CHAPTER FOUR

Evolution of the U.S. Strategic Thinking On Pakistan:

The military aid policy of the U.S. Government in respect of Pakistan has been a key factor in the Indo-U.S. relations since 1954. In 1954, the U.S. Government, in accordance with its global strategic plan against the Soviet Union, decided to give military aid to Pakistan and the continuance of this policy decision by the United States to arm Pakistan became a matter of great concern to India and a great irritant to the development of Indo-U.S. relations.

After the second world war, the United States, after assessing the international situation, considered that the greatest danger to its security and to the security of Europe might come from the Soviet Union with its revolutionary and expansionist doctrine of communism, and decided that the main objective of the U.S. foreign policy would be to contain the power of the Soviet Union. With a view to countering the Soviet


3. George, F. Kennan : American Diplomacy, 1900-1950 (University of Chicago, 1951). Mr. Kennan, who was the Director of the U.S. State Department's Policy Planning Staff, first thought of the idea of 'containment of Soviet Power' see, Norman, D. Palmer and H.C. Perkins : International Relations (Calcutta, 1965), 705.
power, the United States embarked upon a policy of collective 
defence arrangements with the non-communist nations of Europe 
and elsewhere, and signed several military pacts to secure the 
independence and territorial integrity of the countries of the 
"free-world" against the potential armed attack from the Soviet 
Union. 4

After the communist victory in China in 1949 and particularly 
after the Chinese participation in the Korean war in 1950, the 
United States felt that communism posed a grave threat also to 
Asia. The Truman Administration thought that the communist act 
of aggression on Korea was "a part of world wide pattern of danger 
to all the free nations of the world." 5 The Eisenhower Adminis-
tration (1953-1960), too, felt that the 'Communist Russia and its 
Chinese Communist ally' would try to impose their political sys-
tem on the non-communist nations of Asia and that would be "a 
grave threat to the whole free community," 6 and particularly to

4. The United States signed several defence treaties like the 
Rio Treaty, signed at Rio de Janeiro in 1947; it covered 
the entire Western hemisphere; the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization was signed on 4 April 1949 between Britain, 
France Benelux, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Norway, Portugal, 
Canada and the U.S.A.

5. See the statement read by President Truman in the news 
conference on 30 November 1950. Harry, S. Truman : Public 
Papers, 1950 (U.S.Government Printing Office, Washington, 
1965); 725.

6. The statement of Mr. John F. Dulles, the U.S. Secretary of 
State (1953-1959) during the Eisenhower Administration, on 
29 March 1954. U.S. Department of State, Bulletin (here-
after cited as Bulletin), 30 (12 April 1954), 540.
the U.S. global security. The United States considered that this threat should be met by the "United action" of the U.S.A. and the non-communist Asian nations. As a result of this apprehension the United States thought that the conclusion of bilateral and collective defence arrangement with the Asian nations was also essential.

Since India occupied an important position in South Asia the United States tried to persuade India to join in a collective security system. But independent India which had chosen to follow the policy of non-alignment refused to join in any such


11. On 4 December 1947, the late Prime Minister of India, Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru categorically stated in the Constituent Assembly of India, "The main subject in foreign policy is vaguely talked of in terms of 'Do you belong to this group or that group?... We have proclaimed... that we will not attach ourselves to any particular group... We have sought to avoid foreign entanglements by not joining one block or the other." J. Nehru : India's Foreign Policy, selected speeches from September 1946 - April 1961 (hereafter cited as J. Nehru : India's Foreign Policy); Publication Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Delhi, 1961; 24-29.
military alliance. Then the choice of the United States naturally fell on Pakistan, the other big nation in South Asia.

For various reasons Pakistan was considered to be strategically important to the United States. Although Pakistan was situated in South Asia, she was considered to be a part of the Middle East by the U.S. strategists. While West Pakistan provided the link with the Middle East, East Pakistan was nearer to the South East Asia. As a result, the United States might have thought that if Pakistan could be brought into the U.S. collective defence arrangements, Pakistan could be used as the link between the Middle Eastern and the South East Asian defence arrangements which the United States was thinking to sponsor.

It has been pointed out by Sir Olaf Caroe, an expert on the Central and Middle Eastern affairs, that during the British Colonial days the stability of the Middle East and South East Asia

12. In order to consider measures for the 'United action' against the communist aggression on the South East Asian nations, the United States, Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand and Pakistan met at Manila in September 1954. The South East Asia Treaty Organization, known as the SEATO, emerged out of the Manila conference. In this context Mr. Nehru stated in the Lok Sabha (the lower House of the Parliament of India) on 29 September 1954 that India was "invited" but refused to participate in the Manila Conference. J. Nehru: India's Foreign Policy, 87


depended on British diplomacy, the British Navy and the Indian Army. As the British withdrew from the Indian sub-continent in 1947 and as the independent government of India decided to pursue a non-aligned foreign policy, a vacuum, in the opinion of Mr. Caroe, was created in the region detrimental to the interests of the Western bloc. Sir Olaf suggested that it would be in the interest of the free world if the United States with its power could fill in the vacuum. Otherwise, Sir Olaf thought, the region would be a prey to the Soviet expansionist policy. Perhaps, following the logic of Sir Olaf, the United States, for its strategic consideration, decided to pool the resources of the countries in the region to counter the Soviet threat. Pakistan is one of the important states in this region and the United States might have thought that without Pakistan's participation no viable regional security system could be devised for the region. That was why the U.S. Government took particular interest in bringing Pakistan into its bloc.

The North-West border of Pakistan is close to the Soviet Central Asia. This strategic location of Pakistan was again important from the point of view of the U.S. strategic interest in containing the Soviet power in Asia. Hence, the United States

16. Ibid.
might have thought that if Pakistan could be tied with the U.S. defence bloc, the United States could use the Pakistani territory as the U.S. base to deter the Soviets.\(^\text{17}\)

As Pakistan was strategically important, the security of Pakistan was, therefore, an important element of the U.S. foreign policy in the Indian sub-continent. During the 1950s the United States apprehended that the danger to the security of Pakistan might emanate from Communist China.\(^\text{18}\) The United States had not also, perhaps, totally ruled out potential Indian threat to Pakistan's security. Mr. Ralph de Toledano, the biographer of the U.S. Vice-President Mr. R.M. Nixon (1953-1956), revealed that during the 1950s the U.S. Vice-President Mr. Nixon was "convinced that India's neutralism was an outgrowth of the Prime Minister's (Mr. Nehru's) belief that India could be a dominant force if the rest of the non-communist Asia were weak and unarmed."\(^\text{19}\) The United States, perhaps, thought that a militarily strong India\(^\text{20}\)

\begin{itemize}
  \item \text{17.} See, the three articles of Selig Harrison: "India, Pakistan and the U.S., The Case History of a Mistake" \textit{New Republic}, 141 (10 August 1959), 10-17; (24 August 1959), 20-25; (7 September 1959), 11-17.
  \item \text{18.} K.P. Rao: \textit{Impact of U.S. Policy To Pakistan On Indian-American Relations} (Poona University, 1977), 132.
  \item \text{19.} Ralph de Toledano: \textit{Nixon} (London, 1957), 164.
  \item \text{20.} After the partition of India in 1947 into two independent states of Indian Union and Pakistan, India emerged as the militarily superior state in South Asia. For quantitative comparative military strength of India and Pakistan after independence see, D.Som Dutt: "Foreign Military Aid and The Defence Strength And Policies of India and Pakistan: A Comparative Study." \textit{International Studies} (New Delhi), 8 (July - October 1966), 64-72.
\end{itemize}
might try to subdue a comparatively weak Pakistan in order to be the dominant power in South Asia.\(^{21}\) Hence, the Vice-President, Mr. Nixon, strongly urged military alliance with Pakistan so that Pakistan could stand "as a counterforce" to neutralist India.\(^{22}\)

Considering the importance of the security of Pakistan in the U.S. global strategic plan the United States concluded with Pakistan the Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement on 19 May 1954 at Karachi.\(^{23}\) By this agreement the United States committed itself to giving military assistance to Pakistan for the maintenance of her security and independence.\(^{24}\)

With the object of containing communism in Asia, the United States sponsored in 1954 the South East Asia Treaty

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21. Mr. M.S. Rajan, an Indian academician pointed out that those American leaders who did not like India's policy of non-alignment, apprehended that because of superior military strength of India, her weaker neighbours were likely to succumb to the neutralist foreign policy, which would adversely affect the U.S. strategic interest in Asia. Hence they suggested that the United States should give military aid to the willing Asian nations to curb the influence of India's neutralism on her neighbours. M.S. Rajan: India In World Affairs, 1954-1956 (New Delhi, 1964), 267.

22. Ralph de Toledano: Nixon, 164.


24. For the text of the Agreement, ibid.
Organization which was a collective defence arrangement. Pakistan was one of the signatories to the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). On 5 March 1959 the United States and Pakistan concluded another bi-lateral defence agreement. Article 1 of this agreement reads:

"In case of aggression against Pakistan the U.S. Government, in accordance with the constitution, will take such appropriate action including the use of armed forces as may be mutually agreed upon . . . "

Thus we see that in 1954 Pakistan became an important member of the U.S. defence bloc and since then has continued

25. The South East Asia Treaty Organisation, known as SEATO was signed at Manila on 8 September 1954. The signatories of the SEATO were the U.S.A., the U.K., France, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand and Pakistan. Article 4 (Clause 1) of SEATO reads, "Each party recognizes that aggression by means of arms attack in the treaty area against any of the parties or against any state or territory which the parties by unanimous agreement may hereafter designate, would endanger its own peace and security, and agrees that it will in that event act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional process." See, Council On Foreign Relations : Documents On American Foreign Relations, 1954 (New York 1955), 319-325.


27. The reasons for Pakistan to join the U.S. bloc are not discussed in this study. The main attention is focused on the U.S. policy. However, for understanding Pakistan's interest to join the U.S. defence bloc, see, Mohamed Ayub Khan : Friends Not Masters (Karachi, 1967); Z.A. Bhutto : The Myth of Independence (Karachi, 1969); Mohamed Ashen Chaudhury : Pakistan And Regional Pacts (Karachi, 1958); Sarwar K. Hasan : The Strategic Interest of Pakistan (Karachi, 1954).
to receive military aid and materials from the United States. The Pakistani - United States military link became so close that Pakistan allowed the United States to build an air base in its territory at Peshawar. 28

**India's Concern:**

The Government of India sharply reacted to the U.S. decision in 1954 to give military aid to Pakistan. On various occasions it expressed its concern over Washington's policy of giving military aid to Pakistan. Referring to the Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement (May 1954) between Pakistan and the United States, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru stated in the Lok Sabha on 22 February 1954 that India had real reasons to be concerned about the U.S. - Pakistan military cooperation. Because, India believed, the U.S. decision to conclude defence agreement with Pakistan would add to the "feeling of insecurity in Asia."

