CHAPTER IV

THE CONDUCT OF AFGHAN DIPLOMACY

Afghan attitude towards negotiations on Pashtunistan

Successive Afghan governments have found themselves inextricably locked in deep policy dilemmas over Pashtunistan. In order to evaluate Afghan negotiating performance we have to examine Kabul's level of concern with the issue and also Pakistan's refusal to compromise or even to make reciprocal concessions in the course of negotiations. While these questions merit close attention, we have first to discuss the salient features of the psychological dimensions of Afghan negotiations over Pashtunistan. The examination of the Afghan negotiating style pertains to a definite cultural system, and we can relate historical and political constraints to the nation's attitude to negotiation.¹

The rule of an absolute monarchy has left its mark on Afghan professional diplomats, who even when they have excellent credentials have a tendency to exercise limited discretion in order not to exceed the brief given from Kabul, the vantage point of royal authority. The influence of individual personalities has always been important and in

---

¹. For further details on attitudes to negotiations of different cultural systems, see, Jack Sawyer and Harold Guetzkow, "Bargaining and Negotiation in International Relations", in H.C. Kelman (ed.) International Behaviour, New York 1965).
the case of an ardent Pashtun nationalist like Daud, the nation's negotiatory style gains a resilience which it otherwise lacks. Whenever the ruling elite in Kabul was torn into factions, this could jeopardise chances of bargaining success. The expansionism which Pakistan has inherited as part of its imperial legacy from Britain imposes a defensive approach on Afghan diplomacy. 2

No Early Settlement envisaged in Afghan diplomatic goals

The Afghan attitude to negotiations on the Pashtunistan dispute ever since it initiated its diplomacy by sending Najibullah Khan as a special envoy to Karachi for talks with Mohammad Ali Jinnah in 1947 has been a striving towards distant goals. The concern for an early settlement of this issue area does not appear to have been a normative prerequisite. Within the bureaucracy even on the question of the legitimacy of the Durand Line ad hoc approaches were favoured till 1956 when a foreign office spokesman clearly rebuffed Pakistani attempts to justify the denial of Pashtun claims in the light of the "legitimacy" of the imperial


3. For discussion of the Problems of issue area analysis, see, James N. Rosenau, The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy; (New York, 1971), Chaps. 5 and 13.
pattern on the frontier.

Support to the advocates of Pashtunistan did not entail accountability for political action in any meaningful way till Afghanistan had categorically rejected the Durand Line. Kabul's passive mentality is evident from the fact that although there were three wars between India and Pakistan in 1947-49, 1965, and 1971, Afghanistan did not focus on the opportunities its initiatives might have presented during these major conflicts. It is symptomatic of the Afghan leadership's thinking that Pashtunistan was relegated to a lower priority at the crucial junctures and an inward looking mentality prevailed instead of organising a diplomatic thrust. 4

However, by not setting any deadline to introduce a note of urgency, Kabul gave an advantage to Pakistani negotiatory behaviour to adopt manipulative tactics against Afghanistan. Pakistan used its versatile diplomats to dilute the Afghan commitment to national goals by appealing to Islamic unity in behind the scenes maneuvering and hinting at an ultimate settlement in "the long run".

4. Whenever Pakistan's survival has been at stake the Afghan rulers have relaxed their Pashtunistan advocacy as they believed Pakistan was needed to serve as a buffer against Indian expansion. That is why King Zahir Shah has said: "if Pakistan was in trouble Afghanistan was bound to be affected". See Institute For Defence Studies and Analyses (News Review on South Asia), no.239, May 1972, p.3.
Afghan diplomats were uncertain and hesitant to lay down a time limit for peaceful settlement of Pashtunistan.

Avoidance of risk

Afghanistan had the great advantage of proximity to Pashtunistan, but it did not utilise this advantageous situation effectively. There was always in Kabul an exaggerated anxiety about Pakistan's actual or assumed superioriry. The bureaucracy of the foreign office preferred a large margin of safety. Not suprisingly Pakistan skillfully used its influence in Kabul and other Asian capitals to generate a paranoic compulsion among the Afghan elite to avoid even reasonable risk.

With hindsight it can be confidently stated that Kabul had an erroneous appraisal of Pakistan forces. The unabated rivalry between the different ethnic components of Pakistan was also not taken into consideration in evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of Pakistan. Afghanistan could have aimed at diplomatic success if it had gauged the relationship with Pakistan in more confident terms and not ruling out open confrontation. An aggressive bargaining

5. Pakistan through its effective religious propaganda and skillful diplomatic manipulation had created an influential lobby for itself among the top clergy and the Pro-Iranian Persianised elements in the ruling elite. For detail, see, M. Omer Hewadyar, op. cit., Chapter V.
style with Pakistan at the time when it was engaged in bitter fighting with India. At times when Kabul had the capacity to shape the bargaining environment with Pakistan, Afghan diplomacy hardly comprehended the weakness of the opposing side.

