitment in this respect. India too galvanized its diplomacy to present its case before the larger international community regarding the issue of Pakistani aggression and the irrelevancy of the Pakistani demand for a self-determination to Kashmir.

During the UN Debates both India and Pakistan blamed the Security Council for overlooking what they considered to be the real cause of the conflict. While India expressed its unhappiness over the casual attitude of the members towards the issue of Pakistani aggression, Pakistan felt that any cease-fire arrangement falling short of a plebiscite in Kashmir would be meaningless. However, India after some initial reluctance, revealed its willingness to concede to an unconditional cease-fire as contained in Resolution 209(1965) and Resolution 210(1965) of 4 and 6 September respectively. On the contrary, Pakistan was just not interested in an unconditional cease-fire and return to the status quo ante as this would have nullified the main aim of its aggression in Kashmir. 47

However, Resolution 211(1965) of 20 September, which was essentially the result of Super Power unanimity on virtually imposing a cease-fire on 23 September 1965, merely referred to the need to consider "what steps could be taken to

47 See UN Doc. S/PV 1237, 4 September 1965, and UN Doc. S/PV 1238, 6 September 1965, Also see Khan, n. 2, pp. 52-58.
assist towards a settlement of the political problem underlying the present conflict". 48 Jordan, which abstained from voting on this resolution, expressed Pakistan's overall disappointment by describing Resolution 211(1965) as "fruitless for lack of coherence and realism". 49

Issue of Self-determination

As indicated earlier, self-determination to Kashmir became the central issue in the India-Pakistan debate especially on the eve of the conflict in 1965. In fact, this became the touchstone for determining whether a country is extending support to Pakistan or India.

To most eloquent and systematic exposition of Pakistan's viewpoint was presented by Z.A. Bhutto. He declared, "Pakistan's dispute with India is not religious, it is a national dispute over principles, the right to self-determination and the implementation of international agreements". Appealing for UN intervention he felt that "as the international community has supported freedom movements throughout the world, it is its moral obligation to support the freedom movement of the people of Jammu and Kashmir". 50

48 See UN Doc. S/PV 1242.
49 Pakistan Times, 21 September 1965.
50 GAOR, session 20, plen. mtgs., vol. 1, pp. 11-19.
In his efforts to get the support of the larger Afro-Asian nonaligned members of the General Assembly, Bhutto declared that the principle of self-determination was an integral element of the international order embodied in the UN Charter, the Declaration of the Bandung Conference of 1955, the Charter of the Organization of African Unity and the Declaration of the Second Conference of the Nonaligned Countries held in Cairo in 1964. In fact, he quoted extensively from the Document of the Cairo Summit to support his standpoint. In particular, he referred to the concern of the Cairo Declaration that "the violation of the right of self-determination results in increasing tension and an extension of the area of war" and stated, "This declaration as well as others sanction Pakistan's standpoint on Jammu and Kashmir". Bhutto even went to the extent of comparing the Kashmir issue with Angola and Southern Rhodesia and South-West Africa.

India, on the other hand, tried to build up international opinion regarding the irrelevancy of the Pakistani demand because Kashmir was its integral part. Mrs Vijaya Laxmi Pandit clarified in an interview that:

Self-determination applies to a country under foreign rule or to a country that has been partitioned such as Germany.

51 See ibid.

52 Ibid., p.13. The Final Document of the Cairo Summit of Non-Aligned States was circulated as UN Document A/5763.
There have been three elections in Kashmir, but no election worth the name in Pakistan where there is no adult franchise. We consider the will of people was made clear three times. We do not accept that a country can be divided on the basis of religion. Self-determination does not apply here.

India deeply conscious of African sensitivity on this issue tried to differentiate between self-determination in a colonial situation and secession. M.C. Chagla made it clear at the Security Council that:

... the principle of self-determination is applicable to nations and nation-states and cannot be used for the breaking up of a state or fragmentation of peoples. It is this principle which the United Nations and all African states invoked to oppose self-determination of Katanga.

Similarly, Krishna Menon, while referring to the Pakistani demand, had retorted, "Can there be a Welsh issue in Britain, if some imbeciles and insanities in that valley talk in terms of self-determination"?

During the General Debate in September-October 1965 Syed Mir Qasim, representing India, further clarified the Indian stand:

For many years India has been fighting for the principle of self-determination in the United Nations. But to abuse it by seeking to apply it

53 Indian Express 3 October 1965.


to parts of sovereign independent states would be disastrous. Such abuse could lead to political chaos in Africa, Asia and other parts of the world. 56

By this time diplomatic opinion was polarized due to the efforts of the two contestants, so despite the India-Pakistan question not being on the agenda, 85 participants referred to this question at the General Debate out of 110 speeches that were made. 57 Out of these 47 countries held a nonaligned status by virtue of their being participants at the Cairo Nonaligned Summit of October 1964. 58


57 According to newspaper reports; out of eighty five participants who spoke on this issue, sixty three were careful to adopt a neutral position by deploring the conflict by praising the role of the Security Council and Secretary General in effecting the cease-fire, hoping that peace would be established; nineteen participants (including eleven Arab states) made hostile reference to India, three spoke in India's favour, while the UAR spoke without siding with either party, Hindustan Times (New Delhi), 23 October 1965.

58 Apart from India, the following countries had participated at the Cairo Conference of Heads of Nonaligned Government or State in October 1964. These were:

Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Burma, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Ceylon, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Cuba, Cyprus, Dahomey, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Nepal, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tanganyika, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, the United Arab Republic, Yemen, Yugoslavia, and Zambia.

See Two Decades of Non-Alignments; Documents of the Gathering of the Non-Aligned Countries 1961-82. India, Ministry of External Affairs, (New Delhi, 1983) p.17. The observers to this Summit are not included in the list.
Responses : UN and Outside

As said earlier, the Indo-Pak question as such never came for discussion at the nonaligned conferences nor did the nonaligned try any individual or group mediation. Yet some of the nonaligned became actively involved in this conflict through their open support to one or the other of the disputants. In any case most of these countries were concerned with the vital issues involved in this conflict and expressed various shades of opinion at the General Debate.

South and Southeast Asia

To begin with the two South Asian nonaligned, Sri Lanka and Nepal, remained non-partisan. Sri Lanka, which had made remarkable mediatory intervention in India's earlier conflict with China, preferred to sit on the fence throughout the acrimonious phase of the Indo-Pak conflict. Obviously, after the ouster of Mrs Sirimavo Bandaranaike, the new regime was not so keen to continue with the previous government's policy of active mediation among the Afro-Asian countries. 59

Since the very beginning the Sri Lankan government had taken care to accommodate the viewpoints of both the disputants. This could be done by emphasizing a possible solution

of the Kashmir problem" in accordance with the United Nations resolutions" as per Pakistani demand and by adding the phrase "by peaceful means" which took positive note of India's policy of resolving the issue bilaterally without involving the United Nations. 60 This non-partisan attitude was reiterated by Premier Senanayake on the eve of the conflict when he stated before the House of Representatives on 17 September 1965: "As far as this government is concerned, it has always taken the line that Kashmir dispute which is the cause of trouble ... should be resolved in terms of resolutions adopted in the UN or by other peaceful means". 61

Sri Lanka was, however, one of the first nonaligned to send an appeal for an early and peaceful settlement of the dispute, when the conflict broke out in September 1965. In a letter to Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri, Premier Senanayake of Ceylon expressed his deep concern "at the eruption of armed clashes in this area" and hoped for an early settlement of the dispute. 62

60 For instance, see the Joint Communique issued after the conclusion of President Ayub Khan's visit to Sri Lanka in December 1963, Ceylon Today (Colombo, Government Publication Bureau), vol.12, no.12, p.6.

