CHAPTER III

FOUNDATION AND CONSOLIDATION OF TOTALITARIAN ADMINISTRATION
ADMINISTRATION UNDER STALIN

After the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, the soviet administration faced various difficulties. The new soviet government did not control large regions of the Russian empire. Ukraine was mainly under German occupation. Anti-Bolshevik groups had formed in many parts of the country. They were opposed to the Bolshevik's capture of power. Thus before the soviet regime could consolidate control, they faced the threat of Civil War.¹

Another major problem for the new government was the need for ending war with Germany especially since the Bolsheviks promised peace in their slogans prior to Revolution.² The third problem of the regime was to achieve some minimum level of production, in both, agricultural output as well as industrial output, this, if, achieved can solve the shortage of food grain. In the light of above situation the Red Army was set-up to


2. Since the beginning of the world war I, the Bolsheviks were the most radical opponent of Russia's involvement in the war. The mensheviks also for the most part opposed it, but one faction of the party - including Plekhanov and his small group supported the war effort of provisional government. See Leonard Schapiro, The Government and Politics of the Soviet Union (New Delhi, 1979) p.28.
cope with Civil War and intervention to protect the regime. Another development was the setting up of the Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counter Revolution and Sabotage, the 'cheka' with its numerous local sub-commissions, on 19th December 1917. The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was signed on 3rd March 1918. At this early stage itself industry was almost totally nationalized. The management of such an effort required the existence of a substantial bureaucracy as well as centralized or command administration. Therefore, a large part of the Tsarist state machinery and its personnel were retained. Worker's and Peasants'
Inspectorate (Rabkrin) was created with Stalin as its head exercising control over the bureaucracy. 7

Though the October revolution of 1917 had brought a new hope of more humane and liberal system of government and society but it was unable to translate the humanistic aspects of the revolution into reality during the short period of Lenin's administration. This was totally shattered during the much longer rule of Stalin. 8

Bureaucratization in the CPSU:

After the liquidation of the Left and Right opposition and conducting of the "Great Purge", executive power in the soviet administration became centralized in the hands of Stalin and his appointees. Bureaucratic centralization had important consequences for the State's major institutions. This process applied to the Communist Party itself, the system of soviets, reaching from the local to national level and

7. In April 1919 a decree establishing a People's Commissariat for State Control, with Stalin as the Commissar was announced. Later on it was renamed as the Workers' and Peasants' Inspectorate (Rabkrin) in February 1920. See Martin Mccauley, The Soviet Union since 1917 (London, 1981), p.37.

the trade unions. All of these institutions were envisaged at the time of Revolution and immediately thereafter as fundamental policy making bodies, all had been converted into bureaucratic agents for fulfilling the will of one man.

Regarding the bureaucratization of the Communist Party in which Stalin's authority developed in a manner such as to permit him control over the party from top to down and at higher levels of the CPSU, the draining of power from the executive committee were amazing. Even inside the Politburo nobody was allowed to raise their voice democratically against Stalin. In fact his rivals were compelled through the harshest methods to

10. During the whole period of power struggle with various groups Stalin applied various methods to defeat his rivals. Sometimes he accepted programmes, policies and cooperation of one faction to defeat another one. He heavily applied administrative machinery for illegal arrest, torture, trial, execution etc. He had triumphed first over left opposition (Leon Trotsky, Gregory Zinoviev and Lev Kamenov) and later on over his erstwhile supporters, the right opposition (Nikolai Bukharin, Alexei Rykov and Mikhail Tomsky). But the purge between 1934-1939, set off by the planned murder of Sergei Kirov, Head of the Party in Leningrad (according to Medvedev almost certainly engineered by Stalin), eliminated virtually all the opposition and thus placed Stalin in a unique position of dominance. See Roy A. Medvedev, Let History Judge, (Harward, 1989), pp. 92-192; On Stalin and Stalinism (Oxford, 1979), pp.37-68, and also see Isaac Deutscher, Stalin: A political Biography (Oxford, 1950), pp.228-94.
confess to false crimes, for having been 'agents of foreign imperialists'. Those who had the courage to refuse to make such false confessions were administered drugs and third degree treatment which paralysed their will and turned them into physical and mental wrecks. The party became bureaucratized and Stalin abused his power and authority as is clear from hundreds of thousands of arbitrary decisions taken under his directive or connivance, against innocent persons. He destroyed the possibility of any democratic discussion within the Party, the Central Committee and Politburo. Instead of introducing democratic centralism, he enforced centralism without democracy, under his own dictatorship. In his last days Lenin already realised the possible danger of the bureaucratization in the Party which was initiated by Stalin. Therefore, at the time when Stalin was making the most of every available opportunity to strengthen his personal position in the Party, Lenin, ill and confined to bed, dictated his


12. During the greater part of the 'Stalin rule', he was beyond question more powerful than the rest of politburo put together. During the peak period of Stalin's power the politburo met irregularly - only when Stalin deigned to call it - and its member competed with one another to agree with Stalin more enthusiastically than the next man. See Archie Brown, "Political Developments & Some conclusion and Interpretation", in Archie Brown & Michel Kaser eds, The Soviet Union since the Fall of Khrushchev, (London, 1978), p.234.
last articles, notes and recommendations. In all the writings of this period there are two underlying themes; the need to combat the growth of bureaucracy in the apparatus, party and state, and the danger of split in the party. Many of his remarks were directly or implicitly critical of Stalin.13 Many of the rules flouted by Lenin in democratic functioning of the party were becoming institutionalized. Stalin sought to create completely hierarchical and unflexible structure.

The Party's parallel hierarchy had been created in every sphere of administrative organs. In this hierarchy it shared its function, in a interlocking arrangement with the administrative lines of the command system of the Soviet state. Virtually all responsible officials throughout the Soviet administration and police as well as officers in the military were members of the Communist Party and thus stood in two formal chains of command. This was an overlapping arrangement too.14 The background of the parallel organization of the Party with state administration is suggestive. In the period before World War II, the parallel structure on the government side, which acted


as a coordinator for the whole economy up to the mid 1930s, was the Supreme Economic Council, attached to the Council of People's Commissars. Thereafter, its responsibilities were divided among separate industrial ministries. The Party Secretariat had responsibilities for the whole economy. During the war such divisions and competitions were abolished, and the Staff Committee of Defence, directly under Stalin himself, undertook complete unified authority over all organizations of the country; state, party and military. After the war this committee was in turn abolished, but Stalin remained Chairman of the Council of Peoples' Commissars as well as General Secretary of the Party.15 The Party's Central Organs began to issue directives and resolutions to higher administrative bodies which were followed by official Soviet legislation. Some acts of the Central Committee replaced decisions of local government bodies. Since 1931, many laws were published in the official Gazette in the name of both the Central Committee and the Council of Ministers.16 But in practice the authority of the latter body steadily diminished as Party control was strengthened. While the business of administration was largely left to the state machinery, co-ordination