India's concern, Mr. Nehru maintained, was not "due to any ill-feeling against Pakistan." 29 India considered that peace, as the United States sought to ensure, could not be achieved nor it could be maintained by the conclusion of the security pacts;

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to India, security could be achieved only through peace.\textsuperscript{31}

Immediately after the partition of India in 1947 the relation between India and Pakistan became very strained over the question of Kashmir.\textsuperscript{32} Prime Minister Nehru, therefore, apprehended that the U.S. military aid to Pakistan would encourage the Pakistani authorities in their "aggressiveness" against India and would jeopardize the bi-lateral relations between India and Pakistan.\textsuperscript{33}

Prime Minister Nehru "wondered" what the motivation was behind the South East Asia Treaty Organization (September 1954) which, according to him, "definitely added to the tensions and fears" in Asia.\textsuperscript{34} On 29 September 1954 Prime Minister Nehru told the Lok Sabha that as a result of the Manila Treaty (i.e. SEATO) some powerful countries would get the opportunity to interfere in the affairs of the weaker and smaller Asian countries which would be allied to them.\textsuperscript{35}


\textsuperscript{33} Prime Minister Nehru's statement before both Houses of the Parliament of India on 13 March 1959. See, J. Nehru : India's Foreign Policy, 476.

\textsuperscript{34} Mr. Nehru's speech in the Lok Sabha on 29 September 1954. \textit{Ibid.}, 87-89.

\textsuperscript{35} \textit{Ibid.}
Pakistan signed the defence agreement with the United States at a time when its security was, in fact, not endangered either by the Soviet Union or by China. On the contrary, she sought to establish friendly and cordial relations with communist China. Against this background, India thought that the arms given by the U.S.A. to Pakistan might be directed and used by Pakistan against India. Mr. Nehru believed that Pakistan joined the U.S. military pacts and alliances only to strengthen herself against India. He thought that, on the whole, the U.S. decision to conclude military alliances with Pakistan was a "wrong step from the point of view of peace and removal of tensions." 

In an attempt to assuage India's feelings against the U.S. military aid to Pakistan, the U.S. President, Mr. Eisenhower, in a letter to the Indian Prime Minister, Mr. Nehru, dated 24 February 1954 wrote:

"What we are proposing to do and what Pakistan is agreeing to, is not directed in any way against India. I am confirming publicly that if our aid to any country, including Pakistan, is misused and directed against

36. For an analytical study on Pakistan-China relations see, B.N.Goswami: Pakistan And China, A Study of Their Relations, 1949-1969 (New Delhi, 1971).


38. Prime Minister Nehru's statement laid on the table of both Houses of Parliament of India on 13 March 1959: See, J. Nehru India's Foreign Policy, 476.

39. Mr. Nehru's speech in the Lok Sabha on 22 February 1954, ibid., 471.
another in aggression I will undertake immediately, in accordance with my constitutional authority, appropriate action both within and outside the United Nations to thwart such aggression". 40

On the one hand, the Eisenhower Administration sought to assuage India's concern; on the other hand, its policy was to continue to give military aid to Pakistan. This, meant that the U.S. Administration did not attach sufficient importance to India's concern and apprehensions over the U.S. military aid policy in relation to Pakistan. It thus appeared that it was not the concern of India but the security of the U.S.A. and of Pakistan that mattered most to the U.S. policy makers during the 1950s. Consequently, from 1954 the Indo-U.S. relations became strained over this issue.

U.S. Embargo On Military Supplies To India & Pakistan:

In September 1965 war broke out between India and Pakistan. Following the war, which was a great "disillusionment" for the then U.S. President, Mr.L.B. Johnson (1963-1968), the U.S. Government imposed arms embargo on Pakistan and India in

40. Council On Foreign Relations : Documents On American Foreign Relations, 1954 ( New York 1955 ) 374-376. This letter of Mr. Eisenhower was in reply to one which Mr. Nehru wrote to him on 22 February 1954, expressing India's concern at the U.S. decision to give arms to Pakistan. The letter of Mr. Eisenhower was reported first in New York Times, 2 March 1954.

41. President Johnson wrote in his book/disillusionment set in when Indians and Pakistanis started fighting over Kashmir in August and September of 1965, using weapons we had provided them to defend themselves against outside attacks. This conflict raised great doubts about military assistance." L.B. Johnson : The Vantage Point (New York, 1971), 225.
September 1965, for, in the U.S. consideration arms were used in this war "in contravention of solemn agreements" with the United States. 42 In this war (1965) Pakistan used the U.S. arms, and thus violated the assurance given by President Eisenhower to Mr. Nehru that those arms would not be directed against India.

The United States imposed embargo both on lethal and non-lethal weapons. Thus, the U.S. Government decided to discontinue the supplies of the military equipments to Pakistan and India both under grants and sales.

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42. See, Bulletin, 53 (11 October 1965), 602.
Pakistan's Reaction To Arms Embargo:

The United States was the Chief supplier of Pakistan's defence materials. The imposition of the U.S. embargo meant that Pakistan would not receive further military supplies from Washington. The embargo, however, resulted in strong resentment among the Pakistanis who thought that the U.S. arms embargo operated to the disadvantage of Pakistan only, because Pakistan received its military equipments from the United States only.43 There was a feeling in Pakistan that as the arms embargo was imposed on both India and Pakistan, the United States sought to equate the aggressor (i.e. India) with the victim of aggression (i.e. Pakistan).44 Pakistan, therefore, developed a feeling that by withholding arms deliveries to Pakistan in September 1965, the United States had betrayed them. Pakistan, then adopted different strategies. On the one hand, it began to press the United States for the resumption of the U.S. arms aid to it.45

43. See, Z.A. Bhutto: The Myth Of Independence (Karachi, 1969), 76-77. Mr. Z.A. Bhutto was initially Commerce Minister and then became Foreign Minister of Pakistan during Ayub Khan administration. Later on, he became the Prime Minister of Pakistan in 1972.

44. Ibid., 76.

and, on the other hand, it turned to China and the Soviet Union for getting military supplies. Gradually she began to depend on those two countries for arms deliveries.

**U.S. Rethinking On Embargo:**

In the context of Pakistan's resentment over the U.S. arms embargo and in the context of consequent dependence of Pakistan on China and the Soviet Union for the military aid, there was a rethinking in the Johnson Administration on the suspension of arms supplies to Pakistan. The United States felt that the U.S. suspension of arms supplies to Pakistan "dissipated" the U.S. influence on Pakistan, produced "side effects of serious concern," and felt that as a result of the embargo the U.S. relations with Pakistan had "suffered deterioration."

These feelings of the U.S. Government led them to reconsider the suspension of arms deliveries to the Indian subcontinent. Immediately after the imposition of the arms embargo in September 1965, the Pentagon was reported to have urged the U.S.

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Government the need for an early resumption of military aid to Pakistan. Consequently, in February 1966 the U.S. Government partially lifted the embargo and permitted both Pakistan and India to purchase (from the USA) spare parts for non-lethal military equipments. But this could not satisfy the Pakistanis who wanted regular flow of equipments. On 12 April 1967 the U.S. Government again partially lifted the embargo and decided to sell to India and Pakistan the spare parts for the equipments previously supplied by the United States. It was also decided that the U.S.Government would consider on a case by case basis all requests (of India and Pakistan) for export permit covering the cash purchase of spare parts. Explaining the reasons behind the partial lifting of embargo in April 1967, Mr. Hoopes, the U.S. Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence For International Security Affairs stated on 20 April 1967,

"The principal U.S. objective in taking these steps

51. Sagat, Singh : Pakistan's Foreign Policy. (Bombay, 1970), 99.
52. See, Bulletin, 56 (1 May 1967), 688.
53. Ibid.
is to promote stability and arms limitation on the subcontinent. It is possible, however, that we can exert a restraining influence by certain positive actions of a limited character." 54

India's Views on Lifting of Embargo:

The lifting of the arms embargo by the United States in 1966 and in 1967 again became an irritant in the Indo-U.S. relations, which in consequence were further strained. India did not like the U.S. Government's decision to partially lift the embargo in 1966 and in 1967. She interpreted the lifting of the embargo as another example of the U.S. policy to boost Pakistan against India. India thought that the main U.S. motive behind the lifting of the embargo was to enable Pakistan to compensate for its losses of equipments suffered during the war with India in 1965. In fact, the U.S. Government was least concerned at the losses of India's military equipment during the war with Pakistan in 1965; they thought that India could easily recoup its losses because the Soviet Union, the main suppliers of India's defence materials, "have never suspended their (military) deliveries of either end items or spare parts" to India. 55 Mr. Hoopes, therefore, observed that the embargo "fell heavily on Pakistan and lightly on India." 56 And this feeling and consideration of the U.S. policy-makers might have led the U.S.

54. See, U.S. 90th Congress, 1st Session, Hearing before Senate Sub-Committee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (20 April 1967), 51-52, 55.
55. Ibid., 56.
56. Ibid., 51, 52, 55.
Government to relax the suspension of arms supply to the Indian sub-continent.

The Government of India thought that by permitting Pakistan and India to purchase military spare parts from the U.S.A. the U.S. Government virtually helped Pakistan to reactivise its military strength. India received a negligible amount of military assistance from the United States compared to Pakistan's receipts from that country. On 19 June 1967, Mr. B.R. Bhagat, Minister of State in the Defence Ministry of India, revealed in the Lok Sabha that while up to September 1965 Pakistan received military aid from the United States worth $1,500 to $1,700 million, India received those from the U.S.A. worth only $76 million. Since Pakistan and not India was the main recipient of lethal weapons from the United States, it was obvious that the sale of spare parts, as decided by the U.S. Government in April 1967, would suit Pakistan's interests mainly. In this context, Mr. M.C. Chagla, India's Minister of External Affairs, said in the Lok Sabha on 29 May 1967: "What spares can we ask from the United States? We have hardly bought any arms; we have either bought from the

57. For reference See, Sipri: Arms Trade Register (Cambridge, 1975), 33-40. The former U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan, Mr. Benjamin H. Oenlert once said that "In comparison to U.S. military assistance to Pakistan, U.S. arms aid to India can by no stretch of imagination be described as massive." See, National Herald (Delhi) 13 January 1969.

It was, therefore, implied in Mr. Chagla's statement that the sale of spare parts by the U.S.A. would not help India in the real sense; on the contrary, it would help Pakistan to reactivate their military equipments which were mostly of the U.S. origin.

The Government of India also thought that the latest U.S. decision (12 April 1967) to partially lift the embargo might ultimately endanger the security of India. India apprehended that after reactivating the damaged weapons with the spare parts from the United States, Pakistan would develop bellicosity and intransigence which might pose a threat to the security of India. Mr. M.C. Chagla, therefore, commented in the Lok Sabha on 29 May 1967, "The new policy which the United States initiated will be most prejudicial to India; and far from working for peace will increase tension between Pakistan and India."

The Government of India did not and could not accept the U.S. explanation that the principal objective of the relaxation of arms suspension (April 1967) was 'to promote stability and arms limitation on the sub-continent.' Reacting to the U.S. policy of relaxation of the arms embargo, Mr. Chagla was reported to have stated on 12 April 1967:

"I do not know what the U.S.A. has in mind. Nor do..."
I understand the timing of the American decision. If it is actuated by any desire to pressurize us, I can say that the U.S.A. is making a great mistake." 61

India was also convinced that by selling military spare parts to Pakistan the United States would, in fact, be sending military materials to Pakistan, and this was, according to the Government of India, "as good as sending arms." 62 Thus, India thought that by supplying spare parts for non-lethal weapons, the U.S. Government was, in essence, contributing to the increase of the military strength of Pakistan.

