CHAPTER THREE

Communist China and The Indo-U.S. Relations.
COMMUNIST CHINA AND THE INDO-U.S. RELATIONS

Communist China occupied an important position in the history of the Indo-U.S. relations. Washington's relations with communist China greatly influenced its relations with another important country in Asia, India. The Sino-U.S. relations and the Indo-U.S. relations were, therefore, closely linked.¹

Historically, the relations of the United States with China up to 1949 were, on the whole, good and friendly.² There were contacts between the two countries at various levels-political, cultural and educational. The U.S. Administration had good understanding with the Kuomintang regime of China, led by its undisputed leader, Ching Kai Shek. Mr. Chiang was a great friend of the United States and a close ally of the Allied Powers during the Second World War.³ Before the emergence of communist China in 1949, the main objective of the U.S. policy towards China was to help that country in developing in a strong unified nation under a central government which could act as a counterweight to powerful Japan in East Asia in order to maintain what

1. The communist China was an important factor in the Indo-U.S. relations. This point was mentioned by the Indian Prime Minister Mrs. Gandhi in one of her articles. For reference see, Indira Gandhi: "India And The World," Foreign Affairs (New York), 51 (October 1972), 75.

2. For the Sino-U.S. relations see, John, King Fairbank: The United States And China, (Cambridge, 1971). See also, Tang Tsou: America's Failure In China, 1941-1950 (Chicago, 1963); see also, Wolfgang Franke: China And The West (Columbia, 1967).

3. Ibid.
was known as Asian balance of power. 4 

Even immediately after the second world war this objective remained the central theme of USA's East Asia policy and, in accordance with this policy, the United States strove hard to give China a permanent seat in the security Council of the United Nations.

But with the communists' victory in the mainland China in 1949 and the exile of the Chiang - Kai Shek regime in Formosa, the U.S. policy towards China, and Asia in general, underwent a radical change. Communist China appeared to be a great menace to the U.S. interests in Asia. The United States found that China, instead of serving as a counterweight to a power inimical to the United States (i.e. Soviet Union) became an ally of one such power. 5 To the detriment of the U.S. interests, communist China concluded a treaty of Friendship and Alliance with the Soviet Union, USA's main adversary in the cold war, in February 1950. 6 Peking intervened in the Korean war in 1950, confronting directly the U.S. army in that peninsula. Mao-tse tung, the Chairman of the Peoples' Republic of China, adopted a foreign policy whose central theme was the lean on one side, i.e. lean on the Soviet Union. 7 These developments completely alienated the United States

5. Ibid.
which, from the beginning of the fifties, began to consider that communist China was a satellite of Moscow and that it was like the Soviet Union "a great threat to the whole free community." The United States apprehended that communist China, with the help of the Soviet Union, would try to impose their political system on the countries of Asia. Thus, the United States, instead of elevating China to the status of a great power, adopted a policy of 'isolation' and 'containing' of China so that communist China might not expand its ideology and sphere of influence in Asia. A series of political and military measures were taken by Washington in early fifties to attain the objectives of its

8. See, the statement of the U.S. Secretary of State, Mr. John F. Dulles on 29 March 1954: U.S. Department of State, Bulletin (hereafter cited as Bulletin), 30, (12 April 1954), 540. In a news conference on 30 November 1950, the then U.S. President, Mr. H.S. Truman stated that the communist act of aggression on Korea was "a part of world wide pattern of danger to all the free nations of the world." See, Harry S. Truman: Public Papers of The President, 1950, (U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1965), 725.


One such political measure was to develop friendly and closer relations with Japan, once USA's main adversary in the Asian Pacific region, and with India which gained independence only in 1947, two years before the emergence of communist China. India's independence from the British Colonial rule was heartily welcomed by the United States and India's early pronouncement of her commitment to a democratic system gladdened the policymakers of Washington. The United States immediately recognized India and extended a formal invitation to Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru, India's first Prime Minister, to visit the United States for developing friendly relations with the great democratic country in Asia.

11. In order to contain the influence of Communist China, the United States adopted a programme of defence pacts with the non-Communist nations of Asia. Thus, on 8 September 1954 the United States sponsored the South East Asia Treaty Organization, known as SEATO; the signatories of SEATO were, the USA, the Great Britain, Philippines, Pakistan France, etc. For detail discussion on SEATO see, George Modelski: SEATO: Six Studies (Melbourne, 1962). On 24 February 1955 the United States sponsored the Middle East Defence Organization, another defence pact with the Middle Eastern countries.

12. The United States concluded a Peace Treaty with Japan in 1951.

13. On 15 August 1947 India achieved independence from the British rule. Welcoming the British decision to give independence to India, the U.S. President Mr. H.S. Truman sent a message to the Governor General of India, Mr. Lord Louis Mountbatten, on 15 August 1947. For the message see, Bulletin, 17, (14 August 1947), 396.

14. Mr. Nehru, in response to the invitation of the U.S. President Mr. H.S. Truman, visited the United States in October 1949. For Mr. Nehru's speeches in the USA in 1949 see, Nehru, Jawaharlal : India's Foreign Policy : Selected Speeches, September 1945-April 1961, (Delhi, Publication Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1961), 589-596.
The United States, however, developed its real interest in the Indian subcontinent when China went Communist in 1949 and when Peking totally sided with the Soviet Union in the cold war against the United States. The United States, under the circumstances, considered that a democratic India, with its geographical position in Asia and with its large population, could be strategically an alternative to communist China. Moreover, a stable, independent and democratic India could serve, according to the U.S. assessment, as an alternative model for development for the poorer Asian countries in preference to the Chinese totalitarian system.  

"A politically stable India," wrote a former U.S. Ambassador in India, "is essential to a stable Asia... Indian democracy is an inevitable competitor to totalitarian China. If India succeeds, the prospect for stability and peace in Asia will be vastly increased." The U.S. policy in the fifties, therefore, aimed at helping India to build up herself as a viable strong and democratic country in Asia, which could play an important role in meeting the ideological and territorial expansion of


the value and rationale of the Indo-U.S. relations lay in the importance of India as a countervailing power to communist China in Asia. Strategically and politically, India was considered by the United States to be an important factor in its relations with communist China. The U.S. economic and military assistance to India in the early fifties, and Washington's efforts to forge very close friendly relations with India were motivated by the USA's overall foreign policy objectives in Asia.

India, however, did not agree with the United States on the latter's assessment of the revolution in China that led to the victory of the Chinese communists and her (India's) perception of the role of communist China in Asia were different. She did not consider the revolution in China as essentially communist in nature; nor did she believe that this revolution in that country was instigated by the Soviet Union. India viewed the Chinese revolution as an expression of the Chinese nationalism and anti-colonialism against Western dominance. The emergence of communist China never appeared to India as a success of world-wide

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17. For the U.S. economic and food aid to India from 1951 to 1971 see, The United States Information Service (New Delhi): Fact Sheet (No. 23): United States economic assistance to India.

communist plan to dominate the world, as the United States believed. India, unlike the United States, never thought that communist China would be a menace and threat to peace and security in Asia. It was in accordance with this assessment of communist China in early fifties that India extended prompt recognition to the new Government in Peking. She also refused to join several U.S. sponsored military alliances to contain and to isolate China, which were the cardinal principles of USA's China policy in the fifties. The difference between the United States and India on the assessment of the place and role of communist China in international politics, particularly in the regional politics in Asia, constituted an important impediment to the closer development of the Indo-U.S. relations.

