Prior to World War II Moscow had displayed a very poor interest in the 'dark continent and it stood, what Robert Legvold says “on the outermost edge of Soviet consciousness”. Even in the years of high revolutionary optimism, immediately after the great Bolsherik revolution, when imminent uprising of oppressed people was predicted upon, did it receive more than a ‘fleeting notice’ and remained thoroughly uninspiring for Moscow what Alexander Dallin calls an ‘orphan continent for Moscow’.

However, Lenin could see the ‘vast incombustible material’ in the form of anti-colonial movements which were sporadically found its most explicit expression in national liberation movements all over the world. He saw this struggle expanding to include millions of the people in the colonial world and perceived that if these auxiliary forces be enlisted in the broader struggle, their revolt would fately weaken European capitalism. In his seminal work, *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of*...

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Capitalism, he described the spatial spread of modern class struggle engulfing Asian and African demographic space. Therefore, he speculated that the upheavals of western proletariat and the struggle of colonial people would merge into a single revolutionary process directed against their common tormentors.³

The need for this ‘revolutionary collaboration’ was emerged out of Moscow’s own predicaments where it was under constant internal as well as external pressures. Thus by supporting anti-colonial movements it could have eased out external capitalist threat by directing the attention of colonial powers from Soviet front and simultaneously directing the colonial volcanic crater to the imperialist world. The colonial world was seen by many of Soviet thinkers as an area of immense potentials in hastening the dismantling of capitalist world as it was providing an “inexhaustible reserve and most reliable base for world imperialism”.⁴

But despite all its revolutionary potentials, Africa did receive a poor attention during the first two Comintern congresses and the continent remained unrepresented in the proceedings of congress. Even during the Baku Congress of the Peoples of the East, no significant attempt was made to attract this little known continent in the broader

⁴ Joseph Stalin, Sochineniya (Works) IV (Moscow, 1947), p. 171.
revolutionary collaboration. And even during Third Comintern Congress in 1921, the first Africans who attended were whites, and first and only black present at the congress in 1922 were Americans. Although, the future potentials of African nationalism was accepted by the Marxist scholars. Opining with Lenin that territorial rivalry in Africa was instrumental in exposing the contradictions of capitalism. They could see the vital role of African continent in augmenting the great European war, they further concluded that it would continue to provide breeding ground for imperialist war in the near future. They were further invigorated by the Jones observations who saw the “African countries ripe for the message of communist international”, despite their primitiveness.

Thus, prior to cold war Soviet interests in Negro race was only because of their relative importance for the victory of communism over capitalism which made the question very relevant “who is to get this great Africa, the capitalist class or communist”. As it was expected that black race would be a “severe blow to international capitalism on the economic as well as political front”. Thus, Fourth

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7 Address of Comrade McKay at the Forth Comintern Congress, reproduced in Inprecorr, III, No. 2, Jan 5, 1923, p. 16.
8 Inprecorr, III, No. 25, June 14, 1923, p. 422.
Comintern Congress reflected this concern in its resolution – “the cooperation of our oppressed black fellow men is essential to the proletarian revolution and to the destruction of capitalism”.\(^9\)

Accordingly, the Comintern decided to support "every form of Negro movement which tend to undermine or weaken capitalism or to impede its further penetration".\(^10\)

During fifth Comintern congress, its overall shift towards colonies as a resulted of its disilllusionment over the failure of European revolution was reflected in the establishment of a “Negro propaganda commission” in Africa. But by the Six Comintern Congress the case for Negro emancipation like the colonial liberation war was relegated to the constellation of international forces surrounding and protecting the Soviet revolution.

Meanwhile, the great depression bring forth a fresh hope for Comintern as it had already exposed the inherent fragility of capitalist economic structure. The unethical taxation in order to transfer the impact on the “back of the millions of black slaves” was expected to generate unprecedented resentment among native Africans. This was strengthen by the 1929 Nigerian general strike interpreted by Soviet

\(^9\) *Inprecorr*, No. 24, Feb 27, 1923, p. 22.
\(^10\) Resolution on the Negro Question, Article 6, Section I.
scholars as "the first manifestation of revolutionary resistance ...... and a prelude to great battles . . . . for full and final liberation". 11

Similar events in Kenya was seen by Padmore as 'the growing anti-British movement which is taking place throughout the African colonies". 12 Thus, during great depression years Comintern policy was to make use of this disconnection to strike a final blow to world capitalism.

However, depression years simultaneously exacerbated the risk of Soviet Union being attacked by imperialist forces confirming their theoretical formulation that "imperialism sees no run way out to overcome its inner contradiction other than a war against Soviet Union". 13 The Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931 was seen by many communist thinkers as prelude to another imperialist war and indeed a "jumping off ground to the attack against the Soviet Union". 14 Comintern looked at Ottawa Empire conference as a war preparation. Thus amidst fear and confusion they accelerated their activities in Africa. Since then the security concern of Soviet Union frequently appeared in its support for Africa anti-colonial movements.

14 George Padmore, "The War is Here", Negro Worker, II, No. 1-2, Jan-Feb, 1932, p. 4.
With the progress of the 1930 decade, the Soviet Union began to realize that Nazi Germany constituted a more immediate threat to Soviet Union than its old rivals France and Britain. In fact they shared some common interest with Britain and France viz-a-viz Germany. As a result Soviet Union and imperialist powers began to come closer. A mutual Franco-Soviet security agreement began in the spring of 1934 which had been drafted by spring 1934.\textsuperscript{15} Around at the same time an Anglo-Soviet trade agreement was concluded in January 1934. As a result of this growing Soviet imperialist collaboration the Soviet union turned its back towards anti-colonial movements only to ease out the imperialist allies and appease them to collaborate with Moscow against its instant enemy Nazi Germany.

The practical manifestation of these developments found its explicit expression in expulsion of Padmore, so far the greatest Negro communist in Soviet iconography from the communist movement. Thus, the immediate task of defending the Soviet land got precedence over the ultimate task of ‘singing requiem on the grave of imperialism and the young national liberation movements in Asia and Africa were sacrificed to appease the imperialist Gods.\textsuperscript{16}

\textsuperscript{15} Max Beloff, \textit{The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia, 1929-41} (London : 1949), Chapter VIII, “Russia and the Nazi Reich”, pp. 139-42.
Apart from Soviet unwillingness to jeopardize its newly forged alliance with imperialist powers, Moscow's disillusionment from the progress of movement in the African continent was a major reason for their conscious neglect to Africa. More importantly, their prevalent belief throughout the inter-war period that African colonialism would be destroyed by frontal assault made the anti-colonial leaders and organizations temporarily irrelevant for Moscow which found expression in purging out George Padmore.