Mr. Swaran Singh, India's Minister of External Affairs, observed in the Lok Sabha on 1 August 1966 that "the supply of non-lethal weapons also add to the defence potential, and therefore, the distinction (between lethal and non-lethal weapons) is there, but not very effective." 63 As a result, India's understanding was that by supplying to Pakistan the spare parts for both lethal and non-lethal weapons, the United States was helping to increase the defence potential of Pakistan. Mr. Chagla, who became the Minister of External Affairs in 1967, therefore, maintained in the Lok Sabha on 29 May 1967 that Pakistan was "the only beneficiary of the latest U.S.


63. L.S. Deb., 57 (1 August 1966), 1522.
decision" (i.e. the relaxation of the arms embargo in April 1967) because, Mr. Chagla further said, "Pakistan would be able to restore and increase her offensive strength." 64

It would appear from the above account that India sought to impress upon the U.S. Government the need to maintain the embargo so that peace in the sub-continent was not disturbed and tension between India and Pakistan did not increase. Instead of doing that, the United States, India felt, sought to provide arms to Pakistan which, India perceived, might worsen India-Pakistan relations and might go against the security interests of India altogether.

The U.S. Arms Aid To Pakistan Through The Third Countries:

The partial lifting of arms embargo by the United States in 1966 and in 1967 disappointed the Pakistanis. The Pakistanis felt that without a military balance between India and Pakistan, the risk of war on the sub-continent could not be reduced. 65 So, the plain truth was that nothing short of regular flow of the weapons from the U.S.A. could fully satisfy Pakistan. 66

64. L.S. Deb. (29 May 1967), 1528, of Vol. 3.
65. Mr. Z.A. Bhutto wrote that, "... the decision of 12 April (1967) was taken to restrain the arms race between India and Pakistan and prevent another war... an arms balance between India and Pakistan is likely to reduce the risk of war ... The temptation to wage war normally arises where there is a military, imbalance. The United States can not justifiably withhold arms on the ground that it would lead to an arms race ..." See, Z.A.Bhutto: The Myth Of Independence (Karachi, 1969), 79-82.
Immediately after the imposition of the arms embargo in 1965, Pakistan threatened the Americans that their (U.S.A.'s) contract for air base in Peshawar would not be renewed. 67

Thus, it appeared that the U.S. arms embargo on Pakistan created a problem for the Americans regarding their air base in Pakistan. During the discussion in the U.S. Congress on the U.S. Military Assistance and Sales Act 1966, the members of the Congress severely criticised the U.S. military assistance to Pakistan. 68 The Johnson Administration seemed to be in a dilemma; it could neither withhold the military supplies to Pakistan nor could it totally lift the embargo. Consequently, the Administration had to take the course of supplying military equipments to Pakistan through the third countries.

67. Ibid. See also, Chester Bowles: "Will We Ever Learn In Asia." New York Times, 21 March 1970.

Between March and November 1966 Pakistan received nearly 90 F-86 aircrafts from Iran. Those aircraft were manufactured in Canada under U.S. license, Canada sold them to West Germany, and the latter resold them to Iran. Ultimately, those aircraft appeared in Pakistan ostensively to be repaired. The Johnson Administration also sought to provide Pakistan with 100 M-47 tanks to replace those tanks which Pakistan lost during the conflict with India in 1965. The attempt was made by the United States to persuade West Germany, then the Belgians, then Italy and finally Turkey, to sell the obsolescent U.S. tanks (at the disposal of those NATO countries) to Pakistan against nominal price. Germany was said to be reluctant to be a party to the gambit. Then a renewed attempt was made by Pakistan to purchase the tanks from Italy, and it was reported that the United

69. Mr. Coughlin, the member of the U.S. House Of Representatives, narrated the episode of the transfer of 90 F-86 aircrafts from Iran to Pakistan. See, Cong. Rec. House, 115 (13 August 1969), 23944-23946. Both Iran and Pakistan were the members of Bagdad pact. The Iranian Foreign Minister, Mr. Abbas Aram said on 20 April 1966 that "We should like to assure our Turkish and Pakistani allies . . . that they can continue to rely on our support and cooperation in their legitimate rights." See, The Statesman, Calcutta, 22 April 1966. This statement of Mr. Abbas Aram seemed to be relevant in the context of the transfer of the aircrafts from Iran to Pakistan.

States gave their approval to Italy to sell the American F-47 tanks to Pakistan.\(^1\) On 20 July 1968, Mr. Paul. C. Wameke, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defence, admitted that the United States indicated their willingness to approve of the purchase by Pakistan of 100 tanks; he further admitted that the United States initially wanted that Pakistan obtain them from West Germany.\(^2\) The tank deal between Pakistan and other countries, however, did not ultimately materialize.

**Reactions Of India:**

With regard to the supply of F-86 fighter planes from Iran to Pakistan, Iran argued that those aircraft were passed on to Pakistan for repairs.\(^3\) India failed to understand how Pakistan could repair those aircraft when Pakistan herself was affected by the U.S. arms embargo, and especially when her own aircraft were in need of repairs.\(^4\)

Mr. Kuss, the U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence, was reported to have made a number of flying trips to Rome in 1967 and 1968 to negotiate the plan (i.e., sale of tanks to Pakistan). See, The Statesman, Calcutta, 21 March 1968.


\(^3\) See the statement of Mr. Swaran Singh, Minister of External Affairs, in Rajya Sabha on 2 September 1966. R.S. Deb., 57 (2 September 1966), 5315-5316. See also Indian Express, Delhi, 11 August 1966.

\(^4\) See, Indian Express, Delhi, 14 August 1966.
The transfer of arms and aircraft to Pakistan through some third countries naturally piqued India. India believed that in the plan of transfer of arms to Pakistan the United States had its hand. That was why India drew the attention of the United States to the dangerous implications and the consequences of such arms transfer. Mr. M.C. Chagla, the Minister of External Affairs, told the Lok Sabha on 14 November 1966 that the Government of India believed that the peace and tranquillity of the region (South Asia) would not only be disturbed (as a result of arms transfer to Pakistan) but their action would be a clear breach of faith.

The plea of the United States that though the designs of the aircraft to be transferred to Pakistan through Iran were of U.S. design the United States had no control over their manufacture, sale and disposal was not accepted by India. Referring

75. See, the statement of Mr. M.C. Chagla, who in November 1966, succeeded Mr. Swaran Singh as the Minister of External Affairs, in the Lok Sabha on 14 November 1966. L.S. Deb., 60 (14 November 1966), 2695-2696.
76. Ibid.
77. Ibid.
78. On 2 September 1966, Mr. Swaran Singh, the Minister of External Affairs told the Lok Sabha that "Though the aircrafts were of U.S. design, we have been informed by the U.S. Government that their manufacture, sale and disposal were not subject to U.S. control." See, L.S. Deb., 59, (2 September 1966) 8795. The same day i.e. on 2 September 1966 Mr. Swaran Singh told the Rajya Sabha that "the Government of U.S.A. have told us that they are not concerned now in the sense that once they have issued the patent or licence to Canada then it is for the Canadian Government to ensure that any purchaser from Canada complies with the conditions of that purchase," See, R.S. Deb., 57, (2 September 1966), 5215-5316. In this connection see the statement of Mr. Hoopes
to the transfer of those aircraft from Iran to Pakistan, Mr. M. C. Chagla, the Minister of External Affairs, told the Rajya Sabha on 6 December 1966:

"If Pakistan acquires arms from a country to which arms have been given by the United States under the NATO programme or some other programme, we protest to the United States . . . that the arms were meant for that particular country and that they should not have been sold or transferred to Pakistan." 79

India's reactions to the tank deal between Italy and Pakistan were also very sharp. India thought that the United States was somehow involved in this deal. India conveyed her anxiety and strong feelings against this deal to the United States. On 2 May 1968 Mr. B. R. Bhagat, India's Minister of External Affairs, stated in Rajya Sabha that "India's concern and anxiety regarding this deal (tank deal between Italy and Pakistan) has been conveyed to the U.S. Government." 80

India's concern was that if Pakistan were given 100 M-47 tanks, that would increase her defence build up which, India

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79. R.S. Deb., 58 (6 December 1966), 4307.
80. See, R.S. Deb., 64 (2 May 1968), 699. India's concern were expressed to Italy also, ibid.
thought, would "damage or upset the military balance between India and Pakistan."\[81\] The Government of India, therefore, tried to convince the United States that "this particular factor is going against the spirit of Tashkent (Agreement between India and Pakistan) and is coming in the way of having friendly and good-neighbourly relations with Pakistan."\[82\]

Mr. B.R. Bhagat informed the Rajya Sabha on 2 May 1968 that in the context of India's concern over the tank deal between Italy and Pakistan, the U.S. Government had explained to India that it gave consent to Italy to sell the said 100 M-47 tanks to Pakistan as the old tanks of Pakistan were in need of replacement and hence the United States thought that it did not increase Pakistan's armed strength.\[83\] Mr. Bhagat, however, said that the Government of India was "not satisfied" with this explanation of the U.S. Government because, he held that if the older tanks of Pakistan were replaced with more sophisticated and better weapons and armour, it would also be affecting the military balance in the region.\[84\]

Secondly, Mr. Bhagat also told the Rajya Sabha that the U.S. Government explained to India that if those old tanks of

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81. Statement of Mr. B.R. Bhagat, Minister of External Affairs, in the Lok Sabha on 4 April 1968 during debate in the House on his Ministry's budget. See, L.S. Deb., 15 (4 April 1968), 2566.
82. Ibid., 2366-2367.
83. R.S. Deb., 64 (2 May 1968), 699.
84. Ibid., 702-703.
Pakistan were not replaced, Pakistan would more and more depend on China for military assistance. But this explanation also did not satisfy India because Mr. Bhagat said,

"... it is a known fact that Pakistan is trying to procure arms from all sources, and even though they may be receiving from the U.S.A. they are getting more and more from China... We have explained that these replies are not satisfactory." 86

The tank deal between Italy and Pakistan ultimately did not materialize. But in October - November 1968, the United States again renewed their attempts to transfer those tanks to Pakistan through Turkey. Turkey received the tanks from the U.S.A. as a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 87 This attempt on the part of the Johnson Administration to arm Pakistan was later on confirmed by Mr. Laird, the U.S. Defence Secretary during the Nixon Administration (1969-1974). He said on 14 July 1969 before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations:

"The idea in this case (the tank deal between Turkey and Pakistan) was that Pakistan would destroy certain tanks that it already had and would receive those tanks from Turkey; ... This arrangement was approved by President Johnson, but the final agreement has not been worked out." 88

85. Ibid.
86. Ibid.
87. The tank deal between Turkey and Pakistan was revealed by Columnist Mr. K. Saglamer in "Yeni Istambul" with the caption "We Are Deceived." This article was partly quoted in Hindustan Standard, Delhi, 12 January 1969.
Although attempts by the Johnson Administration to provide more tanks to Pakistan were not ultimately successful, the intention of the United States became clear in these attempts. Mr. Swaran Singh, the Defence Minister of India, stated in the Rajya Sabha on 21 November 1968 that the supply of the tanks to Pakistan would "add to the bellicosity and intransigence of Pakistan." 89 He maintained that although the United States proclaimed that they discouraged the armed conflict between India and Pakistan, their actions, however, were "not consistent with what they proclaim." 90 India had pointed out both to Turkey and to the United States that accretion to Pakistan's military strength would disturb peace in the Indian sub-continent and "would make Pakistan more intransigent in its attitude towards the normalization of relations with India." 91 Their (U.S.A.'s) actions, the Government of India thought, would help build up tensions between India and Pakistan. 92

89. See, R.S.Deb., 66 (21 November 1968), 751.
90. Ibid.
91. See, Mr. Swaran Singh's statement in the Lok Sabha on 22 November 1968 during call attention discussion on "Sale of American Patton Tanks to Pakistan Through Turkey." L.S.Deb., 21 (22 November 1968), 211. The relations between India and Pakistan became strained on the question of Kashmir and river issue. By the Tashkent Agreement of 1965 both India and Pakistan agreed to normalize their relations.
Thus, it appeared that the U.S. arms aid policy towards Pakistan during Johnson Administration, i.e., the partial lifting of arms embargo, arms aid to Pakistan through the third countries etc., hampered the smooth development of Indo-U.S. relations.