*Changed International Situations and U.S. policy towards China*: But from the closing years of the fifties the international situations began to change due to the emergence of several factors. By the end of the fifties, the Soviet Union became a

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19. On 29 February 1954, Prime Minister Mr. Nehru stated in the Lok Sabha during debate on Foreign Affairs that he "wondered" what was the 'specific urge' to sponsor the SEATO; he further said that India was invited but "refused" to attend the Manila conference, held in September 1954, out of which emerged the South East Asia Treaty Organization. See, J. Nehru: India's Foreign Policy: Selected Speeches, September 1946 - April 1961 (hereafter cited as J. Nehru: India's Foreign Policy), Delhi, Publication Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1961, 87-89. After independence India adopted the policy of non-alignment. In this connection see the statement of Prime Minister Mr. Nehru in the Constituent Assembly on 4 December 1947. See, J. Nehru: India's Foreign Policy, 24-29.
credible nuclear power, destroying the nuclear monopoly of the United States. The Western military bloc led by the United States remained no longer a solid entity as some of the USA's western allies like France were showing reluctance to toe the U.S. strategic policy against the Soviet Union whole-heartedly. The cracks also developed in the monolithic communist bloc led by the Soviet Union. The world knew by early sixties that Communist China had developed differences with the Soviet Union. The Sino-Soviet dispute became an important factor in the changed international situations. Moreover, the increasing stockpile of the nuclear weapons by both the super powers and their mounting defence budget led them to realize that some kind of an understanding had to be reached between the two countries for their own survival and for protecting their economies from the hazards of

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21. On 4 April 1949 the United States sponsored the North Atlantic Treaty Organization which was signed by the USA, the U.K., France, Canada, Italy, West Germany, Portugal, Norway, Denmark, Iceland, the Benelux countries. For the lessening rigidity of the Western military pacts see an article by Alfred, M. Landon: *New Challenges In International Relations*, quoted by the U.S. Senator, Mr. Pell in the U.S. Congressional Record, Senate (hereafter cited as Cong. Rec. Senate) (9 February 1967), 3278. On 18 November 1966 the Pakistani President Mr. Ayub Khan expressed doubts about the value of his country's membership of the SEATO. See, *The Statesman, Calcutta*, 20 November 1966.

unemployment, inflation and investment of huge national resources in the unproductive sectors. They felt that detente instead of 'confrontation' should be the best policy for the time being.23

The changed international situation, particularly the eruption of the Sino-Soviet dispute, opened up new possibilities for the United States to exploit the situation to its own advantage. The Soviet Union was the main adversary of the United States from the days of cold war in the forties. Therefore, the United States might have considered that a potentially powerful communist China which was no longer a friend of the Soviet Union could play an important role in checking the Soviet ambitions and designs in Asia. Communist China could be a good leverage in the hands of the United States in its relations with the Soviet Union.24

That the USA's China policy required re-assessment and re-evaluation in the context of the new international situation was first felt in Washington by the Kennedy Administration in early

23. 'Detente' has been defined by the Oxford English Dictionary as "cessation of strained relations between states": See, B.K. Srivastava, n. 20, p-10. See; M.S. Agwani (Edt.) : Detente, Perspective and Repercussions (New Delhi, 1975).

But it seemed that President Kennedy's preoccupation with Cuba, the Chinese adventure against India in 1962 and Kennedy's untimely death in 1963 muted the voice of the U.S. Administration in talking of any kind of normalization of relations with Communist China. It was President Lyndon B. Johnson (1963-68) who tried to give a concrete shape to the U.S. feeling of re-evaluating the China policy. President Johnson was convinced that in creating a stable order in Asia and to maintain peace in the Asian continent, communist China's cooperation was absolutely necessary. At a meeting of the American Alumni Council in West Virginia on 12 July 1966, President Johnson stated that a lasting peace could never come to Asia as long as 700 million people of China were isolated from the outside world. The United States felt that China could serve as a possible deterrent to the

25. Mr. H.A. Kissinger, who was the Assistant for National Security Affairs of President R.W. Nixon (1969-1974) was the Champion of the policy to normalize relations with China and to use China against the Soviet Union. During sixties he was one of the advisers of President Kennedy in foreign affairs. During that time he emphasized the policy of normalization of relations with China which, by that time, became a bitter adversary of the Soviet Union. See, H.A. Kissinger: White House Years (Boston, 1979), 164. For Kennedy Administration's thinking towards China see, Arthur M. Schlesinger: A Thousanid Days, John F. Kennedy In The White House (London, 1965). See also, Morton, H. Halperin: America And Asia: The impact of Nixon's China Policy (Roderik, Mac Farquhar: Sino-American Relations, 1949-1971, (London, 1972).


Soviet designs in Asia. Moreover, by that time China became a nuclear power. So, China became a major concern for the Americans. The U.S. Administration thought that an understanding was necessary with Communist China in order to maintain a close link with the people of the largest country in Asia and with a potential Asian nuclear power. The U.S. Vice-President Mr. Humphrey expressed this feeling of the United States when he stated in April 1968:

"I look forward to the day when the great Chinese people... take their place in the modern world. Surely one of the most exciting and enriching experiences to which we can look forward is the building of peaceful bridges to the people of mainland China." 29

President Johnson also stated that the USA was willing to re-establish cultural contacts with communist China and to permit exchange of journalists between the two countries. 30 On 12 July


29. This statement of Mr. Humphrey was quoted by Mr. Wyman, the member of the U.S. House of Representatives, see for this statement, U.S. Congressional Record. House of Representa- tives (hereafter cited as Cong. Rec. House), 114 (3 July 1968), 20020. During interview with the NBC-TV's Meet The press Vice-President Mr. Humphrey urged on 13 March 1966 that the U.S. policy towards communist China be one of "containment without necessarily isolation." See, Facts On File 1966, (Weekly World News Digest : New York), 81, (hereafter cited as Facts On File).

1968, the then U.S. Vice-President, Mr. Humphrey, called for an end to the total U.S. embargo on trade with China and said that exchange of non-strategic goods should be permitted. But President Johnson's Vietnam imbroglio did not perhaps allow him to open direct negotiations with China.

But the process of Sino-U.S. rapprochement gained momentum and attained fruition during the Nixon Administration (1969-'73). In his election campaign in 1968, President R.M. Nixon emphasized several times that if he were elected to the higher office, he would initiate negotiations with China. Mr. Nixon was convinced that "international communism has been shattered and that Sino-Soviet rift had reached such a point that the Soviet Union and China had become "bitter adversaries by mid 1960's." He felt that this rift between the Soviet Union and China opened up an "opportunity before America" to deter the Soviet influence. After assuming office in 1969, President Nixon instructed Mr. Henry, A. Kissinger, President Nixon's Assistant on National Security Affairs, to give encouragement to the attitude that his "Administration was exploring possibilities of rapprochement with the Chinese." By early 1970, Mr. Nixon began "serious approach to opening

a dialogue with communist China. 35

Mr. Nixon was a conservative politician and a tough hardliner against the communist bloc in the cold war days. 36 But, the new international situation and the USA’s involvement in the Vietnam conflict made him aware of the political advantages of proclaiming a new era of reconciliation with the Chinese Communists.

After assuming power in 1969, President Nixon emphasized the normalization of relations with China. His Secretary of State, Mr. William Rogers, stated on 8 August 1969, that the United States was entering “an interesting period in the affairs of Asia” and that “new chapters are about to be written” regarding U.S. foreign relations. 37

By the end of sixties, the United States attached great importance to the normalization of relations with China. Both President Johnson and President Nixon felt that the Communist China should not remain isolated from the family of nations and should not be excluded from the United Nations Organization. 38 The United

35. Ibid.


States, however, recognized Taiwan, as representing China in the United Nations, and obstructed the admission of Communist China to the United Nations from 1949. But in October 1971 China was admitted to the United Nations and became a permanent member of the Security Council in place of Taiwan.

On 15 July 1971 President Nixon dramatically announced that he would visit China, and he termed his ensuing visit to that country as "journey for peace." Mr. Nixon wrote in his Memoirs that because of the importance he "attached to the normalization of relations" with China, he accepted the invitation of the then Chinese Prime Minister, Mr. Chou en lai to visit China. On 17 February 1972 President Nixon left for Peking.

The new trend in the thinking of the United States which was discernible from the latter days of Kennedy Administration reduced India's strategic importance to the United States. In the fifties, India was considered to be strategically important to the United States as a


41. For Mr. Nixon's announcement of the visit to China see, Bulletin, 65, (2 August 1971), 121. see also, R.M. Nixon: Memoirs, 554.

42. See, Bulletin, 65, (2 August 1971), 121.

43. See, R.M. Nixon: Memoirs, 551.
countervailing force to Communist China in Asia. Washington then gave military aid to India to protect its security vis-a-vis China. During India-China armed conflict in October 1962, the Kennedy Administration immediately supplied military materials to India to protect its security and integrity. But in 1963 the U.S. State and Defence Departments opposed a plan of President Kennedy to modernize India's armed forces to make her able to thwart Chinese attack on her in future. It seemed true that the new thinking in the Kennedy Administration regarding China reduced the U.S. interest to giving military aid to India. Following the India-Pakistan war in September 1965, the United States imposed an arms embargo on the Indian sub-continent. From that time, the U.S. military assistance to India substantially decreased, while their military assistance to Pakistan continued. The explanation appeared to lie in the fact that the United States was no longer concerned about the security of India against China: it was more interested in normalizing relations with China.

