CHAPTER I

PASHTUNKHWA AS A PERCEPTUAL FACTOR IN THE POLICY PROCESS IN AFGHANISTAN

It is astonishing that until recently the study of Afghan foreign policy has been little affected by the approaches of historical, geo-physical and ecological scholarship. In spite of a number of significant works on Afghanistan's international relations, foreign policy analysis in this sphere has been influenced persistently by the political values and political pressures which were designed to legitimise British political and military achievements in the colonial era. No effort has been made to document and comprehensively describe the central themes of research on the man-milieu relationship in Pashtunkhwa, the impact of traditionalism (Pashtunwali), the role of ethnicity, and historical and empirical data on political history, political development and political modernisation of Afghanistan.

Hegel's important axiom regarding the impossibility of separating form from content must be taken note of seriously if the present trend in research on Afghan foreign policy is replaced by one which is conducive to the critical analysis of historical events. The Pashtunistan issue can be comprehended as a structural conflict only if we attempt to correlate "form and substance" in the study of Afghan historical science and Afghanistan's international relations. Harold
and Margaret Sprout have emphasised the pervasiveness of environmental concepts and theories in all approaches to the study of international politics.¹

A paradigm for the study of foreign policy in the case of Afghanistan requires a response to questions about the territorial organisation of Pashtunkhwa and the problem of identifying the geophysical variables that make up the diplomatic constellations along with the historical and etymological origins of the Pashto language and ethos. The diplomatic-strategic conduct of Afghanistan cannot be deduced merely from the relationship of external forces. A more meaningful research design must include how environmental and social structures provided the context in which domestic and foreign policies were pursued. We begin our study by presenting a synoptic view of the whole nexus of relations arising out of the combination of geographical and historical circumstances which are at the root of the Pashtunistan problem in contemporary international affairs. We will discuss these issues under the following headings:

a, Geographical definition and boundaries of Pashtunkhwa,
b, Strategic significance of Pashtunkhwa's location,
c, Topography and drainage system of Pashtunkhwa,
d, Ethnography of Pashtunkhwa,
e, Linguistic relations and artificially induced

Persianisation,
f, Pashtunkhwa's Unity in diversity;
g, Culture and Social Structures of integration, and
h, Social organisation and ethical and legal values.

For discussing the legitimacy and efficacy of the Pashtunistan issue we will give primacy to the events which occur inside the political system of Afghanistan and then go on to explain the complex interactions between the domestic and international spheres. By first formulating a conception of the geo-political system and explaining the socialisation process in terms of the political culture, structure and capabilities of Pashtunwali, we hope to discern a direct casual relationship between environmental factors and the moves on the diplomatic-strategic chessboard.

This in-depth examination is necessary as a starting point for new theoretical avenues in the study of Afghan foreign policy. Conventional studies of Afghanistan's international behaviour, which largely ignore the internal political, social and economic processes of Pashtunkhwa, have led to the misinterpretation of the causal dynamics of the situation in which Afghanistan finds itself in the 1980s. The study of the domestic factors is a major advantage for the intensive examination of Afghanistan's behaviour in the international and regional systems, and our position in this respect is
reflective of the level-of-analysis problem in international relations. 

(A) Geographical Definition and Boundaries of Pashtunkhwa

Pashtunkhwa, dominated by the great 'Hindu Kush' ranges, lies in southwestern corner of Central Asia between the Indian subcontinent, the Arabian Sea and the Iranian Plateau and the Middle East and is defined by a series of historically evolved natural and semi-natural boundary lines that have played a significant role in characterization of its ecologic personality and the historical evolution of its inhabitants into a Pashtun cultural and national entity and hegemony. On the north, the river Amu Darya or Oxus - 1700 miles long with its 700 miles course - make the northern natural boundary which separates Bara (upper) Pashtunkhwa or Afghanistan markedly from the plains and the depression of Central Asia, the present Soviet Republics of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmanistan. On the east, 1800-mile long Indus river or Aba-Seend (the father river) the very name


3. Aba or Abaa in Pashto, as in some other Indo-European dialects, means father, most probably God and Grandfather as well. (See for Abba, in other Indo-European dialects, Pike. Encyclopaedia of Religions (London, 1951), p.1.) The word Seend from which originates the terms Sindh and Hind, India, Hindu and so on, is a very common word in Pashto for river. Hence, the Pashtun term of Aba-Seend denotes Father-river or father of rivers. Such a descriptive naming of the Indus as Aba-Seend or Aba-Sindh by the Pashtuns is in accordance with historical reality also. For example, when the Pashtuns, following the Aryan general
of which is Pashto, forms a natural, cultural and national frontier between Kooza (lower) Pashtunkhwa (Pashtunistan) and the subcontinent of India. This boundary has, in fact, remained "a natural barrier" where "for thousand years the influence of Hinduism has stopped at its banks". As Arthur Swinson put it: "geographically, culturally and ethnographically India is the country to the southeast of the Indus and south of the Himalaya." To the West, with the exception of Afghan Seistan and the part of Baluch territory now under Iran, a series of natural barriers in the form of rivers, lakes, empty lands and vast deserts, separates the plateau of Pashtunkhwa from the Iranian Plateau which assumes a vice-versa increase in elevation towards the heavily populated northwestern

migration towards the subcontinent between 1500-1000 B.C., had reached the Indus, they called it as such because they had not seen by then such a great river on their way to the Indus valley and they, therefore, began to respect and worship it as Aba-Seend, i.e., father river as is evidenced and supported by the hymns of Rigveda, which had been composed largely on the territory of Pashtunkhwa. As such Indus is the greatest of the rivers in the whole region.


6. The so-called Iranian Seistan which is an integral portion of Afghan Seistan and the Baluch territory in Southeast Iran called Iranian Baluchistan were parted away to Iran by the British during 19th century. Prior to this, both formed an integral part of Pashtunkhwa. See The Documents of the Helmand River Dispute (Kabul, 1935 Hijra) and R.S. Rastogi, Russo-Afghan Boundary Dispute (Lucknow), 1976.
Iran. To the south, the country stretches through Baluchistan up to the Arabian Sea, offering a natural sea outlet and from the northeast the Pamir massif, a small tract of highland, separates Pashtunkhwa from the Chinese province of Sinkiang.

Pashtunkhwa, with its rugged physiography and its natural frontiers is, therefore, a separate geographical personality with its own typical ecology, eventually differentiative from the regions beyond its natural or semi-natural frontiers, i.e., the depression of Central Asia, the

7. It has been a common tradition with most of the writers to refer to Pashtunkhwa as an eastern extension of the so-called great Iranian plateau. This superficial view which has influenced Afghan writings as well, is scientifically challenged and unacceptable in the light of a systematic geographical study of the two countries, taking into account their special topographical characteristics. It is, in fact, Pashtunkhwa's different geographical features that is mainly responsible for the characterization of Pashtunkhwa's typical ecology, its typical culture, social institutions and the very national character of its people. A simple evidence of differentiation of Pashtunkhwa's Plateau from the highland of Iran is Pashtunkhwa's comparatively higher elevation with an increase in a northeastward direction. The Iranian Plateau, being much inferior in altitude, vice versa stretches through the heart of Iran with increasing elevation towards northwestern Iran. Deserts and vast empty lowlands and a series of natural barriers in form of lakes and rivers, mark a breaking line between the Iranian and Afghan Plateaus. This is an obvious fact of geography which has played an important role in shaping the two country's different history, culture and their distinct national character.
vast plains of the subcontinent and the barren Iranian Plateau. It is distinct by virtue of its variegated physio-graphic features, regional variations, strategic topography, drainage system and climatic characteristics that bear a deep influence on its history, society, economy, its political culture and the national character of its people and the magnitude and multitude of their national problems as well. The geographical characteristics with their special type of influences have continued to forge a peculiar process of national evolution of Pashtunkhwa as a Pashtun entity. As in the words of Professor Deutsch, natural or semi-natural boundaries "often result in the cultural and national evolution of that people into a national state of their own".

This is very much true about Pashtunkhwa inspite of the strategic vulnerability of its peripheral core areas. It is, in fact, in view of the ecological functioning of Pashtunkhwa's typical geographic personality and its natural frontiers that today we find less concentration of population along the two sides of these natural frontiers. As a result of geographical imperatives, concentration of population in Pashtunkhwa and in its neighbouring countries is mainly far beyond these natural, national and cultural frontiers. For instance, in the case of Iran, the population concentration has taken a westward trend, while in Pashtunkhwa, it has taken an eastward direction. Similarly, on the east, along the natural

and cultural frontier of the Indus or Aba Seend river in Kooza Pashtunkhwa, population decreases for a while and increases far beyond the Aba Seend, suddenly towards the heart of the Indian subcontinent. On the north as well, the natural river frontier of Oxus or Amu Darya, separates the Afghan concentration centres in the southern flank from that of Central Asia - Soviet Republics of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmanistan, which assume a northward increase beyond the river and its northern depressions. However, recent planned economic development in the neighbouring countries, aiming at national integration, specially in Pakistan and Soviet Central Asia, has largely affected the pattern of population concentration.

This, in fact, ascertains the fact that Pashtunkhwa has, since ancient time, retained its characteristics of one single country with the same territorial limits as defined by such natural or semi-natural lines, whether united under a native central authority or dismembered occupied by various alien powers.11 Pashtunkhwa's occasional political division and occupation by various contending rival powers, have been temporary and mainly due to its highly geo-political significance and strategic vulnerability of its core areas and rich urban centres, clustered round the massive physical


configuration of the Hindu-Kush barrier, in a vulnerable position in proximity to the frontiers. These urban centres, being cut off from one another, have often proved difficult for the Pashtuns to defend them against an emerging potential power, specially in the absence of a strong native authority.  

**Location Size and Population of Pashtunkhwa**

The geographic region of Pashtunkhwa is generally a highland of about 1,150,000 square kilometres, more than half of which is a high plateau. It stretches from north-east with general gradual slope towards west and South-West. Its extreme length from north-west to south-west is nearly 2,000 kilometres with its greatest width of over 1,300 kilometres from north to south.

According to an Afghan official estimate and the 1972 Census of Pakistan, total estimated population of

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14. According to 1972 Census of Pakistan, Pashtunistan, i.e. the N.W.F.P. and Baluchistan had a population of 13.3 million, See *Times of India* (New Delhi), 15 April 1973, p.13. Out of these 1.2 million is the figure for the Baluchis and Brahuis who live predominantly in Southern and Western Baluchistan. For detailed discussion on population composition see, Ethnography of Pashtunkhwa.
Pashtunkhwa, including Baluchistan, is 32 million. Amongst its various racially and culturally mixed ethnic groups, the Pashtuns, after whom the country is called, form a majority of more than 80 per cent of the total population.

Afghanistan or Bara (Upper) Pashtunkhwa, lies to the north-west of Kooza (Lower) Pashtunkhwa, and has an area of 652,000 square kilometres. It has a population of over 18 million, out of which the Pashtuns proper, who have still retained their own language and culture, constitute a majority of over 66 per cent. Politically separated from Kooza Pashtunkhwa, Afghanistan, still ranks the largest among the world's land-locked states, which with an "irregular quadrilateral shape, it is located in the north "Temperate Zone"

15. 32 million population of Pashtunkhwa includes the official figures for Afghanistan and Pashtunistan including Baluchistan, see Population Table No. I & II.


17. Exact number of people to be originally Pashtuns exceeds far beyond the above figure as a great number of the Pashtuns have turned to be Persianized, losing their Pashtun cultural characteristics. The Persianized Pashtuns include, the Taimanis and Feroze Kohis of the Char-Aimaq tribes, the Momandi Hazaras of Ghazni, the Tajikized Panjshiris, the Formulis of Chardeh district of Kabul and others in the urban centres of the country. For detail see (F) Linguistic Relations and Artificially Induced Persianisation and Table Nos. 1 & II.
between 29° 30' north latitude, and between 68° 30' and 75° longitude. 18

Kooza Pashtunkhwa or Pashtunistan, including Baluchistan, is but a sloping extension of Bara Pashtunkhwa that stretches eastward up to the Indus and southward to the Arabian Sea and as a stretch of foothills of Bara Pashtunkhwa it runs from the north-east to the south-west up to the borders of Iran. It has an area of about 500,000 square kilometres 19 and is inhabited by the same culturally mixed people, the Pashtuns and the Baluchis. The Pashtuns constitute a majority of over 85 per cent in the so-called North-West Frontier Province and northern Baluchistan, with the Baluchis making an absolute majority in southern and western Baluchistan. 20 Kooza Pashtunkhwa or Pashtunistan is situated between 62° 73' north-east longitude and 25° 37' latitude 21 and, according to 1972 Census of Pakistan has a predominantly Pashtun population of about 13.3 million, of which only 1.2 million are Baluchis and Brahuis. 22


19. The total area of Pashtunistan may exceed 500,000 square kilometres (about 190,000 square miles) as some of the Pashtun areas lie on the other side of the Indus river such as the Hazara district. The Pashtunistanis, the Pashtuns of the Kooza Pashtunkhwa or Pashtunistan regard Jhelam river in the north as the north-eastern boundary of Pashtunkhwa, see "Badshah Khan on case for Pakhtoonistan", Patriot (Delhi), 18 April, 1975, p.2.

20. See for detail on Population Composition the Ethnography of Pashtunkhwa,


22. See, (E) Ethnography of Pashtunkhwa and Table No.1.
However, prior to British occupation of Kooza Pashtunkhwa in the middle of 19th century, Pashtunkhwa was one and enjoyed its territorial, national and political unity and oneness. But at present the so-called Durand Line as an artificial political boundary, divides Pashtunkhwa into the Bara (Upper) and Kooza (lower) ones, i.e. Afghanistan and Pashtunistan with the later falling under Pakistan's imperial control since 1947 as a result of the British withdrawal from the Indian subcontinent. In fact, it was the British enforced division of Pashtunkhwa that reduced Afghanistan to a minimum political entity as a small landlocked fragmented state, resulting in precipitation of its various politico-socio-economic imbalances, instability and a national cultural crisis leading to the emergence of the Pashtunistan issue and the present unfortunate Afghan situation.

Equilibrium and Change in the Boundaries of Pashtunkhwa

As mentioned, the present boundaries of Pashtunkhwa, especially that of Bara Pashtunkhwa, are the direct result of the past Russo-British expansionist imperialistic policies. They are political and strategic rather than natural historical,

23. For detail, See, M. Omer Hewadyar, Pashtunistan Issue (M.Phil. dissertation, S.I.S., J.N.U., New Delhi, 1973) Chapters II & III.
24. How the Pashtunistan issue has contributed to the present unfortunate situation, is discussed in subsequent Chapters.
cultural, national or ethnic as they have been imposed on Afghanistan during 19th century.

In fact, history of the boundaries of Pashtunkhwa is an example of maximum friction between Afghanistan and Iran on the one hand and between Afghanistan and its two neighbouring expanding powers of Tzarist Russia and British India on the other. Both expansionist imperialist powers approached each other in their conquest of Asian lands until they marched on the territory of Pashtunkhwa, as a result of which Pashtunkhwa lost nearly half of its native land in spite of vigorous Pashtun resistance which resulted in three major Anglo-Afghan wars, a serious skirmish with the Russians and a century of continued warfare with the British.