61 Ibid., vol.14, no.9, p.3.

At the General Debate, the Sri Lankan delegate preferred not to comment on the merit of the Indo-Pak conflict. He neither mentioned the right to self-determination of Kashmiris nor for that matter did he share India's concern regarding Pakistani aggression. In a rather evasive manner, he pleaded for an effective role of the General Assembly in preserving world peace.63

So cautious was the Sri Lankan government in projecting a neutral image that it did not encourage the proposed visit of Dinesh Singh, India's Deputy Foreign Minister, during the war days.64 And at the same time it squarely turned down an Indonesian request for landing and refuelling facilities for its aircraft ostensibly carrying armaments to Pakistan.65

Although certain sections in India felt sore over Sri Lanka's strict neutrality, on the whole India remained content with its silence over the Pakistani demand for self-determination to Kashmir at the UN and elsewhere.66 Its reservations

63 GAOR session 20, plen mtgs., vol.1, p.2.
64 Hindustan Times, 19 October 1965.
65 Times of India, 30 October 1965. It is worth noting that Pakistan tried its utmost during this period to exploit Tamil-Sinhalese differences by supporting anti-Indian feelings in Sri Lanka.
66 Indian's also expressed satisfaction that Sri Lanka was one of the few countries in Asia which took positive note of India' complaint of Pakistani infiltration in Kashmir. See Hari Ram Gupta Indo-Pakistan War, (Delhi, 1968), vol.2, p.30.
about self-determination in Kashmir were well adumbrated by a Sri Lankan newspaper:

... a plebiscite in Kashmir would immediately give rise to similar demand for a thousand plebiscites in different parts of the world. The negro community in USA as much as Tamil community in Ceylon may demand a similar plebiscite and each may get a Pakistani sponsor. 67

Nepal the other South Asian nonaligned had traditionally been neutral on the Kashmir issue. This was evident when President Ayub Khan of Pakistan tried in vain to mobilize anti-Indian feelings in Nepal during his visit in 1963. 68 However, much to India's disappointment, Nepal did not take note of Pakistani infiltration in Kashmir during August 1965. This was attributed to the growing Chinese influence in this Himalayan kingdom and also to the fact that at this juncture a Pakistani delegation was visiting Nepal which was expected to make offers regarding trade and aid. During this visit it was agreed to raise the diplomatic status of their representation to the level of resident Ambassadors. Pakistan also reportedly made a somewhat vague proposal of offering Chittagong as entrepot to Nepal as an alternative to Calcutta. 69

67 Tribune, Ceylon Daily News (Colombo) 21 September 1965.
69 See Gupta, n.66, p.293.
In fact, Pakistan had of late paid a lot of attention to bolster its ties with Nepal in view of the latter's important geostrategic position in the region. The growing entente between these two countries had led many to speculate on a possible Nepalese support to Pakistani claims over Kashmir. Some Dacca journalists had quoted Nepalese Foreign Minister Kirti Nidhi Bista's advocacy of the demand for self-determination to Kashmir. However, such reports were denied by the Nepalese authorities in due course.

On the other hand, Nepal did not allow Pakistani attempts to foment anti-Indian feelings in the territory beyond a certain point. When Pakistan tried to raise the issue of Gorkha soldiers in the Indian army, S.B. Thapa, Chairman of Council of Ministers, made it clear that, "Nepal will not allow Pakistan to use her soil for any anti-Indian activity." During the General Assembly debates, Kirti Nidhi Bista, Minister for Foreign Affairs, refused to be drawn into the Kashmir controversy. Instead he merely expressed the hope "for permanent peace

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70 According to Z.A. Bhutto, "Nepal's proximity to East Pakistan and to ... the Province of Assam with its Naga and Mizo freedom fighters, not to speak of uprising in Naxalbari corridor, gives Nepal a high place in the calculation of Pakistan's foreign Policy". See Z.A. Bhutto, Myth of independence, (London, 1969), p.125.

71 See Gupta, n.66, p.293.

72 Rising Nepal, (Kathmandu), 15 September 1965.
between the two countries" and praised the "unique service rendered by the Secretary General in this regard". 73

However, when King Mahendra came to India during November-December 1965 on a state visit, his views regarding the issue of Kashmir were considerably influenced by India. On arrival he had expressed his desire that "instead of taking sides, the realities of the situation should be borne in mind". 74 But at the end of his month long visit he seems to have come much closer to India's stand. The joint communique issued on 20 December 1965 stated that "the principles of self-determination can apply only to dependent trust territories and cannot be extended to integral parts of sovereign states". 75 This was an obvious vindication of India's refusal to hold a plebiscite in Kashmir and against the Pakistani demand of self-determination.

Kampuchea (then Cambodia), Burma and Laos, the three non-aligned countries from Southeast Asia, also kept a low profile vis-a-vis the Indo-Pak conflict. Kampuchea decided to ignore the conflict completely and at the General Debate its representative did not even mention this issue. 76 In total contrast

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73 GAOR, session 20, plen. mtgs., vol. 1, p. 701.
to its role as a Colombo Power in the Sino-Indian conflict, Kampuchea did not take any diplomatic initiative to defuse the situation. The subsequent efforts of the two disputants to obtain a favourable mandate from it also met with no success. 77

Burma also did not comment on the issues involved in this conflict. In a carefully worded statement the Burmese delegate stated before the General Assembly that "... the ending of hostilities between the two of our good friends and neighbours, India and Pakistan... will presage the development of better relations between the two countries" 78 However, a statement made by the Burmese Minister for Foreign Affairs stating that "no one should interfere in the India-Pakistan conflict" was seen in many Indian quarters as a "valuable addition to the growing volume of opinion against China's possible intervention" and was thus considered to be partly responsible for China's backing warily away from the brink. 79

It may be recalled that Burma was one of the five non-aligned Colombo Powers which were alerted by India about a possible Chinese incursion in Sikkim as per the Chinese

77 Asis Kumar Majumdar, South-East Asia in Indian Foreign Policy (Calcutta, 1982), p. 83.
78 GAOR, session 20, plen. mtgs., vol. 1, p. 8.
79 Indian Express 22 December 1965.
ultimatum. It considered this ultimatum a breach of promise of providing prior information to the Colombo Powers before taking any military action in the disputed region. Though the Colombo Powers did not consider India's appeal jointly, Burma's vague appeal for non-interference in this conflict was certainly helpful.\(^80\)

Laos did not initially indicate its willingness to take a position vis-a-vis the Indo-Pak conflict. However, when a six-member Indian delegation went to Laos after the September war, Prince Souvanna Phouma agreed to make a favourable statement supporting India. This was construed as a major victory of Indian diplomacy in Southeast Asia.\(^81\)

Unlike its fellow Southeast Asian nonaligned which remained largely neutral, Indonesia decided to take an open stand on this issue. It not only lent diplomatic support to Pakistan but also went whole hog by providing arms and ammunition. It was indeed a peculiar situation wherein an aligned Southeast Asian Malaysia, also having a large chunk of Muslim population, decided to back India and nonaligned Indonesia after decades of solidarity with

\(^{80}\) See Asian Recorder, vol. 9, no. 41, p. 6716.

\(^{81}\) This assertion was made by Hem Barua who was one of the six-member Indian delegation which visited South East Asia in the wake of Indo-Pak war. Times of India, 22 December 1965, Also see Singh, n. 76, p. 173.
India openly supported an "aligned Pakistan".  

Prior to 1963-64, Indonesia had taken meticulous care not to offend India on the issue of Kashmir. However, during President Sukarno's visit to Pakistan in mid-1963, a shift in Indonesian approach became discernible. In their joint communique signed by President Sukarno and Ayub Khan a specific mention was made regarding the right to self-determination which had ostensible reference to the Pakistani stand on Kashmir. The communique stated that the two countries "resolve to liberate the Afro-Asian peoples and to secure the right of self-determination of peoples still held in bondage.  