Thus the pre cold war Soviet policy towards anti-colonial movements in Africa were part of their revolutionary designs to win the support of millions of blacks and to lure them into the impending decisive war against capitalism.

However, Second World War impacts were so profound in its magnitude that they disturbed the entire global setup drastically. With the beginning of cold war and the consequent horizontal spatial division of world into two anti-thetical camps, entire international perspective changed within few years. The rivalry between these two historically opposed social orders was further epitomized in the frantic arms race what Isaac Deutscher calls 'the Great contest'. The globalized bipolar nature of this contest coupled with almost

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inevitably applied absolute game theory between the rival blocs was
often manifested in their antagonistic involvements in every arena of
international politics. Thus, the compulsions and complexities of cold
war was bound to reflect in Soviet Union’s support for ongoing anti-
colonial movements in Africa or anywhere else on the face of the
globe.

Cold war politics had a profound bearing on the Soviet anti-
colonial policies in Africa and were more or less shaped by the
vicissitudes of cold war interplayings. The Soviet support for anti-
colonial movements in cold war era was guided by the twin motives of
filling the vast political vacuum which was supposed to emerge after
the anticipated dismantling of colonial system in Africa, as well as to
ensure the existence of Soviet Union amidst constant imperialist
threats.

The set of circumstances created by the cold war complexities
made it compulsory for the Soviet Union to expand its influence and
control in third world in general and Africa in particular. For, that it
would not have merely exalted the Soviet Union’s position as a super
power it would also have set the equilibrium of ‘balance of forces’ in
the favour of Soviet Union. The problem became more acute in the
wake of imperialist policy of ‘cordon sanitaire’ and ‘encirclement’, which
found expression in a series of pactomanic military arrangement by the US.

The basis for this avowed hostility was provided by Truman Doctrine and Marshall plan. Soon Pantagon’s numerous plans to destroy the Soviet Union in the nuclear war, e.g. “Totality (1945), “Charioteer” and “Fleet Wood” (1948) already created a hoax for Soviet Union. Soon Soviet Russia found itself confronting a series of hostile strategic-military pacts —— NATO (1949), ANZUS (1950), SEATO (1954) which virtually left the USSR reeling under ‘isolationist psychic’. And by the 1953, aside from its East European allies it was virtually isolated from rest of that world.

Thus the strategic disparity and dangers of being destroyed in a nuclear attack, forced Soviet Union to take a more careful step towards the anti-colonial movements in the first half of the 1950s. Throughout the 1950s Soviet support to anti colonial movement was some what covertly organized either through the surrogate conduits or under the sublimed banner of “international duty of Soviet Union to support these movements”. Moscow’s unwillingness to indulge itself in direct confrontation with West was clearly visible on its anti-colonial policies. This was precisely the reason, the Soviet Union

refused to support Algerian liberation movement in 1950s for the obvious fear that 'any small war might spark of a big one' by calling it a internal affair of France.

Apart from the US as the major threat to its existence, the rise of China as a rival revolutionary plank and the emergence of third world with its non-alignmental aspirations were seemed to be further disbalancing factors in the 'correlation of forces';\(^\text{20}\) Now the entire Soviet anti-Colonial designs were calculatively structured to tackle the cold war threats by setting the forces in the favour, winning the vast colonial population in their side. Thus, the cold war Soviet policy towards anti-colonial movements was to be analyzed in terms of pitting the strategic potentials of the colonial demographic space against the US led imperialist bloc. In this light, once an 'insignificant appendage' of imperialist camp became a bone of contention, evoking the question with a renewed zeal who is to gain control over Africa — the capitalist bloc or the Soviet Union?

Support for National liberation movement had been a permanent fixture in the long term Soviet designs of incorporating the vast 'colonial space' against their historically predestined rival social order i.e. capitalism. Thus ideological formulation of proletarian

internationalism was correctly conceptualized in terms of opposition to colonialism in all its guise and disguised forms.\textsuperscript{21}

Accordingly, National liberation movement had been an essential component of broader revolutionary process in Soviet political Lexicon. Soviet theorists have strongly argued to prove this inseparable solidarity of National liberation movements with world revolutionary process.\textsuperscript{22} And in this regard except for the tone of the policy there is hardly any difference between Lenin’s appeal to comrades ‘to give active support to the revolutionary movements of liberation’ \textsuperscript{23} and Khrushchev’s introduction of the idea of “world Peace zone”. This was supposed to bring a kind of ecumenic organic unity amongst communist countries, proletarian in the advanced countries, and the liberation movements in the third world. The reason for this potential alignment was perception of National liberation movements as intrinsically an “objectively anti-imperialist process”.

Another factor which placed the African nationalist movements very high in the Soviet eyes was their chronic revolutionary optimism. The project of Socialist revolution in Western countries was almost

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over by the start of 1950s. Naturally third world became the central pillar of their ‘revolutionary hope’ which was seemed to be a ‘global volcano waiting to erupt’. In this context Africa was looked a potential ground for the realization of their long cherished project as major spurt of Asian anti-colonial tide was almost over by that time.

However, Soviet theorists were wise enough in picking the rallying point in anti-colonial banner, which was a common historical enemy to most of African nations and movements. It was perceived that this ‘anti colonial umbrella’ would not only provide a common platform for both Soviet Union and African nations to stand together against imperialism. But it would also enhance the Soviet ultraistic claims of fighting for the cause of oppressed colonial people and over all for the continent which had been the worst example of colonial exploitation and racial discrimination.

This banner was a subject of frequent changes in order to accommodate it with the most relevant notion of the period in one hand and changing Soviet interest in the other. So by 1980s when colonialism was a dying phenomenon and almost considered a spent force anti-colonial slogan lost its charm and was instantly replaced by anti-imperialist’ slogan only to be further brushed aside by Gorbachev.

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in relatively new 'anti-neocolonialist rhetoric'. It varied according to the nature of the movement as well. Thus in Arab Israel conflict anti-imperialist rather than anti-colonial aspect was emphasized by Soviet scholars keeping in mind irrelevance of anti-colonial banner.

