CHAPTER - III

EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT AND FOREIGN POLICY

This chapter reviews some key issues with respect to the external environment and foreign policy and the fundamental parameters and directions which effected the policy assumptions and realities of the Pashtunistan issue in the context of the Afghanistan's experience in foreign affairs with her neighbours Iran and Pakistan. We will also take up specific aspects of the Super Power Conflict and its structures and procedural patterns insofar as they meshed with the political, diplomatic and economic activities concerned with the means and processes for advancing or retarding the priorities of Pashtunistan.

The following is an attempt to outline the objective factors which played a central role in shaping the priorities and opportunities facing Afghanistan:

1. The Polarisation of the Cold War and its Important Side Effects in Iran and Pakistan

From the Yalta Conference in 1945, when the conflictual situation between the Soviet Union and the United States appeared to be under control in order to promote the common needs of the post-war world, to the sharp adversarial diplomacy of the Super Powers in 1953, was a period in which the burden of deciding Afghanistan's role in
conflictive situations was not affected by the Super Power competition in a comprehensive way. In 1953, the international agenda was crowded with events of which three were to operationalise new perceptions and decisions for Afghanistan and her closest neighbours, Iran and Pakistan.

The first was the coming into power of Eisenhower as the President of the United States with John Foster Dulles as the Secretary of State. The lines of cleavage were now sharply dichotomised with Dulles promoting a foreign policy aimed at blocking Soviet expansion into the Middle East by a system of alliances supported by massive economic and military assistance. Afghanistan had a diffident attitude to the new United States policy motivation and Kabul attempted to explain American behaviour in terms similar to that which guided the British line of thinking when the similar perspective against Russian expansionism led to paranoid projections. The Afghans feared a "solution" which would force their inclusion or assimilation in a Muslim defence system from Kashmir to Turkey and would in the projected arrangement encourage the forces which set out to destroy the Afghan identity. 2


In the ethnicity conflict situation existing between Afghanistan and Iran on one side and Afghanistan and Pakistan on the other side, the failure of the Super Powers to reach accommodation resulted in the United States reinforcing the preconceived assumptions of the Iranian and Pakistani decision makers. The difficulties inherent in bilateral collaboration between Afghanistan and its neighbours were now becoming more evident as time passed with the alliance politics which was a by-product of the Cold War. Washington tended to determine the regional issues instead of allowing processes of problem-solving to be initiated in terms of the issues as perceived by the regional powers.

The second important event was the death of Joseph Stalin in 1953 and the consequent experience within the Soviet Union and the changes in Soviet relations with other countries that led directly from de-Stalinisation which has been eloquently described in literature. The agenda of Soviet policy-makers after Stalin was now crowded with new opportunities to foster close interactions in economic and political cooperation with Asian countries. The 1955 visit of Marshall Bulganin and Nikita Kruschev and other Soviet leaders to Afghanistan was designed to initiate a bilateralism which would examine ways of overcoming the structural and procedural patterns which the United States was imposing

while exercising its gravitational pull on the Middle Eastern States. The Soviet support for Pashtunistan on this occasion was a selective upgrading of the political base on which a wide variety of diplomatic initiatives could be undertaken in terms of practical political realism.

The emergence of Pashtunistan as a specific factor in the Soviet-Afghan dialogue was a strikingly new development after decades of indifference in the socio-historic context. At least in its verbal strategy the Soviet Union showed itself in harmony with the national and regional goals and ambitions of Afghanistan. The thrust of post-Stalin Soviet policy towards Afghanistan was essentially of a political nature and was presumably intended to promote the adoption of political solutions as an integral part of the conflict resolution process. There was, however, no early likelihood of the implementation of the principle of cooperative understanding among the Super Powers as enshrined in the U.N. Charter.

The evolution of a Third world policy on the part of the Soviet Union which attempted to provide a counterbalance to the United States alliance system produced varying frameworks and negotiations with Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan. The Pakistani reaction to the Soviet support of

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Afghanistan's position on the Pashtunistan issue was marked by fear and anxiety, and led the Government of Pakistan to request the Council of the SEATO to reaffirm its support for Pakistan in rejecting the Afghan demand for a separate state for the Pashtuns. Accordingly, the Council Meeting in Karachi in March 1956 declared in a communique that "the SEATO Council unanimously recognised the sovereignty of Pakistan as extending up to the Durand Line". The Soviet support to Afghanistan, in spite of the ambiguity of the situation in which the stakes of the Super Power game had increased had the effect of leading Pakistan to a review of options and shifts in emphasis.

Thus for a time between 1955 and 1958 the tension between Pakistan and Afghanistan eased and a series of state visits took place. President Iskander Mirza visited Afghanistan in August 1956 and the joint communique issued stated that both the countries "affirm their intention to promote better relations and declared their united resolve to remove all differences between the two Muslim countries through friendly negotiations". Similarly, in December the same year the Afghan Prime Minister Daud Khan paid a visit to Pakistan and the joint communique issued, declared that

the talks had contributed substantially to a "better appreciation of the respective views held in regard to the question of Pashtunistan, which has been a subject of discussion between the Afghan Prime Minister and the leaders of Pakistan". The communique further declared that:

"It is the intention of the two Governments to continue their efforts to remove all differences between the two countries through friendly discussions".7

The diplomatic relations between the two countries which were broken off since 1955 were resumed in September 1957 resulting in the reopening of the border for Afghan trade. The Afghan King, Zahir Shah also paid a state visit to Pakistan in February 1958, as a result of which an agreement on the improvement of transit facilities for Afghan goods through Pakistan was signed in May 1958. But this phase did not last long and increasingly strident postures were adopted by both sides. The new President of Pakistan, Ayub Khan, although himself a Pashtun, shifted the direction of Pakistan's policy to the tribal areas which became much more ominous from the Afghan point of view. In spite of a visit to Pakistan by the Afghan Foreign Minister in January 1960, the tension remained acute and an open conflict erupted in the Bajawar District in the fall of the same year and again in 1961.

The Government of Pakistan used several army divisions and employed its airforce which led the Kabul Government to decide that its vital interests and important goals involved in the Pashtunistan policy necessitated an active intervention first of all by the supply of arms and later to support the tribesmen to mount frequent attacks on the Pakistani garrisons.\(^8\) In August 1961, shortly after the Bajawar incident Pakistan announced that it was closing its Consulates at Jallalabad and Kandahar, and demanded that Afghanistan should also withdraw its Consulates from Peshawar and Quetta. Whatever the ostensible reasons, the actual motive behind Pakistan's breaking off of diplomatic relations was Pakistan's irritation over the continued Afghan support to the tribesmen fighting for the attainment of Pashtunistan.\(^9\)

With Pakistan threatening to choke the economy of Afghanistan by closing its borders for the transit of Afghan trade, the Soviet Union came to the assistance of Afghanistan by providing an alternative outlet for Afghan trade by means of a fleet of fifteen Soviet transport planes which daily airlifted Afghan trade items. Further the Soviet Union

\[\text{(8. Arnold Fletcher, } \textit{Afghanistan: Highway of Conquest} \text{ (New York, 1965), } p.275, \text{ and } \textit{ibid.}, 1961, p.18172A.}\]

\[\text{(9. Arnold Fletcher, } \textit{ibid.}, p.268.}\]
offered assistance in constructing and improving Afghanistan's highways that connected Afghanistan with the outside world through the Soviet Union. This undoubtedly resulted in Afghanistan's trade dependency on the Soviets but this was a direct result of the economic pressure exercised by Pakistan supported by the other Super Power, the United States, which conferred unilateral advantages on Pakistan in pursuit of its global interests. The failure, to take into account independent regional factors and to develop any concept of integrative regional peace, led the United States to pursue super power competition at the cost of creating severe problems for the future. 10

Three main elements may be discerned in Iran's exploitation of its United States connection to further its long-term objective of exercising a predominant, if not an exclusive influence on the political evolution of Afghanistan. The most prominent of these is the cultural aggression against the Afghans in the period in which a strongly "westernised" orientation was inherent in the Shah of Iran's regime. Next in prominence was the support given by Iran to the covert operations of western intelligence

agencies working to undermine Afghan efforts to defend their legitimate rights and interests. The third element comprised support to interests seeking to subvert the national liberation movement in the Tribal areas under Pakistan and weakening the general sentiment in favour of Pashtunistan. Iran continued to be the centre of coordination for United States diplomacy to undermine the Soviet position in the Middle East right till the end of the Shah's rule. The elite change which came in the wake of the Shah's removal was not expected by U.S. decision makers and removed even a modicum of American influence when it finally materialised.

The third important event in the fifties was the politically significant response on the domestic scene in Afghanistan which resulted in the change in Afghan leadership from the old conservatives to the young nationalists. Changes in the constellations of social forces in Afghanistan resulted in the strong emphasis on implementation of national policy. In fact, the stress on modernisation and support to Pashtunistan resulted in domestic and foreign policy becoming two sides of the same national platform. The new policy makers, Daud and his diplomat brother Mohammad Naim gave


12. See for detail, Ibid., Chapter 4.
primacy to the ethnicity conflict. When they came up against the pervasive rigidity of attitude of the United States, their premise of realism led them to pursue policies more directly consonant with the promotion of Afghan-Soviet friendship despite the deeply ingrained belief in the necessity of equidistance from both the power blocks.\textsuperscript{13}

The pivotal concept around which Afghanistan sought to make progress towards a stable and peaceful society was the harmonising of national power for security and social and economic progress. The ingrained antipathy towards Pashtunistan which the United States adopted as part of its containment posture and its alliance politics with Iran and Pakistan directly contributed to regional tension and instability. To Afghan perception, the United States role was designed to hold up inevitable change and to denigrate the force of modern Afghan nationalism. Nor was there any evidence that the United States was engaged in serious problem solving which would enhance opportunities for the realisation of a bargaining and negotiating framework for resolving regional ethnic conflicts.\textsuperscript{14}


\textsuperscript{14} Robert L. Osgood, et.al., \textit{American and the World} (Baltimore, 1970), Chapter 7.
2. Protracted Social Conflict in the Region

An understanding of the image of Afghan society and politics is a precondition for evaluating the significance of the identity related conflicts and crises which mark the period 1947-80 and which revolve around the question of Pashtunistan. It is also necessary to identify the complicated British colonial legacy which multiplied the divisive factors. The relations between Afghanistan and the Pashtunistan question cannot be properly understood without some reference to the patterns of protracted social conflict. The variations and dynamism of relations between the states in the region is the product of the way in which social problems are defined and approached.

British colonial policy was undoubtedly an exacerbating feature in the general crisis of social and ethnic relations. With hindsight it is possible to see a clear trend in the British effort to drive a wedge in the economic, political, military and ideological relationship which Pashtuns on both sides of the Durand Line shared.15 This gloomy picture derives from the fact that although there were notable exceptions of policy makers whose judgements were balanced and well conceived, the realpolitik

of expansion and hegemony forced the British into an exploitative behaviour pattern and in 1947 at the time of transfer of power they were themselves the victims of a false consciousness which militated against their leaving behind integrated social and political systems.