U.S. ARMS AID POLICY TOWARDS PAKISTAN DURING NIXON ADMINISTRATION AND INDO-U.S. RELATIONS.

Mr. R.M. Nixon, who was the Vice-President of the United States from 1953 to 1956, became the President of the United States in 1969. In his election campaign in the previous year (1968), Mr. Nixon had alleged on 24 October 1968 that the previous Democratic Party Administrations of Mr. John, F. Kennedy (1960-1963) and of Mr. L.B. Johnson (1963-1968) allowed 'a gravely serious security gap' to develop in the U.S.-Soviet strategic relations and made the U.S.A. second to the Soviet Union in the number and quantity of major weapons. Mr. Nixon pledged that, if elected, he would restore 'clear-cut' military superiority of the United States over the Soviet Union.

Explaining the U.S. strategic policy in Asia, President Nixon declared at Guam on 25 July 1969 that the United States

93. Mr. R.M. Nixon was the Republican Party candidate for the U.S. Presidential election in 1968.


95. Ibid.
would keep its "treaty commitments" but would not make new commitments "unless they were required" by the USA's "own vital interests".\textsuperscript{96} In his first annual Message to the U.S. Congress on 18 February 1970, President Nixon said that in order to keep the treaty commitments, the United States would help her allies "to develop their own strength".\textsuperscript{97}

There were some factors which influenced the Nixon Administration's arms aid policy towards Pakistan. The Republican Administration of President Nixon thought that the relationship between Pakistan and the United States deteriorated during the Democratic Party Administration of Kennedy and Johnson.\textsuperscript{98} Mr. Henry A. Kissinger, who was the National Security Adviser of President Nixon and who later on became the U.S. Secretary of State (1974), held that the reason behind the deterioration in the Pakistan-United States relations was the continued suspension of the U.S. arms aid to Pakistan since 1965.\textsuperscript{99}


By "treaty commitments" is meant military treaty commitments of the United States.


\textsuperscript{98} H. A. Kissinger: \textit{White House Years} (Boston, 1979), 846.

\textsuperscript{99} Ibid. In 1962 Mr. Kissinger was the consultant of President Kennedy in foreign affairs. \textit{Ibid.} 847
Immediately after being the President, Mr. Nixon emphasized the restoration of friendly relations between USA and Pakistan. Mr. Nixon felt that the U.S. Government needed to maintain its influence over the Government of Pakistan in U.S. political and strategic interests. The U.S. Government, perhaps, also considered that the friendly and cordial relations with Pakistan could be restored only by conceding American arms to Pakistan. This consideration, too, might have influenced the Nixon Administration's military aid policy in relation to Pakistan.

President Nixon's personal assessment of the situation in the sub-continent might have also influenced his Administration's military aid policy towards Pakistan. During 1953-1954 Mr. Nixon, then U.S. Vice President, strongly pleaded for giving military

100. Between 24 and 25 May 1969 Mr. Nixon sent Mr. William Rogers, the then U.S. Secretary of State, to Pakistan. On 24 May 1969, Mr. Rogers declared at Lahore (Pakistan) that "I hope that we will have a chance to strengthen the close and cordial relations" with Pakistan, and on 25 May 1969 he conveyed to Mr. Yahya Khan, the then President of Pakistan, the "importance the USA attached" to good relations with Pakistan". See, Bulletin, 60 (16 June 1969) 505. Thereafter, President Nixon himself visited Pakistan between 1 and 2 August 1969. Having arrived at Pakistan, President Nixon declared on 1 August 1969 that "what we can do and what we intend to do on this visit is to restore a relationship of friendship ... That is what we will do". See, R. M. Nixon: Public Papers of the President, 1969 (U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1971.) 597

101 The Secretary of State, Mr. Rogers was reported to have observed in 1970 that the U. S. Government had made a study of how many times they had been "able to influence the policy of another Government by withholding military aid, and we find that it has not been successful in any instance". See, Indian Express, Delhi, 17 January 1970. See also, the Statement of the U.S. senator Mr. Church: U.S., Cong. Record, Senate, 116, Part 27, (12 October 1970) 36218.
aid to Pakistan so that the latter did not succumb to the neutralist policy of India. 102 Later, Pakistan sought to establish friendly and cordial relations with communist China. 103 When Mr. Nixon became President in 1969, he thought that any threat to Pakistan from China was remote, and that Pakistan's security might be really endangered by India which "had gradually become aligned with the Soviets." 104 President Nixon considered that because of the superior military position of India, the military balance on the Indian sub-continent had shifted toward India. 105 In 1971 the U.S. Government apprehended that India, with Soviet support and encouragement, might try to "dismember" Pakistan. 106 As a result, the U.S. Government, in 1970 and in 1971, gave military materials to Pakistan to preserve its independence against Indian threat.

Mr. Kissinger, in his book, wrote that Mr. Nixon was grateful to Pakistan because "Pakistan was one of the countries where Nixon had been received with respect when he was out of office; he never forgot this." 107 He further wrote that President Nixon, during

103. For Sino-Pak relations since 1949 to 1969 see, B. N. Goswami: Pakistan and China: A Study of their relations (New Delhi, 1971).
107. H. A. Kissinger: White House Years. 849
his Presidentship, adopted "a somewhat warmer tone toward Pakistan". This subjective factor, too, might have influenced the Nixon Administration's military aid policy towards Pakistan between 1969 and 1971.

U.S. Position on Military Aid to Pakistan in 1969.

On 5 June 1969, Mr. W. Rogers, the then U.S. Secretary of State, stated in a news conference that the Nixon Administration was "reviewing" its position with regard to arms sales to Pakistan. He further said that the Administration was reviewing its position in the light of Pakistan's urge for additional purchase of arms. In the same news conference Mr. Rogers, however, said that no decision regarding arms sales to Pakistan had been made by the U.S. Government till that time. It may be mentioned here that Mr. Rogers' indication of reviewing the U.S. position (regarding military sales to Pakistan) came immediately after his visit to Pakistan from 24 to 25 May 1969. It, however, appeared that from the very beginning the Nixon Administration was thinking in terms of providing military aid to Pakistan. Meanwhile, the U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee

110. Ibid.
111. Ibid.
112. For details of Mr. Rogers' visit to Pakistan see, Bulletin 60 (16 June 1969) 505.
urged the U.S. Government on 8 November 1969 to reconsider, in the U.S. national interests, the 'selective shipment of military weapons' to Pakistan and to India. 113

Thus, it appeared that in 1969 the U.S. Government was seriously reviewing their position regarding the sales of military materials to Pakistan. The U.S. Government never mentioned in 1969 that their policy was to maintain the arms embargo which was imposed in 1965.

That the U.S. Government was seriously considering giving arms to Pakistan was manifest from the concern expressed by India at the U.S. position of reviewing the arms sales to Pakistan. From 1954, when the United States started to give military aid to Pakistan, India's views against the U.S. policy were expressed many a time. In 1969, the Government of India again thought that in reviewing their position the U.S. Government were ignoring India's views on the U.S. military aid to Pakistan. 114

The relations between India and Pakistan continued to be strained over the Kashmir question. India considered that despite the Tashkent Agreement (1965) between India and Pakistan, there


On 14 July 1969, the U.S. Defence Secretary, Mr. Laird informed the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the United States was reviewing at that time the tank deal (transfer of tanks from Turkey to Pakistan) which was approved by the Johnson Administration; he further said that "I would not want to give you a definite yes or no to that question." See, the statement of Mr. Laird on 14 July 1969: U.S. 91st Congress, 1st session, Senate, Foreign Relations Committee; Hearings on Foreign Assistance Act, 1969 (U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1969) 97.

114. See the statement of Mr. Dinesh Singh, India's Minister of External Affairs, in the Lok Sabha on 7 May 1969. L.S.Deb. 29 (7 May 1969) 37.
was no attempt on the part of Pakistan to normalize relations with India. The Government of India, therefore, held that the U.S. arms assistance to Pakistan at that stage would "retard the chances of normalization of relations" between India and Pakistan. Secondly, the Government of India thought that the U.S. arms assistance to Pakistan would "increase the threat to the security of India" and would also "lead to tension in this part of the world." 117

Mr. Dinesh Singh, the Minister of External Affairs of India, made an eight-day tour to USA, from 11 to 18 July 1969. It was reported that during the tour he conveyed to Mr. Rogers that the transfer of arms or tanks to Pakistan would create strong adverse reactions among the Indians. 118 On 31 July 1969 President Nixon arrived in India for one day visit enroute his Asian trip from 25 July 1969. 119 During his visit to India, Mrs. Gandhi was reported to have expressed India's concern to Mr. Nixon over the United States' reconsideration of the supply of arms to Pakistan, and she conveyed to him that the consignment of Patton tanks to Pakistan would disturb peace in this region. 120

115. See the statement of Mr. Dinesh Singh in the Lok Sabha on 8 April 1969. L.S. Deb. 27 (8 April 1969) 285.

116. See the statement of Mr. S. P. Singh, India's Deputy Minister of External Affairs, in the Lok Sabha on 24 June 1969 during discussion on "Reported decision by USA to supply arms to Pakistan". L.S. Deb. 30 (24 June 1969) 214. This discussion in Lok Sabha took place after Mr. Rogers' news conference of June 1969 in which he stated that the U.S. Government was reviewing its position with regard to arms sales to Pakistan.

117. Ibid., 214.


120. See, Guardian (Editorial), Manchester, 1 August 1969.
word, India thought that the U.S. military aid policy towards Pakistan not only strained Indo-U.S. relations, it also damaged the possibility of normalization of India-Pakistan relations.

Thus it appeared that from its very inception in 1969, the Nixon Administration adopted an attitude towards Pakistan regarding military sales, which evoked adverse reactions in India. This was, no doubt, an impediment in the close understanding and rapport between India and the United States.

The U.S. Military Aid Policy Towards Pakistan in 1970: 'One Time Exception'

But India's concern for the U.S. arms sales to Pakistan which would be inimical to her (India's) security interests and to the security interests of South Asian region in general was not properly heeded in Washington. Nor the hope of India that its views would be taken into consideration by the U.S. Government before their decision to sell arms to Pakistan was realized. 121 In October 1970, the United States decided unilaterally to sell some lethal weapons to Pakistan. 122

The New York Times editorial of 11 July 1969 criticised the U.S. role in the tank deal on the ground that those 'tanks would not be useful against the Russians or the Chinese' because of Pakistan's good and normal relations with them and hence there was 'no reason' to send them to Pakistan.