15. Ibid, p.70.
and control were firmly in the hands of the Party bureaucracy.\textsuperscript{17}

Control of the Soviet administrative mechanism as well as of other non-party organisms was affected mainly through the organised element within them. Party rules required that groups of at least three members in any state or public organization or any gathering must organize to carry through Party Policies and secure Party Control over them.\textsuperscript{18} These primary units established their control by proposing candidates for all leading positions. They voted as disciplined units according to their agreed decisions which were in turn, guided by the policies of higher party bodies and specially by the policy pronouncements of their immediately superior Party Committee.\textsuperscript{19}

The role of the Party as a governing elite was also in its changing social composition. Party rules were changed in 18th Congress in 1939, to open the door to the technical and administrative professionals which had previously found admission difficult to the CPSU.\textsuperscript{20}


In the new membership admitted since 1939, there was an increasingly large proportion of engineers, technicians, factory managers, foremen, collective farm presidents, agricultural specialists and other similar groups who assumed new importance with the drive towards industrialization and agricultural collectivization. The party's reception of these groups obviously enabled it to consolidate its hold over bureaucracy. Therefore, it had the prime responsibility of establishing the policy framework within which the administrators functioned and checked the execution of such policy as well as attempted to mobilize popular support for the regime and eliminate opposition to it.

After the determination of policy framework, as it had been noted above, the Party then sent its representatives to every major organizations and establishments to supervise the execution of all such policies by the local representatives, who were then responsible for the fulfillment of plans in the specified areas and organizations to which they were assigned. The day to day operational responsibilities

were vested in the governmental hierarchy of managers and administrators. But every level of governmental hierarchy was interpenetrated with the subject to control by the corresponding level of the party hierarchy. It was thus, in this manner, an intricate system whereby the Party controlled the entire functioning of the socio-political and economic system. The party representatives became the 'bureaucrats', the informer and controller of all activities, and yielded massive power at the local level. They, in turn, were controlled entirely by the Party bosses at the central level.

Administration During the Pre-War Period:

Administration of the Pre-War period was marked by considerable progress in rationalizing the administrative structure. A number of new commissariats were created, particularly in the heavy industry field. Old industrial Commissariats were broken up and divided into smaller and more manageable units. Efforts were made to eliminate unnecessary layers in administration between the basic production units and top supervisory personnel. Two or three link systems were adopted as


26. Ibid, p.255, also see Merle n.3, p.332.
a model for the organization of a commissariat. But this rationalization was turned towards increasing productivity by increasing efficiency, rather than curbing bureaucratization.

On 30th June 1941, the State Committee of Defence was constituted as an inner or super cabinet. The State Committee of Defence was composed exclusively of members of the Politburo circle. Until its dissolution on September 4, 1945, the Committee functioned as a supreme war cabinet. Specific supervisory powers over related groups of Commissariats were allocated to various members of the committee, and the committee as a group undertook to give co-ordinated direction to the war effort. In the specified areas near the front, however, it had its own field representatives in the form of local Committees of Defence. These local

27. Under this system the factory or enterprise in the field either reported directly to the commissariat or through not more than one, or at the most two, immediate agencies of supervision.

28. State Committee of Defence was consisted of five members: Stalin, Molotov, Voroshilov, Beria and Malenkov. Malenkov was to conduct diplomacy. Beria was incharge of domestic policy. Voroshilov was to ensure liaison between the armed forces and the civilian authorities. Malenkov, one of the Stalin's assistant at the General Secretariat, represented the party. Stalin himself presided over the committee. See Issac Deutscher, Stalin: A Political Biography (London, 1949), p.461.


committees were composed of the Secretary of the regional or city Party Committees as Chairman, the local military commandar, a representative of the Commissariat of the Internal Affairs, and the Chairmen of the regional or city soviets - a significant quadumvirate of party, army, secret police and administration which interestingly illuminates the basic structure of power in the Soviet Union. In the areas in which these committees were established, they exercised supreme governing authority for the duration of war. At the end of the war, both they and the State Committee of Defence were dissolved and the previous existing system of governmental controls was reinstated. During the war, these Committees had exercised complete control and discipline, features which were attributed to the Soviet victory in the war. But simultaneous control over not only the economy but also over the soviet system had by now become part of the soviet system itself. Abolition of committees did little to remove this structure.

Administration After Post War Period:

After the euphoria of victory in the Second World War the Soviet Union was faced with the serious problem of demobilization of the army, reconversion and reconstruction. The pattern of industrial location had been shifted to the East of the Urals during the war,

and administrative adjustments had to be made to take account of these new developments. In the war-ravaged areas enormous tasks of rehabilitation were needed.32 As early as 1943 a special committee attached to the Council of Commissars was designated to direct work on the restoration of the economy in regions liberated from the German occupation.33 Early in 1946 the first of the Post War Five Year Plans was announced.34 Its proclaimed objective was not only to restore, but to surpass the pre-war level in industry and agriculture. Long range plans were sketched to increase industrial production more than three times the pre-war level.35

After announcement, these ambitious economic goals was followed by few spectacular changes in administrative structure. The Commissariat were renamed ministries by a constitutional amendment of March 15, 1946.36 Another more significant change was the movement which received sharp impetus in 1948 to reduce the number of ministries.

32. Timothy, n.30, pp. 98-99; 43.
34. Ibid p.54.
35. Ibid, p.347.
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The reduction from 59 ministries to 25 ministries largely took the form of consolidating or abolishing various industrial ministries which had grown in such profusion after 1936. It registered a conviction that the process of ministerial automization had gone too far, that scarce manpower was being wasted in unnecessary administrative overheads, and that the more of the burden of coordination had to be shifted to the ministerial level.37

Between 1949 and 1952 three new ministries were created, though the total fell far short of the 1947 peak, after the death of Stalin in March 1953, the process of ministerial consolidation was given a sharp impetus, and total number of ministries were reduced to twenty five.38 The extent to which this reduction had been concentrated in the economic or industrial ministries is illustrated in table-2.
Of the 38 economic ministries remaining in early 1949, 28 were All-Union or centralized ministries and 10 Union Republic ministries. The number of economic ministries declined from 50 in 1947 to 16 in 1953. Among the 16 ministries 11 were All Union ministries and only 5 were Union Republic ministries and they were concerned in the sphere of agriculture, food, fishing, building material and lumber etc., while All Union ministries were concerned with heavy industries.