Kabul, in fact, appeared to lack faith in the rightness of its own position and allowed Pakistani self-righteousness to prevail. It was only Mohammad Daud during his Prime Ministership who felt a deep commitment to the national goal and was prepared to challenge the self-deluding fantasies of the foreign office bureaucracy, and demand the mobilisation of effective pressures on Pakistan.

**Domestic Factors**

Kabul's diplomatic actions on Pashtunistan were narrowly conceived and lacked the element of public diplomacy which is a normal feature of the contemporary international scene and serves as a counterweight to manipulative bargaining behaviour of the antagonist. The ruling elite did not permit the organisation of public involvement on foreign policy on a regular basis. Even though there is reason to believe that Daud would have favoured the organisation of an Afghan council of foreign affairs, the bureaucracy

---


found the intrusion of outside expertise in its exclusive domain quite jarring.

Although the Afghan Parliament had repudiated all treaties with Britain affecting the status of the Pashtuns as early as 1949, the establishment in Kabul did not permit popular pressure to build up. Every effort was made to exclude ideas which would suggest support to the national liberation movement in Pashtunistan; parliamentary activity was confined to strong rhetorical demands accompanied by deliberate vagueness and ambiguity when speaking of the nation's bargaining strategies and tactics. To preempt criticism, the Government occasionally made gestures to soften public opinion, like naming a square in Kabul as Pashtunistan square.

Pakistan also used its influence in religious circles to split the ranks of the supporters of Pashtunistan, both inside Parliament and among the individuals and factional groups. Sometimes the negotiators chosen were not firmly committed to Pashtunistan and there was constant leakage of information to Pakistan.

Crisis Diplomacy and Foreign Mediation

The Pashtun spirit of heroic efforts during crisis was not internalised in the negotiating methods.


The crisis-oriented tactics of Pakistan were not opposed by sufficient determination. On the two occasions on which the Shah of Iran used his good offices to help resolve the outstanding issues between Afghanistan and Pakistan, the Afghan government had to face a grave impasse over the degree of its commitment to Pashtunistan. Unable to move decisively in the crisis-situations, Kabul was thrown into confusion when Pakistan obtained Iran's mediation.

Iran's definition of the situation allowed little or no distinction to be drawn between an issue of colonial oppression over a non-state nation (NSN) and ordinary territorial dispute. Afghanistan failed to expose the absurdity of this approach since it did not analyse the imperialist policy of the mediator, Iran. The compromising tendency among Afghan diplomats was based upon the utopian premise that on being presented with a plan for ensuring peace and cooperation between the two countries, Pakistan would adopt a new policy on Pashtunistan based on a psychological understanding of the Pashtuns.

The imperialist minded politicians and decision-makers of Pakistan, however, only intended to pull the wool over the eyes of wide sections of public opinion in the Third World and continue with their wars and violence against the Pashtuns.10

10. For detail, see, M. Omer Hewadyar, _op.cit._, chapter 5.
Afghan naivety and Pakistani deception

Pakistan could achieve diplomatic triumphs in its regional diplomacy as well as in conference diplomacy because it was difficult to find in Afghan words or actions the indications of a detailed and clear policy. At the United Nations and in the Nonaligned Movement (NAM) Pakistan succeeded in an emasculation of Afghanistan's original goals on Pashtunistan. The Afghan negotiators have been subjected to intense pressures by most of the Islamic countries and the Western block, countries not to rock the boat for Pakistan over the Pashtunistan issue.

Thus Afghanistan has not been able to determine the decisional and communication factors which have given a bargaining edge to Pakistan. The conscious distortion of the Pashtunistan issue as a pro-Indian ploy (or a pro-Hindu charade) through which Pakistan sought to isolate Afghanistan in the Islamic world, was not met by any compensatory gambit. The chief Afghan concern was to refute the idea that Pakistan's informal imperialism can serve as a means of resolving the national problem of Pashtunistan.

Kabul, however, did not display and high capacity to mobilise world public opinion. Nor has Afghanistan raised

---

11. Public understanding of such a failure was well indicated by answers to our interview questions, See, Interview responses chart, and M. Omer Hewadyar, op. cit., chapter 5.
the costs of occupation of Pashtunistan significantly except during Daud's first Prime Ministership. Kabul was shown a chronic inability to bring information to bear in a timely and effective manner to refute Pakistan's highly deceptive speculations.