The contradictions resulting from ethnic and denominational (e.g., Shia-Sunni) differences which developed in the past were used by the colonial powers as a major instrument of political dominance. The intensification of the gap between the various identity groups and the nation state is especially visible in the case of Pakistan and has negative consequences for the whole region where situations of protracted social conflict proliferate. The colonialist mentality which pervades many of the regional elites results in a continuing process of hierarchisation which weakens the national capacity for a thorough-going reform of the political system and tackling the underlying issues in the social conflict. If a state like Afghanistan wants to pursue an independent foreign policy and strengthen its national capacity to resist the global pattern of technological dominance and dependence, the first thing it has to do is to break the logic of protracted social conflict and to attempt to alter the logic of both the domestic and international conflicts.
The devastating effects of the imperialist era are still materialising and create a continuous chain of conflicts. The hindrances to autonomous development because of the intensification of identity-related conflicts were particularly evident during Daoud's first regime from 1953 to 1963. Afghanistan's external relations hinged on a dichotomy between consensual arrangements for pursuing the Pashtunistan goal and the strong tendency of external powers to maintain the underlying conditions that have created protracted conflict.

3. Security Dilemmas

By treating the question of Pashtunistan as an irredentist issue and not as a national issue, the discussion of national security as a policy problem has been limited to some aspects of military aid. The hegemonic ideology of military organisations like CENTO and SEATO has been used to evolve patterns of control which exclude radical political and social change. If we direct attention to the specific security features of Afghanistan we can form a clear picture of the aims and criteria of success of an interlocking security complex in which Pashtunistan's exclusion produces distortions in strategic rationality.

However, by denying a holistic perspective to Afghanistan's national security, first the British-drawn Durand Line and later the United States position of opposing the fundamental wholeness and continuity of Pushtunkhwa have resulted in the imposition of security decisions which have heavily discounted the vital elements of the real problem. The form and pattern of security regimes imposed at the cost of Pashtunistan have not contributed to systemic security and have worsened it. The western attempt to bind Afghanistan to established principles of military organisations derived from the prototype of NATO diminished the capacity of all the regional actors to initiate changes. The conceptual foundations of Afghanistan's national defence were challenged by promoting the view that it was unseemly for the Afghans to utilise for their national defence the institutional and historical momentum of the Pashtunistan struggle. We conclude from this discussion that an exceptional security dilemma has been imposed on Afghanistan as a weapon of partisan conflict.\footnote{Barry Buzan, 
People, States and Fear (Sussex, 1983), pp.173-209.}

4. Economic Challenges

The recent crisis in Afghanistan has brought into prominence both empirical and theoretical issues of economic development. The qualitative intensification of dependence on the United States of both Iran and Pakistan
was the negative consequence of the elite economic culture in both the countries having given up the ideology of self-reliance. 18 The Pashtunistan issue not only served the identity and political needs in Afghanistan; it also represented a response to the economic challenge to develop a basic needs oriented national capacity.

This implied a priority for increasing integration of national resource use and defining criteria for an alternative development pattern. The Pashtuns who sought to satisfy their identity and security needs also tried to initiate a process of economic and social transformation on the basis of a self-reliant strategy. The centralised state in Pakistan was perceived as an instrument for the progressive disintegration of the social circuits of Pashtun communities. On the other hand, Pashtunistan was seen as a demand for social optimisation which would remove the structural deformations of the Afghan economy, and mobilize forces supporting collective self-reliance for the benefit of the underprivileged.

Afghanistan was not opposed to international cooperation but unlike Iran and Pakistan its economic decision-making was not under the control of groups integrated into the dominant metropolitan economies. Of course, it did not avoid partial economic dependence but the realisation of self-reliant and participatory economic structure remained intrinsic to the main development goals.

5. **Legitimation of Non-alignment in Afghanistan**

After Belgrade (1961), Non-alignment became a major ingredient of Afghanistan's international relations. The non-aligned strategy aimed at optimisation of three goals: it satisfied the symbolic needs of the Pashtuns as a national expression of their determination to preserve their independence in the face of pressure from the two power blocs; it implied a clear delinking from the sequential processes initiated by the United States in Iran and Pakistan which would have altered the socio-political character of Afghanistan and led to an accelerated penetration of its society which was unacceptable to the Pashtuns; and as a change in the communication network from one dominated by the western powers to one in which Afghanistan could promote issues like New International Economic order, peace and disarmament for which Kabul could use its positional perspective to express Afro-Asian sensitivities.

But Afghanistan's non-alignment was only one aspect of the problem. The structural constraints imposed by the overwhelming alignment of both Pakistan and Iran to the western bloc resulted in significant obstructive effects on Afghanistan's capacity to manage conflicts. Although Afghanistan could cope with many short-term problems by striking a more independent posture in an increasingly
multi-polar world, Iran and Pakistan by their identification with the western alliance system prevented Kabul from developing a macro-dimensional view which could replace the hierarchical arrangement of international relations. 19

6. **Militarisation of Iran and Pakistan**

The effort of United States to realise regional and global security without regard to the deeper causes and dynamics of local threat led John Foster Dulles to package individual security needs in the "Northern Tier" system of alliance to extend the containment of the Soviet Union. The resultant militarisation of Iran and Pakistan (along with Turkey) resulted in an alarming shift in the power relationship in the region. The actual pattern of American sponsored militarism hardly fitted into traditional regional concepts.

There are some who would argue that there is no value in examining this militarisation process now. But such an argument is not convincing even if the events of December 1979 have changed the relative importance of various factors. The structural features and operational imperatives of the militarisation of Iran and Pakistan have had extremely retrogressive effects on the organisation of social relations in these countries. American arms technology in the period under study became a major

instrument of domination, and affected both domestic power relations and regional international relations and served to harden stereotyped enemy images.

The analysis and reflection on the militarisation of Iran and Afghanistan involves an understanding of the polarising compulsions generated by the disproportionate enlargement of military power. Its dysfunctional nature directly led to global and regional conflict potentials getting out of control. While new panaceas were sought at summits, fundamental issues like Pashtunistan were sidetracked and the road to social equity was blocked.

7. Public Opinion and Foreign Policy

The Pashtunistan case highlights the importance of domestic opinion in the formation of Afghanistan's foreign policy. The opinion - policy relationship in the region results from historical factors which may not follow the same pattern as in Europe or America. Several governments in Kabul have tried to pacify and satisfy Pashtun sentiments by granting concessions of various sorts. But such opportunistic moves encounter resentment and cynicism in the first instance and active opposition later on. One of the


most dangerous aspects of extravagant efforts at mobilising support when people have lost faith in the proclaimed state objectives is that the resulting crisis of identity may be abruptly challenged by new domestic and international configurations. Indeed such perceptual distortions are at the root of the intense and painful revolutionary process in which Afghanistan is engulfed.

One lesson of Afghanistan's experience in its external environment, therefore, is that the procedures of conflict resolution must be viewed from the perspective of domestic political reactions at the aggregate level of opinion, if the foreign policy is not to be self-defeating. Since the relationship of the elite and the mass in Iran and Pakistan during the period under review was one of potential fragility, it was extraordinarily difficult for the governments concerned to take a balanced view of Afghanistan's political aspirations or to reconceptualise peace and security on a broader basis. An impression has been created that the Afghan government raised irrational and irredentist demands which made peace and security more illusive. This view has found expression in writings of several foreign policy analysts who lack the investigative interest in a holistic view of security. Both Western and Eastern policy-makers have left out of negotiations the more fundamental question of charge in the prevailing structures and have not addressed the question of democratic policy making in this region.
Thus the Pashtuns have been held hostage to Super Power global strategies and their strategic variants of conflict have created the Afghanistan imbroglio of the 1980s. A regional model for interactions in the future, once the anxieties of the two Super Powers are overcome through summitry, can lead to peace and security if the perceptual factors which relate opinion and policy can play a fundamental role. In addition to the historical and geostrategic factors which must be taken into account, there will be hope for a peaceful solution only if the Pashtun question is also examined in the context of the relationship of public opinion and foreign policy.

Excuruses

This chapter includes four case studies which focus on a review of the specific patterns of dominance and dependence in the external environment of Afghanistan and the corresponding problems Afghan foreign policy was confronted with. The issues chosen are: the perceptual problems of the Durand Line; the issue of the One Administrative Unit in Pakistan as a problem of revisionism versus status quo; the sealing of the Pak-Afghan border and the

severance of diplomatic relations as a power-security dilemma; and Bhutto's confrontation with the N.A.P. as the concretisation of the Pak-Pashtun conflict.

Excursus-I deals with the Durand Line from the perspective of identifying the sources of Pakistan's hegemonic position. Emphasis is laid on the formulation of policies for expressing antagonistic interests and an effort is made to assess the central significance of the framework constituted by power politics around the mechanisms of informal imperialism.

Excursus-II relates the issue of the One Administrative Unit to the larger consideration of power and security politics and corresponding international relations.

Excursus-III deals with the new problems created by the sealing of the border, the break in diplomatic relations and the efforts of the Shah of Iran to mediate between Pakistan and Afghanistan. It is shown that the lack of an integrative solution to the Pashtunistan problem initiated a backlash of the forces of radical political and social change.

Excursus-IV deals with the accentuation of conflict of Pakistan against the Pashtuns under Bhutto and inquires into the consequences of the PPP's policy of deception.
EXCURSUS - 1

DURAND LINE - 1893

Durand Line "Null and Void": 1949

A certain over-simplification of the policy background marked the initiation of the Pashtunistan doctrine of the Afghan government after it was provoked by the Pakistani behaviour in 1949.23 The preferences of the Pakistani leadership were for control and manipulation of the Pashtun environment without any vigorous quest for the solution of the long range issues. What is clear in available accounts from the Afghan decision-makers at the time is that Kabul did not understand the critical component in Pakistan's behaviour which was a reluctance to adopt a politico-diplomatic approach which would give impetus to negotiations. Kabul had hoped to inch forward to new negotiating aims on a bilateral basis related to self-determination for the Pashtun population. Pakistan introduced equivocal language but unflinchingly stuck to the goal of general propositions derived from British colonial diplomacy.

With hindsight Afghan decision-makers concede that the best option in 1949 would have been to make a massive effort to compel the Pakistanis to forgo the option to carry out limited reprisals against the tribals. Afghan uncertainty and anxiety was communicated by the failure to make preparations for any offensive deployment of their side, although there was no evidence that Kabul was at a disadvantage vis-a-vis Pakistani military power. Pakistanis on their side were already calling attention to the possible effect of Soviet support for Afghanistan and a condition of benign neglect by the United States. 24

A controlled low risk action by Afghanistan in 1949, which would have emphasised her security concerns on the one hand and promised a more flexible and differentiated policy in her signals to the two Super Powers, would have gained a high measure of credibility of commitment to the Pashtunistan doctrine. The failure to adopt a major action policy in 1949 had the adverse effect of suggesting that Afghanistan did not have concrete territorial ideas about the Pashtun crisis area. While Kabul made a pretence of employing threats they were proved dubious material for designing an alternative approach to the Durand Line doctrine which was best suited to Pakistani calculations.