Moreover, complex cold war interplayings coupled with a weak Soviet knowledge of the inner dynamics and ethnographic fabric of the continent left them often to reach at the confusing conclusions in reading several anti-colonial movements. A major problem in this regard was to identify the anti-colonial movements amongst several spontaneous movements, occurring sporadically in the continent. The problem was further intensified in case of those countries where more than one group was involved in the anti-colonial movement claiming to be more original and authentic than its rival counterpart. The basic difficulty here was to decipher the primary ideological orientation of these movements as more than one group was using Marxist phraseology, more legitimately than its rival counterpart.

However, in the situation only a loose categorization of anti-colonial movement was possible. Here Soviet Union applied its own yardstick to decide whether the movement is anti-colonial or not? By and large at least theoretically Soviet Union supported only “Progressive” movements which had some ‘Social content’. Here again

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Soviet Union used its own definition of being 'progressive'. In this confusing situation Moscow discriminately opted for three types of movements worthy of their support:

i) Group that was looking for Soviet Union for support and not China;

ii) movement having congenial ideological outlook which permitted the smooth functioning of communist parties;
and

iii) who were critical to west in general and US in particular.

But even this characterization of support does not suffice the Soviet attitude towards the anti-colonial movements as the support for many other regimes presents a contradictory picture. The unconventional recipients of Soviet benevolence like Uganda's tyrant Edi Amin and Equatoria Guinea's Macias. The Soviet support to bourgeois leader Josua Nkomo in place of a professed Marxist Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe. Support for Libya's revolutionary Islamic leader colonel Quadhafi who denounced capitalism and communism both. And last but not the least the assistance for Nasser, whose regime was quite intolerant to the functioning of communists in Egypt. These instances clearly shows that Soviet support was not always guided by the professed doctrinal claims of Soviet Union. Rather Soviet used
pragmatic variables as well to decide the support for a movement or an individual.

However, Soviet identified five movements which can be said true anti-colonial and henceforth worthy of Soviet support and assistance. They were FERLIOMO (Mozambique), MPLA (Angola), PAIGC (Guinea- Bissau), SWAPO (Namibia), and ZAPU (Zimbabwe). While another movement ANC of South Africa was somewhat regarded as anti-colonial, and only loosely incorporated in the broader anti-colonial stream after being ‘objectively considered a part of separate grouping of internal movement’.

But even in this small category the Soviet perception had been inconsistent and even contradictory sometimes. For example MPLA which was described as ‘having grown out of Marxist circles’ in 1961 had by 1963 became an united front of ‘patriotic forces’. And in 1971 it was said to have ‘democratic nature with socialist leanings’ Similarly, SWAPO patrayer was also oscillating between ‘revolutionary democratic’ to ‘national Liberation oriented’.

Despite the contradictory and inconsistent use of nomenclatures like— ‘progressive’, ‘national democratic’, ‘revolutionary democratic’, ‘socialist oriented’ and Marxist-Leninist, they continued

28 The ways of Anti imperialist struggle in Tropical Africa”, World Marxist Review, no. 8, 1971, p. 34.
their support to various movements. A deep delving into Soviet anti-colonial support reveals the fact that terminological variations were only sublimed responses of Soviet policy in meeting the exigencies of real politik, where water tight compartmentalization on the basis of 'social content' hardly had any bearings on Soviet national interests. The differentiated content and aspirations of people fighting against colonialism almost compelled Soviet Union to use these sub-categories only to assimilate the diverse nature of these movements into a single anti-colonial, anti-imperialist stream which was intrinsically anti-west if not pro-Soviet.

The cold war Soviet support to anti-colonial movements was different with its pre-cold war policies in terms of waning grip of ideology over policy implementations. In the cold war era, ideology was often being used to camouflage the naked Soviet national interests in ultraistic, non-egoist color. As Crow ford Young had argued, "while ideology is indisputably a significant vector, it is powerfully cross cut by other determinants ... both Soviet Union and US define African strategy in a global perspective; broader strategic consideration may well override regional ideological factors..."29

So the Soviet support for anti-colonial movements on the ideological basis was not always guided by the principle of socialist

orientation. The unpleasant historical experience in dealing with these movements and the resultant skepticism had forced Soviet Union to use pragmatic variables as well. Thus, mere use of the term ‘socialism’ was not taken as a guarantee and in some cases future orientation was also taken into per view. For example, Ulyanovski was critical to MPLA leaders for not using the term ‘Socialism’.30 At the same time he had every praise for Amilcar Cabral even without using the term ‘socialism’ because of his perceived intentions of transforming the national Liberation into ‘Social revolution’.31 Similarly ZAPU was criticized for its less than revolutionary nature of ideology which was “non-class” and henceforth its nationalistic view were seen incompatible with the notions of ‘class struggle’.

As far methods of support is concerned it consists of propaganda, political diplomatic, humanitarian and financial along with direct arms supplies and training (in Soviet bloc or in third country]. Although, Soviet support for anti-colonial movements was primarily military in nature. Moscow’s inability to match the scale and quality of western economic aid to the third world had forced Soviet Union to exert influence only through the military assistance.32 One prominent feature of Soviet support is the rare use of proxies and we

have only one account of Soviet direct army operation. Although in this case also Cubans were said to be working as proxy surrogates for Soviet union. But in light of Cubans own revolutionary ambition in third world and their good report with PAIGC, this characterization seemed to be invalid.

The use of surrogation in ensuring its policy implication has been a principal characteristic of Soviet anti-colonial behaviour surrogation was used as a kind of revolutionary collaboration where Soviet Union did not openly supported fraternal movements or destabilize hostile regimes, rather it work under cover via conduits for attaining its objectives what so ever. In general Soviet Union used four types of surrogated in helping the anti-colonial movements”

a) Members of WARSAW pact (East Germany, Czchekoslovakia etc.);

b) non-Warsaw pact friendly communist governments (Peoples Republic of Korea, Vietnam);

c) non-communist strategic partners (Libya, Syria, PLO, Yemen); and

d) fourth category is of quasi-Surrogates under which Cuban support could be enlisted. As Cubans were following independent policy adjectives and their own revolutionary ambitions in Africa.

Surrogation approach was best suited for the Soviet Union as it provided maximum flexibility for the conduct of its multi-dimensional diplomacy in Africa. The covert support policy was lowering the risk of direct confrontation with US and China in the one hand while on the other easing the smooth pursuing of mutually advantageous relations with the countries, generally not listed in Moscow’s good will list. For example POLISARIO’S arms support via Algeria and Libya, although Morocco knew it to be Soviet, did not avowedly claim to be hostile to USSR, thus permitting the inflow of Moroccan phosphate for Soviet oil and machinery industries. Similarly, the support for ANC permitted Soviet Union to use ANC’s services to undermine the US influence in the region along with enhancing its business interests with white ruled Pretoria regime.