**Afghan Policy – making**

A macroscopic analysis of Afghan decision-making would have to attempt to list the more salient reasons why the Pashtunistan doctrine has come up against political-diplomatic and institutional obstacles:

1. **Historical interpretation**: The rationale frequently advanced against the Pashtunistan demand is based on the superficial logic which dates the beginning of the modern Afghan state to Abdur Rahman (1880-1901) instead of to that of Ahmad Shah Durrani. The hegemonic aspirations of Afghanistan's neighbours elicit a favourable response in this type of analysis and Afghanistan is given the character of a client state which owes its creation to foreign European powers.

2. **Obfuscation of the nationalist struggle**: Central to the anti-Pashtun posture and attitude is the denial of the impressive historical evidence pertaining to the Pashtun nationalist struggles of the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries.12

---

3. **Dimensions of Pashtun control**: Looking at the dynamics of Pashtun political development from a historical point of view, the replacement of Pashtun rule in India by that of the Moghuls has to be carefully noted when considering the generic elements responsible for the fragmented social and ethnic environment influencing the nature and extent of mobilisation for Pashtunistan.

4. **Impact of the Great Game**: The British dismembered Pashtunkhwa and annexed and occupied the eastern part - Kuza Pashtunkhwa - because the magnitude of catastrophe which hit the Pashtuns was set out against the background of an encounter between two mighty powers, the British and Tsarist Empires. It is only by ignoring this cognitive aspect that the vital fact is ignored that the Afghans are unreconciled to the dismemberment of their country.\(^\text{13}\)

**Decision-making process in Kabul**

A study of the chronology of the negotiating positions taken by Kabul would show that the heart of the policy dilemma facing Afghanistan is in the lack of balance between its explicit commitment to Pashtunistan on a long term basis and the short term situational perspective. Our empirical investigation suggests that inputs with policy relevance

---

came up against routinised procedures which prevented extensive commitment of resources.\textsuperscript{14} It is, therefore, of special interest to enquire regarding the exercise of selectivity in the Afghan decision-making process.

Perceptions regarding the efficiency of foreign offices in Third World countries differ sharply, and particularly in the case of Afghanistan and precision of analysis has not been enhanced by a predisposition on the part of observers to concentrate on highly visible government actions. This approach ignores the role of influential groups in utilising the channels of communication within government. It is not surprising then that the collapse of the Pashtunistan issue structure in 1963 according to the prevailing view adopted by well known scholars was related to predictions about Daud Khan as a key actor in domestic politics. The visible public events must be supplemented by informed and accessible survey of wide areas of Afghan political life, bureaucracy and culture, which is only possible in terms of the Elite-Mass Opinion Structure and the communication flow through which political interests are served.

The question as to how the "anti-Daud coalition" came into being has received only cursory attention in political literature and many analysts nourished the illusion that high priority to Pashtunistan was explained by the personal characteristics of Daud Khan as a political leader rather than as a problem of identifying conflicting ideological, political and cultural commitments. In a state like Afghanistan the possibility of the existence of foreign linkages with domestic groups must be carefully examined whenever the distribution of decision-making power is significantly altered.

a) Gap in Policy Planning

Our opinion survey reinforces the observation policymakers in Kabur did not recognise the value of countering the oversimplified theoretical generalisations emanating from Pakistan and Iran. Both the Superpowers, the Soviet Union and the United States (the latter often sharing a common cultural and philosophical outlook with Britain) provided themselves with diagnostic and predictive models which were sceptical of the claims of Pashtuns. Even when the Soviets considered practical specific options favouring Pashtunistan, an analysis of Soviet theoretical

writing and speculations reveals attempts to manipulate Afghan interests rather than any unequivocal commitment to Afghan national identity.16

In projecting the parameters of probability within which Afghanistan could pursue the commitment to Pashtunistan, the passive mentality of Afghan decision-makers is clearly reflected in the empirical evidence obtained in our survey. Afghanistan's policy objectives were misinterpreted and minimised by the other international actors because in the cases examined it would appear that Kabul was more interested in periodic diplomatic thrusts rather than achieve a new course over the long run through extensive planning and evaluation of alternatives.

The conceptual pressure for change in the status quo could only be generated by relevant generalisations which in turn would create new symbols for Afghan diplomacy. The data of our Survey suggests that Afghan diplomatic tasks were linked to random conceptual fragments derived from domestic politics and therefore permitted opportunities to be lost which would have created new syndromes permissive of and endorsing the rationale of Pashtunistan.17

---


17. For detail, see, Interview Responses Chart.
(b) **Time Pressure and failure to innovate policy**

The sequence of the different patterns of Afghan-Pakistan relations points to the effect of the time-factor on the range and type of diplomatic options. Both Afghan domestic decision-making and foreign policy communication processes were geared to interim objectives rather than the long term goal. The historical experience of the Pashtuns and their cultural cohesion and political unification were not, except at a rhetorical level, used to affirm faith in bargaining goals through a maximalist policy orientation on Pashtunistan. Afghan decision-makers opted for a time frame appropriate to a minimalist status quo oriented regime which was chary of using its commitment power.