Even after the reduction in the ministries which has been noted above, the Soviet Council of Ministers remained a large body by 1952. Internal cohesion and coordination were provided by a smaller super-cabinet.

group, consisting Stalin, as prime minister, and 13 deputy prime ministers. Of the 13 deputies, nine were also members or candidate members of the Politburo.41

Control Organs:

In the later years of Stalin's rule, the security organs acquired a power and autonomy, under Stalin's direct control, and through which he made them the main instrument of his personal rule of terror.42 Until 1951 under the Ministry of Interior, the security services were in fact directly controlled by Stalin's personal secretariat. They were independent of both the party and the state control and supervision. Their powers were hardly defined by public enactment, though an enactment of 193443 did give the security services (organs) wide authority to prepare penal and deport, confine persons considered dangerous to the state. There was no appeal from this decision, and indeed the accused had no right to be represented at the decision.44 This limited and publicly declared power was vastly extended by unpublished instructions, which included the use of torture in the course of interrogation and the power of execution by shooting.45

41. Merle, n.19, p.687.
44. David, n.42, p.194.
45. Herbert n.43, p.473.
The periods of detention were in practice repeatedly extended, and between 1929 and 1953 many millions of people were deported and confined in conditions of quite appalling inhumanity or were shot.46 This was thus one of the central methods of maintenance of such complete bureaucratic control. The potential for revolt or even questioning the system was ruled out. All sections of civil society penetrated to the extent of being almost non-existent.

Agricultural Administration:

Private ownership in the land was abolished by a decree issued by the Soviet government immediately after it rose to power. The purpose of the decree was to socialize land.47 Soon rigid centralized control in agriculture was inaugurated during the period of War Communism. The larger landed estates of the church and nobility were divided among the peasants and large scale farms on confiscated estates was created.48 With the failure of War Communism and due to the Civil War a new policy namely New Economic Policy (NEP), was introduced in which farmers were left more or less alone and were permitted to sell a large portion of their produce in the open market.49 This system lasted

from spring 1921 to about 1927. The aim of NEP was to restore the economy up to pre-war level and the Soviet economy had done remarkably well under the mixed regime of the NEP, industrial production in 1928 having surpassed the pre-war level.50

Despite the introduction of NEP, the idea of restructuring agriculture along socialist lines, however, was never abandoned by the Soviet leaders. Beginning in 1918 attempts in this direction were made with the establishment of the State Farm (Sovkhoz) and the organisation of the farmers into collective farms or Kolkhoz on a cooperative basis.

A) State Farm (Sovkhoz): The Structure, organisation and management of the administration of the state farms had been altered several times. From 1936 to until Khrushchev's reforms, they had been under the control of the All Union People Commissariat of State Farms and of the corresponding peoples commissariats of the republics. A Sovkhoz was managed by an appointed director clothed with full authority.51

The practical management by the state of huge agricultural enterprises presented difficulties which were disappointing. The yield of crops on the state farms was consistently below the average for the


country as a whole. Stalin admitted in his speech to the XVII congress at the CPSU in 1934 that there was a great discrepancy between the results obtained and the vast investment engulfed by the state farms.52

Beginning with 1935 the Government proceeded to disband many of the state farms. Another important development in this direction was the breaking up of the state farms into smaller units.53

B) Collective Farms (Kolkhoz): A collective farm was a voluntary cooperative association for the cultivation of land. The legal status and organisation of the Kolkhoz and the basic rights and duties of their members were determined by the Collective Farm Charter of the agricultural Artel54 of 1935 and by articles 7 & 8 of the Stalin constitution.55


55. Article 7: Public enterprises in collective farms and cooperative organisations, with their livestock and implements, the products of collective farms and cooperative organisation, as well as their common buildings, constitute the common socialist property of the collective farms and cooperative organisation (including small plot of land for personal use).

Article 8: The land occupied by collective farms is secure to them for their use free of charge and for an unlimited time that is imperpetuity. See J. Stalin, On Draft Constitution of USSR and Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Moscow, 1945), p.52.
The administration of a collective farm was run by the general assembly of the members which elected the president, the executive board and the central committee. The president, who could be and in practice often was an outsider, was the chief executive officer at the farm. He was assisted by the executive board of five to nine members who were elected for a two years term. Check and supervision of financial and economic activities of the executive officers were assigned to the control committee.

Cultivation of collective farm was carried out jointly by the members who were organised into brigades under a brigade leader or brigadier appointed by the executive board of the firm from among the members.

The Kolkhoz had been allowed to sell a part of its produce after meeting its statutory obligations. It was a major source of Kolkhoz's revenue which in turn was divided among the members on the basis of labour days.

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56. Often outsider candidates were elected president of a Kolkhoz and secured admission at the time of election.

57. Merle n.3, p.459.


A vital feature of Stalin's rule was the consolidation of totalitarian administration which controlled all aspects of economic, social, intellectual and cultural life of Soviet people. Though, it was an inherent part of Lenin's conception that the party as the vanguard, should exercise control. But Stalin was waging war on the party as much as on any other social institution for the sake of personal domination. This came about as his system of total control tended to transcend the line of Party control.  

Under him not only had the party been decimated and the police was used as an enforcement agency, but also the ministerial apparatus had been enlarged. It developed a vertically integrated structure. The state ministries, especially police, were more important agency of socio-political change. During the Stalin period the party was weakened.

Thus it may be argued that the key feature of Stalin's rule was speedy industrialization of Soviet society, through the political mechanism of centralized control. Socialist ideology in its crudest form was merely a means to legitimise rule by dictatorial methods. Bolshevik consolidation, civil war, collectivization,

60. He worked through his personal control of the security forces and through henchmen of one sort and another, who in the time created the largest internal system of espionage. See Leonard, n. 2, p.52.

World War II were all events used to enforce the preconceived system. Bureaucratism was found to develop in a system which had such a wide ranging control over every aspect of organised life. However, Stalin was capable of curbing even the bureaucracy, if it cut into his personal control. Bureaucracy were mere tool for Stalin's designs, but eventually it became so powerful that it served itself.