Indonesia eventually came out openly in favour of Pakistan during the preparatory meeting of the Second Afro-Asian Conference at Jakarta in the wake of its estrangement with India on that issue. It was particularly sore over India's insistence on including Malaysia and the Soviet Union in the

82 Consequently, Pakistan severed its diplomatic relations with Malaysia. For details see P. Surya Narayan, "Attitude of Malaysia and Indonesia towards India-Pakistan war of 1965", see Punjab Journal of Politics (Amritsar), vol. 1, 1983, pp. 1-15.

83 See Singh, n. 76, p. 171.


85 Indonesia wanted to convene the conference before the autumn session of the UN to canvass for its anti-Malaysian stand. But India thwarted these aims by proposing that the conference be held a year later and that too in Africa. Subsequently, no agreement could be reached at Jakarta as most African delegates viewed the issue as too important to be decided by the heads of government alone. For details see Jha, n. 7, pp. 251-75 and also Foreign Affairs, vol. 10, no. 4, 1964, pp. 122-23.
fold of Afro-Asianism. Exploiting skilfully the hurt sentiments of the Indonesian government, Pakistan elicited a blatantly anti-Indian response from Indonesia when the joint communique issued by the two countries called for "an early solution of this Kashmir dispute in accordance with the wishes of the people of the state and other provisions as envisaged in the Security Council resolutions which were accepted by both India and Pakistan". 86 Similar statements were issued by President Sukarno on 19 September 1964 during his visit to Pakistan. 87

When Pakistan mounted an indirect attack on India by sending trained infiltrators into Kashmir, Indonesian support was readily available to it. On 14 August amidst continuing Pakistani infiltration, Subandrio, the Indonesian Foreign Minister, was conferred "Hilal Pakistan", the highest civil award of the country. 88 The very next day Ali Sastroamidjojo, Chairman of the ruling Nationalist Party, called for every effort to liberate Kashmiris through the platform of Afro-Asian nations. 89

No sooner the news of the outbreak of armed hostilities reached Jakarta, militant groups held angry demonstrations before the Indian embassy there. 90 On 9 September the Indian flag was removed. 91 The Indonesian government which was behind all these

86 See Singh, n.76, p.172.
88  Pakistan Times, 15 August 1965.
89 Gupta, n.66, p.308.
90 See Indonesian Herald (Jakarta), 4, 7 and 8 September 1965.
91 Hindustan Times, 10 September 1965.
acts openly hailed these actions as "a revolutionary step".\textsuperscript{92} Prior to this on 7 September President Sukarno had officially declared that "the sympathy and prayer of the Indonesian people are dedicated to the people of Pakistan who were fighting fiercely to maintain the freedom and sovereignty of their country and people".\textsuperscript{93}

Indonesia also tried to mould world public opinion in favour of Pakistan. While condemning Malaysia for extending support to India, Sukarno called upon all Muslim countries to come out openly on the side of Pakistan.\textsuperscript{94} Similarly, Foreign Minister Subandrio stated: "It is the obligation of all nations belonging to the 'new emerging forces' to give help to Pakistan to face India's aggression".\textsuperscript{95} Indonesia also tried to mobilize international opinion at the Afro-Asian Latin American Conference held in Havana in the first week of January 1966 by emphasizing Kashmir's right to self-determination.\textsuperscript{97}

\textsuperscript{92} Subandrio reportedly "appreciated the actions of Jakarta youths in their condemnation of India as an aggressor against Kashmir and Pakistan". \textit{The Times of India}, 22 December 1965.

\textsuperscript{93} Surya Narayan, n.82, p.13. Also see Bhagwan Das Arora, "Pakistan's role in India-Indonesia Relations during Sukarno Era", \textit{International Studies}, vol.17, no.2, (1975), pp.219-50.

\textsuperscript{94} \textit{Indonesia Herald}, 14 September 1965.

\textsuperscript{95} \textit{Asian Recorder}, vol.9, no.40, (1965), p.6696.

\textsuperscript{96} \textit{Indian Express}, 20 October 1965.

\textsuperscript{97} \textit{Dawn} (Karachi), 3 January 1966.
Apart from outright diplomatic help, Indonesia also provided substantial military aid to Pakistan. As later revealed by Air Marshal M. Asghar Khan, former chief of Pakistani Air Force, in his memoirs, "Indonesia gave Pakistan the key to her arsenal" and offered Pakistan "to take away from there (Indonesia) whatever ... would be useful to Pakistan in this emergency."

When he visited Indonesia during the second week of September 1965 carrying Ayub Khan's request for help, he was assured of "all Mig-19 planes and a few Mig-15 planes of Indonesian Air Force. They were to be dismantled and carried in Indonesian ship". Indonesia not only offered two submarines and four OSSA missile boats to Pakistan in breach of its agreement with the Soviet Union but its naval chief also discussed his plans for taking over the Andaman Islands from India.

Pakistan was thus so much indebted to Indonesia that it found it appropriate to acknowledge this before the international community. Z.A.Bhutto speaking at the General Debate profusely thanked the Indonesian government, and people "who gave us brave

98 Khan, n.45,p.44.
99 Ibid.,p.45.
100 According to Khan, "The submarines and missile boats arrived in Pakistan waters after the cease-fire due to distances involved but they stayed with us till such time as the chances of recurrence of hostilities had receded". These vessels were in fact ordered to proceed to Pakistan direct from their sea patrol. See ibid.,p.47.
and unstinted support in our moment of need and crisis." 101

Central Asia

Afghanistan, the Central Asian nonaligned, remained unaffected by the Pakistani religious propaganda on Kashmir. 102 The fact was that Pak-Afghan relations had become rather strained over a period of time on account of border problems and the issue of Pakhtoon people's demand for autonomy. Consequently, Afghanistan, despite its officially declared neutrality, remained hostile to Pakistan.

There was evidence that Afghanistan had intensified its military preparedness on the Pakistani border. According to official sources, the mobilization of forces and recalling of military personnel from leave was done due to the forthcoming election. 103 Pakistanis, however, remained unconvinced. As remarked by Marshal Asghar Khan, "... it was a gesture to India to offset ... the effect of Chinese moves on her northern borders." 104 In the meantime, Pakhtoon rebels had also intensified their raids inside the Pakistani territory and reports of fightings were

101 GAOR, session 20, plen. mtgs; vol. 1, p. 12.

102 Pakistan was counting on the favourable attitude of the Muslim world which could not be easily ignored by Afghan public opinion. They recalled that a number of Afghan volunteers had assisted Pakistan during the war in Kashmir in 1947. See Khan, n. 45, p. 100.

103 Kabul Times, 20 September 1965.

104 Khan, n. 45, p. 99.
properly covered by the Afghan Press and Radio. All these developments added to the Pakistani insecurity and provided some relief to India.

At the United Nations, too, Afghanistan queered Pakistan's pitch by referring time and again to the issue of Pakhtoonistan during the debate over Kashmir. At the General Debate where Pakistan tried hard to muster the Third World support on the issue of self-determination, it was the Afghan representative who came out openly to counter Pakistani claims that the creation of Pakistan was in accordance with the principle of self-determination. To Pakistan's embarrassment, he again stated on 14 October 1965: "The end of colonial era ... created, besides Kashmir other problems, one of which is Pakhtoonistan where a larger population than that of Kashmir was deprived of the right to self-determination".