Under the guise of realistic appraisals, decision makers in Kabul reduced the time pressure needed for reinforcing strategic and political interests. A long term effect to alter the status quo is not a substitute for short term strategies which utilise a higher level of commitment during a short term situation. This repeated unwillingness to mobilise resources were regarded as demonstrations of lack of intent.\(^\text{18}\) It also provided little feedback for innovating policy and ultimately undermined Afghan prestige and influence. The definition of the situation as a long-term one resulted in reducing the possibilities of a stimulating examination

---

of contemporary policy alternatives in the Afghan foreign office. Few allowances were made for changing conditions within East and West Pakistan and within Iran and the differing perspectives of the two Super powers, the United States and Soviet Union were not scrutinised for concrete payoffs on the Pashtunistan issue.

Kabul's "patience" appeared to imply a lack of clarity of objectives. Our survey shows that the judgement of Afghan participants and competent observers differ and most of the latter believe that a more active and impatient mentality would have strengthened Afghan bargaining power with Pakistan.

(c) Operationalising the commitment to Pashtunistan:

1) Bilateral Negotiations: Afghanistan's diplomatic and military relationships have been closely related to the task of preventing violation of her territorial integrity. It can be plausibly argued that Amanullah and Nadir Shah both tended to use diplomacy and armed force as defensive instruments. The gap between aspirations and performance in bilateral negotiations on the Pashtunistan question may be due to an inbuilt indeterminacy which derives from the narrow and simplistic focus on defensive options. In the diplomatic duel with Pakistan Kabul was not able to utilise the powerful wave of Pashtun nationalism and frequently adopted a passive wait and see approach after initially showing high motivation.

19. Ibid.
Both the dynastic and bureaucratic thinking methodically exploited the Pashtunistan issue but checked the operationalisation of the commitment except in the form of tactical gambits.

ii) **Multilateral Negotiations:** The broader strategic setting of Afghanistan provides opportunities for multilateral diplomatic conduct. Indeed public statements by Soviet leaders show that Afghanistan sought to obtain incremental adjustments in its favour on the Pashtunistan question. Multilateral channels including the non-aligned movement were used by the Afghan government to reaffirm its commitment to Pashtunistan. The dogged attempts of the Afghan government at multilateral fora were limited to comforting idioms and did not form part of a diplomacy signalling strong resolution for solving a core problem.

iii) **Crisis Negotiations:** The situation in March 1955 and later on in September 1961, both illustrate Afghanistan's diplomatic needs during crisis situations. There are indications that Afghan decision-makers who signalled strong commitments to Pashtunistan during crisis were able to maneuver for marginal advantages. It is difficult to give an impartial verdict on the outcome of Afghan crisis diplomacy but the experience in both 1955 and 1961 suggests that the Afghan

---

20. See, M. Omer Hewadyar, *op. cit.*, Chapter IV.
willingness to mobilise diplomatic resources improved significantly and both formal and informal channels of communication were used effectively.  

iv) The Legal Context of Negotiations of Pashtunistan: The Pashtunistan question has legal peculiarities which may favour pressures for changes in the status quo. Afghanistan has consistently rejected the Durand Line and this has put Pakistan in a disadvantageous position. Afghan policy makers, however, made no effort to formulate a doctrine which would call for non-recognition of Pakistan's "unlawful" territorial gains. The administrative limits of the British Government in India certainly did not extend to the Pashtun tribal area and Pakistan as the successor state has had to handle its claims by legal improvisation. Apart from trying a few small steps in this direction, Afghanistan has not resorted to international law as a vehicle for its interests in Pashtunistan.

The role of cognitive policy making variables for overcoming the legacy of imperialism

The preceding account was designed to provide an overview of the conduct of Afghan diplomacy linking the analysis of the Afghan elite foreign policy decision-makers to political and psychological approaches, concepts and

21. See, Ibid, Chapter IV.

methods from the perspective of the Pashtunistan issue.

To evaluate Afghanistan's use of negotiation, the inherent linkage between its foreign policy conduct on the Pashtunistan issue and Afghan domestic opinion must be assessed in terms of policy relevance. Kabul's perception of Pashtunistan as a political phenomena varied from high (or very important) to low (or relatively minor and technical). In establishing "identity references" with other states on this issue, cultural, structural, institutional and psychological factors were important for linkage groups, within Afghanistan. Pakistan's continuation of imperialism by other means can be seen as the paradigm of both direct and indirect types of colonialism.