KHRUSHCHEV'S ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS

The use of supervision and control: The most momentous change effected by Khrushchev was his repudiation of Stalin. The first move was against the security service which was abolished under a new nomenclature, the Committee of State Security (KGB) in 1954.62 This Committee was attached to the All Union Council of Ministers, but there were similar Committees at republican, regional and other local levels. The system was completely centralized, in the sense that it was hierarchically directed by its chairman at the All-Union level, and moreover the Union republics had little if any autonomy in this sphere.63 During the initial years of Khrushchev's rule a series of arrests and executions of high security officials, including

62. Previously it appeared with various name like CHEKA, VECHeka, GPU, OGPU, NKVD, NKGB, MVD, MGB etc.

L.P. Beria,64 (Head of security services since 1938) were carried out. During 1953-54, an attempt was made at reducing this service to the role of the executive arm of the central party organs. The arbitrary powers of the security organs were considerably curtailed; thousands of Stalin's victims in the concentration camps were gradually released and some rehabilitated, if necessary even posthumously.65 By 1961, only the chairman of the KGB remained a voting member of Central Committee. Police and security representation in the Central Committee under Khrushchev continued to decline.66 Meanwhile, special power of deportation, confinement and execution without trial were repealed.67 Another aspect of Khrushchev's reform was that control over the KGB became the regular concern of the party organs of the Central Secretariat and the powers of the security services, in the conduct of investigations were circumscribed by published laws in the place of secret instructions.68 This was a definite improvement over the last regime, and the

64. Jerry, n.23, p.206.
68. Ibid, p.40.
atmosphere of repression definitely decreased. But could "openness" develop just by removal of repression? Facts show that since Khrushchev was more effective in trying to remove the effects of political repression, rather than introduce alternate structure, his reforms in the political sphere had a marginal impact.

In November 1962, a new and powerful organ of overall supervision and control namely Committee of Party and State Control of the Central committee of the CPSU was set up. It took over the functions of general supervision of Party organs and party members over the performance of their administrative duties by state institutions. The structure and functions of the new committee were laid down in a joint directive of the Central Committee of the party and the Council of Ministers of the USSR.

The new system envisaged a centralized, hierarchy of committees at all levels - at the centre of the union, in republics, in regions, in towns, in districts, in the Kolkhoz/Sovkhoz production administrations and in the Zonal industrial administration.


71. Ibid, p.149.
The Committee of the Party and the State Control were given very stringent powers to prevent and eradicate inefficiency and illegality. They could carry out investigations into the activities of all the party and soviet organs, all the industrial and agricultural enterprises and of all the members of the organs of control and supervision i.e. administrative machinery within ministries.\textsuperscript{72} They could set aside acts and orders of which they disapproved. They could impose all types of disciplinary measures on officials and individuals concerned including imposition of financial surcharge or order of demotion or dismissal. They could also forward the papers to the prosecutors with a view to criminal prosecution being launched.\textsuperscript{73} In fact, it was a joint organ of both party and government. It's chairman was both a secretary of the Central Committee and a deputy chairman of the council of ministers.\textsuperscript{74} The purpose of this innovation by Khrushchev was to encourage fusion of the party and the government administrative organs, so long as the party influence remained predominant.

This then, integrated the administrative, ideological and executive structures of the state.

\textsuperscript{72} Ibid, p.150.
\textsuperscript{73} Ibid, p.153.
\textsuperscript{74} Ibid, p.150.
fusing them inseparably to form one single arch. It gave the party great powers, which were then used by unscrupulous bureaucrats. Even though an attempt was made to cut down on duplication of functions by merging party and government, a large and uncontrolled bureaucracy had already emerged.

Management of Economy: The economic reforms of 1957 left far reaching impact on Soviet industry. Khrushchev strengthened the party control over industries and split up economic administration into regional, rather than ministerial units, which coincided with the party administrative boundaries.75

The period between June Plenum of Central Committee (1957) and the XXII Congress (1961) witnessed a profusion of institutional changes and reform programmes, including several reorganisations of the management of industry and agriculture, the abolition of machine tractor stations, an urgent drive to increase the production of meat and milk etc.76

Previously the traditional system of industrial control was completely centralized at the All union level. This system, apart from excessive centralization, left little initiative to the union republics which also suffered from several other disadvantages. These were


76. Roy, n.14, p.171.
mostly the unworkable system of controls in the face of the growing complexity of the economy. The Gosplan was too weak to ensure effective coordination and resulted in waste of efforts and resources. At the union territory levels there was too much confusion due to intolerable bureaucratic delay by the centralized authority at Moscow. During the immediate post-Stalin period, Khrushchev sharply criticised industrial establishment and which preceded the basic overhaul of the whole system of economic administration. Khrushchev also put stress on decentralization of the administration of industries. He worked to set up economic councils which could control industry in their areas of jurisdiction and this entailed the weakness of centralized government ministries. Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin in his famous 'Secret Speech' at the XX Party congress in 1956 brought these issues ahead. The council of National Economy (Sovnarkhoz) in 1957, was created and its aim was to combine the advantage of overall central planning with a measure of regional autonomy. The liquidation of the ministries followed. No less than ten All union and thirteen union republic ministries in Moscow were abolished. The

78. CDSP, Vol XIV, n.8, March 21, 1962, pp 4-5.
79. David, n.15, p.115.
country was divided into 108 economic regions. The Sovnarkhoz was placed at the head of each region and made responsible for all industrial undertakings within the region. But there were two exceptions that about 6% of industries mainly of defence character remained subordinated directly to All union Ministries and local industries remained, as hitherto, under the control of the administrative regions (oblasti). The administration of agriculture at the local level was also reformed in the course of 1962 and 1963. The new organizations namely Collective and State Farm (Kolkhoz-Sovkhoz) Production Directorates were set up in the areas of the enlarged rural districts. These Directorates functioned jointly as state and party organs, within which a. party committee formed an integral part. The main purpose of the reforms was to circumscribe both the administrative district (raion) in rural areas and the corresponding rural district party committee, both of which were until March 1962 the main organs for the control over agriculture. The rural districts were approximately

81. Seventy in the RSFSR, eleven in the Ukraine, four in Uzbekistan, nine in Kazakhstan and one each in the remaining republics. See Lomenko, n.36, p.119.


halved in number and doubled in size. Later Khrushchev divided the party organization into industrial and agricultural hierarchies. By increasing the number of units he in effect reduced the power of many former party first secretaries who, of course, resented the policy.

The reorganization of agricultural administration was on the principle of joint state and party control to the higher levels. The minister of agriculture at union and republic levels was now to be concerned solely with the questions of research and scientific investigations. For coordination of and control over the work of the Collective and State Farms, Production Directorates, a hierarchy of committees for agriculture was set up at Oblast, republics and All union levels. At the All Union level the committee was headed by a deputy chairman of Council of Ministers of USSR; and included, both party officials from the central committee apparatus, and state officials — including Minister of Agriculture, the Chairman of State Committee of procurement, a deputy chairman of Gosplan, deputy Chairman of other relevant State Committees.

