CHAPTER - II

AFGHAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS AND FOREIGN POLICY

There is a close substantive connection between Afghan foreign policy and the complex linkages between domestic politics and the issues areas determined by the sequence of historical events. Insights into the Pashtun National Movement and the struggle against Imperialism confirm the view that the transaction patterns over the Pashtunistan issue in recent times constitute a case of historical continuity. The efforts of successive regimes in Kabul to cope with the political and constitutional issues cannot be adequately assessed unless we take into consideration the "spill-over" effects of the evolution of Pashtun identity as it confronted the divergent sources, motivations and modes of imperialist expansion.

In this chapter we have attempted to structure the historical evidence which helps to mark the crucial changes in direction which different varieties of imperialism have imposed on Pashtunkhwa. Indigenous political structures and movements have been studied in some detail in this chapter in order to broaden the perspective of previous notions of the salience and locus of foreign policy decision-making on Pashtunistan.
I. Pashtun Identity:

Till late the origin of the Pashtuns and their early history were controversial topics in academic debates. The Pashtuns were considered a constituent part of the Indian or the Iranian culture heritage. This was an essential part of the manipulative imperial strategic advocacy of the emerging empires to deny the existence of any viable cultural identity inside of their strategic frontiers formed on the historical territory of Pashtuns. From the imperialist perspective a denial of a separate Pashtun identity was compatible with the existing structural theory of international society.1

However, recent scientific studies and discoveries made in the fields of archaeology, historiography, anthropology and linguistics have exposed the irrelevance of these imperial themes. New scientific studies and evaluations have traced the origin, history and cultural roots of the Pashtuns to early Bactrian Aryans. This central branch of

the early Indo-Aryans had established its separate rudimentary Bactrian identity in Bactria in northern Afghanistan, in the third millennium B.C. beginning with the dispersal and general east-west migration of the early Indo-Aryans into three branches: the eastern or Indian branch, pushing forward across southern and eastern Pashtunkhwa to the Indian sub-continent, (Between 2500-1500 B.C.) called the Bharatis, the western or Iranian branch migrating west to Persia (2000-1000 B.C.), known as Parsavas and the Central or Bactrian branch dispersing in the original country of Aryana called Bakhts or Pakhtas, the ancestors of modern Pashtuns.2

Rigveda, the first sacred book of the eastern Indic Aryans, the Bharatis, (composed in between 1500-1000 B.C.) widely refers to the Bactrian brethrens as Pakhtas and their ancestral abode of Bakbd, Bakhtia, Bactria or Balkh as Bahlika, while Avesta, the sacred book of the Bactrians, mentions them as Bakhts and Pakhts, related to the ancient name of the first Aryan settlement in Bakhd, Bakhtia, Bactria, Bahlica or the modern

Balkh. Greek and Chinese sources later at the time of their dispersal in Aryana in the middle of first millennium B.C. refer to them as both Bactrians, and Pakhtis with Bactrian in general sense covering the entire inhabitants of Aryana, the country north and south of the Hindukush and Pakhti or Pakti in specific sense, referring to the principal Southern Bactrians the Pashtuns proper, inhabiting Pakhtikha or Paktica, the country south of the Hindukush and west of the Indus.

Linguists have found that these various terms are different variants of the same original Avestic term of Bakht or Bakhti which has been corruptly recorded in various languages as Bakhd, Pakht, Pakhta, Pakhti or Pakti and the modern Pakhtun or Pashtun due to linguistic phonetic variations. It is argued that the letters B,D, and Kh and P,T and K or Sh, are respectively interchangeable phonemes common as a rule in most of the Indo-Aryan languages. Hence, all these historical terms are derivatives.


of the original name of the ancient Bakht or Bactria and denote one and the same ethnicity, the Bactrians, the ancestors of the modern Pashtuns which signifies their enduring cultural hegemony and national identity in their ancestral homeland of Aryana or Pashtunkhwa.

**Bactrian Country: Aryana or Pashtunkhwa:** The ancient name of the Central Bactrian country has been Aryana which according to Avesta under the first Bactrian King Yama and his successors comprised a vast territory between Jaxartes (Sardarya) in Central Asia) and the Indus, consisting of sixteen provinces that corresponded approximately with the same limits as prescribed by the classical Greek writers and Chinese accounts. Strabo, the famous Greek geographer, while discussing the three Aryan countries - Persia, Aryana and India, defines southermost Aryana as "bounded on the east by the Indus, on the south by the

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6. According to Avesta, under the rule of Yama and his successors (about 1000 B.C.) Aryana comprised the following sixteen provinces: Airyanem - Vaeja (the upper Oxus region), Sughda (Sughd), Moura (Meru or Merve), Bakhd (Balkh), Nissaya (Murghab valley), Hariya (Herat), Vaekereta (Kabul), Urna (Urgoon), Khnenta (Gurgan in west of Iran), Haravati (Kandahar of Dehrawut), Haetument (Helmand or Seistan), Mogha (Magh or modern Badakhshan), Kakhra (Ghazni), Varna (Wana or Waziristan) and Hepta Hindu (Peshawar or the Indus Valley), A.H. Habibi, *Short History of Afghanistan* (Vol.I, Kabul, 1967) and Mohammad Ali, *op.cit.*
great Sea (Arabian Sea) on the north by the Paropomisus (a countain north of Mughab Valley in the north-west of Afghanistan) and the mountains which continue it as far as the Kaspian Gates and on the west by the same limits as separate Parthyana from Media, and Karmania from Paraitakana and Persis" or Persia.  

Aryana was the earliest name of the country which with the development of the Bactrian identity and hegemony gave rise to another specific term Bakhtia, Bactria or Pakhtikha i.e., Herodotus' Paktica in the first millenium B.C. It is this term related to the ancient name of Bactria or Balkh which has gradually changed into the medieval Pashtunkha or Pashtunkha and modern Pashtunkhwa, meaning the land of the Pashtuns, the modern, descendents of the original inhabitants of Bactria or Bactriana or the modern Balkh in north of Afghanistan. This term has survived till the present day, although the country has been known, later to the outside world in its foreign-inspired names as Khurasan, meaning the land of the rising


8. See, Rawlinson, Bellow, Caroe, Habibi, Dost, Kaka Khel and Benawa.

sun and now Afghanistan, meaning the land of Afghans, i.e., the Pashtuns or the Pathans. While the term Pathan is the Indian variant of the word Pashtun, the origin of the term Afghan is not definitive, although the Indian astronomer, Varana Mihira has recorded it in the 6th century A.D. as Avagana and Chinese Pilgrim, Hiuen-Tsang in the 7th century has mentioned it as Apokien, which according to Professor Habibi is an old Avestic adjective meaning brave, kind and helper.

Thus, historically speaking, most of the present areas of Afghanistan and Pashtunistan including Baluchistan, have been known since ancient times to its original inhabitants, the Pashtuns as Bakhtia or Bactriana, Pakhtia or Paktia, Pakhtikhwa or Paktika, Pashtunkha or Pashtunkhwa, signifying the land of the Aryan Bakhts, Pakhtis or the Pashtuns in their own Bactrian or Pakhti language of Pashto in a similar manner as India has been known as Bharat or Bharatia to its Aryan inhabitants the Bharatis, or as Iran which has been named by its Aryan Parsava inhabitants as Pars, Persis or Persia.


12. See, Benawa, Pashtunistan (Kabul, 1949), pp.3-7 and Ibid., note no.1, pp.92-102.
Bactrian Cultural Hegemony and Linguistic Identity: The famous Greek geographer after defining Aryana or Pashtunkhwa, discussing its principal Bactrian inhabitants, concludes by saying "But the name Aryana is again so extended as to include some portions of Persia and Median territory and even some of the northern parts of Bactrians and Jojdiani, for these nations speak nearly the same language",13. Strabo, Eratosthenes, Herodotus and other Greek writers call this language Bactrian as distinguished from that of Persian and Indian.14 Thus the phrase "these nations speak nearly the same language" not only proves the separate identity of Bactrians in Aryana but also indicates that by the middle of the first millennium B.C. the parental common Bactrian language had not yet "broken down into a few related groups",15 which reflect a rather stronger cultural integrity and hegemony in the central Bactrian country at the heart of the Indo-Aryan world.

Herodotus gives numerous references to Bactrian identity in his description of the Persian satrapies (provinces) of Aryana as significantly influencing its

neighbours in language mode of dress and equipments, denoting a wider Bactrian cultural influence in the region.\textsuperscript{16} The prevalence of Bactrian culture and dialects in Aryana or Pashtunkhwa is further substantiated by Chinese records. The Chinese traveller Chang Chien, visiting Aryana towards the close of 2nd century B.C., records that the people living there "although speaking different languages, are much alike in the common run of things and understand one another in their talks".\textsuperscript{17} The phrases "are much alike" and "understand one another in their talk" further indicate wider cultural unity and their established Bactrian identity. This is further attested by a century later Chinese account which states that in spite of great dialectical differences, the language of the Bactrians "is fairly alike as they understand one another in conversation".

However, till late scholars were puzzled by the Bactrian identity and about the survival of the Bactrian language. These questions were finally answered by the discovery of \textit{Juhrk hotal} inscription in Bactrian language used as an official language by the Kushans in the first

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17. Quoted by Jankovsky from \textit{The History of Senior Hans Dynasty} compiled by Pan Ku in First B.C. Chapter 95, See, \textit{Ibid.}
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to third centuries A.D. Linguistic studies of the inscription proved that this was the middle Bakhto or Pashto, the mother of the so-called last Iranian languages including Pashto, Parachi, Ormuri and various Pamir languages.18

II. Early History: A Process of External Encapsulation and Defossilization of Pashtun National Identity

The long course of Pashtunkhwa's history is permeated by overt violence of external invasions and profound structural conflicts in which the indigenous population was involved in its efforts to assert cultural and political autonomy. Its inhabitants, the Bactrians had only to contend with geo-political realities of their highly strategic landscape and endeavour to safeguard and preserve their cultural identity and win their bare survival in the face of continuous external intervention. The factors that enabled external forces to undermine Bactrian identity, were primarily the physical fragmentation of the landscape by the Hindu Kush, the "Great Divide" and the vulnerable peripheral location of its core areas.19

18. For detail, Dost, The Languages and Races of Afghanistan (Pashto, Academy, Kabul, 1975).

19. See, for the effects of the strategic location, Chapter , p.
The rich river basins of the country, the Oxus, the Helmand, the Kabul and the Indus, and beyond it the vast fertile plains of India, throughout the ages, encouraged migratory hordes and emerging powers from Persia and central Asia to make a series of forward-marching moves towards the subcontinent in a periodical manner. They first established themselves in the Oxus or Helmand basin and then after a consolidating pause moved further across the Hindu kush or through southern plains to the Kabul and Indus basins. The further pause makes them so powerful that a forward-moving "impulse causes them" to "march on the conquest of northern India". Once "established in India the centre of interest and of sovereignty moved south" to the Indian subcontinent and consequently the central authority was fragmented by "the fissiparous tendencies of the "Great Divide".

One significant feature of this historical process was, as Fraser Tytler points out that while "areas north of the Hindu-kush break away or are overrun by a fresh swarm of conquerors", the "Southern empire is gradually absorbed into the body politic of India". The gradual loosening of the alien hold enabled the indigenous population to absorb the alien elements and assert themselves locally but as soon


21. Ibid., p.17.
as a process of politico-socio-economic integration was set in motion, a fresh course of similar pattern of events strikes the country and in this way the history continues to "encapsulate and defossilize" the Pashtun cultural and national identity.

The first evident foreign intervention in Aryana took place in the middle of the first millennium B.C. when the Persian Achaemenid empire under Darius-I (522-485 B.C.) managed to control parts of it as vassal autonomous satrphies ruled by their own chosen chiefs, after stationing large garrisons. Though Achaemenid hold over Pashtunkhwa was tenuous and nominal and consequently could not extend beyond the Indus yet, it was sufficient enough to afflict the Bactrian identity.

After the military might of the Achaemenids was destroyed at Guagamela in 331 B.C., Alexander encountered no Persian resistance on his swift march towards the east, entering Aryana in 330 B.C. But in Aryana Alexander faced stiff nationalist resistance that forced him to build a large number of military cantonments and "garrisoned cities" called Alexandrias all along his marching tract which took him four years of hard effort. In fact, from the time of his entry till his departure from Aryana, Alexander knew no

peace", the more he pressed the greater was his suffering and losses until he succeeded through a matrimonial alliance of marrying Roxana, the daughter of Oxyartes, a Bactrian noble. For, marriage was at that distant time as is still in Pashtunwali an effective instrument of ceasing war and instituting of friendship. Many classic writers admit that this was "a marriage of policy, intended to reconcile the eastern barons and end the national war". The point in emphasising Alexander's prolonged difficult encounters in Aryana is to prove how valiantly the culturally conscious Bactrians, the ancestors of the Pashtuns, defended their independence and identity against powerful invaders like Alexander, while others in spite of their geopolitical advantages did not offer resistance as was the case with the powerful Persians who surrendered to Alexander's forces.

Alexander's prolonged conquests of Pashtunkhwa exhausted his energy and prevented his further eastward march into India beyond Jhelum and he consequently gave up his mission in 326 B.C. Although Alexander could not totally subdue Aryana as was evidenced by subsequent

23. Ibid., p.282.


Bactrian nationalist revolts, yet his four-year devastating onslaughts weakened the vitality of the Bactrian entity as the garrisoned Greek colonies which he left behind replaced Bactrian town dwellings that had provided stable political leadership as in the epic Avestic age. This, in fact, paved the way for the subsequent nomadic invasions from Central Asia that affected the whole course of history of the region.

However, Alexander's death in 323 B.C., in fact, signalled the end of his empire. The northern part of Aryana came under the control of the Bactrian Greek and local chiefs, while in the south Roxana's father and other local chiefs ruled until in 305 B.C. when Seleucus, one of Alexander's successors managed to occupy it and then surrendered it to the Mauryans in 322 B.C. who nominally ruled it until the succession of Asoka.27 During Ashoka's reign southern Pashtunkhwa became a holy land embracing Buddhism. In the north various local and Greek chiefs rebelled and established small kingdoms that gradually led to the rise of two great empires, the northwestern Parthian (250 B.C. - 250 A.D.) formed by a branch of the Bactrian Sakas and the Greco-Bactrian kingdom of Bactria formed by


a Greek noble Diodotus in 256 B.C. that gradually grew into an empire ruling over the whole of Aryana and northern India, replacing the Mauryan power (324-184 B.C.). A Graeco-Bactrian line of 29 kings and a queen ruled for about two centuries.28

As soon as the energy and resources of the Graeco-Bactrian empire dissipated in India and their hold over Aryana weakened the Sakas a branch of the early Parthians emerged in the north and about 135 B.C. they occupied Bactria and pushed down Bactrian Greeks to southern Aryana and then to India where they were finally lost altogether.29

The Greeks vanished but their cultural influence remained to affect Bactrian cultural unity surfacing a rift dichotomy between the Hellenised urban population and the larger semi-nomadic traditional masses as a result of which isolated tribal entities such as the Parthians and the Sakas ascended to overrun the weaker towns and establish their own tribal kingdoms that rose into empires ruling both over Aryana and north-western India. However, a rift between the Sakas and Parthians weakened the hold of Sakas in the North that encouraged a fresh nomadic invasion by the Yue-chis who drove away the Sakas from Bactria and pushed the long-lasting Parthian empire further westwards.


The power of the Sakas and Parthians in southern Aryana and India gradually disappeared as a result of their division and weak hold over northern Aryana and they were gradually assimilated by the masses as is evidenced by the survival of their names in the Pashtun tribal terms and their Pashto titles on their coins which have erroneously led some scholars to consider them as the prototypes of the Pashtuns.\textsuperscript{30}

The Yue-chis appeared as a powerful tribal confederation. They occupied Bactria about 70 B.C. and mixed with the Bactrians, and produced a strong mixed ethnicity called Kushans or Kuchans,\textsuperscript{31} the very name of which is still preserved in the Kuchi (nomadic) name of the Pashtun nomads.\textsuperscript{32} The Kushans after consolidating their power in northern Aryana, crossed the Hindu Kush in about 40 B.C. and with the help of southern Pakhtis established a vast empire that gradually covered northern India. Under the Kushans Pashtunkhwa became free from foreign domination for a longer period attaining a cultural ascendency and

\textsuperscript{30} Habibi, \textit{op.cit.}, pp.58, Zafar Kaka Khal, \textit{op.cit.}, pp.222-40 and Olaf Caroe, \textit{op.cit.}, pp.65-66.

\textsuperscript{31} Habibi, \textit{op.cit.}, pp.62-63.

\textsuperscript{32} The survival of the word Kushan or Kuchan, which according to Tytler might be related to the Kuchas of the Gobi, and the retention of larger Kushanic elements by the Pashtun kuchis (nomads) suggest that the Kushans might have turned to tribalism in the wake of the emergence of the barbaric Ephtalites, causing destructive confrontations with the "Little Kushans" and the emerging Sassanids. The word
economic prosperity specially under its great ruler Kanishka, who brought a comprehensive unity to its various culturally fragmented parts by the total introduction of the new practical forms of the Mahayana Buddhist creed, the greater wheel, (meaning in Pushto great movement) and the flourishing Graeco-Buddhist civilization along with the official use of the Bactrian language and dress which is evidenced by the discovery of Surkh Kotal inscription in Bactrian language and the Kushanic coins and statutes bearing Bactrian styles and mode of dress.

Kapisa, north of Kabul, the summer capital and Peshawar, the winter capital of the Kushan Empire which extended from Gobi in Central Asia to Benaras in India emerged as great thriving centres of art, culture and trade

(f.n. 32 ....contd.)

Jassanids. The word Kushan is preserved in a large number of place names such as Kusan, Kushk, Kushka and Kusai, the Kushnic type of the overcoat used by the Pashtun kuchi nomads, see, Tytler, op.cit., p.21, and Kaka Khel, op.cit., pp.260-72.

33. Pashtun Historian, Zafar Kaka Khel in his voluminous work points out that not only Kushanic coins bear Pashto-like words, but also Kushanic physical figures, and styles of dress and hairs resemble exactly that of the present day Pashtun Ghelzai Kuchis (the nomads). He adds that their dress, headdress, ghadar (body cloth) saddle and even their style of hairs and earings are exactly those worn by the Pashtun kuchis. He wonders how so well the Pashtuns have preserved 1400-year old dress and other elements of the Kushans. He says it is interesting to note that Kushan summer and winter capitals of Kapisa and Peshawar were also chosen in the Pashtun territory. However, Kaka Khel’s observations support a larger Kushanic contribution to Pashtun ethnicity and cultural identity, for detail see, Kaka Khel, op.cit., pp.260-72.
linking major Asiatic lands. However, the decline of Kushan power over northern Aryana at the beginning of third century A.D. led to the emergence of the Sassanids and the nomadic Bphtalities in north and west of Aryana, destroying kushanic civilization of Pashtunkhwa, turning the settled population back to tribalism and nomadism as a result of the recurrent invasions of the urban centres of the country.\textsuperscript{34} By the middle of 5th century the white Huns or Bphtalites subduing the Sassanids taking over the entire Pashtunkhwa, they establish a vast empire covering northern India as well, but the Turks emerging in the north allied with the Sassanids against them, took over their northern and western domains. External reactions caused by their barbarian rule from surrounding areas finally resulted in their political decline and final assimilation as is supported by the survival of their tribal names among the Pashtuns and their Pashto names and titles on their coins.\textsuperscript{35}

\textsuperscript{34} For detail, see, Habibi, \textit{op.cit.}, and Zafar Kaka Khel, \textit{ibid.}.

\textsuperscript{35} The presence of Bphtalite elements among the Pashtuns as that of the Aryan Janas, Parthians and the Kushans, has again led some scholars to consider the Bphtalites the prototypes of at least the Abdali Pashtuns, tracing the word Abdal to Bphtal. Soviet scholars argue that non-Pashtuns until quite late referred to all Afghans or Pashtuns by the word Abdal. This is an oversimplification of the historical events which reflect a complicated process of a gradual assimilation of invaders into general Pashtun masses, see, Habibi, \textit{op.cit.}, pp.75-80, Kaka Khel, \textit{ibid.}, and Gankovsky, \textit{op.cit.}. 
The ethnic, social and cultural setting of these invasions has a recurrent pattern. Their first generation appearing in the north are nomadic, hostile and highly destructive, destroying the rich urban centres and pushing their inhabitants to rural areas and compelling them to adopt semi-nomadic ways of life; their second generation gets domesticated by adopting Bactrian culture which enables them to establish strong kingdoms that grow into an empire after they cross the Hindukush and utilise the human and material resources of the southern Pakhtis; and the third generation gets lost in the Indian subcontinent with the dissipation of their power and energy, while their remnants in Pashtunkhwa get assimilated in the general population. This process is often facilitated by their common Aryan and Bactrianised background as they were all the so-called East Iranian people. But the picture is reversed in the Islamic period in which the invaders are all non-Aryan alien elements who are valiantly resisted by the native Bactrians leading to a heterogenous society and a permanent cultural fragmentation.

36. For detail see, Dost Mohammad Dost, *op. cit.*
III. **Islamic Period: The Rise and Fall and National Awakening of the Pashtuns**

In the ancient era, Pashtunkhwa, in spite of facing continuous external intrusions, had an important role in the development of culture and civilization of Asia. The invaders except the Greeks, were all Bactrianised Aryans in origin and, therefore, they could not affect much the cultural identity of the Bactrians as the invaders being primitive and nomadic, were rather more prone to a gradual assimilation in the culturally advanced settled population of Pashtunkhwa. This, in spite of its setbacks, enabled the Bactrians to maintain their cultural identity and achieve a degree of cultural ascendancy under the Graeco-Bactrian and Graeco-Bactrian and Graeco-Buddhist schools of art and civilization. 37

But as a result of the barbaric rule of the Bphtalites and the three-cornered confrontations between the Sassanids and the Turks, causing wholesale destruction massacres and depopulation of the urban centres of the country, pushing the indigenous urban population to rural and semi-nomadic habitats, 38 Pashtunkhwa's flourishing Bactrian hegemony and identity was permanently shattered.


as north and west of the country lingered under the prolonged ethnic and cultural domination of the Turks and the Sassanid Persians, while south and east of the country remained under the sway of various local rival Buddhist and Brahmanic rulers.39

In was, in fact, due to such a cultural fragmentation of the country that the deculturalised north and west of the country swiftly submitted to the new faith of Islam in the middle of 7th century A.D., while the rest of the country i.e., Zabul, Kabul and Peshawar continued to resist Arab conquests for about three centuries till the rise of the Saffarid and Ghaznavid dynasties in the 9th and 10th centuries A.D.40 Hence, the Arabs during the time of Caliph Omer quickly swept away the Sassanids and in 642-43 A.D. subjugated Herat, Marv, Balkh and Zaranj in Jiestan and introduced the new faith of Islam without any substantial resistance. Islam accompanied with Persian, the language of the Arab Persian soldiers which had quickly developed with the help of the rich Arabic literature, Islam and the latent Sassanid influence, "brought a cosmopolitanism and lack of racial consciousness, forging new religious and cultural bonds", overrode the prevailing ethnic and


cultural diversities in the deculturalised northern and western parts of the country and "absorbed them into a larger and superior" Islamic entity, \(^{41}\) called Khurasan, the land of the rising sun.

Thus, Pashtunkhwa was politically and culturally divided into two highly self-conscious hostile entities: the Muslim Khurasan ruled first by the Arabs and then by the local Persianised rulers, the Tahirids (820-70 A.D.) the Saffarids (870-92 A.D.) and the Samanids (892-999 A.D.) and the non-Muslim southern and eastern Pashtunkhwa that valiantly resisted Islamic conquests under its local Buddhist Ratbil Shahi and Brahman Shahi rulers.\(^{42}\) A malignant hostility continued between the two culturally severed parts that halted the further eastward inroad of Islam for at least three centuries until the rise of the Ghaznavids (999-1186 A.D.). The halt was more the result of a cultural conflict between the Bactrian and non-Bactrian identity which had been lost by Persianised Muslim Khurasan in favour of Persian identity imposed through Islam. Islam as a religion was not responsible for the conflict as the various parts of the country often easily

\(^{41}\) Vartan Gregarian, \textit{op.cit.}, p.11.

\(^{42}\) For detail, see, Benawa, \textit{Chronological Notes on Afghanistan}. 
changed religion as in the case of the alternate prevalence of Zoroastrian, Buddhist and Brahmanist religions in various parts of the country that stood united against an alien cultural threat. The prolonged animosity between the Persianised Muslims and the non-Muslim Bactrians or the Pashtuns, greatly undermined Pashtun Bactrian identity specially under the Ghaznavids who integrated Khurasan with the rest of Pashtunkhwa after converting Pashtuns to Islam and making Ghazna, the heart of Pashtunkhwa as its capital. As a result Ghazna emerged as a thriving centre of Persian language at the cost of Pashto and the political and cultural eclipse of the Pashtuns, bringing Persian to every nook and corner of the country as an effective means of Islamic education and learning and as a symbol of cultural advance orthodoxy that greatly undermined the national awakening of the Pashtuns. We can trace to this the cultural decline of the urban centres which were Persianised by super-imposition at the cost of alienating Pashtun identity.\(^{44}\)

The magnitude of the continued cultural conflict was evident by the severe confrontation between Ghazana, the centre of the thriving Persian language and the long-

\(^{43}\) Vartan Gregorian, \textit{op.cit.}, p.1+.

\(^{44}\) For detail on the consequences of Persianisation, see, Chapter I and Dost Mohammad Dost, \textit{op.cit.}, last Chapter.
lasting mountaineous kingdom of Ghur serving the cause of Pashtun culture and language that finally brought Alau-din Ghuri in 1151 A.D. to overthrow the Jhaznavids and set to fire the beautiful city of Ghazna, earning the title of Jhan-Joz, the world burner. The Ghuri Pashtuns emerged on the scene and for the purpose of internal stability and legitimacy Shahab-u-din, known as Mohammad Ghuri launched a conquest of India, encouraging his Pashtun following with Jihad and the promise of estates in India. The Ghurid rule, though briefly restored Pashtun political hegemony in the region, yet indirectly undermined Pashtun political and cultural hegemony as their energies were almost completely dissipated in the vast plains of India "causing a neglect of their homeland which came to be regarded mainly as a reservoir for recruits", retarding their "national consciousness and sense of unity among themselves". 45 This ultimately led to their downfall at home in Pashtunkhwa and in India at the hands of the Mongols and their Timurid and Moghul descendants.

