Chapter V

SOVIET POLICY TOWARDS ANTI-COLONIAL AND ANTI-APARTHEID MOVEMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA

Amongst all the national liberation movements in the continent, Soviet Union had pinned greatest hope in South Africa, where 'objective conditions' for revolution needed a relatively lesser degree of 'ideological manipulations' for many of Soviet Africanists. Industrially developed, and economically advanced, South African 'Settler capitalism', with the presence of 'antagonistic class interests' and 'contradictory class relations' above all, coupled with a genuine mass liberation movement across tribal and racial frontiers, was promising a brighter revolutionary gains for the Soviet Union.

The early communist optimism could see a bright revolutionary prospect in South Africa on account of several invigorative factors. The country had oldest communist organization in the continent in form of South African Communist Party established in 1921. In addition, the presence of a large number of industrial and agricultural proletariat seething with umbrage discontent as a result of racist colonial policies of 'white minority regime'. Thus amidst enthusing 'objective conditions', South Africa was promising a better revolutionary prospects since the days of Bolshevik revolution.
South Africa was conceived in terms of a “embryonic class conflict” by Soviet ideologues ever since the 1920s. Accordingly, the sixth Comintern Congress in 1928 set the political goal for South Africa as “a workers and peasant government with full equal rights for all races black, coloured and white”¹. In corollary, soon after Bolshevik revolution, Soviet Union established links with ANC and CPSA, the two principal resistance movements in South Africa. But the early contacts had been too unsteady and irregular to decipher any general pattern of Soviet behaviour towards these movements. During these years, except for a brief visit by ANC leader T.S. Gumede to the Moscow in late 1920s, the ties had been almost negligible for almost twenty years. Although the South African Communist Party continued to enjoy a favoured treatment as it was considered as “the ideological and organisational leader of the revolutionary communist movement in other parts of black Africa”².

During these years a persistent mutual skepticism prevailed from both the sides, resulting into a kind of ‘relational dormancy’. The Soviet Union had established diplomatic ties although ephemeral with South African white regime during Second World War, preventing

¹ Quoted in Kurt M Campbell, Soviet Policy Towards South Africa (New York: St. Martins, 1986), pp. 30-34.
them from assuming any overt revolutionary obligation to assist ANC or CPSA. Although Soviet Union continued to support CPSA covertly which was evident from the expulsion of Soviet diplomats for allegedly “furthering the aims of communist organization”3 in 1956. While on the Soviet part it was baffled with ANC on account of some fundamental differences and to some extent by its own ‘ideological dilemma’.

ANC policy formulations along racial rationalist consideration which stood in complete contrast to the Moscow’s ‘ideological guidelines’ where ‘class not colour determines the consciousness’, came in the way of Moscow’s any overt support to ANC. The Soviet suspicion about ANC credentials were further swelled by the reluctance of young ANC leaders to cooperate with South African communist party in the dismantling of white regime.

However, Moscow’s own ‘tactical dilemma’ – whether to organize genuine communist led revolutions against nationalist leaders or to cooperate the nationalist forces as a long term strategy, further aggravated the Soviet muddle, preventing them from providing any substantial support to ANC.

1 Remarks attributed to Eric Louw, south African Minister of External Affairs, 1956, for detail see, ‘The Eric Louw File’, Political Archives, Institute of Contemporary History, University of Orange Free State, Bloemfontein.
Another factor which kept the Soviet assistance low was the nature of ANC resistance, which was non-violent until 1961. For Moscow, non-violent means were ideologically unacceptable as it reduces the serendipitous upsurge of mass movements, a necessary pre-condition for ‘proletariat revolution’. Moscow’s qualm towards ANC before 1961 was attributed to this ‘ideological incongruity’. Later Buhlezi’s zulu Inkatha was criticized for the same reason during 1980s, “opposed to violence, meaning mass actions and thereby collaborating with authorities .......”⁴. Thus, the non-violent nature of ANC resistance was posing a ‘ideological wavering’ on the one hand while limiting the scope of Soviet assistance to ANC one the other.

As a consequence, Soviet support to ANC before 1961 had been of limited influence, confined to garner support on various regional and global forums only. Although, during the years, European colonialism and South African racism remained the most consistent common target in Soviet official documents and policy papers. But ideological and real politik constraints had kept the Soviet assistance impounded to only moral support only.

However, during 1950s, with the increased realization of affinity of their goals, the nationalist ANC and Marxist South African Communist party began to come closer. As a result they began to

work together in their opposition to oppressive apartheid regime which was increasingly becoming more coercive, which eventually culminated into a formal alliance between ANC and SACP during early 1960s.