**Arab World**

Indeed for both India and Pakistan the testing ground of their respective policy was the Arab continent, encompassing many nonaligned countries of West Asia and North Africa (WANA). While Pakistan projected the conflict as a war of Islam,

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107 Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 5-6.
108 Pakistanis compared the September 1965 war with the earlier Muslim conquests in India, i.e., war of Debul, war of Somnath and battle of Panipat. See Khan, n. 45, pp. 136-37.
and tried to evoke Islamic solidarity with the help of its two 'Cento allies' Iran and Turkey and the two nonaligned Saudi Arabia and Jordan, India highlighted its secular image and geared its diplomatic efforts within the fabric of nonalignment and depended on its time tested friendship with the UAR. The struggle was manifest on the various international forums and became a prestige issue when it was raised at the Casablanca Summit of twelve Arab Presidents and Kings held in September 1965.

Saudi Arabia and Jordan, the two West Asian nonaligned, were most vociferous in their support to Pakistan. Both considered their religious ties far more important and lent full support to Pakistan on the issue of self-determination to Kashmir.

Initially Saudi Arabia appeared to have been persuaded to an extent by the UAR to take a balanced view of the Indo-Pak dispute. The joint declaration of President Nasser and King Faisal in September 1965 did not mention the right of self-determination to Kashmir and merely asked India and Pakistan "to put an end to conflict by peaceful means". 109 A noted Saudi diplomat, Zeni Abidine Dabbagh, suggested that both disputing parties should sit down at a conference table to work out a solution for Kashmir and live in peace and security. 110

109 Hindustan Times, 8 October 1965.
110 Ibid.
However, the sobering influence of Nasser did not last long. At the General Debate of the UN in October 1965, the Saudi representative came out openly in support of the Pakistani plea for self-determination to Kashmir. It was, perhaps, the most forceful plea made by a nonaligned in the General Assembly regarding the validity of Pakistani claims:

The principle of self-determination was proclaimed at the Peace Conference of Versailles long before the founding of the United Nations, the same principle has been enshrined in the Charter of our Organization and later on elaborated and accepted as a fundamental human right by the whole human world community. The Maharaja of Kashmir acceded his state to India without ascertaining the wishes of the people of Kashmir... it is dangerous for any state (India) to take action on its own without the consent of the other party. It is no wonder that the war broke out... the people of Kashmir... cannot be muzzled for long when they became ever more conscious of their rights to determine their future.

He also suggested a plan for determining the future of Kashmir. Referring to the Security Council resolution as agreed upon by both the parties, he called upon India and Pakistan to withdraw their forces from Kashmir, while the state is being policed by the United Nations and after the

111 At the Casablanca Summit, President Nasser could not prevail over King Faisal. It was clear when Saudi Arabia along with Jordan sponsored a resolution to condemn India. See African Recorder, vol. 4, no. 21, October 9-22, 1965, pp. 1179-80.

112 GAOR, session 20, plen. mtgs., vol. 2, p. 16.
transitional period wherein both the disputing parties would honour each other's territorial integrity, a plebiscite be held under UN supervision regarding the merger of the state with either India or Pakistan.  

Apart from its unequivocal diplomatic support, Saudi Arabia also provided valuable foreign exchange to Pakistan to procure arms and ammunition and also offered its American supplied arms and spares during the September war of 1965.

Jordan, too, lent its full diplomatic backing to Pakistan during the September war. It was primarily instrumental in introducing a resolution at the Casablanca Summit espousing Pakistani claims of self-determination to Kashmir and later it canvassed in favour of evoking Islamic solidarity against the so-called Indian aggression.

Even on formal occasions, the Jordanian diplomats preferred to ventilate their reservations about the Indian policy. During the fourth anniversary of Al Arab in New Delhi, the Jordanian representative walked out of the gathering along with the Chinese delegate when M.C. Chagla began to address the gathering.

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113 Ibid.
114 According to the information available later, Saudi Arabia had provided Pakistan billions of dollars to Pakistan during its war days. Indian Express, 8 September 1966.
115 Times of India, 13 October 1965.
Pakistan found in Jordan a totally reliable ally in the Security Council of which it was an elected member. Jordan's advocacy of Pakistani cause transcended all limits when it absented itself from the voting on Resolution 211(1965) of 20 September 1965 on the plea that the cease-fire and withdrawal as contained in the resolution will not bring a solution unless the basic problem (Kashmir) is resolved.\textsuperscript{116} It found the Council resolutions inadequate as they did not mention the right to self-determination in Kashmir. Agreeing to the Pakistani position that there will be no permanent peace unless the Kashmir issue is resolved, the Jordanian representative stated:

\begin{quote}
The Security Council will be prolonging the difficulties between India and Pakistan and perpetuating the dispute if it does not take serious and definite steps to resolve the question of Kashmir, which has proved to be the real cause of the unpleasant situation between the two sister states.\textsuperscript{117}
\end{quote}

Evidently Jordan wanted to force the Security Council to go back to the earlier UN resolutions regarding plebiscite in Kashmir which were now totally unacceptable to India.


\textsuperscript{117} UN Doc. S/PV 1241, 18 September 1965, p.7. Also see Khan, n.2, pp.57-58.
Jordan also joined Saudi Arabia, Iran and Turkey to mobilize support at the General Assembly in favour of the Pakistani demand for self-determination to the people of Kashmir. Emphasizing the imperative of a permanent settlement of the dispute, Jordan's representative stated in the plenary session of the General Assembly:

The criteria of proposed settlement should be based on the principles of the Charter and various resolutions of the United Nations. We believe in the principle of self-determination for all peoples everywhere. The belief is strengthened by the great teaching of India's founding fathers Mahatma Gandhi and Pandit Nehru, who ... would not and did not exclude the people of Kashmir from this elemental faith of humanity. 118

However, as compared with Saudi Arabia, Jordan was more conscious of its ties with India while supporting the Pakistani stand and often its representative spoke of their brotherly ties with India. For instance, he prefaced his statement at the General Debate by saying, "It is sad to find ourselves in a position where perforce we have to make a value judgement and adopt a stand ... which appears to be partisan". He further added, "we are not in anyway prejudging or prejudicing the outcome of the plebiscite ... the people, may opt for India or opt for Pakistan". 119

118 GAOR, session 20, plen. mtgs., vol.2, p.4.
119 Ibid.
Jordan's strong espousal for self-determination in Kashmir came as a shock to India. The prevalent opinion in India was expressed by M.C. Chagla when he said, "Jordan had violated its pledge to India".\textsuperscript{120} It was reported that Jordan had asked for India's support when it sought election to the Security Council and had promised to remain neutral on the Kashmir issue.\textsuperscript{121} Apart from its Islamic ties with Pakistan, the other factor which seemed to have emboldened Jordan to take a forthright pro-Pakistani stand was the anti-Indian stand of the United Kingdom with which it had very close relationship at that point of time.

Apart from Jordan and Saudi Arabia, the other West Asian nonaligned country which specifically mentioned the right of self-determination to the people of Kashmir was Syria. Its permanent representative urged at the General Assembly that, "a solution may be found in accordance with the United Nations Resolutions which recognised the right of self-determination to the people of Kashmir".\textsuperscript{122} Perhaps it was the increasing Chinese influence in Syria and the rivalry with the UAR that led to such a hardened attitude on the part of Syria.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{120} \textit{Statesman}, 14 October 1965.
\item \textsuperscript{121} \textit{Indian Express}, 15 October 1965.
\item \textsuperscript{122} \textit{GAOR}, session 20, Plen. mtgs. vol. 2, p. 8.
\end{itemize}
Kuwait and Iraq were, however, less vocal in voicing their opinion in favour of Pakistan. Both preferred not to mention the right of self-determination in specific terms but only referred to the Casablanca resolution during the General Debate of September-October 1965. While Kuwait's delegate urged the United Nations to "undertake a review of fundamental factors of Kashmir problem on the basis of its earlier resolution", the Iraqi delegate felt that "the lasting solution of Kashmir must be based upon the principles of the Charter and the decision of the competent organs of the organisation". At the Casablanca Summit the two countries were comparatively less active in supporting the Pakistani cause, despite their earlier assurance to Pakistan.