Pashtun National Awakening: With the beginning of Mongol invasion in early 1220s, Pashtunkhwa had to face plunder and exploitation as a result of successive assaults. Gendhiz Khan described as "the atom bomb of his time, in

45. Vartan Gregorian, op.cit., p.16.
fact, inaugurated a line of Genghizites in Pashtunkhwa known as Temurids (1370-1506) and Moghuls (1505-1747) who during their five-century political ascendancy in Pashtunkhwa would often repeat the historical deeds of their fore-fathers in order to remind the Pashtuns of the heavy cost of their stiff resistance. They tore Pashtunkhwa into pieces and barbarously ruled over its various parts through general massacres and depredations, forcing out the indigenous population from the urban centres to the remote countryside, turning them to nomadism and pastoralism. *Pata Khazana*, a monumental Pashto work, records a vivid account of the perpetual Timurid and Moghul devastating onslaughts on the Pashtuns even at the village level in the remote rural areas. They did not only carried out such often repeated devastating surprise attacks on the peaceful dwellings but would also indulge in unprecedented treacherous massacres through enticements on the pretext of negotiations as was done by the Ulugh Beg ruler of Kabul (1469-1510) who invited some 700 Yusufzai chiefs of Kabul for talks at a banquet and "massacred them to a man". 46

However, towards the end of 15th century the power of the Mongolian Timurids declined in Khurasan and resulted in the rise of the Persian Safavids in the west and the

Shaibanid Uzbeks in Central Asia who pushed them south to the ravished Pashtunkhwa to further oppress its inhabitants. Babur one of these Mongol rulers, being driven by Shaibanids occupied Kabul in 1505 and began to ravish eastern Pashtunkhwa, the power base of the Pashtun rulers of India for the purpose of building himself and raising of resources for the eventual conquest of India. It is historically recorded that Babur led annual devastating expeditions against the Pashtuns from Ghazni to the Indus with overt political and economic oppression. In fact, "every time he encountered the Afghans he beat them on his own showing" so that:

"they would then come to him as suppliants, with grass between their teeth, as who would say 'I am thine Ox'. After a victory he cut off their heads, and made a minaret of them like his ancestors Chingiz and Timor. His route was studded with these human milestones." 47

Thus in such a barbarous way Babur was able to establish his tenuous control over Kabul that enabled him to march on India and topple down the Pashtun rule with the help of the Pashtuns themselves. Before confronting the Lodi ruler Ibrahim, he sought a matrimonial alliance with the powerful Yusufzai Pashtun. By marrying Bibi Nobaraka the daughter of their chief and made preliminary

47. Stanley Lane Poole, Babar (Ox'ord, 1899), p.47.
raids into Punjab with the help of Ebrahim's own disgruntled nobles. His forces led by Ahu-din Lodi, Ebrahim Lodi's traitorous uncle, finally attacked Delhi and toppled down the Pashtun rule in 1526. In India too, once ascending on the throne, Babur spared no efforts in indiscriminately crushing and uprooting the Pashtuns that provoked a stiff nationalistic resistance among the Pashtuns about which he complains in his memoirs as follows:

"The Afghan governors of the provinces put their fortifications in defence and refused to submit or obey... other Afghan chiefs, who were in a state of open rebellion... had elected Bahadur khan son of Darya Khan as their King, and gave him the name of Sultan Mahmood". 48

The Pashtun resistance continued which after the death of Babur in 1530, resulted in the downfall of his son and successor Hamayun in 1539 at the hands of Sher Shah Suri. Sher Shah was a genius and a popular ruler, but his sudden death enabled Hamayun's return to power with the help of Persia in 1555. Thus ended the long-lasting Pashtun rule and political influence in India (1290-1555), comprising the Kheljis (1290-1320), the Lodis (1451-1526) and the Juris (1539-55), and a strong anti-Pashtun Moghul dynasty came into power under Akbar (1556-1606).

It was the systematic oppression of the Pashtuns that produced a strong national movement which specifically reflects the syndrome of national resistance in Pashtunkhwa.

The Ḡūshānīya National Movement 1555–1647: The fall of Pashtun power in India served as a shock to Pashtuns leading to a nationalist awakening. As a result of the three-century of Mongol – Timurid-Mughul devastating onslaughts, the Pashtuns as a political entity were nearly obliterated both in their homeland Pashtunkhwa and India. The rise of the rival Ḡūshānīya Uzbek们 in the north and the Ṣaffāvid and Moghul empires in the west and east during the 16th century made Pashtunkhwa a bone of contention leading to a virtual socio-economic decline and severe exploitation of the Pashtuns. Persian and Moghul ill-treatment and persecution of the Pashtuns were the added pressures that tortured the minds of enlightened elements, leading to a nationalist awareness among the Pashtun religious section who questioned the Islamic credentials of the oppressive Muslim rulers who had cumulatively perpetrated a reign of terror on their own Muslim subjects.

Thus the necessary congenial conditions to launch a Pashtun national movement against the Moghuls who were the actual cause of Pashtun sufferings had matured. These were inextricably linked with the efforts that led Bayazid Ḡūshānī to launch his nationalist movement against the
Moghuls known as Roshanya, meaning the enlightenment movement with its followers known as Roshani, the enlightened ones. The movement started as an Islamic Sufic reformist movement in 1555 A.D. that initially aimed at the restoration of Pashtun rule in India. Later it assumed a radical nationalist militant form even under its founder, Bayazid Roshan, as "a nationalist movement for the liberation of the Afghan tribes", although Soviet scholars have attempted to demonstrate it as a movement of the Pashtun peasantry against the ruling and propertied class.

Bayazid Ansar, popularly known as Bayazid Roshan, was born in Jallander of Punjab in 1525 (or in 1510). His father, Qazi Abdullah was a judge there who had no leave Jallander for their native place of Kanikram in Waziristan at heart of present Pashtunistan due to the oppressive anti-Pashtun rule of the Moghuls under Babur. Bayazid's family accompanying a caravan started the journey for their country under such difficult conditions that:


50. See, Aslanove.
... when Mahdi Khwaja, brother-in-law of Babur... came to know the fact that they were Afghans, he ordered their general loot and annihilation... (they) with a large number of Afghans escaped only after proving that they were Ansaris and had nothing to do with the Afghans. Later on the leaders of the caravan sent a Peshkash (a quit rent) of seven lakh tankas to Babur with an arzdasht (petition). The Emperor allowed them to pass through his frontiers unmolested. Thus (they)... reached Kanikram after having hazardous odds". 51

Bayazid acquired his primary education at his native place under extreme difficult conditions and earnestly devoted himself to his higher studies and with great hardship finished Quran and other theological works in a short time. He avoided studying advanced works on Islamic laws as he did not like the career of a gazi as his father. To a question of a local Saint as to "which of the two he loved more - the faith or the world", he "frankly admitted that he loved the world more since he devoted much of his time in mundane affairs", 52 about his character Hizvi writes:

"Bayazid was meditative and inquisitive from his childhood and was inclined towards leading a pious life. Illegal food, lies and mischievous deeds were abhorrent to his nature. He served everyone with great devotion and was humane, tolerant, and possessed great forbearance. If he went out to tend his own cattle, he did take care of the cattle of others. Whenever sent to keep watch over fields, he gladly looked after the fields of others. He regularly read Quran and studied preliminary works of Islamic Law and theology with care. Gradually he commenced giving vent to truth without mental pressure". 53

51. Hizvi, op.cit., p.66.
52. Ibid.
53. Ibid., p.68.
His father wanted him to continue his studies under a renowned clergy in Multan but he refused to do so claiming that such persons could not help him in acquiring a true knowledge. Hence he searched for a true spiritual guide but he never found one. Having secured a small share of property from his reluctant father, he resorted to trade which enabled him to prosper and make several trips to various parts of the country to India and Central Asia. During these travels he closely studied the critical conditions and the Moghul indiscriminations against Pashtuns. For instance, about a trip to Kandahar he writes that the officials of Biram Khan, the Moghul ruler of Kandahar took the belongings of our caravan and divided it into six parts of which they "took five portions as Zakat of rahdari (road tax) and left only one portion with the merchants". "Of my goods" he adds, "They took only two-thirds, leaving one-third with me". He says, "We approached Biram Khan for the redress of our grievances which he promised to inquire into but failed to honour his promise." 54 About the oppressions of the Moghul rulers Bayazid write:

"The Moghul governors let a reign of extreme terror and oppression on Afghans to the extent that one day I saw a Moghul oppressor tying an Afghan woman from hair with the plate of a mill and as the plate of the mill began winding, that woman also wound accordingly screaming loudly". 55

55. Rizvi, op.cit., p.74 and Habibi, op.cit., p.50.
Most probably the witnessing of such barbaric scenes might have caused Bayazid to go on a Haj Pilgrimage immediately after his Kandahar trip in 1545 for obtaining a fiqwa, a religious sanction for his campaign against the Muslim Moghuls as was similarly done by Mirwais Hotaki to overthrow the oppressional rule of the Persians in 1708. After his return from Haj he retired to a cell for some five years (to perform vigil), and when coming out he claimed "to have revealed all the secrets of God and bestowed such knowledge as enabled him to discern the inner conditions of living beings." Immediately afterwards he announced his vocation as a religious guide and started preaching. He soon gained a large number of adherents and chose some of his disciples as caliphs, and sent them to different parts of the country. He wrote his first treatise, called Saratul-Tawhid, the way of unity, for his disciples and in 1570 A.D. he wrote his famous Khair-ul-Jauan, the true discourse, in Pashto, which was translated into Arabic, Persian and Hindi languages and sent to all Muslim rulers and clergies, asking them to accept him as their true religious guide. This provoked a hostile reaction from both the rulers and the top clergy.

57. Dizvi, op.cit., p.73.
Akbar, the Moghul emperor and his Moghul Holiness Said Ali Termezi, received Bayazid's invitation with great anxiety saying that "a great calamity is befallen" not religious so much but political in nature.\textsuperscript{59} It bothered almost all the top clergy who, with the blessings of the Moghuls joined hands against him, now called by his followers as Piri - Ṭoṣhan, the true religious guide or guru. In 1571 and 1572, from the different parts of the Moghul empire, various delegations of clergies met him in the hope of defeating him in religious debates. Finding themselves defeated by Bayazid who described them as hypocrites, they pressurized the Moghul ruler to arrest and persecute Bayazid described by them as "Piri-Tarik", the black or dark guru. Hence the governor of Kabul at the head of an army reached Peshawar and with the help of the clergy and their followers managed to capture Bayazid and take him to Kabul as a prisoner.\textsuperscript{60}

In Kabul, where he was prosecuted through a religious trial by the chief judge of Kabul Bayazid proved his credibility and obtained his release. Even his opponents admitted that Bayazid's wisdom and mundane knowledge were so

\textsuperscript{59} Ṭoṣhan Memorial, \textit{op.cit.}, last paper, p.379.

\textsuperscript{60} Zafar Kaka Khel, \textit{op.cit.}, pp.80-82, Habibi, \textit{op.cit.}, pp.53-54.
great that nobody could defeat him in arguments. His major opponent, Darwisa, a disciple of Said Ali even has described him as a philosopher.\(^{61}\) Immediately upon his reaching Peshawar Bayazid gathered his followers and declared a holy war against the Moghuls, calling them aggressors. After two successful battles in Peshawar and Tirah, he made Tirah, a place in the heart of Afridi territory where some five centuries later the formation of the Pashtunistan's National Assembly was proclaimed, as his headquarters, and made it free and clean from the presence of pro-Moghul ethnic elements who collaborated with the Moghuls against the Pashtuns.\(^{62}\) Receiving the news, Moghul forces reached Peshawar and attacked Tirah but were badly defeated by the Roshanis armed only with sticks, rods and stones. These initial victories emboldened the few thousands unarmed Roshanis to march on Nangrahar, where great Moghul troops of the Kabul Subah\(^{63}\) were making

\(^{61}\) Habibi, ibid., p.49, Roshan Memorial, op.cit., p.379.

\(^{62}\) Roshan's opponents allege that he carried out a massacre of his opponents, but the available records show that he killed 220 of the non-Pashtun Terahis who collaborated with the Moghuls against the Pashtuns and expelled the rest of them as being pro-Moghul, who fled to Nangrahar, see Roshan Memorial, p.76 and Habibi, op.cit., p.54.

\(^{63}\) Kabul was one of the largest and strategically the most important of the Moghul subahs or Large Provinces which extended from Ghazni upto the river Indus and Peshawar was part of it. Hence its military forces were the most numerous, and well armed ones.
military preparations for their arrival. In the unequal battle that took place in the hot summer of 1585 A.D. at Toragha of Shinwar, the unarmed holy troops of the Roshanis were defeated by the mighty armed forces of the Moghul empire. Bayazid was saved but died of a sun-stroke on his way to Peshawar where he was buried at Ashnagar. 64

Bayazid Roshan failed to achieve his avowed nationalist goal of liberating Pashtunkhwa but his tasks were carried on by his dedicated successors more vigorously. Roshan's failure was not due to any lack of effort on his part or on the part of his committed followers. It was the natural outcome of the dominance system in which a mighty empire such as the Moghul India which had reached its zenith under Akbar, was in alliance with the clergy, fighting an unarmed people's movement. The unholy alliance of the Moghul rulers and the pro-Moghul clergy 65 whose very interest and survival was threatened by the religious-oriented Roshanya movement, was the result of the convergence of their various political, economic cultural and ethnic interests. 66 For, the Moghul rulers and the clergy

64. Q. Khadim, Roshan Memorial, op.cit., p.77.


66. See, for detail Ibid., pp.12-28 and Masooma Ismati, Roshan Memorial, op.cit.,
did not only represent the interest of the non-Pashtun dominant ruling and propertied class but they were also part of the common dominant Persian culture and the same ethnicity. 67

Bayazid's great opponent, Said Ali Termizei, known as Pir Baba among the Pashtuns, who headed the alliance of Moghul oligarchy and clergy had established himself among the Pashtuns as an uncrowned holy king with blessings of the Moghul rulers, was himself a Moghul and his powerful spokesman, Akhund Darwiza, was a Tajakized Turk and other top clergies had similar non-Pashtun ethnicity. 68 They all allied themselves to carry on an unholy way against Bayazid Aoshan. This is further evidenced by the literary rivalries between Pashto and Persian languages during this ideological battle. In their ideological battle the opponents wrote mainly in Persian and defended the Moghul Persian cultural perceptions and ridiculed the Pashtun cultural traditions and Pashto language, and designating them on Islamic grounds. 69 Bayazid and his dedicated disciples, preferably

68. Ibid., and Aslanov, op.cit., p.24.
69. For instance, Akhund Darviza, in his Persian books, talks so much nonsense about the Pashtun culture and makes such false comments as to invoke the anger of the non-Pashtun Muslims against the Pashtun Aoshanis. For instance, he says there is no Islam among the Pashtuns as their customs are non-Islamic. He regrets at Pashtuns being not under a Muslim king who would introduce Islamic laws and eradicate the Aoshanis whom he declares as Kafirs or infidels worthy of being looted and killed, for detail of such charges, see Aslanov, op.cit., pp.24-28.
used Pashto and worked for its literary growth, leading to a literary revivalism that can truly be called an epoch-making period in the literary history of Pashto language. It was, in fact, these ethnic and cultural factors that made the non-Pashtun Muslim clergy totally behind the Moghul rulers in fighting the Islamic Roshanya national movement, branding it as blasphemy while remaining indifferent to Akbar's own created religion of Deeni-Ilahi-i-Akbar which they should have also fought against if they were truly concerned about Islam rather than declaring the Muslim Roshanis as infidels to be looted and killed.

70. Pashto's most valuable literary works belong to the Roshanya period in which a great numbers of literary figures have appeared and Pashto's great poets and writers such as Khushal Khan Khatak, Rahman Baba, Hamid Baba and others have been either born during the movement time or immediately after it. Roshan himself has not only written many invaluable books in Pashto that had to be memorised by his followers, boasting poetic skill and its popularization but has also brought improvements in Pashto alphabets and writing styles: The Roshani leaders had opened hundreds of madras among the Pashtuns and had deputed a large number of their caliphs and disciples to various parts, contributing to achieving cultural heights. For detail on Roshani Literary Works, see Khidmatgar, Roshan Memorial, op.cit., pp.93-107.

71. The opponent clergy in their writing declared the Roshanis as infidels, the unbelievers, asking Muslims to loot and kill them as a sacred religious deed. Roshan Memorial, op.cit., Aslanov, op.cit., pp.27-28.
However, the nationalist struggle launched by Bayazid Roshan could not be prevented and was vigorously continued by Bayazid's successors in a more intransigent nationalistic form, lasting for about a century, that exhausted the energy and vitality of the Moghul empire, contributing to eventual collapse. Bayazid was succeeded by his son Sheikh Omer and was proclaimed as a king by the Pashtuns who willingly paid him taxes. This act forced the Moghuls to instigate a major religious uprising against him through the clergy in which he, his relatives and thousands of followers were killed by the provoked Yusufzais, and whoever had survived including his 12-year old brother Jallal-u-uddin, were arrested by the Moghuls. Jallal-u-uddin was taken to Delhi as captive by Akbar on his return from Kabul and was kept at the court under close watch. But this great patriotic boy known as Jallal or Jallalah soon managed to escape from Akbar's court and was able to rally behind himself the Roshanis and raise a force of 5,000 horsemen and 20,000 soldiers in a short time and was able to attack and destroy a great Moghul force in 1586 at Khaiber that

72. W. Khadim in Roshan Memorial, op. cit., p. 78.

73. Darwizd expresses pleasure at the disaster and admits that he managed to incite a section of the Yusufzais to disobey the Roshanis and take arms against them, Aslonov, op. cit., p. 26.
was heading for Kabul under General Man Singh and the Kabul Governor.\textsuperscript{74} This greatly enraged Akbar and brought him to Lahore to despatch 50,000 men army against the Noshani boy now 14-year old. This force was also thoroughly wiped out in Swat, Khaiber and Bajawar with a large number of Akbar's best generals including Akbar's counsellor Raja Birbal were killed with only few managing their escape.\textsuperscript{75} This crushing defeat "spread alarm even at the Imperial Camp" and the Noshani's final victory seemed imminent but unfortunately content with the victory, loot and booty, the Noshanis "let slip a golden opportunity" by not following the enemy.\textsuperscript{76}

The humiliating defeat forced Akbar to plan a 5-year war strategy against the Noshanis led by the great boy warrior Jallalah. Several major devastating expeditions were despatched till finally a minimum Moghul control was established in Peshawar valley by 1592.\textsuperscript{77} Thousands of the Noshanis were killed and 14,000 arrested including

\textsuperscript{74} Habibi, op.cit., p.56 and Aslanov, \textit{Ibid.}, p.8.
\textsuperscript{75} See, Spain, \textit{The Pathan Borderlands} (Hague, 1963), p.32, Habibi, Kaka Khel and Aslanov, \textit{op.cit.}.
\textsuperscript{76} Mohd. Ali, Afghanistan: \textit{The National Awakening}, p.11.
\textsuperscript{77} Spain, \textit{op.cit.}, p.32 and Kaka Khel, \textit{op.cit.}, p.705.
Jallal's family members and best lieutenants, but Jallalah retired to the environs of Kabul and raised new forces and in short time managed to attack Ghazni and threaten Kabul. He ruled over the entire Kabul Suba from Ghazni to the Indus, except the urban centres of Kabul, Ghazni and Peshawar. But unfortunately this great young patriot was accidentally killed in a fighting with Moghul forces at Ghazni in 1560 A.D. and his body was captured and cut into pieces with his head being sent to Delhi as a sign of great victory over the Pashtuns.

Jallalah was succeeded by his nephew, Sheikh Omer's son, Ahdad, who proved to be the greatest of Bayazid's successors, ruling over the entire southern and eastern Pashtunkhwa with supreme justice and discipline except its urban centres which were controlled by the Moghul military forces. Because of his popularity, his followers referred to themselves after his name as Ahdadis. He had three main headquarters at Logar South of Kabul, Tirah in the Afridi territory and Kohat at Peshawar valley. Akbar died in 1605 and his successor Jahangir continued the Moghul

78. Kaka Khel, Ibid.
operations against the Koshanis or Ahdadis in a much more vigorous manner. He himself twice went to Kabul to personally supervise joint operations against Ahdad. But Ahdad who was an adept at mobile warfare harassed the stationed Moghul forces. The whole rural population stood behind him, though occasionally the Moghuls would plot against him with certain tribal chiefs. Even when outnumbered, he would attack the Moghuls taking handsome booty up to 5,000 horses. What prevented his final victory was the great distance between his strongholds and his meagre resources which did not enable him to raise a stronger military force against the mighty forces of the Moghul empire. The ethnic minority character of the country's urban centres which stood behind the Moghuls further prevented his success. However, as much as Jahangir tried he could not uproot the Koshanis, until in 1626 a year before his death he once again went to Kabul at the head of a strong force to Kohat to direct joint operations against Ahdad. A surprise attack was made on him at his headquarters in Lwaghar of Kohat and Ahdad's fort was besieged for six months and he was accidentally killed in the battle and most of the besieged ladies preferred suicide and only

81. For detail see, Ibid., and Aslanov, op.cit.

two persons, his mother Allayee and son Qadir managed their escape to Firah.83 Ahdad's head was brought to Jahangir by Zafar Khan who was made governor of Kabul as a reward. Jahangir thanked God for the victory by offering his prayers and ordered his head be hanged on the gate of Lahore Fort for public exhibition and had the victory celebrated throughout the Moghul empire.84 Thus ended the life of a great nationalist hero described by Masarul - Umera as "an invincible hero whose heroism has outshown the examples of Mustam and Afrasyab". According to "Dabistani Mazahib" he was "a strong ruler who would rule with justice, restore people's rights, use public money properly and distribute the booty justly among the Ghazis (the true fighters)".85

However, with Ahdad's tragic death the movement did not die, though it was greatly weakened. The leadership was now jointly shouldered by Ahdad's wife Bibi Allayu and young son Abdul Qadir. Both were, however, at extremely disadvantageous positions. To avenge Ahdad's death the Noshanis closed Khaibar and attacked Moghul forces at Peshawar. Several times Kabul forces were sent to open

83. Ibid., p.10.


85. Quoted by A.H. Habibi, Ibid., p.60.
Khaiber but failed to do so. Ahdad's death, however, produced national unity between the Koshanis and non-Koshani Pashtuns who joined hands to besiege Peshawar for several months in 1630. Final victory seemed certain but the Moghuls engineered a plot of spreading rumours that the tribal chiefs had reached an understanding with the Moghuls to help them in capturing the Koshani leaders. This made the unwise Qadir suspicious and led to the lifting of the siege of Peshawar and departure for his headquarters at Tirah. Fresh Moghul forces had arrived in Peshawar and they chased the retreating non-Koshanis, causing them heavy casualties which resulted in a permanent rift and disappointment among the Pashtuns. A century of prolonged severe sufferings caused by military devastations of the Moghuls had further produced a sense of pessimism and disappointment, rendering larger sections of the people critical of the resistance policies of the Koshani leaders.

It was under such critical conditions that Jahangir's successor Shah Jahan's continued friendly overtures proved fruitful. Several delegations were sent to Qadir to persuade him for a meaningful honourable submission. Through

86. James W. Spain, op.cit., p.32.
continuous persuasions by some well-wishers who had already submitted, Qadir and his mother finally agreed to surrender, regardless of the protests by the common Roshanis who continued the struggle to the end of their life in one way or the other. The author of Dabistani - Mazahib compiled at the time of Shah Jahan reports:

"When by order of Said Khan I visited the family of Abdul Qadir I took with me large variety of victuals of victualls and drinks so that they might be seduced through their effect. One aged Afghan after having tasted sweetmeats, rose on his legs and said O' Abdul Qadir! From the time of your honoured ancestors, never the foot of a Moghul reached this place; the gentleman who has now come intends to seduce you with garments red and yellow, and with victuals pleasing and sweet, which are coveted by those who are slaves of their belly... the best measure, therefore, is to put him to death, as an example to terrify others from coming here. But Abdul Qadir and his mother Bibi Alai did not agree (with the old man)." 88

Many writers give evidences to show that Qadir's surrender was viewed by the common Pashtuns, specially the Roshanis as a great national humiliation and disrespect to the Pashtun nation and was met with great protest. Rizvi quotes an interesting story which indicates the strong anti-Moghul nationalistic sentiments of the common Pashtun people:

88. Quoted by Rizvi, op.cit., p.63.
"On the day Qadir entered the camp of Said Khan (governor of Kabul), his horse was frightened at the noise of kettle drums and horns (of the reception ceremony), and dashed from mid the crowd to one side. An Afghan observed: 'The horse executes what the Lord Miyan Roshan had ordered but you do not; be sure you shall suffer from the after sickness of this desertion. Abdul Qadir said, 'what has Miyan ordered'? The Afghan replied: 'To be at a distance and to beware of the Afghans'. 89

The warning of the common man to Abdul Qadir proved true as he was befooled by the promise of an estate in Peshawar but was secretly poisoned. 90 His mother and uncle Alahdad too were deported to India where they died ignominiously. The rest of the Roshans continued their struggle until 1638 when their last leader Karimdad was killed in a fighting with the Moghuls in Peshawar. Other ring leaders, such as Yusuf Afridi and Azadmir Qrakzai were coaxed by the Moghuls in a similar manner as Abdul Qadir and with this the movement became insignificant and leaderless. 91 Thus the Roshanya militant nationalist movement collapsed on account of its inner contradictions. Although it failed to achieve its avowed goal of the liberation of Pashtunkhwa under those difficult suppressive conditions,

89. Ibid., pp.63-64.


91. For detail, see Kaka Khel, Ibid., pp.700-50.
yet it opened a straight road for the national goal of overcoming political fragmentation. It fired the imagination of the Pashtuns with a militant nationalism. It made it impossible for future generations to tolerate any further alien domination in howsoever enlightened a form. It may be, therefore, not wrong to consider Bayazid doshan and not Ahmad Shah Abdali as the founder of the free united Afghanistan of 1747.