The almost universal opposition of the managerial group to this development was because of the blow they

84. "Khrushchev Report to the Plenary Session of the Central Committee on Agriculture" CDSP vol XIV, no.9, March 28, 1962, p.3.

85. David, n.42, p.118.

86. P. Lomenko, n.75, p.23.
received to their position and power. The new reform was assured enthusiastic support at the Plenum of the Central Committee where Oblast committee Secretaries comprised a majority. Oblkoms supported this reorganization since it enhanced their power. But the Moscow bureaucratic elite was against these changes, all the more so because "thousand of ministry personnel would lose their jobs in the capital and would have to move out of the oblasts to organise the Sovnarkhoz". Khrushchev's next move was to develop technical specialists who would be dependent only on his authority. According to Azrael, by 1962 "Young literate people" Khrushchev had been pushing ahead since 1957 were ready to be placed in position of authority. On the one hand he bifurcated the party apparatus into industrial and agricultural wing, on the other, he consolidated the Sovnarkhozy from the original 108 to 31 in 1961, including the merger of All Russian and central Asian Sovnarkhozy. These were the definite moves of Khrushchev's some degree of recentralization in the field of economic

88. Ibid p.105.
89. Ibid, p.105.
This recentralization was necessary due to unworkable situation in decentralized economic committees which left impact also on production of industry and agriculture. This was the consequence of his reversal of his own policy of decentralization. Thus it is evident that Khrushchev managed to give autonomy in some sphere like in agricultural reorganization but at the same time this autonomy had severe limitations. The overall structure still found them into bureaucratic channels.

Reform in Republic & Local Government:

Some degree of autonomy had been given to republican governments in 1957 when the council of National Economy (Sovnarkhozy) were made sub-ordinate only to the republican basis and made jointly responsible at both levels to the relevant council of ministers.92

Further evidence of the fact that republican government had become more of reality than it was before 1954. A number of All union ministries were transformed into union republican status from union republican to republican status. The ministry of Justice, for example, was now a republican ministry, with no equivalent at the All union level. These were

substantial changes, which had undoubtedly conferred a new status on the governments of the republics.93 From 1954, control of industrial enterprises was transferred to republics which were controlled by the central ministries. This process was completed by industrial reorganization of 1957. Very large number of enterprises were in fact passed to local control.94

At the local administrative level there had been certain trends after 1954 which had made Soviet local government authorities somewhat more democratic, independent and genuine than they were before. There had been a healthy tendency towards stricter enforcement and observance of law. An attempt was made to put down the frequent assumption by local authorities of powers which they did not by law possess and there had also been some enlargement of the scope of their activities.95

In conclusion it can be said that the powerful organs of control such as the Procuracy, the State Bank, the Security Services and the Supreme court remained as centralized as before Khrushchev's rule. They continued to possess tremendous power which they exercised directly over all citizens, cutting across

93. Ibid, p.258.
94. Gwendolen, M. Carter, n.14, p.84.
the republican and local authorities. Above all, the CPSU, remained the most effective organ of power. It was moreover completely centralized and intervened at all points in national life.

**Administrative Changes After Khrushchev**

Party: After the removal of Khrushchev by the new Leonid Brezhnev – Kosygin team, the first change in the sphere of party was the separation of the first secretaryship of the Central Committee from the council of ministers. The second change was the reunification of Central Committee, in 1964, constituting the regional party organs and regional soviets which were divided in 1962 as the organs for industry and as organs for agriculture.96

Another of Khrushchev's innovation, the Committee of Party State control, which was set up in November 1962 with all avowed aim of preventing mal-administration and ensuring the implementation of the party and the state directives,97 was replaced by a Committee of Peoples Control which, unlike its predecessor, was concerned only with inspecting the state organs and

96. The bifurcation of local party and state organs had been part of Khrushchev's answer to the perennial problem of providing party secretaries with sufficient specialist knowledge to be able to exercise their controlling influence over industrial and agricultural enterprises in an efficient and adequately informed manner. See Roy A. Medvedev, n.11, p.236.

97. Grey, n.70, p.113.
not the party organs as well. The Committee of Peoples' Control existed at all levels of the administrative structure down to the district but it appeared to have more limited powers of investigation than the body set up by Khrushchev. The reasons for the reduction in scope of committee's functions were that its power as laid down by Khrushchev made for even more overlap between party and state functions than many party and government leaders deemed desirable. Another point of its demotion was that its involvement in inspecting party officials and state officials alike which party secretaries did not like.

One important change which took place under the new regime was the removal from the party rules of the requirements that a certain percent of the membership of the party committees (25 percent in the case of central organs) be renewed at each party election and that except in special cases, officials were not be re-elected for more than a specified number of times. This rule had had a major impact on the turnover rate of secretaries of primary party organizations (their tenure was set at two years).

98. Ibid, p.162, also see Jerry, n.69, p.27.
99. Jerry, n.69, p.28.
100. Ibid, p.27.
Nevertheless, the abolition of the renewal rule did reflect a tendency to maintain substantial continuity in the membership of central party organs. At the two previous party congresses a large percentage of the members of existing central committee had not been named to the new one. Less than 50% of the living full members of the 1956 central committee were re-elected in 1961, in turn, only two thirds of the 1952 full members had been re-elected in 1956. The turnover rate of 1956-61 was very similar to that of 1952-56.102

Since 1964 there had been a change in the lower levels of party apparatus than in the centre but the basic role of the party apparatus remained the same. In the republican level party organs the major post Khrushchev changed was the abolition of bureaus in industry and in agriculture. However, in a large majority of the cases the chairman of these bureaus had continued as republican level party secretaries, and they dealt with industrial and agricultural problems respectively.103

At oblast level industrial (or urban) obkom and agricultural (or rural) obkom were abolished in 1964 and unified party organs were created. Below the oblast level rural raikom was re-established in the

103. Jerry, n.69, pp.31-32.
committee of zonal industrial production and its authority was restored over other administrators within the raion.104

Economy: The post-Khrushchev leadership reversed the trends that had threatened the domination of the party. The Ministries had been re-established. Previously in 1962, Ministry of Agriculture had been divided by Khrushchev into three separate agencies i.e. (i) Ministry of Production and procurement of Agricultural products (ii) Ministry of Agriculture of Research and Extension service and (iii) All union Farm Machinery Agency.105 Therefore, in the framework of economic changes announced by Kosygin in 1965, the Sovnarkhozy set up by Khrushchev in 1957 were replaced by state committees and resuscitated ministries and economic ministries re-established106 (see table 3).