In the northwest and northeast, the territory of Punjab and parts of Pamirs were seized in 1885 by Tzarist Russia. In the southwest, the Afghan province of Seistan was gifted away to Iran in 1872 by means of British arbitration in favour of Iran, as the British controlling Afghan Foreign policy, acted on behalf of Afghanistan. While eastern Pashtunkhwa was gradually occupied between 1849 and 1993. Afghanistan was actually reduced to a small landlocked state, deprived

25. For detail on the imposition of Afghan boundaries, see Chap. III.
of access to the Arabian Sea, when Baluchistan was occupied between 1854 and 1876.28 In order to have legal control of the occupied Afghan territories, the British further imposed on Afghanistan the so-called Durand Line in 1893 by means of military threat. Being unable to subdue Afghanistan, the British sought the annexation of Afghan eastern territories to limit Afghan freedom and influence for the protection of their Indian Empire.29

However, the frontier with Russia was settled in 1896, with minor adjustments in 1920s, 1930s and 1948. It is the most natural boundary of about 2,000 kilometres, a part of which, about 1,200 kilometres, is defined by the river Oxus or Amu Darya and the remaining by demarcation posts and here and there, by natural barriers in the form of rivers, ridges and high cliffs. The Zulfiqar Pass is the only practical connection there between the Afghan valley of Harirud river and the Soviet Republic of Turkmanistan. The part of the boundary marked by the river Oxus is passable only in a few places where Russian steamers and Afghan ferry-boats operate along the river.30

30. See for detail, R.S. Rastogi, op. cit.
The demarcation of the boundary with Iran has been a subject of a century-old dispute between the two countries. It was settled in 1872 as a result of British arbitration in favour of Iran when the latter acting on the behalf of Afghanistan, partitioned the Afghan Province of Seistan between the two countries. Later due to the change of the course of the River Helmand, the boundary was again disputed until it was finally defined in 1903-5, with corrections made in 1935. However, the Afghan-Iran boundary is a semi-natural and almost ethnic and cultural frontier which runs northward through deserts, lakes, rivers and sparsely populated areas, a small section of which about 90 kilometres is marked by the river Harirud in the northwest.31

However, the boundaries described above are to a greater extent the original, historical and cultural boundaries of Pashtunkhwa on the north and the west. To the south and east, the Arabian sea and the river Indus respectively have defined for centuries the southern and eastern limits of Pashtunkhwa as its natural boundaries.32 But the advent of European imperialism in Asia and the resultant Anglo-Russian rivalries in the 19th century led the British

31. See for detail, The Documents of the Helmand River Water Dispute (Kabul, 1357 Hijri)

to a gradual occupation of the eastern Pashtun lands, resulting in territorial division and in a constant change of the eastern political boundary of Pashtunkhwa. In pursuit of their expansionist "Forward Policy", the British extended the boundaries of their occupation towards the west over Pashtunkhwa or undivided Afghanistan beyond the natural and national boundary of the river Indus which resulted in the three major Anglo-Afghan wars.33

Thus, towards the second half of the 19th century, the Russo-Anglo-Afghan relations were really in the state of a major open conflict, which, the temporary weakness of Russia, internal strife and weakness of Afghanistan and British political struggle and worldwide diplomatic activities enabled the British to impose the unjust, illegal and illogical Durand Line on Afghanistan in 189334 which divided Pashtunkhwa into present Afghanistan and the eastern Pashtun lands which were surrendered to Pakistan in 1947 on the eve of the partition of the Indian subcontinent, known today as "Kooza Pashtunkhwa" or Pashtunistan.35 Thus, at present the so-called "Durand Line", a 1200-Kilometre imaginary Line, separates,
politically, Afghanistan from Pashtunistan. It stretches from Chitral in the north and runs south and southwest through heavily populated areas up to the borders of Iran in the west.\textsuperscript{36}

This line exists only in imagination as a boundary between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Having been imposed on Afghanistan, cutting one nation into two and dividing the same tribes and even some families, neither Afghanistan nor the people affected recognize it as a boundary.\textsuperscript{37} Even some Britishers themselves question the validity of this line.

As Fraser Tytler, a English Statesman puts it: "The Durand Line, though perhaps in the circumstances the best line possible, has few advantages and many defects. It is illogical from the point of view of ethnography of strategy and of geography. It cuts across one of the main basins of the Indus watershed; it splits a nation into two and it divides tribes."\textsuperscript{38} In fact, "the socalled Durand Line" - perhaps the longest ever drawn on a piece of paper and accepted

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{36} For a detailed account of Durand Line, see, R. Gopalkrishnan, \textit{The Political Geography and Politics of Afghanistan} (New Delhi, 1982) pp.96-109.
\item \textsuperscript{37} Since the emergence of Pakistan, the socalled "Durand line" has been repeatedly declared" null and void" by the Afghan Loya Jirgas (Grand National Assemblies) and by the tribal Jirgas of the Pashtunsthemselves as well as by the Afghan Government, See Chapter III.
\item \textsuperscript{38} Sir Kerr Fraser Tyler, \textit{Afghanistan: A Study of Political Developments in Central Asia}, 2nd edn. (London: Oxford University Press, 1953), p. 188.
\end{itemize}
as a political boundary, excluding over two-fifths of the Afghans (Pashtuns), has been the basic cause of the past Anglo-Afghan wars, the "unrest and frontier troubles until this day" as it divides heavily populated areas of the same tribal lineage such as the Chetralis, Bajouris, Momands, Apredis, Shinwaris, Jajis, Waziris, the Kakers, Achkzais, and the Baluchis and Brahuis.

In reality, "the Durand Line" can never be a practical political boundary and a valid line of national control as far as geographical, cultural, social, ethnic, political or economic integrity, unity and stability of a country is concerned. Their tribal, social and cultural relationship and the daily needs of life as well as the geography, economy and the nature of the areas on both sides of the Durand Line, lead the Pashtuns to ignore it as a boundary irrespective of any governmental control which can never be viable under any circumstances. In view of this reality, daily thousands of the Pashtuns on both sides freely cross and recross the so-called "Durand Line" boundary in pursuit of their socio-economic needs as a matter

39. Ibid and Ranman Pazhwak, op.cit., p.150.
40. The so-called Durand Line was neither accepted nor was it fully demarcated as the Pashtuns revolted against the British, blowing off their demarcation camps and commission. The Afghan Amir also had signed the treaty mostly unwillingly under duress and the use of threats of military force and that also secretly without Pashtuns' knowledge and legislative sanction whom would have certainly revolted against the Amir as well, throwing him out of power, see for detail, Durand Line, Chapter III.
of natural right and no power on earth can stop them.\footnote{41}

This apart, the nationalistic centripetal force of cultural, racial and linguistic kinship which tends to consolidate the same people separated by political boundaries, is growing among the Pashtuns and has given rise to an ever-increasing sentiment of national solidarity, which culminates in the claim of Pashtunistan, making it a serious national issue for Afghanistan.

In short, although the validity of the so-called "Durand Line" continues to be challenged, politically it continues to remain the eastern and southern boundary of Afghanistan. However, to the northeast a small strip of land, the very high Wakhan Corridor, makes a natural boundary of nearly a hundred kilometres between Pashtunkhwa and China.

Although boundaries of Pashtunistan or Koūza Pashtunkhwa are not politically settled, yet its boundaries are rather well-marked by a series of natural frontiers separating it from Pakistan. To the south lies the Arabian Sea and to the northeast, southeast and southwest a series of mountain ranges, the Indus river and deserts separate Pashtunistan from Kashmir, Punjab, Sind and Iran respectively.

It is because of these realities that the great Pashtun leader, Fakhri-Afghan Khan Abdul Ghafar Khan, has declared:

"The Durand Line ... is definitely not acceptable to us.

(the Pashtuns). This line is the product of imperialism. Actually it does not divide any country. It only divides the Pakhtoons. Pakistan of yours is confined to Cargal, Margala range, Campbellpur, Mianwali and Jhelum in the Punjab. Areas beyond are parts of Pakhtoonistan as are also the Pakhtoons majority areas in Baluchistan. Whatever remains is what you claim as your Pakistan ... Let me make it clear to you that the Durand Line is not an international boundary line. The boundary line will, in fact, be marked between the Pakhtoon land the Punjabi or Pakistani areas. Demarcate this boundary yourself or we will do it whenever we have an opportunity to do so."

(B) Strategic Significance of Pashtunkhwa's location:

Pashtunkhwa has continued to be strategically a central pivotal country and in the words of great poet Iqbal "a throbbing heart of Asia". Situated in between the ancient dynamic heartlands of Central Asia, China, India and West Asia, it has had a highly significant strategic location throughout the long course of its chequered history. It has always been a "way of conquest" for migratory hordes, ambitious conquerors and expanding empires, "a crossroads for emerging civilizations, cultures and religions, and a round-about for world trade with its various trade routes and thriving urban centres linking Europe with Far East, China with the Middle East and the Indian subcontinent with Central and West Asia.\textsuperscript{43}

Most of the inter-continental and the Asian inter-regional trade passed through Pastunkhwa. As a result, its

\textsuperscript{42} "Badshah Khan on a Case for Pakhtoonistan", Patrim (New Delhi), April 18, 1975, p.2.

numerous urban centres such as Takhar, Balkh, Herat, Seistan, Kandahar, Ghazni, Kabul, Kapisa and Peshawar flourished, emerging as great cities serving as major international markets for exchange of mercantile goods. Pashtunkhwa's such a central location as a prosperous entre-pot for foreign trade was not only a source of strength as it brought enormous material and cultural wealth, but also a disadvantage as it often invited invasions upon invasions, which due to stubborn nationalistic resistance were highly destructive, leading to total or partial devastation of the country.

From the inventory of bygone invaders, the Achaemenids, the Greeks, the Parthians, the Scythians, the Yuch-chis, the Sassanids, the Turks, the Aphthalites or White Huns, the Musli

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45. Pashtunkhwa's such a monopolizing position was shattered not only by the discovery of the new convenient sea-routes which were much cheaper and safer but also by the political developments such as the Mongolian devastations and the Sunni-Shia religious strife and the constant Persian, Uzbek and Moghul encoorages upon Pashtunkhwa that turned its sedentary population to tribalism, nomadism and Pastoralism. The remaining limited trade that passed through Pashtunkhwa was further affected by the advent of the two great rival European imperialist powers of Tsarist Russia and British India which not only stopped and obstructed the remaining trade that came through Pashtunkhwa but also brought a total decline in economic activities in Pashtunkhwa by their repeated destructive invasions causing a persistent socio-economic, cultural and political disorder and dislocation in the country, see K.I. Ghosh "Afghanistan in World Affairs", Eastern World, (London), Feb. 1956, pp.14-19.
Arabs and Turks, the Mongols, the Timurids, the Moghuls, Uzbekks and Persians were well-known historical powers who held parts or the whole of the country from time to time for the purpose of building empires or for the sake of security of their powers. This long list of the conquerors has continued to include the imperialist Russians and Britishers in the 19th century and of now the Soviets, who have continuously endeavoured to engineer various sorts of plots and intrigues for occupation or political control of the highly strategic Pashtunkhwa, making it a bone of contention in their various imperialistic ambitions. As a result, says Swinson, "no area of comparable size has seen so much of action, bloodshed, intrigues, gallantry, savagery, devotion, patience and sacrifice" as Pashtunkhwa which once the "seat of important civilization" has been reduced to its present backward land-locked dependant position as being divided into Afghanistan and Pashtunistan.

As such, due to its highly strategic position Pashtunkhwa has always been vulnerable to invasion from the neighbouring regions that always paralysed its economy, its socio-cultural

46. Ibid., p. 13 & F.R. Pazhwak, op.cit., pp.8-9
and political integrity. Most of the thriving urban centres of the country such as Herat, Balkh, Kandahar, Jelistan, Ghazni, Kabul and Peshawar, situated in the fertile valleys at the "junction of trade routes" have been often sacked and coveted by contending powers either for the purpose of economic benefits or for the sake of their strategic significance as "strategic gates of India", used for the defence of India or as springboards for the invasion of that subcontinent. These flourishing urban centres, located in proximity to Pashtunkhwa's borders, have always been difficult to defend in the absence of a strong central authority.

In fact, the often repeated occupation of the Pashtun urban centres by alien powers and the existence of a multitude of small ethnic, racial and linguistic groups in Pashtunkhwa, specially in its rich urban centres, reflect its highly strategic significance and its grave socio-economic, cultural and political consequences. In the words of Arthur Swinson the rise and fall of empires in Asia have always depended

49. The adverse effects of the unfavourable political developments, did not only disrupt the east-west trade, and led to the collapse of its economy and its social conditions, but also resulted in slacking the development of the Pashtun culture and language, giving rise to the development of alien culture and language, specially, that of Persian culture and persian language which still dominate to the detriment of Pashtun national interests.

on the policies they adopted towards Pashtunkhwa. And it is due to the strategic significance of the country that it is said as a maxim that "only that person can be emperor of India who is first a ruler of Kabul". Pashtunkhwa's history indicates that most of its urban centres have been used as keys or spring-boards to east-west expansionist conquests, especially the conquest of the sub-continent. For, they form a highly strategic triangle with the flourishing cities of Balkh (or Herat), Kandahar and Kabul (or Peshawar), forming its three angles.

The highly strategic significance of Pashtunkhwa has also been responsible for the British imposed delimitation of the country's frontiers which, being based on political and strategic factors, they are not ethnic, national, cultural or economic in origin. The potentially rich Pashtun urban centres situated in the fertile valleys in proximity to its frontiers, have always had a dual offensive and defensive strategic importance which often tempted the emerging powers to occupy and use them either for the sake of security and safety of their empires as was done by Safavid and Moghul empires in the 16th and 17th centuries and the British in the

52. See, F.R. Pazhwak, Afghanistan's Diplomatic History, op.cit., p.3.
53. See for details, Ibid., pp.2-6.
19th and early 20th centuries or for the purpose of further expansion as in the case of the early empires that pushed forward for the conquest of the Indian subcontinent. 55

The problem of Pashtunistan, a legacy of imperialism, caused by the British enforced division of Pashtunkhwa, in itself was the result of a series of such forward-marching offensive and defensive moves by the imperialist Tzarist Russia and British India that resulted in the disastrous British imposed political deduction of Pashtunkhwa to the present small, fragmented and politically dependent Afghanistan as a landlocked controlled buffer state, ensuring the safety and security of their imperialistic dominions. 56 This is well supported by the Soviet claims that they moved into Afghanistan because of the security of their frontiers being threatened. But as the unstable Afghan situation could not pose any security threat to the Soviet territory, so truth in the Soviet claims is to be sought in the long-cherished dream of southward expansion to the warm waters of the Arabian Sea.

The strategic significance of Pashtunkhwa has continued to remain unchanged and what has been true in the past holds true even now. Situated between larger political units such as


Russia, China, India and the economically strong Iran, the location of Pashtunkhwa commands a vital strategic significance as a result of which today also she is involved in a destructive game of power politics of the super powers and its powerful contending neighbours. For, due to such a highly significant geo-political position Afghanistan obtained substantial economic assistance and foreign investments from the Super Powers, largely from the Soviet Union, that generated their dangerous influence, culminating in the present problem. In fact, Pashtunkhwa occupies the strategic zone whose inclusion is bound to tilt the power balance between the super and the major powers in the region. The antecedents of current anxieties are to be discovered in the risks as well as the advantages involved in the strategic and political significance of Pashtunkhwa's location. These have also often raised the serious question of the survival of Pashtun national identity on both sides of Pashtunkhwa - Afghanistan and Pashtunistan - which constitutes the basic ingredients of the problem of Pashtunistan.

In fact, the inherent political weakness of Afghanistan and the non-recognition of Pashtun national identity and hegemony in the strategic landscape of Pashtunkhwa have tended to

57. For detail on foreign assistance, see, Foreign Assistance Table.

be the determining factors of the Pashtunistan issue. It was this strategic concern that paved the way for Afghanistan's dependence on the Soviet Union and led ultimately to Soviet intervention. The Pashtunistan issue, a product of the political dismemberment of the national and cultural unity of Pashtunkhwa, was thus aggravated by the accumulation of concerns which were identified by Afghan foreign policy. Inherent weakness of the country and the limited level of resources which it could deploy in the pursuit of foreign policy encouraged external powers to influence and exploit this situation for their own imperialistic expansionist designs.59

However, peace, progress and stability in Pashtunkhwa and in the region as a whole, therefore, depend on the solution of the question of the national and political unity, independence and neutrality of the strategic Pashtunkhwa. This requires an

59. In fact, it was this national and political weakness caused by the division of Pashtunkhwa that encouraged its neighbours to penetrate the country. While the Soviet Union continued to dominate the country through economic and ideologic investments, Pakistan infiltrated the country through Islam, suppressing Pashtun nationalism and crushing their language and culture. Iran on the otherhand, encouraged the continued domination of Persian language through Kabul's Persianized bureaucracy and its powerful intelligenta and the Shia clergy. The only common obstacle which stood in their way was the growing Pashtun nationalism which they sought to suppress together that finally led to Soviet invasion.
equitable solution of the Pashtunistan issue, that would not only check the aggressive tendencies of the super and regional powers in the region but will also recognise the internal causes of social and political change in South Asia. For political and national weakness in such a vitally significant strategic country as Pashtunkhwa will continue to invite dangerous foreign interventions and rivalries in Pashtunkhwa and the region.

Thus the vulnerable strategic location of Pashtunkhwa in between larger and culturally advanced political units, has continued to adversely affect Pashtun's national and cultural unity and identity. The Pashtuns, being highly conscious and concerned about their cultural and national vulnerability, have no wish to be used as part of a wider strategic game by any outside power.