44. For the U.S. military supplies to India since 1950s see: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (hereafter cited as sipri) : Arms Trade Register : The Arms Trade With The Third World (Cambridge, 1975), 33-40.


48. See, Sipri, n. 44; p. 33-40.
In 1966, Mr. L.B. Johnson, the U.S. President, proposed to Mrs. Gandhi the establishment of the Indo-American Foundation when Mrs. Gandhi officially visited the USA between 27 March and 1 April 1966. President Johnson seemed to have the idea to bring India closer to the USA through such a Foundation. The idea of the Foundation, however, did not materialize and both the governments set aside the proposal in July 1966. Thereafter the United States did not revive the proposal of the Foundation. The reason was perhaps the fact that the United States became interested more in bringing Communist China closer to it than India.

India was treated by the United States as a strategically important nation so long as China was regarded by the Americans as their adversary in Asia and an ally of the Soviet Union. By mid sixties the United States realized that as a result of the wide rift between the Soviet Union and China, the communist world remained no longer monolithic. In this new international context, United States felt that for its own political and strategic interests it should normalize relations with Communist China. As the idea of Sino-U.S. rapprochement gained ground in the State Department, the strategic importance of India to the United States began to reduce. It was pointed out by one U.S. analyst that the Nixon Administration clearly believed that a working relationship with Peking was much more important to the USA than building India as

an alternative to China in Asia. Thus, India's importance to the U.S. policy makers as a countervailing force to China was reduced to a considerable extent. This was very much explicit during the Nixon Administration.

President Nixon believed that there could be "no stable and enduring peace" in the world "without the participation of the PRC (Peoples' Republic of China) and its 750 million people." Mr. William Rogers, the U.S. Secretary Of State during president Nixon's Administration, observed in the context of the changed international situation that the peoples' Republic of China had "a growing role to play" and the aim of the U.S. policy was "not to deny that role but to encourage it." It was pointed out by one observer that with the Sino-U.S. rapproachment taking place, the United States lost interest in south Asia as a whole. Thus, from the closing years of sixties, India was no more referred to by the United States as the 'show piece' of democratic norms as against Chinese totalitarian system.

50. See, William, J.Barnds: "India And America At Odds." International Affairs (London), 49(July 1973), 371-384.

51. For reference see an article by Max Frankel in New York Times, 5 October 1971.


55. See, Max Frankel, n. 51.
It should be noted here that while formulating its new policy to normalise its relation with China, the United States perhaps did not take into consideration, the possible reactions of India of such a decision. Two former U.S. Assistant Secretaries of State were reported to have urged the U.S. Government to keep India informed of the developments relating to negotiations with China. But there were, however, no documents to substantiate that the U.S. Government considered it important to keep India informed about their plan regarding normalization of relations with China. Mr. S.P. Singh, India's Deputy Minister of External Affairs, stated in the Lok Sabha, on 12 July 1971 that the U.S. Government did not consult India before reviewing their policy towards China. But there were reasons to believe that Pakistan was informed by the U.S. Government of their changing policy towards China. President Nixon wrote in his Memoirs that he used Mr. Yahya Khan, the President of Pakistan, as the via media of the Sino-U.S. negotiations for normalization of relations.

It was clear from the above discussions that India's strategic importance to the U.S. policy makers began to recede since the U.S. Government sought to normalize relations with China.

57. See India, Lok Sabha Debates (hereafter cited as L.S.Deb.) 5 (12 July 1971), 74.
Mr. Chester Bowles, the former U.S. Ambassador in India, however, regretted that the United States had never considered India "to be of major political significance to the future of Asia;" but, he pointed out, the Soviet Union held India as an important nation in view of its "potential role in Asia." The influential U.S. Senator, Mr. Edward Kennedy, welcomed Nixon Administration's efforts to normalize relations with China, but at the same time he expressed the apprehension that this might "allow one-sixth of mankind located in India, the largest democracy, to become permanently alienated from the United States." But it seemed that to President Nixon, it was not the friendship with India or the democracy of India but the co-operation with China which mattered most. In his First Annual Report to the U.S. Congress on 18 February 1970, he said that it was "certainly in our interest and the interest of peace and stability in Asia that we take what steps we can" towards the improvement of political relations with Peking.

India's Reaction To Sino-U.S. Rapprochement:--Officially India had no reason to protest against Washington's decision to normalize its relations with communist China. Still, the Sino-


U.S. rapprochement was not a happy development for India. From 1959 India had very strained relations with China. After the Chinese aggression in 1962, India considered that China was a threat to India's security and integrity. India, therefore, considered that the normalization and development of relations between China and the United States had far reaching implications for her own security and interests.

The negotiations between the United States and China for normalization of their relations began during Johnson Administration (1963-'68). As the negotiations for normalization of Sino-U.S. relations were in progress, India perceived that the United States was not as concerned for India's security against China as it was in 1962 when China attacked India. In 1965 the United States imposed an arms embargo on India and Pakistan. On 12 April 1967 the U.S. Government partially lifted the embargo and decided to sell to India and Pakistan the spare parts for the military equipments. The Government of India, however, did

62. For reference see the joint statement issued after Mrs. Gandhi's visit to USA between 27 March 1966 to 1 April 1966: Bulletin, 54 (18 April 1966), 598-605. See also the statement of Mr. Dinesh Singh, India's Minister of External Affairs, in Lok Sabha on 8 April 1969 during discussion on Foreign Ministry's budget grants: L.S. Deb., 27 (8 April 1969), 286-290.


64. See, Bulletin, 56, (1 May 1967), 688.
not like the U.S. decision. In this context Mr. M.O. Chagla, India's Minister of External Affairs, commented in the Lok Sabha on 3 August 1967 that the United States did not realize that India was "the only country in Asia which" could "resist Chinese expansionism." India considered that the U.S. decision to partially lift the arms embargo in April 1967 was taken by the Administration considering the interest of Pakistan which was the main recipient of the U.S. military aid. India thought that the U.S. decision was prejudicial to her own interest and did not reflect Washington's serious concern for India's security against China. India perceived that the Johnson Administration was more interested in providing military benefits to Pakistan and in normalizing relations with China and was least interested in the role of India in resisting China.

When Mr. R.M. Nixon became the President of the United States, the negotiations of Sino-U.S. rapprochement gained momentum. During his Administration the Sino-U.S. relations were normalized. Referring to the new U.S. policy towards China, Mr. Dinesh Singh, India's Minister of External Affairs, told the Rajya Sabha (the Upper House of Indian Parliament) on 13 March 1969 that the Government of India closely followed the

65. See, the statement of Mr. M.C. Chagla, India's Minister of External Affairs, in the Lok Sabha on 29 May 1967: L.S. Deb., 3 (29 May 1967), 1529.
66. See, B.S. Deb., 8 (3 August 1967), 1742.
68. Ibid.
"change in U.S. policy towards China" and various "international trends and developments." India naturally became concerned about this new development in Sino-U.S. relations, he observed. On 20 July 1971, Mr. Swaran Singh, the then Foreign Minister of India, told the Lok Sabha that "while we welcome the rapprochement between Peaking and Washington, we cannot look upon it with equanimity." India might have thought that in the new situation that was emerging in Asia where the United States and China would no longer be adversaries, India's importance in the U.S. design in Asia, i.e. to contain China, would be secondary. India felt that her importance in the USA's global strategic plan was being eroded and that the policy makers in Washington who were once admirers "of her political and economic system were now thinking of" jumping on the China bandwagon. It was reported in the United States that the Indian officials had felt that President Nixon's overtures for rapprochement with China would make India less important in the USA's designs in Asia.

69. See, India, Rajya Sabha Debates (hereafter cited as R.S. Deb.), 67 (13 March 1969), 3459-3470.
70. See, L.S. Deb., 6 (20 July 1971), 259.
72. See, New York Times, 6 September 1971. For the reactions of top Indian Officials see, T.N. Kaul : The Kissinger Years : Indo-America Relations (New Delhi, 1980). Mr. T.N. Kaul was the Secretary in the Ministry of External Affairs of India in 1970-1971; he was the Indian Ambassador in the USA from 1973 to 1976.
In fact, the development of new relations between China and the United States increased India's concerns and tensions. During an interview with Mr. Martin Agronsky on 8 March 1972, the then U.S. Secretary of State, Mr. William Rogers, however, stressed the point that "nothing that occurred in the People's Republic of China (i.e. normalization of Sino-U.S. Relations) was directed against India. It was not an anti-India move" on the part of the USA. New Delhi's perceptions were, however, different. The Government of India did not think that the rapprochement between China and the United States would not affect India's interests. Hence, Mr. Swaran Singh, the Foreign Minister of India, stated in the Lok Sabha on 20 July 1971:

"I sincerely hope that any Sino-U.S. detente will not be at the expense of other countries, particularly in this region. However, we cannot at present rule out such a possibility. It can have repercussions on the situation in this sub-continent as well as in this region."