121. On 3 April 1970, Mr. S. P. Singh, India's Deputy Minister of External Affairs, expressed in Lok Sabha during discussion on 'Reported plan of the United States to sell tanks to Pakistan' that "our view with regard to the supply of military equipment to Pakistan which, we feel, will endanger our security and also create instability in the whole of this region has already been conveyed to the U.S. Government on a number of occasions. In 1969 alone this matter was raised with the U.S. authorities four times .... I am sure that before they take this particular decision, they will take our viewpoints in to considerations" See, L.S.Deb., 38 (3 April 1970) 218.

122. See, H. A. Kissinger: White House Years. 849. See also,
Mr. Swaran Singh, the Minister of External Affairs (he succeeded Mr. Dinesh Singh), told the Lok Sabha that in September 1970 the U.S. Government Officially informed India that it had decided to supply to Pakistan 6 F-104 type star fighter-interceptors, 300 armoured personnel carriers, 7B-57 bombers and 4 maritime patrol aircraft "in replacement to losses and natural attrition" of the military materials of Pakistan. 123 The Government of India was also informed by the U.S. Government that the sale of those equipments to Pakistan did not mean the total lifting of the arms embargo imposed in 1965 but was simply 'one time exception' to the ban. 124

In one sense the Nixon Administration was more intent on providing military help to Pakistan than the Johnson Administration. The latter partially lifted the embargo to provide spare parts and approved the tank deal between Pakistan and Turkey, but did not provide military weapons to Pakistan which the Nixon Administration did. Mr. Kissinger said in his autobiography that the supply of the U.S. arms to Pakistan in 1970 was a "concrete gesture" of president Nixon's gratefulness for the services rendered by Pakistan "as the U.S. channel to China". 125 In 1969-'70 president Nixon decided to normalize the U.S. relations with

123. See, L. S. Deb, 45 (9 November 1970) 199.
124. Ibid., see also, H. A. Kissinger: White House Years, 849.
China for which, he thought, the negotiations "should be done privately". At that time Pakistan had good relations both with the USA and with China. That was why President Nixon might have thought that President Yahya Khan of Pakistan (who assumed power as the President of Pakistan after President Ayub Khan stepped down in 1968) was the appropriate person who could help as the "intermediary" in the Sino-US negotiations for reapproach- ment. Thus, Pakistan became the U.S. channel to China.

India's Response to the U.S. Policy of 1970: - The reactions of the Government of India to the U.S. decision to sell military equipments to Pakistan in 1970 were more pronounced. On 8 October 1970, on the very day when the U.S. Government announced their decision to sell arms to Pakistan, India lodged a strong protest, note to the then U.S. Ambassador in India, Mr. K. Keating, against the U.S. decision.

From 1954 (when the USA started to give military aid to Pakistan) it was the apprehension of India that addition to Pakistan's defence potential would disturb the normalization of Indo-Pak relations. The same apprehension was voiced in 1970 too. While Mrs. Gandhi was in New York from 22 to 26 October 1970 to attend the 25th anniversary session of the United Nations

126. R. M. Nixon: Memoirs. 546
127. Ibid., 546, 562.
128. See, the statement of Mr. Swaran Singh, India's Minister of External Affairs, in the Lok Sabha on 9 November 1970. L.S. Deb., 45 (9 November 1970) 199. See also, Times of India. Delhi, 9 October 1970.
General Assembly, it was reported that she expressed to Mr. Rogers on 23 October that the resumption of the U.S. arms to Pakistan would retard the restoration of normal relations with Pakistan. 129

Mr. Swaran Singh criticised the U.S. policy of 'one time exception' and stated in the Lok Sabha on 9 November 1970:

"Past assurances that U.S. arms to Pakistan would not be used against India proved worthless, and this time even such an assurance has been omitted. This shows that U.S. Government itself believes that these arms will be used against us. ... The U.S. decision (1970), therefore, is all the more regrettable". 130

India was very much disappointed with the U.S. decision to sell arms to Pakistan in 1970 and thought that this might affect her relations with the United States. The Government of India considered that although India's relations with the USA were "friendly", this particular action of military supplies to Pakistan in 1970 on the plea of replacement of the losses of Pakistan and natural attrition could, according to India, "not be called friendly by any means". 131

It was the feeling of India that she could not persuade the United States not to give military equipments to Pakistan,


130. Mr. Swaran Singh's statement in the Lok Sabha on 9 November 1970 during discussion on "Supply of arms to Pakistan by USA and USSR". See, L.S. Deb., 45 (9 November 1970) 199-200.

131. See, the statement of Mr. S. P. Singh, India's Deputy Minister of External Affairs, in Rajya Sabha on 9 November 1970 during discussion on "Decision of U.S. Government to resume supply of arms to Pakistan". R.S. Deb., 74 (9 November 1970) 116-125.
and that the only option she had was to build up her own defence strength and to acquire more arms to meet any danger to her security. 132 It appeared that one obvious result of the U.S. arms aid policy towards Pakistan would be an increase in the arms race between Pakistan and India. 133 The Government of India held that the U.S. military aid policy in relation to Pakistan was responsible not only for the arms race between India and Pakistan but also for the wars which these two countries fought on occasions.

Ultimately, it appeared that the concern of India at the U.S. military aid to Pakistan was not an important factor for consideration in formulating their military aid policy towards Pakistan. It was clear that the U.S. interests lay more in maintaining Pakistan as its defence ally than in pleasing India by sharing India's concern and apprehension over the U.S. policy towards

132. See the statement of Mr. S. P. Singh. Ibid., 122.

133. The influential U.S. Senator Mr. Saxbe too criticised the U.S. decision of resumption of arms to Pakistan on the ground that it would "trouble" the Indo-Pak relations and would "generate" the arms race in the Indian Sub-Continent. See, Congressional Record, Senate, 27 (12 October 1970) Vol. 116, 36218.

On 21 April 1967 Mr. Nixon in a news conference in New Delhi gave emphasis on the lessening of arms race between India and Pakistan; otherwise, he maintained, it would create doubt in the United States about the value of economic aid to these two countries (See, New York Times, 22 April 1967). But the decision of Nixon Administration in October 1970 to give military equipments to Pakistan could not be said by any means as a measure to lessen the arms race between India and Pakistan.

134. On 9 November 1970, Mr. Swaran Singh, the Minister of External Affairs, remarked in the Lok Sabha that "But for American arms aid to Pakistan the (Indian) sub-continent might have been spared more than one destructive war". See, L.S. Deb., 45 (9 November 1970) 200.
Pakistan. Mr. Kissinger dismissed India's concern by saying that "India could have no serious concern about this muniscule flow" of arms to Pakistan in 1970. On the other hand, the Government of India too dismissed the U.S. arguments behind the military assistance to Pakistan as unconvincing. Thus, Mr. S. P. Singh, India's Deputy Minister of External Affairs, stated in the Rajya Sabha on 9 November 1970 that the U.S. justification that they were supplying the military equipments to Pakistan with the objective of preventing Pakistan from coming under the influence of China or the Soviet Union were "not acceptable" to India. Similarly, Mr. Swaran Singh, the Minister of External Affairs, said in the Lok Sabha on 9 November 1970:

"In reply to our protest, the American Government had tried to justify its decision by saying that no great significance should be attached to this replacement of items of equipment and that this sale (the sale in October 1970) was to meet Pakistan's defence requirements. We have


In this book Mr. Kissinger wrote that "I was pressed (by Mrs. Gandhi) to cut off not only arms but all economic aid (to Pakistan) as well. Indian leaders did not think it strange that a country (i.e. India) which had distanced itself from most of our foreign policy objectives in the name of non-alignment was asking us to break all ties with an ally (i.e. Pakistan)". Ibid., 861

136. See, R. S. Deb., 74 (9 November 1970) 115-122.

Mr. Rogers, the U.S. Secretary of State, justified the U.S. Government's decision to give military equipments to Pakistan in 1970 on the ground of weaning Pakistan away from China. See, Tribune, Ambala, 25 October 1970.

See, M. S. Rajan: "Is the world slipping under super power condiminium". National Herald, New Delhi, 26 November 1970.
pointed out that we are unable to accept these arguments."

Thus, gradually the Indo-U.S. relations became further strained during the Nixon Administration as a result of the U.S. Government's policy of continued military aid to Pakistan.

U.S. Help to Pakistan during Bangladesh Crisis in 1971.

In 1971 the people of East Pakistan launched a vigorous movement against the military regime of Pakistan demanding first the autonomy of the province and finally the total independence of East Pakistan. In order to crush the movement in East Pakistan, President Yahya Khan gave a free hand to the Pakistani army to tackle the situation and the army started a violent operations on the people of East Pakistan from 25 March 1971.

Immediately after the military operations began in East Pakistan, the U.S. State Department imposed a ban on the U.S. arms supplies to Pakistan. 138 But in June 1971 it was reported

137. See, L.S. Deb., 45 (9 November 1970) 199.
   Mr. Sisko, the U.S. Under Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, sought to rationalize the U.S. Government's decision in October 1970 to give military assistance to Pakistan by saying that this decision "should not be interpreted as a change in our basic relationship with India" and that the U.S. action was "intended to deter a costly modernization of the Pakistani armed forces" see, The Hindu, Madras, 31 October 1970.

   On 5 October 1970 the Senate Foreign Relations Committee too voted for the suspension of all U.S. economic and military aid to Pakistan. See, H. A. Kissinger: White House Years. 875
that two ships, 'Sundarbans' and 'Padma', flying the flag of Pakistan and loaded with American military equipments left New York harbour on 20 and 21 June 1971 for Karachi. The third ship, 'Kaukhali', loaded with the U.S. arms left New York for Karachi on 24 June 1971. It was further reported that the U.S. State Department Officials confirmed the report that the Pakistani freighter, 'Kaptai', was to sail from New York to Karachi on 2 July 1971.

It appeared that those arms were supplied to Pakistan in violation of the ban imposed by the State Department after 25 March 1971. But the U.S. Government did not admit that they had violated the ban. Mr. Charles, W. Bray III, the U.S. State Department spokesman, was reported to have clarified that the U.S. Government's order to halt the issuing of licenses for military sales was to be effective from 25 March 1971; it, however, did not go into effect until 6 April 1971. It was also explained later that the shipments were legitimate and that they had all been contracted for before 25 March 1971, and that they would continue.

143. Ibid. Mr. Laget, the member of the U.S. House of Representatives, stated in the House on 14 December 1971 that it was explained by the State Department that no military materials had been delivered to Pakistan after 25 March 1971, and that nothing was scheduled for delivery. See, Cong. Rec. House 117 (14 December 1971) 46871.
But the actual reason behind the shipments of arms to Pakistan in mid 1971 seemed to be President Nixon's conviction that India had totally "become aligned with the Soviets", and that taking advantage of the internal strife of Pakistan, India, aided with the Soviet support and encouragement, might try to dismember Pakistan. In this context President Nixon himself wrote in his autobiography:

"We should demonstrate our displeasure with India and support for Pakistan ... We should strongly oppose the dismemberment of Pakistan by a Soviet ally (i.e., India) using Soviet arms ... What we had to do, therefore, was to remain steadfast behind Pakistan." 146

In the light of the U.S. assessment that India might dismember Pakistan it was quite conceivable that the U.S. Government sent military materials to Pakistan in 1971 to enable her to counter the Indian threat.