1. Evolution of the Afghan Attitude to the Validity of the 1893 Treaty

There is one basic leitmotif underlying all the moves of the various Afghan regimes regarding the 1893 Treaty between Abdur Rahman and Mortimer Durand: to express the overwhelming concern for their continuing relationship with the tribal territory and to insist on Kabul's rights and interests in the Pashtun Tribes. Afghan diplomatic thinking about the Treaty has evolved during the years in both substance and importance. Afghan arguments have been developed around three related themes.

First, the Afghans challenge the Treaty on the question of "duress": this has been a fruitful field of analysis by international law experts who have proceeded to investigate the underlying causes of political and economic pressures mounted on Amir Abdur Rahman.25 The second theme is that there was no meeting of minds between the Amir and Sir Mortimer, and therefore the conceptualisation and implementation of the Agreement can both be faulted on legal grounds. The third theme, more implicit than explicit related to the need to develop concepts relevant to the understanding of Asian international relations. The specificity of the tribal situation must

primarily be understood in terms of all the inherent consequences for free economic and social development and not according to the dominant trends of Western notions of international boundaries.

The organizing principles and perceived national interest were quite clearly expressed: the Durand Agreement was only a device to harmonise administrative policy and action and by no means an international territorial settlement. What hung in balance was not whether Kabul would allow a new sub-systemic imperialism to be based on the 1873 Treaty, but whether it would inspire a new conceptualisation of the real problem areas for follow-up action against social and political control dominated by Pakistan's unholy alliance with the West.

2. The 1947 Referendum and its Impact on the Durand Line

The United Kingdom Prime Minister's statement of June 3, 1947 outlined the following points: (1) that the position of the N.W.F.P. was exceptional; (2) that the N.W.F.P. would be given an opportunity to reconsider its position; (3) that a Referendum would be held to decide which of the two alternatives i.e., India or Pakistan, the N.W.F.P. wished to adopt; (4) Baluchistan would also be given the same opportunity; (5) agreements with the tribes of the N.W.F.P. would have to be negotiated with the appropriate successor authority.26

The British position was manifestly imperialistic and confrontational vis-a-vis the Pashtuns, and foreshadowed future developments. A hostile reaction was not limited to the Afghan side, on the British Indian side, Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan declared that the Pashtuns were prepared to contest the referendum on the issue of Pashtunistan versus Pakistan, and not on the issue of Pakistan versus India. The Referendum formula was, however, presented in the form of a non-negotiable demand and deliberately evaded the question of self-determination for the Pashtuns. The British refusal to answer Pashtun anxieties expressed by both the Afghan government and the Khudai Khidmatgars helps us to identify the determinants and mechanisms of "informal" imperialism which were visible behind the intractable issue of the Referendum. The 99 per cent votes cast in favour of Pakistan cannot be given any meaningful interpretation since the Pashtuns perceived the Pakistani regime-designate as a usurper regime.

27. In the Referendum held under British auspices and boycotted by Khudai Khidmatgars, only 289,244 votes or about 50 per cent of the total votes were cast under very sentimental conditions caused by the engineered communal hatreds. The voters were also mainly ethnic minorities and Panjabi settlers. Moreover since the Referendum was held only in a few settled districts, it represented an insignificant percentage of the total Pashtun population. See, M. Omer Hewadyar, op.cit., pp. 95-97, and Kessing's Contemporary Archives, 1947, p.8734A.
All that the Referendum proved was that the results had been engineered artificially and that it could not legitimise the change in the political system. Pakistan has tried to submerge the real issue in a sea of rhetoric. Since Afghanistan was neither consulted nor consented to the arrangements made unilaterally by the British, as far as Kabul is concerned it cannot be argued that the question of self-determination is foreclosed or that the 1947 Referendum conferred any legitimacy on the Durand Line.

3. **Motivations of British Towards the Durand Line after the Transfer of Power**

It is difficult to find a decisive political break with the former colonialist outlook in the case of the British stance which after transfer of power has aimed at boosting Pakistan's prestige and authority, however misconceived.

Thus in 1950, in the House of Commons the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations Mr. Noel Baker made the following statement:

"It is His Majesty's Government's view that Pakistan is in international Law the inheritor of the rights and duties of the old Government of India and of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom in these territories and that the Durand Line is the international frontier". 28

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28. This was declared in the House of Commons by Mr. Noel-Baker, the British Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations on 30th June 1950, in response to a request by the Government of Pakistan, See "The North-West Frontier Today", British Survey, Main Series No.139, Oct. 1960, p.17.
This emphasis on the Durand Line being the international frontier is quite at variance from the authentic description given in the report from the Government of India to the Secretary of State for India on 10th July 1893 to the effect: "We emphatically repudiate all intention of annexing tribal territory". At the time of signing the Durand Agreement the British Government was clearly aware that the Durand Line did not describe the boundary of India and hence it could not be the international frontier. 29

Thus, it is clear that British power and influence are still being used against the Pashtuns in the post-imperial era. The statement in the British Parliament quoted above underlines the continuing effect of traditional fears and stereotypes in Britain's relations with the Pashtuns. The rapport between leaders in Britain and Pakistan is undoubtedly a conspicuous feature of the landscape of "informal" imperialism.

4. Motivations of the Soviet Union Towards the Durand Line

In December 1955, the Soviet leaders, Nikolai Bulganin and Nikita Khruschev declared their sympathy for Afghanistan's policy on the Pashtunistan issue. This statement which was made on their state visit to Kabul

29. See for detail on Durand Line, Rahman Pazhwak, Pakhtunistan, and M. Omer Hewadyar, op.cit., Chapter II.
reflected Moscow's disapproval of Pakistan's entry into the defence arrangements with the United States under the SEATO and MEDO (which later became CENTO). However, on return to Soviet Union, in his report to the Fourth Session of the Supreme Soviet Bulganin made a more precise statement which reflects a Soviet distrust of the legitimacy of the Durand Line as the international frontier:

"Pashtunistan is inhabited by Afghan independent tribes. The region was annexed to the British Empire in 1893, and in 1947, against the interests of the Tribes inhabiting Pashtunistan, it was incorporated into Pakistan. We regard as justified and well founded the demand of Afghanistan that the inhabitants of the bordering region of Pashtunistan should be given the opportunity for a free expression of their will. The people of this area have as much right to national self-determination as any other people. No justification can be found for those who refuse to reckon, and do not reckon with the lawful national interests of the people of Pashtunistan." 30

In Soviet theoretical literature the generalisations about the international character of the Durand Line are questioned. Thus, a Soviet academic expert, I. Riesner wrote on the Question of the Formation of the Afghan Nation: "On the pain of war, Britain in 1893 compelled the Emir to recognise the so-called Durand Line, which

meant isolating from Afghanistan the greater part of the independent East Afghan Tribes which occupied the territory of the so-called "No Man's Land between the Indian Administrative Frontier of 1849 and Afghanistan proper." 31

The rest of the article shows that Soviet analysis of the National Question in Afghanistan rests on the assumption that the "Afghan people are at present completing the process of their formation into a nation, which will inevitably lead to the political unification of the Afghans who are now artificially divided by the 1893 frontier". 32 It would thus appear that both Soviet academic and strategic thinking has been revised from time to time on the question of Afghanistan-Pakistan relations depending on their interpretation of the interventionist role of the Anglo-American "imperialists".

Confronted with the manifold complexities of the self-image and strong identity of the Pashtuns some Soviet writing including that of I. Reisner has a fragmented view of the so-called "Pan-Afghanism". We cannot but have serious reservations about attempts to give a negative


32. I. Reisner, Ibid., p.6.
meaning to the organising concept of the Afghan state about which Reisner says the following: "The Afghan multinational state formed by the Afghan landowners sprang up before the Afghans themselves became a nation".  

A constructive redefinition of the legitimacy of the Afghan state will help Soviet scholarship to avoid analysis or prescription based on imperial concepts. Soviet diplomacy has demonstrated its understanding of relational patterns and general structures which imperialism foisted on Afghanistan, and has a clearer view of the threat to national security which Durand Line embodies for Afghanistan.

However, in the context of Soviet military involvement in Afghanistan, and the establishment of an ideologically aligned regime in Kabul, views on the Durand Line are highly polarised. In the event of a Soviet troop withdrawal and an international settlement in the future, it will become necessary to separate the substance of the issue of the legitimacy of the Durand Line from current processes of political interaction. Kabul may expect to find in the Soviet Union a margin of support for challenging the Durand Line if it can with respect for the autonomous character of Afghanistan's political and social systems.

6. "Reactions to the Question of "Territorial Adjustment"

In 1949, when the Afghan Government took the extraordinary measure of securing a Parliamentary repudiation of all treaties with the United Kingdom affecting the status of Pashtuns, it was in effect making a definite claim for territorial adjustment with Pakistan. Pakistan's threat perception has focused on both the capabilities and intentions of Afghanistan.

The most aggressive projection of national power against the Pashtuns was made during Bhutto's rule. This was a "forward policy" under which the actual Pakistani presence was brought closest to the Durand Line. Bhutto also played his card in Moscow in October 1974 when he persuaded the Soviets to urge negotiations between Kabul and Islamabad on the basis of "principles of peaceful coexistence". This was interpreted as meaning that the Soviet side has also agreed that there should be settlement within existing territorial boundaries. When Daud sent his brother Nairn as special envoy to Beijing in December 1974, the Chinese also urged "a peaceful and negotiated settlement" and there was no mention of territorial adjustment.


35. Ibid., p. 311.
These are examples of typical ambiguity of interest and commitment by great powers.

Kabul has tended to postpone risky ventures and has often failed to take tough decisions. It has too often emphasised a short-run perspective. By taking a firm stand on territorial adjustment, Kabul would carry weight and credibility and have increasing relevance in both coercive and cooperative transactions.

7. The Problem of "Image" and the Durand Line

Robert Jervis has pointed out that "decision-makers will usually benefit from making their beliefs and values more explicit". Whatever the level of their personal commitment to Pashtunistan, the pronouncements of Afghan decision-makers on the Durand Line show that they did not give themselves the freedom of choice which they would have had if they had encouraged the formulation and application of alternative images. Kabul also circumscribed the framework for attempts to operationalise alternative approaches. Kenneth E. Boulding has drawn a distinction between two types of national image: one, the

image held by the small group of those in power; and second, the image held by the mass of ordinary people outside the decision-making process.³⁷

This distinction is useful, because although the silent majority of Afghans habitually equated the Durand Line with the survival of imperialism and clearly wished to reduce the abnormalities resulting from national vivisection, the power elite in Kabul could not retain and exercise the initiative towards constructing an Afghan Ostpolitik which would channel Afghan self-confidence, the search for a Pashtun identity and the revival of Afghan nationalism in such a manner that it could sensitise the international community to the new variation of sub-imperialism which Pakistan practiced in its attempt to straitjacket the potential liberating forces on both sides of the Durand Line.