**National Uprisings and the Emergence of Free Pashtunkhwa**

1. **Aimal Khan's Revolt:**

The doshanya movement sowed the seeds of such fertile but suppressed nationalist sentiments that could easily grow into a great national movement given propitious circumstances. Any excessive act against the Pashtuns either by the Moghuls or the Saffavid Persians could lead to a great uprising against them. As revolt against a Muslim authority was considered an un-Islamic act, so the nationalist minded Pashtuns needed some legitimate cause to rise in revolt against their Muslim oppressive rulers.

One such legitimate cause to be exploited by Aimal Khan for his great nationalist uprisings against the Moghuls was provided in 1672 when Moghul soldiers molested a Pashtun girl in Kunar.92 The local people killed many local Moghul

soldiers and officers for the act. A force of 50,000
Moghul men under Kabul's new governor Said Amin Gulkandi
stationed in Peshawar decided to crush Kunar in retaliation
while leaving for its destination to Kabul. Learning of
the Moghul intention, Aimal Khan Nomand and his great
lieutenant Darya Khan Afridi, mobilised the Khaiber tribes
and the Noshanis and ambushed the great Moghul army at
Khaiber and swooped down upon the 40,000 army killing
10,000 and capturing 20,000 including the governor's family
with 20,000,000 rupees worth of loot.93 Aimal Khan emerged
as the national hero and was proclaimed the king. He struck
coins in his name and declared a jihad against the Moghuls
with an appeal to all Pashtuns to join "the national
movement and the war of liberation". Thousands came to his
help "and the whole of the country from attack to Kandahar
rose in revolt" against the Moghuls.94 Aurangzeb's generals
and governors met and adopted several measures - arrests,
expeditions, subsidies, promotions and executions. But
Aimal Khan was not deterred and he further strengthened
his position and reacted with counter offensives inflicting
heavy losses on the Moghuls.95

93. For detail see, Kaka Khel, Ibid., pp.768-73,
and Spain, op.cit., p.33.

94. Mohd. Ali, Afghanistan: The National Awakening,

95. For detail see, Kaka Khel, op.cit., pp.768-75.
2. **The Great Khushal's Joining the National Struggle**

Khushal Khan Khattak, the chief of the powerful Khattak tribe that since Akbar's time served the Moghul cause of keeping the highways open, broke away with the Moghuls and joined the national resistance movement, declaring:

> My sword I girt upon my thigh,  
> to guard our nation's ancient fame;  
> its champion in this age am I,  
> The Khattak Khan, Khushal my name.  

So Khushal, the great poet-warrior, was warmly welcomed by the nationalist forces who accepted him as their leader. The great triumvirate jointly organised their military operations against the Moghuls. Khushal Khan's joining the resistance greatly alarmed the Moghuls who resorted to various sorts of political weapons in addition to annual military expeditions. They bribed tribal chiefs generously with money and gold, offered subsidies to tribes, carried out executions, arrests and economic blockades, put one tribe against another, and encouraged the latent tribal and family rivalries by generous distribution of gold and offer of posts and positions and employed mobile columns and

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large fortified garrisons but none succeeded to passify or disrupt the resistance97 that defeated the annually repeated Moghul devastating attacks one after the other until Aurangzeb himself came at the head of a large army as "his great grandfather Akbar had a hundred years earlier". He established his base camp at Hassan Abdal, twenty-nine miles east of the Indus, and stayed a year and a half, disregarding the threat to his empire"... by the Marathas under Shivaji "in order to personally direct operations" against the Pashtun freedom fires.98

After three years of heavy savage devastating on slaughters involving ravishing of towns and burning of whole villages, the barbarian Moghul forces managed to sufficiently weaken the national resistance forces. This enabled Aurangzeb to return to Delhi by the end of 1675. Aurangzeb "accomplished this less by force of arms than by skill of diplomacy". Many "clans were bought over by gold and permanent subsidies that amounted to 600,000 rupees annually".99 Rival claimants to tribal leadership were encouraged and perpetual jealou sies, discord and hostilities "between and within various tribal groups were encouraged"

98. Ibid., p.33.
99. Ibid., p.33, f.n. 5.
everlasting effects that continued for decades. Moghul "spies penetrated the tribal councils brother was bribed to oppose brother, and son encouraged to depose father", as a result of which by the time Aurangzeb deported, the Afridis and Khattaks alone remained on the side of Khushal. Aimal Khan and Darya Khan too died soon. But Khushal continued his struggle for a long time in spite of being betrayed even by him own sons through Moghul's persuasions. He fought for the national cause till the last sigh of his life, if not effectively by sword, at least by his powerful pen for which he assumed the title of De Pashto Plar, father of Pashto.

So Khushal died in great disappointment in 1691 but his dreams were cherished and implemented by his successors as not a single literate Pashtun has ever forgotten his nationalistic lamentation:

In deeds the Pashtuns outdo the Moghul foe
But concord they not, so they sin and undo
Hear the story of Bahlal, Sher Shah, so late
who were Pashtun kings in India so nice and great
for six or seven generations they ruled with fame
That all the world wondered at their so great a name
Either they were Pashtuns different from us all
Or it is Lord's will, we suffer so and fall
Ah God! grant us honour, concord, the same
At which Khushal shall rise, a youth again

100. Ibid., p.33.
National Uprising of the Western Pashtuns

As mentioned during the 16th and 17th centuries Pashtunkhwa was made a bone of contention in a three cornered imperial contest. While Shia Persia contested with the Sunni Shaibanids for a political and religious ascendancy in the north of the country, causing a Shia-Sunni strife, in the south, the Moghul and Persian empires fought each other over the control of the strategic Kandahar, which after changing hands, was finally lost to the Persians in 1642, bringing the whole of western Pashtunkhwa under their imperial yoke, leading to a virtual politico-socio-economic and cultural decline. Continuous imperial devastating onslaughts to crush Pashtun nationalist uprisings, had further accentuated the situation contributing to the rise of national resistance forces.

Thus as the Pashtun national resistance on the eastern front weakened as a result of the Moghul prolonged imperial suppression of the Pashtuns, leading to exhaustion of their energies and resources, the resistance of the western Pashtuns against the Persians got momentum. Safavid Persia, being poor and deficient in economic resources as compared with India, "virtually plundered, victimised and tortured" the Pashtuns and in between 1698 and 1704, twice a year collected heavy taxes through heavy use of force. Further,

as traditional rivals the Shia Persians religiously persecuted their Pashtun Sunni subjects.\textsuperscript{102} Such an extreme national oppression often resulted in unsuccessful revolts. The Hotakis and Tokhis of Arghistan and Kalat, Abdalis and Sadozais of Kandahar and Herat and the Baluchis often took arms.

3. \textbf{Mirwais, National Uprising Overthrowing Persian Rule}

The national awareness produced by the Noshanya movement and Aimal Khan and Khushal Khan's nationalist uprisings and their "innumerable sacrifices and the continued sufferings had "fired the imaginations of the Afghans all over the country". As a result, says Professor Ali, "everywhere national movement took a serious form" which made "almost every section of the people to revolt"\textsuperscript{103} against the oppressor Persians. The first to strike successfully was Mirwais Khan, the chief of the Hotakis.

However, when the Persians learnt that Pashtun nationalist resistance could not be easily suppressed, they chose a Georgian mercenary, known as Gurgin, the wolf, as the Viceroy of Kandahar to "extinguish by force once for

\textsuperscript{102} \textit{Ibid.}, p.60.

all those sparks of national awakening" which in their opinion "might ere-long blaze into flame". He organised a series of devastating onslaughts against the Pashtuns in order "to eradicate at bayonet the national aspirations of the Afghans" and secure their total submission. He sent Mirwais Khan, the Persian-recognised chief of the Hotakis, to the Persian court as a state prisoner. But as a great tactician and diplomat, using his influence and money, Mirwais managed to present himself as a friend of Persia coming to Isfihan to lodge a complaint against Gurgin's dangerous excessive behaviour and his political ambitions. He befriended the corrupt ministers and gained the confidence of the king who entrusted him with the additional power and responsibility of watching Gurgin's political behaviour. The wise Mirwais, instead of first going home, sought expediently the permission of the Persian King for a visit to Mecca to perform a 'haj' pilgrimage in order to remove any doubt in his mind about his political ambition and also to secretly acquire a fitva (religious permission) for his revolt against a Shia Muslim ruler.

104. Ibid., p.4.

On his return to Kandahar in 1708, he maintained apparently good relations with the suspicious Gurgin and made a secret plan for his elimination. He discussed his plan with other elders and got their approval and staged a revolt by a surprise attack on the headquarters of the Persian administration at Kandahar in 1709. Gurgin and his Persian and Georgian forces, numbering some 30,000, were soon totally eliminated. 

Kandahar became independent and Mirwais became a Neeka, Grandfather, of all the Pashtuns and refused to assume the title of a king. He was a great charismatic leader, much greater than the great Ahmad Shah Abdali, who led his people in the ideal Pashtunwali way and was the idol of his people. The Persians, after some futile attempts to regain Kandahar by peaceful means, sent two strong military expeditions against Mirwais in 1710-11 and 1713 which met with total defeats. The "emergence of free Kandahar" says, Arunova, not only "marked a stage in the complicated process of the formation of Afghanistan state", but also became "a source of encouragement for other peoples in the region to revolt for their liberation". 

The example of Kandahar was repeated by the Abdalis of Herat who also revolted against the Persians and liberated their province defeating


subsequent Persian attempts to regain it. Thus western Pashtunkhwa as a whole was freed with the eastern part still remaining under the Moghuls.

However, the great Mirwais died in 1715 and did not live longer to consolidate the Pashtun power and liberate and unify the whole of Pashtunkhwa. His successors, Mahmood and Ashraf too, were young men who instead of fulfilling Mirwais' dreams, marched on a conquest of Persia to topple down that empire as an act of revenge. Though they succeeded to rule over Persia and defeat its expansionist neighbouring powers, the Othaman Turks and the Russians, it was a harmful measure which led to their isolation and exhaustion of resources that encouraged Nadir of Persia to invade the country and interrupt Pashtun independence briefly. The job of total independence and unification of all the Pashtuns was finally completed by the great nationalist ruler Ahmad Shah Abdali, in 1747, when Pashtunkhwa for the first time emerged as an independent Pashtun political entity under his dynamic leadership, called Afghanistan officially.

(B) Imperialism and Division of Pashtunkhwa

As a result of the two-century of Pashtun consistent nationalistic struggles against the imperial Moghuls and the Persians, Pashtunkhwa was liberated and unified in 1747 under the dynamic rule of Ahmad Shah Abdali, popularly known and revered as Loy Ahmad Shah Baba - the great Ahmad
Shah, the father of Pashtun nation - who officially named it as Afghanistan. Though his Afghanistan comprised an empire known as the "Durani Empire", Ahmad Shah never gave cognizance to the foreign conquered lands which were entrusted to the local native rulers. As a great nationalist leader he defined the boundaries of Pashtunkhwa in realistic terms giving it a definite political shape as a national political entity of the Pashtuns. He was not interested in building an empire or taking of the attractive thrones of Delhi and Isfahan, which were left at his disposal in the wake of the downfall of the Moghul and Persian empires as that would have dissipated Pashtun power further as in the past. This is well expressed in his patriotic Pashto poems in which he says:

By blood, we are immersed in love of you
The youth lose their heads for your sake
I come to you and my heart finds rest
Away from you, grief clings to my heart like a snake
I forget the throne of Delhi
When I remember the mountain tops of my Pashtunkhwa
If I must choose between the world and you
I shall not hesitate to claim your barren
desserts as my own. 108

In fact, unlike previous Pashtun rulers, Ahmad Shah's lack of interest in ruling India which he left to the Moghuls after occupying it, was responsible for the coming into power of the Sikhs and later that of the British. Ahmad Shah's aggressive foreign policy, leading to occasional invasions of India, was merely a self-defensive nationalist strategy of bringing further unity and additional resources to the newly established Pashtun nation-state that seemed more like a federation of tribal unions requiring a series of integrating measures that were denied by the subsequently emerging European imperial powers.

However, Ahmad Shah (1747-73) was succeeded by his less able son Timur Shah. Though Timur Shah (1773-93) was able to maintain Durrani empire intact, yet he laid the foundation of Afghanistan's future problems by adopting Persian life styles and shifting of the capital of the country from Kandahar, the Pashtun cultural centre to Kabul, a centre of the Moghul Persian domination, in 1775 for the sake of the security of his empire and his own personal life of extravagance and indulgence amongst his Persian Kizilbash courtiers called chand-awal, meaning first few. This not only alienated him from the Pashtuns who lost faith in him, but also brought the disrupting Persian language and culture into the courts and homes of the Pashtun nobility, rendering Kabul, the capital of the country
as a dominant centre of Persian language and culture causing a permanent dichotomy between the Pashtun persianised ruling elite and the Pashtun masses that paved the way for the subsequent civil wars in the country and the successful encroachments of European imperialist powers. Timur Shah had Persian and Pashtun wives as a result when he died he left behind a large number of Persianised and Pashtun-minded rival sons who fiercely fought each other for power through illegitimate means. The capital Kabul and the royal court became a centre of foreign intrigues. The Persians, British and the Chandawali courtiers intrigued to bring into power the Persianised Princes, such as Shah Mahmood and his son Kamran to check a threatening emergence of a strong Pashtun power, while the Pashtun tribes and certain Pashtun-minded nobles supported the cause of Pashtun-minded princes like Shah Zaman.109

The internal quarrels destructions and unrest not only seriously weakened Pashtun power but also encouraged the Persians, the Sikhs, the British and the Russians to expand their dominions towards the boundaries of Pashtunkhwa.

This was the beginning of a period of strident European imperial rivalries around Afghanistan. Russia was advancing through Central Asia, French carried their intrigues in Persia and the British pushed forward their frontiers in India

109. For detail on Timur Shah, see, Zafar Kaka Khel, op.cit.
I. Anglo-Russian Imperial Rivalries and Division of Pashtunkhwa

However, the energetic Prince Zaman Shah managed to emerge out of the foreign-inspired struggle for power as a strong ruler with the help of the eastern Pashtun tribes. To bring national unity to his country through a Jihad cause, as his grandfather Ahmad Shah, Zaman Shah (1773-1800) chose a course of repeated invasions of India. But the clever foresighted Britishers, seeing the emergence of a strong Muslim Afghan power as an end of their future expansion and occupation of India, rushed to check Zaman Shah's invasion of India by bribing the Persians and concluding with them a treaty to "lay waste and desolate the Afghan dominions" and try to "ruin them", whenever they invaded India.110 Thus, while Zaman Shah had reached Lahore, preparing for a forward move to Delhi, he learnt of Persia's attack on Afghan province of Khurasan, threatening Herat, so he was compelled to rush home, putting Punjab in charge of the Sikh leader Ranjeet Singh who later taking the advantage of Zaman Shah's British-created trouble at home, took possession of the Afghan domains in Punjab, declaring his independence within three years.111

110. See, Appendix no. III (1)

Laman Shah after expelling the Persians, as a result of Persian-instigated conspiracy was dethroned and blinded by his Persianised brothers and with his removal in 1800, the threat of Afghan power to the British was over and Afghanistan became a scene of continued internal conflicts, civil war and external intrigues.

The civil war caused by Persian-backed Persianised Princes like Shah Mahmood and Kamran, encouraged the external powers, the Sikhs, the Russians and the British to gradually extend their control and expansion upto the borders of Afghanistan. As a result the Sikhs encouraged by the British pushed forward into Afghan dominion until they reached the Indus, threatening Peshawar, which they occupied in 1823. Failing to exercise direct control of the city, they put it in-charge of the Peshawari Jardars (the Mohammadzai noblemen) as their viceroys until 1834 when they assumed direct control of the city.112

However, by 1826 Dost Mohammad Barakzai of another Pashtun clan, managed to emerge out of the foreign-inspired civil war as a strong ruler with the help of eastern Pashtun tribes. He stabilised the war-torn internal situation by expelling the Persian-backed Shah Mahmood, his son Kamran and his Sikh-supported brother Shah Shuja.

and made serious efforts to regain Peshawar from the British-supported Sikhs. Amir Dost Mohammad faced with internal difficulties and external threats from Persia, Russia, the Sikhs and the Jadozai brothers plotting against him, pleaded for British support in regaining Peshawar from the Sikhs which the British in view of their future imperial plan of controlling Afghanistan refused to offer. Not only this the British allied with the Sikhs and encouraged further Sikh advance into Pashtun territory as a result of which the Sikhs occupied Dera Ismail Khan and some other Pashtun areas.\(^{113}\)

**First Anglo Afghan War: 1839-42**

However, in view of the Russian advance in Central Asia and French intrigues with Persians, the British sought an alliance with Afghanistan against the other two imperial powers, but Dost Mohammad refused to do so unless the British helped him in regaining Afghan territories occupied by the Sikhs. His refusal compelled the British to encourage Shah Shuja's bid to the throne of Kabul through the Sikhs and Dost Mohammad's continued refusal made the British think of a joint British-Sikh-Shah Shuja

\(^{113}\) The British had a double interest in encouraging westward Sikh advance into Afghan territory, firstly to ward off a Sikh threat to Delhi which had come under their hegemony and second to prevent the emergence of a strong Afghan power that could check their gradual expansion and occupation. Ahmed Abdullah, *The Historical Background of Pakistan and its People* (Karachi 1973), p.61.
invasion of the country and to this effect, they signed a tripartite Treaty in June of 1838 by which Shah Shuja was to be installed as a king of Afghanistan and in return Shah Shuja would forgo any rights on adjacent districts to be occupied by the Sikhs. 114 Before doing this the British once more sent Alexander Burnes to Kabul in November 1838. On his failure to get any British promise of help in regaining of Peshawar and other Pashtun areas, Dost Mohammad turned to Russia for help. As soon as the British learnt that Vick-coich, a Russian agent had brought "a letter from the Czar, in reply to one written by Dost Mohammad imploring Russian help against the Sikhs", 115 they declared a war and invaded Afghanistan at the end of 1838 from three fronts and within a year the British-Sikh and Shah Shuja joint forces occupied major southern cities of the country. Shah Shuja was installed on the Afghan throne as a British puppet.

Within a year after the British occupation a national uprising against the British and their agent Shuja took place. The British mission was set on fire and their envoy and political agent Burnes were murdered and by the time the British forces decided to withdraw in

114. See Asghar H. Bilgrami, op. cit., pp.60-62, and Appendix no. III (H)

January of 1842, the nationalist uprising had grown to the extent that none of the invaders was spared except one person. Thus, the "ill-fated expedition that vainly cost the British an army and Shah Shuja his life" met with a total failure. Dost Mohammad was allowed to resume his interrupted reign. He continued his quest for regaining of Peshawar and in 1849 he sent a force that successfully occupied Peshawar but in anticipation of a confrontation with the British who had defeated the Sikh power, Amir Dost Mohammad withdrew his force precipitately and the British promptly moved up and occupied Peshawar to be followed by further annexation of the Pashtun districts west of the Indus. 116

Second Anglo-Afghan War 1878-80

At first as a result of bitter experience of the first war, the British followed a "close-Border" policy of no further advance into Pashtun territory arguing that "with Peshawar, Kohat and Sind in our possession and the communications with our Indian provinces open... we really have the keys of India in our pockets". 117 But it did not take them long to realise that their domains were insecure


117. Rahman Pazhwak, op.cit., p.75.
as long as the struggling Pashtun tribes supported by Kabul continued their attacks on British lines of communication and as long as Kabul remained unfriendly. Advocating a "Forward Policy", they further argued that their administrative frontier running through the Pashtun hostile foothills was strategically unsafe as "it served not as a barrier but as a screen behind which one could hardly know what precisely was going on". So, they "wanted to move forward and fix the 'scientific frontier' on the Hindu-Kush". This, the British argued, was further necessary as the Russian had advanced to a point which made it impossible for the British to remain passive and not interfere with the independent country of Afghans. This resulted in the second Afghan war.

The British invited Shēr Aḥmed, the Amir of Afghanistan to Ambala and suggested to him such terms that would satisfy their interest to which Shēr Aḥmed refused to agree. Returning to Kabul he entered into negotiations with Russia. This legitimate step taken by the Amir was viewed by the British as an act of war and hence they invaded Afghanistan from three different fronts. Shēr Aḥmed retreated to Mazar in the north so as to secure some aid from the Amir of

Bukhara or the Russians, but he died there shortly after. Yaqun Khan, his son, was installed on the throne of Kabul and the "condemned" "Treaty of Gandumak" was signed with him in 1879, as a result of which the districts of Lorali, Zhob, Pishin, Quetta and Nushki were ceded to the British. They also occupied the Khaiber and Michni passes and Baluchistan province, and a British envoy was once more received in Kabul.

But this state of affairs did not last long as the people within a year rose up in opposition to the treaty and against the British in 1879. The revolt was followed by a further British military expedition. Yaqub abdicated, leaving his brother Ayub Khan to carry on the war against the British. Severe losses were again inflicted on the British forces in July 1880 with their envoy being murdered. The British had every intention of staying there to establish their "scientific" frontier with Russia along the Hindu-Kush ranges with a line of defence from Kabul through Ghazni to Kandahar. But the two wars made it clear to them that although it was relatively easy for Britain to occupy certain key towns in eastern and southern Afghanistan, it was much more difficult to hold them.


120. James W. Spain, no.44, p.168.
Therefore, Lord Lytton, in a reversal of his forward policy, reluctantly decided to withdraw his troops and offer to Abdur Rahman Khan, a nephew of Sher Ali, the country with the exception of Herat, Kandahar and the eastern parts. They kept the eastern parts of the country, i.e., Kooza Pashtunkhwa or present Pashtunistan under their own control and wanted Herat to be ceded to Iran and Kandahar to become an independent Amirate under their protection so as to have at least partially achieved the objective of the "Forward Policy". So the British unwillingly withdrew and allowed Abdur Rahman Khan to become Amir of Afghanistan with his foreign policy under their control. But Amir Abdur Rahman was able to extend his control over Herat and Kandahar as well.

Although, Abdur Rahman was able to extend his control over Kandahar and Herat, yet the British managed to occupy larger Pashtun areas during and after the second Anglo-Afghan war. Kurram, Khaiber, Pishin and Sebi in northern Baluchistan and the Afghan maritime province of Baluchistan were annexed during the war and Afghanistan was thus curtailed and reduced to a landlocked position. In spite of the partial failure, the British still stuck to their forward policy and

sought to extend their control further into Pashtun territory. Larger tracts of the so-called tribal territory were sliced out and the Zhob valley in northern Baluchistan inhabited by Pashtuns was occupied in 1889. This resulted in a perpetual enmity, hostility and warfare between the British and the struggling Pashtuns and as a result "scarcely a year went by without a punitive military expedition against the (Pashtun) tribes."

II. Durand Line: Zenith of British Imperialism and Pashtun-Struggle

Abdur Rahman resenting the British occupation of the Afghan territory, continued to support and encourage the Pashtun tribes to resist British control as he never considered any Pashtun area as "permanently ceded" to the British. In order to weaken Pashtun nationalistic resistance and curtail their allegiance to Kabul and Kabul's jurisdiction over them, the British pressed Abdur Rahman for a demarcation of frontier proposing to separate and alienate from Afghanistan, the Afghan territory under British actual

122. Afghan Province of Baluchistan was occupied in 1878 during the invasion of Afghan when its "khan of Kalat, a feudatory of the Afghan King was forced to transfer his allegiance to the British", See Abdul Qaiyum, Golds and Guns on the Pathan Frontier (Bombay, 1945), pp.48-55.

123. For detail on the British anti-Pashtun expeditions, See, Appendix No. III (v)

or nominal control. But Abdur Rahman knowing the consequences of such a line of dividing Pashtunkhwa into spheres of influence, pleaded with the British not to exclude the Pashtuns from their motherland saying:

"If you cut them off from my dominions, they will never be of any use to you nor to me... you will always be engaged in fighting or other trouble with them... and if any time a foreign enemy appears on the borders of India, these tribes will be your worst enemy..."125

But the British were so persistent in their "unjust demand" that the Viceroy addressed a letter to Amir as an ultimatum to the effect that the Indian Government could not wait for his "indefinite promises", and would "draw its own conclusion".126 Further, the British undertook a series of military manoeuverings including gradual advance in the direction of Jallabad, Kabul and Kandahar, appearing like "pushing a knife" into Amir's vitals that forced Amir Abdur Rahman to accept the Durand Mission for signing an agreement, dividing Pashtun lands into British and Amir's spheres of influence. Thus, Abdur Rahman was forced to sign the British prepared Durand Line Agreement on November 14, 1843, and forgo his jurisdiction over Chaman, Chagai, Waziristan, Biland Khel, Kurran, Afridi Bajaur, Swat, Buner, Dir, Chilas and Chitral.127

126. Rahman Pazhwak, op.cit., p.75.
In his autobiography, the Amir has expressed his bitter antagonism against the Durand Line. His assertions make it clear that the agreement was forced upon him and he signed it mainly to avoid a catastrophe of collision with the British. Hasan Kakar provides concrete evidence which proves that the Amir did not actually write the "I renounce my claims" sentence. Most of the British statement writers and even Durand himself admit that Durand Line was merely delination of Amir's and British spheres of influence in Pashtun areas and was not an international boundary. Olaf Caroe, former NWFP governor, who is known for his antagonism against the Khudai Khidmatgars and their Pashtunistan cause admits:

"It is true that the agreement did not describe the line as a boundary of India, but as the frontier of the Amir's dominions and the line beyond which neither side would exercise interference. This was because the British Government did not intend to absorb the tribes into their administrative system, only to extend their own, and exclude the Amir's authority in the territory east and south of the line. In international aspect this was of no account."  

This was the view of almost all of the British administrators. Durand Line was, therefore, not meant as an international boundary nor it had the necessary

128. Ibid.
rigidity of an international frontier. For, the imperialist British still regarded the vassal Afghan State as an integral part of their imperial possession and as such did not allow it to have an international recognition or legitimacy by a recognised international boundary. Hence the Durand Line was merely a boundary of imperial convenience to check the emergence of a strong Afghanistan by the creation of the Tribal Territory or the so-called No man's land as a buffer on its own strategic frontier territory. It was, therefore, a device to ensure British security against a potential Afghan threat.