The theory and practice of Afghan diplomacy was found deficient in relating the unfolding events since 1947 to intrinsic and systematic nature of Pakistani colonialism. It is only through cognitive approaches at different levels of analysis that the general explanatory problems of the Pashtunistan issue can be comprehended.

23. Karl Deutsch has observed: "A linkage group becomes much more susceptible to the imputs from abroad if its ties to the democratic system are weakened" Karl Deutsch, "External Influences on the Internal Behaviour of States," in R.B. Farrel (ed.) Approaches to Comparative International Politics. (Evenston Ill, 1966) p.12.


Cultural and Communication processes

In international diplomacy and negotiations, the party which has control over communications is at an advantage. Again communication and cultural policies are necessarily and closely interrelated. Pakistan took advantage of its advantageous position in communications by controlling the agenda in bilateral and multilateral forums. 26

The most prominent feature of the Afghan political system was its fragmentation on account of the disruption of the policy-making and implementation processes. The inter-elite factions and coalitions could not evolve a durable cultural offensive on the basis of the Pashto language. This is aptly illustrated by the following comment by J.W.T. Cooper:

"The official Pakistani reaction to Afghanistan's call for the creation of Pashtunistan is that the whole thing is a "stunt" to cover up the growing unpopularity of the Kabul Government. The claim of affinity of language is untrue, say the Pakistanis, because the King and his relations who hold most of the top posts in the Government do not speak Pashto (the Pathan language) but Persian," 27

The review of Afghan experience reveals prevalence of simple criteria for the communication processes, but little in the way of explanatory or prescriptive models which could


provide a basis for strengthening the Pashtun cultural profile and increasing the reach and intensity of Afghan communications in the foreign policy field. Even when the initial formulation of the policy was satisfactory, the implementation left much to be desired. Substantive goals like free movement into Pashtunistan and human rights protection of the Pashtuns were never examined with adequate legal techniques and mechanisms. As a result of this the contours of Afghanistan's negotiating style could not express the substance of Pashtun self-determination.

Pakistani diplomacy was marked by quick responses whereas Afghan decision-makers were reluctant to expedite their responses. On the status and form of administration of the Tribal territory, there were several deficiencies in Afghanistan's projection of its arguments, including the failure to make clear the fact that the territory which was passed on to Pakistan by the withdrawing of British power did not actually belong to Britain in law. After joining the Non-aligned Movement (NAM) Afghanistan had an opportunity to project its national interest in Pashtunistan as a key element in the de-colonisation process. On account of lack of organisation competence in the field of communications,

28. It was this independent character of the Tribal territory that the British recognised Afghan interest and right in its affairs by virtue of Article XI of the 1921 Treaty, see M. Omer Hewadyar, op. cit., p. 67.
and failure to use persons with practical experience in modern media, Kabul was unable to have a policy impact on world public opinion.

**Structural adaptations:**

When the first Five Year Plan was announced during Jeshyn 1956, Daud and his advisers wished to promote speed and clarity in government decisions. In the field of foreign policy he wished especially to sensitise the foreign office to information inputs on Pashtunistan. In the name of secrecy there was no accountability for policy failures. He wanted to give up the myopic conceptions which the Monarchy had adopted for the sake of dynastic survival. He realised that Pashtunistan issue provided an opportunity to weigh and try out different variants of action, and he made an intensified effort to adapt the bureaucratic machinery to the modern age.29 He wanted to curb the tendencies of the Persianised elite to permit clandestine operations which were directly the cause of repeated foreign policy fiascoes. His efforts to link foreign policy performance to structural change through feedback and adaptation would have moved the Afghan cognitive process in an integrative direction.

Unfortunately other elite groups, some of them close to the Monarchy struggled anxiously to preserve existing

structures and methods, so that instead of macro-political change, Daud could only achieve disjointed incrementalism. Although dynamic and creative himself, Daud was not able to provide a new style of administrative operations. The cumbersome processes and bureaucratic jealousies made it difficult for Daud's initial decisions to be translated as instruments of negotiating policy. The Afghan King's personal involvement also introduced an element of rigidity which made it difficult for Daud to provide a dynamic quality to the "identity reference" which he wanted to create for the Pashtunistan issue.

**Psychological environment**

The personal preferences of the Afghan decision-makers and the geopolitical concerns shaped the psychological and operational environment which affected the Afghan commitment to Pashtunistan. The "cognitive consistency" which the foreign policy establishment in Kabul aimed at received a rude shock when Pakistan announced the One-Unit Plan. At that time the Afghan Foreign Minister Mohammad Naim Khan had been sanguine that Pakistan would agree to talks between the two countries. Afghan assessment of what Pakistan is likely to do has been subject to serious error time and again.

