The preceding analysis has aimed at elucidating the mutual relationship between internal and external transactions which created political oscillations in the ideological, political, strategic and diplomatic interest taken by Afghanistan in the Pashtunistan question. We have pointed out that existing concepts and data have not permitted theoretical investigation of the Pashtunistan problem to go beyond imprecise statements about the warliness of the Pashtun irridenta.

By singling out particular phases of Pashtun activity and by shifts of meaning in terminology, many scholars have wittingly or unwittingly supported the political strategies associated with British imperialism, or have put an exclusive focus on Pashtun constraints viewed in terms of the pressures from Pakistan, Iran or from the Super Powers and have rooted this approach in unverified assumptions about political fragmentation of the Pashtuns. While analysts of contemporary politics view schematic elements favourably in the case of Basques, Kurds, Palestinians and other cultural communities, there is persistent refusal to combine analytically the effects ecology, ethnicity, language and religion have on the political capacities of the Pashtuns.

The point of departure of this study is the recognition of the structural conditions which developed from the dynamic and creative character of Pashtun nationalism. Our empirical analysis has revealed the numerous dimensions of the stresses
and pressures on the Afghan political actors which had been vastly underestimated in earlier studies. An increasing number of research findings in the case of other Non-State Nations (NSNs) have corrected some misconceptions which were favoured by political writers who tended to dismiss well defined national entities by the ambiguous political connotations of irredentism.

Based on the premise that Afghanistan has no hard interests in the Pashtunistan issue and is unwilling to pay a high price for a coherent policy, most scholars and policy analysts have been concerned with partial explanations and there was often a paranoid concern with Afghanistan's social and tribal stratification. At the time of this writing, a general overview of trends and attitudinal changes which would pay special attention to comprehension of the value patterns, socio-economic-cultural conflicts and the linkage of issues has not been presented to explain the Pashtun experience. There has been no reliable comprehensive information on Pashtun attitudes and declamatory statements have been made without taking into account the particular situational motivations. Contemporary studies generally fail to identify the level of political socialisation among the Pashtun concerns. Many expert studies are based on intuitive assumptions about regional political patterns without clarifying the nature of public opinion in Iran, Afghanistan or Pakistan. These studies often offer some
recommendations on how Afghanistan might develop regional cooperation but unfortunately do not ask the important questions relating to cognition and political action if Afghanistan is to focus upon national sovereignty, human rights, security concerns and maintain a stable balance even with the coexistence of conflict and cooperation.

The overall concept of our study suggests the crucial importance of geographic, political, sociological and cultural aspects of the Pashtun problem and views it as a systemic phenomena. We have suggested some exploratory ideas which can be utilised in further work on peace and conflict research relating to the Pashtun problem. The following six propositions are worth considering in some detail:

1. Participation Crisis

Structural differentiation in Pashtun society has been linked with specific political, economic, social and religious processes which have mobilised the Pashtun masses. The persistence of a participation crisis due to inadequate institutional capacity has been responsible for frustration and political isolation of elements which wanted a break-through on the issue of Pashtun integration.

Our study has shown that the peculiarities of the political system explains the failure to maintain and extend the opportunities to implement a socio-political strategy of Pashtunistan. This problem can best be discussed
within the theoretical framework which M. Edelman provides in his book "the Symbolic Use of Politics".\textsuperscript{1} The inadequate institutional capacity is visible in the central and interrelated problems of what Edelman calls "symbolic reassurance", and "political quiescence".:

i) The Pashtuns have been "symbolically reassured from 1947-1980 while attention was deflected from the organic roots of their demands. The dramatic and pervasive nature of events after the overthrow of Daud require serious exploration based on realistic assumptions which should include the specific properties of the Pashtun ethos in the revolutionary crisis.

ii) The 1980s mark an important psychological turning point in the attitude of the Afghan population towards the symbolic reassurance in the Pashtunistan issue as a harbinger of change in their political, economic and social system. The "quiescence" created by the Afghan leaders increasingly came up against powerful internal demands to alter the environment. That the internal tensions exploded into violence and eventually led to the radicalisation of revolutionary elites must first be analysed in terms of the inner dynamics of the Pashtun ethos if the nexus between

\textsuperscript{1} M. Edelman, \textit{The Symbolic Use of Politics} (Urban, University of Illinois Press, 1964).
internal and external conflict in Afghanistan in the 1980s is to be evaluated in its proper context.

iii) The legitimising of Pashtun demands is directly dependent on the way in which the Pashtuns make up for their existing lack of modern political organisation and reduce their addiction to symbolic reassurance. While maintaining their primary affiliations, the Pashtuns have to set themselves the task of mobilising dormant political, economic and social forces which can use political agencies effectively and overcome the legitimisation crisis which characterised the period under study.

