INTRODUCTION
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The history of the Indo-U.S. relations from 1947 to 1965 was not one of uninterrupted development of friendly relations between the two largest democracies of the world. It had witnessed severe stresses and strains in their relationship and had been marked by sharp differences in their attitudes towards certain important international issues. But, despite those stresses and strains in their relationship and differences in their attitudes, the two countries during the period (1947-65) under review in this chapter had never allowed their relationship to sink to a level where the ties between the two countries were completely broken.

From the days of India's struggle for independence, the United States showed sympathy towards India's cause and it was widely known that the U.S. President Mr. Roosevelt personally tried to impress upon the British Government the wisdom of according independence to India. 1 When India gained independence in 1947, the then U.S. President, Mr. H. S. Truman, sent a message to the then Governor General of India, Lord Louis Mountbatten, expressing his satisfaction and good will for the people of independent India. 2

After independence, India adopted a constitution and established a democratic form of Government the principles of

1. For the U.S. contribution to the independence of India see, A. G. Hope: America and Swaraj: The U.S. role in Indian independence. (Bombay, 1970).

2. For Mr. Truman's message see, U.S. Department of State: Bulletin (hereafter cited as Bulletin) 17 (24 August 1947) 396.
which were based upon the British and the U.S. models of government. The ideas that governed many Indian leaders who were responsible for drafting the Indian constitution were derived from the American concepts of freedom and liberty. In an address to the U.S. Congress (the U.S. Legislature) on 13 October 1949, India's Prime Minister Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru stated, "... in drafting the constitution of the Republic of India, we have been greatly influenced by your own constitution." 3

After becoming the Prime Minister and the Minister of External Affairs, Mr. Nehru visited the United States in October 1949. One of the objectives of his visit to the USA was to build up a close rapport and understanding with that country and to convince the U.S. authorities that India, too, like them believed in the same ideals of democracy and freedom of the people. 4 India felt from the beginning of her emergence as an independent entity that since both the countries had common faith in the principles of individual freedom and liberty, the United States would be a 'natural' partner in India's endeavour for development. Thus, in his address to the U.S. Congress on 13 October 1949 Mr. Nehru said:

"... we enter ... the community of free nations with roots of democracy deeply embedded in our institutions as well as thoughts of our people .... The great democracy of the USA will, I feel sure, understand and appreciate our approach to life's problems because it could not have any other aim or a different ideal. Friendship and cooperation, between our two countries are, therefore, natural." 5

4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
Addressing the East and West Association, New York, on 19 October 1949, Mr. Nehru declared:

"India in Southern, Western and South Eastern Asia has to play a distinctive and important role ... because the United States is playing a vital role in world affairs to-day ... it seems natural for an Indian to think of closer relations with the American people ... . I think ... it is natural, in the present context, for many Americans to think of the importance of India in this respect. Therefore, the question of India and the United States understanding each other and developing closer relations is important from the point of view of these two countries ...".6

It seemed that after gaining independence in 1947, India wanted to establish closer relations with the United States. Mr. Nehru's visit to the U.S.A. in October 1949 was a step taken by India to develop an understanding with that country. During his visit to the USA Prime Minister Nehru, however, expressed the view that although these two countries believed in common ideals and values, it would be wrong "to expect complete agreement" between these two countries on all issues.7

When India achieved independence in 1947, the world was divided into two power blocs led by the United States and the

6. Ibid., 593-596.

7. Mr. Nehru's address before the East and West Association, New York, on 19 October 1949. See, J. Nehru: India's Foreign Policy; 596.
Soviet Union. After the Second World War, the United States assessed that the main danger to the security of Europe and the United States might come from the Soviet Union which was a communist power. According to the United States, the Soviet Union threatened international peace and security by its policy of expansionism and world revolutionary goal. The United States, therefore, embarked upon a policy of military alliances with the nations of the free world to contain and to counter what the Americans called the Soviet expansionism. The United States became concerned about free Asian nations after China became communist in October 1949.