Indeed the two declarations made by Mohammad Ali Jinnah, and the assurances given by the Foreign Minister of Pakistan, Zafarullah Khan, in his letter of January 1, 1948 to the Afghan Ambassador Najib-Ullah, persuaded Kabul that a degree of realism and balance had been introduced in Pakistani attitude regarding the independence of the Tribal areas and the autonomy of the N.W.F.P. An earlier recognition by Afghanistan of how Pakistani policies were laying the ground-work for new strategic crises in the future, would have led to a greater sense of responsibility in Kabul rather than the habitual responses to Pakistani moves.31

Moreover although the makers of foreign policy were not subject to specific pressure groups, yet the psychological environment was sensitive to general tendencies and principles which underlie anti-imperialism. It was the interactions of the psychological attitudes and political competition that played a significant role in shaping Afghan diplomatic thought. An alternative Afghan approach could be based on uncovering the long-term processes underlying "imperialist" patterns of conflict since the Durand Line is illogical from "the point of view of ethnography, of strategy and of geography"; the range of Afghan options can be widened, the new Republican elite can give its policy a stronger psychological element through both bargaining and symbolic actions.


32. Fraser Tytler, op. cit., p. 188.
**AFGHAN NEGOTIATION INITIATIVES ON PASHTUNISTAN AND ITS REPERCUSSIONS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Negotiation Initiatives and Overtures</th>
<th>Responses and Repercussions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Negotiation Initiatives and Overtures**

November 14, 1947

Afghan Minister of Education, Dr. Najibullah, was sent to Karachi as a special envoy to negotiate Pashtunistan issue with Pakistani rulers.

Dr. Najibullah held a series of talks with Mr. Jinnah, Prime Minister Liaquat Ali, Foreign Minister Zafarullah Khan, Foreign Secretary Ekramullah, NWFP's Premier Abdul Qaiyum and other Pakistani leaders.

In his talks which lasted for two months Dr. Najibullah emphasised that the Pakistan government should declare "its intentions" with regard to "the Pashtun areas".

**Responses and Repercussions**

Nothing was put on official papers beyond that "the Pakistani leaders promised that "Jinnah's promise of non-interference in the independent tribal territory" would be fulfilled and that the autonomy of the NWFP would be recognised.

These assurances were confirmed later by a letter of Pakistan Foreign Minister to Afghan Government dated Jan. 1, 1948 and official statements of the Pakistani leaders that after the Kashmir war "the freedom of the Pashtuns" would be respected.

However, after "the Kashmir invasion" Pakistan changed its stand declaring that the Durand Line or the Pashtunistan question was not subject to negotiation.

In fact, the Kashmir invasion was a measure to divert Pashtun opposition and Afghan advocacy to consolidate the emergence of Pakistan as a Muslim State. Thus Afghans were deceived in a very opportune time.
After Pakistan's refusal to negotiate the Pashtun question, Afghan Prime Minister Shah Mahmood instructed Afghan Ambassador in London Faiz Mohd. Zikiria to approach British Government to press Pakistan for a negotiation. Mr. Zikiria sent a note to the British Government urging for the solution of the problem.

Mr. Zikiria in response to a negative British reply stated "if negotiations with Pakistan failed Afghanistan would appeal to the United Nations".

June 13, 1952

Afghanistan introduced a Draft Resolution on the inclusion of an article on "the right of peoples and nations to self-determination" in the general debate on Human Rights by the General Assembly's Special Committee. The move reflected Afghanistan's efforts to consolidate the legal foundation of her Pashtunistan advocacy.

The British Government's response was a statement made by the Secretary of Commonwealth Relations that "Pakistan was in international law the inheritor of the rights and duties of the former Government of India in the territories on the Northwest Frontier, and that the Durand Line was the International boundary".

In response to this Afghan Prime Minister in a public address to demonstrators in Kabul assured the Afghan nation that the Government would rescue the "brother Afghans" by peaceful means, but if not, "by other means".

The Afghan resolution was welcomed and unanimously accepted by the Committee. The General Assembly adopted the Afghan resolution and asked the Human Rights Commission to include it as an article in the covenants on Human Rights, which was done so on 13th June 1952.
January 1954

The coming of Daud into power which resulted in a strengthening of Afghanistan diplomatic ties with a number of countries, opened the way for negotiations with Pakistan on a trade agreement necessitating further negotiations on a revision of the Durand Line and the Anglo-Afghan Treaty of 1921. A negotiation dialogue opened between Kabul and Karachi.

April 18, 1955

Afghan delegation led by Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Mohd. Naim, took an active part in Bandung Conference, and exchanged views with the heads of States and governments of the participating countries on the need of broadening friendly relations between the Afro-Asian countries and Afghan desire for a solution of the Pashtunistan issue.