It was only during early 1960s when ANC in collaboration with SACP formed Umkhonto we Sizwe (Spear of the Nation), the armed wing of ANC, to launch an armed struggle against apartheid regime that Soviet Union came out with substantial material support to ANC. Since 1963, Soviet Union has provided an overwhelming preponderance of military aid to ANC. Since then ANC insurgents had received training from Soviet and its European Surrogates in Tanzania and Zambia and since the fall of Portuguese colonialism in 1974, in Angola and Mozambique.

Although Moscow’s support for ANC was in line with its general support for other national liberation movements. But still Soviet’s had maintained a cautious approach and had been bashful in accepting the military side of their assistance. They had publicly accepted the non-military aid, but had never acknowledged the military side of their assistance. At most they had intimated publicly, had been rhetorically camouflaged rubrics such as ‘all round help” or “material

---

as well as moral support, but even these expressions were rarely employed. But the quite open acceptance of SACP journal African Communist about Soviet aid to African Liberation movements including ANC, revels that Moscow was assisting ANC militarily as well.

Nonetheless, 1960s marked with an increased interaction between ANC and Soviet Union. ANC leaders had been frequently visiting Soviet Union and had participated in the various Soviet sponsored conferences and events in support of anti-colonial and anti-apartheid movements. ANC had been accorded same rank as ZAPU and SWAPO in Soviet documents, including references in May Day slogans. And in terms of media attention and ANC leaders visit to Moscow, they enjoyed a even better status than ZAPU and SWAPO.

The working alliance between ANC and SACP did not merely relieved the Soviet Union from its ‘chronic tactical dilemma’ – whether to support nationalists or communists put also purged out major ideological strains in avowedly supporting ANC, with the merger of nationalist and communist goals into one. Another reasons for accelerated Soviet assistance was the fact that the west in general and South Africa in particular had gone defensive after the Sharpville

---

6 TASS, 6 December, 1976 (on the occasion of the ANC’s 50th anniversary).
7 Vusizwe Seme, African Communist, No. 71, 1977, p. 34.
Massacre of 1960 and later was facing a virtual moral outcast by majority of nations.

With the Soviet help, ANC-SACP collaboration increased their guerrilla activities, exerting tremendous pressure on South African white regime which forced them to take an abortive attempt to blunt the struggle by engaging in dialogue with ‘moderate’ African governments.

Although the west has found South Africa to be an embarrassing ally as it can not support South Africa either ideologically or morally. Soviet Union’s position in ANC support was to a good extent rested on this ‘moral dilemma’ of West where it could neither afford to support racist regime avowedly nor it could have forfeited its economic and perceived strategic gains of status quoism. Contrary to west, Moscow was not facing any moral compunction in its support to ANC, as it was inline of official OAU policy and in the tone of majority of third world national. The growing pressure from third world countries which tended to see South African crisis as an extension of ‘colonial question’ and henceforth a ‘western

__________

responsibility' only to be solved through the 'transfer of power further strengthen the Soviet case.

Furthermore, the black population of South Africa was going increasingly anti-western and pro-soviet, this was noticed on more than one occasion. For example, the unfurling of a Soviet flag at the funeral in Eastern Cape when an activist claimed that "we are very happy to see our leaders going under Soviet flag, which has never been associated with the oppression of blacks in South Africa ...... it is surrogates of yankee imperialism which is responsible for our misery and subjugation"9.

Since the opening of armed struggle Soviet Union has given all kinds of material and moral support to ANC with a consistent determination to assist it until racism and imperialism is defeated finally in South Africa. Moscow had supplied arms, medical supplies, financial aid and training facilities in Soviet conduit states, and provided help in publications and organisational activities. Soviet Union had also convictionally supported the ANC policies and interests at international forums including UN.

This assistance had been duly acknowledged by the ANC leaders on different occasions. Nelson Mandela himself gave the reason de etre for the cooperation of ANC with SACP and socialist bloc countries in general during the Rivonia trials:

".........it is not only in internal politics that we count communists as amongst those who support our cause. In international field also, communist countries have always come to our aid ......... although there is an universal condemnation of apartheid, the communist bloc speaks out against it with a louder voice than most of the white world".  