Thus, its indefinite imperial character makes it obvious that the Durand agreement did not have the necessary legal force. Apart from being concluded under duress between unequal political parties the imperial British power and the dependent vassal Afghan state, the British themselves treated it as a temporary agreement concluded with the person of the Amir, subject to renegotiation under a changed political situation. Hence as Ludwig Adame points out the British agreements with Afghanistan never had continued legal force and had to be renegotiated as has

been done in 1880, 1883, 1893, 1905 and 1921. For, "Britain conveniently maintained that her agreements with Afghanistan were concluded with the person of the Amir, subject to renegotiation with every successor", 132 who often tried to avoid it because of public resentment and reaction.

However, when the Pashtuns came to know that they have been divided and excluded from their motherland by the so-called Durand Line, they revolted blowing up British Camps and even the boundary commission. They found the measure a shocking imperial conspiracy concluded with utmost secrecy. It was a general revolt all along the frontier from Chitral to Takhti-Sulaiman in Baluchistan. It was at a tremendous cost in terms of men and money that the widespread uprising, lasting for 5 years, was brought under some temporary control after deploying 60,000 highly equipped troops.133

Thus, the political objective of the Durand Line to control the encircled landlocked Afghan state and bring stability in the British occupied Pashtun territories, was never realized. It fell far short of either serving British imperial interest or solving the problem of Pashtun tribes,


133. James, W. Spain, op.cit., p.169.
who continued their national struggle against the British in a vigorous assertive manner. In fact, as a direct result of the British attempts to impose "the hated Durand Line", the British and Indian troops fought many bloody engagements with the fiercely independent border mountaineers. Thus, it was "politically, geographically and strategically untenable". For, as an imaginary line it was neither based on any sound geographical and topographical foundations nor on any ethnic, cultural and humanitarian ground. It not only divided a nation into two fragmented parts but also split the tribes and even the villages. In several instances it "lay the fields of a village on the one side and the village itself on the other".

It was in view of these reasons that Abdur Rahman opposed the Durand Line "most furiously, and submitted solely to evade a greater catastrophe. He considered himself free to abrogate it at the first opportunity", as he "looked on all Pashtun areas as a part of his kingdom". The Amir, therefore, believing to have "acted against his will", continued to encourage tribal agitations in spite of British protests, and one could hardly expect him not to express

135. Ibid., p.428.
137. Quoted from *Cambridge History of India*, by Rahman Pazhwak, *op.cit.*
resentment and bitter feelings over the loss of Afghan territory, which was not only a matter of national honour but also a national question related to the very national unity, integrity and stability of the nascent Afghan state, a political entity of the Pashtuns. In fact, "a review of the frontier history since 1893, shows that the agreement increased not only the responsibilities of the Government of India, but also the chances of collision with the tribes and of war with the Amir".138

The "fate of the eastern Afghans, therefore, continued to be the main concern of the Afghan rulers, which ever-since their severance from Afghan state has affected Afghanistan's relations with the British and later, with the successor Pakistan. The tribes, in view of their strong nationalistic attachment to Afghan state, have been a strong source of strength for Afghan rulers and have been valuable allies in the events of Anglo-Afghan conflicts. Afghanistan has, therefore, always "resisted British demands to sever relations with these Afghan tribes.139

The created tribal areas or the no-man's land, as they called it, were in theory a British protectorate not in reality. They constituted an integral part of the Afghan state. The British considered it as "Independent

Tribal Territory" until 1901, when Curzon administration launched upon a policy of gradual penetration of the area. The so-called "Tribal Territory" was also kept separate from other Pashtun areas under their actual occupation and was dealt with directly by the Central Government. Curzon also separated the occupied Pashtun districts west of the Indus from Punjab and set them up as the North-west Frontier Province of India. In a lecture at Oxford in 1907, Curzon said that he saw the "Tribal Territory primarily a 'Marchland' in which the north-west frontier of empire could be protected against any hostile interest, which might seep through the 'buffer state' of Afghanistan beyond the Oxus.\textsuperscript{140} Yet, in spite of British imperialist vivisection of Pashtun lands the Tribal areas have remained and would continue to remain an inseparable part of the Frontier Province, attached to Afghanistan by national sentiments, loyalty and a common Pashtun national and cultural identity.

In 1919, Amanullah, the new Amir, launched the short-lived Third Anglo-Afghan War for obtaining full external sovereignty over the lost territories. Almost all of the tribes joined the war and continued it even afterwards. The Peace Treaty of Rawalpindi, 8 August 1919, ended the war by recognising Afghan independence. Amanullah too,

\textsuperscript{140} James Spain, \textit{op.cit.}, p.169.
like his grandfather Abdur Rahman, and father Amir Habbullah, was forced to accept the Durand Line, but he won from the British the recognition of Afghanistan's independence in foreign affairs. Although Amanullah failed to recover the lost territories, yet in the Treaty of Kabul, 22 November 1921, he managed to extract a further concession in Article XI, which provides for reciprocal interests in the frontier affairs:

"Having mutually satisfied themselves each regarding their benevolent intentions toward the tribes residing close to their respective boundaries, hereby undertake each to inform the other in the future of any military operations of major importance which may appear necessary for the maintenance of order among the frontier tribes residing within their respective sphere before the commencement of such operations". 141

A British note added to the Treaty also recognised Afghanistan's interests in, and concern over the conditions of the frontier tribes.

But in spite of the new treaty, Amanullah, having been forced to act against his will, continued to support Pashtun agitations for freedom which grew in momentum and paved the way for the emergence of the Khudai Khidmatgars national movement. King Amanullah, even while signing the

1921 Treaty stated unequivocally to the British representative that the treaty could "not be one of friendship but only of neighbourly relations", so long as Britain oppressed Muslims, in particular the Pashtun tribes, whose affinities to Afghanistan were well known.\textsuperscript{142} Amanullah's active support severely strained the relations between the two countries and the British blamed their "difficulties in India on unwarranted pampering of Afghans" until they managed to overthrow Amanullah, a champion of the Pashtun national cause.

Thus, the fate of trans-Durand Line Pashtuns have continued to be a matter of serious concern for successive Afghan governments. In view of the national and tribal ties and their importance for the national security and also in view of nationalistic pressures, Afghan governments, have always "insisted that they have rights and interests in the tribes". Even rulers, friendly towards the British, such as Abdur Rahman and Nadir Shah, had to express sympathy with the Pashtun national cause. Nadir Shah, in his inaugural speech to Parliament in 1931, declared that the fate of the "Pashtun tribes" of the "Free Frontier" was "of special concern to Afghan government".\textsuperscript{143}

\textsuperscript{142} Leon Poullada, \textit{op.cit.}, p.128.

\textsuperscript{143} \textit{Ibid.}, p.128.
The British on their part, at least tacitly, "recognised a legitimate Afghan interest" in the fate of Pashtuns by often declaring that they had no intention of annexing the tribal territory. The British, however, changed their position after the emergence of Pakistan by declaring that the "Durand Line is an international frontier", and "Pakistan is, in international law, an inheritor of the rights and duties" of their old imperial power. 144

III. The Red Shirt Politics: Pashtun Ideology in a Fragmented Imperialist Dominated Society

Before we pass on to the discussion of the relationship between the Afghan social and political order and the foundations for national political action either on the basis of constitutionalism or through revolutionary action, we must first discuss some of the characteristics of the struggle against imperialist domination in British India from the standpoint of the interests of the Pashtuns. Frequently linked to Afghanistan's domestic politics was the external pattern of the ideological aggregation across the Durand Line. The character of the developments in the North-west Frontier Province had a major bearing on the political environment in Afghanistan.

144. For detail, see Ibid., pp.138-39 and Chapter III.
The domestic political crisis in India has to be examined for the light it sheds on the clash of ideologies of imperialism and national liberation. India experienced a long freedom struggle in which the Pashtuns participated as an important anti-imperialist force. But it is misleading to formulate this effort in terms of only a reformist political force. From the standpoint of the long-term history of the Pashtun National Movement outlined in the preceding sections, the Red Shirt Movement was a major means of legitimating the Pashtun struggle against imperialism in its last phase. No matter how closely the Red Shirts (Khudai Khidmatgars) were identified with the political aims of the Indian National Congress, the Pashtun ideological contribution was directly connected with the attempt to win national autonomy for Pashtunkhwa. The link between the fight against British Imperialism in India and the rebuilding of the domestic political structures of Pashtun society was both basic and unavoidable.

III. The Khudai Khidmatgars National Movement (1912-47)

As a result of the Hoshnya movement, Peshawar had emerged as one of the two centres of Pashtun intellectualism, the other being Kandahar, the core of western nationalist uprisings. It had a strong intellectual link with the Persian dominated Kabul, the nearby national capital of the country. The British imperial domination of Pashtunkhwa had resulted in suppression of Pashtun intellectual and nationalist trends.
While Kabul suffered under the despotic Persianised Pashtun rulers, Peshawar was occupied by the imperial forces and kept as a military cantonment in complete isolation. In view of bitter experience with Pashtuns, the Frontier Province with Peshawar as its capital, was not allowed to enjoy civil freedoms and socio-economic and educational facilities as in the rest of their Indian empire. For in the British eyes, Pashtuns deserved "a special course of treatment". Ruthless military officers were appointed who would rule as absolute kings and masters. They introduced cruel and inhuman repressive laws like the Frontier Crimes Regulations for trial and rigorous punishment of people suspected of having anything to do with either social work or political activity. In order to hide their wild deeds and subjugate the Pashtuns, they kept Pashtun territories in total seclusion, ignorance and poverty, cutting off its internal and external linkages.

The critical situation made sensitive urban intellectuals work for some socio-economic and cultural reforms with the aims of improving the living conditions and ultimately overthrowing the British yoke. Under that critical circumstances, only the progressive clergy were in a position to take the leading role. In Kabul, the progressive clergy under Wasif Alakozai brought about the first constitutional movement,


146. For detail, see, ibid., pp.26-27.
while in Peshawar the clergy launched a socio-economic reform movement that ultimately assumed the character of an armed anti-British national struggle under Haji Fazal Wahab Tarangzai Sahib.\textsuperscript{147} Tarangzai started a school movement and opened his first village school in the Frontier Province in 1910 at Utmanzai village of Peshawar, with the same object as Habibya school was brought about in Kabul in 1906 by the royal clergy. Tarangzai's school movement attracted a young sensitive dynamic youth, Abdul Ghaffar a son of a well-to-do landlords, born in January 1890 at Utmanzai.

The two great reformists soon managed to set up a wide network of village schools in Mardan and Peshawar districts of the Province. But the British seeing the danger, immediately reacted to close down the schools, arrest the teachers and persecute its founder Tarangzai Sahib who managed to escape to the tribal territory, making Bajaur a centre of his anti-British armed struggle.\textsuperscript{148} Abdul Ghaffar, was left alone and was not arrested because of his father's influence. He pleaded with the British for allowing him to carry out the school movement, but the British in a typical imperialist way would refuse by saying "what security you can give that they won't revolt against us after they have been educated and organised


\textsuperscript{148} Ibid., p.98, and Muhammad Yunus, \textit{The Frontier Speaks} (Bombay, 1947), pp.104-05.
by you?" It was this blatant denial of the basic human rights that made Ghaffar Khan to realise the crux of the problem and observe:

"Whenever an imperialist power takes over a country, its first attempt is to ensure that the people of that territory remain ignorant; their mother tongue is the second victim of the occupying power... their foremost effort was to see their own language i.e., English was spread... once they (the people) knew it, they would come to have affection and sympathy for it. (Thus) Pathans were not allowed to have even primary education in Pashto (as) the British wanted the Pathans to remain illiterate.... The result was that the Pathans remained uneducated as a rule and those who studied in English schools lost all love for and contact with their own mother tongue so much so that they started hating it".150

In spite of British opposition and repression, Ghaffar Khan reorganised village schools with a great difficulty but the imperialists again closed down the schools and arrested Ghaffar Khan, his 95-year old father and his colleagues. They were released later on the occasion of the King's Proclamation Day in 1919, enabling them to resume their social work.151

However, Amanullah's successful war against the British in 1919 made the Frontier Province the centre of anti-British Khilafat movement and thousands of Muslims from all over India gathered in Peshawar to undertake a hijrat migration

149. Muhammad Yunus, Ibid., p.105.


151. Muhammad Yunus, op.cit., p.106.
to a Muslim land, i.e., Afghanistan. Ghaffar Khan and his colleagues joined the hijrat movement. In Kabul, he met and exchanged views with the victorious nationalist monarch Amanullah who advised him to go back and resume his work as he told him "it was futile to run away from one's country and seek shelter abroad".152 So, he returned to Peshawar and gathered his social workers and founded his social reform organisation, the "Anjumani Islahi Afghanya", reform association of Afghans. The organisation soon developed into a strong body with branches all over the province. With the view to spread his reforms to the Tribal Territory, Ghaffar Khan and his stalwart associates undertook extensive tours of the Pashtun areas, explaining the aims of their reforms. The Chief Commissioner of the Province warned him to abandon his social reform programmes or face the consequences. Refusing to do so he was "sentenced to three years rigorous imprisonment" in 1921.153

His imprisonment strengthened his movement and by the time of his release in 1924, thousands thronged to Utmanzai to see their popular leader. In a monumental gathering at Utmanzai his grateful people conferred on him the title of Fakhri - Afghan, the honour of the Afghans.154 In 1926, he

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152. Muhammad Yunus, op.cit., p.108.
154. Ibid., p.110. The view common among the Afghan intellectuals is that this title was conferred on him by King Amanullah, by letter sent to him. See, Afghan Milat, January 18, 1968.
undertook a tour of Muslim countries and participated in the Grand Islamic Conference at Mecca and performed his haj.

British hinderances in his social work forced him to indulge in politics and establish a political organisation with educational, social and political objectives. So, in consultation with his colleagues, he founded the Pashtun Jirga in 1927 and published the first Pashto Journal, the Pakhtoon as its publicity organ. But he found that without a mass movement the Pashtun Jirga will not achieve its objectives due to British repression and local reaction encouraged by the British, so he established a religious oriented organisation of volunteers, called Khudai Khidmatgars, the servants of God in October 1929. Before joining the organisation, the volunteers had to pledge themselves by a sacred oath:

1) To remain a Khudai Khidmatgar, a servant of God;

2) To obey the orders of God in the service of community and the nation and not to accept remuneration for service;

3) To sacrifice life, wealth and comfort in the cause of the motherland;

4) To serve all humanity with the object to win freedom of the country and the religion;

5) To refrain from factionalism, jealousy and ill-will towards fellow Pashtuns and not to retaliate in spite of harm done by a Pashtun brother;

6) To follow the path of non-violence in thought and action and eschew violence, leading to hatred and ruin of the Pashtuns;

7) To eschew bad motives and social evils and protect the oppressed against the oppressors;

8) To be good, virtuous and just in dealing with others;
9) To obey the officers (Khudai Khidmatgars) and refrain from joining other organisation; and

10) To please God with selfless services without any regard for personal motive, gain and show. 155

The above solemn pledge and the Khudai Khidmatgars national anthem, 156 throw enough light on the solid nationalist foundations of the powerful Khudai Khidmatgars mass movement. As a symbol of equality, dedication, and oneness, the Khudai Khidmatgars wore uniforms dyed in local brick dust with a distinctive red colour that provided the British with a good pretext to brand them as communists inspired and financed by the "Reds of Russia". So, they mischievously popularised them as "Red Shirts" to incite the Indian Muslims angered at the British-publicized Soviet ill-treatment of the Muslims in Central Asia. While Soviet literature, referred to Khudai Khidmatgars as the servants of British imperialism. 157

In spite of British repressive measures, the "movement spread like a wild fire throughout the province" and thousands of young men joined it with a pledge to serve "the sacred cause of freedom of their country, and eager to lay down their lives for it". Ghaffar Khan became a leading hero and the common people started calling him as their Pacha Khan,

155. See, Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, op.cit., p. Muhammad Yunus, op.cit., p.113, and Abdul Qaiyum, op.cit.

156. See, Muhammad Yunus, Ibid, p.114.

King of kings. Khudai Khidmatgar Jirgas were set up in most of the villages in the Frontier Province and links were established with the tribal Jirgas in the Independent Tribal Territory. "At the top was the provincial Jirga, which included the Khudai Khidmatgars' high command. All of the Jirga members were elected, and the system began to develop into a kind of parallel administration independent of the British Government. Side by side with the Khidmatgar Jirgas was an organisation of volunteers bound by an oath of discipline to follow and enforce the organisation's policy as determined by the high command.\(^{158}\)

The emergence of Khudai Khidmatgars as a strong political force in the sensitive Frontier Province worried the British who "let loose a wave of severe repression on the people". To save his organisation Ghaffar Khan was forced to search for political allies in India. He first approached the Muslim League leaders who "turned a deaf ear" to his "appeal for help". Then he approached the Indian National Congress which most willingly came to his help and the Khudai Khidmatgars organisation was finally affiliated with Congress in August 1931 in spite of the British efforts to prevent it.\(^{159}\)

\(^{158}\) Abdul Qaiyam, \textit{op.cit.}, p.29, and James W. Spain, \textit{op.cit.}, p.165.

\(^{159}\) Abdul Qaiyam, \textit{op.cit.}, p.29, and James W. Spain, \textit{op.cit.}, p.173.
Ghaffar Khan's link with Indian leaders further provoked the British. Ghaffar Khan and his close associates were arrested and sentenced with three years rigorous imprisonment under section 40 of the Criminal Laws primarily intended for robbers, murderers and notorious outlaws. Ghaffar Khan's arrest led to a wide-scale demonstrations in the Province. The British authorities called in a regiment of local soldiers to fire at demonstrators in Peshawar city. They heroically refused and were, therefore, hurriedly disarmed and arrested. British troops were brought in who indiscriminately fired at the crowds of demonstrators at Kissa Khani Bazar and hundreds were indiscriminately massacred and curfew was imposed under strict military rule. Thousands of Red Shirts were rounded up and tried under the scandalous Frontier Crime Regulation Act. Pakhtoon was declared illegal and its publication stopped. Shooting, beating and "gunning of the Red Shirts" became "a popular sport and pastime" of the Britishers. 160

The sad episode of Kissa Khani triggered a wide-scale revolts all over the Province and the Tribal Territory. To avenge almost all of the tribes in the Tribal Territory launched a series of repeated attacks on British installations, causing heavy losses to the British. The British failed to control the situation in spite of using full military forces until they were forced to declare Martial

Law and hastily bring heavy military reinforcements from Punjab and other parts of India in August 1930. In spite of their terrifying repressive military measures, the situation continued to be explosive that forced the British to indulge in heavy airbombing of the tribal territories, wholesale arrests, executions, midnight house searches, confiscation of properties and so on. The situation continued to be so disturbed that by late summer 1931, even the pro-British Khans began to join the Khudai Khidmatgars withholding their revenue payments. In an effort to counter this, British arrested and sentenced the defaulters under the Land Revenue Act. 161 Kabul was approached for help by the tribes who were for the first time in history sadly advised to come to terms with the imperialists due to Kabul's "internal difficulties" caused by the rebellion.

Abdul Ghaffar Khan and some other prisoners were released in March 1931 as a result of Jandhi Irwin Pact, envisaging suspension of agitation till the results of London discussions. But Ghaffar Khan in disregard of a promise from Gandhi reinforced his agitation by setting up new training centres and recruiting thousands of young men from the tribal territory. 162 The British expressed readiness to allow some reforms as recommended by Bray and Simon's Commissions, but

161. For detail, See James W. Spain, Ibid., pp.166-67.
162. Ibid., p.167.
Khudai Khidmatgars declared "no reform short of complete goal self-government would be accepted". They scheduled a mammoth mass meeting for January 1, 1932, to chalk out a programme for the implementation of their goals that frightened the British to ban the Khudai Khidmatgar organisation on December 26, 1931. The British again arrested Ghaffar Khan, his relatives and a great number of other Khudai Khidmatgar leaders and crushed Khudai Khidmatgars' protest gatherings at various parts of the province indiscriminately. They rounded up thousands of their activists and tried them under the scandalous Frontier Crimes regulations.\(^{163}\)

Failure to subjugate the Khudai Khidmatgars forced the British to allow a degree of self-rule and raise the Province to the status of a Governor's Province. Sir Abdul Qaiyum a retired civil servant was appointed as the first minister of the Province. Real power still remained with the Governor and his executive council.\(^{164}\) Ghaffar Khan and his brother Dr. Khan Sehib were released in 1934, but were not allowed to enter the Province. Khudai Khidmatgars organisation and the Pakhtoon Journal remained banned. The Province was given a seat in the Central Assembly and the Khudai Khidmatgars being jailed or externed had to contest

\(^{163}\) Muhammad Yunus, *op.cit.*, p.123.

and win it even in their absence. Thus the Khudai Khidmatgars "movement continued to grow underground". The more the British suppressed them the stronger they became. The British were finally forced to allow a greater degree of self-government. General elections were ordered in hurry in 1937 for the 50-member Frontier Legislature in the hope that the Khudai Khidmatgars being hit by party ban and imprisonments, would not be able to capture a sizeable number of seats. But quite to their surprise, they secured 19 out of the 50 Assembly seats that enabled Dr. Khan Sahib to form the first Congress ministry in Frontier Province.

Dr. Khan Sahib's ministry did marvellous work in spite of British and Muslim League's intrigues, but in response to the Congress decision not to cooperate with the British Government, the ministry resigned in 1939 joining the non-cooperation movement. No ministry in the Frontier Province could be formed as the majority in the Assembly belonged to Khudai Khidmatgars. Yet Mr. Jinnah jubilantly volunteered to cooperate with the British Government by forming the first Muslim League ministry in the Province in 1943 headed by Sardar Aurangzeb Khan. So with the British blessings various pro-British Arbabs, Nawabs, Landlords, Khans, Sayeeds, Mullahs, bureaucrats, etc. were brought together to constitute Jinnah's Muslim League in the Province and

great efforts were made to prepare them for the final battle with the Khudai Khidmatgars. Communal hatred riots and killings were encouraged in the sacred name of Islam and malicious campaign against Khudai Khidmatgar leaders was launched and they were accused of betraying the cause of Muslims and "misleading the Pathans" in favour of the Hindus. Jails were soon filled with thousands of the Khudai Khidmatgars and even their leaders were beaten including their beloved leader Badshah Khan. While Red Shirts were put behind the bars and their leaders externed, Muslim Leaguers were extended a free hand to expand through fomenting communal hatred. As a manoeuvre to acquire strength and political vigour, Mr. Jinnah, the hero of the play was brought into Peshawar in November 1945 and was accorded a splendid welcome. The "different political Agents and Deputy Commissioners, sent their henchmen, Nawabs and title holders to see that the welcome was really a historically decisive one. The stage-managed show was so great and splendid that even the pessimist Muslim Leaguers became confident of a sweeping victory at the polls.

With such a great confidence in Muslim League's ultimate victory at the first stage of the imperial play,

166. For detail, See, Ibid., Chapter V.

167. For a detailed account of the communal riots, though biased, See, James W. Spain, op.cit., Chapter 10.

general elections were ordered in February 1946. The legendary Pashtun leader, Badshah Khan undertook an election tour of the province and his inspiring message turned the deprived masses to defy all threats and obstacles and record their verdict in favour of his cause. The League's claim to have gained ground in the land of Ghaffar’s sacred national movement was best revealed by the results of the elections to the great astonishment of their imperial allies. The Khudai Khidmatgars had a tremendous success as compared to the result of previous election which reflected a stable growth of their movement in spite of the imperial intrigues. They secured an absolute majority of 32 seats out of the total 50 Assembly seats while in the previous elections, they had secured 19 seats only. Muslim League's success was only in the formation of the unholy opposition alliance with the communal label which various British backed reactionery elements were brought together with the help of generous imperial blessings to fight the Khudai Khidmatgars.

Thus, the only course open to imperialism was to hatch an imperial conspiracy for completing the final stage of the drama of forcefully surrendering the Pashtuns to its successors through an imperial referendum.

169. See, Ibid., p.192.
Nature of Ghaffar Khan's Struggle: Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan had been initially a supporter of Amanullah, and of many of his proclaimed policies for the reformist possibilities for national identity of the Pashtuns. A later stage of his policy framework might well be called the "Gandhian" stage, because it was during the period of the intensification of the Indian struggle that consensus politics within the Indian constitutional framework was given prime importance. This resulted in a certain perception of ideological dualism about the Red Shirt Movement, which was inevitable in view of the political and social fragmentation which had been imposed on the Pashtuns by British Imperialism. The main line of ideological development within the Red Shirt Movement, cannot be abstracted from the political and historical struggle in the entire Pashtunkhwa during preceding centuries.

Outwardly the processes of political socialisation of the Indian national movement affected the Red Shirts, but the structures and assumptions of their composite ideology are a direct response to the manifold problems of social and political fragmentation of Pashtunkhwa. The broader connections between the Red Shirt Ideology and the intellectual ethos of "Pashtunistan" both, derive from the historical context in which Bayazid Noshan, Aimal Khan, Khushal Khan Khattak, Mirwais, Ahmad Shah, Dost Mohammad Sher Ali, Abdur Rahman and Amanullah attempted the creation of a national
consensus to overcome the problem of fragmentation faced by the Pashtuns. Thus, the Red Shirt Movement was effective not only in the Frontier Province; it provided the basis for an integrating ideology for all Pashtuns and worked for a powerful aggregation of political-interest groups in Afghanistan, in the Tribal Areas, in the NWFP and in Baluchistan.

The liberal, humanitarian and education reform urged by the Khudai Khidmatgars was based largely on the concept of reconciliation among tribes and social classes in the face of imperialist attempts at divide and rule. It was also an attempt to reconcile modern democracy with the traditional principles of Pashtunwali. The Red Shirt Movement profoundly affected the framework and vocabulary of the anti-imperialist discourse in Afghanistan to a great extent, laid the groundwork for the political goals and aims of democratic movements and the framing of national perceptions.