Following the reported shipment of the U.S. arms to Pakistan in mid 1971, the level of the Indo-U.S. relations touched a new low. As soon as the shipments of arms to Pakistan were reported, the then Indian Ambassador in Washington took up the matter with


Mr. Kissinger wrote that he was convinced that in 1971 India had the motive to isolate Pakistan. See, H. A. Kissinger: White House Years, 914

146. R. M. Nixon: Memois, 525-527.

147. Mr. Swaran Singh told the Lok Sabha on 24 June 1971 that the New York Times reports of the shipment of the U.S. arms to Pakistan seemed to the Government of India" to be substantially correct". See, L.S. Deb, 4 (24 June 1971) 264.
the then U.S. Under Secretary of State on 22 June and the matter was also taken up with the U.S. Embassy in New Delhi on 23 June 1971. Mr. Swaran Singh, the Minister of External Affairs, informed the Lok Sabha on 24 June 1971 that the U.S. Government had explained to India that no new arms authorization had been made with Pakistan after 25 March 1971; what had been delivered to Pakistan were in the pipeline, and the Government of the United States regretted this loophole regarding the past authorization of military equipments. On 28 June Mr. Singh, however, stated in the Lok Sabha that the Government of India was "completely dissatisfied" with this explanation of the U.S. Government and that the Government of India could "not accept" and could "not understand" the U.S. explanations.

India considered that the U.S. supply of arms to Pakistan was a calculated move and it was to hurt India's feelings and interests. She further thought that the U.S. action (i.e.

148. See the statement of Mr. Swaran Singh in the Lok Sabha on 24 June 1971 during discussion on 'Reported carrying of American arms to Pakistan'. L.S. Deb., 4 (24 June 1971) 264

149. Ibid., 264-271.


The U.S. explanation that the shipments of arms to Pakistan during June 1971 were the results of the loopholes of the past authorization was not very much convincing. For example, the prominent U.S. Senator Mr. Kennedy pointed out in the Senate on 10 December 1971 that once military goods were to be delivered by the U.S. Government the shipper must obtain a licence from the U.S. Department of States' Office of Munitions Control before the actual shipment (see, U.S. Cong. Rec. Senate, 177, 10 December 1971; 46288). It could, therefore, be inferred that everything was done deliberately and every thing was within the full knowledge of the U.S. Government.

151. On 12 July 1971, Mr. Swaran Singh, the Minister of External
the shipments of arms to Pakistan in June 1971) went "definitely against" India's "interests". 152

The United States supplied military equipments to Pakistan at a time in 1971 when the Pakistani military forces were using force against the movement of the East Pakistanis. India "welcomed" the movement of East Pakistan for, in India's considerations, the movement involved the values which India stood for. 153 India thought that by supplying arms to Pakistan during the movement of the East Pakistanis the United States helped the military authorities of Pakistan in suppressing the movement and encouraged the wanton violation of the principles of democracy and freedom which, however, the U.S.A. professed. 154 In this context Mr. Swaran Singh said in the Lok Sabha on 24 June 1971 that the Government of India had conveyed to the United States that,

" ...... any accretion of military strength to Pakistan particularly in the present circumstances when military oppression and atrocities are being let loose on the unarmed and defenceless people of Bangladesh (East Pakistan), would not only pose a threat to the peace and security of this sub-continent but the whole region." 155

Affairs, stated in the Lok Sabha that "we know that in 1954 these (US) arms were supplied to Pakistan against us, and the same policy continues. So there was no question of any valid explanation in 1954 as there is none to day, except their own desire, as they say, to continue to give support to Pakistan in the matter of military equipments." See L.S. Deb., 5 (12 July 1971) 128.


153. See Prime Minister Mr. Indira Gandhi's statement in the Lok Sabha on 27 March 1971. L.S. Deb., 1 (27 March 1971) 43.


155. Ibid.; 265.
The prominent U.S. Senator Mr. Kennedy explained in the
Mr. Swaran Singh informed the Lok Sabha on 12 July 1971 that the Government of India pressed the U.S. Government to give up their plan of continued supply of arms to Pakistan even though the licences for these might have been issued prior to 25 March (1971). But the Government of India understood that under no circumstances the U.S. Government would stop supplying arms to Pakistan. Mr. Swaran Singh, therefore, told the Lok Sabha on 28 June 1971 that he could not give the impression to the House "that there will not be any further (arms) supplies from the United States to Pakistan." On 12 July 1971 he again informed the Lok Sabha that following the shipment of arms to Pakistan in June 1971 the Government of India sought an assurance from the U.S. Government that they would not supply any more arms to Pakistan. But no such assurance was given by the United States, Mr. Swaran Singh informed.

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156. See, L.S. Deb., 5 (12 July 1971) 122-123.
158. See, L.S. Deb., 5 (12 July 1971) 121.
159. Ibid.

Mr. T. N. Kaul, the Secretary in the Ministry of External Affairs of India in 1971, wrote in his book that during his talks with Mr. Kissinger in New Delhi in July 1971 he (Mr. Kaul) asked Mr. Kissinger that "could not there be a total (arms) ban as there was in 1965". Then he wrote that "Kissinger evaded the query". See, T. N. Kaul: Kissinger Yeard, Indo-American Relations (New Delhi, 1980) 45.
India's concern, protests and feelings had no or little impact on the U.S. military aid policy towards Pakistan. It was quite evident that the U.S. policy was to continue to give military aid to Pakistan. Consequently, on this issue the Indo-U.S. relations during Nixons' Administration deteriorated though India had not wanted the worsening of relations.

**How India viewed this situation**

From the above account, it follows that India had not at all liked the U.S. policy to supply military assistance to Pakistan. India had not only disliked the policy but considered the U.S. arms aid policy towards Pakistan as inimical to her own national interests. India considered that though the U.S. Government had all along been stating that its arms aid policy to Pakistan was a part of its global strategic planning against international communism, the real motive behind the U.S. policy was different. She was convinced that the United States had been supplying military equipments to Pakistan (whose security was an important element of the U.S. Foreign policy) to strike a military balance in the Indian sub-continent between India and Pakistan.

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160. Mr. T. N. Kaul aptly observed that "The so-called one time exception was in fact neither one time nor an exception." See, T. N. Kaul: *Kissinger Years*, 52.

Perhaps, there were two main reasons for which the United States had sought a military balance between India and Pakistan. First, the United States thought that since India was militarily superior to Pakistan in the Indian sub-continent, Pakistan required sufficient military assistance so that a military balance in the sub-continent could be maintained. That India was considered to be militarily superior was admitted by various responsible persons in the U.S. Administration. Mr. Hoopes, the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence during Johnson Administration, stated on 20 April 1967 that after the 1965 Indo-Pak war "India has demonstrated its clear superiority in manpower and in the capacity for sustained fighting". 162 Later on, in the Third Annual Report to the U.S. Congress on 9 February 1972, President Nixon maintained that "the military balance shifted decisively toward India between 1966-71". 163

Immediately after the partition of India in 1947, the relations between India and Pakistan became very much strained on the question of the future of Kashmir. From that time, Pakistan considered India as a danger to her security. Hence, Pakistan, to maintain her security, pleaded for a military balance with India 164 and sought arms. By following the policy of continued


164. See, Z. A. Bhutto: Myth of Independence; 79.
military assistance to Pakistan, the United States seemed to have shared Pakistan's phobia of threat to its security from India.

Secondly, the United States perhaps thought that a military balance in the sub-continent between India and Pakistan would checkmate any ulterior design of India to dominate the South Asian politics. The dominance of South Asian politics by India could not be conducive to the U.S. global security and strategic interests. Since India did not militarily ally with the USA and had no intention to resist the communist expansion in Asia, the United States thought that it was not desirable that India should emerge as an 'autonomous centre of power', and as a major power 'capable of limiting the hegemony of the United States' in Asia. Pakistan, it was assessed in Washington, was the only country in South Asia that could counter the dominance of India. And hence, a military balance between the two countries was essential as Washington viewed the situation.

But India considered that the U.S. policy of maintaining a military balance between India and Pakistan was based upon a

165. Mr. T. N. Kaul wrote that during his talks with Mr. Kissinger in New Delhi in July 1971, he (Mr. Kaul) understood that the impression of Mr. Kissinger was that "India wanted to become 'dominant' power in the sub-continent". See, T. N. Kaul: Kissinger Years, 81-82. See also, Ralph de Toledano: Nixon, 164. See also, M. S. Rajan: India in World Affairs, 1954-56. 267.

166. For reference see, L. P. Singh: "Regional Power Vs. Global Power in Arms Control: India, America and Nuclear Affairs". India Quarterly (New Delhi) 35 (July - September, 1979) 352.

wrong assumption. India made it repeatedly clear both to Pakistan and to the United States that India had no design against her neighbours; India had made repeated offers of a no-war pact to Pakistan. Hence, India felt that Pakistan had no ground to apprehend any threat from India. India considered that the United States, too, should not have unnecessary apprehensions about India's motive vis-a-vis Pakistan. The U.S. assumption behind its arms aid policy that India was a threat to Pakistan's security and territorial integrity seemed to India a result of wrong assessment of the situation in South Asia by the United States. India's understanding was that the U.S. determination to build up Pakistan as a force to resist the Soviet and particularly the Chinese communism in Asia was bound to be foiled as Pakistan would fight neither with the Soviets nor with the Chinese. Since the middle of 1950s Pakistan had established more or less friendly relations with China. On the other hand, Pakistan considered that India was her enemy number one and her immediate adversary. Pakistan, in India's assessment, did not consider China as a threat to her security. Consequently, Mr. M. C. Chagla, the

168. See the statement of Mr. Swaran Singh, the Minister of External Affairs, in the Lok Sabha on 9 November 1970. L.S. Deb., 45 (9 November 1970) 199. See also, the Statement of Mr. M. C. Chagla, the Minister of External Affairs, in the Lok Sabha on 3 August 1967. L.S. Deb., 8 (3 August 1967) 17042.

169. For reference see the statement of Mr. M. C. Chagla, ibid.

170. For an analytical study on Pakistan-China relations from 1949 to 1969 see, B. N. Goswami: *Pakistan and China: A Study of Their Relations* (New Delhi, 1971).