(C) **Topography of Pashtunkhwa:**

Pashtunkhwa is generally a highland with an average height of 4000 feet above sea level. Its topographic features are rugged mountains with narrow and deep valleys, fertile river basins, plains and empty deserts. It is a peculiar combination of snow-capped mountains, high tablelands, green and fertile valleys and deserts. This is the overall topographic character of the country common to any part of it, whether it is **Bārā** (upper) Pashtunkhwa (Afghanistan) or **Kooza** (lower) Pashtunkhwa (Pashtunistan), which has an equally common bearing on the attitude, character and culture of its people and their socio-
economic structure.

Pashtunkhwa's most prominent topographical features are the Hindu Kush mountain system and its five major river basins - the Oxus, the Harirud, the Helmand, the Kabul and the Indus. The Hindu Kush and its great offshoots dominate the whole of the landscape and demarcate the river basins. 60

The central massive belt of the Hindu Kush mountain ranges stretches from the northeast, the Pamir massif, to the west and south-west and is "variously known on its 1100-kilometre course as the Hindu Kush proper, Koh-i-baba, Siah-koh and Safid-koh. With an average width of about 400 kms. from Peshawar in the east to Kunduz in the north, it dominates the whole of northern Pashtunistan and the entire central Afghanistan 61 with normal elevations between 13,000 to 20,000 ft.: and snow-capped peaks upto 25,000 feet. This massive physical configuration forms the main watershed of Pashtunkhwa's important rivers. 62

The Hindu Kush proper, originating from the Pamirs is the highest mountain with impassable snow-bound peaks, hazardous


61. Ibid., p. 13.

passes and deep precipices, which extends southwest with a gradual decrease in elevation. 63 The Hindukush proper is divided into an eastern extension from the Pamir knot to the Khawak pass, and a western extension from the Khawak pass to the Akrubat and Bamyam Passes. The western extension is inferior in elevation as the entire belt of ranges stretches in a southwestward direction with an average elevation of about 4000 metres above sea level. To the west, the Hindukush constitutes a "cluster of nearly parallel ranges"; the Mir Samir range which, after crossing the Charikar gap, bifurcates into the Paghman range, joining Kohi-Baba; and the Paghman range which projects southwestwards to separate the basin of river Helmand from that of Ayghandab and Kabul rivers. 64

The centrally located Kohi-Baba which originates from the Western Hindukush from Shiber Pass in Bamyam valley, stretches westward until "it runs in a series of low hills and ridges along the Harirud" river. Kohi-baba with its 150 kms east-west extension, has an average elevation of about 4500 metres which "its steep slopes, deep narrow valleys" and the greater width of its ranges, render "communication difficult and at places impracticable". Further West, Kohi-Baba bifurcates into the northern Safid-Koh and southern

63. Fraser - Tytler, op.cit., pp.5-6.
64. R. Gopalakrishnan, op.cit., p.12.
Siah-Koh ranges. The Safid Koh stretches north-westwards until it loses itself near the Iranian frontier, separating the Harirud valley from the Murghab valley. To the north, in the area between the Murghab valley and the Soviet border, it gives rise to a subsidiary range known as Teerbandi which surrounds the Murghab basin from the northeast. The south-western extension of Kohi-baba, the Siah-Koh, stretching southwestwards, treads the separation of Harirud valley from the Helmand river valley. A subsidiary offshoot of Siah-Koh known as the eastern Siah-Koh "forces the Helmand river to adopt a southern course upto Grishk." 65

The Hindukush proper is a desolate and treeless range and only its eastern spurs that penetrate into Nuristan and northern Pashtunistan, specially Chitral and Dir, offer vegetation and forests. Kohi-baba and its western ranges with the exception of the Parapomisus, are also barren and devoid of vegetation. But in the laps of these ranges there are numerous green and fertile valleys. These ranges specially the Hindukush and Kohi-baba, with their perpetual snow-capped peaks, serve as great reservoirs of water to feed most of Pashtunkhwa's rivers, offering great hydroelectric potentials. At the same time this great conglomeration has continued to serve as a major barrier to national integration and communication, offering little choice for population concentration, assimilation and cultural interminglings so necessary for the

political unity and national awareness of the heterogeneous population. In fact, the ranges from a 960 km mountainous belt which divides Pashtunkhwa practically into two unequal parts, cutting off the northern Bactrian Plains and its important urban centres from those of the south of the country. 66

Two great offshoots of the Hindu-Kush are the southern Spinghar and the Sulaiman ranges with their subsidiary offshoots of rather inferior elevation like the Turghar, the Salt range and the Khwaja Emran mountain. These ranges dominate southeastern Afghanistan and the entire Pashtunistan including Baluchistan. They are "young, folded and faulted mountains" with an average height of about 10,000 feet, they form the most important Western Watersheds of the Indus river. 67

The Spinghar projects southward up to Logar Valley south of Kabul and dominates the territories of the Afridis, the Orakzais, the Turis and the Provinces of Paktya and Paktika. It is separated from the Hindukush proper by the Kabul river basin with its highest peak Sikaram reaching 15,000 feet. Its peaks are covered with perpetual snow and its slopes are covered with dense forests. Eastwards, it gives rise to the Salt range that stretches east of the so-called Durand Line up to Kala Bagh across Central Pashtunistan.

66. Vartan Gregorian, op. cit., p.3.
The Sulaiman range lies to the south-west of Spinghar which stretches in a south-west direction with its highest peak, Takhti-Sulaiman reaching up to 11,500 feet above sea level. The Sulaiman range with its spurs spreading in different directions, is a prominent topographic feature of southern Afghanistan and northern Baluchistan which separates Baluchistan from the so-called Tribal Territory (the Independent Pashtunistan) and the NWFP (Central occupied Pashtunistan). To the south, the Sulaiman range "dissipates into low barren ridges near Sibi at the southern end of Bolan pass" and "its highest parts are undoubtedly near its commencement." Thus, the Sulaiman range and its numerous spurs dominate most of Baluchistan, specially its northeastern parts. Baluchistan’s mountains are also some of the distant offshoots of the Sulaiman main range.

The northern mountains of Baluchistan constitute a massive physical conglomeration which stretches eastward until "forming a curve it merges with the main range of Sulaiman. It renders northern Baluchistan physically a very congested area with small valleys and green tablelands like the country lying immediately above, i.e., southern Afghanistan. An important western offshoot of the Sulaiman range is the Khwaja Emran range which lying southeast of Kandahar, stretches north-east towards Kalat. It separates Shorawak of Kandahar.

68. R. Gopalakrishnan, op. cit., p.13.
from Pishin and "theb forms the northern boundary of Pishin and afterwards takes the name of Toba, from (an area) through which it runs". 69

However, the Central configuration of the Hindukush ranges at Pamirs where it merges with the great Himalayas, gives rise to a series of subsidiary spurs that penetrate deep into northeastern Afghanistan and northern Pashtunistan, dominating the area from Kunar and Chitral up to the fertile valleys of Hazara, Peshawar and Mardan. At the lap of this physical configuration by the fertile and beautiful valleys of Nuristan, Kunar, Chitral, Dir, Swat, Kohistan and Bunair. The rugged Hazara district is a green and a fertile valley at the foot of a subsidiary spur, the Turghar or Black mountain. The extremely fertile plains of Peshawar, Mardan and Bannu are also surrounded by wild hills radiating from this conglomeration. 70

Thus, Pashtunistan, including most of Baluchistan specially its northeastern parts as a whole is dominated by the eastern ranges that radiate either directly from the Hindukush proper or from its great offshoots such as the important Spinghar and Julaiman mountain ranges. These very special physiographic characteristics with their specific ecological bearings, characterize Kooza Pashtunkhwa identical


70. See, Abdul Qaiyum, Gold and Guns on the Pathan Frontier (Bombay, 1945), p.6.
with that of Bara Pashtunkhwa, rendering it a compact landscape.

Thus, Kooza Pashtunkhwa, exhibiting the same geographic characteristic features as that of Bara Pashtunkhwa, proves to be a slanting extension of Bara Pashtunkhwa, bordering the subcontinent on the east with the river Indus as its natural geographic boundary. Pashtunistan is, therefore, geographically nothing but an irregular mountainous periphery of the rugged conglomeration of upper Pashtunkhwa which as its foothills, it stretches east and south up to the Indus and the Arabian sea. It is in view of these geographical features that it is popularly called Kooza (lower) Pashtunkhwa. Being geographically as well as culturally an integral part of Upper Pashtunkhwa, it is only separated from Afghanistan by the so-called imaginary Durand Line which, running southwestwards cut across most of the heavily populated areas.

In short, the pattern of mountain system of Pashtunkhwa which demarcates its major river basins and the distribution pattern of its population concentration and the type of its socio-economic activities, represents a distinct feature that characterises Pashtunkhwa as an integral geographic personality, essentially different from its surrounding geographic regions by virtue of its typical geographic features and their latent ecological influences upon its people, the Pashtuns and Baluchis.

Although most of Pashtunkhwa's ranges are impassable "extensive and certainly not easily negotiable" a number of
deep passes provides links between north and south which have been used from the times immemorial as main trade routes, highways of conquest and great communication axis. Thus, in spite of being great obstacles, the central massive conglomeration of mountain ranges have "never truly served as barrier to cultural, economic, or political penetration, but merely funnelled peoples and ideas along certain routes". 71

However, the passes over the central Hindu-Kush ranges are really hazardous. Being few in number and higher in elevation covered with perpetual snow, they are formidable barriers difficult to cross specially during the cold seasons, whereas the routes and passes through the eastern ranges are numerous, low and open always passable as convenient land routes and communication links responsible for the existing greater Pashtun social, cultural and tribal unity, affinity and integrity on both sides of the so-called Durand Line.

Until the late fifties, there was no adequate direct road to link the capital, Kabul and southern provinces with the northern provinces beyond the Hindukush. 72 The existing


72. Though the Hindukush ranges pierced by a few formidable passes, have served as a great barrier in the cultural, social and political integration of Afghanistan, yet the passes have made it possible to overcome the difficulties in a long course of time. Now we find different Afghan ethnic groups of either side settled in both southern and northern regions, leading to national integration. In addition a newly modern highway passing through the Sallung Pass Tunnel, has removed this barrier, strengthening the integration process.
roads traversed such hazardous and formidable passes as the Khawak (11,880 feet), the Shiber (10,758 feet) and the Akrobat (12,560 feet), which were difficult and impassable for at least six months of the year during cold and snowy seasons. These "passes and the narrow rocky gorges which are even higher than some mountains forced both commercial and military expeditions" to take "a long and circuitous route" from Kabul through the provinces of Ghazni, Kandahar and Herat.73

On the other hand, the routes and passes on the eastern ranges, the Kheiber, the Paiwar, the Kurram, the Tochi, the Gomal and the Bolan, names which occur again and again in the history of Pashtuns, are convenient highways passable throughout the year.

**Strategic Significance of the Topography**

In fact, it is these strategic passes and the highways that provide regional geographical linkages in the region that has given supreme strategic significance to Pashtunkhwa. The passes guarding the highways, have had a highly strategic importance, serving as highway gates leading to the peripheral strategic urban centres and core areas of the country. Located on two parallel strategic lines of offensive and defensive significance, they have special defence value. As Jeinson says "Anyone forming a defensive line on the Hindu-kush..."

the Khaiber behind him; anyone falling back to the Indus plain is dominated by the Sulaiman range". This has been a dilemma for generations of statesmen and soldiers, "policy after policy has been discarded". No "policy has been successful" and most of them have led to disasters.  

In fact, the survival of any political power within Pashtunkhwa or in its neighbourhood depended largely on the success of the ruler's policies towards these strategic passes and the "Gateway valleys". The British realizing this right from the beginning of their expansion in the subcontinent, tried their best to push forward across the Afghan territories in order to control these strategic routes and passes in the hope of establishing a "scientific frontier" along a line containing the strategic cities of southern Afghanistan, supported by the might Hindukush barrier. Though meeting with repeated failures, defeats, losses and retreats at the hands of the Pashtuns, the British still retained the passes along with the Pashtunkhwa's territory west of the Indus, which the Pashtuns in view of the unfavourable conditions created by British invasion and devastation could not recover in spite of their repeated attempts.

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However, whether it be the British or the new State of Pakistan, the fact remains the same that apart from the legitimacy of the Pashtun cause and its advocacy by Afghanistan, the highly strategic significance and proximities of these passes and the Pashtunistan territory are of serious concern for Afghanistan's own safety, security and its political survival as they form an integral vital part of the security and integrity of Pashtunkhwa as a whole. Hence, neither Afghanistan nor the people of Pashtunistan can ignore the interdependence of the strategic position of their homeland of Pashtunkhwa as the survival of its both wings—Afghanistan and Pashtunistan depends on the safety and security of each other. It is the realization of this vital question that Afghanistan can never afford retention of the strategic Pashtunistan in alien hands.

In fact, an alien hostile domination of Pashtunistan can threaten the whole of southern Afghanistan which is the most vital and central constituent part of Pashtunkhwa. For instance, Afghanistan's most important strategic areas and its core areas and urban centres such as Kabul, the capital, Jalalabad, Ghazni, Paktya, Kandahar and Helmand have rather exposed position from the security and military point of view, vis-à-vis the so-called Durand Line or the Pashtun territory beyond, as these areas lie close to the Durand Line and the core areas beyond, posing an ever-present threat and command, and thus could very easily be occupied by hostile invading forces from the territory of Pashtunistan as was done by the
British and now by the Afghan resistance forces. Nowhere, the distance between the adjacent Afghan and Pashtun core areas and urban centres exceed beyond a 120 Kilometre. Thus, Afghanistan, because of its own significant geopolitical position as being placed under the voluminous shadow of the surrounding rival powers of Russia, China, India and economically strong Iran, is bound to support the Pashtunistan cause out of security considerations also in addition to the country's national and moral obligations towards the legitimate aspirations of its Pashtun and Baluch brethrens.

In short, the geographical personality of Pashtunkhwa and its environmental bearing on its ethnography, its culture and its economy exhibit characteristic qualifications which all question the logic and the validity of the existence of the so-called "Durand Line" drawn on such an unfeasible and disturbing location which being described by Fraser-Tytler as "illogical from the point of view of ethnography of strategy and of geography," does not only disturb the ecological integrity of Pashtunkhwa causing unjust socio-economic crisis, cultural imbalances and injustices and political unrest and instability, but also leads to serious political complications of larger and severe consequences for the peace, progress and stability of the region and of the world at large.

To conclude, Pashtunkhwa or the land of the Hindu Kush ranges is a land of wide regional variations. More than half is a high plateau, traversed by lofty mountains, snow-clad for greater part of the year. The sloping plains at the foot of the plateau in view of flood deposits are extremely fertile. The valleys surrounded by hills and mountains are fertile and extremely beautiful and "appear like green gems set in the lap of mountains." The other half of the region, specially southwest of Afghanistan and a major part of the western Baluchistan which in fact is the extension of one geographic set-up divided by the so-called 'Durand Line', is flat, sandy and desolate, where the very wind is often dusty and suffocating. Generally it is an unproductive wasteland except certain parts which are potentially cultivable, awaiting future development.

Although average rainfall is low, heavy snow originating in the high precipitous ranges of Pashtunkhwa, provide adequate water and power resources of great potential for the region. But since much of the water "rushes down in torrents" along the mountain slopes, most of the water is wasted rather than retained and "passed on gradually to the valleys" for cultivation.

Thus, an examination of the topographical formation of Pashtunkhwa reveals the fact that while northern Pashtunistan is a continuation of eastern Afghanistan, Central Pashtunistan is an extension of the southeastern Spinghar region of Afghanistan.

Similarly, while northern Baluchistan represents southern Afghanistan, the remaining vast and empty part of Baluchistan corresponds with that of south-western Afghanistan that is the Seistan region or the Helmand river basin.\footnote{Thomas Henry Thornton, \textit{Colonel Sir Robert Sandeman} (London, 1895) pp.98-112.}

This geographical classification, in fact, corresponds with respective ethnographic, cultural, social and psychological characterization and categorisation as well, exhibiting a great deal of tribal, social, cultural and psychological cohesion, unity and integrity all along these geographically classified sub regions, in spite of being artificially and unnaturally divided by the so-called Durand Line. In fact, as a result of its common geography, the territories on both sides of the "Durand Line" are firmly integrated together by strong bonds of cultural linguistic and tribal affinities all along these regional territorial stretches. The present heavy concentration of population of same ethnic and tribal origin on both sides of the Durand Line is a good testimony of this geographical fact.