India apprehended that the Sino-U.S. rapprochement might affect the South Asian power balance. In short, the South Asian power system before 1971 was this: Pakistan was militarily allied with the USA; but she had good and friendly relations with China. Pakistan was never very close to the Soviet Union. India had strained relations with Pakistan since 1947, and with


74. See, Bulletin, 66 (10 April 1972), 535.


76. For Sino-Pak relations since 1949 to 1969 see, B.N. Goswami: Pakistan And China: A Study Of Their Relations (New Delhi, 1971).
China since 1959. But India was friendly both with the United States and the Soviet Union. Since the closing days of the fifties China and the Soviet Union developed a rift in their mutual relations. From 1949 the United States considered China as its adversary in Asia.

Now, India thought that as a result of Sino-U.S. rapprochement in which Pakistan played an important role as intermediary, a new undeclared axis between Washington, Peking and Pindi would be formed. India's ruling party member in the Lok Sabha, Mr. B. R. Bhagat, who was once Minister of State for External Affairs, stated in the Lok Sabha on 20 July 1971, in the context of President Nixon's announcement of his proposed visit to China, that if by normalization of Sino-U.S. relations President Nixon thought that China and the USA "should strike another balance of power in Asia, he will be mistaken." Mr. Bhagat continued that "if it (Sino-U.S. rapprochement) is either to contain the Soviet Union or to create a new power balance here . . . I think that will be the worst of things to happen." The Government of India thought that the existing power balance in Asia was lost following the development in Sino-U.S. relations. Mr. Dinesh Singh, India's former Minister of External Affairs, apprehended that the 'pressure' from Sino-U.S. detente "will be to freeze

77. See for reference Subimal Dutt: With Nehru In The Foreign Office (Calcutta, 1977). Mr. Subimal Dutt was the Foreign Secretary of India.


79. See, L.S. Deb., 6 (20 July 1971), 192-193. Mr. Bhagat was the Minister of State for External Affairs in 1967-1968.
The new undeclared axis in South Asia between Pakistan, China and the USA, New Delhi envisaged, might not be a welcome development for India which was considered by both China and Pakistan as their adversary.

India further apprehended that these three powers, the United States, China and Pakistan, might try to dominate and interfere in the politics of South Asia. This possibility was apprehended by no less a personality than Mr. Swaran Singh, India's Minister of External Affairs. He stated in the Lok Sabha on 20 July 1971:

"While we welcome the rapprochement between Peking and Washington, we cannot look upon it with equanimity if it means the domination of the two powers over the region or a tacit agreement between them to this effect. We maintain the right of each and every country and people to decide their own destiny without any interference from outside."

This apprehension of interference was voiced by Mr. Swaran Singh with particular reference to the episode of Pakistan in 1971. The eastern wing of Pakistan, the East Pakistan, revolted in 1970-'71 against the Pakistani military authorities and demanded an independent state of Bangladesh. In this context, Mr. Singh further stated that India cherished the right of each and every country and people to decide their future and that this


81. See, L.S. Deb., 6 (20 July 1971), 259.
policy of India applied

"as such to Bangladesh as to Vietnam . . . we shall not allow any other country or combination of countries to dominate us or to interfere in our internal affairs. We shall to our maximum ability help other countries to maintain their freedom from outside domination . . . " 82

There was an opinion in India that as a result of Sino-U.S. detente which brought Pakistan, China and the USA closer, India was left alone and was isolated in South Asia. If India was isolated in this region, she would be left with no significant role to play in the sub-continent. This apprehension was voiced by Mr. Bipin Pal Das, the ruling party's member in the Rajya Sabha and the former Minister of State for External Affairs. On 14 August 1971 he said in the Rajya Sabha:

"There have been attempts all along, particularly from the side of the Atlantic Powers and China to ignore us and keep us away from playing an important role in world affairs." 83

The above assessment of Mr. Das should be given due consideration as Mr. Das was an influential member in the ruling party of India who became Minister of State for External Affairs of India.

The New York Times of 30 August 1971 commented that the 'growing rapproachment' between the USA and China left for India a 'desperate sense of isolation.' 84 The U.S. diplomat like Mr.

82. Ibid., 259-260.
83. See, R.S. Deb., 77 (14 August 1971), 81.
Philips Talbot who was the U.S. Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs during the Kennedy Administration (1961-1963), however, cautioned the U.S. Administration against the Washington's act of isolating India from the USA. It was reported in the United States that the Indian officials began to feel isolated after the U.S. move to develop normal relations with China. Some Indian officials viewed the Sino-U.S. rapprochement as anti-India conspiracy.

In 1971, during the Bangladesh crisis, India felt insecure when China supported Pakistan. There was a fear in India that the United States might not come to India's protection if the latter was attacked by Pakistan or by China or by both together. In 1971 the military rulers of Pakistan created a war-like situation by mobilising forces at India's border on the plea that India encouraged the independence movement of East Pakistan. India's concern about the threat to her security grew because of Pakistan's collusion with China.

86. Ibid., 10 August, 1971.
88. China was reported to have supported Pakistani government in their policy to suppress the East Pakistani movement in 1971 and in their policy towards China (see, New York Times, 11 August 1971). On 6 November 1971 China's Acting Foreign Minister Mr. Chi Peng-fei declared that "Our Pakistani friends may rest assured" that China would "resolutely
a former Indian Ambassador to USSR observed:

"The threat increased when the USA complacently watched Pakistan entering into what Jawaharlal Nehru (the first Indian Prime Minister) called an 'alliance of animus' against India. And under President Nixon the threat assumed a blatant form, naked and unashamed." 89

Under the circumstances, the United States was not expected to shield India against an attack on her by Pakistan, because, in the first place, Pakistan was an ally of the USA. Secondly, the United States could not antagonize Pakistan because between 1970–1972 Pakistan was the intermediary between China and the USA in normalizing their relations. On the other hand, because of the priority given by the Nixon Administration to normalization of relations with China, it seemed that India could not expect that the United States would shield India against an attack on her by China. 90 Moreover, declaring his Administration's policy towards

support the Pak Government and people" (see, New York Times, 8 November 1971). This declaration of Mr. Chi Peng-fei was made at a banquet at the conclusion of talks in Rawalpindi on 6 November 1971 between Chinese leaders led by Mr. Chi and the Pakistani leaders led by Mr. Z.A. Bhutto. Mr. H.A. Kissinger wrote that "we received word that Huang Hua (the Chinese Ambassador to USA) needed to see me ... we guessed that they (China) were coming to the military assistance to Pakistan" (H.A. Kissinger: White House Years, Boston, 1979, 90). For China's attitude towards the independence of East Pakistan see, B.N. Goswami: "Bangladesh: The Chinese Stand," A Nation Is Born, (Calcutta University Bangladesh Sahayak Samiti, 1972), 286–293.


Asia, President Nixon stated at Guam on 25 July 1969 that "we will keep our treaty commitments" in Asia. And in his Foreign Policy Report to the U.S. Congress on 18 February 1970, President Nixon stated:

"We shall provide shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us, or of a nation allied with us, or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security . . . "

It could be inferred from Mr. Nixon's policy as stated above that as the United States had no (military) "commitments" to India and as India was not (militarily) "allied" with the USA, she could not expect help from it if she were attacked by a power like China with conventional weapons. Secondly, as the United States did not consider India as "vital" to the U.S. Security in Asia, the United States was not expected to run the risk of war with China in the interest of India. On the other hand, it could be 'guessed that the United States would not impair the new trend in Sino-U.S. relations for the sake of India only.