Nevertheless, ANC cannot be called a client or conduit of Moscow unlike MPLA or FRELIMO. In seeking support and assistance ANC had been expedient and relied in general on those governments who had been opposed to apartheid (capitalists and socialist alike) and by and large avoided being instrumentalized in the super power rivalry. Neither did it intend to take an anti-western or pro-Soviet stance, atleast avowedly. ANC had maintained a good relationship with Scandinavian countries, non-aligned nations and even China and the west.

---

But despite this unscrupulous behaviour of ANC, the intensity of Soviet influence on ANC had been far from ambiguity. Although, the primary ‘ideological protégé’ had been SACP, but the obvious ‘organic links’ between ANC and SACP hardly leave any scope for confusion over the degree of Soviet influence on ANC. Precisely for this reason, many of western Africanists saw ANC as being “deeply infiltrated by those who seek to advance the imperialistic ambitions of the Soviet Union”\textsuperscript{11}. Although others identify ANC rank and file being primarily filled up with nationalist elements which play down the degree of Soviet influence\textsuperscript{12}.

Another, Soviet Union had avowedly supported ANC-SACP alliance which was no longer viewed merely as an “agitation opposition” but seen increasingly as ‘the immediate alternative power’\textsuperscript{13}. Obviously, ANC came as almost a natural recipient of Soviet assistance not merely because of its close links with South African Communist Party, but also because of massive third world support it enjoyed which saw it as an metaphor of ‘anti-apartheidism’. Apart from the massive global support ANC garnered and its hold on the native black population, its potentials to unite all ‘anti-imperialist’ streams within its gambit was

\textsuperscript{11} “The Role of Soviet Union, Cuba and East Germany in Fomenting Terrorism in Southern Africa”, Hearings before the sub-committee on Security and Terrorism, Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate (Washington DC : USGPO, 1982), p. 208.


a factor which compelled Moscow to take ANC seriously. In January 1982, the CPSU congratulation message on the 70th anniversary of ANC, made this point further explicit, which reads, inter alia:

*The ANC is now rightly recognized as the genuine representative of the South African people and comes forward as the consistent defender of their rights and interests. In conditions where resistant to the apartheid regime in the Republic of South Africa has widespread, your party rallies all opponents of racism into a single liberation front.*

The ANC's longstanding alliance with SACP had converged the two mainstreams of militant anti-apartheid movements within the ambit of ANC. Precisely for this reason, much of the Soviet propaganda in South Africa rests on the role of ANC, and to a lesser degree on SACP. This calculated estrangement from its primary 'ideological protégé', i.e. SACP was hardly surprising in the light of Moscow's long term designs in the South Africa. By keeping ANC in front in their somewhat unusual choice, they could have silenced their western critics, who had consistently alleged Moscow's support for centi-colonial and anti-apartheid movements as merely a rhetoric to

---

15 This long standing *de facto* working alliance achieved some formality at the ANC's first National Consultative Conference in 1969, in Morogoro, Tanzania.
camouflage their real intentions of 'expanding its covert aims of socialist disemination'. While simultaneously it could have enhanced Moscow's championship claims of assisting an anti-racial liberation movement and thereby winning the hearts of not only the black world but also appeasing the majority of third world demographic space.

Thus, symbiotically inter-weaven objectives of ANC and SACP allowed Moscow to support ANC keeping SACP in rear, without jeopardising their own prospects. This fact is highlighted not only by the overlapping dual membership of their cadres but also that these two ideologically heterogeneous movements were fighting against a 'common enemy'. This had been made clear by the leaders of both the organization, for example Yusuf Dadoo explained that establishing majority rule is "immediate goal" of both ANC and SACP. That is why they worked under the banner of each other amidst frequent bans and frantic suppression by white Pretorian regime.

Meanwhile, Moscow had a disguised calculation that communist elements within the ANC would gradually assume the leadership of the movement sidelining nationalist forces. And then the South African apartheid regime would be confronted by a single consolidated opposing force, a communist led vanguard party, increasingly able to sustain guerrilla warfare.
However, Moscow could see the inherent differences of ANC and SACP ideologies which were parallel only as far as opposition to apartheid and foundation of equilitarian society is concerned. For all other purposes, the goal of SACP goes much beyond that of ANC. The ANC claims its goal a “national democratic revolution” the SACP describes this ‘democratic revolution” as “a stage towards the struggle for social emancipation in the epoch of world transition from capitalism to socialism and within the context of the struggle against imperialism”17. Thus Soviet Allocracy in this regard was transitory in nature where its assistance for ANC would resolve the ‘basic contradiction’ by undermining the ‘principal enemy’ while SACP its natural ally would pave the way for transition of South African society from capitalism to socialism.