\textbf{Drainage System of Pashtunkhwa}

Pashtunkhwa or the Hindukush region with its special physiographic structural formation has a distinct drainage system. Being influenced directly by the physical structure of the Hindukush ranges and its offsets, serving as drainage dividing lines, Pashtunkhwa's drainage pattern can mainly be divided into five drainage main networks, that is the five
river basins, through which the five main rivers and their tributaries run and all of which draw their water sources from the Hindu Kush ranges, but run in different directions. They are the Kabul river basin, the Oxus or Amu Darya river basin, the Helmand river basin, the Harirud river basin and the Indus river basin.

The Kabul river and its tributaries such as the Logar, the Panjshir, the Togab, the Alingar, Alishing and the most important, the Kunar, form the Kabul river basin with a catchment area of more than 75,000 kilometres delimited by the Hindu Kush in the north, Kohi Baba in the west and Spinghar in the South. The Kabul river, rising from the Unai pass in the Kohi Baba, some 80 km. west of the capital, Kabul, flows swiftly eastward through Kabul, Jalalabad, the Khaiber, Peshawar until it meets the Indus at Attock. It is 500 km. long of which 360 km. flows through Afghanistan and the rest through Pashtunistan, with an average discharge of 30,000 cubic feet per second during summer. It is a river which flows mostly through the highly fertile and largely cultivated areas of the basin and is largely un navigable except for a while below

80. Out of the tributaries of the Kabul river, the Logar and the Kunar are the most important. While the Logar which joins the Kabul river 12 km. east of Kabul city, comes from the southwest, the Kunar and other tributaries of the river such as Panjshir, Tagab, Alingar and Alishing, come from the north, rising at great elevations upon the southern slopes of the Hindu Kush. The Kunar, originally the principal river of Chitral, joins the Kabul river at Dakka, east of Jalalabad.
Jalalbad and then near Atak in Pashtunistan. The tributaries of the Kabul river are widely used for irrigation, except a few the rest dry up during summers. A prominent feature of the basin is the numerous interior valleys separated by various subsidiary ranges. Though highly cultivated, the Kabul river basin which splays wider into Pashtunistan, still possesses great potentials for overall economic development both in Afghanistan and Pashtunistan which requires joint ventures for its economic exploitation.

The Amu or the Oxus with its tributaries such as the Kunduz, Kokcha and other small rivers, training the northern fertile plains of the Hindukush form the Oxus river basin which is entirely fed by the perpetual snow of the Hindukush and the gigantic Pamirs known as the roof of the world. It is separated from other basins by the central Hindu-kush ranges and extends from the wakhan in the east to upper reaches of Murghab in the west. The Oxus river being 1,600 km. long, rises at an elevation of about 14,000 feet from among the glaciers of the Pamir Plateau and flows west, making a natural boundary of 1200 km. with Soviet Russia. The Oxus river is navigable after its 680 km. flow, after which it widens with depths up to 30 feet depending on season. Out of its important tributaries only the Kokcha and Kunnduz reaches the river while the remaining get exhausted by extensive irrigation in the basin. The Oxus river

basin is the most fertile and cultivable basin of Pashtunkhwa, possessing enormous scope for future economic development.

The main course of the Harirud river with its less important tributaries draining the fertile valley of Herat, make the small but highly productive basin of the Marirud. It is delimited by Paropamisus, Safid-Koh and Siah-Koh from the north, east and south respectively. The Harirud river originating in the western extension of the Hindukush, the mountains of Ghur at an elevation of about 9000 feet, flows west until it meets the border with Iran where it turns north, making a natural boundary line of 90 km. with that country. The numerous canals which irrigate Herat valley deplete the waters of the Harirud, with a catchment area of more than 17,000 square km. Several subsidiary ranges divide the fertile Harirud valley into various small valley. Although small and largely cultivated, Harirud basin still possesses a large potential for modern schemes of irrigation.

The Helmand river basin comprises vast catchment area of more than 350,000 square kms. in southwestern Afghanistan, of which a 10th (about 50,000 sms) lies in Iran as a result of the British division of Afghan Province of Seistan. The Helmand is the largest inland river with an average discharge

82. R. Gopinakrishnan, Ibid., p. 18.

83. Ibid., p. 17.
of 70,000 cubic feet per second during normal summers. The river originates in Koni Baba near the source of Kabul river at an altitude of 10,000 feet and flows southwest through Grishk and Bust until it enters the Seistan desert (Higistan) where, after making a long gradual west and curving, it turns sharply to the north and immediately empties into the Helmand, and inland lake between Afghan-Iran frontier. The important Arghandab, flowing southwest which joins the Helmand from the east, near Lashkargah, is the largest tributary of the river which itself receives abundant waters from the Arghistan, the Tarnak and the Dori rivers in the Kandelar region. Helmand river being largely unutilized, possesses the largest economic potentials in the region availing extensive exploitation which has already been started by the Afghan Government.84

84. The Helmand river possesses great scope for economic development but unfortunately its full exploitation and utilization is prevented to some extent by the Iran-Afghan dispute over the sharing of its water. Afghanistan in order to give the so-called one-third share of water (28 c.m. per second) to Iran, has to sacrifice a highly significant amount of usable water, perhaps twice as much as that going to Iran, which gets wasted as the Helmand river passes through the vast deserts before reaching Iran. A large amount of its water is lost in the deserts which could be saved and utilized for the greater benefit of the human community in the upper Helmand valley, if Iran were to give up or at least relax its claim for the humanitarian reason of saving waste. Iran can very well manage by using underground water sources there. For the dispute, see, Helmand Water Dispute, (Kabul, 1972) pp.44-56 and A.A.H Abid, "Irano-Afghan Dispute over Helmand Water" International Studies, vol.16, no.3, July-Sept.1977, pp.357-78.
The last and the important is the Indus river basin, which comprises the entire area of northern and central Pashtunistan between the Indus river and its western watersheds is the eastern ranges of Pashtunkhwa through which the so-called Durand Line runs. Being about 2,000 km. long, it rises in the eastern higher extension of the Hindukush, near the water source of the Oxus river and flows in a southwest direction until it reaches the Arabian Sea. More than half of the river's length specially between Atak and Chinab, along with the ranges of northern Pashtunistan and eastern Baluchistan, make a natural boundary line of Pashtunkhwa with the subcontinent between Pashtunistan and Pakistan. The Indus is widely used for irrigation and energy production, and hence it is not navigable except over short distance.

In addition to the five main river basins, there are other important rivers also both in Afghanistan and Pashtunistan: The Murghab river in the northwest of Afghanistan, flowing northward until it enters Soviet territory serving for a short distance as Soviet-Afghan border. In the west, the Farahrud (640 km.), the Khashrud and the Adreskan (480 km.) draining a large area between the Helmand and Harirud river basins, rise in the Jiankoh and flows southwest parallel into the Seistan lake, but dries up during summer. In south, the Ghazni (190 km) and the Nawur (133 km.) are important rivers,
which drain the Ghani region with their respective catchment areas of 12,730 and 3,710 square kilometres, pouring into Abi-istada (still water).

The river system of Pashtunistan is a part of Pashtunkhwa's main river system influenced by the physical structure of the Hindukush ranges. Next to the Indus in rank is the Kabul river which drains the most fertile Peshawar Valley. In northern Pashtunistan, the Kunar known as Chitral river in Chitral, and the Swat are the most important rivers of which the former after draining Chitral in Pashtunistan flows through Afghanistan as a major tributary of the Kabul river, the Swat and its tributaries drain the Swat and other valleys in northern Pashtunistan before it joins the Kabul river north of Peshawar which ultimately joins the Indus near Attab. In central Pashtunistan, the Kurram and its tributary the Tochi, and the Gomal rising in the slopes of the Llinghay, flow eastward from Afghanistan into central Pashtunistan which after draining the area, join the Indus. Thus, from Chazni onwards the Afghan highlands form the main watersheds of "all the rivers of eastern Afghanistan" which flow across the so-called Durrand Line into Pashtunistan, joining the Indus.85

In southern Pashtunistan or Baluchistan the rivers are either flowing deep and are largely unutilized as those of

northern Baluchistan, or being seasonal, have little water and dry up in summer.

Climate

The climate of Pashtunkhwa has an important bearing on its people, their customs and their various activities and is a factor determining the range of products, type of its economy and the patterns of its economic development.

Pashtunkhwa, being a combination of high snow-capped mountains, rugged foothills, sloping plains and vast deserts with numerous altitude variations, exhibits a typical continental climate influenced by its location and local conditions and essentially affected by the climatic influence of the neighbouring regions. As a result we find the eastern and south-eastern parts of Pashtunkhwa under the effect of the Indian monsoon, its northern parts separated by the Hindukush proper, under the climatic influence of central Asia. In between the Hindukush proper and the eastern ranges of Spinghar and Sulaiman which cut off the Indian monsoon, the country is subject to the net effect of the local climates influenced by the combined effect of the climatic influences coming from Central Asia and the Indian subcontinent. Still to the south-west, the region retains a desert character which is unaffected by the monsoon from the Arabian Sea. Situated in the "North Temperate Zone", Pashtunkhwa with its physical and regional variations in elevation, acquires a typical continental dry climate exhibiting "seasonal extremes of heat and cold, very
marked differences between day and night temperatures and rapid transitions from one season to the next. In general, the winters are cold and wet, while summers are hot and dry and still "hot in the sun but cool and fresh in the shade and rather cold at night." The average mean temperature for Kabul ranges between 32° in January to 75° in July.

In fact, subject to the effects of the "cold air masses" from the north, from Siberia and the "Atlantic low depression", Pashtunkhwa gets much of its precipitation in the form of winter snow between October and April which the high mountain peaks retain at above 14,000 feet perpetually or at least for ten months of the year. In the steppes north and south of the Hindukush, the precipitation is in the form of rainfall with little occasional snow. Rainfall is scanty and estimated to average little over 12 inches per year for the whole of Pashtunkhwa. The Indian monsoon brings summer showers only to the eastern regions, the valleys that lead to the Indus river basin i.e. central Pashtunistan and the Paktya region, where at Peshawar the annual rainfall reaches 15 inches, while the rest of Pashtunkhwa largely remains rainless during summer, though occasionally heavy showers do occur. There is a small but important amount of rainfall during spring accompanied occasionally by heavy showers and even hailstorms. Thus except the valley of Peshawar in the lower Kabul river basin, the entire Pashtunistan including northern Baluchistan assume the climates of the adjacent regions of eastern and southern Afghanistan.

AFGHANISTAN

Physiography

LEGEND

PHYSICAL REGIONS

I NORTHERN AFGHANISTAN
II SOUTHERN AFGHANISTAN
II-A EASTERN AFGHANISTAN
II-B WESTERN AFGHANISTAN

MAJOR RIVER BASINS

A OXUS RIVER BASIN
B KABUL RIVER BASIN
C SISTAN BASIN
D HARI RUD BASIN

SCALE
D) Ethnography of Pashtunkhwa

As a "highway of conquest", Pashtunkhwa with its highly rugged physiography derives from its conquered history a number of legacies that have significantly affected its people, its culture, its society, its socio-economic structure and the heterogeneous character of its people. The various migratory hordes conquerors and empire-builders who conquered the whole or parts of the country from time to time, or marched ahead on their way to India, left their traces in people, culture and languages in the fertile plains and deep inaccessible valleys of the rugged Pashtunkhwa.87 For the rugged physiography which served significant contact and communication between the new settlers and the native inhabitants, provided shelter to such diversified cultural survivals, preventing their assimilation into the main body of the general population.

The physiography did not only serve to divide the population into diversified ethnic and linguistic groups, tribes and clans, leaving them in various uneven stages of socio-economic cultural and political development88 but also facilitated the advent and persistence of elements of traditionalism, tribalism,


nomadism and semi-pastoral ways of living as effective means of cultural survival in the face of continued internal and external threats that greatly undermined the process of cultural, national and political evolution.\textsuperscript{89}

However, inspite of the evident ethnic and linguistic diversity, most of the ethnic groups have greatly intermingled with each other in one way or the other, adopting a common culture which seems to be based on Aryan traditions, the fundamentals of Islam and religion-oriented social system. Hence of the ethnic groups, the Pashtuns, being a historically, and culturally dominant ethnic entity, confined mainly to the inaccessible mountainous areas, indicate strong evidences of retaining their early Aryan racial and cultural characteristics. Being an absolute majority of about 70\%, they seem to have influenced all other ethnic groups culturally as well as racially with the help of their effective egalitarian social system of Pashtunwali\textsuperscript{90}

The principal ethnic groups that make up the 32 million composite and culturally mixed population of Pashtunkhwa\textsuperscript{91} are: the Pashtuns or the Afghans proper, the Tajeks, the Baluchis,


\textsuperscript{91} The figure of 32 million population for Pashtunkhwa as shown in Table III, is an addition of the official figures for Afghanistan and Pashtunistan (N.W.F.P? the Tribal Territory and Baluchistan) released by the governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan respectively. See, Statistical Information of Afghanistan, 1974-75, Statistical Office, Kabul, 1975, p. 1 and 1972 Census of Pakistan, Times of India (New Delhi), April 15, 1974, p.13.
the Brahnis, the Uzbeks, the Hazaras, the Aimaqs, the Dardics (i.e., Nuristanis, Chitralis and Kuhistanis), the Turkmans, the Qizilbashs, Saiyeeds and Arals and the recently settled Punjabis and small ethnic groups such as the Hindus, Sikhs, Kirghigis, Sindhi-speaking Lassis, Jats, Mongols, Jews and few others. Most of these ethnic and linguistic groups, specially the major ones, as shown in Tables II, III and IV are mixed and in a sense culturally Pashtunized in their character and are scattered more or less all over the region, but each group retains certain characteristics of its own, confined to certain territories, the bulk of which are divided unnaturally between Afghanistan and Pashtunistan.92

The inhabitants of Afghanistan are shown in Tables I and II, are estimated at about 18.7 million out of which the Pashtuns constitute a majority of over sixty six (66%) per cent or a population of over 12.4 millions, who are primarily concentrated in eastern, southern and western parts of the country, with a great number of them settled sparsely in the northern provinces, specially in the provinces of Baghlan, Kunduz, Balkh, Jauzjan, Faryab, Badghnees and Herat, where they also form a rather weak majority.93

92. See, Table II, II, III and IV.

93. A comprehensive census has not yet been taken in Afghanistan. The figures given for Afghanistan's total and provincial population are official estimates. The rest are my own calculations based on available estimates and my research and study of the distribution of Afghanistan's ethnic groups. Hence the figures are only suggestive approximation and may be far from facts. However, at present in the absence of ... (f.n. contd).
The Pashtuns of Afghanistan, whose about three million nomads are not included in the provincial population of the country, make a provincial majority in twenty of the country's twenty-six provinces and in the remaining six provinces they either form the second or a third majority as indicated in Table II.94 And if the three million nomad Pashtuns who change their residence between summer and winter (as shown in Table No.3) are to be reckoned with the settled Pashtuns, their number would further increase in northern provinces, making a further provincial majority.95 Outside Afghanistan about 10.2 million of the Pashtuns live in Pashtunistan and Baluchistan as shown by Tables III and IV; they are entirely settled.

However, the future of 12.4 million Pashtuns for Afghanistan include those Pashtuns only who are generally recognized and accepted as Pashtuns who have preserved their native Pashtun identity, speaking their own language of Pashto. There are... real statistics, they can serve best to give a rough idea about the ethnic composition and distribution of Afghanistan's population. So the figures given are most reliable and agreeable, with small deviations to most of the authorities on Afghanistan. The contention is only with regard to the percentage of the Pashtuns whose considerable number about three millions are still leading nomadic life and hence difficult to reach at a definite estimate. While according to an Iranian estimate the Pashtuns are 70% a UN/UNESCO statistics claim 75% to be the percentage for the Pashtuns. See for detail, Table I, II, III, IV and their respective footnotes.  

94. According to official estimate out of the total population of 18,714,600, 16.4% or 3,068,600 people are estimated to be nomads out of which 98.97% or 3,037,000 are to be Pashtuns; the remaining are supposed to be Baluchi, Ajmaq and Turkman nomads whose number are not included in the provincial population, see for detail, Table II and its respective footnotes, and the Statistical Information of Afghanistan 1974-75 (Kabul, 1975).