Naturally, any direct mention of self-determination could have serious ramifications for Iraq in the context of the demand of Kurds within its own territory. And yet it found it necessary to mention the Pakistani demand in this context. So intense was the imperative of Islamic solidarity in West Asia. Later President Mohammad Arif reportedly expressed his willingness to mediate between India and Pakistan over the Kashmir issue.

123 Ibid., p.10.
124 Ibid., p.7.
125 See Indian Express, 11 October 1965.
126 Iraq's not so critical attitude was considered a partial success of India's nonaligned diplomacy in West Asia. See Hindustan Times, 26 March 1966.
Yemen and Lebanon the two West Asian nonaligned remained totally neutral on the issue of Indo-Pak dispute. Both preferred not to make any reference to this problem during the General Assembly debate of the twentieth plenary session. Lebanon had been officially neutral on Kashmir issue since the very beginning and despite provocation by the Muslim fundamentalists, the Lebanese government stood firm on its ground. It also expressed full appreciation of India's viewpoint. Public opinion and press took a balanced view of the conflict. In the case of Yemen, it was the UAR's decisive influence which countervailed Islamic propaganda in that state.

The UAR, being the premier nonaligned in the Arab arena, was once again in a predicament. If in 1962 it was to be a choice between an Afro-Asian China against a non-aligned India, this time the UAR had to choose between its claims of secularism and nonaligned bounds of friendship with India, and its Islamic ties with Pakistan. What added to the UAR's dilemma was the fact that Pakistan, along with its Arab friends such as Turkey and Iran from the aligned world and Jordan and Saudi Arabia, from the nonaligned, had spared no efforts to invoke Islamic solidarity against India. Thus

128 See Gupta, n. 66, pp. 326-27.
129 See Times of India, 10 October 1965. The UAR was literally fighting in Lebanon against the Saudi Arabia.
it could neither side openly with its nonaligned friend India as this would jeopardize its premier position in the Islamic world nor could it ignore the trust India reposed on it to counter Pakistani religious propaganda in the Arab world. However, it transpired soon that the UAR would not allow religion to mould her foreign policy posture. It decided to offer India diplomatic backing though in a rather subtle manner.

**UAR and Casablanca Summit**

This was quite evident during the Casablanca Summit of Arab Heads of State (13-17 September 1965). The conference which was attended along with the UAR by Lebanon, Sudan, Yemen, Algeria, Kuwait, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria, Libya and Morocco became a platform of diplomatic struggle between those who wanted the conference to pass a resolution condemning India as an aggressor and those who opposed it.\(^{130}\) Pakistan hoping much from this Arab gathering, had sent its information Minister, Khwaja Shahabuddin and S.K. Dahlvi, Ambassador to Switzerland, well in advance, to canvass in favour of the demand of self-determination to Kashmir and branding of India as an aggressor.\(^{131}\) While Saudi Arabia and Jordan, imbued with religious fanaticism, sponsored the Pakistani claim and mobilized the support of the remaining Arabs

\(^{130}\) For details see *Indian Express*, 11 October 1965.

\(^{131}\) India had sent V.K. Krishna Menon as its envoy to Casablanca but he reached there just before the Conference. For details see *African Recorder*, (New Delhi), vol. 4, no. 21 (1965), pp. 1179–80.
in the name of a so-called Jehad against India, Syria, Libya and Morocco all had promised to patronize the Pakistani viewpoint.\textsuperscript{132}

However, President Nasser's being the Chairman of the Casablanca Summit prevented the Pakistani supporters from succeeding. His public silence in this dispute was generally taken as his support for India. Through his astute diplomacy he made it possible for other participants like Lebanon, Sudan, Algeria and Kuwait not to be led away by the religious propaganda unleashed by Pakistan.\textsuperscript{133} Nasser, in fact, exercised his decisive influence on Iraq and Yemen in this regard. As rightly observed by an Indian correspondent, "... at Casablanca, he remained the one stumbling block in the path of Pakistan's hope. It is the magic of his working that he did it by his silence".\textsuperscript{134} Nasser eventually succeeded in thwarting the various moves by Jordan and Saudi Arabia to make any substantial pro-Pakistani reference in the Final Communique of the Conference. The communique issued on 17 September 1965 thus referred to Kashmir only in two sentences:

"... The Arab Kings and Heads of States once again call for general abstention from the policy of power, for solving international problems by peaceful means and for respecting the right of self-determination."

\textsuperscript{132} See \textit{Pakistan Times} 18 September 1965.

\textsuperscript{133} See A.N. Dhar, "Arab Attitude to Indo-Pak Conflict", \textit{Indian Express}, 11 October 1965.

\textsuperscript{134} Ibid.
The second sentence which formed a separate paragraph stated:

"Hence the Arab Kings and Heads of State express their disturbance at the armed clash between India and Pakistan and urge both countries to stop war immediately and put an end to the fighting through peaceful means in accordance with the principle and resolution of the Security Council".135

In between the two sentences, 'hence' was reportedly added by Jordan thereby connecting the two sentences. This in a derived sense lent meaning to the general demand of self-determination in the context of Kashmir. In any case, "It was nothing more than an attempt to satisfy Pakistan's friends, a concession given to them for accepting Nasser's stand".136

Later President Nasser made it a point to assure V. K. Krishna Menon that "the UAR subscribed to the principle of self-determination only in general terms of the UN Charter, that is in the context of colonialism only".137 Hailing the efforts of Nasser, Krishna Menon after his visit to Cairo stated on 26 September 1965 that "the Arab refusal to accept in toto Pakistan's plea for a plebiscite in Kashmir and that India was an aggressor was a very big political defeat for

137 Indian Express, 27 September 1965.
Pakistan". He further claimed "The Arab countries were the corps of our nonaligned policy." India thus had reasons to feel gratified at the outcome of the Casablanca Summit as "the land which has given birth to the religion on which Pakistan is based almost turned its back on Pakistan".

At the United Nations General Debate, the UAR again expressed reservations regarding the Pakistani version of the Indo-Pak conflict and the demand of self-determination to Kashmir. Taking a balanced view the UAR's Foreign Minister referred to the "potential repercussion of the conflict to the solidarity and common struggle of the people of Asia and Africa and hoped that both parties would continue to exert self restraint and co-operate with the Security Council."

However, as was the case in 1962, UAR's diplomatic help to India was not properly appreciated in Indian circles. It was felt that Egyptian neutrality had gone against the Indian interest. Indian newspapers had in fact started doubting UAR's pro-Indian stance well before the outbreak of hostilities. It was contended that Sheikh Abdullah was given an unusually warm reception by the UAR government during his visit to Cairo in March 1965. Despite the UAR officials explaining it as of no

139 Uhar, n.133.
140 GAOR, session 20, plen. mtgs., vol.1, p.7.
consequence and in no way affecting their stand on Kashmir, the Indian Press reacted sharply to that. The UAR Press and Radio were also charged with not reporting positively in favour of India. Capital was also made of Indian formal protest to the UAR government against the release of a Pakistan ship carrying the Sinews of war to be used against India. Though Nasser responded positively to Shastri's request for exercising his influence over China in the wake of the Chinese ultimatum, an impression was created that "he did not pay serious attention to Indian position". In an academic debate, M.R. Masani and M.C. Chagla, who were actively associated with Indian diplomacy in the Arab world, criticized the UAR for remaining neutral vis-a-vis the Indo-Pak conflict of 1965. Chagla held that while Nasser had supported India in 1962, it remained biased against India in 1965.