Under the circumstances, India's acceptance of the democratic system of the Western model had gladdened the U.S. authorities. On its part, the United States thought that they had a responsibility to help maintain democratic system in India. The United States also thought that in its crusade against the

8. For reference see, Luis, L. Gerson: John Foster Dulles (New York, 1967). Mr. John Foster Dulles was associated with the U.S. State Department since 1940s. He was the foreign policy adviser of President Harry, S. Truman; he was the U.S. Secretary of State from 1953 to 1959.

9. On 4 April 1949, the United States sponsored the North Atlantic Treaty Organizations. The signatories of this defence pact were the U.K., France, Benelux, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Norway, Portugal, the USA and Canada.

communist India would be a natural ally of the United States. This was clear when Mr. George, C. McGhee, the U.S. Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs, said in Tennessee on 19 November 1949 (after China established a communist government in October 1949 and after Mr. Nehru's visit to the USA):

"... Communist ideology had gained little influence in South Asia itself .... In the so called struggle between the Soviet Union and Western powers, we are hopeful that the nations of South Asia will desire increasingly to associate themselves with the free world on all issues of fundamental importance, on their own volition and on the basis of full equality and partnership". 11

By virtue of her size, population and location, India was an important nation in Asia. The United States held that the Indian democracy could be a counter challenge to the Chinese totalitarian system in Asia. They also thought that if the democratic system succeeded in India, the newly independent Asian nations would be inspired by the democratic system and ideals rather than the Chinese totalitarian model of government and economy. 12 The United States favoured Indian leadership in Asian politics against Chinese leadership. 13


Thus, immediately after India gained independence, both India and the United States sought to establish close rapport and understanding between them. The unifying force behind their friendship was their common faith in democratic values. But after 1949 India and the United States sharply differed on some international issues owing to the differences in their national interests and perceptions. Consequently, there were some stresses and strains in their relationship. Some of the important issues over which the attitudes and perceptions of India and the USA differed may be briefly stated:

**The Containment of China:** In October 1949 China established a communist form of government in the mainland, but Formosa, a province of China, remained under the Nationalist government of Mr. Chiang Kai-Shek, who was opposed to the communists in China. Before the communists' victory in China in 1949, the U.S. policy towards the Far East was to make China a counterbalance to Japan and the Soviet Union. 14 China was then the permanent member of the Security Council of the United Nations Organization.

After the establishment of the communist government of China in October 1949, the United States accorded recognition

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to the Formosan (Taiwan) government of Mr. Chiang Kai-Shek as the legitimate government of China. On 14 February 1950, Communist China concluded a thirty year Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance with the Soviet Union, the leader of the world communist movement. The United States apprehended that this treaty between the Communist giants was the manifestation of the conspiracy of international communism to dominate the free world. The United States believed that communist Russia and its new ally, Communist China, would try to impose their political and economic system on the countries of Asia. The emergence of Communist China was regarded by the United States not only as a danger to the free and independent countries of Asia but also as "a grave threat to the whole free community". The United States considered that international communism was a great threat to the United States as international communism thought "in terms of ultimately using its power position against the United States". As a counter

15. For reference see the address by the U.S. Ambassador to India, Mr. Henderson, before Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi, on 27 March 1950; Council on Foreign Relations: Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1950 (Princeton, 1951); 507. Press, New Jersey, 1951); 507.


17. For reference see the statement of Mr. John, Foster Dulles, the U.S. Secretary of State, on 29 March 1954; Bulletin, 30 (12 April 1954) 540.

18. Ibid.

measure against the design of international communism, Washington, as in Europe, embarked upon a policy of military alliances in Asia to contain the influence of communist China in Asia.

India's perception of the emergence of communist China was, however, different. She did not consider that the Chinese communist government was a danger either to India or to any other nation of Asia. She perceived the communists' victory in China as a triumph of nationalism in China. The Government of India, therefore, accorded recognition to the Chinese communist government immediately after its emergence.