The Khudai Khidmatgars provided a new social perception for structured action on both sides of the Durand Line and thus gathered support from a wide variety of social groups. From the standpoint of ideological development, many analysts of Afghan foreign policy have largely missed the vitally important role of general legitimation of a politically unified and stable Pashtunkhwa which resulted from the ideological aggregation in the course of the development of anti-imperialism by the Red Shirts.
IV. Referendum and the Emergence of Pashtunistan Issue

Before we pursue the career of the Pashtunistan issue in the period after the British Transfer of Power, we must look at the various related efforts of the Imperialist rulers to perpetuate the imperialist structure over the Pashtuns and to bequeath the annexationist mentality to the successor state. It can be argued that the Referendum of 1947 was not simply the expression of a desire on the part of the imperial power to reconcile the interests of the two successor states of India and Pakistan, but also of the need to prevent the ideological leanings of the Red Shirts to find full expression against the continuing informal imperialism and social imperialism after transfer of power.

The main ideological alternative to imperialism for the Pashtuns could only be evolved in terms of the relationship between Pashtun society and their physical environment. Even in the context of imperialist policy, there were some steps in this direction. As a result of the assertive emergence of a strong Pashtun nationalism under the Khudai Khidmatgars national movement, the British began to understand Pashtun problem. Under the Government of India Act of 1935, they allowed the Frontier Province a degree of self-rule since 1937.

This, however, encouraged the Afghans to believe that in the event of their withdrawal from India, the British would certainly allow the Pashtuns to return to their old
Afghan allegiance. These hopes received some confirmations also in private conversations with British officials of the time. In early 1940s when British withdrawal became certain, the Afghans were having great hopes for the eventual return of their lost territory. Moshahiban dynasty's friendliness towards the British, Afghan neutrality in World War II and the expulsion of Axis nationals from Afghanistan in October 1941 at the request of the British, were acts motivated by the belief that British withdrawal would result in the union of the Pashtuns with the motherland. Furthermore, the visiting Cripp's Mission also informed Afghans that their claims to the Pathan territory were being seriously considered.

But unfortunately with the emergence of a growing militant Muslim League, a change occurred in the British attitude towards Afghanistan. There was callousness towards the Pashtuns who had proved their unswerving devotion to their cause of national liberation under the Khudai Khidmatgars. It seems most probable that when the British found that they were no more in a position to control national liberation forces in the subcontinent, they might have found it advisable for their long-range imperial interest to divide their Indian Empire into two rival Hindu and Muslim entities.


British private assurances to Afghanistan that her claims would be seriously considered suggest that the Britishers might have initially thought the creation of such a Muslim entity under Afghanistan advisable. Later, they might have changed their mind because of difficulties involved.

The hypothesis suggests that the partition of the Indian subcontinent into two Muslim and Hindu States was on the British card long before its formal advocacy by Mr. Jinnah. This is evidenced by British encouragement of a bilateral political factionalism, disallowing the third party of the Pashtuns. However, when it became apparent that British withdrawal was certain, the Khudai Khidmatgars began to freely express their ultimate objective. Formerly, the fear of losing the interest of their allies, made them to be evasive and diplomatic to the extent of hiding their actual objectives in ambiguous terms. Thus, Badsnah Khan would only talk of freedom, but would not specify its concrete institutional form. But afterwards, when British withdrawal became certain, the Khudai Khidmatgars became more outspoken, clarifying the parameters of the Pashtun national Liberation movement and acknowledging that "for this independence of the Pathans we sided with the Congress and fought our common enemy". 172

However, with imminence of British withdrawal, Khudai Khidmatgars began to press for their demand of a separate Pashtun State, which had received the attention of Mahatma Gandhi as well. But when the time for the crucial decision arrived,  

Khudai Khidmatgars' demand was totally ignored even by their own Congress allies. The parties concerned, the British, the League, Congress and the Muslim League, accepting Jinnah's two-nation theory, turned down Ghaffar Khan's formally presented demand for a separate state of Pathanistan or Pashtunistan.\textsuperscript{173}

When Pashtun leaders came to know about this betrayal, they strongly reacted by declaring that "nobody in the world can force them to join anyone", and that "it is the Frontier people to decide and if they decide by majority vote that they will not join any group, nobody can force them".\textsuperscript{174} Khan Abdul Ghaffar in a statement on December 6, 1946 urged that the question of whether or not the province should join any group should be left to the free will of the Province itself.\textsuperscript{175} Dr. Khan Sahib, the Frontier Premier, declared on December 21, that "the Frontier people do not bother themselves about sections or groups, they want independence and nobody can force them to join anyone else.\textsuperscript{176}

However, in spite of Pashtun insistence demand for a third alternative of a separate independent state, the parties concerned in total disregard of the Pashtun nationalist...


\textsuperscript{174} Rahman Pazhwak, \textit{op.cit.}, p.11C.

\textsuperscript{175} Kessing's Contemporary Archives, 1947, p.8352 A.

\textsuperscript{176} Ibid., 1947, p.8352 A.
aspirations decided on a referendum to be held among the Pashtuns to either join India or the new proposed state of Pakistan. In response to this unjust imperialistic decision Ghaflar Khan in a statement declared that "the Pashtuns were ready to contest the referendum on the issue of Pashtunistan and Pakistan, and not on the issue of Pakistan and India. 177

However, on June 3, 1947, the British authorities formally announced their imperial decision of holding the referendum in the Frontier Province. Badshah Khan regretting the anti-democratic decision, declared on June 3, 1947, that "in these circumstances I am convinced that we cannot associate ourselves with this referendum". Commenting on the imperialistic nature of the decision, on June 28, at Charsada, he said:

"The main object is to make the Pathan free from domination. For this independence of the Pathans we sided with Congress and fought our common enemy jointly. We were then called Hindu agents... Now when we have refused Hindustan, we are forced to fight the referendum issue of Pakistan versus Hindustan". 178

The imperial announcement was an unexpected shock to both Pashtuns and Afghanistan. The Afghan government quickly protested and asked the British for two additional choices: union with Afghanistan or a separate state for the Pashtuns.

177. Rahman Pazhwak, op. cit., p.23.
178. Ibid., p.23.
The Afghan requests were met with a curt refusal, and a subsequent Afghan request was received with silence. The Afghan notes presented to both the British and Indian Governments, urged that the Pashtuns and the inhabitants of Baluchistan should have the right to decide whether their future should lie with Afghanistan or Pakistan or on the basis of their complete independence. The notes added that Afghanistan considered the question as one that should have been decided between the British and the Afghan Government. 179 The Afghan Prime Minister, Hashim Khan, in a public statement in Bombay declared that "Afghanistan was entitled to have a representative at the referendum in the North-west Frontier Province" and expressed his "country's support for a Pathanistan (Pashtunistan) as advocated by Abdul Ghaffar Khan. 180

However, the referendum took place in the Frontier Province from 6th to 17th July 1947, on straight issue of India versus Pakistan. The Khudai Khidmatgars staged a complete boycott and thus denied it a legitimacy. Out of the total electorate only 50.119 per cent voters exercised their franchise. Majority voted for Pakistan. The remaining 49.881 per cent boycotted the referendum. At least half of

179. Kessing's Contemporary Archives, 1947, p.8704,A.
those voting were either Punjabi immigrants or the non-Pashtun inhabitants of the province.\(^181\) That is to say about 25 per cent of the Pashtuns in the referendum-covered areas might have voted for Pakistan. But the referendum was held only in five districts of the province and British Baluchistan which represented roughly less than half of the total population. No referendum was held in the Baluch states and the district of Dera Ghazi Khan which was arbitrarily considered part of Punjab. Further, there was no referendum in the Independent Tribal Territory which constituted about half of the total population.

Calculating on the basis of the above facts, it will be clear that only about half of those entitled to voting could exercise their franchise under the existing conditions. So with about 50 per cent refusing to vote and half of those voting being non-Pashtuns, produces the net figure of 12.5 per cent for Pashtuns to have voted in favour of Pakistan under that highly provocative conditions caused by politically inspired communal disturbances.\(^182\) Thus apart from its imperialistic nature, the validity of the British stage-managed referendum stands challenged in terms of statistical analysis. In addition, the referendum was held in such a conspiratorial way that the religious susceptibility of the Pashtuns were exploited. The holy quran was used and people

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were asked to vote for the holy Quran. On one side of the ballot boxes the holy Quran was placed and on the other the Granth, the Sikh sacred book. Therefore, it was natural for the participating devout Pashtuns and other Muslims to vote for Quran representing Pakistan. In addition to British intrigues, "hurried secrecy" and "public coercion", most of those who voted were affected by the statements of Jinnah as well that "the Pakistan Constituent Assembly can only frame a constitution wherein the Frontier people will be an autonomous unit in which the Frontier people will be their own masters.... The Government of Pakistan would not interfere with the freedom of North-West Frontier". 183

However, in this way, while the apparent result of the so-called referendum was the forceful incorporation of the Pashtun territories into Pakistan, it showed how imperialistic tactics supressed the honest verdict of the people already given at the last year's polls in favour of the popular ministry of Dr. Khan Jahib. The Congress leadership whom the Frontier...supported, failed any voice against "the fraudulent registration and impersonation of voters in addition to many mischievious tricks played by the Muslim League with the blessings and support of the British bureaucracy"; 184 and none bothered to see that the Khans

184. J.C. Jafri, op.cit., p.121.
and their trusted followers were not deserted and "thrown to the wolves" at the time of crisis; none argued that a referendum on the straight issue of India versus Pakistan without a third alternative, an independent state of their own, and confined only to a small section of the population, either negatived their verdict already given at the polls or restricted their real choice. It offered no more than a 'Hobson's Choice' of putting them in a position of either being fried or grilled.

The first official communique issued in Kabul stated that "... In spite of the boycott of a great majority of the Afghans, the forced referendum was enforced and carried out in Afghan Baluchistan and the NWFP. Both were given to Pakistan", hence "our claim stands as it was, and Afghanistan... will not acknowledge the results of the above-mentioned... unjust referendum",185 and, therefore, shall not recognize the Pashtun territories of the Independent Tribal areas, the NWFP and Baluchistan as part of Pakistan.

Thus, the Pashtun territories were finally incorporated in the new state of Pakistan against the will of the majority. The Pashtun leaders including Abdul Ghaftar Khan, Dr. Khan Jahanib, Abdul Samad Khan and other top leaders were all arrested and tried on the false charges of anti-Pakistan activities.186 In fact, arrests, tortures, and

185. Rahman Pashwak, op.cit., p.117.
186. Kessing's Contemporary Archives, 1948, p.9383, D.
suppression of the Pashtuns became a daily affair in the new Islamic state of Pakistan, which had their reverberations in the whole of Pashtunkhwa. The new political conjunctures explain the significance and vital relevance of the Pashtunistan issue as a legacy of British imperialism.

The referendum has been criticised on a number of grounds, most notably because it deflected democratic choice by creating a communal and religious divide. From the standpoint of the present study, the deficiencies of the referendum lie in a rather different direction. In retrospect, the referendum was an important stage in the distinctive political actions which comprise the struggle of the Pashtuns against Imperialism. In spite of the machinations of the imperial power, more than fifty per cent of the Pashtuns observed a boycott, thus providing an explicit recognition of the success of the Red Shirt ideology in building the anti-imperialist consensus in favour of Pashtunistan.

(C) Afghan Political Developments and Foreign Policy

we can understand better the challenging task undertaken by Afghan decision-makers in relation to imperialism, post-imperialism and neo-colonialism if we place our discussion within a general framework of domestic politics and foreign policy. Both internal and external political relationships of Afghanistan were characterised by a continuous tension between the forces of autonomy and the continuities and discontinuities of imperialism and "informal" imperialism.
The essential task of foreign policy of Afghanistan from 1747 onwards has been to cope with the power politics of the classical colonial powers of the era of imperialism or the Super Powers in the post-imperial period. The domestic political system of Afghanistan had to allocate power, resources and values in accordance with the parameters of traditional Afghan political thinking in order to resist the global hegemony of the major powers. Afghan politics reflects the concern for security and self-determination throughout the course of modernisation in the 19th and 20th centuries.

For many years historical research has concentrated on "the periodic alterations between the extremes of anarchy and tyranny with which Afghan politics is replete". Scholars did not care to devote their energy to the investigation of the coherent and self-sustaining policies of Afghan regimes as they tried to cope with the strategies of imperialist expansion. The rationality of the Afghan political expression flows from the maintenance of the nation-state as a coherent political unit in spite of collaborationist elites which were used to fragment the indigenous communities. The legacies of the imperialist era condition the prospects of contemporary Afghanistan in many ways and especially in relation to the unresolved Pashtunistan issue.
Internal Conflict: A Legacy of Imperialism

Afghanistan is in many respects a country adversely affected by Western imperialism. It was dismembered and cut into pieces by imperial powers and its present boundaries were drawn not in order to remain a united, homogeneous stable state, but rather to suit the whims and wishes of its imperial British India. It was rendered a destabilised, weak landlocked heterogenous state by removing nearly half of its majority community - the Pashtuns from the jurisdiction of its central national authority that brought about severe socio-economic, cultural and political dislocations in the country, causing a perpetual political unrest. The result that the Pashtuns, although constituting an absolute majority, could not provide an effective leadership and the kind of political and cultural influence that would have enabled political socialisation with other ethnic groups to overcome the wide cultural and ethnic diversities in the country.

However, imperialistic pressures continued to keep the country in seclusion, isolation and socio-economic and cultural backwardness, resulting in a persistent alienation between the rural areas and urban centres of the country adversely affected by imported western ideas and the domination of Persian culture and language. Persianised rulers,

187. See, Boundaries of Pashtunkhwa, Chapter I.
188. See, Population Table No. I and II.
ministers and bureaucrats held sway in Kabul, while local chieftains, landlords and clergy enjoyed traditional authority in the countryside. Any regime, from monarchy to republican or communist that tried to bring a positive change in this dual set-up with the ultimate power lying with the traditional elite, was bound to end in disaster, unless the cultural alienation gap and public participation crises were not removed.

To understand the problem of Afghanistan well, it will be useful to begin with the first constitutional movement.

I. Afghan Constitutionalism: The Need for Legitimacy

The activism of the constitutionalists during the reign of Amir Habibullah has an important analytical dimension. Some of the individual aspects of the power struggle of the new nationalist elite have been carefully studied by Professor Abdul Hai Habibi and Mir Ghulam Mohammad Ghobar in their monumental works, but other aspects remain virtually un researched. The complicated interplay of numerous factors which is prominent in Afghan political history is already evident at this early stage. The development of

189. See, Islamic Patterns, Chapter V.
190. The authors themselves were active constitutionalists who were members of the West Zalmyan as well. Habibi is a great liberal historian whose last book Mashrootyat dar Afghanistan published in 1948, is entirely devoted to the constitutional movement during 1906-29. Ghobar is a political historian, his book is a general history of Afghanistan.
administration and the rudimentary industrialisation both underwent a process of functional differentiation. On the surface the very real cleavages between different social groups and between town and country were masked by the autocratic rule. But the forces of social change were increasingly institutionalised by administrative practice and offered tactical opportunities in open and secret political activity. We can look at the first Constitutional Movement in more detail and point out some general aspects of political development.

The popular British invasions of Afghanistan and the North West Frontier Province, often produced strong nationalist groups of chieftains and the religious leaders as a result of their heroic participation in the nationalistic struggles against the aliens, posing serious threat to the authority of the unpopular British imposed rulers. When the tyrant Abdur Rahman came to power with the British backing he introduced an extremely despotic monarchy based on a centralised administration and an unrestrained absolute power checked only slightly by the sharia, the Islamic customary laws. This rationale had a crucial importance because the Amir used the powerful weapon of religion to ruthlessly crush all such influential anti-British nationalist elements. Their survivors fled to seek shelter in India.

When his son Amir Habibullah (1901-19) succeeded to throne, he liberalised slightly his father's despotism and offered amnesty. As a measure of appeasement and the need for educated personnel, the Amir absorbed most of the well-educated emigrees into his bureaucracy and the supreme religious council which included fifty top clergy with a ten-member supervisory board headed by a distinguished scholar, Maulavi Abdur Raouf Kandahari, surnamed Khaki.192

However, there was the royal religious school in Kabul, called Shahi Madrasa, headed by Raouf Karidahari, where these liberal clergy taught. They not only taught the children of the royal court but also gathered to exchange views about the future of the country. They found the need to press for some liberalism in the Amir's repressive policies.193 As a result, the group under the leadership of Kandahari emerged as the first reformist group in the country which as a first step they endeavoured to impress on the Amir the need of setting up a school of modern education

192. Notables among them who had all the rank of chief quazils (judges) were: Maulavi Abdur Raouf Kandahari (Khaki), Maulavi Gul Ahmad Ahmadzai, Maulavi Ahmad Jan Tukhi, Mullah Lala Gul Arghaniwal and Said Ghulam Mohammad Char Baghi. See, A. Habibi Constitutional Movement (in Persian), (Kabul, 1984), p.24.

193. Raouf Kandahari, the royal Priest, whose father, a famous holy man, was executed by Amir Abdur Rahman, had decided political ideas besides being a spiritual leader of the group. Habibi, p.6.
The Amir, in view of the westernised requirements of his luxurious Court, most willingly accepted their idea and the first modern school of Habibya, named after him, was started in 1903 in Kabul. The liberal clergy taught the arts subjects and some Indians were employed for teaching the science subjects.

Encouraged by this initial success the group suggested to the Amir another revolutionary step of starting a two-week periodical publication which was also accepted by Amir after some consideration. A literary society headed by Kandahari was set up which brought out the first Saraj-ul-Akhbar of Afghanistan on January 11, 1906, in 36 fullscape pages printed lithographically, under the chief editorship of Kandahari and sub-editorship of the young Maulavi Sarwar Wasif Alakozai. But the publication, emphatically hinting at the cause of modernisation, education and the independence of the country and the cause of Frontier Afghans (the Pashtuns under the British) was so warmly received by the small circle of the intelligentsia of Kabul.

The group thought that as the most top clergy, they would be in a good position to impress upon the unwilling Amir the need for some degree of democratization, freedom of expression and the cause of modern education in view of the growing needs of his bureaucracy for skilled services and educated personnel. Canfield, op.cit., p.63.

According to Dr. Abdul Ghani 400 students were chosen for the Habibia School out of 5000 children of school age, Abdul Ghani, A Review of the Political Situation in Central Asia (Lahore, 1921), p.73.

Habibi, op.cit., p.6.

that alarmed the Amir to order its immediate ban and the
dissolution of its literary society, although according to the
proclaimed reason, it was banned due to censure from the
British Government. 198

The indiscriminate banning of the first Saraj-ul-Akhbar sparked the first underground constitutional movement that affected future political upsurges among the intelligentsia and political elites of the country leading to the emergence of various political groupings. The movement was founded by the dynamic Maulavi Wasif Alakozai, the sub-editor of the first Saraj-ul-Akhbar who was a member of the royal religious council and a leading teacher in the Shahi Madrasa and the newly established Habibya College. Wasif founded a secret political organisation called Pata Maraka 199 (Secret Council) consisting of about 300 intellectuals, mainly the teachers of Habibya and Shahi Madrasa and the royal religious council. It comprised numerous cells or assemblies of ten-members, secretly active within the intelligentsia, the bureaucracy and the royal court, each having a President and a Secretary. The members of the various cells did not know

198. Baba Abdul Aziz, a subscriber and later a Constitutionalist is quoted by Habibi as saying "the Publication advanced the interest of the Amir's modernising monarchy which had sanctioned its running, but as it appeared anti-British, the British pressed the Amir to ban it. Habibi, Ibid., p.8.

each other and only their Presidents were known to each other who periodically gathered at the Habibya School to discuss their progress and future plans under the guidance of their leader Wasif Alakozai. 200

The constitutionalists, known as "Akhwan Afghan", Afghan brothers 201 worked for the cause of a constitutional monarchy, spread of education, modernisation and the political independence of the country and of the Pashtuns under the British. Their influence rapidly grew in momentum and affected the small urban nationalist intelligentsia, the liberals of the Amir's court, specially the ghulam bachas, the slave boys dominated by Mohd. Wali, the top ghulam bacha. 202

Inspired by the janissary system of the Ottomans, Amir Abdurrahman had introduced the system of ghulam bachas in Afghanistan in order to create a group of civil and military officials "loyal to his dynasty and the state rather than to the tribes and regions. According to Professor Kakar, "they were recruited not only from the slaves in Chitral, Badakhshan, and Kafiristan (now Nuristan), but also from

201. For detail, see, Habibi, op.cit., Chapters III and IV, pp.12-48.
202. This group, which was a religious-minded reformist group, should not be confused with the Zwan Afghan, the Young Afghans, who emerged subsequently as a radical offshoot of this group, led by Amir Amanullah Khan. See, for Afghan, Habibi, Ibid., p.23.
among the sons of senior officials and some influential Muslims, mainly non-Pashtun families". They were trained in public affairs and the jihad and, after acquiring some practical training in the court, they were given high civil and military posts.

Thus, the ghulam bachas were the first fertile group to take an active interest in the constitutional movement. It was so more because of their close links with the Maulavi Kandahari and Maulavi Wasif Alakazi who were their teachers at the Shahi Madrasa and the Habibya schools. With the active participation of the ghulam bachas who constituted a major element in the bureaucratic structure, the first constitutional movement grew in momentum, and "covered a wide circle of the intelligentsia, the ghulam bacha group, the bureaucrats with aristocratic background, as well as the Durani Sardars, businessmen, artisans, writers and poets and the teachers and students of the Habibya school, including some Indian teachers, besides the founding members".

The constitutionalists were in accord with the Amir concerning the introduction of "new culture", which actually meant the spread of education. But on the question of the monarch's unlimited power and independence of the country


205. Ibid., p.26, and Abdul Ghani, op.cit., pp.74-75.
and the eastern brethrens, the group and the Amir were in opposite camps. However, when the Amir did not respond to a popular pressure from the constitutionalists and renewed his treaty with the British on March 21, 1905, keeping Afghanistan, as before, in a subservient position, the group passed a resolution asking Amir to introduce a constitutional monarchy "putting an end to the anti-Islamic rule, and allowing the people to prosper under a government and a constitution established by law". The meeting also called upon its members to arm themselves to meet any eventuality and sent the resolution to Amir through some ghulam bachas. The Amir received the resolution with some concern but as "two members of the group, betraying the cause, informed the Amir of the arming of the group, and provided him a list of the members, Amir got provoked and immediately ordered the execution of the four ghulam bachas present there. He similarly ordered the execution of the top leaders, Wasif Alakozai, his brother Sadullah, and cousin Abdul Qayume; and the imprisonment of some sixty important leaders, including Wasif's old uncle Abdur Rahman Alakozai, who died in the prison.

206. Hasan Kakar, ibid.


208. Abdul Ghani, op.cit., p.75 and Habibi, op.cit., p.22.
The suppression of the constitutionalists "did not create public stir as the movement by its very nature was not publicized and the Amir set a precedent by punishing only those directly involved in the movement and not their relations "as was previously the practice".\textsuperscript{209} The centre of the activities of the remaining constitutionalists was shifted to the safer Royal Court, the \textit{darbar}, itself, where the \textit{ghulam bachas}, the great Mahmood Tarzi, the father of Afghan journalism, and the very near relatives of the Amir, provided a fertile ground for their activities. Mahmood Tarzi, an ardent follower of Said Jamal-u-\textit{ddin} Afghani who had come home from exile in Turkey, was entrusted by Amir with running the banned \textit{Saraj-ul-Akhbar} of Afghanistan. Tarzi also developed matrimonial alliances by marrying his daughters to the elder Prince Inayatullah, the younger Prince Amanullah and some other influential personalities in the Royal Court.\textsuperscript{210}

Thus with such an effective alliance with the Court, Tarzi managed to make \textit{Saraj-ul-Akhbar} as the mouth-piece of Afghan nationalism, ardently advocating the cause of a rapid modernization and external independence of the country and the emancipation of the eastern Afghans from the British colonialism. The influential Tarzi cared little for Amir's opposition in view of his own royal origin and the matrimonial

\textsuperscript{209} Hasan Kakar, \textit{op.cit.}, p.27.

\textsuperscript{210} Abdul Ghani, \textit{op.cit.}, p.81.
alliances. He fired the imagination of the young constitutionalists with his extremist views in the Saraj-ul-Akhbar but at the same time his aggressive criticism of traditional system of values alienated the traditional elite and the clergy. It also produced a rift among the constitutionalists, dividing them into two factions: the radical reformists and the traditional reformists.

The radical reformists included the Persian-speaking westernized ghulam bachas, the members of the Tarzi and royal families, their relatives and the Mohammadzai aristocrats (returnees from an exile in India), all of whom rallied behind the young Prince Amanullah. The traditionalist known as the anti-British war party, included the religious-minded Pashto-speaking traditionalists, the liberal clergy, the followers of Kandahari and Wasif, the founding constitutionalists and some traditional bureaucrats and intellectuals coming from the countryside who collectively rallied behind the Amir's brother Nasrullah, the regent of the Kingdom. But the common goals of ending the tyranny of the Amir, and achieving the independence of Afghanistan and the eastern Afghans, compelled a working coalition the two groups to work together against the Amir. As such, when their efforts to change the

211. Ibid., p. 81.

212. Revealed in an interview in 1977 by Nasrullah Khan Wardaki, a constitutionalist, serving as manzoor-nazar-bashi, personal attendant of the Amir.
Amir failed, they resorted to an extremist method of ending the Amir's life.213

The first attempt at Amir's life was made by abdur Rahman Lodi in 1918 which led to his arrest and that of many other constitutionalists. The fear of the execution of the imprisoned constitutionalists hurried the radicals to arrange for the assassination of the Amir in winter of 1919 at his hunting camp in Laghman.214

With the pre-planned assassination of the Amir, the young Prince Amanullah quickly strengthened his position in Kabul by taking a bold stand on the country's external independence. He enhanced his options as a result of the third Anglo-Afghan War (1919). His popular reign began with a marked cooperation between constitutionalists, the intelligentsia, the liberal clergy, the traditional elite and the King. Amir Amanullah released all the political prisoners, introduced necessary changes, opened diplomatic missions abroad. New administrative units, schools and other educational institutions were established.215 Pashto was declared national language of the country and a society called Pashto Maraka (council) was set up for its literary development and popularization.

213. Hasan Kakar, op. cit., p.28

214. According to Nasrullah Khan and some other evidences cited by Habibi, Farash-bashi, Shuja-ul-dawla, a ghulam.bacha and the Musahiban brothers were assigned with this job, See, Habibi, op. cit., pp 52 and 142.