EXCURSUS - II

ONE ADMINISTRATIVE UNIT

One Administrative Unit of W. Pakistan-1955

Decision-makers in Kabul were compelled to undertake a detailed stock-taking of the bases and processes of Pakistani politics following the declaration of the One Administrative Unit. Here was a potential source of

upheaval and for once Kabul's response was not sluggish. The Afghan government also showed a better understanding of the basic characteristics of the international system in the mid-fifties and used bilateral diplomatic channels to emphasise a high degree of participation in the crisis which had erupted as a result of the One Administrative Unit.³⁸

Kabul's cognitive map now included the Soviet support for a plebiscite in the Pashtun territory under Pakistani rule which was articulated by Bulganin on December 15, 1955. Daoud's decision to accept military aid from the Soviet Union synchronised with the strong tenor of his government's support for Pashtun claims, mainly in terms of emotional and historical attachments. The experience of 1955 was however a convincing demonstration that the constellation of factors shaping Afghan foreign policy did not show evidence of firm adherence to Pashtunistan as a central task of Afghan behaviour. Kabul's policy makers were prepared to administer erratic shocks to Pakistan but they were not equipped with overall control over multiple options to seriously challenge Pakistan's hegemonic position in the Pashtun majority areas.

³⁸ For a detailed account, see, De Charbi (Pashto: The West Pakistan Unit), Kabul, 1954, and Kessing's Contemporary Archives, 1954, p.13972A.
Kabul's resistance to the One Administrative Unit can only be explained as symbolic although Daud had achieved a certain level of capacity by parametric adjustments with both the Super Powers. The opportunity to give a powerful boost to the Pashtunistan demand was lost because Kabul sent out a variety of signals suggesting uncertainty of direction. The course of Afghan-Soviet relations during this period remains obscure despite Soviet rhetoric on Pashtunistan. There is no evidence that Kabul made strenuous efforts to discuss Soviet or American goals and behaviour if Afghanistan had agreed to pay a higher price for the preservation of its interests against the One Unit doctrine and strategy.

1. Punjabi Domination - Myth and Reality

The egalitarian Pashtuns found themselves subjected to the most rigid stratification under the decision taken by the Pakistan Government to merge all the nationalities of West Pakistan into one administrative unit. Given the Punjabi ethos and its dominant concern for system maintenance, a chauvinistic posture against the Pashtuns was inevitable. In answer to strategic political uncertainties the Punjabi domination was to be strengthened.

39. For details on the Afghan Resistance to One Administrative Unit, see, Chronological Notes, Kessing's Contemporary Archives from 1954 onwards, and Ibid.
by giving the Pakistani regime structure a political, ideological and organisational status which would have imperial consequences for the Pashtuns.40

The explosive nature of the latent and manifest conflict in which the Pashtuns were involved as a result of the incompatible policies of Pakistan since 1947 came out in the Anti-One-Unit Movement. There was sufficient political consensus in Afghanistan and tensions rose to an excessive pitch with massive demonstrations which culminated in the insult to the Pakistani Flag hoisted on the Embassy in Kabul. The highly volatile pattern was repeated in Pakistan with a similar incident involving the Afghan flag and with Pakistan troop deployments on the border. After Pakistan had disrupted Afghanistan’s trade and some armed clashes had occurred, Kabul ordered general mobilisation and declared a national emergency.41 It is worth noting some anomalies that arose during the crisis.

Although the new activism increased Kabul’s room for manoeuvre, a major constraint remained in the form of some of the groups which had considerable say over policymaking. Kabul needed a more contextual view of the lapses

40. For Punjabi domination see, Feroz Ahmad, Focus on Baluchistan, Atwae, Pashtunistan in the Light to Self-determination, Mohammed Said Khan, The Voice of the Pakhtoons, Chapter III, Disparities, pp.116-23, and Whither Pakhtunkhwa, pp.180-83; and Arnold Fletcher, op.cit., p.274.

in the institutional strength of the Punjabi dominated Pakistani regime. Pakistan had a psychological and political stake in the success of the mediation of Islamic countries of West Asia.

But Afghanistan and Pakistan were using different approaches in the negotiation, the former was concerned with the specific manner in which the Punjabis were exercising superiority in an asymmetrical and imperial relationship against the Pushtuns, while the latter was seeking a broad formula which would help in restoring diplomatic relations on the plank of Islamic solidarity while relegating the Pashtunistan issue to an insignificant position.

2. Permanent Entrenchment of Conservative Forces

The domestic scenario in Pakistan since its formation has tended to intensify the hierarchical divisions which accrued to it at the time of transfer of power. The belief of its elite that Islam provided a cementing force which would transcend the magnetism of nationalities and language groups proved illusory. The theocratic atmosphere held up the process of political modernisation and apart from the middle classes in Punjab which experienced some prosperity, the rest of the population groups faced economic stagnation and increased pauperisation. The conservative forces talked of nation building and national integration in propagandist terms.
whereas they resorted to economic exploitation, commercial penetration and especially in the N.W.F.P. to an increasing extraction of plunder. 42

The One-Unit plan was an expression of this "tunnel-vision" of the conservative forces. They were prepared to offer a new deal for local collaboration to the Afghan leaders. The interaction of domestic and international forces in Afghanistan failed to strengthen the collaborative elites to the extent that was necessary for a grand alliance of the conservative forces of both countries. The broad social consensus in favour of Pashtunistan acted as a pressure for moving in a professedly anti-imperialist direction and the indigenous elites in Afghanistan had to take public positions which did not serve the political needs of the Pakistani conservatives regardless of other circumstances.

The "progressive" power and obligation of Afghanistan should have prevailed against the conservative bridgeheads which Pakistan was creating. Kabul's response, however, was paradoxical. On the one hand, the Afghan approach was characterised by increased vehement expressions

42. For details on Exploitation of Minorities, see, Ahmad Feroz, op.cit., Attayee, op.cit., Chapter 4, and Mohammad Said Khan, The Voice of the Pakhtoons, Chapter III, Disparities, pp.116-23.
of Pashtun egalitarianism. On the other hand, however, Kabul's policy-making served to conceal a bureaucratic disinclination to take advantage of legitimate ideological opportunities.

3. **NWFP: The Base of the Pashtun National Movement Against the One Unit Plan**

A review of the activities of the last British Governor of the NWFP Sir Olaf Caroe shows that he was strongly committed to destroying the base of the Pashtun National Movement. The specific features of his policy were dictated by his personal antipathy to Pashtunistan and by the established policy of the British Government to prevent the reunification of the Pashtun nation. Pakistan's acceptance of the legacy of the Olaf Caroe style of administration was only part of the acceptance of the legacy of British imperialism.

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The refusal of the NWFP to accept the One-Unit Plan was part of a more general trend which was to gather momentum during the 1960s: a search for a revolutionary modification of the political system to ensure auto-centric development for the Pashtuns on both sides of the Durand Line. The reasons for the unsatisfactory balance-sheet of Kabul's utilisation of the power base of the Pashtun national movement in the NWFP are manifold. They have to do with the complexity of the political socialisation of the NWFP Pashtuns, the bureaucratic mentality of the Persianised elite in Afghanistan and the legitimising umbrella of Islam under which Pakistan carries out its disinformation activities.\footnote{For details See, Mohd. Said Khan, \textit{op. cit.}, and Wali Khan's Statement Delivered on May 22, 1970 at the Pakistan's Institute of Foreign Affairs, \textit{Karwan} (Private Daily, Kabul), Vol.2, no.196.}

The NWFP is, however, an inseparable part of the Pashtun National awakening and Pakistan's wish to arrest or inhibit its drive for Pashtun reunification runs counter to human nature itself.

4. \textbf{The Pseudo-Democratisation Under a Pashtun Chief Minister}

Pakistan appears to have opted for coercion as the dominant means of political control and its elite has seriously underrated the margin of error. To begin

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with Jinnah promised the Pashtuns full autonomy and appealed to them to throw in their lot with Pakistan. With his demise the growing sense of insecurity in the ruling elite made the lack of political leadership more conspicuous than ever.

Instead of extending the hand of cooperation to the Pashtuns, the Pakistani regime persecuted and brought about the closure of the Pakhtoon, the recognised press organ of the Pashtoon national movement. Instead of the path of negotiation, the Pakistani rulers embarked on handling unilaterally issues with serious implications for the Pashtuns. They also curtailed civil liberties and put all genuine Pashtun leaders in prison. When Pakistan started experiencing severe internal strains as a result of these misguided policies, the power elite in despair offered the post of Chief Minister of the United Province of West Pakistan to Dr. Khan Sahib and expected the Pashtun leadership to produce a magic formula for peace and tranquility in Pakistan. There is no doubt that the attempt at pseudo-democratisation fuelled the fear of an impending catastrophe. It was against the background of a deteriorating internal situation, and a further

fragmentation of existing structures and institutions that military rule was imposed in Pakistan in 1958.

It would be too easy to argue that Dr. Khan Sahib's failure was due to political exigencies. Experience had shown that the Pakistani system was burdened with tasks it could not possibly fulfil even under a Pashtun leadership at the apex. Under the circumstances it could surprise nobody in Kabul that even the facade of democracy in Pakistan soon fell into oblivion.

5. The Anti-One Unit Movement and Cracks in the Stability of Pakistan

The military coup d'etat in Pakistan in October 1958 which brought General Ayub Khan to power not only involved a painful change of leadership; it also showed that the legitimacy of societal and constitutional arrangements in Pakistan had precipitously declined.

The Anti-One Unit Movement had shown that Pakistani decision-makers were trapped in the framework they had themselves created and the incidence of ethnic and religious cleavages would only escalate. The military junta inherited political, social, and economic conditions which were all caught in a persistent structural crisis. Pakistani repression of the Pashtuns was only a symptom of the crisis of societal legitimacy which the Pakistani elite had created for itself by failing to identify the
dangers of peripheralisation which neo-colonialism was extending in the third world.\footnote{46} It was the deformed economic and social structures which led to the cracks in the stability of Pakistan. Instead of adopting radical social cures, the imposition of military rule in Pakistan would only "strengthen imperialist dependency after the end of formal empire".

Our discussion has made clear that for understanding the process of regional politics with Pakistan, Afghan decision-makers must focus on a continuing analysis of domestic-international policy linkages of Pakistan which show manifest imperialistic tendencies albeit of an informal type. The element of personalisation whether under Ayub, Bhutto or Zia, may show Pakistan as cohesive and effective in dealing with the external environment. There is, however, an inherent quality of brittleness in the stability of Pakistan which Afghanistan must carefully appraise.