The United States opposed the entry of China into the United Nations and recognized the Formosan government as representing China in the United Nations. On the contrary, India strongly pleaded for the admission of communist China into the United Nations. She felt that peace in Asia would


Mr. A. N. Mishra's book gives a comprehensive account of India's attitude towards and perception of communist China.

21. Ibid.

22. For the U.S. view on the entry and representation of China in the United Nations see the Joint Statement following the discussion between the U.S. President, Mr. H. S. Truman and the British Prime Minister, Mr. Attlee, on 8 December 1950. See, H. S. Truman: Public Papers of the President, 1950 (U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1965) 739. See also foot note n.15.

23. See, Prime Minister Nehru's statement in the Lok Sabha, the Lower House of the Indian Parliament, on 29 December 1954: J. Nehru: India's Foreign Policy; 91. See also, A. N. Mishra: n.20.
be disturbed if China was debarred from its entry into the United Nations. 24

In pursuance of their policy to sponsor military alliances in Asia to contain China, the United States concluded a peace treaty with Japan in 1951. 25 They proposed to build up the Middle East Defence Organization in 1952-1953, but it did not materialize. 26 With the idea to contain Communist China, the United States sponsored the South East Asia Treaty Organization, known as SEATO, signed at Manila on 8 September 1954. 27

The United States expected that India, as it was a democratic and a major non-communist nation of Asia, might join the side of the U.S. in their crusade against the Soviet Union and China. But after independence in 1947, India decided to pursue the policy of non-alignment and refused to join either the U.S. or the Soviet military bloc. 28 The leaders of independent India thought that by aligning with the United States, 29

24. See, J. Nehru: India's Foreign Policy; 91.
27. The signatories of SEATO were the USA, Great Britain, the Philippines, Thailand and Pakistan. For the text of the SEATO see, Council on Foreign Relation: Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1954 (New York, 1955) 319-323. For the diplomacy behind SEATO see, George Modelski: SEATO: Six studies (Melbourne, 1962).
28. See the statement of Prime Minister Mr. Nehru in the Constituent Assembly of India on 4 December 1947: J. Nehru: India's Foreign Policy, 24-29.
India would intensify the tension and cold war in Asia. It would be better for India, they thought, if India remained non-aligned with any bloc. Moreover, on 8 March 1949, Prime Minister, Mr. Nehru, who was the chief architect of independent India's foreign policy, declared that India had close relationship with other countries and was friendly with all countries. As long as the United States was concerned with the security of Europe only, India's policy of non-alignment did not clash with the U.S. global security interests. The United States became concerned about their security in Asia after China turned communist in 1949. The United States sought India's alliance with the U.S. defence arrangement in Asia. On 29 September 1954, Prime Minister Mr. Nehru revealed in the Lok Sabha that India was "invited" to participate in the Manila Conference of September 1954 (which led to the formation of SEATO), but refused to participate in that conference. As a non-aligned country, India vehemently reacted against the U.S. policy of military alliance in Asia to contain China. As a result, misunderstanding

29. Ibid.
30. See Mr. Nehru's speech in the constituent Assembly of India on 8 March 1949. Ibid., 24-29.
32. See, J. Nehru: India's Foreign Policy, 87. Later on it was revealed that India was invited to participate in the Manila Conference on the insistance of Britain; Mr. John F. Dulles, the then U.S. Secretary of State, was not very enthusiastic to invite India. See, Luis, L. Gerson: John Foster Dulles (New York, 1967) 195.
developed between the United States and India, and this misunderstanding often strained their relations. The difference between India and the United States was that while the latter sought peace through defence and security pacts, India sought security through peace. India was of the opinion that communism should be contained and combated in Asia not by forming military alliances, but by removing want and poverty of the Asian people. The U.S. approach to military pacts like SEATO, according to Mr. Nehru, was "a wrong approach, a dangerous approach and a harmful approach". He "wondered" what the U.S. urge was behind the SEATO, which, according to him, "definitely added to tensions and fears in Asia."