Newspapers and periodicals were brought up and the first large cabinet was formed, although political parties were not allowed to function officially. ²¹⁶

However, his operational freedom lasted only in the first phase of political reforms which were warmly welcomed by the people. Instead of consolidating the gains through confidence building measures, Amanullah was misled by his non-Pashtun Persianised and Westernised colleagues (including mainly the culturally alienated ghulam bachas) and disgruntled opportunists to exceed prudent limits in his drive for modernisation. This not only alienated the masses but also the intelligent and pragmatic constitutionalists such as Abdur Rahman Lodin Dawi, Mahaiuddin Afghan, Mir Qasim and others, and finally resulted in a national catastrophe. ²¹⁷

Three different groups emerged as a result of Amanullah's extremest reforms: (1) the pragmatic traditionalists rallying behind Mahaidin Afghan, Dawi and Mir Qasim who advocated gradual reforms through religious policies relying on traditions; (2) radicals like Abdur Rahman Lodin, Ghubar and others who placed emphasis on strict pragmatism and constitutionalism in the reforms to check abuse of political power, corruption and irresponsible behaviour of bureaucrats. This group pressed for a constitutional monarchy with a representative government responsible


²¹⁷. For detail, see, Habibi, op.cit., "The Members of Second Constitutional Movement".
to Parliament; and (3) the extremist Persianised and Westernized ghulam bachas and urban opportunists who rallied behind Amanullah, using him for their various ends. This political fragmentation among the constitutionalists, the Young Afghans was the real cause of the failure of Amanullah's reforms.

Thus, "the political framework created by Amanullah was so weak" that when the rebellion broke out in the countryside in 1929, "the political structure could not withstand it and it crumbled with remarkable speed" and the constitutionalists were unable to save it.

Constitutional Development: Ambiguities and Domestic Constraints (1923-53)

The transition from Amanullah to Nadir Shah throws light on the regulative principles for political life in Afghanistan. Both were problem-solvers and committed to national unification. A replacement of traditional channels often led to a political stalemate. The Pashtun tribes mustered opposition to coercive transactions but often responded generously to cooperative initiatives. The progress towards a stable and peaceful Afghan society came up against ambiguities and domestic constraints.


The problem here is to understand the meaning of national loyalty in different sets of circumstances and to relate it to what were regarded as just or unjust institutions. Obligations of justice in Pashtun society are more demanding, and in spite of geographical diversification, there is more or less a common conceptional representation of democratic demands in the whole country. In assessing the complex patterns of political interactions during Amanullah's period, the importance of the time factor must be emphasised. His modernisation efforts took place at a speed which was unprecedented for Afghanistan, and the social and political institutions could not be equally rapidly built up.

**Amanullah's Constitutional Reforms**

Amanullah's constitutional reforms included a constitution brought up in 1923 which originally published in Pashto had provision for a liberalised (absolute) hereditary monarchy with an "appointive council of state (cabinet) and several partly elective consulative bodies". The constitution brought into power Kabul's Persianised and westernised secularist urban elite, replacing the rural traditional elites that led to a general feeling of dismay and discontent coinciding with Mangal revolt. Thus, Amanullah was forced to call a Loya Jirga in 1924 to bring some minor amendments

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in the 73-Article Constitution, increasing the discretionary power of the clergy in judicial decision-making. However, the 1923 Constitution was a real breakthrough at that time. Its major drawback was that it did not have provision for a responsible representative government to check corruption and irregularities. It failed to tackle the participation and alienation crisis and paved the ground for the increasing unpopularity of the regime, British plottings and Amanullah's failures. To aggravate the situation further, Amanullah after his extended trip to Europe called another Loya Jirga of about a thousand members in August of 1928 and proposed a series of extremist reforms that included mainly a constitutional monarchy with a nominated Upper House, an elective Lower House of 150 members, abolition of the traditional Loya Jirga system, creation of a western type of secular government based on "separation of church and state, emancipation of women, enforced monogamy and compulsory education for all Afghans".

However, Loya Jirga rejected most of the proposals but Amanullah was so strongly persistent in his drive for modernisation reforms that he dismissed the Loya Jirga and two months later held a smaller Jirga of a hundred trusted men including loyal government officials, his ghulam bacha supporters and other Kabul Persianised and westernised

221. Ibid., p.463.
zealots. He got his proposals approved by this artificial and illegal Jirga and "dramatically removed the veil from his wife to symbolize the voluntary abolition of Purdeh and announced himself a revolutionary King". Even at this loyal Jirga his own well-known supporters such as Lodin, Dawi, Mir Qasim, Arti and other constitutionalists did not agree with his reforms. They maintained that such reforms if desirable should be brought about through a responsible representative government chosen by the people. But Amanullah not only ignored such constructive proposals but also asked the critics to resign their posts which they did quite willingly, leaving the whole regime in the hands of opportunist colleagues.

The ultimate result was the British-inspired rebellion and the 9-month (January to October 1924) rule of the bandits headed by Habibullah, a British-trained outlaw known as Bacha-i-Saqaw, who looted and destroyed everything in the country. It was this pitiful situation that compelled the great patriot, General Nadir, to hurry and save his country from political, moral and intellectual capitulationism.

Constitutional Movement Under Nadir's Dynasty

Nadir was a great dynamic personality who had defeated the British forces in the third Afghan War. He was removed as minister of defence and was appointed as ambassador to

222. Ibid., p.463.

Paris for his disagreement with Amanullah's drastic reforms. He had resigned his post and was living in self-imposed exile at Riviera as a sign of protest to Amanullah's premature modernisation programmes. He anticipated that Amanullah's regime would collapse one day and the British imperialists would be compelled to allow him to return and control the situation as they had done in the case of Amir Abdur Rahman.

Nadir was a man of great wisdom, ability and deeds but unfortunately his image has been eclipsed by that of Amanullah, who had skillfully built himself in the imagination of the depressed colonialised peoples of the Asia as a challenger of British global imperialism. Thus the struggling Asian people all looked forward to Nadir to save Afghan Kingdom and then return it to Amanullah. Nadir's tactical dualism of first declaring his aim to save Amanullah's throne and then subsequently occupying it himself greatly undermined his national and international image and drew the hostility of Afghan intellectuals towards him and his dynasty. For, the cult of Amanullah's idealised

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224. Because of such an expectation on his way to Afghanistan, Nadir was given in India a substantial purse, collected from the Indian people for Amanullah's cause. When he assumed the throne, the same people who had collected the sums, had carried a vast propaganda against him as a traitor and a British agent. The fund raisers also included a great number of Amanullah's followers. See, Kaka, op.cit., Last Chapter.
heroism continued to cast a deep and lasting shadow on the future perceptions of social, cultural and ideological profile of Nadir's legacy of realism.

However, after the rebellion was tactfully quelled and the bandit Amir was eliminated by Nadir with the help of Frontier tribes, Nadir summoned a Loya Jirga of 286 notables in September of 1930 which declared him the King of Afghanistan in response to his November 1929 declaration that he would renounce Amanullah's reforms.225 But in reality he continued Amanullah's reforms in a very gradual and cautious manner. To institutionalise his modernisation schemes he convened another Loya Jirga in 1931 to draft and approve a constitution for the country which provided for an appointive Upper House and elective Lower House. The Parliament whose inner logic was to shore up the regime's vulnerability in a pro-Amanullah intellectual environment, had an advisory role to provide sanctions and the necessary legitimacy to what was still regarded as the "usurper" Nadir Dynasty. The real power remained with the centralised administration that was headed by Nadir and his brothers and the periodically held Loya Jirga. Thus the 1931 constitution established an absolute monarchical rule of the Nadir that lasted till the overthrow of Nadir's son Zahir Shah in 1973.226 It was intended to play a role in influencing


226. For detail on 1931 Constitution see, Ibid., pp.461-69.
political processes and policy rather than to provide a new political culture.

Nadir was an embodiment of traditional wisdom, talent and great diplomatic skill. He rallied behind himself the actual elements of power, the traditional elites and pragmatic urban reformists for his modernization plans. He spoke Pashto and freely interacted with the people in the traditional Pashtunwali manner and encouraged the development and popularisation of the national language and provided a symbiosis of Islam, national culture, folk-traditions and secure elite mass relations that ensured his great political success. As a pragmatic ruler he normalised his relations with the two neighbouring imperial powers in order to stabilise his regime and modernization programmes. He expelled a famous basmachi leader, Irahim Beg Uzbek who carried a guerrilla war against the Soviets and which had caused Soviet incursions into Afghan territory. He also signed a Treaty of neutrality and Non-Aggression with Soviet Russia in June of 1931. He similarly assumed a friendly posture towards the British and accepted two grants totalling £75,000 and a present of 10,000 rifles and 5 million cartridges that were used for the modernisation of the army, road construction, education and other developmental

227. Ibid., p.463.
programmes. However, the completion of Nadir's modernisation schemes were hampered by his untimely assassination in 1933. 228

The Constitutionalists and the Nadir's Dynasty

In early 1930s the banner of constitutionalism was taken up by the "young Afghans" including mainly those pro-Amanullah's Young intellectuals who were students during Amanullah's time. In opposing the new regime, the urban westernised and Persianised "Young Afghans", still espoused the discredited "causes of Amanullah's reign" and synchronised their actions to undermine the national consensus.

However, Nadir's accepting of British assistance, coinciding with his moderate policy towards the anti-British national struggle of the "eastern Afghans" gave a good excuse to the "Young Afghans" to accuse Nadir following a policy in line with British interests and compromising with the Pashtun cause. This and Nadir's vigorous attempt to either win them over or suppress them resulted in an increase of their anti-government activities that led to a series of political assassinations, Nadir executed Abdur Rahman Lodin, Ghulam Nabi Charkhi, and some other leading...

228. According to contemporary writers, Nadir was possessed of "great intelligence, vision and farsightedness" who did not only bring peace and progress to his war-term country in short span of time but also established a capable modernising an administrative machinery to handle pragmatic reforms. It is argued that had he been not untimely assassinated he would have certainly taken his country much ahead solving its strategic problems tactfully.
supporters of Amanullah who fomented trouble in the
country and in retaliation the Young Afghans struck by
killing Abdul Aziz, Afghan ambassador in Berlin, Nadir's
brother and Lāud's father in June of 1933. In September
of that year they attacked British mission in Kabul, killing
a secretary and wounding two others. 229

Nadir was warned of the danger of further intensifica-
tion of these terrorist acts but he never cared to cancel
his public engagements and "still courted students in
public", and so, on November 7, 1933, he was shot dead by a
student of Nijat School, Abdul Khaliq, an adopted son of
Ghulam Nabi, at a prize distribution ceremony while he was
personally distributing the prizes. 230 Thus ended the short
reign of a great and able King. His 14-year old son, Zahir
(born in 1919) was placed on throne and real power was
exercised by his brothers: Mohammad Hashim, Prime Minister
Shah Mahmood Minister of Defence and Shah Wali (ambassador
and later Minister of Defence).

The terrorist activities of the "Young Afghans" did
not further their cause of constitutionalism but rather
weakened it as in the wake of Nadir's assassination, his
brothers, not only adopted repressive measures but also
changed Nadir's progressive policies for more conservative

229. For detail, see, Hasan Kakar, op.cit.,
pp.29-31.

230. Ibid., p.31.
ones that allowed little scope for positive change. As a result, in the 20-year long avuncular period (1933-53) nothing much substantial was achieved until the coming of Daud into power. 231

However, the renewed emphasis on traditionalism in public affairs and the moderate stand towards the Pashtun cause merely reflected anxiety over the regime's inability to make autonomous decisions. The Mosahiban dynasty was very much committed to modernisation and the Pashtun cause but the confrontation between the Mosahiban regime and the Young Afghans did not serve the national interests and thus in the long-run proved ruinous. For, the monarchy became suspicious of the Young Afghans and other patriotic elements and did not trust influential and capable individuals with important public responsibilities nor they allowed the Parliament to handle the affairs of the state in a democratic and representative manner to end the existing alienation gap and political fragmentation. This resulted in further domination of the country's affairs by the parasitic Persianised urban elites of Kabul who could not manipulate political threat to the regime. The "young Afghans" and other patriotic and nationalist forces on their part continued to sabotage and destroy the public image of the ruling dynasty by various means that gradually isolated and alienated the ruling dynasty. The situation led the

231. For detail see, Louis Dupree, op.cit., The avuncular period, pp.477-95.
frustrated nationalist intelligentsia to turn radical, becoming highly critical of the role of traditional institutions including the religion on which, they thought, rested the political structure of the ruling dynasty. The result was the subsequent acute political fragmentation and a multiple internal conflicts. What could really save the country was a widening national consensus between the divergent political forces. The marginalisation of the masses could not be avoided in the absence of a mature political culture and a nationalistic educational system.

These fallacies were compounded by the extreme views of the privileged classes while the intelligentsia ignored the limitations posed by external and internal factors, the regime ignored grass-roots pressures and gave undue importance to external forces as a decisive factor in the affairs of the country. Zahir Shah during the constitutional period, ignored the continued internal unrest and protest saying that it is external relations that matter.232 Thus Nadir's brother scrupulously refrained from providing an active support to the Pashtuns resisting the British rule until the last moment of their withdrawal from the subcontinent. They similarly obliged the Soviet Russia by curbing the Basmachi anti-Soviet activities in north of the country. To offset the influence of Russia and Britain and to check the activities

of the Young Afghans, the regime developed close ties with Germany and friendly relations with Iran, Turkey and the Arab countries. The core issues of national policy often escaped attention in the anxiety to maintain status quo.

The ambiguity inherent in this approach was apparent while heavy emphasis was given to the legal-constitutional position of the Monarchy, the integral character of the various political sub-systems was ignored. The stagnation in developmental activities and the misuse of bureaucratic power created an ever-present antagonism among political and ethnic groups.

Weesh Zalmyan Movement: An Alliance of Nationalist Forces 1949-52

With the British decision to withdraw from India the regime allowed some freedom and free election to Parliament, thinking that the disaffected pro-Amanullah nationalist forces might have been eliminated and a degree of Parliamentary freedom would enhance the prestige and influence of the monarchy on the world scene and in the face of the emergence of the new states of India and Pakistan. The pro-Amanullah "Young Afghan" nationalist forces had yielded place to a new nationalist intelligentsia that was more pragmatic matured and politically united, committed to constitutional monarchy, modernisation and the Pashtunistan cause. The Shah Mahmud Government allowed some liberal figures to be elected to Parliament in 1949. Although powerless, they were able to use the legislature as a tribune, and a press with substantial freedom was permitted to
flourish. The movement was known as the Weesh Zalmyan or Awakened Youth movement and had grown to strength since 1947. Between 1949 and 1952, as many as 50 of the 120 members of the Lower House were in one way or the other sympathetic to this radical movement. These deputies began to ask questions about government corruption and legislated the freedom of the press.

Several ministers refused to reply to inquiries and stated that although the National Parliament had the right to question the national budget as prepared by the Minister of Finance (Article 43 of the 1931 Constitution), it had no jurisdiction over the budgets of individual ministers, using Article 55 and 61 to justify their positions. These two articles taken together allowed a minister to ignore any parliamentary rejection of a bill he had introduced. However, Section IX (Articles 73-83) elaborating the "Duties and Rights of Ministers", gave Cabinet ministers almost unlimited powers, and exempted the King from any responsibility for ministerial actions while Article 76 theoretically made ministers "responsible to the National Assembly for the policy of the Government in general and of the Ministry under their charge in particular, leading to further confusion". 

234. Ibid., p.495.
As a result of legislation passed by Parliament, several newspapers were brought up in opposition to the government. Among these were Watan (Homeland), Angar (Burning Embers) and Nida-yi-Khalq (Voice of the People). Watan, a biweekly published in Persian, was edited by Mir Ghulam Mohammad Ghubar and assisted by Abdul Hai Aziz (later minister of Planning in the 1960s). Angar, a Persian and Pashto biweekly, was published by Faiz Mohammad Angar, a noted Kandahari "Pashtunistan" advocate. Nida-yi-Khalq, a biweekly Persian publication, generally supported the government's foreign policies but demanded genuine neutrality and increased freedom of the press, and approved the necessity of the monarchy at that time. "The papers had circulations of approximately 1,500 each". 235

The editors and their staff demanded that "elections be genuinely free, that the government be responsible to parliament". "Letters to the Editor" were a very popular measure even though "letter writers sometimes were arrested for violent anti-government criticisms".

Kabul University students also got impetus from Parliament and formed a student union. They "debated everything from communism and atheism to the role of

religion in a Muslim state". Several European and American teachers in Kabul's High Schools encouraged these discussions and some actually participated. 236

The Afghan Government at first ignored the student opposition movement. Later, in 1951 when it realised that "the rising strength of the vocal opposition might become menace to the status quo", the government ordered the dissolution of the student union and in 1952 closed down all non-government newspapers and arrested 25 leaders of the Weesh Zalmyan and imprisoned them. Louis Dupree gives the reasons for the failure of the Liberal Parliament as follows:

"Opposition was directed against an established independent regime, not against a colonial oppressor. (The movement was largely confined to educated Kabulis - civil servants and students). The massive illiteracy prevented the "liberal" press from having an impact outside its own circles; personal attacks on the royal family and religious leaders antagonized many fence sitters. The government refused to believe that the "liberals" merely wanted to liberalize the existing government, and looked on all opposition as preparation for overthrow". 237

236. Louis Dupree, op.cit., p.496.

II. **Daud's Decade**

(1) **Socio-Economic and Cultural Reforms**

If Amanullah's reforms (1914-29) showed the dangers of too rapid a modernisation the avancular period (1933-53) reflected the risks of too slow a pace as was clearly revealed by the *Weesh Zalmyan* national movement (1949-52).\(^{238}\)

Open violent criticism of the regime in the National Assembly and free press indicated that the government would now have to undertake a series of socio-economic and cultural reforms if the monarchy desired its survival in the wake of the withdrawal of the countervailing forces of British imperialism from the region encouraging Afghan nationalist forces to align and assert themselves. The younger nationalist elements of the royal family headed by Daud shared these anxieties, and so they pressed on the older conservative members the need for a positive change in the royal autocratic leadership. Unable to persuade the older nobles, Daud, his brother Naim and their allied cousin, the young King Zahir Shah whose sisters were betrothed to them, clandestinely encouraged the *Weesh Zalmyan* specially its Kandahari elites\(^{239}\) who formed the vanguard of the movement, to assume a vocal posture against Shah Mahmood government in

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order to convince the royal family that the educated elite no longer accepted the unrestricted leadership of the monarchy over the slow process of modernisation.

Thus, the Weesh Zalmayan movement and the younger nationalist minded elements in the royal family and military helped the patriotic Daud to come into power as Prime Minister more as a result of a bloodless palace coup than a normal succession. Although free political expression was not allowed and most of the opposition leaders were not released as hopefully as expected, yet in fact, "much of the opposition was accepted under Daud's vigorous modernising leadership". He attacked five major failures of his predecessor, namely, the softness towards Pashtunistan issue; the sluggishness of the American-aided Hilmand Valley Project; the slow pace of the socio-economic and cultural reforms; the military weakness and the pro-western posture of the foreign policy in spite of Afghanistan's traditional neutrality. So, Daud moved ahead steady and cautiously in all these major areas.

Economic Planning under comprehensive five-year plans were undertaken, numerous development projects began, education, transportation, communication, trade and commerce were expanded and most significantly, the army was thoroughly modernised with the Soviet help to safe-


guard both his modernisation programmes and the national security which for the first time was seriously threatened by the new Islamic State of Pakistan.\textsuperscript{242}

Ambitious Daud bravely faced the serious internal and external challenges and did not believe in the out-dated divide-and-rule policy of the conservative members of the royal family.

The most serious internal threat which the ruling oligarchy faced was the lack of legitimacy of the ruling family which had alienated itself from the people by its autocratic power and adoption of Persian language and a secular Persianised and westernised culture.\textsuperscript{243} As such due to a lack of trust, the Persianised oligarchs could not afford to allow the potential Pashtun traditional leaders to share power with them and, therefore, for their expanding bureaucratic needs they relied on non-Pashtun Persianised ethnic minorities and kept the Pashtun traditional elites at bay. The advent of Islamic Pakistan, and the emergence of

\textsuperscript{242.} The seriousness of the national security was drastically felt when Pakistan bombed the Kghulgal village in 1949 as measure of pressuring Kabul to give up its support for the Pashtunistan movement, when Afghan government retaliated merely by a verbal protest. Hasan Kakar, "The Fall of Afghan Monarchy in 1973", \textit{International Journal of Middle East Studies}, vol.9, May 1978, no.2, p.211.

\textsuperscript{243.} Hasan Kakar, op.cit., p.198 and Jalalabadi, \textit{Afghan Milat}, April 19, 1976.
Pashtunistan movement and the encouragement of the Pashtun nationalism rendered such anti-national policies of the royal oligarchy dangerous. Pakistan as an effective tool of western imperialism could now use both the Pashtun and Islamic cards against the Afghan conservative Persianised oligarchy. 244

So, Deud accepted this challenge by advocating the Pashtunistan issue vigorously and allowing Pashtuns greater opportunities. He gave greater share to the deprived Pashtuns in the administration, started economic projects and more schools in the Pashtun rural areas and directed some high schools in Kabul such as the Harbi Showanzay, the Khushal Khan, Rahman Baba, Ibni-sena, and the AIT technical School, to enroll students mainly from the rural countryside and started a gradual official use of the national language of Pashto in the mass media and bureaucracy. Official transactions of the Department of Tribal affairs which looked after the Pashtunistan problem was entirely converted into Pashto and his secretariat and some provinces such as

244. Pakistan was not only using Islam against the secularist Kabul Persianized oligarchy but also the Pashtun card, reminding the Pashtuns that their Persianised oligarchs suffered the inferiority and inability to speak Pashto. It was due to this fact that Pakistani leaders often advocated a referendum amongst the Pashtuns of Afghanistan whether they wanted to remain with the Persianised Kabul regime or wished to join the Muslim state of Pakistan, see, President Ayub's various statements.
Paktya, Nangrahar, Kandahar and Grishk (now Helmand Province) started using Pashto in official business.

However, this process was reversed under the King during the constitutional period. Before Daud, education and other facilities were mainly confined to Kabul and few other non-Pashtun urban centres of the country. Thus, Daud believed in a Pashtun cultural unity and development as an effective means of ensuring the country's national security and worked diligently and creatively for the solution of the Pashtunistan issue, while the King and the older members of the royal family and the educated westernised elite favoured a Persianised Afghan identity as best means of survival of the monarchy and the land-locked Afghan heterogeneous state. In other words, Daud challenged the legacies of informal imperialism operative through Pakistan and Iran.

The other serious challenge was the extreme socio-economic backwardness of the country which Daud sought to remove through a process of integrated 5-year socio-economic planning. Afghanistan was a large country in proportion to its small population having a great potential for economic development. The shortage of technical know-how, capital, and the absence of planning and organization were the main

245. See on Education Disparities, Education Tables.

246. Revealed to me by President Daud in an interview during 1977.
difficulties to be overcome. Only a small portion of the country's cultivable land was brought under cultivation and that also by primitive methods. Afghanistan had abundant soil and water resources and the major problem was to "mate soil and water to fertility". Thus, it was imperative for Daud to secure foreign assistance to tackle this problem. He sought more American aid to remove the sluggishness of the Helmand Valley Project that had swallowed large sums of Afghan money, and to seek Soviet loans for new agricultural schemes. Great projects such as the Nangrahar Canal and Shazni's Jarda hydro-electric projects were started with Soviet aid. Daud made a good use of Afghanistan's strategic location to secure the keen interest of the super powers in the country's socio-economic developmental projects. According to Dupree, Daud brought the super powers to fight their "cold war" in Afghanistan for the economic benefit of Afghanistan.

Another major achievement of Daud was the voluntary removal of the customary veiling of women in 1959 that, unlike Amanullah's reforms causing the 1929 rebellion, resulted in a little public unrest in Kandahar quickly


249. For detail, see, Ibid., "The Economic Korea Develops", pp.514-22.
checked by Daud's efficient bureaucracy and modern army. This was not a little achievement in the face of internal disruptionist forces antagonised by Daud's policies and external intrigue from the West, Iran and Pakistan. Another major breakthrough was the crushing of the base of feudalism, tribalism and conservatism, and reducing the unlimited power of the top feudals, khans, tribal chiefs and influential clergy.

However, Daud's developmental schemes were seriously affected by his active support to the Pashtunistan movement as Pakistan, as a measure of retaliation, thrice closed its borders for the transit trade of the land-locked Afghanistan, and the equipments and materials meant for Afghan projects got blocked and destroyed in Pakistan. The Afghan government pressed that the aiding powers should supply such goods through Soviet Union or Iran, but the West on various excuses refused to avail of these routes. Thus, Pakistan's economic blockades of 1950, 1955 and the last prolonged one of 1960-63, resulted in Afghanistan's heavy dependency on Soviet Union for trade and economic assistance. External pressures and internal reactions intensified by the economic crisis destabilised Daud's political position. His stepping down from power could only be understood against a background of Afghanistan's socio-political structural problems referred to earlier.
Legitimation of the Pashtunistan Issue

After the transfer of power by Britain in 1947, the external threat from Pakistan as the aspiring dominant power, and the sharpening of conflict of interests have led the Pashtuns to search for deeper and more distant historical roots to promote their unity. The principal contradictions and trends of development of Pakistani neo-colonialism have channelised the different national liberation movements among the Pashtun clans into joint initiatives to achieve a comprehensive political settlement of the future of Pashtunistan. The political initiative has been a powerful catalyst in the process of providing legitimating connections to the historical process of ideological development extending back to classical antiquity of Pashtunkhwa. The Pashtun public opinion has been singularly unimpressed by the theocentric formulations of Pakistani ideology. The Pashtuns have understandably rejected the notions of ethnic and cultural superiority presented through a religious garb by Pakistanis, which the Pashtuns have come to regard as a challenge to their traditional weltanschuaang. Pakistan's Islamic constitutional model has proved to have limited explanatory potential to a people who have throughout their history rejected the imperialist argument.