Mr. T.N. Kaul, who was the Foreign Secretary of India in 1971 and later the Indian Ambassador to the United States from 1973 to 1976, wrote in his book that during his conversation with


Kissinger, in New Delhi on 31 July 1971 the latter told him that the United States would never cooperate with China in its move against India and that "any military move by China against India would retard our political relationship with China."94 But, Mr. Kaul later wrote that though Mr. Kissinger appreciated India's genuine fear from China, he seemed to have retraced his steps later. 95 Mr. Kaul further noted in his book:

"It is interesting that Kissinger later (after his return from China in August 1971) told our Ambassador (in the USA), that if China intervened in the Indo-Pak conflict (regarding Bangladesh crisis), America would not be in a position to do anything about it. This is contrary to what he had said to us before his visit to Peking." 96

In fact, India perceived that the Sino-U.S. detente might adversely affect her security against China and might increase the interansigence of Pakistan. She apprehended that the Sino-U.S. detente, might also encourage Sino-Pak combined threat to the security of India.

Officially, India could not object to the new trend of relations that was emerging between the United States and China, nor could she state that the Sino-U.S. detente was being sought primarily with anti-Indian objective. She was, however, concerned

94. See, T.N. Kaul: Kissinger Years: 47-48. Mr. H.A. Kissinger was the Assistant to President Nixon on National Security Affairs.
95. Ibid.
96. Ibid., 58. It was reported in the USA that Mr. Kissinger gave warning that should India be attacked by China, she "should not expect the kind of emotional and indirect support she received from the United States in 1962".(See, Max Frankel: "To India the USA. Is A Bitter Disappointment," New York Times, 30 November, 1971).
about its impact on her national interest. Hence, India could not welcome the changed China policy of the United States and, therefore, could not look upon it with equanimity.

**India's Criticisms of U.S. Foreign Policy** - India expressed her dissatisfaction over the new U.S. policy towards China through severe attacks on some issues of the U.S. foreign policy. The nature and tone of the criticism would indicate India's resentment against the U.S. policy in Asia. For example, India vehemently criticised the USA's Vietnam policy and its involvement in Vietnam War. From February 1965 the United States began "selective bombing of military targets in North Vietnam." On 22 February 1966, Mrs. Gandhi revealed in the Lok Sabha that the U.S. Vice-President, Mr. Humphrey who visited India on 16 and 17 February 1966 en route his Asian tour, asked

"us for our support to U.S. policy in Vietnam as elsewhere. He also mentioned that this would lead to strengthening the friendly relations between our two countries ..

But India, Mrs. Gandhi told the Lok Sabha, refused to lend such support to USA. India, on the other hand, expressed "deep concern at the resumption of bombing" in North Vietnam by the USA, Mrs. Gandhi informed the Lok Sabha. After Mrs. Gandhi's

97. In the conflict between North Vietnam and South Vietnam the United States sent both arms and armies in favour of South Vietnam to fight against the North Vietnamese.


99. See, Mrs. Gandhi's statement on Mr. Humphrey's visit to India : L.S. Deb., 50 (22 February 1966), 1504.

100. Ibid., 1507-1508.
visit to the United States in March - April 1966, India began to criticize severely the U.S. bombing in North Vietnam. India emphasized a peaceful solution of the Vietnam conflict. In a broadcast over the All India Radio on 7 July 1966, Prime Minister Mrs. Gandhi pointed out that the U.S. bombing in North Vietnam would simply add to the escalation of war and expressed the view that there could be "no military solution in Vietnam "and emphasized the "withdrawal of all foreign forces from Vietnam." India thought that "Vietnam must be left free to decide its own future without the intervention of any other power." Mrs. Gandhi visited the Soviet Union from 12 to 16 July 1966 on the invitation of the Government of the Soviet Union. In the Joint Indo-Soviet statement issued on 16 July 1966 both sides called for an end to the U.S. bombing of North Vietnam, and there was also reference to "imperialistic powers" in the joint statement. These were interpreted in the USA as attacks on the U.S.

101. Ibid., 1507-1508.

102. For Mrs. Gandhi's broadcast on 7 July 1966 see: Indira Gandhi: "The Years Of Endeavour", selected speeches of Indira Gandhi, January 1966 - August 1969 (Publication Division, Ministry of Information And Broadcasting, New Delhi, 1975), 326-327. See also the statement of Mr. Swaran Singh, India's Minister of External Affairs, in the Rajya Sabha on 8 August 1966: R.S. Deb., 57 (8 August 1966), 1789-1792. See also the statement of Mr. Dinesh Singh, India's Minister of State, for External Affairs, in the Lok Sabha on 8 August 1966: L.S. Deb., 58 (8 August 1966), 3175.

103. See the statement of Mr. M.C.Chagla, India's Minister of External Affairs, in the Rajya Sabha on 7th April 1967: R.S. Deb., 59 (7 April 1967), 2877.

104. For the statement see: Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs: Foreign Affairs Record 1966 (New Delhi).
policy. Mr. Chester Bowles, the former U.S. Ambassador in India, wrote in this context that these attacks on the U.S. policy "demolished much of the good will in Washington which had been created during her (Mrs. Gandhi's) visit there" in March - April 1966.106

In 1967 Indian attacks on President Johnson's Vietnam policy were more vigorous. India thought that instead of containing China the U.S. policy was helping China. In this context, Mr. M. C. Chagla, India's Minister of External Affairs stated in the Lok Sabha on 10 July 1967:

"We should try to "contain China, we should not permit China to expand. Our view is that the present American policy, far from containing China, is helping China ... The more the bombing goes on, the more the war is escalated, the more North Vietnam is driven into the ambit of China ... North Vietnam does not want to become a vassel of China." 107

It was reported in the United States that USA told the Indian Foreign Secretary, Mr. T.N.Kaul, on 13 October 1969 that the U.S. Congress would regard the upgrading of India's diplomatic ties with North Vietnam as an "unfriendly act."108 Reacting to the U.S. warning, Mr. Dinesh Singh, India's Defence Minister, stated in the Rajya Sabha on 27 November 1969:

105. For reference see, Chester Bowles: Primises To Keep, My Years In Public Life, 1941-'69 (New York 1971), 515.

106. Ibid.

107. See, L.S. Deb., 6 (10 July 1967), 10730. See also, Mr. M.C. Chagla's statement in the Rajya Sabha on 7 April 1967: R.S. Deb., 59 (7 April 1967), 2885-2886.

"They (the U.S. Government) say that there would be adverse reactions in the United States if we unilaterally raise the (diplomatic) status with North Vietnam and not with South Vietnam, because it would give the impression that we are taking sides. We don't agree with that assessment. It is a question of our bilateral relations with countries... That is purely a bilateral issue and in any case we have to decide this in keeping with our national interest." 109

The above statement of Mr. Dinesh Singh signified that India was not willing to comply with the U.S. advice. India might have thought that since India's importance in the U.S. strategic design was being eroded as a result of the changed U.S. policy towards China, she would not comply with the U.S. counsel.

In April 1970, the U.S. armies, along with the South Vietnamese forces, moved into Cambodia "to clear out major enemy sanctuaries of the Cambodian-Vietnam border." 110 India sharply reacted to it and expressed the opinion that the U.S. "intervention" had "aggravated" the situation in South East Asia. 111 India also raised her voice against the U.S. "atrocities in South Vietnam" and emphasized that these should "be brought to an end." 112

109. See, R.S. Deb., 70 (27 November 1969), 1637-1638.


India's vigorous criticism of the U.S. arms aid policy towards Pakistan was another manifestation of India's reactions to the new China policy of the United States. India criticised and expressed concern at the U.S. decision to give military aid to Pakistan since 1954. But India's criticism was more sharp and more vehement during the sixties and seventies.\footnote{For India's criticism of the U.S. arms aid policy towards Pakistan since 1954 to 1971 see \textit{Chapter Four} of this thesis.}

India criticised the U.S. attempt to strike a military balance between India and Pakistan.\footnote{For reference see the statement of Mr. M.C. Chagla, India's Minister of External Affairs in the Lok Sabha on 3 August 1967: \textit{L.S. Deb.}, 8 (3 August 1967), 17042. See also the statement of Mr. Swaran Singh, India's Minister of External Affairs, in the Lok Sabha on 6 July 1971: \textit{L.S. Deb.}, 5 (6 July 1971), 165.}

India was "surprised" to see that instead of helping India which could 'resist Chinese expansionism,' the United States continued to give military aid to Pakistan which was in collusion with China and whose purpose was only to threaten India's security.\footnote{For reference see the statement of Mr. M.C. Chagla, India's Minister of External Affairs, in the Lok Sabha on 3 August 1967: \textit{L.S. Deb.}, 8 (3 August 1967), 17042.} It annoyed India to see that her role in resisting China was not considered important by the United States policy makers when they decided to normalize relations with China.

