CONCLUSION

Ever since its maiden foray in 1899-1900 Boer War, South Africa had attracted the Soviet Policy makers, primarily because of its geo-strategic importance and 'revolutionary potentials'. The early communist hopes in this 'settler yankee capitalism' was closely pinned up with 'objective conditions' which were promising great revolutionary gains for Soviet Union in the years to come. A country with a large number of proletariat, presence of a communist organization in the form of South African Communist Party and the umbrage discontent prevalent amongst native population against the 'white minority regime', this set of conditions were promising brighter 'revolutionary future' for South Africa, where ideological manipulations were required to a lesser degree.

But before 1960s, when the ANC entering in a 'revolutionary collaboration' with South African Communist party, started armed struggle, relinquishing its earlier strategy of non-violence, through its military wing Umbhonto we Sizwe, Soviet assistance had been mostly willy nilly. Soviet support during these years had been mainly rhetorical, supporting ANC policies and interests at various international forums. Moscow's early skepticism about the real intentions of ANC and the future direction of the movement itself,
coupled with ANC cadres reluctance to work with South African Communist Party had kept the Soviet Union in a transitory dilemma – whether to support nationalist forces or to assist communists to take leadership from the nationalists. This quandary was often reflected in low levels of interaction between Moscow and ANC until 1960s.

However, with the start of armed struggle by ANC in collaboration with SACP during 1960s, the Soviet Union came out with a bold assistance to this anti-colonial and anti-apartheid movement. The long standing alliance between the ANC and the SACP did not merely purge out the possible stumbling blocs in the way of a good working relationship with ANC, but also relieved Moscow from its old "tactical dilemma" with the merger of nationalist and communist goals. Since then Soviet support for anti-colonial and anti-apartheid movements in South Africa had been move or less consistent, of course with slight fluctuations in tune with the vicissitude of the Soviet strategic gains and hopes from the region in general and South Africa in particular.

Although even after 1960s, Soviet ideologies were not apodictly expecting a outright victory for socialist forces in South Africa but still they were quite hopeful about the future turn of events which might well and up in 'socialist victory' if not a full fledged 'proletarian
revolution'. This was precisely the region the Soviet pragmatism was oscillating between 'revolutionary hopes' and 'egoistic national interests' throughout its support to ANC. In actual policy formations and execution Moscow never allowed its ultruistic claims to precede over its 'egoistic national interests'. As a result, quest for revolution and desire for profit went together almost parallely in the entire Soviet assistance to ANC. Moscow, did indeed maintain a equilibrium in these two asymmetrically opposite goals in South Africa.

Thus, during 1970s, when armed guerilla activities arose to enormous proportions in South Africa, which was seen by many of Soviet Africanists as the 'prelude to mass unrest' an essential pre-requisite for 'proletarian revolution' Soviet Union increased its military and logistic supply to ANC. But as the hopes of 'proletarian revolutions' felled short of Soviet expectations the idea started fading after 1984 Sweto riots. The Soviet pragmatism took a egoistic turn, settling clandestine business talks with South African mining companies and making covert tacit alliance with them.

With the intensification of guerrilla activities during 1980s marked with fierce urban encounters between ANC guerilla's and South African forces, Soviet Union was caught in a new quandary. As Moscow could not afford to back track from its earlier commitments to the ANC, and make this protégé movement fall pray to imperialist and
racist designs, simultaneously it could not allow the ANC insurgents to take a heavy toll of civilian life, in urban centres. In this situation of difficult choices, soviet Union approached with caution calling the ANC to keep its guerrilla activities within bounds while assisting it militarily and otherwise at the same time.

However, by the late 1980s, most of the Soviet ideologies and theorists realized that South Africa is not going decisively to the Marxist-Leninist prophecies. As a result of this realization and the grave crisis which the Soviet Union itself was confronting at the domestic level, compelled then to take a pragmatic approach towards the South African crisis.

Meanwhile, with the opening of 27th the Congress of the CPSU and the adaptation of historic 'new political thinking' at international realms finally epitomized in redefining the entire epistemological and ontological contours of Soviet policy. Its political implications kept aside the 'military solution' theory and propounded the need for 'political settlement' and 'negotiated conclusions' in resolving the major regional conflicts at global level. Thus the 'new political thinking' left hardly any scope for 'strict military solutions' limiting the scope for Soviet assistance to ANC, leaving them alone to fight their own battle.
CONCLUSION

The epiphenomenal status of colonial crisis in Marxist eschatology, which naturally conceives it as a subsidiary causation, only indirectly linked to the ‘proletarization of globe’. Since the early onset of Marxist theory colonies were not enlisted very high in their ‘revolutionary project’. Primarily Euro-centric, Marx and Engels themselves never envisaged a ‘colonial revolution’ at least before the revolution in metropolis since ‘objective conditions’ were present only in a small pocket of European nations, their hope was confined to only industrially developing countries, i.e. Ireland, England, Poland and Germany etc.