95. In fact, the rich pasture lands of the provinces of... (f.r. contd)
some other Pashtun group who have lost their Pashtun identity, adopting Persian language as of their own due to the historical domination of the language. These groups categorized with other ethnic groups on the bases of their speech, Physical appearance and association, include the Taimanis, Firozekohis and Zuris of Ghur in the northwest termed as Aimaqs, the Nomandi and Masoodi Hazaras and the Panjshiris and Formulis of Parwan and Kabul Provinces respectively. Almost all of these people have lost their Pashtun cultural characteristics in view of the continued Persianisation, but most of them still believe to be genetically related to the Pashtuns. 96

Next in number are the mixed Persian-speaking ethnic groups known together as Parsiwans who, consisting mainly Tajiks, account for 13 percent of total population or nearly 2,340,000 people, 97 who are sparsely scattered all over the

95. ...Bamyan, Ghur, Badghees, Faryat and Badakhshan are specially attracting enormous number of the Pashtun nomads during spring and summer seasons from the lowland areas of the country, see Ethnic Map No.3


97. The various estimates for the Parsiwans or Tajiks range up to 30% which happen to be exaggerations due to the domination of Persian language and its use by other ethnic groups in communication with outsiders, that mislead foreign scholars and visitors to include such Persian-users among the actual Persian-speaking ethnic groups. In fact the most unreliable writings of the American writer Louis Dupree, specially his book Afghanistan, 1975, is a good example of such blunders. See for detail; Tables I, II and the respective footnotes.
northern, western and central urban and agricultural areas of the country, constituting a majority only in the two provinces of Takhar and Badakhshan as indicated by Table II. The so-called Tajeks in Afghanistan consist of "a number of some different and distinct ethnic groups who have lost all tribal affiliation or identity" adopting "Persian as their mother tongue" and "who live as peasants, artisans, merchants or labourers" in urban centres and as sedentary agriculturist inhabiting the most fertile oases of the country. Though highly Persianized, they are still categorized mainly "into four distinct population groups": 1, the Parsiwans or Tajeks in the valleys south of Hindukush in the provinces of Kabul, Parwan and Logar; 2, the Mountain Tajeks of the Hindukush mountainous region from Bamyan to Badakhshan; 3, the urban Parsiwans of northern provinces; and 4, the Parsiwans of western Afghan which include various Persianized ethnic elements, known in Herat as Heratis, whose half a number is Shia, the other half being Sunni as the

98. The word Tajek is believed to have been derived from the Arabic Taj or Taz which originally meant a non-Muslim Arab. In the "medieval times (i.e., 13th-14 centuries) the word Tajek (then usually written or Tazik" meant persian speaking Muslims, sedentary peoples as opposed to the nomadic or semi-nomadic Turks and Tatars". H.F. Schurmann, The Mongols of Afghanistan (Hague, 1961), pp.72-73.

99. See for detail H. F. Schurmann, ibid., pp. 73-85.
However, the other ethnic groups that make up the rest of Afghan population are: the Turkic Uzbeks, 5.34% or about one million; the Mongoloid Hazaras, 4.75% or 890,000; the ethnically distinct Aima tribes 2.93% or 550,000 people; the Turkic Turkmans 1.22% or 240,000; the culturally mixed Baluchis and Brahmis, 1.12% or 210,000 and other small ethnic groups, such as the Dardic Nuristanis and Pashais (0.80%) the Qizibashs (0.32%) the Arabs and Sayeeds (0.61%) and others. The Uzbeks and Turkmans are Turkic people with Mongoloid admixture who inhabit northern Afghanistan, specially the provinces of Kunduz, Takhar Samangan, Balkh, Jauzjar and Faryab, where after the Pashtuns they form the second majority as shown by Table II. They are exclusively Hanafi Sunnis.

100. The Parsiwans or Tajeks of the urban centres of northern Afghanistan are the modern descendants of the ancient Khwarazmians and Soghdians of Central Asia who have lost their languages due to Persianization. Their basic physical appearance is Mediterraneans sub-stock. The Mountain Tajeks reflect a Mediterranean substock with Mongoloid features increasing from south to north. The rest of the Parsiwans in the south and west of the country are a complex mixture of various Mediterranean substock looking features, Ibid., p. 75.

101. See Tables I, II, III and their respective notes.
The Mongoloid Hazaras, an ethnically mixed people, who are Shia in sect, predominate in the central mountainous part of Afghanistan, constituting the only majority in the province of Bamiyan. 102

The different Aimaq groups inhabit the provinces of Ghur and Badghees with a great number of them in Herat.103 Being entirely Hanafi Sunnis, they include the originally Pashtun Taimannis and Ferozekuhis, the Hazara Aimaqs, the Jamshedis and the Mugholic Temur is of which the Taimannis being the largest form a majority in Ghur.104 The mixed Baluchis

102. The Hazaras are ethnically a Turkic and Mongoloid elements, exhibiting in their basic physical appearance Mongoloid features with certain sub-Mediterranean admixture. Some of the southern Hazaras, specially the Momandi and Massoodi Hazaras are believed to be genetically related to the Pashtuns, in particular, to the two Pashtun tribes of Mohmands and Massoods. These Hazaras with their distinct cultural characteristics and their sub-Mediterranean features, do not indicate cultural affinities with the main body of the Hazaras and traditions regarding their genetic relation to the Pashtuns exist among themselves. See, H.F. Schurmann, op. cit., pp. 37-39.

103. The Taimannis predominate in the Province of Ghur. The Ferozekuhis being the second largest Aimaq group, live to the north of Taimannis in Ghur and in the adjacent province of Badghes. The Hazara Aimaqs are settled in Badghees. The Jamshedis settlement lies to the northwest of Herat and that of the Temuris to the southwest near Iran-Afghan border. These groups generally indicate sub-Mediterranean basic physical appearance with some of them specially the Hazara Aimaqs representing a Mongoloid admixture. Ibid., pp. 51-67.

104. According to Bellew, Ferdinand, Gankovsky. Schurmann and Pata Khazana (Hidden Treasure), the Taimannis, Ferozekuhis and Zuris of Ghur are ethnically related to the Pashtuns and are supposed to be the descendants of the Ghori Pashtuns who for a long period supplied various ruling dynasties known synonymously as Zuris, Jhuris or Juris. Bellew even traces the names of certain Pashtun tribes among the tribal lineages of the Taimanis such as Kakar and Darzai. For (f.n: contd)
and Brahuis whose one-third are Baluchis, inhabit a large part of southwestern Afghanistan adjacent to Baluchistan.

The different Dardic groups of Kohistanis (Pashais) and Nuristanis inhabit the interior small valleys south of the Hindukush proper in the northeast which extend from Kapisa to Chitral in northern Pashtunistan, comprising the northern limits of Parwan, Laghman and Kunar provinces. Being Hanafi Sunni with sub-Mediterranean features, they are culturally and ethnically related to the Chitrali and Konistani Dardics of northern Pashtunistan. The few Arabs are scattered in the northern provinces, while the numerous Sayeeds or the

104. instance Mr H. F. Schurmann after recording the existence of cultural affinities, intermarriages and good relations between the Pashtuns and the Taimannis reports that: "When specifically asked about the origin of the Taimannis, the same informant stated merely that they were the descendants of Taiman the son of Kakar. Other informants in the Ghurat however, stated that the Taimannis were related to the Afghans and that both have a common origin." However, these statements are in complete accord with the record of Pata Khazana, the historically valuable Pashto literary monument recently discovered. Pata Khazana written in 1141-42 A.H. quotes a historical authority in the following words: "Sheikh Taiman was the son of Sheikh Kakar. He went to the upper part of Ghur and settled there with the result that now no one considers his descendants to be included among the Kakar Pashtuns". Mohammad bin Hotak, Pata Khazana (Hidden Treasure) (Kabul, 1975), pp. 27-28.

105. The various Dardic ethnic and linguistic groups consist of the Nuristani Katis, Paranis or Prasunis, Waigelis, Damalis, Ashkunir, Kauwalis, Kleshis, Gwaris, Jhumachtis, Watapuris, Gwanabatis, Klangili, and the Pashais and others. In northern Pashtunistan in Chitral, Swat, Dir and Kuhistan they include Khuwaris or Chitralis, Gwaris, Klashis, Busukaries, Garwis, Turwalis, Majanis and others, Dost Mohammad Dost, The Languages and Races of Afghanistan (Pashto) (Kabul: Pashto Academy, 1975), pp. 391-463.
so-called descendents of the Prophet Mohammad are scattered all over the country who, being culturally mixed with other people retain their proud identity only by calling themselves Sayeeds.106

Of all the population of Afghanistan, the Pro-Iranian Turkic Quizilbashes, Shia by sect numbering about 90,000, are a highly Persianized, urbanized, politicized, literate and most rich and politically influential ethnic group who live mainly in capital Kabul and the two major urban centres of Kandahar and Herat. Being entirely educated and culturally sophisticated they dominate disproportionately the country's top business and the key positions in the administration specially in the foreign, civil, cultural and educational services. Hence, being highly politicized and Persianized, they serve an anti-Pashtun influential reactionary interest group, active clandestinely against most of the national issues, specially those in favour of the Pashtuns.

In addition to the above ethnic groups, there are a number of other very small ethnic groups whose numbers range from a few hundreds to several thousands, such as the Turkic Kirghizis (about 40,000), the Hindus (about 20,000) the Jikhs (about 10,000), the few thousands Mongols, the Karakalpaks,

Jews, Gujars, Jats and so many other minor groups. However, there are other important ancient ethnic and linguistic peoples, known as Pamiris, who live in the isolated narrow valleys of the Badakhshan highlands. The languages of these ancient Aryan people specially those of the Wakhis, Ishkashimis, Rushanis, Shughnis, Munjanis, Sanglichis and others exhibit close relations to Pashto, Ormari and Perachi languages and the desolate ancient languages of Avesta, Jugndi, and Khwarazm. As a result of the recent findings, these languages are considered to be a separate central group of Indo-Aryan languages called the Bactrian or Bactric group as distinguished from the western Iranian (Persic) and eastern Indian (Indic) groups by its distinct typical character assuming a middle position between the two Iranian and Indian groups of the Indo-Aryan branch of the Indo-European family of languages.

107. See Tables I, II, III and their respective notes.

108. The Parachis and Ormuris have been once a numerous people and now their number is limited to a few thousands tending to decline further. Today Parachi is spoken only by a few Paracris in isolated places in the interior southern valleys of the Hindukush in the Parwan province. The few Ormuris now live in Logar and Paktya provinces of which about 100 families live in Baraki Barak of Logar. The bulk of the Ormuris about 3500 live in Kani Kram of Waziristan in Central Pashtunistan, see for detail, Dost Mohammad Dost, op. cit., pp. 168-216.

109. Until now Bactrian or Bactric languages, including, Pashto, were included in the Iranian group, the so-called East Iranian branch. But the new findings of many scholars such as Professor Abdul Hai Habibi of Kabul University and Mr. Dost Mohammad Dost, a notable scholar of the Pashto Academy in Kabul, proved the inclusion of these languages specially Pashto in East Iranian group as incorrect and rejected. They have proven that these languages constitute a separate Bactrian group of the Indo-Aryan branch. Dost has produced a comprehensive research work in support of this theory. See for detail, Abdul Hai Habibi,
In Pashtunistan, the traditional inhabitants are predominately the Pashtuns with the Baluchis and Brahuis living mainly in Baluchistan. According to 1972 Census of Pakistan, the total population of Pashtunistan is about 13.3 millions of which the Pashtuns number about 10.2 millions. The culturally assimilated homogenous Baluchis and Brahuis who live primarily in the southern, central and western parts of Baluchistan account for more than one million. The rest are some indigenous ethnic groups and some larger settlements of Punjabi and Sindhi emigrants from Pakistan as indicated in Tables III and IV.

In the so-called Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) of 8½ millions and the tribal territory of 2½ millions, the Pashtuns account for 86.1% or 9,385,000 people out of 10,900,000 the total population, the bulk of which belong to the major Pashtun tribes which are divided between Afghanistan and Pashtunistan by the so-called Durand Line. The remaining ethnic groups are the Punjabi emigrants, the Dardic Chitrals, Kuhistanis and Nuristanis, the Baluchis, the labourer and


111. Ibid.
agriculturist Awans and Sujars and the small numbers of the Jayeeds, Qizilbash, Tajeks and Hazaras. Most of the Pashtuns are concentrated mainly in the so-called Tribal Territory, the districts of Bannu, Kohat, Mardan, Peshawar and the former States of Dir and Swat, where they constitute an absolute majority of 90 to 95% of the total population and in the rest of the province specially in the newly developed urban centres the Pashtuns form an ordinary majority as the Punjabi emigrants from Punjab are encouraged to settle there.

The Dardic Chitralis, Kuhistanis and Nuristanis who number about 210,000 mainly live in the remote valleys of northern Pashtunistan i.e. on the territory of former Chitral and Swat states. They are ethically and linguistically related to the neighbouring Dardic people in Afghanistan. The other ethnic groups specially the politically and economically dominant Punjabi emigrants from Pakistan are mainly settled

112. See Tables III, IV and their respective foot notes.
114. A considerable number of the Pashtuns also live in the Campbellpur and Rawalpindi in Punjab and in Karachi and in Upper Sindh. After 1947, due to the colonial policies of the Government of Pakistan, the Pashtun population of Punjab and Sindh has jumped to about 300,000 mainly as seasonal workers and toiled labourers, which in Karachi alone it mounted to nearly 150,000 in 1957, Yu. V. Gankovsky, op. cit., p. 11 and Dr Feroz Ahmad, Focus on Baluchistan and Pashtoon Question (Lahore, 1975), p. 91.
115. According to 1961 Census of Pakistan in Chitral there were 95,000 kurds or chitrailis, 3000 Nuristanis and 2000 Kohistanis and the bulk of the Kohistanis numbered about 60,000 in the former states of Swat, Yu. V. Gankovsky, op. cit., p. 12.
in the urbanized centres and highly agricultural areas of Pashtunistan where their settlements are patronised by the colonizing policies of the government of Pakistan.\textsuperscript{116}

In Baluchistan, the indigenous of permanent resident population account for 90% of the province's total population which consists of different ethnic groups such as the Pashtuns, the Baluchis, the Brahuis and the Lasis. According to 1972 Census of the Government of Pakistan, there were 2,400,000 people in Baluchistan,\textsuperscript{117} of which the Pashtuns account for 35%,\textsuperscript{118} Baluchis about 28%, the Brahins nearly 16%, the Lasis about 5% and the rest being small ethnic groups with large number of Punjabi, Jindui and Urdu speaking emigrants from Pakistan (See Table 111).

The Pashtuns inhabit mainly northern Baluchistan, especially, the three districts of Quetta-Pishin, Loralai and Zhobe where they constitute an absolute majority of over 60%. A great number of the Pashtuns about 22%, also live in the district of Jibi and the rest of them are sparsely settled in other districts. Quite a good number of Pashtuns are assimilated into the main body of Baluchis and Brahuis through

\textsuperscript{116} Most of the Punjabis who dominate Pakistan's economy and the administration, live mainly in the urban centres and the two districts of Dera-i-Ismail Khan and Hazara, see for detail on the political and economic domination and exploitation of Pashtuns by the Punjabi emigrants, Attyee, \textit{Thi Khpalwakai Taroon: Self-Determination (In Pashto) (Kabul: Ministry of Frontier Affairs, 1975), (1345 hijra) and Meeraz Ahmad, \textit{Oncit. p.4.}

\textsuperscript{117} 1972 Census of Pakistan, \textit{Times of India, 15 April 1973, p.13.}

\textsuperscript{118} According to a lecture delivered by Mr. Mohd. Ayub, the
the long course of history. The Baluchis, after whom the province is named, pre-dominate in northeastern, southwestern and western Baluchistan, specially in the four districts of Sibi, Makran, Kharan and Chagai where they constitute a majority of over 60%. The Brahuis are concentrated in central Baluchistan i.e. the district of Kalat and its neighbouring areas, where they form a majority of about 40%. The Lasis form a majority of about 66% in the district of Labella. The remaining ethnic groups are the Punjabi,

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119. Some Pashtun tribes living in the southern slopes of the Sulaiman ranges are believed to have greatly contributed to the formation of the tribal lineages of the Sulaimani Baluchis who live south of the Sulaiman mountains in northeastern Baluchistan, Mosh Mohammad Jost, op. cit., p.370.