These considerations suggest that in reviewing the Pashtunistan issue and Afghanistan's foreign policy a comprehensive perspective of political participation must be maintained, and the question of stabilisation of her neighbourhood relations must not be seen only in terms perceived by outsiders. The tendency to view the Afghanistan issue only as part of the East-West affairs with analogies from Eastern Europe has resulted in conceptualisation which is entirely in terms of political and strategic impulses from the Soviet Union. It is true that the crossing of the Amu Darya by the Soviet troops is in sharp contrast to the policy of non-alignment pursued by Afghanistan. There is, however, a continuous and consistent line of reasoning in terms of the model adopted in this study which shows that
domestic developments might influence foreign policy through emerging new structures. If the correct focus is put on institutional requirements, the following dimension stated by Dieter Senghaas is relevant to Afghanistan in the 1980s:

"In such a situation, it devolves upon socialism to save peripheralised societies from further peripheralisation and, by developing coherent productive forces, to make possible once again an accelerated, delayed development. Socialism becomes a development policy without alternatives in conditions in which capitalism failed. Its function is that of a midwife and pacemaker for a differentiated and well-proportioned development of productive forces. It was not abundance but privation, and what is more usually privation aggravated by war, which was the ground in which socialism was able to take root and become a decisive societal force." 2

The crisis behaviour of neither of the two Super Powers has taken into account sensitivity of the Afghans on the Pashtunistan issue on account of their globalist strategies. The process of alleviating tensions among the Super Powers may prove of consequence towards discovering alternatives for Afghanistan. There are a number of observers and scholars who believe that the resolution of clevages in Afghan society will eventually turn on removing the imbalances between social mobilisation and political

participation. Illustrative is the enumeration by Leon B. Poullada of the main issues confronting Pashtun nationalism:

1. Tribal autonomy vs. centralised government
2. Ethno-linguistic rivalry between Pashtuns and non-Pashtuns
3. A serious urban/rural split
4. Economic class (rich/poor) conflict
5. Social class distinctions
6. Competition between modernists and traditionalists

He goes on to say that the breakthrough on the issue of Pashtun integration is discernible on several fronts:

4. If we examine these groups, it will at once be evident that in nearly every case groups opposed to each other are, within themselves, dominated by Pashtuns or contain a substantial Pashtun plurality. We will find this condition whether we look among the tribes, the central government, the various ethno-linguistic segments, the urban and rural sectors, the economic classes, the technocratic elite, the ordinary citizens, the modernists or the traditionalists, in almost all of these groups, as within each individual group, there exists a consensus among the leadership cadres which is supportive of the Pashtun ethos, which favours Pashtun nationalist values and which feels that the Pashtuns beyond the Durand Line are "soul brothers" who must be protected against absorption into, or oppression by, Pakistan.


The key question is why these considerations have not helped to overcome the tradition of fatalism about Afghanistan's alternatives. The Pashtuns remained optimistic for a long time, but gradually a wall of self-deception was erected by the basic decision of the regimes in the area of domestic, diplomatic, strategic and economic policies, where through manipulation of symbols political perceptions were distorted.

2. Countervailing Forces

The ambit of public policy in an area of high geographical sensitivity may be adversely affected by a series of historic failures. To fit foreign policy analysis in a broader perspective must await the emergence of important countervailing forces which can attack the conventional framework which denies that the Pashtuns can forge a political consensus.

We may summarise into four categories the countervailing forces which have policy implications for action:

1. As a society which has been driven towards peripheralisation, Afghanistan has to gear its development towards modernisation of its social framework to the dynamic of an effective territorial, cultural and political identity as a unified nation. Historical experience indicates that substantial impetus was given to forces which worked for the
fusion of socialism and nationalism. The strategy called for a fine balance which could help to transcend social divisions through patriotic fervour but was not indifferent to the national environment and traditions.

2. The domestic interest in national security policy strengthened forms of social bonding in the political context. The notion that the Pashtun has never been conquered even by those who were regarded as invincible like Alexander the Great, Taimur and Babar, formed a sound basis for solving perceptual problems arising out of the amplification of negative images bequeathed by imperialism. While avoiding militarism, a certain controlled posturing on security issues could have forged unity and coherence among cross-cutting interests and provide a massive feedback effect. This would have given the regime a mobilizational character and enhanced its grasp of major political uncertainties.