However, it was not before Lenin that some kind of natural affinity between two seemingly heterogeneous movements—colonial movements. Lenin was the first to envisage a broader alliance between the proletariat of the advanced countries and the national colonial movements, which were supposed to deliver a decisive blow to imperialism in the ultimate analysis.

Thus, in broader ‘colonial agenda’ Soviet Union saw the colonies naturally aligning with the socialist forces because of their shared opposition to their common enemy—world imperialist powers. Throughout their support for anti-colonial movements, the colonies
remained an instrumental entity in Soviet long-term designs. Even during long series of long ideological discourses much before the beginning of cold war, Soviet theorists never appeared in confusion regarding the historical role of colonial people.

Even in Comintern discussions, the existence of colonial crisis was denied an independent and autonomous status and was conceived only in terms of its relative potentials in assisting socialism vis-à-vis capitalism. Thus, Marxist scholars kept on juggling about the theoretical conclusions, and were swinging along the ups and downs of their own ‘revolutionary optimism’ on the one hand and worldwide historical events on the other.

Thus, first Comintern congress witnessed the relegation of colonial problem amidst high hopes of ‘European revolution’. During the period ‘Euro-centricism’ was at its best and colonies were conferred as an auxiliary force only. But when their revolutionary optimism soon became elusive amidst several unsettling events, they immediately turned their attention towards the ‘East’. So from second to fourth comintern congress an obvious shift from ‘West’ to ‘East’ was explicitly visible on comintern policies. This trend continued till the Koumintang betrayal after which they almost lost their faith in ‘national bourgeois’ and turned towards organizing workers and peasants at lower levels.
After Stalin’s commencement, the comintern was reduced to mere a mouthpiece of Soviet foreign policy. Unrestrained power which Stalin assumed after ouster of Zinoviev and Trotsky which finally culminated in the purge of Bukharin, comintern colonial outlook was overshadowed by Stalin’s own monolithic preoccupations. Naturally colonial problem further slipped down in Soviet agenda.

Meanwhile, after 1930s Soviet Union’s own security dilemma assumed alarming proportions with Japan and fascist Germany posing serious existential problems for the Soviet Union itself. In this crisis period they had hardly had the time to concentrate on colonial crisis and whatever little interests they could take was because of potential of colonial people to defend the ‘national incarnation of world revolution’.

Even during the cold war era the colonies remained an instrumental object for Soviet policy makers. And a deep delving into Soviet anti-colonial policies reveal that the continued to see the colonial crisis as merely a by-product of cold war super power antagonism. This was precisely the reason that Moscow’s entire anti-colonial policies were swinging along the vicissitudes of cold war exigencies rather than the developments in the colonial world. Thus, Moscow’s cold war anti-colonial policies were consciously designed to fulfill the dual interests of Soviet Union- to fill the vast political
vacuum which was about to emerge after the dismantling of colonial structure and to pit the strategic importance of colonial demographic structure against the capitalist world. Because for that it would not have merely brought the ‘balance of forces’ in favour of socialism it would have also deprived the west from its’ mineral access’ and thereby putting a cramp in the entire capitalist structure.

Cold war exigencies were so profound in intensity that Soviet Union was even forced to free its actual policy from its rigidly overloaded ideological commitments. Moscow’s ‘ideological contortionism’ during cold war was primarily designed to provide it extra adaptiveness to cope with the new environment. So many times Soviet Union appeared to reverse its own professed goals. Anti-west and anti-China agenda became so prominent that Moscow did not even hesitate to incorporate regimes like, Idi Amin, Macias, Col. Gaddafi and several others unconventional recipients of its benevolence.

This anti-west and anti-China approach was explicitly visible on its anti-colonial policies throughout the cold war period. Soviet attitude towards anti-colonial movement in Southern Africa especially exposes Soviet policies where it was constantly determined and influenced by the west and Chinese variables. In case of Angola and Mozambique their anti-colonial designs were primarily aimed at
undermining the west- South African influence while in Zimbabwean case anti-Chinese plank seemed to be more powerful.