The United States, on its part, might have thought that since India had not been allied with its global military system, it was not desirable, from its point of view, that New Delhi should

\footnote{For reference see the statement of Mr. M.C. Chagla, India's Minister of External Affairs, in the Lok Sabha on 3 August 1967: \textit{L.S. Deb.}, 8 (3 August 1967), 17042.}
emerge as an autonomous centre of power, and as a major power capable of limiting the hegemony of the United States' in Asia. This might be the reason behind the U.S. attempt to strike a military balance between India and Pakistan. India on the other hand, thought that by giving continued military aid to Pakistan, the United States was "acting in a manner prejudicial" to her interests, and that the proping up of Pakistan militarily was an unfriendly act towards India. India also felt that by supplying military materials to Pakistan at a time when the Pakistani authorities had been using arms to suppress the independence movement of the East Pakistanis, the United States was encouraging the wanton violation of democracy and freedom of the people.

The vigorous Indian attacks on the U.S. arms aid policy during the Johnson and the Nixon Administration seemed to be the


118. See the statement of Mr. M.C. Chagla, India's Minister of External Affairs, in the Lok Sabha on 29 May 1967: L.S. Deb., 3 (29 May 1967), 1528-1529.

119. See the remarks of Mr. S.P. Singh, India's Deputy Minister for External Affairs, in the Rajya Sabha on 9 November 1970: R.S. Deb., 74 (9 November 1970), 116-125.

reactions of India to the changing U.S. policy towards China. India's reactions to the U.S. arms aid policy towards Pakistan were the expression of her feeling that on the one hand the changed U.S. policy towards China made her position insignificant to the USA, and on the other, the continued U.S. arms aid policy toward Pakistan made her security endangered.

From 27 March 1966 to 1 April 1966 Prime Minister, Mrs. Gandhi officially visited the United States to help develop "a close rapport and understanding" with that country. During her visit the U.S. President Mr. L.B. Johnson proposed to her the establishment of an Indo-American Foundation to forge a closer relationship between the two countries. In reply to President Johnson's proposal to set up the Foundation, Mrs. Gandhi welcomed and agreed to it, and she remarked that if such Foundation was set up it would bring India and the USA "into closer union" which was "of the greatest importance." The proposal, however, did not materialize, and by mutual consent the two governments set aside the proposal of the Indo-American Foundation in July 1966.

Neither India nor the United States revived the idea of the Foundation after it was set aside in 1966. It seemed that as a mark of her displeasure over the changing China policy of the United States, India did not revive the idea of the Foundation

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121. See Mrs. Gandhi's statement in the Lok Sabha on 7 April 1966 about her visit to the USA: L.S. Deb., 53 (7 April 1966), 10010-10015.
123. Ibid.
for closer understanding and relations with the USA. The proposal for such an Indo-American Foundation was made by the USA in 1963 also. But at that time also it did not materialize, though the idea was not put off completely. It was under the consideration of the Government of India in 1964-65. But after 1966 the Government of India did not revive the idea of the Foundation.

In February 1970 the Government of India directed the U.S. Embassy in India to close its Information Service Centres, known as U.S.I.S. (presently known as United States Communication Agency), at Bangalore, Hyderabad, Lucknow, Trivandrum and Patna. India argued that those centres often indulged in "political" and "undesirable" activities, implying that those centres might engage in the clandestine and espionage activities in India and might interfere into India's internal administration.

The timing of the India Government's directive to close the above mentioned U.S.I.S. Centres was very important. From 1954, when those centres began functioning, to 1969, the Government of India did never take a hard line attitude towards those centres.

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125. See, Mrs Gandhi's statement in the Lok Sabha on 7 April 1966: L.S. Deb., 53 (7 April 1966), 10010-100015. See also the statement of Mr. M.C. Chagla, the Education Minister of India, in the Lok Sabha on 5 August 1966: L.S. Deb., 57 (5 August 1966), 3091.
127. Ibid.
centres, nor it did even allage that the centres might engage in political and undesirable activities. In 1970 when the Nixon Administration began to endeavour for normalization of relations with China,\textsuperscript{128} the Government of India, perhaps against the new China policy of the USA, began to air its suspicions against the communication agencies of USA in India.

The United States carried its clandestine and espionage works through the central Intelligence Agency, known as C.I.A.\textsuperscript{129} It was reported that after the India-China war in 1962, India "had sought the CIA's assistance for the limited purpose of getting information on China."\textsuperscript{130} Mr. D.P. Moynihan, the former U.S. Ambassador in India, revealed in his book that an American team planted nuclear-powered instruments atop Nanda Devi Hill (26,645 feet) in India in 1965 to record the Chinese rocket telemetry and atomic tests; in 1967 a joint Indo-American team did the same thing atop the Nandakot hill (22,400 feet) in India.\textsuperscript{131} Therefore, it appeared that India was not totally unfamiliar of C.I.A. activities in India. In 1966 much criticism, were made


\textsuperscript{129} See, L. Fletcher, Prouty : \textit{The Secret Team} (New Jersey, 1973); Mr. Prouty was a former C.I.A. personnel. For the C.I.A. activities in India see, Satish Kumar : \textit{C.I.A. And The Third World : A Study In Crypto Diplomacy} (New Delhi, 1981); H.S. Malviya : \textit{C.I.A.-Its Real Face} (New Delhi, 1965); Daljit Sen Adel : \textit{Danger of C.I.A.} (New Delhi, 1976); John D. Smith : \textit{I was a C.I.A. Agent In India} (Communist Party Publication, New Delhi, 1967).

\textsuperscript{130} See, T.V. Kunhi Krishman : \textit{The Unfriendly Friends : India and America} (New Delhi, 1974), 46-47.

\textsuperscript{131} See, D.P. Moynihan : \textit{A Dangerous Place} (Bombay, 1976), 40-41.
within and outside the Parliament of India against the C.I.A. interference into the educational system of India. The government of India, however, viewed the charges against the U.S. CIA as false apprehension. In 1967 also members of the Indian Parliament brought charges of pouring money in India by the CIA to influence politico-economic policies of India, to penetrate into India's defence system etc. The Government of India, although warned by the members of Parliament, did not seem to be alarmed regarding the role of the CIA in India, nor the Government publicly criticised CIA in 1967. But, in 1969-'70 when the new pattern of the Sino-U.S. relations was emerging, the Government of India, perhaps to ventilate its resentment against China policy of the Nixon Administration, started criticising the U.S.I.S. Centres in India. Later, it directed the U.S. Embassy in India to close some of its Information Service Centres in

132. For details of the charges against the CIA and for the Government of India's views see chapter two of this thesis.

133. See the remarks of Mr. Umanath, an opposition member, in the Lok Sabha on 23 March 1967: L.S. Deb., (23 March 1967), 878-885. See also the remarks of the Communist member Mr. Bhupesh Gupta in the Rajya Sabha on 24 November 1967 R.S. Deb., 62 (24 November 1967), 1082.

134. See the replies of Mr. MC. Chagla the Minister of External Affairs, in the Lok Sabha on 23 March 1967: L.S. Deb., (23 March 1967), 896-897. See the replies of Mr. Y.B. Chavan, India's Home Minister, in the Rajya Sabha on 7 April 1967: R.S. Deb., (7 April 1967), 2766. See also Mr. Y.B. Chavan's replies to the criticism of CIA in the Rajya Sabha on 24 November 1967: R.S. Deb., 62 (24 November 1967), 1079, 1091-1092. See also Mr. Y.B. Chavan's statement in the Lok Sabha on 12 December 1967: L.S. Deb., 2 (12 December 1967), 6308-6314.
India. Announcing the decision, Mr. Dinesh Singh, Minister of External Affairs, stated in the Lok Sabha on 26 February 1970, "the Government of India were unable to recognize such establishments and sections (U.S.I.S. Centres) as being parts of the diplomatic missions." Secondly, Mr. Dinesh Singh maintained that he did not understand "for whose benefit these centres are being operated, for ours or theirs (U.S.A.'s)." In 1970 the Government of India began to allege that those centres were often involved in extra-educational, extra-cultural and espionage activities. Mr. Dinesh Singh, stated in the Rajya Sabha on 26 February 1970:

"... It is the experience of the Government of India that all such Information Centres do not confine themselves within the secret limits of their prescribed activities. Sometimes they do indulge in political activities of the type which can be described as undesirable and it is for that reason that Government have thought that perhaps the time had come when we should stop all these centres and allow only those which are engaged in strictly literary and cultural activities." 