3. Linguistic and cultural forces can be combined with political and religious efforts to overcome the colonialist social formations and tendencies. Elite reactions against Pashto have been rejective, but as a symbolic affirmation of national glory the promotion of Pashto could help in the transformation of a political revolution into a social revolution.
4. The greater applications of principles common to both Democracy and Pashtunwali can ensure accountability of rulers to the masses and strengthen the path to political stability in Afghanistan. Powerful indigenous forces demanding change were, however, choked by alien influences and by eclectic modernisers. By its nature Pashtunwali can enhance the coherence of Afghan political culture and is better suited to match the rising expectations of the population than either the Western models based on material incentives or the Marxist modernising strategy of imposed egalitarianism.

3. Communication Channels

The channels of communication used by the Kabul government for the Pashtun issue were not effective either bilaterally or on a multilateral basis. In order to influence international political behaviour, it is not enough to introduce new political perceptions in the information flow. A careful follow through in communication which is all the time reinforcing, is necessary if political behaviour of other countries is to be modified in line with articulated national purpose.

The decisive role of an effective communication system in the formulation, execution, and modification of a country's foreign policy towards the realization of its national objectives is an established fact today, although
it has been overlooked in the past. For, government i.e., the political systems, the networks of national decisions are dependent on conductive processing of relevant information through proper and efficient channels of communication for the formulation of political behaviour in relation to one another and in line with one's articulate national purpose. It is, in fact, through a careful flow of the necessary information through an effective system of communication channels between the receiving systems that the desired domestic and external change can be produced. The "more efficient is a given system of communication channels, or a given chain of commands" the greater and quicker is the desired change.5

In order to counteract the imperial legacy in foreign policy of Pakistan, the Afghan side has to use its communication potential in an optimum way. There can be no doubt that the Afghan communication strategy has been subject to a considerable degree of ad hoc improvisation. What is at stake for Afghanistan decision-makers is to clarify the conditions of success for the struggle against the forms of "informal imperialism" to which the Pashtuns have been subjected. New informal channels can be established to demonstrate the possibilities of inter-

Pashtun contacts across the Durand Line, and to generate a positive thrust to Pashtunistan policies which should all be related to the core principle of Afghan foreign policy.

However, from a realpolitik perspective, by conveying the idea forcefully that strategic and political considerations cannot be separated, the Pashtunistan issue would be crystallised as a programme for a comprehensive peace settlement. Afghanistan can move into a future which is uniquely its own, but the pre-requisite for this is to project the Pashtuns as a people of high political consciousness on the path to modernisation.

4. Cognitive Model

The inter-cultural penetration from Iran and Pakistan has affected the cognitive performance of Kabul policy-makers. A question of fundamental importance revolves around the specification of cognitive models on which Foreign Policy strategies are based. The structure and process of a Persianised bureaucracy has contempt for simplistic popular Pashtun attitudes.

The cognitive model for policy makers is both a central and an elusive concept, if we consider the underlying requirements for preserving the independent identity of Afghanistan. There has been an exaggerated belief that
Afghanistan has to structure legitimacy patterns in such a way that the framework of the "Great Game" played by the rival external powers is maintained. On account of the intrinsic importance of the Pashtunistan issue to the principle of a unified nation-state, the socio-economic legacy of imperialism can only be overcome if the participatory political process overcomes the characteristics of the reactionary political culture of the collaborationist elites.

The cognitive model has to be based on a strengthened confidence in the adequacy of the nationalist forces. There should be an examination of the ways in which the key factors establishing the political identity of the state should be related to an authentic sharing of power between ethnic, language or religious groups. What is critically important in Afghanistan is that the level of information and interest articulation that is brought to bear on a problem like Pashtunistan should be such that it strengthens the relationship between the Afghan regime and Afghan society. A cognitive model which breeds policy confusion should be replaced by one which strengthens regime-society relations.

5. Balance of Power

The political eclipse of the Pashtun in international society has adversely affected Afghanistan's role. The sceptical perspective on the Pashtunistan issue has
been largely the result of unequal bargaining situations vis-a-vis the rival European imperialist powers in Asia i.e., Russia and Britain, and later the dangerously disruptive Cold War between the Soviet Union and United States. It is only by interpreting the balance of power dynamically that Afghan decision makers can avoid the induction of Afghanistan into one power bloc or the other.