In their support for anti-colonial movements Soviets saw the ongoing National Liberation movements as chief vehicles of anti-imperialist sentiments as well as potentials of transforming the society into revolutionary path. In general, Soviet Union lend its support in four types of situations:
a) Where national liberation movements were anti-colonial in nature;

a) those pro-Soviet regimes where they were trying to improve relations;

b) national liberation struggle which had an anti-imperialist content; and

c) The fourth category incorporates those situations where struggle is directed against regimes hostile to Soviet Union and friendly to US.

However, for a more appropriate analysis of Soviet anti-colonial policies in Africa we have to analyze the broader Soviet stakes in the continent. The entirely new strategic and political configurations in post second world war era placed the Africa a bit higher in the Soviet priority list. The primary Soviet goals in Africa were:

i) To diminish or if possible eliminate the western influence and control in the region;

ii) to counter the threats arising out of western naval build up in the region;

iii) to counter the Chinese influence which was trying to wear the mantle of communist leadership after the death of Stalin; and
iv) to build up an atmosphere to spread Soviet political and economic influence in the region with its role as super power.

The newly independent countries of the Africa in the post war period, along with the countries still fighting for their independence were viewed as an area of potential Soviet influence by many of Soviet ideologues. This anticipation was based on several firm calculations. Firstly, Soviet Union was in a advantageous position vis-a-vis US by virtue of being a relatively new power with a 'clean hand' unblamed by the colonial past of the Africa. Secondly, Soviets were viewing the upsurge of African nationalism as intrinsically pregnant with anti-western content. Zhukov confirmed this Soviet view in stating that “the anti-imperialist orientation of the new nations and liberation movements was substantial and sufficient to bind them to socialist camp, and their shared opposition to colonialism and imperialism justifies Soviet assistance and friendship”.35

Thirdly, they were quite hopeful and optimistic about the capabilities of many of African leaders such as Nkrumah, Keita, and Ben Bella to turn this anti-imperialist tide in favour of socialism. The optimistic hopes of subsequent proletarization of the continent was kept alive by the periodic statements of these leaders. But all

these possibilities were true only in terms of potentials which had so far been not fully exploited, partly because of Soviet’s weak historical links with the dark continent and especially as a result of Stalin’s rigid monolithic policies.36

Stalinist adherence to manichaeism which saw the world from the prism of rigid zhadanovist division of world into two asymmetrically opposed camps. Further, Stalinist suspicion towards the national bourgeoisie and his theory of colonial revolution which refused to consider any solution of the colonial oppression other than the “proletariat revolution and overthrow of imperialism”.37 As a result many of the African leaders were considered less than ‘revolutionary and progressive’. The political application of this ideological construct’ was often manifested in Stalin’s continued ritualistic anti-colonial rhetorics without any real assistance to these movements either bilaterally or through the international agencies like UN. Thus most of the Stalinist ventures in pre cold war third world liberation proved utter failures.

The new leadership after Stalin felt an urgent need to review some of their earlier prejudices and presumption in order to win the large population of the globe in their side. As it was perceived that

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36 R. Legvold, n.1, p. 2.
they would not merely enhance the numerical strength of socialist forces but also deprive the western access to their minerals thereby putting a cramp in the entire capitalist structure. Thus the ascendency of khrushehev almost instantly started the process of de-sublimation of Stalinist cult in order to free the ideology from rigid Stalinist preoccupations which had not been very fruitful in either fulfilling the Soviet national interest or its altruistic universalistic claims so far. Thus subjective idealist views on the role of personality in history and 'dogmatism' were attacked to create theoretical space for third world incorporation in bigger Soviet designs.

Thus by 1955, major efforts were taken to woo the nationalist African leaders. Soviet warmed and lavish praise for Banding conference of Afro-Asian leaders in 1955 where it was conceived that cooperation among former colonial areas could be a strong and useful weapon in the struggle against capitalist world.\(^\text{38}\) The new de-puppetized image of African nationalist leaders, was primary guided by their hopes that African leaders of bourgeois democratic origin would eventually become Marxist-Leninist. So rather than concentrating on developing a communist framework the radicalization of African nationalist parties was thought to be a shortcut to achieve the Soviet goals. Naturally, the radicalization

\(^\text{38}\) E. M. Zhukov, "The Bandung Conference of African and Asian countries and its Historical Significance" International Affairs, 1955, no. 5, pp. 18-32.
gained higher priority than the former keeping in mind the weak and fragmented nature of communist forces in the continent.

Accordingly, an intense revision of Soviet doctrine was heralded. The role of bourgeoisie in impending revolution was reemphasized and it reversed the many of Soviet earlier stands. Soviet economist E. Verga while putting the earlier Soviet position right side up summarized that:

In the course of last twenty years there has been the wide spread tendency among us to think that the victory of the peoples of the colonies in the national liberation struggle is only possible when the proletariat with the communist party in the vanguard, play the leading role in the struggle. The experience of the post war years has shown that this view is false..."39

Similarly E. Zhukov, while conceding the “complex and many-sided process” of colonialism accepted the role of national bourgeoisie while analyzing the far reaching effects of anti-colonial movements:

“Whatever the form of national liberation of the colonies and semi-colonies might be, this is a blow to imperialism and consequently, necessarily doesn’t strengthen, but weakens the world capitalist system...”40

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40 E. Zhukov in Kanet no. 39, P. 29.
Thus from mid 1950s, Soviet intensified their efforts of forging ecumenical unity with colonial people and liberation groups through four networks.\(^{41}\)

i) The UN and its committees dealing with colonialism;

ii) Third world intermediaries, such as Nasser and Nkrumah;

iii) West European communist parties, especially French and Italian; and

iv) Soviet sponsored cultural and scientific meeting.

Soviet also toned down its earlier view on non-alignment which was perceived in orthodox ideological framework so far that- "antagonistic classes can not be neutral" and henceforth viewed as "pernicious attempt to disorient the masses."\(^{42}\) Soviet attempts to align the non-align countries even took the warning tone when Khrushchev expressed that "their confusions had assisted the colonialists to preserve their position in these countries".\(^{43}\)

But soon Soviet policy makers, changed their early view by describing anything as 'absolutely neutral' especially when the 'cardinal problem of the age that of war and peace, is at issue'. And by

\(^{41}\) Alvin Z. Rubenstein, no. 34, p. 86.