In the negotiations undertaken in January of 1954, Pakistan expressed somehow an ambiguous willingness to negotiate the Durand Line and the Pashtun question.

But as soon as the Pakistan received some assurances of political and military assistance from the West, it hardened its position, deciding to merge the NWFP and Baluchistan into One West Pakistan Unit.

Pakistan joined Western military pacts and hardened its position towards Afghanistan by deciding to amalgamate the NWFP and Baluchistan into one Administrative Unit of West Pakistan and pressurizing Afghanistan by breaking diplomatic ties and closing off its border for transit of Afghanistan international trade.
September 4, 1955

Following the deadlock in mediation efforts for resumption of diplomatic relations broken by the flag-burning incidents in Kabul and Peshawar, Afghan Foreign Minister Mr. Naim and Pakistan Ambassador to Kabul A.S.B. Shah held talks and agreed to make amendments for insult made to their flags.

The U.S. and Middle East Arab countries offered their good offices to bring the two countries closer to negotiate the resumption of diplomatic ties and the re-opening of the border.

November 1955

An agreement was reached in Kabul and accordingly the flags of the two countries were ceremonially hoisted but normal diplomatic ties could not be resumed until 1957.

Relations further aggravated because of Pakistan's One Unit move and Afghan Ambassador Nafiq Atiq, handed over a strongly worded note on October 13, 1955, saying "Afghanistan could not remain a silent spectator of the merger of the Pashtun territory into West Pakistan Unit without ascertaining the wishes of the Pashtun and Baluch people.

Both sides claimed a success in the talks, saying that "a notable advance towards coming closer to each other" was achieved, yet nothing fruitful came out of the negotiations. It became apparent that either the Pakistanis had deceived the Afghan envoy or Mr. Naim had drawn "unduly optimistic conclusions".
August 1956

The Soviet leaders' official visit of Kabul in December of 1955, opened a way for negotiations. Pakistan's President Iskander Mirza visited Afghanistan and in the joint communique both sides affirmed "their intentions to promote better relations" and declared "their united resolve to remove all differences through friendly negotiations". Invitation was extended to Prime Minister Daud to visit Pakistan.

June 1957

Pakistan's Prime Minister Shraawardy visited Kabul as a result of which it was agreed to resume diplomatic relations and remove differences.

In the joint communique both sides confirmed "the contents of the joint communique agreed in Karachi in December 1956 and agreed to solve their differences through friendly negotiations". To achieve this they agreed to accredit Ambassadors to each other with immediate effect.

December 1956

Prime Minister Daud visited Pakistan and the joint communique stated that the "talks" had contributed to a "better appreciation of their respective views" on the question of Pashtunistan.

However, after Daud's departure a Pakistani statement said that the reference to Pashtunistan merely took note of the fact that Afghan government regarded this concept which is purely their own as the only political difference between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Diplomatic relations between the two countries were resumed in September 1957, resulting in the opening of border for Afghan transit trade.

This was a result of American diplomatic pressure on Pakistan to prevent Afghanistan's heavy dependence on Soviet Union. It was also part of an American attempt to bring the three neighbouring countries of Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan in some sort of alliance.
February 1958

King Zahir Shah paid a state visit to Pakistan as a result of which an agreement on the improvement of transit facilities for Afghan goods through Pakistan was signed in May 1958.

January 1960

Foreign Minister Naim Khan was sent for talks with the new military leaders of Pakistan on the question of the Pashtun resistance to Pakistan's "One West Pakistan Administrative Unit" which had caused the arrest and persecution of a large number of the Pashtuns and Baluchis by the military regime.

March 4, 1960

Soviet Party Chief Khurushchov visited Afghanistan on the invitation of the King and in the joint communique both sides agreed on "the application of the principle of self-determination on the basis of U.N. Charter" for settling the Pashtunistan issue.

Relations improved substantially, paying the ground for further fruitful negotiations on the Pashtun question. But General Ayub's coming into power prevented the continued dialogue.

Nothing came out of the negotiations and Ayub's regime adversely responded by adopting further repressive measures against the Pashtuns and the Baluchis that reached its height in the Bajaur incidents. Ayub, claiming a Pashtun origin, instead demanded a referendum to be held among the Pashtuns in Afghanistan to ascertain whether they remained in Afghanistan or wished to join Pakistan.

This was meant to further pressurize Daud to give up the issue.

Pakistan responded by closing its border and withdrawing its diplomatic missions and asking Afghanistan to do the same. The reasons given were the charges that the Afghans ill-treated Pakistani Embassy officials and other nationals in Kabul. Diplomatic ties remained broken and borders sealed till May 1963.
May 1963

The deadlock over Pashtunistan resulted in Daud's resignation which opened the way for negotiations on resumption of diplomatic ties and opening of the border.