As a landlocked country the spiralling costs of finding alternative trade connections have put in question the ability of the Afghan government to extend the principle of national self-determination to Pashtunistan, after its assertiveness in the 1960s. An illustration of the Afghan defensiveness can be found in the minimalist policy followed by Kabul at the time of the upheaval in East Pakistan in 1971 and subsequent Indian intervention. Policy-makers have given disproportionate weight to the asymmetries in power resources and have thus worked to maintain the status quo while making rhetorical claims of freedom of action. The failures in Afghan politics and ideology have been presented as aspects of the limited influence of a small state in international relations.

A broad systemic change which introduces rational, and legitimate reconciliation of conflicts of interests domestically and insulates the political institutions from external penetration, can pave the way to the development
of a strong "identity reference" for Afghanistan. In place of seeking agreements like that with Iran in 1973, which though successful in dividing waters of the lower Helmand River, projected a false sense of hopeful anticipation of improvement of regional relations, Afghanistan has to emphasise negotiations which will achieve solid political deals and influence the direction of political change in the region giving credence to optimistic long-term evaluations.

6. The Repressed Sovereignty of the Pashtuns

The cultural background of the Pashtuns and the Pashto language have been conditioned by conventional wisdom simply in terms of past lessons and experiences. As key elements in the emerging international community and as basic ingredients of democratic nationhood Pashtun culture and Pashto language have not received the political value implicit in an effective participation by the Pashtuns as members of the Asian and world community.

One of the most difficult and challenging problems the Pashtuns have ever been faced with has been their threatened and insecure cultural and national survival and continuity, mainly due to the vulnerable and highly sensitive strategic location of their rugged country which throughout its chequered and crowded history invited a score of ambitious racial, cultural, military and political invasions and inroads
that continued to vitally affect the Pashtun culture and language. For situated in the ancient pivotal heart-land of Asia between the Central Asia, China, India and West Asia, she had to serve as a highway of conquest for migratory hordes and expanding empires that left their cultural and ethnic elements undermining the development of Pashtun culture and language.

The question of the repressed sovereignty of the Pashtuns can be approached at two levels: first the continued use of the coercive instruments of classical imperialism against the Pashtuns by preventing them from consolidating their national unity; and second, the normative perception which denies the right to the Pashtuns to advance towards real power in the evolving world system. Fresh cultural exploitation of the Pashtuns took place through strategic decisions which reflected and reinforced consensual perceptions which in turn strengthened processes of ideological penetration. The dichotomy between cohesion and rivalry of the Pashtuns cannot be reconciled until "informal imperialism" is prevented from creating new forms of structural deformation and dependence.

However, only a politically strong decision-making system in Afghanistan can check the negative consequences of informal penetration. An integral part of the transition to a new foreign policy structure has to be the sensitisation
of collaborative elites to Afghanistan's autonomous capacity to create, adapt and use endogenous power structures. The tactics of divide et impera have weakened the political, economic and social circuits thus preventing the nationalist movements from playing their decisive role. The restoration of Pashtun self-confidence must be channelled in such a manner that it becomes the carrier of a strategy for full sovereignty in Afghanistan and collective self-reliance in the Third World.

Prospects

Although the situation in Afghanistan has altered in the last few years on account of both national and international events, the social scientist must interpret political behaviour as a reflection of deeper phenomena. The process and content of political socialisation in Afghanistan cannot be understood without first of all identifying the basic issues in the social and political environment.

In our study we have found it useful to employ the concept of "political culture" and our survey research has tried to deal effectively with the data on Afghan behaviour derived from both official and non-official sources in order to tender a partial answer to the Pashtunistan problem in Afghan foreign policy. The available data was
was collected and analysed in terms of the methodology of Almond and Verba, 6 and our investigations have relied upon the threefold classification suggested by them:

a) **Cognitive Orientation** i.e., the knowledge of and belief about the political system, its roles and incumbents of these roles, its inputs and its outputs;

b) **Affective Orientation** i.e., feelings about the political system, its roles, personnel, and performance;

c) **Evaluation Orientation** i.e., the judgements and opinions about political objects that typically involve the combination of value standards and criteria with information and feelings.

The traditional style questions about Pashtun irredentism do not help in giving focus to policy outputs. But a systematic comparative analysis of Non-State-Nations (NSNs) leading to a careful and thorough conceptualisation of Pashtunistan would not only remove the gap in theoretical knowledge but would provide motivational components to Afghan foreign policy makers to accomplish a broad range of goals.