Minister of External Affairs of India, stated in the Lok Sabha on 3 August 1967:

"The United States should realize the elementary fact that Pakistan and China are in collusion ... We are the only country in Asia which can resist Chinese expansionism. I am surprised ... that the United States does not realize this elementary fact ... ." 172

It appeared that India considered that Pakistan had threats neither from India nor from China. On the contrary, India perceived that she faced double menace from Pakistan as well as from China. 173 As a result she thought that she had to be strong "not only against Pakistan" but also against the "possible combined threat" of Pakistan and China. 174 In this context, India felt that her need to acquire military equipments was much higher than that of Pakistan. The Foreign Minister Mr. Swaran Singh, therefore, clearly stated in the Lok Sabha on 8 April 1970:

"Military balance has some relevance if we had only Pakistan as our enemy. Now there is no question of military balance. That concept is completely changed." 175

India felt that by giving continuous military assistance to Pakistan the United States always equated Pakistan's need for military equipments with that of India. 176 By no means, India

172. See, L. S. Deb., 8 (3 August 1967) 17042.
174. Ibid.
175. Ibid.
176. See the statement of the Foreign Minister Mr. M. C. Chagla in the Lok Sabha on 3 August 1967. L. S. Deb., 3 (3 August 1967) 17042.
felt, their respective needs for military materials could be equated. Referring to the partial lifting of embargo in 1967, Mr. M. C. Chagla, the then Minister of External Affairs of India, expressed the resentment of the Government of India against the U.S. attempt to equate India with Pakistan by remarking that the U.S. decision was extremely "unfortunate". Addressing the U.S. Government he said:

"You are again equating Pakistan with India. That is not the correct historical perspective which you should take of the relationship between India and Pakistan". 177

On 6 July 1971, the Foreign Minister, Mr. Swaran Singh, stated in the Lok Sabha that this 'doctrine' of military balance between India and Pakistan was "unreal" and "unacceptable" to India because, India was "five times the size of Pakistan" and the problems of India were also "bigger". 178 The spirit of this statement of Mr. Swaran Singh was that considering the size and problems of India, her needs to be militarily strong were greater than those of Pakistan and that the needs to acquire military equipments of these two countries could not be equated. Mr. Singh, therefore, remarked:

"It (military balance) is completely misplaced and out of place so far as the Indian sub-continent is concerned ... we do not accept any such approach". 179

177. Mr. Chagla's statement in the Lok Sabha on 3 August 1967. Ibid.
179. Ibid.
The renowned U.S. journalist and communist, Mr. Selig Harrison, once observed that the U.S. policy of striking a military balance in South Asia was unacceptable to India because India cherished the hope - 'quite-justifiably' in the opinion of Mr. Harrison - that the military superiority which the partition of India in 1947 vested in her would continue to remain unaffected for some time to come. In other words, Mr. Harrison thought that the Indian aspiration to become a dominant regional power in South Asia would be greatly thwarted if USA adopted the policy of military balance in the sub-continent. This conception of military balance in South Asia was, again, unacceptable to India because, she felt, by continued military assistance to Pakistan, the U.S. Government were "acting in a manner perjudicial" to the interests of India.

On several occasions in the past, India conveyed to the United States that India wanted to live in peace with her neighbours and that India desired to see the South Asian region free from tension and military activities. But it appeared to India that the U.S. policy to arm Pakistan to maintain a military balance between the two countries was only resulting in the creation of

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180. Selig S. Harrison: "India, Pakistan and the USA: Undoing of a Mistake". *New Republic*, 141 (7 September 1959) 11-17
After the partition in 1947 India emerged as the strongest power in South Asia see, D. Som Dutt: "Foreign Military Aid and the Defense Strength and Policies of India and Pakistan: A Comparative Study". *International Studies* (Delhi), 8 (July - October 1966) 64-72.

of tension in the sub-continent. 182

India, however, considered that the U.S. attempt to strike a balance between India and Pakistan was a futile attempt. According to her, the U.S. arms aid to Pakistan could neither achieve a balance with India militarily nor Pakistan could "force a settlement" on India "by the use of arms". 183 That was why Mr. B. R. Bhagat, the Minister of State for External Affairs, observed in the Lok Sabha on 20 July 1971 that the U.S. policy to achieve a balance of power between India and Pakistan "failed earlier, but they (the U.S. Government) are pursuing this policy even to-day, and it is going to have the opposite effect". 184 In December 1971 India and Pakistan fought a war. And, in fact, by defeating Pakistan in this war India proved the futility of the U.S. policy to strike a military balance in the sub-continent.

**India Lost Faith in U.S. Assurance**

In 1954 when the United States started to give military assistance to Pakistan, the then U.S. President, Mr. Eisenhower, gave an assurance to India (in response to India's concern) that the arms which the USA would give to Pakistan were not meant to

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182. See the statement of Mr. B. R. Bhagat, the Minister of State for External Affairs, in the Rajya Sabha on 2 May 1968, *R.S. Deb.*, 64 (2 May 1968) 702-703.


184. Mr. Bhagat's statement in the context of the U.S. arms
be directed against India. But during India-Pakistan war in September 1965 Pakistan used the U.S. arms against India, and thus violated the U.S. assurance. India, therefore, could not trust the U.S. assurance, but felt that the United States could hardly restrain Pakistan from using the U.S. arms against India. After the relaxation of the U.S. arms embargo (on India and Pakistan) in April 1967, the then Foreign Minister of India, Mr. M. C. Chagla remarked in the Lok Sabha:

"The assurance (that Pakistan would not use U.S. arms against India) was given to us last time by President Eisenhower. But I do not believe in any assurance. Assurances depend upon political considerations." 186

On 9 November 1970, Mr. Swaran Singh stated in the Lok Sabha that India could not rely on the U.S. assurances because "past assurances that U.S. arms would not be used against India proved worthless". 187 Referring to the U.S. arms deliveries to Pakistan in October 1970, Mr. Swaran Singh pointed out in the Lok Sabha on 9 November 1970:


187. Statement of the Foreign Minister Mr. Swaran Singh during discussion on 'supply of arms to Pakistan by USA and USSR'. See, L.S. Deb., 45 (9 November 1970) 200.
"... this time even such an assurance (that those arms were not meant against India) has been omitted. This shows that the U.S. Government itself believes that those arms will be used against us". 188

In December 1971, Pakistan fought another war against India using the arms supplied mainly by the United States. Therefore, Pakistan again proved the U.S. assurances worthless.

It seemed that, in fact, India sought an assurance from the United States that they would no longer supply arms to Pakistan. But it was clearly revealed by the U.S. actions between 1966 to 1971 that their policy was to continue to give military assistance to Pakistan, no matter what India's reaction was. As a result the Government of India felt that they could never give any "assurance" to the people of India that the United States would no more sell arms to Pakistan. 189 India, however, believed that if the United States wanted and decided, she could stop arms aid to Pakistan. 190 But India realized well that the USA had no such intention or plans. Mr. Swaran Singh, therefore, told the Lok Sabha on 28 June 1971: "I would not like to give an impression that even now there will not be any further supplies (of arms) from the United States to Pakistan". 191

188. Ibid.


On 12 July 1971, Mr. Swaran Singh was asked by one member of the Lok Sabha whether he had received any assurance from Mr. Kissinger (at that time Mr. Kissinger was the National Security Adviser of President Nixon), while he was in New Delhi in July 1971, to the effect that the USA would no more supply arms to Pakistan. In reply Mr. Singh informed:

"... he (Mr. Kissinger) did not give any such assurance of that type. We have asked at a level higher than Dr. Kissinger's for such an assurance, but it is not forthcoming".

**India Turned to USSR for Arms.**

The impact of this U.S. arms aid policy towards Pakistan and the U.S. determination to maintain a military parity between India and Pakistan on the Indo-U.S. relations could be easily imagined. India found that since 1954 the United States had been following a policy in the sub-continent that was prejudicial to India's interests and aspirations, and was also inimical to the closer development of the Indo-U.S. relations.

Since the United States would continue to give military assistance to Pakistan which, India thought, endangered her security, India naturally turned towards the Soviet Union for fulfilling her own security objectives. The Foreign Minister, Mr. M. C. Chagla, accordingly, said in the Rajya Sabha on 28 July 1967 that the constant U.S. military aid to Pakistan

193. Ibid.
compelled "us, for our own security, to buy new tanks to match the tanks" which the United States had been giving to Pakistan.  

The Soviet Union became the chief supplier of India's defence equipments. In 1966 India received from the Soviets 40 Mi-4 aircraft, 14 Mig-21 UTI aircrafts, 10 An-12 aircraft, 102 SA-2 missiles, 540 K-13 "Atoll" missiles to arm Mig-21, 2 landing crafts for India's Naval Force.  

In 1967 India received from the Soviet Union 3 TU-124 aircraft, and from 1967 to 1974 India got 196 HAL/Mig-21 FL produced under licence in India. From 1968 to 1970, the Soviets gave to India 100 SU-7B aircraft, from 1968 to 1972 India received from the Soviet Union 75 SA-2 missiles. Between 1968 and 1969 the Soviet Union gave to India 2 submarines of "F" class, 5 Frigate of "Fetya" class. In 1971 India received from the Soviets 20 Mig aircraft; between 1971-1972 India received from them 96 SS-N2 missiles, one submarine, one more frigate and 8 Motor Torpedo Boats.  

As India received military assistance from the Soviet Union, the relations between India and the Soviet Union became very friendly and cordial. The United States, however, interpreted it as a policy of tilt towards the Soviet Union, deviating from

194. See, R. S. Deb., 61 (20 July 1967) 1283-1284.
196. Ibid.
197. Ibid.
198. Ibid.
199. Ibid.
from India's path of non-alignment. 200

India's Defence Budget Increased: Another consequence of the U.S. military assistance policy towards Pakistan was that India had to increase its defence budget which caused internal economic hardship in India. India considered that as both Pakistan and China posed the main threats to her security, the constant supply of arms by the United States to Pakistan would make Pakistan more hostile to India and would increase 'the intransigence' and 'belligerency' of Pakistan. 201 Under these circumstances, India felt that she needed to increasingly modernise her defence to meet the challenge posed by Pakistan armed with the U.S. military equipments. Mr. Dinesh Singh, the Minister of External Affairs, therefore, stated in the Lok Sabha on 18 August 1969:

"... it is our duty to defend ourselves. Let us not spend too much time in going into what America is doing. Let us spend more time in seeing what we have to do to meet that challenge." 202


201. See, the statement of the Defence Minister, Mr. Swaran Singh in the Rajya Sabha on 21 November 1968 during discussion on 'Reported decision of the Government of USA to permit Turkey to sell 100 Patton tanks to Pakistan'; R.S. Deb., 66 (21 November 1968), 751.

202. Mr. Dinesh Singh's statement during discussion on 'supply of U.S. arms to Pakistan'. See, L.S. Deb., 31 (18 August 1969), 244.
It was implied in the above statement that as a result of the constant U.S. military assistance to Pakistan, India was to strengthen her defence build-up. Thus, one direct impact on India of the U.S. military aid policy towards Pakistan was the gradual increase in the defence budget of India; which became an impediment to India's economic development. The following table shows the steep rise in the year-to-year defence budget of India.

(In terms of crores of Indian rupees)

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<th>Year</th>
<th>Capital Account</th>
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<td>Budget Estimates</td>
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<td>1965-'66</td>
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<td>1971-'72</td>
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In 1960-'61, the total defence expenditure of India on revenue and capital account combined was 312 crores of rupees, while in the revised estimate only for 1965-'66 the defence expenditure had been placed at ₹. 769 crores. The defence expenditure under the revenue account of 1966-'67 budget (₹. 798 crores)

marked an increase of Rs. 29 crores over the revised estimate of 1965-'66 (Rs. 769 crores). In 1967-'68 this marked an increase of Rs. 15 crores (Rs. 842 crores) over the revenue estimate of 1966-'67 (Rs. 827 crores). In 1970-'71 the defence expenditure in revised estimate on revenue account increased by Rs. 22 crores over the budget estimate of Rs. 1,018 crores, and in capital account the revised estimate (Rs. 143 crores) was increased by Rs. 9 crores over the budget estimate of Rs. 134 crores. The budget estimate of defence expenditure on revenue and capital account of 1971-'72 was marked by an increase of Rs. 19 crores and Rs. 39 crores respectively over the revised estimate on capital and revenue account of 1970-'71 defence budget.

India thought that she had to invest a large portion of her national income for her defence preparedness due to the U.S. military assistance policy towards Pakistan. Such a feeling of India about the USA was not helpful for cordial and friendly Indo-U.S. relations.