By mid 1970s, Moscow’s revolutionary optimism attained a new height. Propelled by the enthusiastic estimates of South African Communists who could see “the material pre requisites for the transition to a higher socio-economic formation already taking shape”18. In South Africa, Moscow’s hopes of ‘socialist revolution’ became a close reality. The rank and file of ANC had swollen rapidly during these years. The External Mission of 1970s had enhanced its

17 William R. Kintner, n.13, p. 142.
capacity to embark on a campaign of “armed propaganda” inside South Africa\(^\text{19}\). Around at the same time South Africa along with its western allies had been pushed to defensive lines with the growing “institutional pressure” after 1976 Sweto riots, especially after the death of Black consciousness leader, Steve Biko, in police custody.

The emergence of two arowed Marxist-Leninist regimes—Angola and Mozambique in 1974 did not only propelled their revolutionary optimism of revolution sweeping the entire Southern African region, but also provided a vantage point to assist ANC and other friendly movements to the desirable goals. Thus, after the fall of Portuguese colonialism, the ANC began to receive move and better arms. Some of these erstwhile Portuguese colonies facilitated the training sites for ANC guerrillas and even surrogated the role of conduits for direct arms supply to ANC and SWAPO\(^\text{20}\).

Although Moscow saw the ultimate revolution still very remote but the ‘objective conditions’ were promising a better revolutionary prospects in the years ahead. Skepticism still reigned the minds of Moscow about the actual revolution occurring in the South Africa, yet


they believed that future developments might take a turn towards the realization of Marxist-Leninist prophecies. Accordingly, though they acknowledged ANC in alliance with SACP as the only ‘legitimate future government’ in South Africa, they reflected a holistic view of incorporating all segments of society in this broader movement. Moscow believed that ‘class division’ in society are as important as racial schisms and that even whites can play a progressive role in the struggle against apartheid21.

Precisely for this reason the exclusive black resistance movements like Pan-African Congress were condemned by Soviet Scholars for promoting another form of racial segregation or what they prefer to call ‘anti-racial racism’. The aims and objectives of these exclusive black movements had to often been branded as running contrary to the “interest of liberation struggle”22. Moscow’s own locus as an ‘white outside actor’ was an disguised motive as Moscow was apprehensive that this might be used by its adversaries in jeopardizing its ecumanic revolutionary ties with ANC and South African Communist Party.

But prior to bombing of government buildings in Pretoria in 1983 what was called by Soviet analysts as beginning of ‘decisive war’, the

---

ANC had waged a low intensity sabotage campaign against white regime. But with the beginning of 1980s the ANC was under constant pressure from within to review its earlier policy. As a result of growing internal pressure, the ANC had to revise its earlier ‘careful’ approach to the military operations consequently the key to progress was defined as laying in ‘development of insurrectionary forces and tactics’\(^{23}\). This ‘tactical revision’ reflected in the phenomenal growth of guerrilla activities which rose 23 from 1976-1983 to 118 for the first six months of 1986 alone.\(^{24}\) Since then the struggle had been marked by fierce encounters between ANC insurgents and South African forces\(^{25}\).

Encouraged by the relatively more aggressive stance of ANC and the consequent political turmoil inside South Africa, Moscow increased its pressure for the solution of South African problem characterizing it ‘virtually ungovernable’\(^{26}\). November 1984 East Rand riots which unleashed endless rounds of black unrest throughout the South Africa, engendered new predicament for Moscow where both its opportunities and risks snowballed together. This new dilemma placed Moscow in a precarious situation where it could have neither

---

\(^{23}\) ANC Sources, in Howard Barrel, n.19,p.58


\(^{25}\) A 1982 CIA Study concerning a purported debate within the ANC about the strategy and tactics of armed struggle was leaked to Trans-Africa, a Washington based lobby and group. The report claims that younger ANC activists object to the careful approach of the traditional leaders to military operations inside S.A., IHT 5, Nov 1982.

backtrack from its commitments to ANC, nor supported the unrestrained coercion of civilians by the ANC insurgents.

Therefore, Soviet Union approached this quandary with caution and flexibility regarding making any larger commitment to military aid to the ANC. Although, Oliver Tombo after his November 1986 trip to Moscow, hinted at major increase in arms supply expressing immense satisfaction over Soviet assistance. Although by that time Soviet scholars had began to doubt the ANC capabilities of seizing power through armed struggle. But its intrinsic importance remained intact as ANC was consistently mobilizing hostility for US and South Africa and served to remind Africa that "an unholy alliance had been struck between the two countries".