\(^{43}\) *Pravda*, J. Jan. 1957.
the 22nd CPSU congress in 1961, they could see the “anti imperialist tendencies in neutralism”\textsuperscript{44}

By 1963, Moscow perceived the foreign policy goals of the neutralists’ “to correspond largely with the political course of the socialist states” evidence for this was taken from the joint condemnation of colonialism. A group of Soviet lawyers even went to the extent of interpreting Khruschevian maxim of 1961 to mean that such states were neutral “only in relation to the aggressive block of imperialists states”\textsuperscript{45}

Thus neutralism was depicted as a manifestation of national liberation movement directed against colonialism and imperialism. They reversed their Stalinist dogmas during late 1950s only to incorporate the ‘non-aligned bloc ‘which was trying to assert itself independently amidst war prone zone of two blocks. Thus, by late 1950s they could see the non-alignment as intrinsically anti-western, anti-colonial and anti imperialist. Naturally Soviet identification of objectives for NAM included struggle against colonialism and racism at the Lusaka, submit in 1970.

The Soviet pragmatism and Stalinist review was finally epitomized in the adoption of theory of “peaceful co-existence” and

\textsuperscript{44} Ethinger and O, Melinkyans in Roy Allison, no. 42, p. 23
\textsuperscript{45} quoted in Allison, no. 42, p. 24-25.
creation of a “peace zone” at the 20th party congress in 1956. Although, the competition between both the antithetical systems continued to exist but it shifted from military to more sublimed economic sphere. The fatalistically inevitable “war between capitalism and communism” now no longer regarded as the ‘golden rule of historical development’. It was asserted that no compromise is made in the sphere of ideology and now the eventual victory would be made by peaceful means.

But they confirmed that ‘peaceful coexistence’ would not mean a retarding agent in the ongoing Soviet support for anti-colonial movements. Thus Brezhnev claim that “there can be no ‘peaceful coexistence’ when it comes to the national liberation struggle”,46 was a kind of confirmation that African importance in the eyes of Soviet Union does not necessarily be mean, a by-product of superpowers rivalry in the continent.

Throughout the 1950s, a kind of renewed optimism about the potential alignment of third world with Soviet Union reigned the minds of Soviet thinker. They were quite hopeful that the countries working for strengthening of peace will be joined by new countries that have freed themselves form colonial yoke or still fighting for their freedom. Khrushchev could see the opportunity when he saw Africa

“seething and bubbling like a volcano”. So he moved one step forwards to turn this bubbling volcano against the imperialist west by embracing the new opportunities gleefully. Khrushchev grabbed the opportunity with both hands in 1956 Suez crisis. He proclaimed in a messianic version, “today when the blood of the colonial people is flowing we can not turn away, we cannot close our eyes. The Soviet government believes that the time has come to pose the question of the full and final abolition of colonial system... in all its forms ... in order to make an end to this infamy, this barbarism, this savagery”.47

However, with the testing of first inter-continental ballistic missile by Soviet Union in August 1957, the policy of peaceful coexistence’ received a jolt. This strategic achievement was reflected in a more aggressive support for anti-colonial movements by Soviet Union which reduced the chances of ‘nuclear blackmail’ by west and henceforth facilitated a more aggressive support for colonial revolution on the other. This strategic parity enthused the Soviet Union with a kind of confidence, which saw its political manifestation during Congo crisis. Soviet Union warned that if the imperialist did not cease aggression against the Congolese people “then the Soviet Union would not hesitate to take decisive measures”.48

In 1960s, which is aptly described as ‘African Year’, when 16 African countries gained independence and when the high tide of de-colonization had gone unstoppable Khrushchev came out boldly in defence of colonial people. He offered a draft declaration which was adopted in a modified version as UN General Assembly Resolution 1514 — “Declaration on the Granting of Independence to the Colonial Peoples and Countries”. The declaration publicly denounced colonialism in all its forms and demanded immediate independence for all subjugated people.

The most of post-Stalinist ‘doctrinal contortionism’ were consciously designed to enhance the adaptiveness of Soviet system to cope with the new circumstances on the one hand and to bring a kind of affinity between the professed Soviet goals and the objectives of colonial people in the other. Thus the enunciation of concept of national democracy at the 22nd party congress was mere a doctrinal implication of the conclusions of 20th party congress. Once again faith was affirmed in national bourgeoisie which was seen as capable of turning the workers and peasants for support against colonial rulers, thereby creating the condition for the development of power full class organization and eventually the condition for the socialist stage.49 “National democracy” was contrasted from dictatorship of proletariat

49 The Discussions held in Leipzig in May 1959 were published as “The National Bourgeoisie and the Liberation Movement”, World Marxist Review, 2, no. 8, 1959, pp. 81.
only by the means and methods of transformation, and apart form peaceful versus bloody transformation no other difference was seen by the theorists.\textsuperscript{50}

The Soviet policy's opportunistic turn to adjust itself with the new circumstance of the continent was further explicit in its equivocal support for the African nationalism. Their early theoretical construct which claimed 'consciousness' as being shaped by 'class' and not by race or any other artificial component hardly gave them scope to work with African nationalist movements. Precisely for this reason they were condemned by Soviet Union as "anti-racial racism".\textsuperscript{51}

Apart from this epistemological incompatibility they were quite apprehensive of Chinese anti-white propaganda against them in rallying the colonial people in their side. Thus nationalism which was considered a major stumbling bloc in the 'proletarization of globe' had by 1960's became a banner "rallying colonial people against imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism".\textsuperscript{52}

In a similar fashion earlier stand which although conceded the viability of 'African road the socialism 'but denied anything as' African socialism' as such was kept aside. The African peculiarities which

\textsuperscript{51} I. Potekhin, "Pan Afriacaism and the Struggle of the Tow Ideologies, International Affairs, 1964, No. 4,pp.48-54.
were allowed to effect the ‘transition to socialism’ only, were reversed and the ‘African socialism’ was co-opted as the ‘positive progression towards socialism’. The embracing of this new breed of socialism was conceived as strengthening African affinity with the Soviet goals, potential of forging a socialist fraternity around the globe.