The United States did not like that India, which too believed in democratic values, should have criticised, like the

33. Mr. M. S. Rajan, an Indian academician, pointed out that India's strong opposition to the proposed Middle East Defence Organization was one of the reasons why it did not materialize. See, M. S. Rajan: India in World Affairs, 1954-1965 (Delhi, 1964) 262.

34. For the Indo-U.S. differences on, and for the U.S. attitude towards India's policy of non-alignment see, R. P. Kaushik: The Crucial years of Non-alignment (N.D., 1972).


36. See, Mr. Nehru's reply on 30 October 1951 to the criticisms of his foreign policy by some prominent Americans. See, Facts on File, (World News Digest) 1951 (New York) 364.

37. Prime Minister Mr. Nehru's speech in the Lok Sabha on 29 March 1954 regarding the proposed South East Asia Defence pact. See, J. Nehru: India's Foreign Policy; 95.

38. See, Mr. Nehru's speech in the Lok Sabha on 29 September 1954. Ibid., 87-89.
communists, the U.S. security policy to contain communism in Asia. Mr. John Foster Dulles, the U.S. Secretary of State and the chief formulator of the U.S. foreign policy during the fifties, was of the opinion that Prime Minister Nehru had no adequate comprehension of the threat from international communism. 39 Mr. Dulles believed that Mr. Nehru was unrealistic in assessing the motives of communist China; he resented Mr. Nehru's 'impartial and moralistic lectures'. 40 Briefly, the differences between India and the United States in their attitude towards Communist China were great impediments in the closer understanding between these two largest democracies.

The U.S. Military Aid to Pakistan — The issue which had vitiated most and has been still vitiating the Indo-U.S. relations was the U.S. military aid to Pakistan. Mr. Luis, L. Gerson, the biographer of John Foster Dulles, the former U.S. Secretary of State, pointed out in his book that Mr. Dulles was very much impressed by the fact that in the Indian sub-continent, it was Pakistan and not democratic India which showed evidence of awareness of the danger from communism. Mr. Dulles was said to have been very much pleased to find Pakistan's friendly disposition towards the USA from the very beginning of the former's

39. See, Subimal Dutt: With Nehru in the Foreign Office (Calcutta, 1977) 216. Mr. Subimal Dutt served as India's Ambassador to the Soviet Union from 1961-1962; before that, he was the Foreign Secretary of the Government of India.

Indeed Pakistan, from the early days of the cold war, became USA's ally against the latter's crusade against world communism. Pakistan entered into Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement with USA and in 1954 concluded the U.S. sponsored South East Asia Treaty. By the Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement the United States was committed to give military aid to Pakistan "to maintain its security" and for its self-defence.

When the USA and Pakistan were negotiating the above Agreement, Prime Minister, Mr. Nehru, stated in the Lok Sabha on 22 February 1954 that such U.S. military agreement with Pakistan would simply add to the "feeling of insecurity in Asia". India apprehended that the U.S. military aid to Pakistan would jeopardize the India-Pakistan bilateral relations which had already been strained on the question of Kashmir, and would encourage the "aggressiveness" of the Pakistani authorities. India further apprehended that the arms, which the United States would give

41. Ibid., 251-252.


43. Ibid.

44. See, J. Nehru: India's Foreign Policy; 471.

45. Mr. Nehru's speech in the Rajya Sabha, the Upper House of the Indian Parliament, on 26 August 1958 and his speech in both Houses of Parliament on 13 March 1959. See, Ibid.; 98, 470. See also the statement of Mr. A. K. Chanda, India's Deputy Minister for External Affairs, in the Lok Sabha on 19 February 1954; India, Lok Sabha Debates, 1 (19 February 1954) 181-182.
to Pakistan, would only be used by Pakistan against India, and would threaten India's security.

Pakistan was one of the signatories to the South East Asia Treaty Organization. Although Pakistan, strictly speaking, was not a country within the South East Asian region, the United States rationalized its inclusion into SEATO on the plea that the Eastern wing of Pakistan (East Pakistan) was adjacent to South East Asian region, and hence it was vulnerable to pressure from communist China. India apprehended that the SEATO might interfere in India-Pakistan disputes.