However, with the ascendancy of Gorbachev and the adaptation of 'new political thinking at 27 congress of the CPSU in 1986, the entire Soviet 'strategic epistemology shifted from 'confrontation' to 'cooperation' which reflected in Soviet support to ANC as well. After that Gorbachev repeatedly stressed the "collective quest" in defusing conflict situation in all of the 'planet's turbulent points'. Gorbachev's emphasis from 'military confrontation to 'negotiated settlement' paved

the way for the prospects of a better bilateral ties with South Africa, stipulating 'political settlement as the most likely outcome in South Africa'\textsuperscript{29}.

Moscow's new pragmatism was outcome of its own turbulent domestic affairs as well as its increasingly confused speculation of future post-apartheid regime in South Africa soviet Union was quite confused over the future power configurations, leaving them in complete doldrums as it was unclear to them whether there would be ruling coalition of blacks and whites leading to a genuine multiracial democracy', an ANC dominated government, or a period of constant confusion chaos and commotion leading to the virtual collapse of any government.

Moreover, by the late 1980s, the leading Soviet Africanists began doubting the very idea that South Africa would ever advance to socialism. The old formulation that "there are objective factors which can not be manipulated by ideology" began to take more frequent appearances in the Soviet ideological circles. At the Soviet African conference for "Peace Cooperation and Social Progress" in June 1986, the doubt become explicit as Moscow became susceptible over the absence of nationalization plans by anti-racist forces.

By the end of 1980s it had fairly clear to Moscow that, South Africa is not decisively going to the socialist way at least in conformity with orthodox Marxist-Leninist prophecies. Thus with a little hope of South African revolution Boris A. Asoyah, Deputy Chief of the Dept. and African countries in the Foreign Minister, accepted it dejectedly that “......we doubt that revolution in South Africa is possible, if you are talking of revolutionaries storming Pretoria\textsuperscript{30}. Thus revolution being going ever elusive, Moscow began to take it non-seriously which turned even jocularly sometimes. Thus, Gromyko. S deputy Goncharov, when asked whether he expected a socialist S.A. in his life time? he replied light heartedly, “in not less than ten years, possibly hundred, I am an optimist”\textsuperscript{31}.

Moscow’s apprehension were based on genuine calculations. The 1984 unrest in South Africa had failed to provide extra pace and capacity needed for any serious insurgency, contrary to Soviet expectations. Despite the adaptation of new strategy to encourage national revolution by ANC and a meticulous propaganda and material support by Soviet Union, the uprising failed to yield any substantial gain either for ANC or Soviet Union, not to talk about ‘proletariat revolution’. The upshot of 1984 unrest were so frustrating

that Soviet Union had to remained ANC that there is no short cut to genuine “class struggle”, the only way which could ensure the majority rule is South Africa.

Frusted in their ‘revolutionary hopes’ and dejected over the future turn of South African movement the Moscow could see a very blik ‘socialist future’ in South Africa. Accordingly they turned towards ‘new pragmatism’, switching over to ‘political and peaceful’ solution which echoed in the sporadic but frequent statements of Soviet leaders. Gorbachev in his speech in honor or Chissano’s visit to Moscow in August 1987, stressed the need for “new ideas” in the search for political solution in south Africa. Similarly, Yuri Yukalov, head of the Foreign Ministry’s Department of African countries emphasized that “we would prefer a political settlement and want apartheid to be dealt with by political means”, warning that “any solution through military means would be shortlived”32.

Thus, under Gorbachev, Moscow took a more pragmatic approach and advocated negotiations with South African whites as the best available method to end apartheid. In line with this approach Moscow had also

---

urged the ANC to hold its acts of violence within bounds refraining it from attacking civilians\textsuperscript{33}.

Thus, this new approach shaped the contours of Soviet ANC relations in a new perspective. Although, Moscow did not reject the possibility of armed struggle completely neither it outrightly withdrew itself from aiding and assisting ANC. As Admishih stated boldly in March 1989 that, the Soviet Union is the only major source of weapons for the ANC and would continue supporting it and that “those who think we are going to stop supplying ANC with arms to force it into negotiations are engaging in wishful thinking”\textsuperscript{34}.

However, such claims heardly had any bearing on actual policy directives as Moscow consistently pressurized ANC to modify its approach and stressed the viability of political over military solutions. Making it further clear Soviet Spokesman said that Moscow, “is not a supporter of armed struggle for national liberations where there exist an opportunity to use peaceful means” and emphasized that “…..apartheid in the Republic of South Africa can also be dismantled by peaceful means”\textsuperscript{35}.