In fact promotion of the concept of ‘counter, imperialism’ between 1956to 1971, provided the Soviet policy extra-space as well as theoretico-moral justification to adopt any kind of regime which claimed to be hostile to the west especially US. The co-option of many of unconventional regimes and movements fall under this category. The inclusion of Idi Amin and Macias Nguera in the favored list was facilitated under this extra-space. Secondly national liberation movements were distinguished form ‘local wars’ (which were described as potentials to escalate wars), left USSR theoretically free to help colonial people. National liberation movements were categorized as uprisings against “rotten regimes” and henceforth ‘just wars’ worthy of Soviet support and assistance.54

But even during the period this theoretical support could never go beyond the realm of ‘ceremonial lip service’, and when it comes to

real support Khrushchev often turned a blind eye. This fact was testified in his speech to the 22\textsuperscript{nd} congress of the CPSU where he spoke of the "international duty of Soviet union to help the people struggling against their colonial oppressors" - without citing any genuine example.\footnote{N.S. Khrushchev, \textit{Communism Peace and Happiness for the Peoples}, vol.2, (Moscow : Foreign Language Publishing House, 1963), P.24.}

A principal objective of Soviet anti-colonial policy in Africa was to curb the US and Chinese influence in the continent. Soviet consistently portrayed US as an ally of British, French, Belgian and Portuguese Colonialism. Soviet support for pro-Soviet Angolan Mozambiquan and Guinean movements were primarily designed to counter the US and South African (who was often regarded as a conduit of US policies in the region) influence in the region. Soviet Union constantly highlighted the US close ties with colonial powers and some time even with those regimes which had a bad name in the region.

Furthermore, Soviet attempts to cut the Chinese influence into size also influenced the course of Soviet anti-colonial policies in the continent. The Soviet-Sino rivalry had a profound bearing in shaping the formers anti-colonial policies in the continent. Soviet efforts to counter the Chinese attempts to excommunicate Soviet Union from third world in General and Africa in particular by putting a serious
challenge to Soviet” revolutionary hegemony” was often reflected in Soviet anti-colonial policies in the continent. Chinese attempt to tarnish the anti-imperialist image that Soviet Union had so carefully and assiduously cultivated in the long years was taken by Soviet Union as a serious offence.

Soviet accused China of “fanning anti Soviet sentiments and undermining friendly ties” between USSR and Africa while seeking to establish “a dominant position in the African Liberation movement” to impose Chinese hegemony over Africa.\(^5^6\) In fact, China consistently tried to defy the Soviet ‘ideological hegemony’ after the death of Stalin. Thus the Chinese strategy of surrounding the ‘global towns’ by ‘world village’ was not merely a challenge to some of ideological constructs of Soviet Union but also threatened its exclusive monopoly over world revolutionary process. In the wake of defying its rival revolutionary counterpart China avowedly analyzed the Soviet anti-colonial contributions in terms of its hidden agenda of “social imperialism”.

The political manifestation of this rivalry soon surfaced in Africa. Moscow choose to support bourgeoisie leadership of Joshua Nkomo in place of a avowed Marxist Robert Mugabe only to undermine the growing Chinese influence in southern Africa. The obvious reason for this Soviet allotheism was Mugabe’s closeness to

China. Similarly in Namibia. SWAPO’s unwillingness to align with China made it almost a natural recipient of Soviet benevolence. Thus Sino-Soviet rivalry brought a new strategic constellation in the Africa as china was working soldier to solder with US in Angloa and several other countries. This growing Sino-US closeness became so explicit in the post Stalin era that Moscow often accused Post-Mao Chinese leadership of having “overt programmes of military and political collusion with imperialism”.\textsuperscript{57}

Soviet-Sino differences were so profound in nature that it transcended the Soviet doctrinal objectives as well sometimes. The empathy for Mugabe and the support for Uganda’s Idi Amin were some of examples where Soviet behaviour produced strange behaviour only to combat the Chinese threat. In the first case Robert Mugabe’s reluctance to withdraw its Chinese association was instrumental while the support for Amin was primarily designed to counter the growing Chinese influence in neighboring Tanzania, (China was coming up with ambitions projects like construction of Rail/roads in Tanzania), and henceforth gaining a strong foot hold in East Africa.\textsuperscript{58}

A prominent feature of Soviet support for anti-colonial movements had been its assessment in terms of its fruit bearing for


the Soviet national interests. That made their policy to often oscillating and following a zig zag pattern. The frequent changes in the context and perspective of anti colonial movements and its depiction were analyzed in terms of its contributions in fulfilling the Soviet long term, short term policy objectives. This is precisely the reason the Soviet leaders came out with moral boosting patting to colonial people when ever they found the set of circumstances in their favour.

Thus towards the conclusion of 1950s, when the eventual victory of socialism was looking brighter in the continent, khrushchev applauded confidently, “victory has already been won in many countries... but we can not rest on our laurels, for we know that tens of millions of human beings are still languishing in colonial slavery and are suffering grave hardship”.$^{59}$ So to finish this ‘half achieved’ project they came out with unshakable conviction and solidarity with colonial people by describing them now no longer a rear and reserve of imperialism, but “an important ally of socialist camp... for the full liquidation of colonialism”.$^{60}$

But by the mid 1960s amidst several undesirable and unsettling events their high hopes began to wither. After dislodging of Soviet proteges—Ben Bella, Nkrumah and keita form power, Soviet

thinkers started sensing the fruitlessness of their unrestrained altruism towards the causes of anti-colonial movements. Thus, Soviets shifted to promote business like state to state relationship, amidst unpromising prospect for the proletarization of globe. Khrushchev's deheterorized declaration that "we are in favour of developing business like and useful cooperation and strengthening trust and friendship between all peoples and countries," was mere a testimony to this fact. 61

In fact a series of 'cooling action, as a part of detente policy in post Cuban missile crisis period had imposed a kind of moral limitation on USSR in their support to anti colonial movements, at least overtly, to some extent. Therefore, they shifted to more covert assistance to these movement in the form of 'constant diplomatic struggle, unmasking of the colonialist and mobilization of the opinion in defense of the oppressed peoples". 62 Although they continued to promise 'broad moral political and material' support but they certainly refrained themselves from supporting guerrilla and subversive activities, explicitly.

This Soviet shift can be analyzed in terms of fading Soviet hopes of bringing the 'black continent' under 'red vaxillum' as well as the

difficult tasks they were facing at the domestic level. As a result of their fading hopes many scholars criticized the Soviet Union for being overoptimistic in intercepting the elements of socialism in Africa in general and national liberation movement in particular. Therefore, they concluded painfully that socialism is not a dominant tendency of national liberation movements. The pessimistic gloomy assessment of Lee that “the national liberation revolutions today is developing along difficult and thorny path” was mere a realistic confession of bitter realities.