\footnote{46. For details on Pashtun Struggle and Sufferings under One Administrative Unit of West Pakistan, see, De Khpalwakai Taroon, (Annual Records of the Pashtunistan Movement), from 1955 onwards; De Gharbi Pakistan Unit (Pashto: West Pakistan Unit), op.cit., and Mohd. Said Khan, The Voice of the Pakhtoons, Chapter II.}
Afghanistan again found itself in a defensive position, although Soviet help had refurbished Afghan military position. The crisis found the Afghan government drawing closer to the Soviet Union although dominant opinion in Kabul was not attracted by this course. The decisive show-down with Pakistan proved problematical and risky and the closure of the Pak-Afghan border did not show that the policy-makers had made a discriminating diagnosis of the situation. 47

One cannot generalise with any confidence as to the motivation of Sardar Daud's resignation in 1963, but his miscalculation in 1961 demands our attention. He could have forestalled a direct challenge to this authority if

47. With frequent severence of diplomatic ties and sealing of the border which meant an economic blockade of land-locked Afghanistan, the country had to seek assistance from the Soviet Union which gradually developed into a virtual economic dependence. For details see, Franck, Afghanistan Between East and West, Washington, 1960. Aloys A. Michel, "Foreign Trade and Foreign Policy in Afghanistan", Middle Eastern Review, Vol. XII, no.1, Jan. 1961, pp.7-15, and Afghanistan's Foreign Trade Chart.
his romanticization of the Pashtunistan doctrine had been accompanied by an effort to grapple with some fundamental questions: Would the Afghan elite accept a one-sided tilt towards the Soviet Union? If not, should Kabul seek a wider perspective on planning for contingencies? As it turned out Daud was fighting a rearguard action against the status-quoists whose efforts and thoughts turned towards King Zahir Shah for summarily abandoning the limited momentum built up in favour of a high commitment towards Pashtunistan. In retrospect one can see that Daud in his first incumbency did not provide himself with a base sufficiently broad for an "escalation dynamics" involving as a consequence the upsetting of the social and political equilibrium in Afghanistan.

1. The Severance of Diplomatic Relations (1961)

The severance of diplomatic ties between Afghanistan and Pakistan in 1961 deserves careful study since it reveals the mechanism by which Pakistan asserts its control and domination over the Pashtuns and shows itself to have formidable skill in coercive diplomacy. The dignity and weakness of Daud Khan were also revealed in this highly complicated situation. Shortly after the Bajwar incident, Pakistan announced that it was closing its Consulates at Jallalabad and Kandahar, and demanded that Afghanistan
should also withdraw its Consulates from Peshawar and Quetta. However, the reasons for this step initiated by Pakistan were far from clear. Pakistan blamed the Afghan people for their hostile attitude towards the Pakistani officials and the difficulties faced by the Pakistani citizens at the hands of the Afghan authorities. Pakistan had levelled such charges on earlier occasions as well. But, while history may repeat itself in this way, at each new crisis the contradictions arise in an acuter form. The Pakistanis reeled under the force of events represented by the disaffection of the Pashtun masses supported by Afghanistan which hitherto had been rather submissive.

In order to bring pressure on Kabul to reverse its stand, Pakistan threatened to close the borders for the transit of Afghan foreign trade and thus disrupt its economy. When Pakistan carried out its threat, Afghanistan's economy was, in fact, adversely affected since it had just completed its first Five Year Plan (1956-1961) and had launched a second one, and all planning priorities were

adversely affected. As a result of the Pakistani blockade the Soviet Union became Afghanistan's chief means of contact with the outside world, although this channel was quite costly and uneconomical.49

An additional complication was that the closing of the border halted shipments of equipment from the United States for Afghan developmental projects, and the U.S. Government refused to avail itself of the Soviet route. This created a critical situation in the country, and Kabul was compelled to press the United States to persuade Pakistan to negotiate a peaceful solution to the Pashtun problem and open the border for normal Afghan trade. The situation, however, remained unsettled and the United States' attitude raised the question whether they were not secretly glad that the Afghan "strong-man" Daud Khan was heading for his downfall.50

49. For the adverse consequences of the Pakistani blockade, See Louis Dupree, Afghanistan (Princeton, New Jersey, 1973), pp.545-54.

With the resignation of Daud Khan on March 4, 1963, it became clear that his gamble had failed. Daud had the reputation of being an able administrator and was keen to use the most effective means for the development of the Afghan economy and for pursuing the core foreign policy interest in Pashtunistan. Unfortunately he was not able to build a team of competent advisers. His brilliant initiative in bringing the Pashtun issue to the fore was defeated not so much by Pakistan as by the die-hardism in the bureaucratic apparatus. \(^5\) Afghanistan needed a lasting solution to the problems of security, sovereignty and cultural integrity which were all different aspects of the Pashtunistan problem. Pakistan had shown that it would not shrink from the use of force and economic coercion in pursuing its aggressive policy of neo-colonialism and neo-hegemonism.

\(^5\) Daud had many powerful enemies such as the King, the Persianised bureaucracy, the pro-Pakistani clergy, the business community, the traditional elite and even his own Cabinet colleagues who sabotaged his plans. He was popular among the common people, the Pashtun intellectuals and the nationalist army. The constitutional reforms in itself were mainly meant to end Daud's influence, preventing his comeback to power through popular democratic means. See, Louis Dupree, "An Informal Talk with Prime Minister Daoud", AUFSR, Vol.III, no.3, 1959, pp.1-4 and Ralph Magnus, "The Constitution of 1964: A Decade of Political Experimentation", in Dupree's Afghanistan in 1970s, (Praeger, New York, 1974), pp.54-70.
However, it was now clear that in spite of Daud Khan’s appeal to the forces of Pashtun cohesion, the Afghan establishment distorted and devalued by westernised elitism, was quite timid, irrational and obsessional in its yielding to the temptations of the international status quo. Even a superficial account of the Pak-Afghan interactions will reveal that Pakistan obtained high returns for its coercive diplomacy because Kabul put too much trust in persuasion without the possibility of punishment to fall back on.

2. The Islamic Powers of West Asia: A Dismal Record

It has been particularly puzzling and disconcerting for the Afghanistan Government and the Pashtuns to find that the complexities and ramifications of the Pashtunistan issue have not been of great interest to the regimes in West Asia. Although Afghanistan has offered to produce ample evidence of the wrongs perpetrated by Pakistan over the Pashtuns, and their infringement of the norms of Islamic solidarity, the West Asian governments have expressed no interest to take on themselves the responsibility to verify the allegations of Afghanistan.

During the period of high tension between Pakistan and Iran between 1961-1963, as indeed during the earlier confrontation in 1955-56, the West Asian countries played a mediatory role on the questions of restoration of
diplomatic ties and transit trade facilities but refused to accept the arduous task of controlling conflict over the Pashtunistan issue.52 The fundamental weaknesses of the West Asian states relate to the deficiencies of the political and administrative structures bequeathed to them by the colonial powers. The aspirations of the Pashtuns for social and political advancement often appear to them to echo the demands of some of the ethno-nationalists who are raising challenges to these regimes.

The underlying continuity between the formal imperialism of the British and the informal imperialism of Pakistan is a dimension which these regimes are not prepared to entertain. The deep-seated feelings of mutual suspicion and rivalry which pervade West Asia have made the environment propitious for authoritarianism and even despotism and the rationality of the demand for Pashtunistan with its ideological dimensions of Pashtun egalitarianism has difficulty in finding acceptance. Conversely, Pakistan can present more activist and populist conceptions of Islamic solidarity without bothering to explain why it has denied the right of self-determination to the Pashtuns.

52. For detail on mediation, See, Arif Hussain, *op.cit.*, p.120, and, Dilip Mukerjee, *op.cit.*, p.310.
Iran's mediatory efforts created their own momentum and had a penetrative effect which merits discussion. The question of Islamic solidarity receded more and more into the background as under the Shah of Iran the parochial political, cultural and economic interests gained ground. What must interest us here is the general direction of Iran's grand strategy and its implications. Is it to establish the ancient Daryush Empire for which she has been dreaming for centuries?

Iran's hope of incremental change after the Shah of Iran advocated his thesis of the protection of the Persian Gulf and the Makran coast was expressed quite openly. Tehran let it be known that if Pakistan happened to disintegrate further, Iran would occupy Baluchistan because she did not want "another Vietnam situation" on her frontiers. In fact, the Shah's regime had on political, social and cultural questions adopted an attitude that harked back to an unrealistic model of imperial expansion and divide and rule. The Iranian objective was to exploit the differences over Afghanistan and Pakistan over the Pashtunistan issue.


and keep the two countries which were otherwise geo-
graphically and culturally close at loggerheads with
each other while Iran tried to infiltrate into the whole
region.55

The undermining of the national sovereignty of
Afghanistan became a shared objective of Iran and the
United States; the U.S. did its utmost to create a
mediator role for Iran during the 1961-63 tension primarily
to create dissociation of Pashtun nationalism from Kabul.

3. Mediation of the Shah of Iran: 1963

In the light of recent political development in
Iran, and with the benefit of hindsight, it can be
suggested that it is necessary to clearly differentiate
between the tactical moves of the Shah of Iran in 1963 and
the deeper convictions of the Iranian ruling elite. The
logic of Iranian contentions with Kabul and Islamabad
produced the impression of a good-neighbour policy. Afghan
discussion of the basic causes of this benign mediatory
attitude remained inconclusive. The primary emphasis of
the Shah of Iran on the normalisation of diplomatic and
economic relations without interlocking them with the
Pashtunistan question ran counter to the initiative taken
by the Daud Government.

The modalities of diplomacy at the tripartite talks at Tehran in May 1963 necessitated that the fundamental concepts of Kabul's Pashtunistan Doctrine be put aside for an indefinite time ahead. This was tantamount to a veritable surrender to the Iranian diplomatic offensive and showed that summit diplomacy without adequate preparation runs its own risks. The Tehran summit involved Iran intimately in Afghanistan's future but offered no assurances that Iran would not disrupt the foreign policy perspective of Afghanistan.

Our empirical investigation suggests that the Afghan participants in the Tehran negotiations did not subject the fundamental assumptions underlying the Iran Shah's paradigm to critical scrutiny. A further dimension of difficulty for the Afghan participants was that the prophylactic role of Iran was launched with a vigorous campaign to sell an ostensible policy of regional cooperation.

4. Resignation of Daud: 1963

Diplomatic relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan were restored only in May 1963, three months after Daud Khan laid down his Prime Ministership. The Shah of Iran's mediatory efforts succeeded but only at the cost of calling Daud to account for the pro-Pashtunistan measures he had taken.

56. For a detail account, see Omer Hewadyar, op.cit., Chapter V, and Kessing's Contemporary Archives, 1963, p.19490.
Daud Khan's terms for resumption of diplomatic relations with Pakistan demanded among other things a guarantee by Islamabad that the Pashtuns would be granted the right of self-determination. He succeeded in internationalising the Pashtunistan issue and a clear indication of this was that within a month of the rupture of Afghan-Pakistan diplomatic relations the United States was compelled to send a good offices mission to Islamabad.57

One of Daud's objectives certainly was to make it clear that Afghanistan could play the Soviet 'card' and he secured a Soviet commitment to Afghanistan's development programme as well as ensured a greater visibility of the Soviet strategic stake in Afghanistan.