Thus, the U.S. decision to give military aid to Pakistan through the Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement and through SEATO was perhaps the greatest irritant in Indo-U.S. relations. Prime Minister Mr. Nehru, in a letter on 24 February 1954, expressed India's concern over the U.S. decision to conclude military pacts with Pakistan. As against India's apprehension

46. See Prime Minister Mr. Nehru's letter to the U.S. President Mr. Eisenhower, dated 24 February 1954, expressing India's concern at the proposed U.S.-Pakistan bilateral military agreement, see, Council on Foreign Relations: Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1954 (New York, 1955) 374-376.


48. See Mr. Nehru's speech in the Lok Sabha on 29 September 1954; J. Nehru: India's Foreign Policy; 87-89.

the U.S. President, Mr. Eisenhower, in a letter to Mr. Nehru, dated 1 March 1954, however, assured him that "what we are proposing to do, and what Pakistan is agreeing to, is not directed in any way against India." 50

India, however, made it clear that she was very much concerned over the U.S. arms aid policy towards Pakistan. Her concern for the U.S. policy of military alliance in Asia was not because of any ill feeling against the USA or Pakistan but because, she felt, the U.S. policy would add to the "feeling of insecurity in Asia." 51

It was pointed out that Mr. R. M. Nixon, who was the U.S. Vice-President from 1953 to 1956 and who became the President of the United States in 1969, strongly pleaded in 1954 to give U.S. military aid to Pakistan to counter the neutralism of India and to counter, what Mr. Nixon called, the desire of India to be the dominant force in Asia. 52

50. Ibid, see also New York Times, 2 March 1954. See also, Luis, L. Gerson: John Foster Dulles, 197.

51. Mr. Nehru's speech in the Lok Sabha on 22 February 1954. See, J. Nehru: India's Foreign Policy, 471.

Thus, the United States continued to give military aid to Pakistan ignoring the concern and apprehensions expressed by India. India felt that this continued supply of military provisions by USA to Pakistan was a deliberate attempt by Washington to underestimate India's position in South Asia and a calculated U.S. move to inject tension and elements of instability in this region. As a result, Indo-U.S. relations on the question of the U.S. military aid to Pakistan continued to remain strained.

The Korean War — After 1949, the major international issue on which the United States and India differed was the Korean War of 1950. In 1945 Korea was divided into the Soviet occupation zone, i.e., North Korea, and the U.S. occupation zone, i.e., South Korea. The dividing line between North Korea and South Korea was the 38th parallel. The Soviet Union recognized the North Korean Government in October 1948 and the South Korean Government was recognized by the USA in January 1949. India was of the opinion that Korea should be united and free.

In 1950, war broke out between North Korea and South Korea. Both India and the United States considered that North Korea was the aggressor. On 27 June 1950, the U.S.


54. See the statement of Prime Minister Mr. Nehru on 15 November 1950: India, Parliamentary Debates, 5 (15 November 1950) 9-11.

55. On 25 June 1950, the United States moved a resolution in the Security Council of the United Nations; the resolution branded North Korea as aggressor. India supported the resolution. See, Year Book of the United Nations, 1950 (Department of Public Information, United Nations, New York), 221-222.
representative in the Security Council moved a resolution urging it to take urgent military measures against North Korea for restoring peace. The resolution was passed in the Security Council. Although India did not participate in the voting in the Security Council, she, however, later on accepted the resolution. Pursuant to this resolution, the Security Council on 7 July 1950 set up a United Nations Command under the United States. Mr. Mc Arthur a former U.S. General of the Army, was chosen to lead the UN armed forces in Korea.