120. The percentage of the Baluchis in the remaining five districts of Baluchistan is as follows: Kalat, 31.8%; Lasbella, 23.7%; Loralai, 8.1%; Quetta-Pishin 2.2%; and Zhob, 0.3%; Feroz Ahmad, Focus on Baluchistan and Pashtoon Question (Lahore, 1975), pp.1-5.

121. In the rest of the districts of Baluchistan the Brahuis account for the following percentages: Chigai 31.2%; Quetta-Pishin, 7.8%; Makran, 5.2%; Kharan 21.2%, and Lasbella, 7.9%; Feroz Ahmad, ibid., pp.1-5.

122. The Lasis are somehow mixed people of diverse ethnic elements and their language called Lasi is more akin to Sindhi language.
Sindhi and Urdu speaking emigrants from Pakistan and some small ethnic groups such as Jats, Hazaras, Jowdis and Tajeks. Of all the ethnic groups, the Baluchis and Brahins are ethnically and culturally so greatly mixed that they are reckoned together as Baluchis and that their very classification into two separate ethnic groups is very much objectionable to them.\(^{123}\)

(B) LINGUISTIC RELATIONS AND ARTIFICIALLY INDUCED PERSIANISATION

The evidential basis for an assessment of linguistic relations in Pashtunkhwa in changing the national and cultural aspirations is to be derived from careful historical research in areas which have been ignored by many western scholars. This study stakes a view more sharply focussed on historically cumulative effects which led to the process of artificially induced persianisation. When we attempt to assess the prospects

\(^{123}\) In addition to the Baluch population of Baluchistan according to 1961 census, there were over 420,000 Baluchis "in Sindh mainly in the Upper Sindh Frontier District, Dadu, Larkana and Naabshah; where they never constituted a majority—e ven though due to colonial policies of Pakistani government, their numbers are rising rapidly on account of their increasing forced migration to these areas as labourers and seasonal workers. There are 130,000 Baluchis in the Karachi district. Yu V. Jankavsky, The Peoples of Pakistan (Moscow, 1971), p.12. Similarly, more than half a million Baluchis are living in the adjacent Iranian Baluchistan, Dost Mohammad Dost, op. cit., pp.359-70.
with respect to both Pashto language and Pashtun culture we must inquire into several important aspects of the overall problem:

(1) How extensive is the cultural continuity and homogeneity of the Afghan population in spite of the linguistic heterogeneity on the surface?

(2) What is the bearing of Persianisation on the political, social and cultural values of the Afghans?

(3) What has been the nature of adaptation of the universal values of Islam to the cultural pattern of Afghanistan which was affected by the predominance of Persian and the frustrated development of Pashto?

(4) How have the Pashtuns reacted to the stimulus of the linguistic and cultural impact of the Pakistani manipulation of their political control over the Pashtun areas?

Most of Pashtunkhwa's ethnic groups, specially the Pashtuns and Baluchis are culturally united, demonstrating a great deal of cultural similarity and affinity: firstly, because of their common Aryan origins; secondly, due to their long historical association and intermingling with each other; and lastly, because of their collective exposure to similar religious, intellectual, socio-economic, cultural and political influences which continue to bear a common impact on the ecology of Pashtunkhwa as a whole.
Thus, in spite of its heterogeneous character and its mixed origin, the population of Pashtunkhwa share a common national character and culture and in a sense they are Pashtunized in their very behavioral characteristics. Hence against the backdrop of heterogeneity of the Afghan population, "there is considerable cultural continuity". The only difference existing between the diverse ethnic groups is that of their different languages which in itself is a direct result of their landscape's mountainous physiography and its strategic location which has forced them either to adopt new languages, the languages of the invading powers, or to preserve their own dialects in the inaccessible valleys and interior river basins of the country.

Almost every ethnic group speaks its own language: Pashtuns or the Afghans proper (66%) speak their predominant language of Pashto; the Tajeks and Parsiwans together (13%) speak persian or the so-called Dari language; the Turkic Uzbeks (5%) and Turkmans (1.4%) speak their own special Turkic dialects of Uzbeki and Turkmani; the Hazaras (5%) speak a

124. Donald N. Wilber for instance maintains that the differences in cultural patterns are no. as great as one might suppose ... Behind the surface heterogeneity of the Afghan population, there is considerable cultural continuity". Donald N. Wilber, op. cit., p. 361

typical Persian called Hazaragi; some of the Brahuis (1.3,4) speak Baluchi; and the Dardic Pashais, Kuristanis, Chitralis, Kohistanis and others speak various Dardic dialects. The small ancient Bactrian ethnic groups of Ormuris, Parachis and the various other old ethnic settlements of Badakhshan speak their own ancient Bactrian dialects such as Ormuri, Parachi, Wakhi, Ishkashimi, Rushani, Shughni, Manjani, Yagnobi, Janglich and others which along with Pashto and the famous ancient desolate languages of Ayesta, Khwarazmi, Sughdi and others form the distinct Bactrian group of the Indo-Aryan languages.126 With the significant exception of the Turkic dialects of Uzbeki and Turkman and the Dravidian dialect of Brahul, all of the languages spoken in Pashtunkhwa are Aryan by origin. Pashto is the oldest and purest of them which in spite of historical suppression is still a major South Asian language.

In fact, a comparative philological, etymological and morphological analysis of the Aryan languages indicate Pashto language to have been comparatively an older and historically a largely influential spoken language with a parental contributory role played in the formation of many of the Aryan languages of South Asia.127 It is the new form of the old Pashto,

126. For detail, See D. M. Dost, The Languages and Races of Afghanistan, Kabul, 1975.

127. For instance, even modern Pashto share nearly 50% of vocabulary, phonetic, syntax, and etymological affinity and resemblance with Sanskrit, Ayesta; Old Persian, and others. See for detail, Prof. A. H. Habibi, op. cit.; and Dost. Mohammad Dost, op. cit.
known as old Bactrian or Takhtari language which flourished as
court, official and religious language under Bactrians, Jaks, Yuen-ches, Apalthalites and Kushans till the rise and spread of
Islam, and the Persian language. Hence, Pashto belongs to
the synonymously known Pashtic or Pakhtic or Bactric or
Bactrian (Tokhtari) group of the Indo-Aryan branch of the Indo-
European family of languages as indicated in the classification
chart below:

INDO-EUROPEAN FAMILY OF LANGUAGES

Indo - Aryan Branch

Various European Branches

Iranian group

(Persic)

Bactrian group

(Bactric)

Indian group

(Indic)

Iranian or Persic subgroup

a) Northern: Medi, Kurdi,
Talishi, Ghilyani and
others

b) Southern: Old Persian
Middle Persian (Pahlavi),
New Persian (Dari),
Bakhtyari and others

Bactrian or Bactric subgroup

a) Northern Bactrian: Jughdi,
Yagnusi, Alyani, Avesti and
others

b) Southern Bactrian: Pashto,
Bakhtari (Takhtari), Avesta,
Jaki, Ormuri, Pashto
various Pamiri dialects

Pashto language and other Bactrian dialects and living

languages of Pashtunkhwa have been wrongly publicized and
classified as Iranian or the so-called West Iranian languages,

128. For details on linguistic classification, see, Dost,
op. cit., chapter 1.
a blunder which is enthusiastically misinterpreted and abused by the Iranian apologists to falsify the historical and cultural realities of the region. In fact, the whole mass of modern Iranian published materials, while admitting the existence of certain Indian cultural heritage and influence farther to the east, totally ignore and omit the presence of any third cultural entity in the region, that of the Afghans or the Pashtuns which according to Iranian literature are supposed to be part and parcel of the cultural and territorial entirety of the so-called Iran-Zamin (Iranian Land).  

However, Pashto is the oldest original language of Bactrian or Bactric (Pakhtic) group which is basically a separate and distinct group from that of the Iranian and Indian by virtue of its typical independent character in the sphere of vocabulary, phonetics and syntax, which makes it assume a middle position between the two groups of Iranian and Indian languages.

129. Iranians claim almost all of the past literary, and political figures of the Pashtuns such as Said Jamal Uddin Afghani, Abu Muslim Khurasani and literary figures known by the names of their region as Balkhi, Heravi, Ghaznavi, pushanji, Jourzjani, Faryabi and others as Iranian because of their contribution to Persian language. In short, they claim the whole of Pashtunkhwa to be a part of Iran, territorially, culturally, historically and even ethni­cally and linguistically, as they consider Pashtuns a small Iranian ethnic entity, the so-called East-Iranians, having a population of two to three millions.

130. See for detail, Habibi, and Dost, op. cit.
However, other ethnic groups such as the Mongoloid Hazaras, the Char Aimaq tribes, the Jyedes and Arabs, the Turkic Qziltashs, the Mongols, the completely Persianized ancient Khwarazmians and Sughdians of northern Afghanistan and other small ethnic groups known as Parsiwans speak Persian in addition to the Tajiks. As a result of the centuries old domination of Persian as court language, they have lost their cultural identity, adopting Persian language and culture as of their own.\textsuperscript{131} Not only this, due to the domination of Persian as official language and as medium of instruction, and of cultural and economic activities in Afghanistan, a large number of even the ethnic pashtuns have lost their language and their cultural characteristics resulting in an increase in the number of the Persian speaking people, the Parsiwans.\textsuperscript{132} It is estimated that annually about 30,000 Pashtuns lose their language and their cultural identity in transition to one of other Persian-speaking communities.\textsuperscript{133} Thus, as a result of its

\textsuperscript{131} See for detail, H. F. Schummann, op. cit.

\textsuperscript{132} In fact from amongst the Pashtuns alone, great numbers in Herat, Farah, Nenere and other provinces have lost their language and other cultural characteristics, in addition to those great number of the original Pashtun Taimanis, Pirozekhis and Juris of Chur and the Mohammendi and Massoodi and Massoodi Hazaras and the Panjiris and Fourmulis of Parwan and Kabul Provinces.

\textsuperscript{133} The 30,000 figure being a rough estimate, is my own finding as a result of my comprehensive surveys undertaken in 1976 and 1977. The figure was unanimously admitted in the interviews, though some doubts about exactness have been expressed, See Interview Responses Chart.
past prevailing domination and due to its present ever-increasing Persianization, the Persian language, originally spoken by the Tajeks only who form one-third of the present ethnic admixture of 13% Persians is now spoken by other ethnic groups also, increasing the total strength of the Persian speaking peoples in Afghanistan to about 23% of the country's total population. Hence in view of these historical reasons, Persian named as Dari has emerged as the second largest spoken language, in Afghanistan with constitutional recognition as the second official language, after the nominally national and official language of Pashto which is spoken by at least 70% of the total population of Afghanistan.134

134. The term Dari is an artificial name given to the commonly known Persian language which is the state language of Iran and Soviet Republic of Tajikistan. Naming Persian as Dari has been a political move aiming at creating a impression that Dari is an Afghan language, separate and distinct from that of Iranian Persian in order to find valid justification for its domination at the cost of the national and official language of Pashto. But in reality, such a different language called Dari has never existed either in Afghanistan or in Iran as far as historical and linguistic evidences are concerned. However, the term Dari meaning court language only, find mention in certain literary works as signifying the highly literary and sophisticated Persian used in the royal courts of the Muslim rulers of Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan, which outside the courts the common people could not speak or understand it., Dost Mohammed Dost op. cit., pp. 326-30

135. The difference between 66.63% of the Pashtuns and 70% of the Pashto speakers is due to the fact that certain sections of other ethnic groups such as the Baluchis, Brahuis, Nuristanis, Pashais, Morgols in northern Afghanistan and others have adopted bilingualism, speaking Pashto in addition to their own mother tongue, see Table II, H. Schurmann, op. cit., p. 49
In fact, out of the various ancient languages of Aryana or Pashtunkhwa, it is the rich and widely spoken language of Pashto that has survived all past cultural onslaughts as a major language. The most serious threat it faced was posed by Persian language which originally a local Iranian language it developed as a great dominant religious, educational and court language in Khurasan ever since the century A.D. with the help of Islam, Islamic power and the rich Arabic literature. As a result, it flourished as a dominant language not only in entire Iran and Khurasan, including Pashtunkhwa but also in the whole of Central and South Asia from Iraq in the west to Bengal in the Subcontinent. Thus, as an official language Persian inflicted heavy losses on most of the indigenous languages of the region specially on those of Iran and Khurasan such as the ancient languages of the region specially on those of Iran and Khurasan such as the ancient languages of Pahlavi.

136. Various ancient Greek and Chinese evidences suggest that Bactrian language, the middle Pashto, was once widely spoken language, prevailing from the borders of China in Central Asia to the Mediterranean in the west. It was due to such a prevailing use of the language that all the Central Asian migratory people such as the Sakas, Parthians, Kushans, Alchon, and others who built empires over Pashtunkhwa, adopted the language as of their own. See, Dost, ibid.

137. Dost, ibid., pp. 326 - 50.
Sughdi, Khwarazmi, Tukhari, Bakhtari and others, which were totally replaced by Persian. And since Afghanistan or Pashtunkhure became the center of Islamic power and culture the widely spoken, prosperous and prevalent Pashto language was specially affected by the evergrowing domination of Persian, which enjoying the patronage of religious and state power, Persian increasingly attracted the Pashtun intellectuals. while totally neglecting their own language of Pashto, the Pashtuns made great contributions to the development of Persian language. In fact, it were the Pashtun rulers who introduced it in the Indian subcontinent and made it an official and court language in their own home country.

In short it was the introduction of Islam in Pashtunkhwa that resulted in the critical domination and development of Persian language and culture as the prolonged and stiff resistance of Pashtuns to the Arab conquests did not only offer a golden opportunity to the submissive local Persian-speaking communities of Khurasan to rise into power and develop their language with the help of Islam and Arabic language as an effective medium of Islamic education and learning; but also resulted in an anti-Pashtun bias among the ruling Arab and other Muslim elites who often branded the Pashtuns as "unbeliever" "obstinate"


"Hindu-like" brigand tribes. This propensity resulted in the seclusion and alienation of the Pashtuns from the overall benefits of the rich Islamic culture and sciences, leading to a gradual isolation and decline of Pashto language, paving ground for further spread and growth of Persian language. As a result Persian became a defacto medium of instruction, literary and artistic expression and learning not only in Pashtunkhwa but throughout South and Central Asia.

Thus, with the help of Islam and outside influences, Persian language assumed a form of a critical cultural imperialism in Asia that not only undermined the national, cultural political and economic base of the Pashtun power but also replaced many ancient linguistic and cultural entities in Central Asia and Pashtunkhwa, leading to a de-culturalization Process, called Persianisation, which still persistantly continues in Afghanistan. Thus, Persian language through a thousand-year critical domination, greatly weakened the overall political and cultural influence of the Pashtuns in terms of the balance of power in the Islamic world.

140. In fact almost all Persian books written by non-Pashtuns contain such ridiculous anti-Pashtun Prejudices which have also influenced the writings of foreign Scholars. Even great Scholars such as Al-beruni could not avoid such an insulting reference to the Pashtuns. Such an anti-Pashtun attitude is still continued by the Iranians and other Persian-speaking communities who regard Pashtuns as traditional enemies.

141. See, Most Mohammad Dost, op. cit., Last chapter.
Similarly, Islam, later on when the Pashtuns heartily accepted it, remoulded their cultural artifacts. They now accomplished the spread of Islam and Islamic culture through the Persian language in the subcontinent of India,142 which resulted in the further alienation of Pashtuns from their own native language and culture, weakening their nationalistic consciousness.

This supra-national adaptation proved in the long run to be highly ruinous to the cultural resources and political and economic structure of the Pashtuns and the neglect of their motherland of Pashtunkhwa. It undermined foundation of their nation-state and the development of their economy, their culture and language.143

However, when we speculate about the future of the Pashtun civilisation, we have to remember that in Pashtunistan also, where the Pashtuns constitute a solid majority, the position of Pashto language is even more retarded than in Afghanistan. Pakistan's neglect and suppression of the symbols of Pashtun cultural, national and historical identity, is evidence of a colonial policy of building an artificial modern nation-state by destroying the cultural values of the Pashtuns and other nationalities.


Thus in Pashtunistan the Pashto resisting the onslaught of Urdu and English is of great political significance to the Pashtun cause of self-determination. Thus Pashto language on both sides of the Pashtunkhwa expresses the underlying faith in the Pashtun continuity. It is the vehicle of nationalistic demands with special reference to the Pashtunistan issue.