However, with an army one-quarter the size of Pakistan's and with an airforce only one-third of her opponent, Afghanistan could not change the territorial and political status quo by armed confrontation, nor was that her intention. Daud's plan was to give diplomatic, political, ideological and some military support to the progressive forces within Pashtunistan. This required a protracted commitment by Kabul which the ruling elite was not prepared for. Daud's resignation showed that Pakistan

and Iran (and the United States) shared a shrewd understanding of the assumptions and attitudes upon which Afghanistan's domestic and foreign policies were based. 58

5. **Pashtunistan - A Closed Issue**

The great paradox of the events of 1961-63 is that the ouster of Daud Khan and the attempt to drive a wedge between the Pashtuns by declaring the demise of the Pashtunistan issue led eventually to a harder line which Daud adopted on his return to power in 1973. 59 Is it fair to say, as some commentators have pointed out that "the fateful decisions made by the Daud Government between 1953 and 1956 led to the eventual extinction of Afghan independence"? Certainly the Pashtunistan dispute proved a great help to the Soviet Union in its diplomatic thrust southwards.

It would be wrong to think, however, that the certainty and credibility which Daud created in the minds of Afghans on the eventual realisation of Pashtunistan is a negligible political asset. As we


have already seen the bureaucracy's response to the demand for fulfilment of Pashtun identity was often based on conflicting motivations. Nevertheless Daud proved to be unmoved by the mechanisations of the ruling elite and preferred to lose his job as Prime Minister rather than to give up his insistence on tougher measures. It is therefore a very narrow view that focusses only on the factors that prevented Daud's gamble paying off. 60

The much touted initiative of the Shah of Iran had little meaning ten years later when for all the rhetorical claims of the Iranians and the Pakistanis that Pashtunistan was a closed case, the issue was back on the regional agenda in a significant way.

However, in the 1980s there are elements of both openness and closure in the posture towards Pashtunistan. Whether after an international settlement on the future of Afghanistan, Kabul will be able to preserve or expand the legacy of Daud is another matter which the Afghan regime of the day will have to confront directly.

60. One main factor was King Zahir Shah's own reluctance to let the constitutional experiment to work genuinely. He was using it as a "divide and rule" device that led to political fragmentation and socio-economic and cultural regression, preventing the emergence of a nationalistic political culture so necessary for a stable growth of a backward heterogeneous society such as Afghanistan.
6. **Super Power Motivations**

None of the momentous development which took place in the late seventies and early eighties in Afghanistan could be anticipated by American diplomacy. Using the calculus of interests Washington guided its choice towards Turkey, Iran and Pakistan and encouraged Iran and Pakistan to follow a policy of intimidation towards the Afghans. As a consequence many American writers who surveyed the shifting panoply of events in South-West Asia in late 1979 were for the first time compelled to ask themselves whether in making Afghanistan a negligible factor in the security of the region there had been a high degree of ineptness in their choice. 61

The United States could have adopted a neutral posture towards the Pashtun issue and awaited the result of the revitalisation of national values in Afghanistan. By supporting the chauvinism of Pakistan taking a stand against the national and political emancipation of the Pashtuns, the United States may have sought to underline its deep seated ideological differences with the Soviet Union, but it actually helped the Soviets to dangle seductively its support for Pashtunistan before Afghan

eyes. Similarly, the American support to the One-Unit Plan and the efforts to bring the Pashtun issue within the purview of SEATO would remain a fostering source of discord between the U.S. and Afghanistan. 62

The Soviet involvement in Afghanistan, leading eventually to a military involvement had a defensive character against the imperialistic-cum-reactionary forces. Given a different diplomacy by the United States, the Afghans could have perceived the Soviet Union as the last remaining European nation with a colonial empire in the third world. It was Pashtunistan that made the vital difference to the Afghan perceptions.

7. **The Asian Power Balance**

The consequences of Pak-Afghan tensions (1961-63) can be categorised in different types: the relationship of a local confrontation to the Super Power competition; the relationship of national and social liberation to neo-colonialism and neo-hegemonism; the nature and type of Islamic solidarity and the fratricidal struggle over border tribes; the Soviet view of indigenous forces in Southwest Asia; American ideas and actions for building a bastion against Communist expansion; and the changing power balance in Asia.

62. The West and the Americans had found it difficult to see Pashtunistan as a national issue which no Afghan government could ignore it. Had it been so Mohammad Zahir Shah would have certainly given it up.
The power balance in the political geography of this vitally strategic region underwent a dramatic reversal from the early 1960s to the 1980s. The interaction between Pakistan and Afghanistan in 1961-63 was significant for the future correlation of forces, as it emphasised the danger that local confrontations could escalate into world power confrontations. The equations of the Super Powers with Kabul, Islamabad and Tehran could be seen as reflections of perceived changes. Moscow would give major importance to the forces of national and social liberation in Pashtunistan although overtly the Soviet Union would adopt a low-key approach. The motivation of access to the sea colours the motivations of both Afghanistan and the Soviet Union and the two could have interests which diverge in this crucial respect.63

The pressure from the United States gave the Russians an opportunity to play a partner-like role with Afghanistan. The concept of a Forward Policy which was

63. The access to the Sea is one of the ingredients of the issue linked with the question of wider political freedom which the Afghans have often frankly admitted to in private discussions. Afghan diplomat Dr. Najibullah is claimed to have even officially communicated such a desire to the Pakistani authorities in early 1948. See, Mujtaba Razvi, The Frontiers of Pakistan, Karachi, 1973, p.152. Such a nationalistic desire converges with the Soviet interest of having a political access to the "warm waters" through a friendly Afghanistan.
so central to Pakistan's conception of maintaining political and economic leverage over the Pashtuns was shown to be flawed since it destroyed any basis for long term stabilisation of Pakistan-Afghanistan relations. Two years later from the period we are discussing, i.e., in 1965, India and Pakistan were engaged in war, which would crystallise new alignments in the region. The Soviet Union would begin in right earnest to consolidate her relationship with India and in this long-term strategy Afghanistan would be a vital link. Although for some time in the late sixties it would seem that Pashtunistan would be downgraded as an issue, the Bangla Desh crisis of 1971 would serve to bring home once again the inherent historical tension around the future of the Pashtun Tribes. 64.

The improvement of Soviet-Pakistan relations in the 1960s could only result in a temporary downplaying of the Pashtunistan problem. It would not be possible for Pakistan to rewrite history and turn the clock back on the relations between the Pashtuns on both sides of the Durand Line.

The complex and ever-changing political environment of Asia would ensure that Pakistan's self-assurance would prove shortlived. It does not take too much imagination

to see why the Pashtuns can always crucially affect the Asian Power balance although the idea of full sovereignty over Pashtunkhwa has often been an elusive object of pursuit for them.

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**EXCURSUS - IV**

**BHUTTO VERSUS N.A.P.**

**Bhutto Versus N.A.P.: 1972**

Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto was deeply committed to the view that Pakistan should back up its words with actual employment of force to cripple the capabilities for voicing the Pashtun national demand. His major action
policy was initiated by the dismissal of the NAP coalition governments in both North Western Frontier Province and Baluchistan. The intransigent Pakistani attitude was based on what Bhutto regarded as controllable risk vis-a-vis Afghanistan.

65. December 1970 general elections in Pakistan brought regional parties in absolute majority in their Provinces. Awami League of Shiekh Majib-ur-Rahman won in the populous East Pakistan, Bhutto's PPP emerged in Sind and Panjab, while NAP led by Wali Khan, son of Abdul Ghafrar Khan, with its JUI Jamya Ulama-i-Islam emerged in the N.W.F.P. and Baluchistan. The ruling Punjabi elite and Bhutto who had a majority in the West wing Pakistan, did not allow Awami League with its overall majority to form the national government at the Centre. This resulted in the break-up of Pakistan and the emergence of Bangladesh in 1971.

With the break-up Bhutto's ego was satisfied and he became the ruler of Pakistan. As a result of the weakness caused by the defeat in the war with India, Shutto allowed the NAP to form their lawful governments in the NWFP and Baluchistan in early 1972 as a result of which relations with Afghanistan became very friendly and he twice paid friendly visits to Kabul. But as soon as he strengthened his position and the growing influence of NAP checked Iran's influence in Pakistan and became a threat to his PPP Party, Bhutto began to fabricate various charges against NAP in order to dismiss its lawfully established governments. Hence on the behest of Shah of Iran, he dismissed NAP's governments that triggered a civil war in Pakistan, For detail see, Werner Adam, "Storm Warning in North-Western Pakistan", Swiss Review of World Affairs; Vol.22, no.1, Apr. 1972, p.21; Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow: Baluch Nationalism and Soviet Temptations (New York, 1981), T.F.D.S & A. Journal of News Review on South Asia (New Delhi), Jan. 1972, pp.2-3.
The Pakistani action indicated the extent to which Islamabad had interpreted Afghan political attitudes and behaviour as a weakening of Kabul's commitment to its Pashtunistan doctrine. There is little doubt that the coercive response of Bhutto was based upon his understanding of Afghan psychology to avoid signalling commitment and being content with oversimplified generalisations. In its statements the Afghan government promised a bold new departure and appeared to be calibrating the proper degree of humanitarian intervention in support of the Pashtun brothers. This moral endorsement of the rights of the Pashtuns and the Baluchis as articulated by the NAP, however, remained immune to mobilisation of pressures against Pakistan. The NAP provided an inherent check to the exaggerated and grandiose claims of Bhutto, but mobilisation of world public opinion required a plausible conceptual framework of the Pashtuns as a Non-State Nation. Unfortunately, decision-makers in Kabul could only contemplate cataclysmic scenarios which would contribute to Super Power confrontation.

Our enquiry shows that there was little consideration of minimal conditions and actions necessary to increase the relevance of Afghan and NAP actions. A new consensus on multiple options was coming into being in Kabul and a new strategy of pressure on Pakistan appeared to have viable
aspects. The strong leverage effect was not utilised after a few limited probes and once again the possibility of a wider latitude of policy options was given up creating a wide credibility gap between the power elite in Kabul and the Pashtun masses.

1. The Khudal Khidmatgars: Continuities and Discontinuities

One of the features of the relationship between the political organisation of the Pashtuns in British India and Afghanistan is Kabul's labyrinthine complexity in its dealings with the Khudal Khidmatgars, the Red Shirts. At the time of Nadir Shah the paradox of contemporary Afghan policy lay in the fact that while on the one hand the regime declared that on both sides of the border the Pashtuns were "one people" by virtue of their Islamic religion and nationality (identical as regards race and religion), the impression was given to the British that the Afghan Government disapproved of the alliance between the Red Shirts and the Congress Party in India.