However, the foxy incorporation of the Pashtun and Baluch territory in the new successor state of Pakistan leading to ruthless suppression of the Khudai
Khidmatgars national liberation movement, resulted in the emergence of the Pashtunistan issue. The rulers of the Muslim state of Pakistan, inheriting imperial resources and traditions, continued to brutally crush Pashtun nationalist forces in a much more systematic repressive manner with the help of the additional options and capabilities provided by the legitimacy of Islam. New repressive rules and regulations sanctified Islamic legitimacy were added to the imperial provisions to deal with the Pashtun nationalist resistance effectively.\(^\text{250}\)

Initially, when Pakistan was consolidating itself under the direct supervision of British administrators, Pakistan demonstrated a reconciling attitude, expressing willingness for negotiation, while keeping the entire Khudai Khidmatgars leadership behind the bars. Islamic brotherhood, equality and justice were preached and repeated assurances given that Pashtuns would be given autonomy in the Islamic state of Pakistan in accordance with Jinnah's avowed statement. Kashmir's jihad was launched and Pashtun tribes were invited in the name of Islam with a promise of eventual restoration of Pashtun autonomy.\(^\text{251}\) But as soon

\(^\text{250}\). See, M. Omer Hewadyar, \textit{op.cit.}, Chapter III.

\(^\text{251}\). Ahmad Ali Kohzad, \textit{Frontier Discord Between Afghanistan and Pakistan} (Kabul, 1950).
as Pakistan's Kashmir jihad was over, resulting in consolidation of Pakistan, Pakistani rulers changed their attitude. They refused to honour their Islamic commitments to respect Pashtun autonomist demands. As soon as assurances of assistance and political backing from the West and U.S. were secured, Pakistan launched a wave of repressive measures against the Pashtun and Baluchi resistance forces. A destructive propaganda against the movement leaders and Afghanistan was launched. Arrests, trials, tortures, executions and confiscation of property of the Khudai Khidmatgars and the tribal rebel forces became part of the national security doctrine. Afghanistan made serious efforts for a negotiated settlement of the problem which met with negative Pakistani responses. 252

The tension between the two Muslim states aggravated. Afghanistan intensified its support for the Pashtuns by a publicity campaign over radio and press, while Pakistan increased its heavy air bombings of the tribal areas till it actually threatened Afghanistan by bombing of Afghan territories in June 1949. Moghulgai village, two miles inside Afghanistan, was bombed resulting in a casualty of 23 persons killed and 24 injured. 253 This was intended to frighten Afghanistan into abjuring its advocacy of the Pashtun

252. See, Ibid., and Chapter IV, The Afghan Negotiation Initiatives Chart.

cause. Afghanistan protested verbally which indicated Afghanistan's serious military weakness against Pakistan equipped with British military power and their imperial strategic promptness. Pakistan at first denied its act of military aggression on Afghanistan and claimed that the bombs were dropped on the Pakistan side of the Durand Line but afterwards admitted that it was a result of a 'bona fide' mistake on the part of the pilot and expressing willingness to offer compensation. Afghanistan refused to accept the offer by pointing out, with truth, that "the explanation was an interesting commentary on Pakistan's relations with the Pashtuns". 254

However, Pakistan's intimidation failed and Afghanistan continued with its political support, leading to the establishment of various independent Pashtunistan Jirgas throughout the vast tract of the independent tribal territory from Chitral in the north to Toba in northern Baluchistan. On August 12, 1949, a mammoth Jirga of the Afridis, Orakzaís and Shinwarís, met at Bagh in Tirah, the historic centre of the Aoshanya movement at the heart of the Afridi's mountainous habitat, and after thorough deliberations proclaimed the establishment of an independent state of Pashtunistan. The Jirga adopted a red and black colour flag with an emblem of rising sun over mountains. 255  

254. Arnold Fletcher, op.cit., p.256.

255. See, Arnold Fletcher, Ibid., p.255 and Appendix No.
Pashtunistan Jirga's proclamation addressed itself to "all the rank and file of the Pakhtunistan, the entire Muslim world, particularly Afghanistan... and the United Nation's organization", appealing for legitimate political support and recognition. The proclamation read in part as follows:

"We (the Tirah branch) of the National Assembly of Pakhtunistan having formed the first nucleus of a free and independent Moslem government amidst the lofty mountains of Tirah express the hope that with the help of Almighty God and the support of brave and freedom-loving Pakhtuns this young plant may in a short time grow into a sturdy tree which will not only benefit Pakhtunistan but will also fulfil its obligations to the cause of progress and world peace". 256

The "Pashtunistan Proclamation" was welcomed in Afghanistan with great enthusiasm and Afghan government announced that it will extend due political support and formal recognition after the approval by Afghan Loya Jirga, the Grand National Assembly. 257 Tirah's Pashtunistan Jirga was followed by the establishment of the Central Independent Pashtunistan Jirga at Dazmak in Waziristan, which passed a similar declaration and elected the renowned freedom fighter Pakir Ipi of Waziristan as its President. Soon thereafter, the Afghan Loya Jirga, was summoned in Kabul. It approved the Afghan Government's proposals for support and recognition of the Pashtunistan Jirga and

256. Arnold Fletcher, ibid., p.255.
257. De khpalwakai Tarona (Kabul, 1951), p.36.
declared all the treaties between Afghanistan and Great Britain, including the Durand Line Agreement, as "null and void". 258

Pakistan was greatly infuriated by these developments, striving to brutally suppress the movement, but officially she dismissed the developments as "figments of the Afghan imagination" or "the work of a few dissidents on Afghan pay". Having failed to crush the movement, Pakistan indulged in pressurising the land-locked Afghanistan economically by halting shipments of petroleum products on the pretext that the Afghan tankers "did not meet safety requirements". Pakistan imposed further restrictions on the traffic of Afghan imports and exports and finally closed its borders in 1950, resulting in a virtual halt of Afghan trade via Pakistan, which provided the only practical outlet for Afghan foreign trade. 259 This severely affected Afghanistan's economic developments which had just been started and resulted in a heavy economic dependence on Soviet Union. The United States and some Arab countries offered their good offices for mediation. Each time proposals were accepted by Afghanistan and rejected by Pakistan on the ground that it was her internal matter not subject to mediation.

258. Arnold Fletcher, op.cit., p.255.
259. Ibid.
However, apparently United States and the West observed impartiality in the dispute but in reality they encouraged Pakistan's bellicose attitude by providing her with political and military support, while Afghans were left dismayed at the American repeated refusals to provide them with arms on the pretext that such a military assistance would be used against Pakistan rather than the Soviet Union. But the Afghans rejected the glib generalisation of the Western powers since their prevailing perspective did not prevent the British from arming Pakistan which was threatening Afghanistan by actual acts of aggression as in the case of Pakistan's bombing of Afghan village of Moghulgai. In fact, Afghanistan with its twelve rickety pre-World War-II biplanes in marked contrast to the numerous Spitfires of Pakistani air-force, had found itself in an acute military dependency. The Soviets were evidently aware of the geo-strategic implication of changes in the military linkages and conveyed offers of both political support and arms and economic aid to Afghanistan. But the Afghans still hoping for American military assistance and positive friendship, avoided Soviet offers. They continued with their persistent pleadings for Western assistance but never succeeded in winning recognition of their security interests from the West. As a result Afghanistan was isolated and threatened from all sides - Pakistan, Iran and the ideologically hostile Soviet Super Power. This critical situation was

viewed by Afghans as the projection of American diplomacy to bring Afghanistan under the influence and control of their Pakistani and Iranian friends. It was natural that in resetting the national priorities, a stronger man like Daud came to focus more directly on the military dimension of security, and to understand the empirical content of the Pashtun ideology.261

The Pashtunistan issue as a legacy of British colonialism came to have an overriding importance over all other issues in the formulation of national policy during his Premiership. The fear that mere verbal Afghan support would further encourage Pakistan to attempt an assimilation of the Pashtuns, persuaded Daud to assume a harder uncompromising stand on the issue in spite of its grave political and economic consequences.262 For, Pakistan holding "land-locked Afghanistan" by the throat exerted constant pressure by detaining "on frivolous excuses", Afghan foreign trade and developmental goods and often closed its borders.263

261. For detail see, Arnold Fletcher, op. cit., pp.255-76.


263. For detail, see Arnold Fletcher, op. cit., pp.255-76.
To overcome this, Daud like his predecessor approached the west to persuade Pakistan to negotiate a peaceful settlement of the Pashtunistan issue or at least provide Afghanistan with arms to ward off "the imminent Pakistani threat". But the U.S. refused to accede to Daud's repeated requests which were viewed by Afghans as actual American political support for Pakistan.\footnote{Neutral Afghanistan", \textit{Eastern World}, Vol. 12, no. 2, Nov. 1958, p. 1.} Western support for Pakistan and indifference towards Afghanistan, encouraged Pakistani rulers to assume a tough bellicose attitude towards Afghanistan and seek a head on collision with the Pashtun nationalist movement. Finally they attempted to destroy the Pashtun identity by amalgamating their territories into one West Pakistan Administrative Unit. The attempt by Pakistan to reverse the course of history by destroying the identity of the Frontier Province achieved as a result of a century of hard struggle against the British, was accompanied by unprecedented war-planning and military activity.

In March 1955, Pakistan's embassy in Kabul and her Consulates in Kandahar and Jalalabad were attacked by crowds of demonstrators with Pakistan's flags being pulled down and torn. In retaliation Pakistani mobs also did the same thing with Afghan Consulates in Peshawar.\footnote{For detail see, \textit{Kessing's Contemporary Archives}, 1955, p. 14217, A, and \textit{Current Digest of Soviet Press}, vol. VII, no. 14, 1955, p. 31.} As a result, relations
between two countries further deteriorated and Afghanistan in view of Pakistani ultimatum, calling for unconditional "adequate amends", proclaimed a state of emergency in May 1955, and ordered mobilization of civil forces against a probable Pakistani threat. Mediation efforts by Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Turkey to alleviate the tension between the two countries failed, leading to break off of diplomatic relations and the closure of the border. Questioned about the economic consequences of the sealing of the border by Pakistan, Daud replied "if we are in a room with only one outlet and that outlet is closed, we will have to make ourselves another outlet by breaking a window", i.e., Afghanistan would seek an alternative across the Soviet Union. 266

So the Loya Jirga was convened in November 1955, which after reaffirming Afghanistan's traditional policy of non-alignment and Afghan stand on the Pashtunistan, approved the Government's proposal for purchase of arms from the Soviet bloc countries. So Afghanistan invited Soviet leaders, Marshal Bulganin and Nikita Khrushchew to visit the country in December 1955 and open an era of Soviet-Afghan cooperation and friendship. The Soviets not only responded to basic psychological nationalistic needs of the Afghans by supporting them over the Pashtunistan issue, but also demonstrated an

266. Kessing's Contemporary Archives, 1955, p. 14217, A.
eager interest in the economic development of the country that paved the ground for growing of their political and ideological influence with the new political elite of Afghanistan. It was at this critical juncture that Bulganin in order to please the distressed Afghans said: "We sympathise with Afghanistan's policy on the question of Pashtunistan", declaring that "the Soviet Union stands for an equitable solution of this problem, which can not be settled correct without taking into account the vital interests of the people, inhabiting Pashtunistan".  

The visit of Soviet leaders and their generous offers of economic and military aid and support for Pashtunistan greatly annoyed the Americans, who never expected Kabul-Moscow cordiality to acquire such a wide dimension. For, the U.S. thought the Afghans being poor, weak and threatened by Pakistan and Iran, and even Russia, would ultimately join their Baghdad Pact. In an effort to retrieve the loss, the United States persuaded Pakistan to enter into a fruitful dialogue with Afghanistan as a result of which in late 1950s, a series of official visits took place between the two countries resulting in opening of the border, resumption of diplomatic ties and negotiations on Pashtunistan.  

Thus, Daud's strong stand at least enabled the opening of a way for direct negotiations. The Pashtunistan movement received a new momentum as


268. For detail see, Chapter IV, Negotiation Initiative Chart
a result of these developments. Apparently General Ayub's military regime came into power to control the situation by crushing the movement and repulsing Daud's diplomatic offensives, which had disrupted the fragile equilibrium of Pakistan politics.

Thus, with the coming of Ayub into power, the fruitful dialogue was stopped and the tension between the countries reached new heights till it was released in armed conflicts in Bajour in the fall of 1960 and again in 1961. The conflict was the result of General Ayub's attempt to dominate the Tribal Territory and to crush the strongholds of the Pashtunistan resistance forces. A rival tribal chief was encouraged to challenge and assume the authority of a pro-Pashtunistani chief. Several Pakistani divisions and airforce units were employed in support of the pro-Pakistani tribal chief against the Pashtunistani tribesmen. The Bajour fighting caused heavy casualties, and led Ayub's oligarchy to announce the closure of border and the break of diplomatic relations with Afghanistan. This was a virtual blockade of the Afghan economy and its various development projects. As a further pressure Pakistan stopped the migration of Pashtun nomads to their traditional pasture lands in the Indus valley. The result was further economic dependence on Soviet Russia and

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269. For detail see, Arnold Fletcher, _op. cit._, pp. 275-76, and _Kessing's Contemporary Archives_, 1961, p. 18172, A.
increase of Soviet economic and political influence. The closure of the border halted the shipment of American goods and equipments for the U.S. - aided projects since U.S. refused to avail of the Soviet rout. The border remained sealed till May 1963 and mediation efforts failed, producing a deadlock and embattled strategies on both sides.

So, in order to break the deadlock and pave the way for the introduction of political reforms in the country Daud willingly resigned in the greater interest of his country. with his resignation, a golden decade of national reconstruction, pragmatism and national unity and decisiveness ended and a decade of political adventurism, socio-economic retardation, external ideological penetration, internal intrigues and conflicts and cultural and national decadance began under the personal rule of King Zahir Jhah under the garb of constitutional monarchy.

However, Daud's resignation enabled the Shah of Iran to bring the two countries closer. An agreement was reached in Tehran in May 1963, envisaging immediate resumption of diplomatic ties and opening of the border. The agreement did not refer to Pashtunistan issue but it marked a departure from an active to a verbal Afghan advocacy during the 1960s. But in 1970s, due to constant pressures from Afghan Parliament and as a result of the emergence of the Pashtun-Baluch

270. Daud in his letter of resignation to the King explained that one of the reasons of his resignation was to open a way for the introduction of a new democratic set up in the country. See, Afghanistan in the Era of Government in Transition, (Persian), Kat 1, 1965, p.1 and no.88.
National Awami Party (NAP), as a major political force in the Frontier Province and Baluchistan, Pashtunistan advocacy was reactivated, specially under the dynamic Premiership of Musa Shafiq (1972-73).  

However, Shah of Iran's blatant opposition and actual involvement in Pashtun and Baluchi national struggle, enabled Butto's regime to dismiss NAP governments and suppress their autonomist movement, events conspired to challenge this strategic design and Daud was able to overthrow the monarchial regime. July 1973 and champion once again the Pashtunistan cause. But due to internal politico-socio-economic and cultural instability, external pressures from Pakistan, Iran and Soviet Union Daud was finally forced to postpone the Pashtunistan issue and come to terms with Pakistan in late 1970s. This volte-face on the Pakistan front provided the initial impulse to the realignment of forces that led to his death and a violent communist take-over in April 1978. The Taraki regime's overt challenging of Pakistan's political jurisdiction over Pashtun and Baluch territory and treating them as part and parcel of the "one great Afghanistan", led Pakistan and the west to encourage the Islamic resistance to the regime. The Soviet leitmotif for intervening in the country and replacing the Khalq nationalist-oriented socialist regime with a puppet Parchamite communist regime in December 1979, was related to both Soviet global ambitions and the realpolitik which led Moscow to give a carte blanche to the faction which would not go beyond the rhetorical level in pursu-

271. For detail see, Chapter III, and IV, negotiation chart.
ing the Pashtunistan question.

However, in spite of the misrepresentation of the true character of the Pashtunistan issue by Pakistan and the Western powers, the Pashtuns have continued to evolve a vision of a new social and historical reality. There have been times when political leaders of the Pashtuns on either side of the Durand Line have wrongly evaluated objective conditions in political terms, but the creative and transforming activity of the Pashtunistan ideology has continued to influence the cognitive framework of the Pashtuns in a fairly continuous manner. The revolutionary consciousness and activity of the Pashtuns is an ideologi­cal-historical expression of the historical pradoxis of Pashtunkhwa as an autonomous political sphere.

Consequences of the Pashtunistan Issue

The competitive impulses and anxieties between Pakistan and Afghanistan complicated the task of building domes­tic credibility. As the march of events proved, the kind of credibility that Kabul needed could not be created by appeasement of the combative state of mind of Pakistani rulers. It became necessary for the Afghan government to mobilise the population and galvanise its will. At the same time, it became necessary to enter an era of a new openness towards the Soviet Union if Kabul was to confront its adversaries successfully. This logic had a special salience for Afghanistan's domestic politics since it would reflect a major reevaluation of the domestic and foreign policy assumptions of the previous period.
The closure of the frontier in 1959 and 1961 was a much more serious development than it might have been earlier. It resulted in Afghanistan turning where the nature of its social regime might least have oriented it to the Soviet Union. Afghan militancy on Pashtunistan had turned the rulers to Moscow for assistance. But here there was the added factor of the two countries sharing a common frontier: something that enabled the Russians over time to provide the land-locked Afghanistan with an alternative trading outlet and to break the country's previous dependence on trade with Pakistan. In 1950, the Soviet Union and Afghanistan signed a new trade agreement; over the next five years, trade between the two countries rose by 50 per cent, with the Soviet Union taking a fifth of Afghanistan's exports. In 1961, another crisis year, 55 per cent of Afghan trade was with or through the Soviet Union. The Pashtunistan issue, therefore, created a sort of political alliance with the Soviet Union, one more durable and extensive than the earlier one between Lenin and Amanullah. This alliance was given added impetus as Pakistan moved closer to the United States and joined both the Baghdad Pact (later CENTO) and SEATO in the mid-fifties.272

The real factors which lay behind the new militancy in Kabul are harder to identify, subsequent developments were to show that Afghan commitment to the cause of Pashtun self-

determination was stronger in verbal than in real terms. Any autonomous Pashtunistan, let alone a reunification of all Pashtuns inside Afghanistan, would obviously have strengthened national unity and identity and would have therefore acted as a further counterweight to any increase in the influence of Iran. The Pashtunistan policy was unpopular with the Tajiks and other Persianised non-Pashtun ethnic groups whose commercial and cultural interests as traders, farmers and educated elites have also been hit by closures.

It has sometimes been argued that the emphasis laid on Pashtunistan was designed as much to mobilize and divert public attention at home as to help the oppressed kith and kin across the frontier. This, however, is too simple a view. It is no doubt true that there was a lot of posturing in Afghan foreign policy on the Pashtunistan issue. To understand the Afghan reaction comprehensively, however, we will do well to remember that the leadership was heartened by the fact that Afghanistan's standing had improved in the comity of nations and particularly in the Third World. There were important points of leverage for asserting Pashtun rights and privileges. At this point Kabul's relationship with the United States must remain a point of conjecture. But what is not so speculative is that this moment marked the turning point in the development of Kabul-Moscow relations. There was no exaggerated enthusiasm for the Soviet Union, but the problematic relations with Pakistan and with the West provided the general contours for moving away from traditional conceptions of domestic politics.
(3) **Anti-Daud Coalition: Identity Conflicts and Political Order**

Daud's socio-economic reforms, specially the expansion in education, trade and bureaucratic services, had resulted in the emergence of a Persianised "assertive middle class" and a westernised educated elite who no longer accepted Daud's autocratic nationalist leadership, specially his foreign policy which affected their interests. For, they had adopted a Persianised mentality and "superficial elements of western life styles and had alienated themselves from their own countrymen". 273 Daud's policy, specially his hard line stand on Pashtunistan was not in accordance with their wishes as it seriously harmed their economic interests and political aspirations.

The King, on the other hand, being relegated and out-classed by the charismatic personality of Daud and his autocratic leadership wanted to rule not reign and therefore worked for Daud's eclipse through the anti-Daud elements in the bureaucracy, the middle class, the clergy and the traditional elite, in order to find the pretext for persuading him to step down from power. External pressures, specially General Ayub's refusal to reopen the border that had resulted in an economic crisis and a halt in developmental projects. This had created a deadlock, bringing serious political and

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economic pressure on Daud's regime. Daud knew of the
necessity of a change in the leadership and the political
set up. Long before his resignation he expressed the desire
for a popular representative system:

"The one dream of the royal family is to some­
day give the country of Afghanistan to Afghans,
and let the people select the type of govern­
ment they want.... We would not for a minute
hesitate to give up the throne if this would
advance true freedom in Afghanistan".274

Daud Khan planned to institutionalise the socio­
economic and cultural changes in the form of a new consti­
tution "based on a constitutional monarchy, parliamentary
democracy, and the legalization of either one or two politi­
cal parties. The king was merely to play the role of head
of state, without interfering in state affairs. The govern­
ment formed by the majority party in Parliament was to be
alone responsible for overall state policies. The judiciary
was to function independently".275 The plans had already
been discussed by a Cabinet Committee, but the discussions
revealed the gap between the thinking of Daud Khan and the
King and the Persianised educated elite, who did not wish to
give up their hold. Daud favoured a strong single party
democratic system at the initial stage to integrate the
country. For, he argued, unless education is widespread,
multi-party system would spread disunity and result in the
coming into power of the non-Pashtun dominant minority elite.

274. Louis Dupree, "An Informal Talks with Prime
Minister Daud", American Universities Field
Staff Reports (South Asia Series), vol.III,
no.3, September 1959.

The King and other members of the royal family felt that such a constitution would do away with their power and perpetuate the de facto rule of Daud Khan who "could use these powers and his influence over the composition of the Loya Jirgah to completely alter the political system, even including the abolition of the monarchy".\(^\text{276}\)

The King, having no faith in a larger national cause, favoured a multi-party system to enable the prolongation of his dynastic rule through the use of "divide-and-rule policy", as was indicated in his lack of interest in a genuine democracy to emerge.

The Persianised "educated elite largely shared these fears, "So they all united and formed an unholy alliance against Daud Khan which has been described by Ralph Magnus as the anti-Daud "Constitutional Coalition."\(^\text{277}\) Thus, once Daud resigned, the coalition took over power and prevented Daud's return to power through normal democratic means by bringing a clause in the Constitution, precluding members of the royal family, from politics. They tried to completely alienate and isolate him by cutting his public relations. He was kept under tight watch as a captive for ten years that was a great disadvantage which limited his potentiality during the republican era. As long as the threat of Daud's return to


power was imminent, the anti-Daud coalition remained united and solid, but once that threat was removed, they broke away, seeking their own objectives, and deliberately creating political anarchism.

However, for the next decade, King Zahir Shah himself exercised power in liaison with the Persianised educated elite. These included the Minister of Defence in all the Cabinets, General Khan Mohammad; Marshall Shah Wali Khan, the surviving uncle and Abdul Wali, his son and son-in-law of the King who was, as Daud Khan had earlier been Commander of the Central Forces, and General Ghulam Farooq, the Chief of Staff. The Prime Ministers, under the 1964 Constitution, were not members of the royal family but they were non-Pashtun Persianised loyal bureaucrats who followed Zahir Shah's orders like his personal servants. Despite the ban on the members of the royal family holding political office, "dynastic control was as great as ever", marked by a facade of docile of Persianised "commoners chosen for their obedience and lack of any domestic base". After doing away with Daud, the King embarked on his political adventurism, what was alleged to be a major initiative - the constitutional monarchy, which in an unintended fashion, not only hastened his down-fall but also laid the foundation for Communist take-over, leading to Soviet intervention.

278. Ralph Magnus, Ibid. p.59.
279. Fred Halliday, op.c. , pp.18-19.
III. Constitutional Experiment: A Political Adventurism, Causing Political Fragmentation, Radicalisation and Nationalist Reaction

Western scholars showed great interest and faith in Zahir Shah's Constitution of 1964, approved by the 552-member Loya Jirga in 1965, but a precise examination would indicate that the constitution was merely used as a political tool to strengthen and ensure Zahir's absolute monarchical rule and to prevent his talented cousin, Daud's return to power as constitution debarred the members of the royal family other than the King to play any political role.

The constitution declaring the King as "unaccountable to be respected by all", strengthened Zahir's position by giving him absolute powers: the dissolution and summoning of the Parliament, the appointment of the Prime Ministers and other Ministers, the Chief Justice and Senior Civil and Military officials and proclamation of a state of emergency. Though, theoretically these powers were to be exercised within constitutional restricted limits, in practice they were used in such a way that served only the King's own interests and his whims and wishes and the constitution did not specify any mechanism to prevent such an abuse of power by the King. Thus, two major factors that led to the failure of the constitutional experiment were: first, the

King's abuse of powers and his interference and lack of interest in genuine democracy and second, the unrepresentative, ethnic minority character of the persianised and westernised administration that served as puppets of the monarch rather than enjoying the actual confidence of the Parliament and the people. 281

Parliament under 1964 Constitution: The Wolesi Jirga (Lower House) of 216-members was to be directly elected every four years by the universal suffrage of all Afghans including women, over the age of twenty. Elections to Wolesi Jirga were based on direct vote system as practiced in Britain. Of the 84-members Hashrano Jirga, one-third, 28 members were directly elected every four years by the 28 provinces; one-third were to be representatives of the elective provincial councils elected every three years and one-third were appointed every five years by the King from "amongst well-informed and experienced persons". 282 Thus, the composition of both Houses of Parliament, was pre-dominantly democratic with its members being answerable to the voters at regular intervals. Thus, the Parliament could truely be representative if allowed to choose a government of its own choice.

First Election September 1965: At the first elections of autumn 1965, there were 1,358 candidates for the 216-seats of Wolesi Jirga (six of which were reserved for nomads) and

100 for the 28 directly elected seats in the Mashrano Jirga. The elections were largely free as the influential section of the nominees were favourites of the King and his administration, consisting of anti-Daud feudals, tribal chiefs, retired bureaucrats and senior government officials who had resigned their posts to contest elections at the behest of the Yusuf government. Only in a few constituencies where influential pro-Daud figures such as Arsalan Jalini (Chaki-Wardak) Ghulam Hasan Safi (Laghman) Abdulla Khan (Saidabad) and few others contested, the government manipulated the elections to prevent the return of potential charismatic national figures to Parliament. In such instances, government officials were intimidated by the Yusuf government not to take part in election campaign in favour of the pro-Daud opponents of the government. In addition, "provincial governors and other local officials spent much time explaining to voters what kind of people they should vote for, "that is to say, they were using government influence" to secure "support for candidates sympathetic to the administration".283

The major factor that contributed to the election of pro-monarch deputies was the partyless personal character of the elections in which only the rich feudal, khans, clergies, bureaucrats and nominees of the political groups could afford to bear the high cost of the election campaign.