The instrumentalisation of colonial crisis was further evident in the willy-nilly assistance to their anti-colonial movements. For that Soviet Union did not even come avowedly in support of these movements primarily because of perceived direct intervention from the west. It conducted its operations via its surrogate conduits and by and large it appeared to be unwilling to assume responsibility on behalf of its proteges. In many cases Moscow's policy seemed to be 'to keep the pot boiling'. This might not have diverted the western attention from Soviet front but also had successfully created a permanent demand for Soviet arms and ammunitions. One prominent reason for Soviet attempts to foil 'peaceful negotiations in Namibia could be analyzed in this context.

However, with the fall of Portuguese colonies, Soviet Union appeared to be assisting the anti-colonial movements more overtly and confidently. The emergence of two avowedly proclaimed Marxist-Leninist regimes in Southern Africa and a rough nuclear parity with West was central to this confidence. But Soviet Union itself was gripped in serious problems at domestic and international levels and it was forced to drop anti-colonial movements once and for all.
However, their Southern African anti-colonial ventures were largely determined by the balance of advantage in ideological, political and military spheres. Naturally its support to MPLA in Angola, FRELIMO in Mozambique, ANC in South Africa, ZAPU in Zimbabwe and SWAPO in Namibia were marked with its ideological material and strategic gains from the region. In Angola and Mozambique, Moscow had virtually committed itself to save MPLA and FRLIMO against their imperialist colonialist adversaries i.e. South Africa in particular and the West in general. South African prime position in the region and more importantly its image as a conduit of west acting on behalf of Washington to undermine Soviet gains in the region made it the principal target of Soviet anti-imperialist designs. Precisely for this reason South Africa was constantly a target of Soviet engineered strategy of “total onslaught”.

Beside Angola and Mozambique, SWAPO and ZAPU were also facing dangers from South Africa, while Moscow’s principal ally ANC was severely under pressure from the ‘white minority regime’. However, Soviet policy towards ZAPU was more influenced by Moscow’s rivalry with China than the West. In Zimbabwe this Chinese factor was so prominent that Moscow chose to back Joshua Nkomo, an explicit ‘bourgeois nationalist’ in place of an avowed Marxist like Robert Mugabe.
However, in Zimbabwe and Namibia, Moscow’s primary interests were to undermine the US and Chinese influence more than anything else. Moscow’s consistent efforts to prolong the military campaign and its efforts to frustrate the West in their efforts of ‘peaceful settlement’ upholds the hypothesis that Soviet Union was more interested in cutting the Chinese, South African and the Western stature in size rather than resolving the problem. In fact they were not against negotiated settlements rather they were against any settlement under western auspices with western brokership.

Meanwhile, in South Africa, Soviet Union tended to be acting for ideological gains rather than purely materialistic and strategic. In their broader designs South Africa was a potential socialist country with a large proletariat and the presence of communist organisations from the early 1920s were enthusing factors. Moscow had thought South Africa going socialist with least ideological manipulations.

Nevertheless, Moscow’s primary ally was not South African communist party rather it was African National Congress. By backing ANC instead of SACP it could fulfill its dual purposes by silencing the West’s criticism of Moscow’s hidden objectives of ‘social imperialism’ and above all enhancing its international position as a champion of anti-colonial and anti-apartheid causes.
However, Soviet Union anti-colonial policies in the Southern Africa had been far from altruistic as claimed and propagated by Soviet publicists. In Angola its military assistance was earning nearly the half of the Angolan oil expenses while in South Africa it could maintain a proportional balance between its altruistic claims and egoistic national interests. Thus Moscow never allowed its ideological commitments to come in the way of its profitable business with South African companies. Soviet Union continued to foster its revolutionary quest along with profit desires almost simultaneously. It maintained close business ties with South African mining companies and they collaborated for profits in international markets on more than one occasion.

Meanwhile, with the opening of 27th congress, Moscow enmeshed with its own problems in both international and domestic levels was compelled to abandon its earlier premises. With the adoption of historic ‘new political thinking in international politics’, finally epitomized in redefining the entire epistemological and ontological contours of Soviet policy. With anti-colonial movements fast becoming an historical entity together with decolonization of Portuguese colonies and rest of anti-colonial and anti-apartheid movements entering the decisive phase, there was hardly anything left for Soviet Union. Soon afterwards, third world itself slipped down
sharply from Soviet policy papers. With the dismantling of South African white regime, even the last of the movement disappeared from the international arena, which proved the irrelevance of anti-colonial banner itself.