\textsuperscript{33} The Washington Post, Dec 18, 1988.
\textsuperscript{35} See, Admishin’s press conference in Harare, after he completed tour of number of African countries in the region – Moscow TASS, April, 1989.
Thus, this shift to Soviet policy from ‘armed struggle’ to ‘negotiated settlement’ did also influence the echelons of ANC policy. The ANC leaders, after the 1987, started using the term ‘negotiated settlement’ more frequently than ever before in near past. This softening was evident on more than one occasion. The ANC National Executive Council stated in October 1987, “we wish to reiterate that the ANC has never been opposed to a negotiated settlement of the South African question”\textsuperscript{36}.

This new realization was not merely a outcome of Moscow’s increased pressure on ANC, but also a growing pragmatism among anti-apartheid leaders themselves. By 1987, ANC/SACP alliance has realized that they are not going to win the battle against their formidable enemy through the armed means. Hence they started contemplating on political solutions, as Joe Slovo, leader of SACP and the former chief of \textit{Umkhonto we Sizwe} said in an interview that “I believe that the transition in South Africa is coming through negotiations”\textsuperscript{37}. Although, whether Moscow did pressurize ANC to adopt this line or not, is not known, at least the intensity of the

\textsuperscript{36} Winrich Kuhne, “A 1988 update on soviet Relations with Pretoria, the ANC and the SACP”. CSIS Africa Notes, 89, Sep 1, 1988, p. 5.
pressure. But whenever, Moscow mentioned "negotiated settlement" they gave a clear indication that this policy is shared by the ANC. However, for the ANC leadership means was hardly a bothering point they were more interested in end i.e. the dismantling and minority white regime. Although their tone explicitly indicates that they too were considering the 'negotiations' as the most viable solution of the South African crisis. In a news conference in Moscow in March, 1989, ANC president Oliver Tombo expressed similar views. The ANC task is to "intensity its struggle military, politically, and diplomatically in order to hasten the demise of the present regime in South Africa, and to usher in a democratic non-racist government".

The South African Communist Party, the alliance partner of ANC, came out ever more overtly in tune with Moscow's policy. The SACP leaders argued that the best means to achieve South African solution is through negotiation and 'selective violence' rather than all out military action. For SACP, the Zimbabwe style settlement was preferable over armed settlements settlement and Joe Solvo, became

---

40 Africa Confidential 28, No. 8, April 15, 1987, pp. 6-7.
convinced by then that transition is going to come through negotiations\textsuperscript{41}.

However, a unique character of Soviet support for anti-colonial and anti-apartheid movement in South Africa, had been a balanced coalescence of ultrulism with egoism and Moscow had not let ideological conflicts stand in the way of its pragmatic profitable interactions\textsuperscript{42}. As a result, desire for profit and the quest for revolution were never considered incompatible and almost went parally together. Thus, it continued its support for anti-apartheid liberation movements and maintained a good rapport with South African mining companies simultaneously\textsuperscript{43}.

Moscow has insisted South African companies not to make their relations public. It has been confirmed by South African business authorities that ‘Russians prefer not to receive any public attention’.\textsuperscript{44} Thus this clandestine business deal with South African mining companies apparently contradicts the Soviet avowed ultraistic claims of supporting the anti-colonial and anti apartheid movements under its ‘international onus’, to see revolution sweeping the globe.

\textsuperscript{41} Kunhe, no. 36, p. 4.
\textsuperscript{42} Kurt Campbell, n. 1, pp. 95-126.
In contrary, a close analysis of Soviet assistance to these movements reveals that even in assisting these movements, Moscow had never forfeited its egoistic business interests. USSR's small arms deliveries to ANC was attributed to this fact that ANC does not have any financial obligation like Angola, with whom Soviet had a trade surplus of between $50 million and $100 million per year between 1981 and 1987.45

This fact is further concretized in the fact that South Africa never faced any real danger from Soviet Union. Rather Moscow's unwillingness to assume any direct military obligation on behalf of either ANC or SACP, indirectly enthused South African apartheid regime to take more coercive and oppressive means to crash them. Furthermore, we do not have any account of any direct Soviet military involvement or Soviet and Soviet bloc personnel operating with the ANC in the field. These indulgence in anti-colonial and anti-apartheid movements was based on their diplomatic formulation that movements themselves must achieve their independence, Moscow would only help them in achieving their goals through arms and training.