Indeed, the media in British India acknowledged that since Nadir Shah's advent to power "Kabul has become an increasingly steadyng factor in the politics of the Indian frontier". Since the 1920s the British policy of penetration of the Frontier Tribes had been pursued with increasing vigour and there were major conflicts between
the British and the Pashtuns. Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan assessed this development realistically. The Red Shirts looked to Afghanistan for inspiration but at the same time he developed a policy of giving absolute precedence to the confrontation with the British with the help of the Congress Party of India.

In the 1930s the Pashtuns were an active ingredient in the Indian freedom struggle and were stressing a revolutionary strategy against compromise as is clear from the following message to Mahatma Gandhi from the Red Shirts on the eve of the Round Table Conference:

“Oh, our dear Malang, you have to make peace with armed forces of 300,000 men. Well go, and taking in one hand the strength of 36 crores of peaceful people and in the other the strength of 400,000 fighters - the free tribes - demand the following conditions in the next Round Table Conference:

1) Immediate grant of full independence to India according to the Congress Resolution of 1929.
2) The release of S. Bhagat Singh, Harish Kishen, Sukh Dev, Raj Guru, the Garhwalis, and all other political prisoners.
3) The payment by the Government of compensation of 50 lakhs for hanging the innocent Ghazi Habib Nur.

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66. For detail, see, Attayee, Pashtunistan, op. cit., Nighting, S. De Pashtano Mojahadi (The Pashtun Struggles), Kabul 1331 (1952); and James W. Spain, The Pathan Borderland (The Hague, 1963), Chapter IX.
4) The grant of reasonable pensions to the widows and orphans of the Indians who fell victims to rifles, bayonets, machine guns, armoured cars, lathis, and aerial bombardment and to those who were martyred by being dipped in dirty water and hung upside down.

5) The withdrawal of the British forces from the Kajuri and the payment of an indemnity of 50 lakhs to the Afridis. 67

At the time of decolonisation and end of formal empire the British were able to deprive the Pashtuns of the potential benefits which could have accrued to them. The Governor of the NWFP, Olaf Caroe became the instrument for achieving the political aims of the Anglo-Pakistan commonality against the Pashtuns. He encouraged and supported the intensification of religious propaganda and sabotage against the popular ministry of Dr. Khan Sahib in the NWFP. The Frontier leaders were pushed into increasingly awkward situations and finally the Dr. Khan Sahib ministry was dismissed on the ground that it had lost the support of the legislature. 68


68. For detail see, Chapter II, B (iii) p.199; Pyarelal, Thrown to the Wolves, Chapter XIII and Amit Kumar Gupta, North West Frontier Province Legislature and Freedom Struggle 1932-47, New Delhi, 1976, Chapter IV.
The structural dislocation of duly constituted political set up in the NWFP in order to help the transition to Pakistan was the final strategy of imperial rule and the conduct of the British officials as well as failure of the Indian National Congress Party to prevent the imposition of a sub-imperialism on the Pashtuns was a flagrant violation of the principles relating to transfer of power. Deeply marked by past history as an anti-imperialist force, the Pashtuns of the NWFP were left at the mercy of the new neo-colonialist strategies of the Pakistanis who would deny the Pashtuns their right to auto-centric development.69

The Khudai Khidmatgars wanted neither a colonial nor a semi-colonial status and were total in their rejection of the ideology of imperialism. Their legitimate right to independence was taken away by a combination of factors: the fundamental flaw in the transfer of power by the British who paved the way to the imposition of informal imperialism; the abdication of reciprocity and responsibility by the Indian National Congress who had secured Pashtun help in overthrowing imperial rule and failed to

discharge their debt of honour to the Pashtuns;\textsuperscript{70} and finally the narrow minded political culture in Kabul which could not generate the political momentum to erect a barrier against the precipitate and disproportionate use of force by Pakistan against the Pashtuns.

In the case of Bhutto what Afghanistan should have realised was that under him the process of repression would be speeded up since the comprador classes which he represented wanted to move from an internally-directed repression to an externally-direction domination which would spread on a regional scale. Here, then we find the main explanation for the Bhutto phenomenon of socialist rhetoric combined with policies for perpetuating the poverty and economic backwardness of the Pashtuns. This also explains the militarisation of the confrontation with the Pashtun national movement and Bhutto's fierce hatred of the Khudai Khidmatgars who were in his eyes the symbol of status and prestige of the Pashtun nation.

2. \textit{Conflict and Convergence in the Democratic Movement in Pakistan: Role of the Pashtun National Movement}

The Military - bureaucratic establishment in Pakistan has by and large accepted the acculturation of the indigenous society to the Imperialist tradition. It

\textsuperscript{70} For detail, see, Pyarelal, \textit{Thrown to the Wolves: Abdul Ghaffar} (Calcutta, 1966).
does not have a national-revolutionary potential and it has a policy of ruthless suppression of the democratic movement while following a unilinear development path which requires collaboration with the western capitalist system.

After the military establishment was discredited as a result of the defeat and surrender in East Pakistan in 1971, the Pakistan Peoples Party was able to work out a new coalition between scions of feudal families and leftist agitators. Bhutto oscillated between radical rhetoric and his support to the Nizam-i-Mustafa, a slogan he sometimes shared with the Rightist opposition parties. By the time the elections of 1977 were announced Bhutto had used his demagogic skills to create the impression of political predominance by exciting Punjabi chauvinism. He also resorted to open and blatant rigging of the elections and was able to defeat the Pakistan National Alliance. His persecution of the NAP, the purge of the leftists within the PPP and the confrontation with the PNA brought Pakistan to the verge of a civil war. In July 1977, General Zia-ul-Haq staged a coup with the avowed aim of ending political instability and the threat to Pakistan's survival. Neither of these objectives was achieved, but

71. For detail, See, Kessing's Contemporary Archives, 1976, and De Khpalwakai Taroon, Kabul, 1976-77.
the effect of Bhutto's persecution and death sentence was to confer martyrdom on him and give a further lease of life to the PPP.

Thus, Pakistan political scenario presents a complex picture. While the role of the Pashtun national movement is conditioned by its singular historical circumstances the specific categories in which other segments of the democratic movement can be included remains somewhat arbitrary. The Saudis and the Iranians along with the Super Powers have all been fishing in the troubled waters of Pakistan's political arena. The Saudis want a strong theocratic regime to emerge led by the Jama'at-i-Islami, while the others have their own vested interest in seeing that Pakistan does not develop a viable policy.

The democratic movement can only succeed if it responds to the changed situation which calls for radical re-thinking and reformulation of policies. Bhutto produced a veritable anti-Pashtun hysteria,\textsuperscript{72} which along with the geostrategic doctrines which the American connection has fostered in Pakistan, has resulted in even the Democratic Movement being divided into the "haves" and the "have-nots", with the Pashtuns being exposed to the vagaries and turbulence of the political weather more than others.

\textsuperscript{72} See, Mohammad Said Khan, \textit{The Voice of the Pakhtoons}, (Lahore, Ferozsons, 1972), Chapter 2.
There is every reason to believe that the social and revolutionary turmoil in Pakistan will continue and the processes of democratic resistance will continue and the processes of democratic resistance will continue to evolve. The consequences may be in many ways unpredictable. Since the Pashtun national movement openly declares its intention to challenge the existing political system, the convergence of interests will lead it to cooperate with other elements of dissent. The fundamental difference is that in the permanency and scope of their engagement the Pashtuns cannot ever be expected to give up their identity reference in the interest of political expediency.73

3. Repercussions of Bhutto's Assault on Provincial Autonomy in N.W.F.P. and Baluchistan

The fragile logical and factual base on which Bhutto grounded his assault on the provincial autonomy in NWFP and Baluchistan resulted in his being unable to extricate himself from this political entanglement for the rest of his career. With hindsight it would seem that Afghanistan was much more diffident with regard to the possibility of political influence than was warranted. The Afghan emphasis on Pashtun rights and the NAP workers demonstration in

February 1972 in Peshawar forced President Bhutto's regime to respond favourably. Martial Law was lifted and the NAP governments were reinstated in NWFP and Baluchistan.  

But afterwards when Bhutto buttressed his position with the help of Iran, he started a policy of divide and rule, setting one tribe against the other and alluring leaders by offer of political posts to set one against the other. He brought up the issue of discovery of arms at the Iraqi Embassy to link it with the NAP. Similarly, the Las Bela tribal uprising was the work of Bhutto's agents and the Central Government sent the army there despite the protests by Bizenjo, the Governor. Bhutto responded by removing the Governor as well as the popular NAP Ministry. In March 1973, the Afghan Government declared that "Afghans would not tolerate continuation of the present policy of injustice and repression in occupied Pashtunistan (NWFP and Baluchistan)". The statement further added:

"We still hope that Pakistan Government would abandon the dangerous path of naked repression against the Pashtuns. We would warn the Pakistan Government not to play with fire. The people of Afghanistan have the fullest sympathy for their tortured brethren in occupied Pashtunistan and would retaliate in every possible way if in any way harm was done to their leaders".


75. Philip McKerrow, op.cit., p.308.
This statement was the strongest Afghan warning, ever since the end of the Daud decade. The formulation was an improvement over earlier reactions, and may have been instrumental in preventing the Bhutto regime from carrying out certain oppressive measures which had been planned against the NAP. A more rigorous and sophisticated approach might have led to diplomatic initiatives to restore the NAP to its former incumbency or to provide it with alternative options.

A subsequent statement by the Afghan Government in April 1973 placed Afghanistan's quest for balance and security in proper perspective and pointed out how Pakistan could come out of a vicious circle: At a time when the Government of Pakistan has promulgated a new constitution, the Government of Afghanistan considers it a duty to reiterate, once more, the following:

1) The historical ties, based on Islamic brotherhood, and life, in this one cultural region that links Afghanistan with the nation of Pakistan, have special value to the people of this country.

2) Hence the people of Afghanistan welcome every step which will help lead the life in Pakistan towards normalisation and stability in that brother country.

3) The people of Afghanistan can never accept any action by the Government of Pakistan which would entail suppression of the rights of our brothers in Pashtunistan, be they Pashtun or Baluch.
4) The people of Pashtunistan and their land have a history and culture independent of that of the people of the sub-continent of Pakistan and India, and it shall be so. Hence, whatever resolve that does not emanate from their own will, and is not based on the principle of the right of self-determination of nations, shall have no legal status for Afghanistan.

5) Afghanistan considers it a right and historical duty to support the demands of the people of Pashtunistan for the right of self-determination in every peaceful way.

6) Afghanistan in accordance with the decision of the Grand Assemblies, shall continue with this support until such time that our Pashtunistani brothers achieve this inalienable right, and their national wishes are fulfilled.