The industrial state committees were replaced by ministries with direct administrative authority both over the industrial enterprises and the major industrial research institutes.107 In March 1965, the

104. Ibid, p.32.
state committees in the defence sector were transformed into ministries. In all 17 All Union and 12 union republic ministries were established in the industrial realm, compared with 16 All union ministries and 11 union ministries in 1957.108

# Table - 3

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<tr>
<th>Council of Ministers</th>
<th>Ministries</th>
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<tr>
<td>Chairman</td>
<td>Aviation Industry</td>
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<tr>
<td>Deputy Chairman, Chairman of Gosplan</td>
<td>Motor Industry</td>
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<tr>
<td>Deputy Chairman, Chairman of Gosnab (State Committee for Material-Technical Supply)</td>
<td>Foreign Trade</td>
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<tr>
<td>Deputy Chairman, Chairman of State Committee for Science &amp; Technology</td>
<td>Gas Industry</td>
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<td>Deputy Chairman, Chairman of Gosstroy (State Committee for constructions)</td>
<td>Civil Aviation</td>
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<td>Engineering for light and food industries and service equipment</td>
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<td>Medical Industry</td>
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<td>Merchant marine</td>
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<td>Oil Industry, Defence</td>
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<td>Industry General Engineering</td>
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Instrument making, Automation and control systems
Means of communication
Radio Industry
Medium Engineering
Machine tool and Instrument Industry
Construction, Road and Communal Engineering
Ship Building Industry
Tractor and Agricultural Machinery
Transport Construction
Heavy, power and transport Engineering
Chemical and oil engineering
Chemical industry

Committees
Committee for People's control
State Committee for labour and Wages
State Committee on prices
State Committee for Forestry

State Committee for Foreign Economic relations
Soyuz sel'khoztekhnika
(Agricultural supply Organization)
Gosbank
Central Statistical Administration

The major structural differences between the ministerial system of 1965 and that of 1957 lies in the creation of a separate system in the realm of supplies procurement. In the centre a union republic state committee for material-technical supply (headed by the deputy Chairman of the council of ministers), was formed, while chief administrators for material-technical supply were created by the republics. The Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) also was divided into 24 regions each with its own office of supply. According to Hough, "retention of the republican and regional supply offices was an attempt to retain some of the advantage of the Sovnarkhozy". In the re-established ministry of agriculture, the Farm Machinery Agency was retained but the Ministry of Production and Procurement of agriculture products was abolished and its functions retained to the Ministry of Agriculture. This was the continuity of earlier organizational forms prior to 1961-62.

General Administration:

In the sphere of general administration, as distinct from the party, in addition to the creation of

109. Jerry, n.69, p.27.
110. Ibid, p.27.
111. L.I. Brezhnev, "On urgent measures for the further development of Agriculture in the USSR", Communiqué on Plenary Session of Central Committee in March 1965, CDSP, vol XVII, no.11, April 7, 1967, p.3.
new ministries and the revival of some old ministries, the committee system of Supreme Soviet was expanded since 1966.\textsuperscript{112} In 1968 the Ministry for the Protection of Public order was renamed the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD).\textsuperscript{113} This ministry with its jurisdiction over personal affairs evoked fear of repression and threat. Its purpose was to strengthen the Soviet Police for the maintenance of law and order in the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{114}

Immediately after Khrushchev's removal, a drastic step was taken with the unification of oblast soviets and executive committees. Previously in the oblast there had been both industrial soviets and executive committee and a rural soviet and executive committee, the former supervising the city soviets and the later the soviets in the rural districts (raions).\textsuperscript{115} This

\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{112} Archie, n.12, p.221.
\item \textsuperscript{113} Hindustan Times (Delhi), 1st Dec 1968.
\item \textsuperscript{114} After the October Revolution of 1917 to deal with Counter revolutionaries, Djerzhinsky and Peters organised the Tcheka (Extra Ordinary Commission), Bulganin was one of its leading member. Between the wars, the name was changed to OGPU, GPU and finally NKVD (Peoples Commissariat for Internal affairs). Under the last name it carried out the whole sale purge known as the Yezhovshchina. After World War II Stalin changed it as a MVD which was the organs of purges conducted by Zhdanov, Beria and Serov. Later its name was changed such as KGB (Committee for State Security) or GRV (Military Intelligence, see Statesman (Delhi), Dec. 1968.
\item \textsuperscript{115} L.G. Churchward, Contemporary Soviet Government (London, 1968), p.537.
\end{enumerate}
was the innovation of Khrushchev's 1957 reorganization.

Creation of the committee of people's control in the place of the committee of party and state control has been discussed earlier in the context of party reform. But as far as the realm of general administration is concerned it was not much different from that of its predecessor. It continued such functions of the old ministry of state control like the investigation of specific complaints of mismanagement and the conducting of general survey of general managerial practices or problems. The degree of control thus continued.

Degree of Centralization and decentralization during Brezhnev regime

With the abolition of Sovnarkhozy, administrative hierarchy became more centralized after 1964. A number of decisions which were firmly made in the republics were made in Moscow after 1964. Local authorities became unable to take decision at local level for the needs of local population. Administrators in the various sectors of economy were subordinated to ministries which were part of a united system of public administration. However, after Khrushchev, the new leaders embarked at the same time experimentally on a system of decentralization down to

116. Jerry, n.69, p.28.
117. Ibid, pp.34-35.
enterprise level. At the plant level some degree of autonomy had been given to plant manager. Therefore, in some respects real decentralization to the plant level was more compatible with a network of ministries than with a network of Sovnarkhozy.\(^{118}\) By June 1966, this experiment had made a small start and by March 1968 it had been extended to one third of all enterprises.\(^{119}\) The structure of enterprises, their large near monopoly nature, greatly expanded during this period. Single producer units inherited from Stalin’s time were further enlarged. Instead of being remodelled, these large units entailed a bureaucracy and a logic of their own. Quotas were handed to these units from the centralized planning boards, their capacity in some instances was under utilized, but no cost effectivity was measured. This led to corruption, mismanagement and waste of resources — all features covered by the layers of bureaucracy which developed around them.

**Military and Civil Administration:**

Before Brezhnev, military did not gain so much power and prestige to influence the day to day activities of civil administration. But during Brezhnev regime, it became part and parcel of the

\(^{118}\) Leonard, n.36, p.124.