However, if it is true that Nasser did not come out openly against Pakistan, it is equally true that but for his diplomatic backing the whole Arab world would have stood up in unison to

141 See Das Gupta, n.13, pp.333-34.
142 For instance, it was felt in India that UAR's Press has deliberately avoided reporting U Thant's statement calling Pakistan an aggressor, see Indian Express, 11 October 1965 and also Manorama Shukla, Indo-Egyptian Relations, (Jodhpur, 1979), p.50. The UAR, however, repudiated this charge with evidence, see Gupta, n.66, p.319.
143 Indian Express, 5 October 1965.
144 Nasser had sent a message in this regard to China through Ali Sabry on 21 September 1965 while he was in Morocco, see Al Ahram (Cairo), 23 September 1965.
145 Shukla, n.141, p.50.
146 For details of this debate, see Rahman, n.136, pp.231-32.
protect the Pakistani interests. An outright support to India in any case would have isolated the UAR from the remaining Arab countries which were mostly committed to Pakistan on religious ground. Nasser's role was thus in the best tradition of nonalignment which binds India and the UAR together. "Ever since Brioni meeting between Nehru, Nasser and Tito in 1956, each country has been protecting the other's interest in its own region." 147

Barring the UAR, other North and Northeastern African states, however, preferred to go by their religious considerations and joined their counterparts in West Asia to decry India's stand on Kashmir. It was all too evident at the Casablanca Summit when most of these African nonaligned expressed their opinion in favour of a specific resolution condemning India. 148 As if it was not enough, some of these Islamic countries tried to raise the Kashmir issue at the African forums and gatherings.

To begin with Tunisia which had earlier withdrawn from the Casablanca Summit wanted to include the issue at the agenda of forthcoming summit of the Organization of African

147 Ibid., p. 231.
148 See Indian Express, 11 October 1986.
Unity (OAU). However, the efforts of President Bourguiba in this direction were frustrated by President Nasser who ensured that the political committee of the OAU refuse to admit this issue on the agenda on the ground that, "it was an Asian issue outside the scope of the African Summit and as such it could not be taken up without the presence of the parties to the dispute". Later the Tunisian representative Mongi Slim had to withdraw the proposal. Obviously it was a Tunisian ploy to condemn India on the platform of the Casablanca Summit. In any case, in India it was taken as a major diplomatic victory in the African continent.

However, at the General Debate of the twentieth plenary session of the General Assembly, Libya, Tunisia, Sudan and Morocco, the nonaligned countries holding membership of Arab League, preferred to support the Pakistani demand for self-determination to Kashmir. The Libyan representative said that "the final settlement be in accordance with the wishes of the people of the disputed territory and principles of the Charter". The Tunisian representative urged "to examine the very roots of this conflict to find an equitable solution and that ... the people of Kashmir should be allowed to exercise the right

149 See Sunday Standard (New Delhi), 24 October 1965
151 GAOR Session 20, plen mtgs. vol.2, p.3.
Morocco's delegate referred to the right to self-determination as "a fair and honest means of granting the people of Kashmir, a right which the international community has finally, owing to untiring effort on the international scene of India among others recognized as a right of other people in the world".\textsuperscript{153}

Similarly, Sudan, though a little subdued due to the UAR's influence, did make a reference at the General Debate to the right of self-determination when its representative spoke of "a lasting solution to the Kashmir dispute in conformity with the accepted principles of peaceful negotiation and self-determination".\textsuperscript{154}

Somalia, another North African nonaligned which later became a member of Arab League lent full support to Pakistan on the Kashmir issue. Apart from its Islamic links with Pakistan it had traditionally been concerned with the granting of self-determination to the exiled Somali community in the adjoining areas of French Somaliland, Ethiopia and Northern Kenya. The Somali community was dismembered by arbitrary frontiers in this part of North Africa by France, Britain and Italy at the end of nineteenth century.\textsuperscript{155} It is for these considerations that

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{152} Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{153} Ibid., p.14.
  \item \textsuperscript{154} Ibid., p.15.
\end{itemize}
Somalia had backed the Tunisian stand of raising the Kashmir issue for discussion on the platform of the OAU.\textsuperscript{156} It hoped to build public opinion in favour of the principle of self-determination so as to legitimize its claims on Eritrea which was occupied by Ethiopia. With this very perspective, the Somalian representative made a specific mention of self-determination at the UN:

\begin{quote}
The Somali people believe in right to self-determination ... the only real formula for an equitable and just solution of the Kashmir problem is based on the implementation of the principles of right to self-determination.\textsuperscript{157}
\end{quote}

Algeria was the only North African nonaligned which preferred to respect the Indian position vis-a-vis the Kashmir dispute. Respecting its nonaligned ties with India, it generally kept a low profile during the UN discussions and did not refer to Kashmir. Moreover, it also came very close to the Indian position by not mentioning the possible role of the United Nations on this subject.\textsuperscript{158}

\textbf{Africa South of Sahara}

Among the non-Arab African nonaligned, Ethiopia's support to India was most categorical. It officially expressed the fullest understanding of India's stand on 14 September 1965

\textsuperscript{156} See \textit{Sunday Standard}, 24 October 1965.
\textsuperscript{157} \textit{GAOR}, session 20, plen mtgs. vol. 2, p. 15.
\textsuperscript{158} See \textit{UNMC}, November 1965, pp. 140-41
when the conflict was going on.159 Later Emperor Haile
Selassie in a joint communique issued at the end of
President Radhakrishnan's state visit declared that, "self-
determination should apply only to colonial territories
which have attained independence and not to the part of
sovereign or independent states". The communique further
stated that "religion should not be allowed to influence
policy anywhere in the world" and recalled the Bandung
Principles and Cairo Declaration of the nonaligned countries
in 1964 regarding the "inviolability of the traditional
and established boundaries of the states". The communique
"condemned" the threat or use of force in settling territo-
rial or boundary disputes.160 At the United Nations, too,
the Ethiopian delegate gave an indirect support to India
by welcoming the cease-fire unconditionally.161 Obviously
it was totally averse to the exercise of self-determination
outside the colonial context as this would have weakened
its position vis-a-vis Somalian claims on Eritria.

The nonaligned from the former French Africa were
largely neutral but most of them referred to the political

159 Indian Express, 15 September 1965.
161 GAOR, session 20, plen. mtgs., vol. 1, pp. 4-5.
imperative of solving the Kashmir problem according to the UN resolutions. At the General Debate of September-October 1965, the representatives of many of these countries expressed their views. While the representative of Mali insisted, "In order to solve the fundamental problem there must be strict application of the Charter and the UN resolutions on the subject".162 Dahomey, another nonaligned from this region, while welcoming the cease-fire felt that the "fundamental problem has not been solved".163 Similarly, Guinea, another former West African nonaligned, opined: "A definitive solution must be found to the dangerous conflict in Kashmir which takes into account the sacred principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations".164 Chad, too, indirectly echoed the Pakistani demand when its representative felt that "the problem of divided nations should be solved through negotiations and general elections under the UN supervision".165 Senegal also stated: "Territorial disputes should be settled by peaceful means and having regard to the will of peoples concerned".166

On the other hand, Congo, Togo and Cameroon were the three nonaligned from the former French Western colonies which remained either silent on the issue or made statements in favour of the

162 Ibid., p.2.
163 Ibid., p.6.
164 Ibid., vol.2, p.18.
165 Ibid.
166 Ibid., vol.1, p.12.
Indian position, Congo preferred complete silence on the issue, Togo under strong Soviet influence, while supporting the application of self-determination and elections under UN supervision in Germany, Korea and Vietnam did not mention Kashmir.\textsuperscript{167} Cameroon instead of mentioning the right to self-determination and the UN resolutions on Kashmir simply hoped that, "India and Pakistan these two brothers in our great Afro-Asian family to refrain from any acts that might aggravate their present disagreements".\textsuperscript{168}