Afghan delegation led by Finance Minister, Said Qasim Aishtya and the Pakistani delegation headed by Foreign Minister Bhutto held talks at Tehran on the initiative of Shah of Iran. An agreement was soon reached to the great satisfaction of all the parties concerned.

October 1965

Wolesi Jirga, the Lower House of the new Afghan parliament in accordance with the Loya Jirga resolutions, specially of the September 1965 Loya Jirga which approved the 1964 constitution, stressed upon the government to take seriously the question of negotiating a peaceful solution of the Pashtunistan issue on the basis of the right to self-determination.

The agreement signed at Tehran on 28th May, envisaged immediate resumption of diplomatic ties and re-opening of the border between the two countries.

At the end of the talks Bhutto claimed that "Pashtunistan was a closed issue", while Aishtya declared that "Afghanistan did not recognize the Durand Line and the Pashtunistan continued to be the main issue dividing the two countries".

Though the agreement did not refer to the Pashtunistan issue, but in reality, it marked a departure from an active to a verbal Afghan advocacy of the Pashtunistan cause.

In view of the improved relations agreements on air traffic, trade and transit facilities were signed with Pakistan and visits of heads of states and high-ranking officials were exchanged between the two countries in 1960s, but due to resultant cordiality Pashtunistan issue could not be discussed in these talks as stressed by parliament. So "no bitterness or fanaticism crept into these considerations" in that pleasant atmosphere in the 1960s.
The disintegration of Pakistan in 1971, resulting in the emergence of Bangladesh, Shah of Iran's blatant interference in Pakistan to check Pashtun and Baluch autonomist movement and the emergence of NAP as a dominant political force in NWFP and Baluchistan, encouraging Afghan nationalist forces led Afghan Parliament once again to stress upon government to actively support the Pashtun and Baluch movement against Bhutto's onslaughts.

As a result Afghan government specially the Musa Shafiq ministry, reactivated its Pashtunistan advocacy. The government vigorously emphasised its serious concern and "whole-hearted support for the restoration of "the rights and national identity of the Pakhtuns" in the Press, government statements and joint communiques issued.

The developments and renewed emphasis on the solution of the Pashtunistan problem opened a negotiation dialogue between the two countries. In January 1972, Bhutto and later, Bhutto's wife Nasrat Bhutto visited Kabul, requesting King Zahir for a relaxation of Afghan Pashtunistan advocacy "at least for the time being" at that difficult hours of Pakistan struggle for survival".

As a result of the new developments, NAP was temporarily allowed to form its autonomous governments in the NWFP and Baluchistan. But as soon as Pakistan stabilized itself as a result of American and Iranian military support it changed its stand towards Afghan government that resulted in the dismissal of NAP Ministries.
March 1973

The dismissal of the NAP governments in NWFP and Baluchistan forced Afghan government to strongly react by declaring that "Afghans would not tolerate continuation of the present policy of injustice and repression in the "occupied Pashtunistan" (NWFP and Baluchistan).... We would warn Pakistan government not to play with fire. The people of Afghanistan... would retaliate in every possible way if in any way harm was done to their (Pashtun) leaders.

Similar further warnings were given with renewed emphasis urging negotiation with dialogue with Pashtun and Baluch people.

Shah of Iran's avowed declaration that Iran will not allow further "liquidation of Pakistan", emboldened Pakistan to ignore Afghan warnings and to take further repressive steps for the suppression of the Pashtun and Baluch autonomist movement, declaring NAP outlawed and taking with Iran joint military operations to crush the resistance in Baluchistan.

Afghan inability and Iran's actual involvement led to the overthrow of Zahir's monarchy and the emergence of Afghan republic under Daud in July of 1973.
### Assessment of the Components of Bargaining Power

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AFGHANISTAN</th>
<th>Decision-Making and Domestic Resources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Relative Power Position: Threats and Responsiveness</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Armed resistance in tribal areas</td>
<td>1. Rhetorical demands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Military assistance from USSR</td>
<td>2. Ineffective use of NAM membership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Reciprocation with concessions</td>
<td>4. Domestic political support not mobilised on sustained basis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Inward-looking bureaucracy and narrow diplomatic horizon</td>
<td>5. Sluggish communication channels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6. Crisis orientation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAKISTAN</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Military preponderance and pressure</td>
<td>1. Overall Punjabi political support.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Military assistance from USA</td>
<td>2. Resistance by ethnic political groups.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Mediation by US, Iran, favouring Pakistan</td>
<td>4. Active communication channels.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Opposed to making real concessions</td>
<td>5. Careful planning.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. External diplomatic horizon</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Manipulative tactics.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>