283. Ibid., p.165.
Ambitious and politically committed nationalist individuals could not finance a campaign and this did not only "limit candidature to the wealthier sections of the community", but also reduced polling which ranged between 5 per cent to 10 per cent in cities and 3 per cent to 8 per cent in the rural areas. Among those elected were six women from the major urban centres of Kabul, Kandahar and Herat, and four marxists. Thus, 1965 elections were a democracy show-case to outdo and discount Daud's overwhelming public popularity rather than a serious democratic experiment. For, genuinely qualified individuals were not allowed to enter the Parliament.

**Legislature-Executive Conflict**: The wide perception gap between the rural Pashtun dominated legislature and the Royal-nominated Persianised and Westernised executive resulted in a serious confrontation between the two which further crippled the performance of all the six governments which came one after the failure and collapse of the other in the less than 9-year constitutional period (from October 1965 to July 1973). This reflected the structural weakness of the 1964 constitution. The Prime Ministers were appointed directly by the King and then asked to seek a vote of confidence from the most unwilling Wolesi Jirga by presenting a list of cabinet colleagues and a policy statement. Neither the Prime Ministers nor their

284. Ibid., pp.165-66.
ministers were members of the Wolesi Jirga and therefore they did not enjoy its real confidence and faith. They were chosen from the same Persianised and westernised corrupt bureaucrats who followed the orders of the Monarch only, caring little for the people's mandate. Though theoretically the Wolesi Jirga had the power to grant or withhold its vote of confidence, but knowing their weaker institutional position in the power structure. They had to reluctantly accept the King's nominated ministry after compelling them for weeks to listen to exhortations on the national issues and the urgent needs of the country. The Wolesi Jirga often unanimously reiterated its in terms of the following five major national issues:

1) A real substantial support for the Pashtunistan issue;

2) The development, popularisation and official use of Pashto language;

3) The settlement of the Pashtun nomads;

4) A balanced economic growth to end the widening socio-economic and cultural diversities between the major urban centres and the countryside; and

5) The implementation of the provisions of the constitution, specially, the Bills concerning party regulations, provincial councils, municipal elections and the civil services which have been passed by Parliament and kept pending by the King.

285. For detail see, Ibid., p.167.


287. Based on my own surveying the speeches of the Wolesi Jirga members on the vote of confidence to the ministries of Dr. Yusuf, Maiwandwal, Stimadi and Musa Shafiq.
When the new Parliament met in October of 1965, the King nominated the same previous corrupt caretaker Prime Minister Dr. Yusuf, "with much the same cabinet as before, almost as if there had been no elections". The Wolesi Jirga though, highly critical was helpless and could only criticise his ministers accusing them of bribery and corruption. It gave its vote of confidence most reluctantly after subjecting them to severe criticism. This caused continuous students protests and large number of nationalist and left-wing students from Kabul University and the closeby high schools occupied the Parliament and took to the streets. Army was called to quell the student protests, leading to at least three deaths and a number of casualties. The King thinking that the bloodshed would further escalate the trouble, asked his favourite Yusuf to immediately resign despite being voted by the Parliament.

The Minister of Information and Culture Mohd. Hashim Maiwandwal, a previous Afghan ambassador to U.S., was invited to form a new ministry. But "the tension between the government and Shora (the Parliament) was by no means over", although by an attractive policy statement partly delivered in Pashto, he conveniently secured the confidence vote. But once Maiwandwal secured Wolesi Jirga's vote of confidence due to his Pashtu reputation and the presence of

a larger Pashtun element in his cabinet, he began to ignore the legislature while bringing changes in his cabinet without first seeking the approval of the Wolesi Jirga, thinking "they could do nothing more, short of moving a specific and direct vote of no confidence in the government as a whole" and that "in the country's unsettled state of affairs, they were reluctant to do for some time". 290

However, Maiwandwal was an ambitious politician, his Pashtun connections, his reputation as a successful diplomat and his easy acquisition of the Wolesi Jirga's vote of confidence emboldened him to aspire for a national role with the help of the bureaucratic machinery. And to this effect he established his Progressive Democrat Party and a publication called Masawat (equality), advocating a progressive socialism "based on a policy of guided economy, the Constitution, Islam, constitutional monarchy, nationalism, democracy and socialism". 291 Maiwandwal enrolled mostly bureaucrats and government officials and some Kandahari intellectuals and nationalist elements. This resulted in resentment among other political groups and many liberals questioned his "progressive credentials and especially his methods in creating an unofficial government party" and

accused him of providing for a "collective dictatorship." Maiwandwal's such attempts to form a political estate out of the Persianised bureaucracy was in line with the King's interest but his attempt to institutionalise democracy by getting Party Regulations Bill passed by Parliament made him an undesirable element to the King who was in search of a pretext to dismiss him. This opportunity was provided by a newspaper report disclosing his alleged CIA connections, published by Afghan Millat, the publication of the "Social Democrats" a nationalist group headed by Ghulam Mohammad Farhad. The result was the temporary closure of Afghan Millat, suspicion of the Wolesi Jirga, more students demonstrations and the dismissal of Maiwandwal in 1968.293

Second Parliamentary Elections: The King not learning from the deteriorating situation, again asked a Persianised bureaucrat, Noor Ahmad Etimadi, Maiwandwal's Foreign Minister, a Mohammadzai trustworthy to form the government and seek Wolesi Jirga's vote of confidence. The Wolesi Jirga troubled him the most by delaying its vote of confidence and debating his policy statement. The King still did not sign the Party Bill and returned it to Wolesi Jirga for reconsideration. The Parliament passed the Bill again in April 1969, but the "King had still not had the confidence


to sign and enact the Bill". Thus, once again Afghans had to go for a partyless general elections under a puppet government headed by a Mohammadzai Loyalist of the King. The elections were rigged as a result of which more pro-King elements came into Parliament and important political figures such as Maiwandwal, Taraki, (for the second time) and Abdulla Wardak and others were not allowed to win the elections. Only two of the Marxists, Amin and Karmal, from Paghman and Kabul were allowed to get elected. The election greatly disappointed those nationalist elements who had a faith in democracy. This could be explained well by the composition of the Wolesi Jirga members comprising mostly conservative elements and their poor standard of debates caused by an increase in illiteracy, lack of interest of the deputies and their absence from the debates. Wolesi Jirga members were mostly khans, feudals and tribal chiefs chosen for their local influence rather than any policy interest, political ambition, ability or knowledge in politics.

294. The Bill was passed in July 1966 and approved by Mushrano Jirga in May 1967 and was sent by the King to Wolesi Jirga for reconsideration and was passed by Wolesi Jirga in April 1969, with some amendment, lowering membership, age limit from 25 to 20 years, but the King still refused to ratify the Bill arguing "the nation is still politically immature" to have political parties, Louis Dupree, *Ibid.*, p.650, and Griffiths, *op.cit.*, p.169.


The "deadlock of Parliament between the Legislature and the Executive grew worse" under the Etimadi's second term of office as the King and the Executive ignored the importance of the elected Parliament. Wolesi Jirga similarly reacted by blocking those government's proposed legislations which hit urban interests. Some Western scholars failing to understand the root of the problem, attribute the responsibility to the Legislature citing the example of the Wolesi Jirga's blocking of a land tax bill. This Bill would have resulted in further ruthless exploitation of the countryside by prosperous Kabul, but it was argued that the Wolesi Jirga blocked the Bill as it hit its members who were small landlords. This is superficially true since such scholars failed to decry the ruthless exploitation of the country by the capital Kabul, the net income of the feudals or the so-called landlord members of the Wolesi Jirga were much smaller than an ordinary Kabuli shopkeeper.

The land-tax Bill or for that matter the establishment of an industrial development bank were seen by the deputies as measures aimed at further strengthening Kabul's domination and control over the country. In spite of their feudal and conservative character Parliament very well knew their responsibilities towards major national issues. Parliament passed with urgency.

297. The arguments were expressed by most of the Wolesi Jirga members interviewed in 1977.
most of the necessary legislature proposed by the government such as the bills of Civil Service, Party Regulations, Provincial Councils and Municipal Elections which were all blocked by the executive and the King who refused to ratify them as those would have resulted in transfer of power from the Kabuli elite to the people, bringing about a real democracy which the people in view of their democratic traditions, have long aspired to. 298

In a bid to ease the tension between the Legislature and the executive the King appointed the previous Speaker of the _wolesi Jirga_ Dr. Zahir, who finding himself too weak for the job soon after resigned. The dynamic Foreign Minister, Musa Shafiq, a son of renowned clergy-cum-justice was asked to seek _wolesi Jirga_'s vote of confidence as Shafiq, because of his religious and semi-Pashtun background, Pashto speech and his personal charm, secured a record vote of confidence and the _wolesi Jirga_ received him with warmth as he shared with them their political culture and common rural background. He proved a dynamic personality, raising the expectation of the people. But it was uncertain whether under the King's immobilisme he could achieve much in spite of some power being given to him by the Monarchy. 299 The Helmand Water Agreement with Iran made him

298. Abdul Jatar, _Ibid._

299. Hasan Kakar, _op. cit._, p.200
unpopular among the intellectuals who looked upon him as an instrument to crush the intellectual forces, specially the leftists. In Musa Shafiq's short-term of office resulted in a tremendous increase of the influence of Islamic fundamentalists. Further external pressures, specially the Shah of Iran's interference in the Pashtun and Baluch autonomist movement, posed a serious foreign policy dilemma which Shafiq could not handle under the autocratic conservative regime of Zahir Shah. Thus, the critical internal and external situation led indomitable Daud to stage his bloodless popular coup in July of 1973, and overthrow the monarchical regime of his cousin Zahir Shah.

**Daud's Return to Power and the Causes of his Failure and the Advent of Communist Rule**

The orientation of Mohammad Daud Khan's regime after the coup of 1973 is still a matter of controversy among scholars. The chief perceptions about his Presidency are often depicted as (1) He had close relations with both Parchamis and Khalqis, the two wings of the Afghan Communist Movement who wished to use him as a figurehead for the coup-d'état. (2) Daud was not prepared to give communist ideology a place of primacy over national interests, and demanded the liquidation of the communist organisations and their membership to merge with the proposed National Revolutionary Party which he was creating; (3) After an initial

support to the Soviet plan for Asian security, and intensification of support to the Pashtunistan issue, Daud moved to a policy of adjustment with Pakistan, acceptance of Iranian economic aid and an agreement to construct a railroad between Iran and Afghanistan; (4) Daud expressed Afghanistan's foreign policy as "true non-alignment" and differentiated it from that of Cuba which was promoting non-alignment in terms of a natural alliance with the Soviet Bloc.

The intelligentsia felt considerable misgivings, and ambivalence about Daud's National Revolutionary Party which failed to articulate a strategy to overcome the serious economic crisis on the one hand, and failed to project legitimate Pashtun interests in foreign policy on the other hand. The domestic political situation could not be stabilised by Daud in the face of serious opposition by groups both on the right wing like Ikhwan-ul-Muslemin and on the left like Khalq, Parcham, and the Shula-i-Jawid.

The change of policies between 1973 and 1976 brought about a spectacular intensification of communist influence by strengthening the Khalq-Parcham coalition. At the same time, Daud failed to clarify the main aims of Afghan foreign policy in terms of the legitimate community of interests and aims. The generation of political goodwill with Pakistan and Iran did not compensate for the symbolic consequence of dilution of support to Pashtunistan. Daud's failure to assemble support from a wide variety of social groups
reflected the failure of both ideology and institutions. He failed to build a new political constituency and at the same time incurred heavy political costs by diluting his support for Pashtunistan that resulted not only in his death but also in a national disaster in the wake of Saur Revolution.

**The New Communist Framework for Afghan Foreign Policy**

The advent of the Khalq-Parcham government in April 1978, was characterised by a widespread recognition that the foreign policy tools were inadequate to the national purposes. The signing of the 20-year Treaty of friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union, although characteristic of the particular ideological predilection of the two pro-Soviet Communist groups, also reflected the linkage of the Pashtun problem to super power issues. Had the United States placed the Pashtunistan problem in the framework of decolonisation this crucial turning point in the Afghan political development may never have accrued. The ostensible changes that made Afghanistan a subordinate part of Soviet Policy towards Asia can, of course, be seen as part of the "big picture" view of the patterns of Super Power interaction. We cannot, however, disentangle the conflict issues if the highly complicated political environment of Afghanistan is not related to the core issue of the Pashtun identity. The evidence presented in this Chapter indicates the complexity and fragmentation which deepened the political conflict was the culmination of a process extending back in chronological time. The socio-political struggle against imperialism, the civilisational-cultural struggle for Pashtun identity and the processes of political socialisation in a fragmented polity have all left a deep imprint on events in Afghanistan.
IV. The Relevance of the Pashtun Ethos

The most important conclusion from this survey is the historical impact on the collective Pashtun Identity on political developments in Afghanistan. The term "Pashtunistan" refers not only to a demand for the urification of national groups but also refers to a powerful body of public opinion lodged prominently in the political consciousness of Afghanistan. The emergence of Bangladesh in 1971, offered a challenge which Daud was prepared to take up but which the Afghan elites failed to answer.

Whenever Pashtun expectations are significantly downgraded the acute failure of leadership is prominently visible and Afghanistan’s political system is in danger of being destabilised. The dilemmas of the modernisation school of thought which cannot visualise a long-term alternative to Persianisation and westernisation provide an insight into the tension of the Second Cold War as it has erupted over the territory of Afghanistan. The policies of collaborationist elites favouring either bloc of world powers embody objectives that lie outside the interests and genuine intent of national action of the Pashtuns. The undermining of the image of a stable and secure Afghanistan begins minority elites pitted against each other and thus serve as an inducement to escalation of external intervention and national humiliation.

However, the legacy of imperialism and neo-colonialism in Afghanistan are not merely vague references to coercive politics and diplomacy. They are in the shape of impediments
whether extrinsic or intrinsic to the realisation of Pashtunistan. A clear definition and defence of Afghan interests requires an effective programme domestically to bring Afghanistan's commitments and national response into balance. In line with our analysis there is an inescapable choice between two paradigms:

It is useful to list the two different sets of assumptions underlying the political culture of the Westernised-cum-Persianised elite and the Pashtun Ethos.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Westernised-cum-Persianised Elite</th>
<th>Pashtun Ethos</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1. The Centre (Kabul) should concentrate political power.</strong></td>
<td>The Provinces must be the basis for autocentred development. National policy-makers at the highest level must not jeopardise the power of the traditional social and political organisation in the Provinces.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>2. Major socio-economic transformations will be realised through the urban areas.</strong></td>
<td>It is only through alternative approaches which ameliorate the condition of underdevelopment of the rural areas that the economic and political goals of Afghanistan can be fulfilled.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3. Priority for western technology.</strong></td>
<td>Priority for strengthening patterns of autonomous development.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
4. Highest importance in the hierarchy of political values for Parliamentary democracy at the national level.

Highest importance in the hierarchy of political values for the realisation of self-reliant and participatory democratic social structure.

5. Hierarchical and bureaucratic decision-making and implementation through official channels. Bureaucracy has the superior knowledge and therefore the right to expect unquestioning obedience.

The need to establish coherent internal socio-economic structures and continuous investigation of the bureaucracy through interpellations in the Wolesi Jirgah.

6. Preference for reformist policy issues even if they result in accentuating social inequalities.

Overriding importance of social equity. Build a framework for social reconstruction by identifying criteria for increasing social equity.

7. Social and political coalitions for pushing through application of science and technology, sacrificing control over resources if necessary in the interests of modernisation.

It is only through the unity of the Afghans embodied in a national consensus that the goals and instruments for an Afghan industrialising strategy can be realised. Control of resources in national hands.

8. Piecemeal answers to problems created by economic backwardness and pressures on political sovereignty by external forces. Solutions may be at variance to social and cultural value systems.

Clear vision of future political, economic and social revival after a speedy solution to the economic crisis in the countryside. Refusal to accept economic subserviance and erosion of political sovereignty and firm adherence to social and cultural value systems.
9. Resolve political tensions by creating new institutional values and alterations in the distribution of authority at different echelons of the existing political leadership.

10. Stability and peace in Afghanistan will contribute to regional stability. Respond to the Pashtunistan issue in ways that leave options open.

The reintegration of Pashtuns across the Durand Line will contribute to a just and lasting peace in South-west Asia. The Pashtunistan Issue is one of the basic needs of security, national identity and justice.

Our review of the domestic politics in Afghanistan suggests that from vague socio-economic formations political forces have proceeded slowly and irregularly to overarching themes by endeavouring to provide social opportunities to develop structures of solidarity to replace the older ones.

The conceptual means available within the Afghan cultural community have been combined with the internalisation of political values from abroad under political leaders often belonging to traditional elites, who have tried to convert themselves to modern politics with varying degrees of success. Jean Blondel has argued that in the Third World "only when parties are strong can leadership be sustained. While presidential systems have
the unfortunate effect of breaking political parties, strong parties do not always emerge in prime ministerial or dual systems because neither the leaders nor the other politicians are sufficiently concerned to build up these structures".301

We can illustrate the point from the experience of Afghanistan. It is clear that the underlying political structures were not expanded and linked to the population, particularly to the Pashtun masses. The case of the Communist regime does not deprive this argument of its validity. Even if it is conceded that the regimes after the Saur Revolution have built new communication channels, signs of breakdown and repression have affected the popularity of these regimes in the domestic context. To quote Blondel again: "Political leadership cannot have an assured basis if it develops by accident: political structures have to buttress leadership. The contemporary world subscribes, by and large to democratic goals; the consequence is an undeniable decline in the 'automatic' acceptance of leadership".302


302. Ibid., p.269.
With the benefit of hindsight it is possible to suggest that the nationalist forces could have fully developed the mechanisms of cohesive socialisation and built stable political structures if they had been successful in penetrating state and society from the centre of the Pashtunistan issue. The idea of revolutionary upheaval seemed at least exceptional being characterised by more the frustrations of the intelligentsia than the integration with a new structure for solving the social question.

Afghan regimes have only so far captured the sympathies of narrow strata of population and this explains the transitional character of the political systems which have emerged. What is still at issue is that the large Pashtun strata have increasingly been seized by the feeling that they are being excluded by regimes with different profiles of leadership. The multiple balances which have determined the narrow limits of Afghan foreign policy choices in the matter of the Pashtunistan issue were the result of the continuing interaction of several major factors. These were:

(1) The constraints and choices of Afghanistan's domestic politics have been considered in most academic research by emphasising the pendulum swing between "tyranny and anarchy" in the development of internal
political structures. Any such interpretation fails to yield a clear perspective because it fails to distinguish the specific political needs of the different political elites and the shifts in their political power bases. In this academic research there is also a tendency to devalue the significance of bold experiments in Afghan democratization and to deny the advent of mass politics in the evolution of constitutional development. The real or alleged impediments to the creation of national unity are not due to the persistence of tribal politics, but most importantly because of the preference of the elites for political fragmentation which, in turn, has prevented coherent formation of coordinated foreign and domestic politics.

A convenient rationale for shoring up the aristocratic pattern against the risks and tensions of a modernising environment is the overly simplistic confrontation between the tribal units and the central government. Even in the case of Dost Mohammad, Abdur Rahman and Amanullah the impetus for political transformation received a substantial contribution from mass behaviour and attitudes, and to a greater degree a consideration of political conditions under Mohammad Daud Khan (1953-63), Dr. Yusuf (1963-65), Mohammed Hashim Maiwandwal (1965-67), Nur Ahmed Etamadi (1967-71), Dr. Abdul Zahir (1971-72), Mohammad
Moosa Shafiq (1972-73), or even under Taraki (1978-79) shows that the problem of Afghan leadership elites faced fatal handicaps when they denied forceful expression to mass politics.

(2) A first hand study of the 1969 Afghan Parliament showed a convergence of interests and activities among the representatives of urban, rural and tribal populations. Indeed the political environment was permeated with a renovative spirit which promised an overall ability to cope with the task of adapting to the changed political, economic and social conditions. The problem of political stability, however, centred on broadening of perspectives which would produce greater political coordination to suit the patterns of mass politics. Prime Minister Shafiq (1972-73) came forward as a principal advocate of the "Open Society", but the lack of behavioural integration in Parliament showed the gap between aspiration and achievement. Integrative cognition was not promoted when there was persistent and conspicuous domination of the Persianised elite, which was more interested in dealing with particularistic interests and did not consider parliamentary activity as leading to general conclusions of either military-diplomatic or political-ideological significance.
(3) As Prime Minister, Mohammad Daud Khan had worked himself free from many orthodox suggestions and appraisals but a detailed consideration of the political conditions during his tenure shows that his government could not enter into significant relations with other collective actor-units, in the national context. The political power structure generated a set of circumstances under which neither partners nor rivals could show ingenuity or flexibility even to develop competing strategies of national integration and Pashtun autonomy. The low effectiveness of Daud as Prime Minister was not due to his lack of political ambition or lack of policy acumen. The forms of interaction among Afghan political actors gave neither shape nor momentum to real political needs in both the domestic and external sectors, and more particularly the latter. The informal penetration of the Afghan political system made it difficult for political actors to give political priority to creative politics which would enlarge communication flows in the country. Daud's political finesse could not persuade the political elites to overcome the sense of acute alienation which had arisen between them and the masses. When he again returned to power as President Daud presented a rationalised vision to what the Afghan state should be. But even with his overriding powers he was unable to secure
political responses from other political actors in the national arena which would have led to major power realignments and simultaneous horizontal and vertical interaction for promoting more integrative cognition in the Afghan polity.

(4) The inauguration of the Constitution of 1964 put a premium on ideas and political techniques for issuing relevant appeals to peripheral groups. Politicians with ideological messages were able to generate political sympathy for their activities. But all this did not signify a crucial revision in the distribution of political power in Afghanistan. New policy planks did not press too heavily on existing social structure and their revolutionary impact was severely limited. The legacy of political attitudes and relationships continued to sharpen ethnic and tribal cleavages. The Constitution of 1964 did not create an alliance for progress because the overriding concern of most leaders focussed upon narrow political gains rather than involvement and participation through interest articulation and aggregation.

(5) The advent of constitutional politics in Afghanistan affected the traditional patterns of political allegiance. The polarisation of internal politics was the result of both principles and opportunism. Often those who advocated Marxian ideas and forms accepted the influence of
associational interest groups which had no fixed alignment. Political rewards flowed to those who utilised opportunities on a personal basis without any positive interest or intention to pursue basic policy planks. As a matter of record, prominent Afghan leaders have not made serious efforts to seek national roles and tasks more on account of subjective value judgements rather than on account of objective conditions for Afghan statesmanship.

(6) The attitudinal measures of Afghan society showed divergence in terms of both political inclinations and ideological affiliations but a remarkable convergence in terms of cultural symbols. Any discussion of the Afghan political mind therefore would be misleading if it drew inferences only on the basis of lack of consensus on the public issues. To ascertain Afghan opinion about public affairs the political choices of the makers of public policy do not suffice. The task of the empirical study of Afghan politics lies in discerning the social bases of Afghan politics by the recognition of cultural elements, and by relating Afghan historical developments to the involvement, perception and participation of both the elite and the mass public. The non-political variables which provide an organic sense of history to the Afghans must be used to supplement the analysis of the structure of purely political relationships. As a political community jealous of its
independence, Afghanistan's different segments which have parochial preoccupations also show an all-Afghan responsiveness to any external challenge to their collective and unique identity. What is striking about Afghan public opinion is that domestic dissension consists with a functional convergence to oppose external intervention.

(7) Formal positions on foreign policy do not indicate political mobilisation or the degree of involvement in regional relations. Looking to correlations between the social backgrounds of the principal decision-makers in foreign policy and the several major phases in the development of Kabul's policy towards Pashtunistan, one notes that rhetoric was often combined with a quest for face-saving formulae. Till the middle of the '70s Afghanistan enjoyed a certain measure of stability based upon a somewhat stable equilibrium of four forces: The money and influence of the monarchy; the control of the corridors of power by the Persianised bureaucracy; lack of political concern by the Army; and the apathy of the middle classes.

The monarchy served the representational needs of Afghan foreign policy and was identified with a time-buying strategy. The second force the Persianised bureaucracy sought to provide a framework of economic and technical cooperation and in the name of "flexibility of response to downgrade politico-military concepts which would offer an
acceptable avenue for pursuing the Pashtunistan question. This force was deeply attached to the "prevention of crises" and was prepared to put up with inconsistencies and compromises in the face of Iranian and Pakistani expansionism. Through formal or tacit agreements, the Persianised bureaucracy favoured the collective security ideal rather than a unilateral commitment to the integrity and political independence of Afghanistan and the political emancipation of all Pashtuns.

The third force, the Army avoided any hard assessment of its commitment to national interest in terms of the nature and scope of modern conflict. The military intelligentsia studied contemporary international developments but without envisaging a set of conditions in which it could seek tactical gains in a confrontation. The general conclusions that emerge from our empirical enquiries suggest that security discussions in the mid-seventies in the military intelligentsia were based on good factual knowledge of the policy context of Pashtunistan.

The fourth force, the middle-class had excessive faith in rhetoric politics in both domestic and foreign arenas. This force, however, feels that it is enmeshed in the web of exploitative relationships. The younger elements of the middle class have produced radical critiques of the conventional wisdom of the ruling structure and
power in Afghanistan. The efforts to gain freedom from external and internal constraints to pursue the goal of Pashtunistan is no longer mere rhetoric politics. Instead to such elements the principal elements of a potential political reform or revolutionary programme cannot be put into operation without making the Pashtunistan question a priority area. The increasing articulation of these views is fraught with tension because these demands threaten to destabilise the entrenched power wielders of the elite groups and through a different conceptualisation of foreign policy to provide a different style and substance to domestic politics. The undercurrent of Pashtun beliefs along a centrality - peripherality dimension could significantly influence a Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan.

This Chapter has dealt with various perspectives of domestic politics relevant to foreign policy. The discussion provides a background against which the relationship of the external environment and foreign policy and the conduct of Afghan diplomacy can be studied. This will be attempted in the following Chapters.