It is important to note that before 1970 the Government of India did never charge the centres with political and undesirable activities. Again, not before 1970 the Government of India

136. Ibid., 230-231.
137. In this context see Patriot, New Delhi, 26 February 1970.
139. Mr. John, D. Smith, who confessed to be a CIA Agent, revealed in his book, published in 1967, that "Many people are under the impression that the U.S.I.S. in India is only an educational and information project. However, its main aim is to act as a supplement and help to the CIA." See Hohn, D. Smith: "I Was A CIA Agent In India" (Communist Party.
found the centres' existence illegal. The timing of the directive (i.e. February 1970) of the Indian Government to close down the centres was such that it seemed that the decision of India was the result of its strong reaction to the emphasis of the Nixon Administration on the policy to normalize relations with China.

The directive of the Government of India regarding the U.S. I.S. centres evoked immediate reactions of the Government of the United States. The then U.S. Ambassador in India, Mr. K.B. Keating said in a statement issued on 24 February 1970, "I deeply regret the decision of the Government (of India) compelling the closing" of the centres. He maintained that the centres in India functioned "completely in the open" and also within their limits. Mr. Keating also explained that those centres were

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140. On 26 February 1970, the Foreign Minister Mr. Dinesh Singh said in the Rajya Sabha that as per the Vienna Convention such cultural and information centres could only be opened in a place where foreign Government had a diplomatic or consular mission. The Government asked the USA to close the U.S.I.S. centres of the places where there were no U.S. diplomatic or consular missions (See, R.S. Deb., 71 (26 February 1970), 110.

141. Times of India, Delhi, 26 February 1970.

142. See, Hindustan Times, Delhi, 27 February 1970.
designed to develop the educational and cultural contacts between India and the USA. And now, Mr. Keating said, "whether India wants to increase or decrease its cultural contacts with the United States is entirely a decision for India." Against this statement of Mr. Keating, a spokesman of the Government of India was reported to have said that "it is and has been our desire to expand our cultural contacts with United States." Mr. William Rogers, the then U.S. Secretary of State was reported to have described the decision of India regarding the centres as "unfriendly." It was also reported that the decision of India had angered the U.S. diplomats, and strained the relations between India and the USA. Mr. Keating refused the extension of time offered by the Government of India to close down the centres by 16 June 1970, and thus he expressed his displeasure and anger.

U.S. Reactions to Indo-Soviet Treaty:—The Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Co-operation, concluded between India and the Soviet Union on 9 August 1971, was, in a sense, a result of the Sino-U.S. rapprochement. India concluded the treaty with a view to meeting the threat from what New Delhi thought, Washington-Pindi-Peking Axis.

144. See, Times of India, Delhi, 26 February 1970.
145. See, Times of India, Delhi, 4 March 1970.
It was revealed by Mr. T.N. Kaul, the Foreign Secretary of India, that the talks between India and the Soviet Union for the conclusion of an Indo-Soviet Treaty had been going on at the Ambassadors’ and Foreign Secretaries’ level since 1969. Mr. Henry Kissinger made a secret visit to China in July 1971 "to prepare and make necessary arrangements" for President Nixon’s visit to Peking. On 15 July 1971 President Nixon announced his acceptance of the invitation of Mr. Chou-en-lai, the then Prime Minister of China, to visit Peking. It was noteworthy that although talks for an Indo-Soviet treaty began in 1969, as revealed by Mr. T.N. Kaul, the Treaty was actually concluded in August 1971 after President Nixon’s open announcement on 15 July 1971 of his plan to visit China. The timing of the conclusion of the Treaty, therefore, appeared to be the sequence of Mr. Nixon’s announcement to visit Communist China.

India repeatedly said that the Sino-U.S. détente would “have repercussions on the situation in this sub-continent as well as in this region.” India thought that the Sino-U.S.

149. See T.N. Kaul: Kissinger Years: Indo-American Relations (New Delhi, 1980), 54. Mr. T.N. Kaul was India’s Ambassador to USSR from 1962-1966 and to the USA from 1973-1975. The U.S. Columnist Mr. Max Frankel pointed out that the Indo-Soviet Treaty, which was concluded on 9 August 1971, was drafted in 1967-1968 (see, the despatch of Mr. Max Frankel in New York Times, 30 November 1971).


151. See the statement of Mr. Swaran Singh, the Minister of External Affairs in the Lok Sabha on 20 July 1971: L.S. Deb., 6 (20 July 1971), 259-260.
rapprochement would affect the South Asian power balance and would produce a chain reaction on the Sino-Indian and India-Pakistan relationship. She apprehended that China and Pakistan with the support of the USA might try to dominate the politics in South Asia. It was perceived by India that with the normalization of relations between the USA and China, a new undeclared axis between Washington, Peking and Pindi would come into existence which, in effect, would leave India isolated and alone in the region. Under such circumstances, India could "not look upon" the Sino-USA rapprochement "with equanimity."\(^{152}\) Hence, against the new situation, arising out of the Sino-U.S. detente and the emerging undeclared axis between the USA, China and Pakistan, India decided to conclude the Friendship Treaty with the Soviet Union in August 1971. From India's point of view, one of the objectives behind this treaty was, perhaps, to maintain the power balance in South Asia with the help and co-operation of another great power. In this context, Mr. Dinesh Singh, the former Minister of External Affairs, observed in the Lok Sabha on 20 July 1971:

"I believe that the pressure from Sino-American detente will be to freeze the power balance on the sub-continent. It will be their effort to keep . . . Pakistan as a lever against India. And if we want to break out of this, we have got to build our strength."\(^{153}\)

And that strength, India might have considered, could be

\(^{152}\) Ibid.

built by concluding a treaty with the Soviet Union. India thought that the Soviet Union was the country that could help her escape from the state of isolation in this region. By signing the 20 years Friendship Treaty with the Soviet Union, India demonstrated to both the United States and to China that she was no longer alone in the South Asian region. One influential U.S. Senator, Mr. Eagleton, in this context remarked in the U.S. Senate on 15 December 1971 that "when India needed friends, the Russians were there and we were not." 154

During the crucial period of the Bangladesh crisis in 1971 it was widely believed that there would be a combined Sino-Pak attack on India. The Sino-U.S. detente was a major concern and consideration for India in this context. India assessed that the United States would not come to India's help, if she were attacked by Pakistan and China. In India's assessment, the U.S. would not antagonise China to defend India at the cost of newly formed relationship with Peking.

From India's point of view, the Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty was a contrivance to deter Pakistani threats on India and also to "deter China and America from direct intervention in the Indo-Pak conflict of 1971." 155 The Treaty, however, did not specify any military clause. But Article 9 of the Treaty stated:

"In the event of either Party (India or U.S.S.R.)

155. See, T.N. Kaul: Kissinger Years, 62.
being subjected to an attack or a threat thereof, the High Contracting Parties shall immediately enter into mutual consultation in order to remove such threat and to take appropriate effective measures to ensure peace and security of their countries." 156

Thus, the Indo-Soviet Treaty was a deterrent to any power that might have aggressive designs on the territorial integrity and sovereignty of India.157 The Treaty was also designed to demonstrate to the United States that India was not alone in South Asia and that she was a factor in the politics of the Indian Subcontinent and South Asia.158

On 9 August 1971, India's Minister of External Affairs Mr. Swaran Singh stated in the Lok Sabha that the Indo-Soviet Treaty was "not aimed against any country." 159 On 10 August 1971, he

156. For the text of the Treaty see, L.S. Deb., 7 (9 August 1971), 254-259.

157. For reference see the statement of Mr. Swaran Singh, the Minister of External Affairs, in the Lok Sabha on 9 August 1971: L.S. Deb., 7 (9 August 1971), 252-253. Mr. B.R. Bhagat, India's former Minister of State for External Affairs, stated in the Lok Sabha on 10 August 1971 that the Treaty was a great deterrent in Asia and "a deterrent against aggression or intervention by any power in our affairs." See, L.S. Deb., 7 (10 August 1971), 290. Mr. Jagjivan Ram, the Defence Minister of India, stated in the Rajya Sabha on 14 August 1971 that he had no doubt that the Indo-Soviet Treaty would act "as a positive deterrent to any kind of madness on the part of Pakistan." See, R.S. Deb., 77 (14 August 1971), 157-158.