The foregoing discussions is pertinent to the growing Pashtun nationalism which fosters the Pashtun national liberation movement and its demand for Pashtunistan. In considering the interrelationships of culture and foreign policy we must remember that the Pashto language problem is a complex of many factors which will be shaping the future of Pashtunistan issue, and the overall political destiny of the Pashtuns of the entire Pashtunkhwa.

In summary, then, we may conclude that although the effect of Persianisation greatly overshadows the linguistic and cultural accomplishments of thePashtuns, the underlying linguistic factors which moulded Afghan culture persist and remain a critical part of the total environment for the evolution of the physical, mental and intellectual potential of the country. Many of the uncertainties as to Pashtun identity stem from the lack of comprehensive educational planning for linguistic development of Pashto. Admittedly many of Iran and

Pakistan's activities have adversely affected the linguistic and cultural resilience of Afghanistan. These detrimental operations can only be reversed only with political changes correlated with the development and sustained use of the national language - Pashto. If the language is preserved and developed, a successful future is assured.

(F) Pashtunkhwa's Unity in Diversity

An examination of the interpretation which the Pashtuns have placed on "unity in diversity" falls in the more general field of ecological view of Afghanistan's international relations. The following remarks will stress a point of view which arises out of the Pashtun's integration with the natural world, rather than attempt an exhaustive description of the form and intensity of human settlement in Pashtunkhwa. The roots of Pashtun life strike deep into the Past and the conventional tools of western political analysis cannot reach down to them. Our present purpose accordingly is to make use of the existing information, in order to ask more pointed questions.

The people of Pashtunkhwa have continued to be united and articulate as a nation through their strong common bonds of blood, culture, religion and congenial social and cultural traditions which are reflected mainly by the conventional laws and norms of Pashtunwali code of their national behaviour- a code so significant a force which has always enabled them to
survive and evolve their diverse cultural characteristics into powerful traditions of national resistance and survival, national unity, identity and political integration and independence in such a highly strategic landscape. For, Pashtunwali is not merely a code of social conduct but a national ideology and philosophy of national survival and continuity on which rests the very foundations of Pashtun nationalism. 145

In fact, most of Pashtunkhwa's potential economic resources specially the exploitation of its land and water resources have an integrated potentiality which necessitate joint ventures. Construction practices in Pakistan have aggravated rather than alleviated the situation as far as the exploitation of the Indus River basin and other natural resources is concerned. Inspite of higher claims, Pakistan's economic development in Kooza Pashtunkhwa has not affected the lot of the Pashtun and Baluch people as there developments have been meant mainly to politically integrate the areas into Pakistan for the benefit of the Punjabi ruling junta. As a result of such colonial exploitation the Pashtun and Baluch people greatly suffer and annually great numbers of them are forced to migrate to the urban centres of Punjab and Sindh as seasonal labourers.

145. In view of Pashtunkhwa's typical historical conditions, Pashtunwali has emerged as a national ideology, an institution of national survival, embodying a wide range of nationalistic concepts that constitute a highly militant form of Pashtan self-defensive nationalism, For detail see, Q Khadim, Pashtunwali (Kabul, 1952).
and toiling workers.\textsuperscript{146}

However, due to the ecological integrity of Pashtunkhwa, fragmentary isolated developmental schemes cannot solve the Pashtun Problem but can add to their problems. The acute interdependence and ecological integration of Pashtunkhwa's core areas, require an overall socio-economic development which depends on a free socio-economic intercourse and joint development ventures between the politically divided core areas of Pashtunkhwa,\textsuperscript{147} feasible only under a single indigenous political authority. Pashtunkhwa, therefore, suffers as a whole due to its present unnatural political division by the so-called Durand Line, leading to its acute socio-economic backwardness as a result of the artificially contrived ecological imbalance.

Both Bara and Kooza Pashtunkhwa have continued to remain the integral parts of each other by virtue of the abiding Principles of Pashtunwali and Pashtunkhwa's common unifying environmental characteristics, resulting in an overall system of ecological, cultural and economic interrelationships and interdependences. Such a separate and independent geographical and ecological personality and identity of Pashtunkhwa consisting of a set of inter-dependent core areas, is further evidenced by its natural boundaries such as the Indus, Oxus, Murghab,


\textsuperscript{147} See, the Topography of Pashtunkhwa.
Hari-rud rivers and the Arabian seashores which offer two-third of Pashtunkhwa international boundaries.\footnote{148}

This natural and geographically identified definition and delimitation of Pashtunkhwa's territory in fact, finds reflection in its common ecology, which signifies a historical evolution and continuity of its national and cultural personality and identity. It also denotes that all the core areas within Pashtunkhwa's naturally defined territory, have continued for ages to have been jointly functioning as highly interdependent and integrated parts of one whole enabling the emergence of Pashtun cultural and political hegemony and national evolution in the core areas and their integration into a single Pashtun nation-state. However, the division of Pashtunkhwa continues to perpetuate the present socio-economic backwardness, retardation and limitation of economic activities in both the politically divided segments, of Pashtunkhwa i.e. Afghanistan and Pashtunistan, which cause various regional socio-economic imbalances, limitation of its local markets and economic freedom and severe constraints on developmental programmes, commerce, foreign trade and transit facilities due to the resultant untenable consequences of the land-locked position caused by the political separation of Pashtunkhwa's highly interdependable core areas from one another and from the sea-ports through the forced separation of the

\footnote{148. For detail, see The Geographic definition and Boundaries of Pashtunkhwa and Topography of Pashtunkhwa.}
country's maritime province of Baluchistan.  

In fact most of Pashtunkhwa's core areas and heavily populated nucleus regions lie on two closer parallel lines along the two sides of the separating Durand line, due to their regional variations and contrasts in the size and types of products and the resultant diversified nature of economic activities, an integrated and interdependent social economy is necessary for a prosperous economic survival.

The extrapolation from the Past of Pashtunkhwa upon which alone our predictions concerning the future can rest must take into account the following:

These heavily populated cognate cultural territories on the two sides of the Durand Line have always remained integrated and politically united under a native identical political authority as integral parts of one and the same geographical personality - Pashtunkhwa. This in fact very well explains the failure and inability of the British in the past and Pakistani rulers in the present to integrate these territories with their dominion in the organic sense of the term. Pashtunkhwa has continued to preserve its national unity and identity throughout its long course of history whether under a native rule or under an alien political control. It is only the northern Oxus region or occasionally the far-western

149. See, Topography and drainage system of Pashtunkhwa.
Harirud and the lower Helmand river basins located beyond the great divide of the Central Hindukush mountains that were occasionally separated.

The particular frame of reference which distorted the natural unity of Pashtunkhwa led to the fatal topographical mistakes of the British. The imperial rulers divided the Pashtun territory and named them as separate areas such as the so-called Northwest Frontier Province, the Independent Tribal territories, the Political agencies, British Baluchistan, the Princely States of Dir, Swat, Chitral, Las-Bella, Kalat and various tracts of lands dismembered and attached to the Punjab and Sindh Provinces or administered directly by the centre or the areas in the Southwest parted away to Iran, i.e. the lower Seistan and Western Baluchistan respectively. Such a division by the British of the Pashtun or Afghan territories into variety of political units under nominal or actual British jurisdiction was intended on the one hand to weaken the political power and hegemony of the Pashtuns which threatened and challenged the British imperial expansion and survival in the region and on the other hand to safeguard and ensure the security and strategic needs of their British Indi possessions against possible Russian

150. See, Attaee, op.cit. and Ahmad Abjullah, The Historical Background of Pakistan and Its People, (Karachi, 1973), pp.36-37.
threats and invasion of the Indian sub-continent.

In fact, neither history nor its geography or its permanent regional economic interdependence nor the very cohesive politicized cultural traditions and nationalistic aspirations of the people approve of any political divisibility of Pashtunkhwa. By surveying the present political and cultural trend of the landscape, we can clearly see that the Pashtuns are not and will not be a part of any other political entity save that of their own Pashtunkhwa, as soon as the Pashtuns get the chance and rise into a strong political power either in Afghanistan or in the politically occupied Pashtunistan. The continuous nationalist struggles during the last four centuries prove that national freedom is their real and ultimate wish and aspiration.

A political, cultural and economic entity which has endured for so long and survived so many vicissitudes and historical changes cannot be deprived of its potential for national resurgence.

The blind forces of Islamic-state-ideology in Pakistan, flowing along the lines of neo-colonialism show no aptitude for creating a self-sustaining pattern of Pashtun identity and nationalism. On the contrary, as the inter-ethnic confrontation intensifies in Pakistan, the ruling military-bureaucratic elite seeks to increase the economic and political burdens on the Pashtuns and to use the full resources of a totalitarian state for cultural oppression. A clearer conception of how the Pashtun social order is related to the unifying
principles of Pashtun culture would help to identify the real problems of human values and behaviour which the international community has ignored so far. Rational goals in regional relations cannot be formulated by denying an identity to a culture which is an integrated whole.

(G) Culture and social structures of integration

Dr. Paul B. Sears has indicated that the sum total of resources and the population among which the resources have to be divided are a function of the pattern of culture. He has indicated the relationship by the following notation:

\[ \frac{R}{P} = f(c) \]

with \( R \) representing resources, environment or land, \( P \), human population, and \( C \), culture.\(^\text{151}\)

Our experience in field investigation has been closely identified with the examination of a comprehensive array of evidence on the cultural patterns in Afghanistan. Dr. Sears' notation is useful for developing an agenda for discussion of Pashtun culture and the social structures of integration. The Pashtuns have worked and fought for the survival of their culture when they have been aware of grave danger and of the kind of effort required from them. There are factors in the cultural process of Pashtunkhwa not commonly thought of as affecting the cultural patterns of other nations. Pashtun culture can only be properly understood if it is recognised as

\(^\text{151}\) William L. Thomas (ed.) Man's Role in Changing the Face of Earth (Chicago, 1956) p.423.
adjustment or adaptation through which the Pashtuns had to evaluate the potential of the area of the earth they were inhabiting. They had to organise their life in the environment of Pashtunkhwa in terms of available techniques and the values they accepted as desirable for the integration of their social structures.

The rich cultural heritage of the people of Pashtunkhwa covers a period of more than five thousand years and the evidences of its past civilizations and prevailing culture are found and discovered almost in every part of the country through excavations and archeological research, and those of its literary evidences are vividly recorded in "the two of the world's most valuable literary monuments the Rigveda and the Avesta, and the later literary work of Pata Khazana.

According to archaeological discoveries of historical monuments dating from 3000 B.C. there existed in Pashtunkhwa a pre-historical civilization, the evidences of which are found in the mount Mundigak of Kandahar. It was followed by that of the Aryan civilization between 2500-500 B.C., which found expression in the emergence of two important systems of man's

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153. These two literary documents can really be considered as the most ancient books of the Pashtuns, as being composed in Pashtunkhwa, reflect Pashtun cultural characteristics and deal mainly with the names conditions and products of Pashtunkhwa, more than of any other people, see for detail, Habibi, and Mohd. Ali, Ibid, and A.H. Habibi, the History of Pashto Literature (3rd Edn.) Kabul, 1975.

self-transformation - the Brahmanism i.e. of the earlier Rigvedic period, and Zoroastrianism both of which initially emerged and flourished in Pashtunkhwa, and penetrated vast regions of the surrounding world.  

Towards the end of the 4th century B.C. the advent of the Hellenistic culture in Pashtunkhwa as a result of Alexander's invasion, interacted with local cultural elements, and emerged in Pashtunkhwa as a new form of cultural dynamism, the Graeco-Bactrian School of art and culture which though short-lived, had a significant contributing influence on Pashtunkhwa and its adjacent regions. Further, Buddhism as founded in India was creatively adopted in Pashtunkhwa as the Mahayana School under the aegis of Kanishka the Great, and deeply penetrated into Sinkiang, China and other Far Eastern countries.

Again, towards the opening of eleventh century A.D. it was Pashtunkhwa which gave rise and momentum to the spread and influence of the new faith of

155. "Brahmanism" as Prof. Mohd. Ali, points out is not an appropriate term, for, it developed on Indian soil and is based on the caste system while "the Rigvedic Aryans had priests but no distinct and privileged priestly class nor were they vegetarians, see for detail, Mohd. Ali A Cultural History of Afghanistan, Kabul, 1964, pp.19-40.

156. Kanishka the Great was a Pashtun or Pashtunished Kushan emperor who laid a foundation of a vast empire in Pashtunkhwa between 120-160 A.D. Kushan or Kucan, according to the new evidences seems to be one of the main branch of the new Pashtun comers as their coin and inscriptions in Pashto, their court language, and their other cultural characteristics suggest, see for Kushanic coins and inscription in Pashto, Dost Mohammad Dost, The Languages and Races of Afghanistan, Kabul, 1975, pp.59-402. and Zafar Kaka Khel., op.cit-pp.
Islam, Islamic culture and Persian language, and introducing them to Central Asia and the subcontinent of India.\textsuperscript{157} During the long course of its history, the main source of Pashtunkhwa's artistic, intellectual and cultural expression, have been the early Aryan civilizations of its northern Bactrian plains, the Islamic civilization and for relatively shorter periods that of the Greek, Buddhist and the modern Western influences. In other words the culture of Pashtunkhwa is basically characterized by the early Aryan traditions, as vitally affected by the significant and far-reaching influences coming from outside especially those of Islam which are visible in the cumulative self-transformation of the art, though and character of the Pashtun people.\textsuperscript{158} This cultural process permeates the tribal, pastoral and semi-nomadic traditions of the people which being commonly shared, affords great scope and potential for positive cultural change and material advancement.\textsuperscript{159}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{157} Though Islam by the end of 7th century had subdued most of Pashtunkhwa's surrounding regions such as Iran, Central Asia, Baluchistan and partially Sind, yet its power and influence was not effective enough to penetrate further to the east into Pashtunkhwa and India, as was strongly resisted by the Pashtuns for periods of more than two centuries, but when in the 10th century Pashtunkhwa submitted to Islam, Islam found its way to India through the contribution of the Pashtuns, see for detail, Mohammad Ali A \textit{Cultural History of Afghanistan}, Kabul, 1964, pp.155-164.
\item \textsuperscript{158} See, Mohammad Ali, \textit{Ibid}, pp.95-96.
\item \textsuperscript{159} In fact due to the influence of the British hostile and politically motivated literature, the Pashtuns or Afghans are wrongly represented and misconceived of as a savage and highly orthodox followers of Islam, who would value nothing save that of their religion. Such allegations and blunders, being totally baseless, are not supported by facts of history. In fact the historical background of their cultural and religious toleration and adoptability, and their nationalist risings against co-religious Muslim powers (f.n. contd)
Thus, Islamic religion being the last in the chain of transformation plays the most significant role in this cultural adaptation of the Pashtuns. It is the religion of almost the entire population (99.8%) of Pashtunkhwa of which more than 90% belong to the Sunni sect and the remaining (about 9%) are the followers of Shia sect of Islam, which includes the Afghan Hazaras, the Turkic Qizilbashs, and some Parsiwans, specially in the west of the country. Hence, Islam serves as a most significant unifying factor in the overall cultural, social and political integrity and solidarity of Pashtunkhwa and has been a useful means of social harmony, a source of strength in the defence of it's territory against foreign aggression.

Thus, Islam serves to bring a greater amount of social unity, harmony and cultural stability and continuity. As a result of which, in the words of Wilber" indeed the life of the people in the country has dignity and harmony, and even in the

159. (f.n. contd)\textsuperscript{.}, such as the Arabs, the Mughals the Safavid Persia and the Muslim Pakistan and also the safe and dignified living of thousands of the unbelievers such as the Hindus, Sikhs, Jews and others in Pashtunkhwa, are few of the many arguments in support of the rejection of such allegations and misconceived theories. In fact most of writers have failed to understand the facts behind the Pashtan obstinate resistance of foreign domination and their aversion and distrust of foreigners which its genesis in their freedom, national honour and dignity being impinged upon, see James W. Spain, \textit{The Pathan Borderland} (Hague, 1963) pp.85-100

towns there is a short of unconscious integration of the medley of moving parts, which makes friction and clashes rare."\(^{161}\)

Further, "Islam has helped to bring an ideal balance between the spiritual and material aspects of life" so essential for a harmonious happy social existence. Thus, Islamic influences bear a common pervasive impact on the various cultural attitudes of the people of Pashtunkhwa.