\(^{119}\) Ibid, p.125.
According to Hough, Marshal Grechko, elected to the politburo in 1973, greatly increased the military power in the civilian areas.\textsuperscript{121} The military became a state within a state. Much of the scarce resources were transferred from civilian sector to military sector. Military became a visible and pervasive pressure in Soviet society through its control of a network of mass, voluntary, paramilitary, youth organizations and military preparedness as well as civil defence training activities.\textsuperscript{122}

Therefore, the military establishment was the Brezhnev regime's favourite institution and enjoyed uninterrupted institutional growth and expansion through a "siphon system", as described by William Odom.\textsuperscript{123} The three bodies comprising this military siphon system gave the defence establishment vast authority at the apex of the Soviet power structure:

1. The military industrial commission, chaired by the deputy chairman of the council of ministers, provided a central focus and management for

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{121} Jerry, n.14, p.391.
\item \textsuperscript{122} Roman, n.120, p.69.
\end{itemize}
military requirements within the state economic bureaucracy;

2. The general staff of the Armed forces generated the military doctrines that dictated military requirements;

3. The defence industries section of the Central Committee secretariat provided the politburo with party supervision of the defence sector.124

However, institutional device was not the only factor of military's increased power and authority. There were other factors also responsible for that matter.

According to Zerry Hough the power or influence of military seems to stem not from any ability to force through its opinion against Politburo objection, but from its ability to support its request with technical expertise not possessed, by the leadership and especially its ability to appeal to powerful values, emotions, and fears in supporting its policy advice.125

Other important factor for the military's increasing power and influence, as described by Roman Kolkowic, was its assumption of a number of key roles and position within the system including those of:

124. Roman, n.120, p.80.
* the main instrument and supporter of expanding Soviet external military and political commitments to clients and proxies in Africa, the middle East and Asia;

* the key stabilising factor in the restless alliance system in Eastern Europe, where in the final analysis only the military restored order, punished opponents and served as a policeman on the beat;

* the educator, national integrator and disciplined spartan model for the restless and diverse, young and old, from the various geographic, linguistic, national, religious, and class based society.126

Militarial establishment also gained more power due to the development of large number of heavy military industrial complexes for defence production. Civil defence programme was another aspect for the increase of power and influence of military bureaucracy within MIC. Only civil defence programme overseed the expenditure of nearly $2 billion per year and directed a peacetime force of 115,000.127

The purpose of the Civil Defence Programme (CDP) was to reduce the level of Soviet casualties in the

126. Roman, n.120, p.79.

event of nuclear war. The effort had two quite separate dimensions and was hierarchial: first, protection of essential cadres; second, provision for the general population. CDP could adequately shelter up to 110,000 key Soviet personnel from the political, military, industrial and scientific sectors should a nuclear war erupt between the super powers. Thus seventy five command centres had been built in and around Moscow to increase the likelihood Soviet leaders would survive a nuclear attack and to provide them the physical infrastructure from which to direct Soviet war time operation. Additionally, shelters at important economic installations could have accommodated a small percentage of total work force.128

All these factors increased the power and position of defence personnel immensely. A large number of defence bureaucracy interested in political and civil administration to the extent of decision making. During Brezhnev regime, almost 90 percent of all military personnel were party or Komsomol member.129 Army officers not only joined the party but also became involved in higher political activities. Of the 4998 delegates to the 20th party congress in 1976, three hundred and fourteen were personnel from the army, navy or borderer troops, and twenty officers were named

voting members of the party Central Committee in 1976. Since 1973 the Minister of Defence—most of the time not civilian—had been a voting member of the politburo, and of course, the concerned person had always been a member of Defence council. At the local level, an army officer was named a full or candidate member of seven of the fourteen republican party bureaus and some five to ten officers were regularly named to each of the republican central committee. The same pattern was observable in the selection of deputies to the Soviets. Fifty six military officers (only four of them political officers) were elected to the Supreme Soviet in 1974 and the number of military deputies in the local Soviets at the time was put at 13351. In the past, military personnel did not seem much involved in the detailed work of the Supreme Soviet, but in 1974 twenty nine of the fifty four military deputies were on standing committees.

It seems that Khrushchev's 'populism' increased the power of the masses in relation to the bureaucracy, but that the Brezhnev era was a reversal of these trends and a restrengthening of the position of the professional and managerial elite especially military bureaucracy.

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130. Ibid, p.393.
131. Ibid, p.393.
ADMINISTRATION UNDER ANDROPOV AND CHERNENKO

Party:

As we discussed above that during the Brezhnev rule, party and state bureaucracy gained enormous power and influence in the Soviet political system which they never enjoyed earlier. A large number of accompanying bureaucracy of Military Industrial complex entered in the political institution of party and civil administration. Therefore, the swelling of party and state bureaucracies with the entry of military had been a function of the mounting chaos about decision making power, the corruption, of negative economic growth and also of divisive tendencies in the party apparatus.\textsuperscript{132}

Due to bureaucratic function of administration and long delays in the decision making process on burning issues was an important cause of stagnation which in turn represented a major potential for crisis.

Andropov's and Chernenko's tenures were too brief\textsuperscript{133} to introduce any far reaching reforms and restructuring in the party as well as administration. However, some changes in party and state apparatus were attempted. The first task before Andropov was to


\textsuperscript{133} Andropov remained in power from 12th November 1982 to 10th February 1984. Chernenko from 12th Feb 1984 to 10th March 1985.
establish discipline and order in the party as well as in the administration. Therefore, during his tenure he carried out "massive personnel reshuffles in the party and government apparatus". He replaced seven heads out of twenty three Central Committee departments. Thirty five of the 159 regional and district secretaries were dismissed. The rest of them were either demoted or retired. The cadre department of the Central Committee (Department for organizational and party work) was fully reshuffled.

Economy

The final years of the Brezhnev regime were generally characterised by immobility, and pervasive reluctance to confront and deal with several important decisions in Soviet domestic and foreign policies. On the domestic front economic entropy became the dominant trend, aggravated by wide speared corruption, lack of labour discipline, declining level of productivity, a burgeoning second economy, and a persistent drain of vital resources from the civilian to the defence sectors.