As a result of this serious jolt to Soviet African project the widely distributed economic assistance programs of the late 1950s and early 1960s came under increasingly critical scrutiny. Almost at the same time the Soviet Union was facing difficulties at domestic front as well. The Kosygin reforms of September 1965 were not sufficient to bring the Soviet Union out of its technological and productivity problems.

Keeping in mind the jolts it received at both international and domestic levels, Khrushchev began to de-emphasized the importance of national liberation movements and construction of communism at

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63 Simonia Points out that of the Seventy six states of Asia and Africa, only four have elected communism and no more than seven are following a non-capitalist path of development.
domestic level were mooted as the “primary international duty of Soviet Union”. It brought almost naturally an unsympathetic portrayal of non-capitalist path of development which had so far been synonymous to socialist path, was now said to be entirely different.

Accordingly, it was hardly surprising that at the 23rd congress of the CPSU in March 1966, Soviets temporarily abandoned their ‘unfinished colonial’ project in Africa and emphasized the need for building its own economy so that it could ‘aid the world revolutionary straggle’. \(\text{Pravda}\) made it even more precise by confining the primary contribution of the USSR to the world revolutionarily process in the ‘construction of socialism and communism at home’. It was held that the peoples of socialist countries can best fulfill their ‘supreme international duty’ by focussing their energies on strengthening their own national economies. Simultaneously, the anti-colonial movements were left alone to fight their own battle with a stoic preaching “those who can put an end to all forms of colonialism and neo-colonialism and raise the cultural and economic standard... are above all, peoples of these counties themselves”.

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However, the dying hopes of proletarization of continent gained a fresh lease of life in the wake of increased radicalization of the continent during 1970s. The trend set up by peoples Republic of Congo by declaring itself avowedly Marxist Leninist in 1969, was followed by Somalia, Angola, Guinea-Bissau, Sao Tome, Madagascar and Benin. The trend was looked so bright that Brezhnev report to the 25th congress of the CPSU, asserted that the ‘cultivation of special relation with the Afro-Marxist states would be a central element in the African policy of the Soviet Union.71

However, with the beginning of 1970s, the continent was going through a decisive phase of decolonization, where last remnants of Portuguese colonialism had started crumbling. As a result by the mid 1970s Soviet theorists were enthused by the favorable set of events in the region providing a ‘new lease’ to Soviet ‘revolutionary optimism’. The emergence of avowedly Marxist-Leninist regimes in Angola and Mozambique, the attainment of rough strategic parity vis-a-vis West and US unwillingness to intervene in the third world in general after their ludicrous fiasco in Vietnam. The decline of Chinese influence and the shift of ‘balance of forces’ in favour of Moscow with the Cuban military, intervention in introducing a ‘new international division of labour’ and other factors which propelled the Soviet hopes.

Thus, the region was promising a substantial gain for Soviet Union. Accordingly Soviet Union promptly tried to grab the fresh opportunities by assuming aggressive overtures in Southern African region.

As a result of these events, mid 1970s witnessed the reemergence of Khrushchevian optimism regarding the prospects for revolution which was well manifested in the readily endorsement of armed struggle in the colonies and the national liberation movement by Soviet scholars. Accordingly, the avowed mission of Soviet armed forces went well beyond the boundaries of defending USSR and other Socialist countries alone and incorporated the assistance of liberation movements and ‘progressive regimes’ in resisting the “export of counter revolution”.  

In corollary, during mid 1970s, Moscow’s policy shifted to sustain unrelenting offensive with its avowed objective of ‘strengthening the revolutionary forces’ throughout the globe. This offensive gesture gained its most profound expression in Marshall A.A. Grechko statement:


At present day, the historical function of the Soviet armed forces is into restricted merely in defending the motherland .......the Soviet state ..........supports the national liberation movements and resolutely resists imperialist aggression in whatever distant region of our planet it may appear.74

The operational manifestation of this newly attained Soviet confidence appeared in more overt resistance to colonialism and imperialism with an increased Soviet aggression. After their Angolan victory they dramatically upgraded their assistance to SWAPO, training several thousand and P.L.A.N. personnel in Angolan bases. They also increased their assistance role in Zimbabwe, training and equipping ZIPRA guerrillas in collaboration with their Cuban and East German allies. Simultaneously ANC was also benefited from this Soviet aggressiveness. 75

But by the end of 1970s the classical era of anti-colonial movements was over with the de-colonization of Portuguese colonies. With the end of colonialism the war entered into a new phase where Soviet dilemma also got a new turn. The problem now was not so

much how to get clients into power but how to keep their existence in tact in the face of frequent internal opposition and external political, economic and military pressures. As one Soviet strategic thinker pointed out in 1978:

In the post war period, two types of national liberation wars were characteristic. The first include wars of the colonies against the metropolis for the achievement of national independence .......... with the collapse of the last of the colonial empires ..........the Portuguese, this type has in practice disappeared from the global arena. The second type of national liberation was comprises wars of governments having already received national independence but which remain weak, against the aggression of previous metropoles striving to revive their domination, or against new colonizers. 76

The second category clearly indicates those regimes who were under constant imperialist threat even after their independence. The best example of this category were MPLA of Angola, and FRELIMO of Mozambique who were facing severe existential problems against the imperialist designs of US – South African nexus. The later category of

76 E. Rybkin, "XXX S'ezy KPSS / Osvoboditel'nye voine sovremennoi epokhi", Voennno-Istoricheskiy zhurnal, (1978), No. 11, p. 15, quoted in S. Neil MacFarlane, no. 73, p.41.
movements were likely to continue. So, Moscow expressed its willingness to assist not only FRELIMO and MPLA but also to remaining movements in Namibia, Zimbabwe and South Africa.

In fact, this categorization was mere a justification for Soviet assistance to ‘new citadels of socialism’ in Southern African region, where its old ‘anti-colonial’ legitimition collapsed with the dismantling of Portuguese colonialism. The second category did not only provided the Soviet ideology an extra space to incorporate those movements who were intrinsically anti-western but also facilitated the natural justification for Soviet presence in the region.

However, the 1980s started with a frustrating note for the Soviet Union. Both Angola and Mozambique started showing a shift from their earlier commitments to ‘socialist solidarity’. Their divided loyalty to socialist world was finally epitomized in signing of Lusaka and Nkomti accords. Accords severely reduced the prestige of Moscow in the region as US emerged the foremost broker in both the agreements. Apart from exclusion of Moscow from both the accords, the emergence of US – South African alliance as the biggest benefitters from the accords, clearly exhibited the declining trend of Soviet influence in the solution of regional problems.