The Islamic harmony of Pashtunkhwa has not been paralleled to the east. The heritage of Hindu-Muslim antaganism, and the conspicuous acceleration of revivalism has culturally ill-prepared Pakistan to meet the real challenges of the future. Theoretically speaking revivalist forces seek to achieve a Muslim society in which religious and temporal authority are to be made identical " so that the state is the instrument of religious laws as revealed in the holy Quran."\(^{162}\) But, in practice Pakistan has never, sought to establish a true Muslim Society. Pakistan's religious policies merely aim at exploitation of Islam for political ends to strengthen its position in quarrel with Afghanistan and India and to divert and undermine internal opposition to the government.\(^{163}\)

However, Pakistan's advocacy of religious orthodoxy and her stress on Hindu-Muslim animosity are, therefore, pathological.

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163. See, Baha-ud-din, Islam in Pakistan, (Karmpur, 1953) p.15.
tions, to which the Pashtunistan movement is largely indifferent with its nationalist orientation. The existing trends in Pakistan militate against Afghanistan's equilibrium of religion and politics. Pakistan's foreign Policy finds it useful to interpret cultural development in terms of Islamic fundamentalism, in order to inhibit Afghanistan from Pursuing a more assertive policy on Pashtunistan.

It should be apparent that the degree and facility of cultural communication among Pashtuns creates hopes and possibilities for the future equilibrium of culture and social integration in the whole of Pashtunkhwa. It is the cultural resurgence which guarantees the interests of the people on both sides of the artificial Durand Line.

(H) Social Organisation and Ethical and Legal Values

The contemporary Pashtun is simultaneously the creator and inheritor of a code of national and public conduct. Known as Pashtunwali it has related him to his social organisation and national behaviour in a unique way. Again it has a far-reaching effect on the ethical and legal standards prevalent in Pashtunkhwa. The ideological problems and conflicts of Afghanistan cannot be solved without insights which can reconcile and preserve the basic ingredient of Pashtunwali.164 Pashtunwali is an early Aryan institution which has developed as a direct

result of the chequered history and vulnerable geographic position of Pashtunkhwa and as a basic necessity of national security and social order, which determines the very social, cultural and national behaviour of the Pashtun people and also of the Baluchis who have a similar practice. Hence the way of life of the Pashtuns and Baluchis is governed to a large extent not by civil, legal or Islamic laws, but by a set of their cultural and national norms in the form of conventions embodied in the pashtunwali institution.\textsuperscript{165} A Pashtun is conventionally bound by honour and duty to respect and observe these conventional norms and procedures in his daily conduct as national "demands of honour" in the interest of the social order of the Pashtun nation. As a convention, a breach or violation of any principle of Pashtunwali by a person not only brings disgrace to himself, his family or his tribe or village community, but is also punishable even by excommunication and banishment,\textsuperscript{166} depending on the magnitude of the crime committed.

Attayee defines Pashtunwali as an embodiment of "all the customs, traditions, heritage, customary law and usages and social relations" of the Pashtun people. It "is the concept conveying the meaning of tribal, socio-economic, political and cultural system in totality". In the words of Dr. Noorzoy it

\textsuperscript{165} Ibrahim Attayee, \textit{A Dictionary of Terminology of Pashtun Tribal customary Law and Usages} (Kabul, 1979). p.76.

"is the aggregate of all human welfare in the social life of the Pashtuns. 167

One of the most important institutions of Pashtunwali is the Jirga System which performs three-fold functions, i.e., the executive, legislative and Judicial. In the words of James W. Spain "a Jirga, in it's simplest form is merely an assembly. In its operation, it is probably the closest thing to Athenian democracy. 168 The Jirga system has had an institutional hierarchical foundation ranging from the lowest Kalai Jirga (Hamlet or Small Village Assembly) at the base to the highest Loya Jirga, the Ground National Assembly, on the top, including in between the seema (the region or, district) Tabar (Tribal), Ulus (People) and the Milli (the national) Jirgas. 169 The small local hamlet or kalai Jirga send representatives to the major village Jirga which in turn send its selected members to the still higher Regional Jirga and the Regional Jirgas are represented by the highest National Jirga or the Parliament, and the Loya Jirga or the Grand National Assembly is still larger

169. In fact the Jirga system is a well elaborated hierarchical system of democratic political order and governance, which unfortunately being neglected and misused has not been able to function in it's full and real philogicphic form; Moreover the division of Pashtunkhwa and the misuse of local Jirgas by the British and Pakistani governments, has further eliminated the overall hierarchical practice of the Jirga system, See James W. Spain, Ibid., pp.69-72 and Q.Khadim, Op.Cit.
and higher in authority which are convened only at the times of grave national emergencies such as issues of war, overall mobilization of national defence forces, approval of a constitution, election or removal of a king, etc. 170

The decisions of the Jirgas are unanimous and binding which can never be broken. The Afghan government also convenes these Jirgas for various useful purposes, specially the Loya Jirga, the last of which approved the erstwhile Afghan constitution in 1964, and still another Loya Jirga was summoned in February 1977, to approve Daud's Republican Constitution. In fact, as a well elaborated democratic political system, the hierarchy of Jirgas has since ancient times continued to play a significant role in the political destiny and cultural survival and continuity of the Pashtun nation. 171 At time of grave foreign threats and invasions, and in cases of local, regional or national emergencies, the Jirgas used to meet, resolve and devise means and ways to ward off the threats and, have always mobilized forces for the defence of their country and have elected their leaders and kings at the times of anarchy and chaos. 172

As a conventional rule the king's or Amir's authority was subject to the pleasure of these Jirgas. But since late

eighteenth century due to the absolutist and despotic rule of certain Afghan Amirs, the monarchy became entirely a hereditary institution and sometimes defied the choice of the Jirgas. Thus, the division of Pashtunkhwa into Afghanistan and the eastern part annexed by the British, on the one hand, and the evergrowing despotic centralizing rule and administrative control of the persianised Afghan government on the other, have continued to gradually eliminate the authority, role and the overall practice of the hierarchical functioning of the Jirga system, leading it to survive mainly as tribal Jirgas.\(^{173}\) However, the Jirgas are still a common practice of keeping social order at least at the lowest village level, especially where the population is organised mainly on tribal lines, particularly in the adjacent regions on the two sides of the so-called Durand Line, where government influence is scant and ineffective.\(^{174}\)

The second commandment of Pashtunwali is "Badal" or revenge which calls for a revenge for any insult or wrong done to a Pashtun or his family, his clan or to his country as a whole. He does not believe in forgetting and forgiving, he is rather in favour of a tooth for a tooth and an eye for an eye. The Badal concept being originally meant for avenging mainly


\(^{174}\) It is important to note the "Tribal Territory" was never an isolated "no-man's land" as the British called it. I was an integral part of Pashtunkhwa as any other part of it, remaining peaceful, rule and loyal to the central authority of their own. It assumed a different, more tribalist character only after they were removed from the jurisdiction of their national government at Kabul which was strongly resisted.
humiliation, loss and wrong done to the Pashtuns by an alien aggressive party, tribe or a country, has turned to be adhered to in their own relationship as well giving rise to many frictions and feuds. Bādal or pāre also means the return of any favour or owing to the person or party concerned.175

The third law of Pashtunwali is Nanawati, i.e. to grant and accept a request for a demand, help, protection or asylum to those seeking it, regardless of the consequences, whether the party is a powerful individual, family, a tribe or even a government.

The fourth concept of Pashtunwali is "Melmastia" and "Melmapalanga", hospitality and grant of honour, favour and protection to every guest regardless of his social status or his earlier enmity and it is so strong that it takes precedence over "Bādal", "Pore" or revenge. Even an enemy who seeks refuge or help, must be received, and "anyone who can gain access to the presence" of "a pāthan" can claim asylum from the host regardless of the previous relationship and irrespective of how poor or distasteful he may be and even if necessary "a formal escort or guarantee of safe conduct to a stranger, emissary or even an enemy" guest, called "Badragga" is offered.176

Still another most significant principle of Pashtunwali, is the economic concept of "Wesh" i.e. the just periodic

distribution and exchange of property and land among the
members of the tribe or village community. The basic significance
of "wesh" lies especially in the idea to allow every member
of the group and each of the various groups as a unit to enjoy
the best land for some time and thus to prevent the development
of leadership based on economic power" and exploitation. 177
Such a distribution and exchange of land and property used to
take place under the authority of a Jirga at varying periods;
three, five, ten and thirty years as the economic conditions
and circumstances of the time required. But, unfortunately,
this healthy tradition gradually faded away, due to the new
base of power established first by the Moghuls and subsequently by
the British rulers, which sought to create among the Pashtuns
rich and propertied families on their side for their imperia-
listic purpose of dividing and ruling the Pashtuns and collecting
of land revenues. However, the "wesh" system was still surviving
till the beginning of the twentieth century, specially among the
Pashtuns of Dir, Swat, Burner and Bajawar in Pashtunistan. 178

However, the Pashtunwali institution contains a large
number of such basic conventional laws and norms, worked out in
great detail only a few of which can be named here as essential

177. Ibid, p.84.
178. The imperialist Moghuls and the Britishers, in addition to
the requirements of their divide and rule policy, out of
economic necessity also tried to crush the "Wesh" system
of distribution of land as they could not collect enough
land revenues under the "Wesh" tradition, see, Ibid, p.84,
and previous footnotes.
for an understanding of the character of the Pashtun people. These include: the "Tura", achievement of bravery, victory and glory in the battle-field for the defence and glory of the Pashtun nation and their country; "Merana", Manhood, gallantry and chivalry; "Baspana" and "Mirasta", offering and making of needful donations, contributions and assistance of any kind to those in need; Ashar, joining of a co-operative effort and endeavour for a collective execution of a welfare or developmental programmes; "Taega", suspending of enmity, conflict and hostility at the times of national emergencies, foreign aggression or during an intervention by a third party; "Natan Palana", extending of service, love and sacrifice for the glory of the motherland; and others like respecting of the elders; displaying of regard and equal treatment of women, the poor and weaker people; sacrifice in friendship, fulfilling of a promise or pledge; preserving of one's individuality, dignity, honour and prestige and the most significant is the obligation to abide by these principles as are enshrined in Pashtunwali. And if a Pashtun happens to be devoid of these characteristics or he is unable to abide by them, he ceases to be a Pashtun according to a principle of Pashtunwali which exempt only the disabled ones.179

Thus, the people of Pashtunkhwa have always preserved their unity, wellbeing and independence through this common

179. See for detail on Pashtunwali Q.Khādim, Pashtunwali, (in Pashto), Pashto Academy, Kabul, 1952.
code of behaviour. It has served to give them a common sense of nationality, a sense of belonging and oneness so essential for the national and cultural survival and growth of a human community. In fact it has been mainly to the credit of Pashtunwali which has enabled the Pashtuns, inspite of their lack of sophistication, not only to survive and emerge as a nation state but also to lay the foundations of vast empires, in such a dangerous strategic location as Pashtunkhwa, where many strong races forming vast empires all faded away. At times, the absence of a native central authority encouraged certain foreign powers to invade Pashtunkhwa in the sheer hope of an easy conquest.

When they, quite to their surprise, found the Pashtuns united against them under the auspices of Pashtunwali. Similarly, the British while invading Pashtunkhwa grossly misunderstood the interplay of these factors, which resulted in their defeat in the wars with the Pashtuns. For instance when the British believed that the Afghan people were ripe for a revolt against their ruler and would welcome a deliverer with open arms", they invaded Pashtunkhwa only to find quite to their dismay that all the Pashtuns, inspite of their dissensions and conflicts, fought against them united even behind their hated ruler. [181]

181. Mohammad Ali, *op. cit.*, p. 21
Thus, Pashtunwali continues to be a useful institution for the preservation and consolidation of Pashtun patriotism, nationalism, individualism and their healthy democratic, political and socialistic traditions and their various useful cultural and national characteristics specifically it serves as a powerful apparatus for the solution of Pashtunistan issue and the overall transformation and consolidation of the Pashtun society into a modernized nation-state. In fact, it provides a broad social, cultural and economic base of political power authority, and consensus for the Pashtun national struggle for Pashtunistan and others major causes pertaining to national survival and independence. 182

However, due to historical factors some of the Pashtunwali practices have deviated and deteriorated which go against themselves. As a result of these tribal feuds, jealousies, rivalries, discord and dissension have become persistent. Above all, some of these deviationist practices make the Pashtuns vulnerable even to their enemies. For instance foreign imperialists such as the Mogauls, the British and now the Pakistanis, all have sought and obtained, through invoking certain principles of Pashtunwali advantages, favours and protection from the Pashtuns even against their own people and their political leaders.

However, taken as a whole Pashtunwali produces the most striking qualities such as self-respect, prestige, self-

182. Q. Khadim, op. cit., p. 10.
confidence, bravery, courage, toughness, prowess, strong spirit of independence and individualism. As such Pashtunwali gives the Pashtuns a strong national character as follows:

As a nation they demonstrate an intense love of freedom and are a people most virile, energetic, pragmatic, faithful, reliable, hospitable, susceptible, affectionate, frank and extremely proud and confident with a strong democratic and socialistic mentality. Their main drawbacks are their extreme individualism, emotionalism, jealousy, discord, dissension and their vindictive obstinacy. To outsiders "who come in friendly and open-minded spirit they show a remarkable hospitality, yet their war-scared past have made them suspicious of the Ferangi (the Britisher) or foreigner and wary of his wiles and intentions" and the "same background make them dangerous enemies of those who try to bully or deceive them". Being "a singularly care-free people" they appear to be happy and well adjusted in their own environment and free from complexes and as such an overseas stay can soon make them homesick howsoever attractive it may be. Though, family honour and prestige and economic motives are the main incentive for efforts, yet "stronger as a rule is the desire for prestige, virtue and recognition as a man of character, ability, piety, learning or courage" against which economic gains do not matter. Castes do not exist and class consciousness is the lowest among them.

183. Donald N. Wilber, op. cit., p. 4.
184. Donald N. Wilber, op. cit., pp. 4-5.
In short, being democratic and freedom loving people in character, the Pashtuns resent dictatorship and the imposition of arbitrary decisions howsoever appealing, liberal or beneficial they may appear to them. As a proverb says "you can coax an Afghan into Hell", but "you cannot drive him into Heaven."\textsuperscript{185} As such the Pashtuns are not easy to influence, except by their own democratically chosen leaders through proper and democratic means and friendly popular approaches. Arguments rather than force can influence the Pashtuns to rally round their leaders and accept their programmes. Thus strong a sense of freedom, democracy, individualism, traditionalism, socialism, romanticism, pride of origin, culture, language, and faith, popular and open response to a friendly approach, strong reaction to offending attitudes and a lasting desire for revenge are the principle character traits of the Pashtuns.

This chapter has provided a blend of history of ecology of Pashtun life in Afghanistan, geographical description and socio-cultural analysis in order to accomplish two essential requirements. First it identifies, defines and shows the relationship between Pashtunkhwa and the homogeneous backgrounds and attitudes which can shed light on the Pashtunistan question. And second, it provides the basic historical perspective to understand the persistent demand for the revision of the Durand Line between British India (and the successor state Pakistan)

and Afghanistan. The several transformations wrought by the Big Power rivalry between Russia and Britain limited the possible courses of action open to the Afghan state. After the Anglo-Russian Convention in 1907, a degree of mutual understanding led the Big Powers to move towards non-interference as part of the adjustment of their spheres of influence. The new context presented both challenges and opportunities to the conduct of foreign policy by the national government.

The ambiguity of many policy measures by the successive Afghan Governments were inevitably influenced by the changing nature of the international confrontation and the external constraint they imposed on each policy output. The tendency to reduce Afghan foreign policy development to the simple formula of the Afghan response to the "Big Game" cannot be justified. The conflicting and antagonistic interests in the social-political sphere revolved around the important question of rationalisation of authority in the Afghan state.

A searching enquiry into the ferment and political conflict evident in the larger historical context of Afghanistan did not really lie in the classic dangers underlined in the prevailing view given in the empirical literature on Afghanistan, for its growth can be observed in the persistent structural crisis of a political nature. The difficulties in coping with short-term problems in Afghan diplomacy are related to the political, social and economic feasibilities of development strategies which remain structurally distorted on account of the fragmentation and stratification which affected the political stability
of the state as a whole. The social and environmental factors of Pashtunkhwa can serve to bind the state into an organic unity if the subjective and objective requirements of the national ethos can be institutionalised.