Therefore, there was a need to correct economic disaster and gain some level of efficiency. For this purpose concerned decisionmaking bodies had to be revitalized and restructured so that they could do their duty efficiently and honestly. Therefore, central committee departments concerned with the economy were recognised and renamed. The Department of Planning and Finances was designated 'Department of Economy', the Department for Consumables and Food industries was renamed Department for consumable and consumer Good Industries, and Agriculture Department was renamed Department for Agriculture and Food Industries. A large number of personnel reshuffle was carried out in these departments and other institutions.137

Chernenko, after his election as General Secretary, also emphasised continuity in discipline which had been initiated by Andropov. However, he also intimated that he would not treat the cadre as rudely as his predecessor had done. Under continuing reorganization and redistribution of responsibilities in the Central Committee departments, the Department for Heavy Industry was renamed Department for Heavy Industry and Energetics. Eight new deputy heads of departments were placed in the various departments.138

In the regional Party apparatus, reorganization process was very slow. A few first secretaries in the regions and districts were replaced during Chernenko tenure because in the regional party apparatus, where Brezhnev's followers were particularly supportive of Chernenko.139

**General Administration:**

Under Andropov, massive personnel and administrative, including ministerial rushuffle took place. On the institutional level, two new state committees were created, one for foreign tourism and another for nuclear safety. A minor reshuffle in administration had taken place during Chernenko's tenure but Andropov replaced more members of the council of ministers and higher bureaucrats than Chernenko did. During his fifteen months tenure in office Andropov replaced one fifth of all members of the government, Chernenko only one tenth in nearly same length of time as the party leader.140 This resulted Andropov's impatience with the system and attempted to press reforms. These were the moves which brought individuals like Mikhail Gorbachev into prominent position. Whereas, Chernenko's perception favoured status quo and tended to be more in continuity with the Brezhnev regime.

139. J.H. Miller, "The mass party membership: Steady as he Goes", in n.132, p.90.
Conclusion:

During the Stalin period Soviet administration became highly centralized and virtually all state powers were vested in the high command of the communist party epitomized by Stalin himself. Masses had to follow the directive and instructions of combined bureaucracy of the party and the government. They did not have the right of independent initiatives. Whosoever, organised or unorganised, dared to express freely faced heavy repression in the mode of torture, mass deportation or even shooting by government agencies. In the communist party itself, disagreement with Stalin's line was enough reason for repression or physical elimination. Therefore a large number of senior leaders of the communist party, who opposed Stalin, were eliminated one by one.

Centralization of power, was carried out by preventing democratic debate and discussion in the party. Stalin did not do anything for the creation of civil society or democratic society as visualized by Lenin. Stalin always misquoted Lenin while doing his despotic acts. He did not give any freedom of debate, discussion or independent initiative to any social or political institutions and always prevented democratic decentralization. World War II also gave him great opportunity to centralise power of Soviet administration in his hands. The creation of State Committee of Defence was the institutional milestone
for the centralization of power during World War II. Concentration of power was also effected through the use of secret security organs of administration. Though the extraordinary powerful institutional devices and directives of war period, were abolished after the World War II but it did not help much because of use of every kind of terror. Masses still had psychological fear. Stalin was again planning to carry out wholesale purge and terrorise masses but it could not materialise due to his death in 1953.

Stalin's rule was also responsible for overall development in the field of economy. Though the Soviet union passed through various critical and turbulent phases, during Stalin era but kept herself intact and also made tremendous over all development. Soviet union made great achievement in the field of industry, science, technology and defence and achieved near about self sufficiency in the food grain production. Partly due to above reasons and also partly due to victory over Germany, not only Soviet Union became the super power to compete with USA but also created a large number of satellite states on the globe.

After strengthening his position Khrushchev reversed almost all policies and programme of Stalin and denounced him at the highest forum of the party in his 'Secret Speech'. He tried his best to reform administrative and decision making bodies towards more decentralization and more democratization. He also
checked the unlimited power of security organs by punishing its guilty officials of Stalinist terror and circumscribing its rule and regulation by a defined code of conduct in the place of secret directives. He also tried to check bureaucratism of the party and general administration by creating the Committee of Party and State Control and eliminated dualism in administration.

In the sphere of economic management Khrushchev tried to combine the benefits of central planning with regional autonomy by creating Sovnarkhozy. He decentralized more power to the newly created various committees for agriculture and industries and given great degree of autonomy to them to manage their affairs, take decision and formulate policies in their respective fields. Defence industries were exceptions in this regard and they were totally centralized.

Moreover, some of his reform programmes were not liked by the vested interests in the party as well as in general administration. Specially lower level of party secretaries or other functionaries were totally opposed to check and supervision by Khrushchev's device of independent committee or commission i.e. Committee of Party and State Control. In the same way administrative decentralization in the field of economic management faced same fate by the state bureaucracies because they had to leave Moscow and move in the rural areas.
Therefore, due to above reasons and other reasons also, Khrushchev was deposed by collective leadership of Brezhnev and Kosygin with the connivance of bureaucracy. New leadership pacified the party as well as state bureaucracies by reversing most of the Khrushchev's policy and programme of reform. Immediately, the Committee of Party and State Control was abolished and created a new actor. The Committee for People's Control in which party functionaries were not the ambit of its control or supervision. In the same manner Sovnarkhozy and committees were abolished and created new one with less autonomy which in turn only created the ideal conditions for bureaucratization of Soviet society in greater degree. Reversal of Khrushchev's ministerial reform as a part of centralization policy and snatching away of the autonomy of local administrative bodies was another reason for bureaucratization.

In fact, during Brezhnev regime bureaucracy found highly favourable condition for its overall growth in every sphere of Soviet institution and life. A large number of militarial bureaucracies emerged from heavy military industrial complexes and entered various decision making bodies of civil administration and influenced their policies and programme greatly which in turn paved the way for uninterrupted flow of scarce resources to army side. Therefore all pervasive nature
of bureaucratization only helped stagnation in economy, mal-administration of every administrative bodies, corruption in every sphere of Soviet life and negative tendencies in Soviet society as a whole. And most importantly Brezhnev did not possess vision and courage to correct these illnesses and reform the system rather he always tried to maintain status quo.

Chernenko followed the same line as Brezhnev adopted. He did not antagonise bureaucracy as well as party cadre. Initially he projected himself that he would continue the reform programme and policies of Andropov. But he left such policies soon. Therefore his acts only reflected that he was status-quoist and not a reformist.

Andropov recognised the massive bureaucratization of Soviet system and other illnesses. He carried out massive reshuffle and restructuring in Soviet administration during his short span of time. Moreover due to his illness and very brief tenure overall condition of Soviet administration remained same as was earlier but his effort of restructuring and reshuffling created a favourable atmosphere for political reform for incoming leader, while Chernenko ignored the political reform but it was not possible to ignore it for a long time if he would have lived for another two or three years.

Finally it can be said that whole period of Stalin’s rule was for consolidating totalitarian system
in which command administration subordinated every aspect of human life at its mercy in the Soviet union. While Khrushchev unsuccessfully tried to reform the system but his reform was within the system and did not make structural changes. Brezhnev only bureaucratized the system greatly which in turn left various negative impact on the Soviet system. Andropov's and Chernenko's tenure was too brief to record any lasting trend in Soviet administration.