Our survey of the existing data on the motivations of Afghan policy-makers has indicated that the pressures for continuity of support to Pashtunistan did not lead to a constructive Afghan foreign policy on account of uncertainty and ambivalence in providing either incentives or disincentives to gain acceptance of political aims. The worst feature of Afghan policy was that it foreclosed options without taking into account the pragmatic tendencies in regional conflicts in the Third World.

The scale, direction and intensity of guerilla warfare in Asia, Africa and Latin America has varied according to political, social, economic and demographic indicators, but the most important pre-requisite for achieving "national independence" is to maintain a conscious, deliberate and militant movement which can powerfully influence the course of events and earn legitimacy in the eyes of the world. The alienation of the Persianised elite in Kabul from the social environment of the Pashtuns rendered them incapable of broadening the activities of the Pashtun rebels into an oppositional force with political and military strength. The melancholy struggle of the Pashtuns never came fully of age as a guerilla warfare for national liberation and their self-image became adjusted to an irredentist movement.
As Afghan experience shows the lack of any doctrinal support of armed conflict and exaggerated formulations of both conciliatory and aggressive statements, in the final analysis provide a strong temptation for decision-makers to equate scenarios for future developments with passivity in the present.

In reviewing the most important historical events in Afghanistan's policy towards Pashtunistan, we have seen that the stress on "realism" never corresponded to political facts either within the country or externally. The trend in the 1980s when Afghanistan has become a major area of international controversy, will not by itself bring about a major change in the behaviour and strategy of political decision-makers in Kabul on the question of Pashtunistan. The causes which led to fragmentation of earlier efforts are still there. Our analysis of the problem points to the lack of ability to clarify the basic policy choices in an environment where the minimising of political risks leads ultimately to a laissez faire approach.

The prospects for Pashtunistan would seem to be best advanced when the seriousness of Kabul's interest in the Pashtun issue is underscored by a mature understanding of the functional value and legitimising effect of "front-line deployment" in support of Pashtun nationalism in conjunction with regional conflict-management efforts which are undoubtedly necessary once hegemonic aspirations are out of the way.
On Pashtunistan as an element in Afghan Foreign Policy

This study is devoted to the argument that the role of Pashtunistan in Afghan foreign policy is the culmination and continuation of complex processes of ideological development relating to the Afghan national ethos, the expansionary aims of the Persianisation cultural thrust, the careers of imperialist ideologies of Russia and Britain, the pursuit of the cold war goals laid out by the United States and the Soviet Union and the structure and assumptions of Pakistan's Islamic-fundamentalist ideology in the North Western Frontier Province and Baluchistan.

From the standpoint of the present study, the deficiencies of existing studies of Afghan foreign policy lie in their attempts to view Kabul's politics as a series of immediate responses to the external environment. Thus key dynamic processes are ignored both in the external and domestic environment. The point of departure for the present study is the adequacy of integrative forces in the domestic policies of Afghanistan, which in turn links to the most important sources of foreign policy. The perceptions of change and the dangers lurking in the presence of imperialism and neo-colonialism are central to the historical analysis of the Pashtunistan issue and this study recognises this area of interaction in a systematic fashion.
In the Flow Chart, we identify the structural and functional characteristics of the most important influences on Afghan foreign policy on the issue area of Pashtunistan.

The logical connections between the constituent elements of the Flow Chart (Boxes 1-8) are often quite loose depending on "images", "symbols" and "ideological" conditions. There is, however, strongly pronounced pattern in the complex of ideas, attitudes, perceptions and motivations which impinge on the overall configuration of Afghan foreign policy. The Flow Chart emphasises the linkages which are frequently glossed over in the existing foreign policy literature, with some exceptions.

However, while further research is called for the understanding of the "real world situation" of the 1980s in Afghan foreign policy, the study undertaken here has highlighted the saliency of policy areas and also outlined methodological considerations for gaining causative insights. It is hoped that the Flow Chart will help in a closer consideration of the problem of causation than is true of most previous studies of Afghan foreign policy.
FLOW CHART ON PASHTUNISTAN IN AFGHAN FOREIGN POLICY

Afghan National Ethos

Perception of Persianisation as a threat to National Goals

Policy Option Minimalist to Maximalist

 Constraints Perception of Elite-Mass Relations

International System Super Power Interaction

Sensitivity to Environment in Iran

Sensitivity to Environment in Soviet Central Asia