158. The ruling National Congress Party member of Rajya Sabha and former Minister Mr. B.P. Das remarked in the Rajya Sabha on 14 August 1971 that as a result of the Indo-Soviet Treaty "we have emerged as a nation to be reckoned with". R.S. Deb., 77 (14 August 1971), 81.

159. See, B.S. Deb., 7 (9 August 1971), 252.
further declared in the Lok Sabha that "we would welcome the conclusion and signing" of such a treaty with other countries also.\textsuperscript{160} A similar sentiment was expressed in the Indo-Soviet Joint Statement issued in New Delhi on 11 August 1971. The statement declared:

"The treaty is not directed against any one; it is meant to be a factor in developing friendship and good neighbourliness in keeping with the principles of the United Nations character." \textsuperscript{161}

Though the above statements of Mr. Swaran Singh and the Indo-Soviet Joint Statement were designed to assure the U.S. Government that the treaty was not meant against the USA, Washington was not naturally happy over the development.

Immediately after the conclusion of the Indo-Soviet Treaty, there were, however, no adverse official reactions in USA against the treaty. But the treaty left the United States in doubt about India's non-aligned character. In a news conference later in Washington on 12 November 1971, Mr. William Rogers, the then U.S. Secretary of state, said that Mrs. Gandhi "assures us that their non-alignment policy will continue regardless of the recent treaty that was signed with the Soviet Union. We have no reason to doubt that."\textsuperscript{162} But this statement of Mr. Rogers did

\textsuperscript{160} See, \textit{L.S. Deb.}, 7 (10 August 1971), 340.

\textsuperscript{161} See, Government of India, Minister of External Affairs: Foreign Affairs Record, 1971 (New Delhi), 163-164.

\textsuperscript{162} See, \textit{Bulletin}, 65 (6 December 1971), 655.
not wholly reflect the real U.S. official thinking on the issue. Commenting on the future of Indo-U.S. relations Mr. Rogers said in a news conference on 23 December 1971:

"Relations depend on mutuality . . . India has taken the position they are non-aligned and they have assured us on several occasions that they are going to continue a policy of non-alignment. We will be watching events with considerable interests to see what happens." 163

The above statement of Mr. Rogers had an obvious reference to the Indo-Soviet treaty. The implications of the statement was simple; it was that the Indo-U.S. relations would depend on the Indo-Soviet relations and on India's adherence to the policy of non-alignment.

The real U.S. reaction to the Indo-Soviet treaty was known after the publication of the memoirs of Mr. Nixon and Mr. Kissinger. Mr. Nixon hinted in his memoirs that after the conclusion of the treaty, India deviated from the path of non-alignment. "Mrs. Gandhi had gradually become aligned with the Soviets . . . ." Mr. Nixon wrote. 164

Mr. Henry Kissinger too had doubts about India's non-aligned character after the conclusion of the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship. Immediately, after signing of the treaty, Mr. Kissinger sought explanation from the then Indian Ambassador in the USA, Mr. L.K. Jha. 165 Mr. Kissinger wrote in this context that Mr. Jha "denied that the Soviet treaty was incompatible

165. See, H.A. Kissinger: White House Years (Boston, 1979), 868.
with non-alignment" and confirmed that the "treaty was not a reaction to American policy "but" a carefully considered Indian strategy that had been in preparation over a year." But Mr. Kissinger was convinced that the Indo-Soviet treaty was the response of India to the Sino-U.S. detente. He observed that India and the Soviet Union "were brought into a natural defacto alliance" by the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship which he called as a "bombshell."

Mr. T.N. Kaul, however, reacted to these comments of Mr. Kissinger and sought to explain in his book how Mr. Kissinger contradicted his previous assessment about Indo-Soviet relations. Mr. Kaul wrote:

"He (Mr. Kissinger) calls it (the treaty) a 'Bombshell'... It is at complete variance with the assessment he gave me in July 1971 and when I was Ambassador to the USA from 1973-'76, and also during his talks to India in October 1974. He told me then that America not only understood but also appreciated India's policy of non-alignment. America did not mind India's friendship with the Soviet Union and did not consider that the Indo-Soviet treaty violated or went against India's policy of non-alignment."

Referring to Article 9 of the Indo-Soviet Treaty, Mr. Kissinger maintained that the treaty had "strategic significance"

166. Ibid.
167. Mr. Kissinger wrote that the "fictitious Sino-American designs on the sub-continent" was a "pretext" for India's "own arrangement with the Soviet Union." See, Ibid., 767.
168. Ibid., 767.
169. Ibid., 866.
170. T.N. Kaul: Kissinger Years (New Delhi, 1980), 60.
and that the treaty was a Soviet guarantee against the Chinese intervention in Indo-Pak conflict.  

The influential U.S. Senator Mr. Edward Kennedy, however, thought that for India the Indo-Soviet treaty was "to preserve its national interest, national objective and to meet in particular its security requirements."  

He did not think that the signing of this treaty by India was in any way "disadvantageous to the U.S. friendship and relations with India." But it was reported that the conclusion of the treaty by India with the Soviet Union "irritated and puzzled" the Nixon Administration.  

The Indian official sources were, however, reported to have assured the U.S. Government that the treaty contained nothing in spirit or in letter that could adversely affect India's relations with the United States. The United States might have thought that in the power politics of Asia, India, by concluding the treaty with the U.S.S.R., was obliging itself with the Soviets. This was naturally against the U.S. global security interests. The United States felt that in the new context of


172. See, Patriot, New Delhi, 11 August 1971. The Senator Mr. Kennedy, as the Chairman of the U.S. Senate Refugee Rehabilitation Committee, arrived in India on 10 August 1971, the day after the Indo-Soviet treaty was signed. He made this comment in Calcutta on 10 August 1971 when he was asked by the reporters to comment on the treaty.


175. Hindustan Times, Delhi, 13 August 1971.
the Indo-Soviet Treaty, the future of Indo-U.S. relations would depend upon the behaviour of India in its relations with the United States. This was the implication of the statement of Mr. Rogers when he said that the U.S. relations with India would depend on the latter's "relations with other powers," and particularly on its "stated non alignment policy in the light of the treaty it signed with the Soviet Union during 1971." 176

India at heart did not welcome the U.S. policy to normalize its relations with China. India thought that the Sino-U.S. rapprochement would not be conducive to her national and security interests. India desired, though not expressed in concrete terms, that the United States should pursue its earlier policy of containment of China and should take measures to see that China could not play any part in the South Asia politics. But the development of Sino-U.S. relations between 1966 and 1971 belied India's hopes. India, thought that the new China policy of the United States would have repercussions on the politics of the Indian Sub-Continent and on the politics of South Asia as well. 177 India apprehended that the U.S. decision to normalize relations with China might destabilise the Asian politics.

On the other hand, the United States was, perhaps, not unaware of the feelings of India regarding the Sino-U.S. rapprochement.


177. For reference see the statement of Mr. Swaran Singh, the Minister of External Affairs, in Lok Sabha on 20 July 1971: L.S. Deb., 6 (20 July 1971), 259-260.
rapprochement. But the U.S. assessment was that a country like India with whom the United States had very good relations, should realize that Washington's new policy towards China was not aimed at all against India; it was set, according to the U.S. officials, against the new context of international situation arising out of the Sino-Soviet dispute. The Soviet Union, in the U.S. estimate, was the main adversary all over the world, and that was the reason why the United States decided to exploit the Sino-Soviet rift to its own advantage by normalizing relations with China. The United States expected that India should have realized these things. But the U.S. felt hurt when it saw that instead of understanding the U.S. positions India concluded a treaty with the Soviet Union, a move not conducive to the U.S. interests in Asia.

In fact, India and the United States had conflicting national interests in Asia. As a result, there were stresses and strains in Indo-U.S. relations which oscillated between high expectations and deep suspicion. As India considered that the new U.S. policy towards China adversely affected her national interests, she expressed displeasure over it in many ways. But India never cut off its relations with the USA simply because she did not like its foreign policy towards China. On the other hand, although India became a country of secondary importance in the United States' global strategy because of its developing relations with China, and although India's actions between 1966 and 1971 sometimes went against the U.S. interests, the United
States did not cut off its relations with India. Between 1966 and 1971 both India and the United States severely criticised the policies of each other, but neither of them was found to think in terms of severing its ties with the other. It was true that the primary purpose of the United States behind its policy to normalise relations with China was not to threaten India's security. Their enemy in Asia was not India, but the Soviet Union.