Apart from opportunistic behaviour of its old allies, Soviet Union was equally disturbed by the adverse trends in the socialization
of Southern African region. As a result, by mid 1980s majority of Soviet scholars had given up the hope of “imminent proletarization of globe”. Many Soviet officials and scholars started avowedly accepting it here and there that these countries are not going socialist decisively.

Around at the same time, Moscow's own problems at domestic level were no less severe than the fiasco of the 'proletarization of globe' project, at international level. Apart from it, war weariness was also becoming visible on Soviet face as it was exhausted by the unfruitful involvement over the last thirty years. Thus, compelled by the crisis at both domestic and international level, the entire Soviet policy was switching over to a uncamaflouged pragmatism. Gorbachiev's stress for the need of 'new ideas' in the search for political solution in South Africa in particular and entire disturbed zone in general was mere a testimony of this Soviet disillusionment.

The 'new pragmatism' and the subsequent changes in the content of Soviet policy assumptions left a very little scope for the its anti-colonial choices. The major changes in the theoretical constructs of Soviet Union which saw the 'imperialist meddling' as the sole cause of 'regional instability' was by 1985, attributed to inherent crisis of third world societies itself ----- "the root causes of such conflicts are multiform, partly rooted in history, but above all in the social and
economic conditions in which the newly liberated countries have been placed.77

Although Gorbachev did not drop the national liberation movements and their ongoing support for anti-colonial movements from the Soviet agenda. The 27th party congress continued to reaffirm "the CPSU's solidarity with the forces of national liberation and social emancipation".78 But the short space given to these references and the mention of these movements, clearly indicated the low priority of anti-colonial movements in overall Soviet priority list. Thus, with shrinking space for anti-colonial maneuverings, (as only one movement was left in ANC in South Africa) and compelled by its own inner contradictions. Moscow did find hardly any time for anti-colonial movements in Africa in particular and third world in general. Although it continued with its old rhetoric's in support of remaining anti-colonial movements, but by and large for all practical purpose, Moscow's ecumenical alliance with there movements was over.

CONCLUSION

Although, Soviet Union accorded a very low attention to Africa through out pre-cold war. However, whatever little attention Africa could drew in the comintern discussions and Soviet foreign policy

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documents were instrumental in nature. A deep delving into Soviet policies clearly reveals that African importance in the eyes of Moscow was merely a byproduct of its long term strategic designs in the continent.

But in Post-second world war era, cold war politics had a profound bearing on Soviet anti-colonial polices in Africa and were more or less shaped up by the vicissitude of the cold war interactions between the major global actors. Thus, with the beginning of cold war the entire Soviet anti-colonial assistance was consciously designed to till up the vast political vacuum which was supposed to emerge after the dismantling of colonial structure in Africa. For that, it would not have merely set the 'balance of forces' in favour of socialism, but also have instrumental importance in undermining the rival powers. Thus Cold war Soviet policy towards anti-colonial movements was calculatively designed to pit the strategic potentials of the colonial demographic space against the US led capitalist bloc which was supposed to ease the possible existential threats on Soviet Union.

The cold war exigencies were so profound in its magnitude that if forced Moscow to overlook even its professed doctrinal goals, where it was supposed to assist only fraternal movements with some 'social content'. But the real politick exigencies overshadowed their doctrinal premises to the extent that, it appears to be reversing some
times. The anti-American agenda became so high that Moscow didn't even hesitate to co-opt Idi Amin, Macias, Col. Gadaffi and other unconventional alliance partners.

Similarly, Moscow's growing acrimony with China also influenced the course and intensity of Soviet support to ongoing anti-colonial movements. Moscow's allotheism in zimbabwe, where it chose to support bourgeoisie nationalist Nkomo, in place of an avowed Marxist Robert Mugabe clearly shows that Moscow's anti-Chinese sentiments well preceded over its repeated assistance for 'socialist forces' in every part of globe.

Another prominent characteristics of Soviet anti-colonial support was its unwillingness to assume onus on behalf of protege on the fear of being directly confronted by west. The covert support to there movements via its surrogate conduits not only lowered the risk of direct confrontation with west but also provided Soviet Union maximum flexibility in Africa. This flexibility was often manifested in Moscow's simultaneous persuasion of two anti-thetical goals – quest for revolution and the desire for profit.

Moscow's behaviour towards anti-colonial movements had been far from consistent and had been marked with amorphous inconsistencies. Consequently, their anti-colonial policies were swinging along the vicissitude of their ideological and material gains.
Thus, during the beginning of 1950s to mid 1960s when the potentials of bourgeoisie leaders were looked brighter in transforming their societies on Soviet path, they were more loud in their opposition to colonialism. But when many of these regimes succumbed to internal pressures by native nationalist forces, Soviet expressed their disenchantment and explicitly shifted their policy of 'promoting business like relation with these nations'.

However, the start of 1970s, witnessed the reemergence of Khrushchevian optimism, regarding the prospect for revolution sweeping the entire southern African region. This new lease to their 'revolutionary optimism' was facilitated by the emergence of two avowed Marxist-Leninist regimes in Angolan and Mozambique on the one while the US unwillingness to intervene the third world in general on the other. In fact amidst new wave of decolonization in the Portuguese colonies and the intensification of anti-colonial, anti-racist movements in Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa provided Moscow with a fresh opportunity to get hold of these movements, who had waged a relentless against US - South African imperialist alliance in the region.

However, by mid 1980s, a series of adverse sets at both domestic and international levels, had forced Soviet Union to incorporate new pragmatism in its foreign policy. By that time the
‘proletarization of globe’ project had already assumed ever elusive proportions. Many of earlier Soviet allies in Southern African region had changed their undivided loyalty to Moscow and remaining movements in the continent were exhibiting a discursive trend.

Thus, by mid 1980s, Soviet Unions hastily co-opted ‘new pragmatism’ in its policy formulations, which dropped the ultruistic contents of soviet policy almost instantly and a new desire for setting the home in order was clearly visible in the policy documents thereafter. With the ascendancy of Gorbachev, many of earlier pre-assumptions were pushed aside and the new framework was constructed to create extra space for the remedies which could bring Soviet Union from its continued predicaments. Thus, with only one anti-colonial movements remained in South Africa, and the sharp decline of third world from the overall priority of Soviet agenda, there was hardly left anything for Soviet Union to contribute the ongoing anti-colonial movements.