All the four nonaligned from West Africa-Ghana, Liberia, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone more or less took a non-partisan attitude and by not mentioning the Kashmir issue or the related UN resolutions helped India indirectly. Ghana, one of the founding members of the NAM, kept a low profile and while speaking in favour of a cease-fire urged the two countries to solve their problem around a conference table.\textsuperscript{169} Although such an attitude was welcome to India which wanted to solve its difference bilaterally, many in India felt that because of its nonaligned ties with India, Ghana ought to have come out more forthrightly in favour of India. They blamed the growing Chinese influence for not permitting Ghana to do so.\textsuperscript{170}

\textsuperscript{167} Ibid., vol.2, p.10.  
\textsuperscript{168} Ibid., p.4.  
\textsuperscript{169} Ibid., p.14.  
\textsuperscript{170} See Gupta, n.66, pp.332-33.
Liberia referred to the undeclared war between India and Pakistan without any specific comment and hoped for a peaceful solution. 171 Nigerian Prime Minister Abubakar Tafawa Balewa urged both India and Pakistan on 6 September after the fullfledged war broke out between the two countries "to agree to an immediate cease-fire as further deterioration might result in grave consequences for world peace". 172 At the General Debate its representative, while highlighting the need for a permanent settlement, underlined the need for a supervisory force for maintaining India Pakistan cease-fire". 173 On similar lines Sierra Leone urged both India and Pakistan" to apply their minds to a nonmilitary settlement of the dispute ... the problem is a political one and ... it is in that context that a lasting solution can be found". 174

The East African nonaligned, Malawi, Burundi and Tanzania did not express their views at all on this subject. 175 Zambia during the General Debate welcomed the cease-fire and urged for an agreed settlement. 175 Uganda spoke of a permanent solution to this very complex and delicate problem in accordance with the UN resolutions. 176 However, Kenya's attitude was more predisposed towards India when its representative, without

172 See Asian Recorder, vol. 9, no. 4, p. 695.
173 GAOR, session 20, plen. mtgs. vol. 1, p. 2.
174 Ibid., p. 3.
175 UNMC, vol. 2, no. 9 (1965) p. 56.
176 Ibid., p. 107.
commenting on the issue of self-determination or the UN resolutions, urged that "the UN should be allowed to facilitate a settlement, acceptable to both sides without threat or interference from the outside". Kenya's delegate also lent support to the Resolution 209(1965) and 210(1965) of the Security Council which had called for an unconditional cease-fire. Kenya along with its historical ties with India was also averse to the granting of self-determination beyond its anti-colonial context in view of its constant bickering with Somalia on this issue.

Outside Afro-Asia

Outside Afro-Asia, Cuba being the only Latin American member of the nonaligned movement, kept itself aloof from the happenings of the Indian subcontinent. Cuba's silence on the Indo-Pak conflict was complete both within and outside the United Nations and much in line with its attitude during the Sino-Indian conflict of 1962. In view of an apparent Soviet neutrality on the question, it was perhaps logical on the part of Havana not to take any interest in this subject.

However, Cyprus, the nonaligned from the Mediterranean supported India unequivocally, as it had earlier done during


179 Cyprus officially declared on 2 October 1965 that "the right is on the side of India". Indian Express, 3 October 1965.
the Sino-Indian conflict. Being the Chairman of the informal Afro-Asian group at the United Nations, it thwarted the attempts of pro-Pakistani members to raise the Kashmir issue at the gathering. In particular, it disallowed the Irani proposal that Z.A.Bhutto, the Pakistani Foreign Minister, be allowed to propagate his views through this forum and that a special meeting be held for the same. As Chairman, the representative of Cyprus pointed out that special meetings are held exclusively to hear the heads of the state. Although at the United Nations, Cyprus decided not to comment on the Indo-Pak conflict, in October 1965 during President Radhakrishnan's visit to the country, it officially endorsed the Indian stand by declaring that "the sympathy and support of Cyprus is in the side of India".

From the standpoint of the present study the Yugoslav response was perhaps most vital, as it was the only significant nonaligned actor outside the pale of Afro-Asia which had constantly taken active interest in matters relating to nonaligned countries. Not only that it enjoyed a considerable prestige in the Afro-Asian region, but its attitude also influenced the world opinion at large. India, too, depended heavily on Yugoslav support as it was along with Yugoslavia and the UAR that India had forged the Brioni-Belgrade frame of Third World co-operation.

180 See *Asian Recorder*, vol.11, no.44 (1965), p.6748. The Chairmanship of this informal gathering used to rotate from month to month alphabetically.

181 Ibid.
Even before large-scale hostilities broke out in the Indian subcontinent, Yugoslavia had assured India of its "full appreciation of Indian stand on Kashmir". This was quite in line with President Tito's firm opposition to take recourse to arms to solve controversial territorial and ethnic as well as border problems. In a Television interview Tito had stated that "military solution to ethnic and frontiers problems was absolutely contrary to the principle of non-aligned and peace-loving countries ... there are problems similar to those between India and Pakistan in most countries of the world".

Evidently Yugoslavia was against the Pakistani propaganda for raising the Kashmir issue on the grounds of self-determination. At the United Nations, the Yugoslav representative hinted at his country's reservation about the Pakistani claims when he urged India and Pakistan to show more sense of responsibility and realism. In his address to the General Assembly the Yugoslav representative referred to the right of self-determination exclusively in the context of granting independence to colonial people. Apart from its consideration for its ties with India, Yugoslavia seems to be clearly

183 See Tito's interview at Cairo on 11 October 1964, in n.9, pp.68-69.
184 Times of India, 25 September 1965.
guided by the domestic ramifications of applying this principle in its absolute meaning. Many nationalities in Yugoslavia, especially the Croats were clamouring for more autonomy and its espousal of a plebiscite in Kashmir would have set a dangerous precedent for them.

The most vital point on which Yugoslavia gave valuable support to India was the issue of the Chinese ultimatum to India. Tito openly chided the Chinese when in a statement he referred to the

"... acts of Chinese leaders whose aggressive policy has this time also manifested in threats and demonstrations of force towards India. Such a policy deserves to be condemned by all as it constitutes a direct threat to the world peace". 186

During President Radhakrishnan's visit to Yugoslavia just after the cease-fire, Tito declared in clear terms that Kashmir was an integral affair of India. The joint communique signed by the two leaders stated that "the conflict was brought about as a result of external attempt to impose by force concepts and solutions on the question which constitutes an internal affair of India". The communique further criticized "the Anglo-American efforts to support Pakistan and the Chinese readiness to exploit Indo-Pakistani differences to achieve its political ends in Asia". 187

186 Hindustan Times, 6 October 1965.
187 Indian Express, 5 October 1965.
The firm affirmation of President Tito of non-interference in Indo-Pak affairs and his forthright recognition of Kashmir as an internal matter of India were hailed in India as "the most significant contribution by a "leader of non-aligned world who carries a great deal of influence in Afro-Asia as well as in the communist countries. Never before has India received such unequivocal support on Kashmir".\(^{188}\) Almost all national newspapers wrote editorials on the positive stand of Yugoslavia. For instance, the \textit{Indian Express} wrote, "President Radhakrishnan's visit has dramatically revealed Yugoslavia as a valued and trusted friend from whose co-operation India stands to benefit greatly".\(^{189}\)

Earlier, during President Nasser's visit to Yugoslavia both the UAR and Yugoslavia had expressed their readiness to offer good offices to the governments of India and Pakistan.\(^{190}\) However, after their mediation offer was not taken serious note of, Yugoslavia came out openly to support India. Foreign Minister Nikezic strongly vindicated India's nonaligned status in the wake of Pakistani allegation that India had mortgaged its nonalignment by acquiring arms from the two Super Powers.