Afghanistan's clear proclamation was unfortunately not equalled by a continuing diplomatic thrust to check Iran's interference in the Pashtun issue and her efforts to limit the Afghan influence in the name of the security of Pakistan. At the time of Bhutto's visit to Tehran in May 1973, the Shah addressing the Pakistani leader said; "We shall stand by you... we shall not remain indifferent and close our eyes to any separatist movement in your country". The Iranian declaration amounted to a warning to Afghanistan.

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76. The Statement was issued by Prime Minister Musa Shafiqui's Ministry after a thorough deliberation by the Cabinet meeting held on 17 April 1973. See, Kabul Times, Vol. XII, no. 20, Apr. 18, 1973, p.1.
Kabul's immobilism on the subject of Iran's avowed goal of "preventing the disintegration of Pakistan" showed how fragile was the internal cohesion for any sustained activity for Pashtunistan. Not surprisingly the strong thrust of the April 1973 statement lost momentum since Afghan diplomacy failed to achieve its central objective of supporting the autonomy movement in Pakistan, in a tangible way. To do this it would have had to go beyond generalities and assume greater responsibility by giving up self-imposed measures of restraint.

4. N.A.P.'s Political Aim

The character of the Pashtun struggle can take very different forms, from providing forthright proclamations for the overthrow of the enemy to political programmes which sustain diversity in the interests of the final goal of the future.77

The kinds of historical variable with which the National Awami Party (NAP) has been faced include the following: the varying character of the support for the Pashtunistan movement from the Afghan side; the strength and pattern of Pakistan's domination of the independent Tribal areas taking advantage of Afghanistan's ambivalence; the character of the leadership of Khan Abdul Wali

77. See, Mohammad Said Khan, op.cit., Chapter II, pp.36-68.
Khan (son of Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan) who had to keep the organisation at a political level appropriate to the subjective and objective factors of the system structure of Pakistan; the legitimacy of the stand for maximum autonomy, keeping the ultimate goal of independence and of integration with Afghanistan as issues connected with decisions, actions and capabilities in the future.  

The Pashtun national movement has both constitutional and revolutionary streams. It could not be stated with certainty at any time as to which of the two was politically stronger. The Afghan predilection for ambiguity and caution was in the end counter-productive. True, Kabul never abandoned the idea of Pashtunistan, if not in deeds then in words. The MAP served the political purpose of the Pashtuns, and it was urgent for Kabul to help create the kind of political environment in which the Pashtunistan case remained credible enough as an international issue. By not developing enough mutually reinforcing linkages with the national movement in NWFP and Baluchistan, Kabul followed too narrow a path for removing the relics of imperialism.  

78. Ibid., Chapter II, The Pakhtunistan Jogey.
5. **P.P.P's Democracy and the Pashtuns: The Policy of Deception**

One is struck by the considerable uncertainty with respect to the future course of events with regard to the theory and practice of the Pakistan People's Party (PPP). Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, in whose career we can measure the political structural changes in the power-elite of Pakistan reflected both the political capability and the psychological duplicity which pervades groups, factions and coalitions in Pakistan. As Robert Jervis has analysed "one tends to see what one believes". 79

The hopes, fears, and memories of the decision-makers in Pakistan and Afghanistan were so opposed that the concept of democracy looked quite different to either side. The positional perspective of the PPP turned out to be opposed to stability in the NWFP and other regions. It suited it to propel politics out of the arena of realism into one of confusion. At the time of the elections in 1970, the PPP did not have any strength of speak of in the NWFP and Baluchistan. It therefore practised a policy of deception and managed to destroy the autonomy in both the provinces by dismissing the majority

governments. The PPP's way of looking at the Pashtuns turned out to be even more egocentric and dangerous than that of the previous regimes. Bhutto lived in a Manichean world, in which PPP represented light and the Pashtuns were identified as dark and evil and therefore he declared a virtual war against them.

Afghanistan's objectives were not helped by vague appeals to Pakistan. With uncertain prospects the most that Kabul did was to offer asylum to Pashtun leaders and workers who were being persecuted in Pakistan. Kabul's view of the PPP - NAP confrontation was a mixture of genuine sympathy for the Pashtun cause and considerable misunderstanding and misperception.

The inescapable conclusion is that the structure of domestic decision-making and of domestic politics in Afghanistan must be altered if parochial impulses are to be replaced by statecraft which can prevail over the cross-cutting interests working against the Pashtuns.

LINKAGES

The foreign policy of Afghanistan has been closely linked with those of Russia and Britain since the evolution of the contemporary international system. With Iran, Afghanistan has always shared broad domestic

societal dimensions. Finally Iran and Pakistan face problems of adjustment, and the latter although it does not have "externally projectable power" by itself has been able to achieve identification and loyalty towards United States policies in the region.

The international environment facing Afghanistan, and the range of foreign policy options open to it are determined by the continuum of relative power relationships with (1) Iran; (2) Pakistan and (3) the two Super Powers, the United States and the Soviet Union. The antagonism that has characterised Afghan-Pakistani relations since 1947 cannot be considered in isolation on a bilateral basis. This conflict behaviour is more indirect that appears at first sight and is an integral part of the total pattern of activity in which Afghanistan is involved in forestalling unfavourable policies against her. In our case-by-case approach we have studied the cluster of variables and demonstrated the consequences of the shifting structure of the Pashtunistan issue. It remains to categorise the potentially relevant sources of foreign policy of Afghanistan in the context of specific linkages.

1. Afghan-Iranian Linkages

Policy-makers in Kabul in viewing problem areas of foreign policy have to take into account the historical factor in the pattern of dominance in the external environment. Afghan nationalism has an initial memory of
antagonism with both the Iranian Safavids and the Indian Moghuls. 81 The critical question that the evidence of the historical perspective asks is whether or not, in spite of societal change, the imperial vectors of policies originating in Iran and in the Indian sub-continent have recreated certain "historical goals" against Afghanistan.

However, looking at the distinctive trend of Iranian dominance, the Iranian foreign policy outputs towards Afghanistan have been rendered much more ambitious by the one-sided cultural flows. It is not so much a question of the size, population, and oil resources and ambitions to become an important military power in the region that have to be underscored here. A number of dimensions have to be taken into account to give due consideration to the structural pattern of "cultural

81. Pashtuns waged a strong nationalist struggle against both Safavid Persia and Moghul India during the 16th and 17th centuries, as a result of which they toppled both the empires and established their own national state of Pashtunkhwa officially called Afghanistan. Thus Pashtuns ended alien political control but they could not eliminate their cultural domination as British imperialist interventions deflected the priorities away from the cultural dimension.

imperialism" which has been facilitated by the socialisation of the Afghan elite groups into a pro-Persian mentality. 82

The continued penetration of Afghanistan by Iranian sources was one of the issues explored in our questionnaire in our general examination of the pattern of interaction and stratification of the Afghan political system. The regime structure in Afghanistan, as shown by our survey reflected significantly both conflict and accommodation to Iranian influence penetration at (a) the apex political echelons in Kabul; (b) distinct functions and values at societal levels and (c) general intellectual climate, in which identity references are developed in Afghan political behaviour.

2. **Afghan-Pakistan Linkages**

The tensions between Pakistan and Afghanistan are the result of complex combination of forces. Pakistan remains a post-imperial adversary, and Kabul which has throughout history been wary of its political foes cannot but look upon Islamabad in the same light. There are obvious pressures working in favour of Pashtunistan. There are equally obvious constraints and limitations, some internal and others external, which keep these pressures

82. For detail, see, the following Chapters.
within certain bounds. At the same time the Pashtunistan issue has a time horizon which goes well beyond what the Persianised bureaucracy in Kabul can contemplate.

During Daud's first tenure the central thrust of the Pashtunistan issue challenged the deeply ingrained habits and sensitivities of the Afghan elite. Pakistan is able to take advantage of these parochial and personal interests which obscure the real issue while bringing secondary issues to the fore. The Pakistani military-bureaucratic complex exploits the hidden dimension of Afghan politics. Nevertheless Pakistan has no vision of, or confidence in a future which could satisfy the criterion of progress on an auto-centric basis. There is a pervasive rigidity of attitude which favours old imperialistic formulae to fit the new problems presented by the ethnic revival of the Pashtuns.83

The growing significance of domestic factors in the contemporary era has resulted in the tensions between the various ethnic groups in Pakistan reaching crisis point from time to time with which the precarious balance of Islamic solidarity has little or no connection. The ethnic revival of the Pashtuns can facilitate integrative relations

83. See, A.W. Sadaqat, "Pa Pakistan Key Sa Kegi" (What Happens to Pakistan), Karwan, (Kabul), Vol.2, nos. 200 & 201, May 26, 27, 1970.
between the populations on both sides of the Durand Line, and under conditions of non-interference by outside powers, Afghanistan can increase its relative power in its politico-geographical zone, especially if it finds an access to the sea through Baluchistan. The structural pattern of the Pakistan-Afghan linkage is determined by their power potentials. The conspicuous characteristic of Pakistan is its effort to gain preponderance by its military and political alliance with the United States and by holding the Pashtuns of NWFP and the Tribal Areas as hostages.

In contrast to this Afghanistan has no wish for an "open" conflict and prefers to challenge the institutionalisation of Pakistan's hegemony and domination over the Pashtuns by regulating and transforming the Super power bilateralism. Kabul has all to gain from a rational reconstruction on a regional basis and wishes to use non-alignment to legitimise its options. Pakistan, on the other hand, wants to relate itself not to the "regional balance" but to the "central balance" and has found it necessary to exaggerate ideological difference in order to attract American aid.

84. Sadaqat, Ibid.
Decolonisation if extended to the Pashtuns would have provided the conditions of normal relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Afghanistan's natural inclination is for complete freedom of action. Its latent dependency on the Soviet Union has not been freely chosen; it has been pushed into a corner by Pakistan (along with Iran and the U.S.) since there are no other realistic alternatives so far.85

3. Super Power – Afghan Linkages

The perceptions of the Super Powers have always clashed with reality in the case of Afghanistan. In its anti-Communist fervour, the United States denied the existence of territorial, political and strategic rights of the Pashtuns and created the circumstances for the gravitation of Afghanistan towards the Soviet Union.86

Afghanistan has been linked to the "central balance" much against its national consensus expressed in the non-aligned ideology. The Afghans have anxieties about both the "Soviet threat" and the "American threat".


It is possible that if America had acted differently on the Pashtunistan issue, Kabul would have been more outspoken in expressing its instinctive scepticism about the Russian thrust beyond the River Oxus. By providing ideological and political support to Pashtunistan, Moscow was able to exercise a determining influence on the dynamic process of polarisation in both military and non-military spheres.

The competition in power politics and ideology between Soviet Union and China could not affect the decisive structural characteristic of the system. American efforts to reduce the effectiveness of the Soviet strategic posture in Afghanistan and the region have been deflected by unforeseeable changes of actor interests (e.g., the removal of the Shah of Iran, and the Saur Revolution in Afghanistan). The accumulated consequences of highly inadequate rationalisations on the Pashtunistan question have materialised in the increased risk-taking by both the Super Powers over Afghanistan in the 1980s.