India Rejected the U.S. Counsel

Perhaps having realized that its arms aid policy towards Pakistan was encouraging some kind of an armament race between the two major powers in South Asia and that its policy was

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204. In this connection see the statement of the Defence Minister, Mr. Swaran Singh, in the Lok Sabha on 8 April 1970 during discussion on 'Reported recent decision of USSR to supply 200 tank to Pakistan'. L.S.Deb., 39 (8 April 1970) 179.
creating a wide gap in the Indo-U.S. relations, the U.S. Administration in the mid-1967 conveyed to the Indian Government that it would strive for the reduction of its arms supply to Pakistan and India. This was revealed by the Foreign Minister, Mr. M. C. Chagla. On 29 May 1967, Mr. Chagla informed the Lok Sabha that the United States had told India that the U.S. Government was interested in the reduction of its arms supplies to Pakistan and India, and was also interested to see that the arms race between India and Pakistan did not go on. Mr. Chagla further informed that the United States counselled India to cut down her arms so that the U.S. Government could persuade Pakistan to do so.

Mr. Morarji Desai, the Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister of India, went to the United States on 10 September 1967 for a five-day tour to that country. It was reported in India that while Mr. Desai was in the USA, the U.S. Government stressed to him that India should reduce her defence budget for her economic development.

205. See, L.S. Deb., 3 (29 May 1967) 1530. Also see Mr. Chagla's statement in the Rajya Sabha on 20 June 1967; R.S. Deb., 60 (20 June 1967) 4859-4860.

It was reported that the former U.S. Vice-President Mr. R. M. Nixon said at a news conference in New Delhi on 21 April 1967 that if the United States failed to bring about a "dampening down" of the arms race between India and Pakistan it might create doubt in the United States about the value of the U.S. economic aid to the two countries. See, New York Times, 22 April 1967.


207. See the report of Mr. Selig Harrison in The Statesman, Delhi, 15 September 1967.
India, however, could not fully rely on the U.S. counsel to cut down her arms and to reduce her defence budget. India held that the U.S. counsel was contrary to the policy the United States pursued in fact. Hence, Mr. M. C. Chagla remarked in the Lok Sabha on 29 May 1967 that while on the one hand the U.S. Government was counselling India to cut down arms, on the other hand it was giving military materials to Pakistan, and because of this policy of the U.S. Government India had to acquire more arms for her security. This sentiment of India was expressed by Mr. Swaran Singh too when he was the Defence Minister in 1968. On 21 November 1968 he stated in the Rajya Sabha:

"... the United States is one such country which is always proclaiming that they are anxious that there should be no armed conflict between India and Pakistan. If they (the US. Government) are adopting a policy which increases the intransigence of Pakistan, surely then their actions are not consistent with what they proclaim". 209

It was reported in India that Mr. Morarji Desai reacted to the U.S. counsel to reduce India's defence budget by saying that India would make her defence as strong as it was needed. 210 It was further reported that in a Press Conference in Washington (during his tour in the USA in September 1967) Mr. Desai had said that so long as there were threats to the security of India


209. Mr. Swaran Singh's statement during discussion on 'Reported decision of the Government of USA to permit Turkey to sell 100 Patton tanks to Pakistan'. See, R.S. Deb., 66 (21 November 1968) 751.

210. See the report of Mr. Selig Harrison in The Statesman, Delhi, 15 September 1967.
from Pakistan and China. Our defences have got to be maintained at a level where we can defend ourselves adequately. That is our first priority. 211

India also refused to accept the U.S. contention that she had entered into an arms race with Pakistan in the sub-continent. By counselling India to cut down her arms the United States tacitly held as though India started the arms race with Pakistan. What India thought was that the U.S. Government, by its policy of arming Pakistan, was forcing New Delhi to do what India felt was needed to protect India's interests and security. The Defence Minister, Mr. Swaran Singh, made India's position clear when he said in the Rajya Sabha on 21 November 1968:

"We do not want to enter into any arms race. We also do not want to enter into any conflict. We have been very anxious all these years to create a situation where our relations with all our neighbours may be peaceful. But it is a cruel reality that this is a matter in which one country unilaterally cannot be decisive." 212

A close observer of the political scene in the Indian sub-continent held that the possible reason behind the U.S. counsel to India to cut down her defence budget and arms might be the former's desire to prevent India from emerging as a powerful country. 213 The Government of India also did not

211. Ibid.

212. See, R.S. Deb., 66 (21 November 1968) 758-759.

altogether rule out such a view. 214

India ignored the U.S. counsel to cut down defence budget and arms. On the contrary, she remained firm in enhancing the quality of her defence, and a five-year defence plan for India (1969-1974) was announced in the Lok Sabha on 22 April 1969 (during the Budget Session of Indian Parliament) by the then Defence Minister, Mr. Swaran Singh. The new plan took into consideration the threats posed to the security of India and also the military preparations of the countries inimical to India. 215 The main objectives of the new plan were: to increase the efficiency of the Indian Army with "modern weapons", to strengthen the Naval Force, to modernize the Air Force by "phasing out" of older aircrafts, to increase the "reliance on indigenous sources of supply for the main equipments" etc. 216

214. On 9 November 1970 Mr. S. P. Singh, India's Minister of State for External Affairs, was asked in the Rajya Sabha by Mr. N. G. Goyal Whether the Foreign Ministry of India was of the opinion that the powers like the U.S.A, the USSR or China desired India to be "a really big nation". In reply Mr. Singh stated that "it may be some foreign powers may not want India to prosper and grow into a big "strong country". See, R. S. Deb., 74 (9 November 1970) 122. On occasions the Soviet Union too gave some military materials to Pakistan. Referring to this, Mr. Swaran Singh, the Defence Minister, expressed in the Lok Sabha on 8 April 1970 that he did not think that the Soviets supplied arms to Pakistan "to counter balance the power of India and to ensure that India does not grow strong". See Mr. Swaran Singh's statement during discussion on 'the reported recent decision of USSR to supply 200 tanks to Pakistan, L.S. Deb., 39 (8 April 1970) 178.

It appeared that India might have considered that it was mainly the United States and not the Soviet Union which did not want India to be strong.

215. For the new defence plan of India see, L.S. Deb., 28 (22 April 1969) 299-304.

216. Ibid.
By 12 July 1971 (two years after the announcement of the new defence plan) Mr. Jagjivan Ram, the then Defense Minister of India, could claim in the Lok Sabha that India was more than a match for her adversaries. 217

India never recognized that the U.S.A.'s Pakistan policy, particularly its arms aid policy to that country, was based on any sound consideration for the development of Indo-U.S. cordial relations. On the contrary, as Mrs. Gandhi wrote, the U.S. policy as it developed "impinged seriously" on India's vital interests. 218 To India, the U.S. military assistance to Pakistan appeared as not at all a "friendly" act towards India, 219 and as "prejudicial" to the interests of India. 220 Moreover, India considered that the U.S. arms aid policy towards Pakistan threatened the military balance in the sub-continent.

In spite of this assessment of the U.S. policy by India, the Indian Government never considered the United States as India's enemy. India, therefore, never considered the severance of its relations with the United States, specially on the issue

217. See, L.S. Deb., 5 (12 July 1971) 137-139.


219. The remark of Mr. S. P. Singh, India's Deputy Minister of External Affairs, in the Rajya Sabha on 9 November 1970: See, R. S. Deb., 74 (9 November 1970) 116-125.

220. Statement of Mr. M. C. Chagla, the Minister of External Affairs, in the Lok Sabha on 29 May 1967: See, L.S. Deb., 3 (29 May 1967) 1528-1529.
of the U.S. arms-aid policy towards Pakistan. In this regard, India's attitude towards the United States was clearly expressed by the Defence Minister, Mr. Swaran Singh, in the Rajya Sabha on 21 November 1968. During discussions on 'The reported decision of the Government of U.S.A. to permit Turkey to sell 100 Patton tanks to Pakistan', Mr. Singh stated:

"... we have to fashion our relations with other countries keeping in view the totality of relations. There may be differences of opinion in one sector and there may be identity of views in several other sectors ..."

The spirit of the above statement of Mr. Singh was that though the Government of India widely differed with the U.S. military assistance policy towards Pakistan, it would not serve India's national interests if India severed its relations with the USA. During discussions in the Rajya Sabha on 'Decision of the U.S. Government to resume supply of arms to Pakistan' on 9 November 1970, Mr. S. P. Singh, the Deputy Minister of External Affairs, also reiterated the Government's position in relation to the United States:

"Our relations with America are very friendly; they have been friendly and even to-day they are friendly even though we may not like this particular act (i.e. the supply of arms to Pakistan in October 1970) of America".

222. See, ibid.
223. See, R.S.Deb., 74 (9 November 1970) 125
Thus, it appeared that it was the view of India that its differences with the USA on a particular issue like the U.S. arms-aid policy towards Pakistan should not affect its total relations with the United States. India believed that the military assistance to Pakistan was the U.S. state policy which India could "hardly interfere" with. India reacted to the U.S. policy never by severing her ties with the United States but by increasing her (India's) defence potentiality. She was in favour of maintaining friendly relations with the USA.

India did not join the U.S. defence bloc and had chosen to follow the policy of non-alignment, which the United States might not have considered as contributory to their strategic interests in Asia. Moreover, India severely criticised and opposed the U.S. security policy in Asia. Still the U.S. Government neither regarded India as their adversary in Asia nor was it against giving any military assistance to India. The U.S. Government supplied military assistance to India too. The U.S. military assistance to India was, however, much less than their military assistance to Pakistan. This was not because

224. Remarks of Prime Minister, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, in the Rajya Sabha on 2 May 1968 in reply to an oral question in the House by one member; See, R.S.Deb., 64 (2 May 1968) 705.

225. See, SIPRI: Arms Trade Register (1975) 33-40.

226. Ibid., Mr. S. P. Singh, India's Deputy Minister of External Affairs, revealed in the Rajya Sabha on 9 November 1970 that "the quantum of military aid given by the USA to Pakistan is definitely much more than what the USA has given to India ..." See, R.S.Deb., 74 (9 November 1970) 132.
the United States considered India as their adversary but because Pakistan was strategically more important to USA than India.

Whenever the United States gave military assistance to Pakistan or was considering to giving it, India vehemently criticised, reacted and expressed concern at this assistance. The United States, however, did not appear to have taken into account India's concern; they often ridiculed it and dismissed it as strange, 227 but they did not give any indication to sever their ties with India. It seems to be true that if the United States considered their relations with India as inimical, because India criticised and opposed the US arms aid policy towards the Indian sub-continent, they would not have given economic and military assistance to India. 228

The differences between India and the United States on this issue were, in fact, due to different national interests. Many times India asserted that the U.S. military assistance to Pakistan

227. H. A. Kissinger: White House Years. 961

228. For the U.S. economic assistance to India see, Fact Sheet: No. 23, U.S. Economic Assistance to India, June 1951 - April 1971 (The United States Information Service, New Delhi.)
posed a threat to India and thus it might disturb peace in South Asia. But India's interest in maintaining regional peace (peace in South Asia), by implication came in conflict with the U.S. global interest in maintaining its security interests which necessitated giving military help to their allies. Consequently, the relations between India and the USA became strained on this issue. But there was, however, no reason to assume that because of the strained relations on this issue, their total relations deteriorated to the lowest ebb or to the point of enmity.