\(^{188}\) \textit{Hindustan Times}, 5 October 1965.

\(^{189}\) \textit{Indian Express}, 6 October 1965.

\(^{190}\) The Tito-Nasser joint communique did not mention Kashmir issue per se but only appealed to both parties to discontinue military operations, an immediate cease-fire and return of respective armed forces behind the cease-fire line. See \textit{African Recorder}, vol.4, no.20(1965), p.1164.
especially after 1962. During this phase Yugoslavia's commitment to India was total. This became evident when Pakistani Foreign Minister Bhutto was not even encouraged to visit Yugoslavia.

Summation

In the final analysis, the nonaligned countries which expressed their diplomatic support to India were Yugoslavia, Ethiopia, Cyprus and to a considerable extent the UAR. In contrast the nonaligned which came out openly to support Pakistan's plea for self-determination to Kashmir were Indonesia, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iraq from Asia, and Somalia, Morocco, Libya, Tunisia, Mauritania, Sudan, Mali, Dahomey, Senegal and Chad in Africa. The Nonaligned which strictly followed a neutral course were, Cuba from Latin America, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Kampuchea, Burma, Lebanon, Yemen, Cameroon, Togo, Congo, Ghana, Zambia, Malawi, Burundi, Tanzania, Uganda, Angola, Central African Republic, Guinea, Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Tanganyika, Algeria and Kenya from the larger Afro-Asian world.

Thus out of forty-six countries that had participated at the Cairo Summit of nonaligned states (apart from India) only four came out openly to extend their diplomatic support to India. On the contrary, fifteen nonaligned extended their support

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191 See Hindustan Times 8 October 1965.
192 See Hindustan Times 2 December 1965.
to India. On the contrary, fifteen nonaligned extended their support to the Pakistani demand for a plebiscite to Kashmir. The remaining twenty-seven preferred not to pass any judgement on the merit of India-Pakistan question, though they held different shades of neutrality. For instance, Nepal, in course of time, was persuaded by India to support its stand on the issue of self-determination and Afghanistan, despite referring to the right of self-determination in Kashmir, embarrassed Pakistan by discounting latter's claim of being a champion of this right. Similarly, Yemen and Lebanon in West Asia, and Algeria and Kenya in Africa remained largely predisposed towards the Indian position.

Evidently the most significant dimension of the non-aligned response was the expressed commitment of about sixteen nonaligned towards the issue of self-determination in Kashmir both within and outside the United Nations. This was, indeed, a great success of Pakistani diplomacy. After railing in its attempt to bring to bear a decisive influence of the Anglo-American bloc over India, Pakistan had increasingly looked for the support of the larger Third World. In this pursuit, it fully utilized the sensitivities of newly independent Afro-Asian countries regarding the issue of self-determination, despite the fact that these post-colonial states were committed to the doctrine of self-determination in a general way in the context of their historic struggle against colonialism. But Pakistan took full advantage of the evasive nature of this
doctrine and built up a rather convincing case for self-
determination by relating it with the various other liberation
struggles. On the other hand, Indian case on Kashmir suffered
from an inherent weakness on account of various assurances
given by its leaders at the UN and which had led to the
passing of a number of resolutions regarding the imperative
of plebiscite in Kashmir. Consequently, India found it hard
to convince the larger world public opinion regarding the
fact of constant Pakistani aggression on Kashmir and the
irrevocability of Kashmir's accession to India.

As has been detailed in the earlier part of this chapter,
when the issue of self-determination was taken up at various
Afro-Asian and nonaligned conferences, India tried to clarify
that this right cannot be applied to the post-colonial states
in the same manner it was being applied on the issue of trust
territories and other colonial questions. However, Pakistan
cleverly referred to various resolutions of Afro-Asian
gatherings and nonaligned conferences on the validity of self-
determination as a general principle. Bhutto, in the course
of the UN General Debate, circulated the section of the docu-
ment adopted at the Cairo Summit of 1964 which had referred
to the principle of self-determination to bolster its argu-
ments on Kashmir. It is no surprise, therefore, that a large
number of nonaligned countries supported the issue of plebiscite
and self-determination in Kashmir as a part of their general commitment to this right. Most of the African nonaligned which supported Pakistani claims can be put in this category. Somalia and some of the other Africans also saw in this question an excellent opportunity of legitimizing their claims in their own arena.

Pakistan by the virtue of its Islamic ties with the Arab nonaligned also received ready support from a large number of them. While Saudi Arabia presented a very strong justification for a plebiscite in Kashmir, Jordan, forgetting its commitments to India, went all out to safeguard Pakistani interest at the Security Council. So overwhelming was the appeal of Islamic solidarity that even a country like Iraq, having potentials of a secessionist movement in Kurdistan, indirectly vindicated the demand of self-determination in Kashmir.

In fact, but for the towering influence of President Nasser which to a great degree neutralized the pro-Pakistani attitudes in his region, the entire Arab ronaligned world from Asia to Africa would have extended its full support to Pakistan. It is, indeed, ironic that the unique role played by President Nasser is not properly appreciated in various quarters. As has been described earlier, it was his skilful diplomatic manoeuvring that did not allow the Casablanca Summit of Arab League to take an anti-Indian
stand. At the African Summits, too, he pre-empted the moves of Tunisia and Somalia to make an issue of Kashmir. India, in any case, would not have benefited so much had the UAR come out openly in its favour.

Another maker of Brioni-Belgrade framework of nonalignment, Yugoslavia, did come out openly to defend India's position. Its open condemnation of China, Indonesia and other Arab friends of Pakistan provided valuable diplomatic relief to India. In a sense, it atoned for its silence vis-a-vis the Sino-Indian conflict. It is noteworthy that India, the UAR and Yugoslavia had developed quite a fruitful relationship during the mid-sixties which eventually ushered in a formal triangular cooperation among them.

However, apart from the UAR and Yugoslavia, the remaining nonaligned did not give much importance to India's nonaligned status. Most of them did not distinguish between an "Afro-Asian" Pakistan and a "nonaligned" India. Pakistan's alignment with the Western Power Bloc did not prevent it from utilizing its linkages in the Afro-Asian world. During the UN debates Afro-Asian solidarity and the nonaligned movement were referred as the two sides of the same coin.

On the contrary, the emerging contradictions between Afro-Asianism and nonalignment provided Pakistan a unique opportunity of mobilizing support against India of those countries which had reservations about the Indian perspective on this issue. Indonesia can be singled out as the case in point. The struggle
for leadership between Sukarno and Nehru, which began at the Belgrade Summit itself, had reached a climax in the wake of a joint Indonesian and Chinese efforts of holding a Second Bandung. Indonesia, sore at India's insistence on including Malaysia and the Soviet Union in this conference, thus launched a full-fledged diplomatic attack against India and also did whatever it could to encourage Pakistan militarily.

The Indo-Pak conflict of 1965 was unique in terms of relatively lesser involvement of the two Super Powers. In fact, the various Security Council resolutions on this issue were jointly sponsored by both the Soviet Union and the United States. Against this setting, the nonaligned were relatively free to express their opinion and to intervene in the conflict if they had so desired. Yet the nonaligned, by and large, kept a low profile and not a single concrete mediation offer came from them. This was in contrast to their role vis-a-vis Sino-Indian conflict wherein about a dozen nonaligned countries had tried to mediate between the two disputants. Thus, the Indo-Pakistani conflict of 1965 brought in sharp focus the decline of the nonaligned peace-making role; a process which had began after they failed to resolve the Sino-Indian conflict.