Although India offered medical units to the UN forces in Korea, she considered that the U.N. forces should not have been put under the command of the U.S. General. This, she felt, would not help bring about the meeting between the U.S. and the Soviet representatives which India was trying to forge to settle the Korean crisis. On 13 July 1950, Prime Minister Mr. Nehru, in identical words, wrote letters to Marshal Stalin of the Soviet Union, and to Mr. Dean Acheson, the U.S. Secretary of State. In the letter Mr. Nehru proposed that in order to facilitate a peaceful solution of the Korean problem the People's

56. Nine members of the Security Council voted for the resolution; Yugoslavia abstained from voting and the Soviet representative was absent. Ibid., 223-224.
57. Ibid.
58. Ibid., 227.
Republic of China should be given its seat in the Security Council. Mr. Nehru further wrote in the letter that a solution of the Korean problem would emerge only through negotiations between China, the Soviet Union and the United States. 60 While Mr. Stalin welcomed India's proposal, Mr. Dean Acheson rejected the proposal of a meeting between China, the Soviet Union and the United States by saying that it would be an appeasement of aggression. 61

The U.N. forces pushed back the North Korean forces from the 38th parallel. On 7 October 1950 the General Assembly of the U.N. accepted a U.S. resolution empowering the U.N. forces to cross the 38th parallel. India's objective was to localize the war. 62 She opposed the resolution because she apprehended that this might result in prolonging the North Korean resistance and in widening the area of conflict. 63 India warned the United States not to cross the 38th parallel; if they crossed, India apprehended, it would provoke China to intervene. 64

61. Ibid.
62. Ibid.
63. See, the statement of Mr. Nehru on 15 November 1950: *India, Parliamentary Debates, 1950*: 5 (15 November 1950) 38.
64. See, K. M. Panikkar: *In Two Chinas: Memoirs of a Diplomat* (London, 1955) 109-114. Mr. K. M. Panikkar was the Indian Ambassador to China during Korean war. Mr. Panikkar wrote in his book that he sent reports to the Government of India that China would intervene if the U.N. forces crossed the 38th parallel.
Ignoring India's warning, the U.N. forces crossed the 38th parallel and intruded into North Korea. Consequently, on 3 November 1950 the Chinese armies moved in defence of North Korea. The U.S. government took strong exception to the Chinese intervention, and moved a resolution in the General Assembly branding China as aggressor. The resolution was passed by the General Assembly, but India voted against it and refused to brand China as aggressor. India thought that China had no aggressive intention. This was a major difference between India and the USA on the Korean issue. India also thought that the U.S. policy towards this crisis widened the war and intensified the crisis. India and the USA had different perceptions of the Korean crisis. The United States thought that not branding China as aggressor, India helped the Chinese and the North Koreans. It, therefore, assessed that India had no adequate appreciation of the threat posed by international communism. As a result, some misunderstanding developed between the USA and India.


67. Ibid.

68. Ibid.

differences between these two countries or the Korean crisis were not at all helpful for forging smooth and uninterrupted development of relations between them. On the contrary, their relations became strained as a result of their differences on this issue.

The Kashmir Question — The state of Jammu and Kashmir situated at the North West region of India was one of the 562 princely states under the British rule in the Indian sub-continent. These princely states too became independent with the British withdrawal from the sub-continent in August 1947. After independence, most of these states acceded either to the Indian Union or to Pakistan. But at that time the state of Jammu and Kashmir did not accede to any country and remained as an independent state. 70

In October 1947, the Pakistani troops and Pathan tribesmen invaded Kashmir. Against this background, the Kashmir Government and the National Conference, the biggest political party of the state, offered to accede to India, and India accepted the offer. 71 The then Hindu ruler of the state appointed Mr. Sheikh Abdullah, the leader of the National Conference, the Chief Minister of Jammu and Kashmir.


After Kashmir's accession to India in October 1947 India considered that the state of Jammu and Kashmir was legally a part of India. On the other hand, Pakistan considered that India forced Kashmir to accede to India.\textsuperscript{72}

India on 1 January 1948 referred the matter to the Security Council and urged it to maintain peace in that region.\textsuperscript{73} The stand taken by Pakistan in the Security Council was that the Council should make arrangements for the withdrawal of the Indian forces from Kashmir, and for the establishment of an impartial interim administration in the state of Jammu and Kashmir until a plebiscite was held there.\textsuperscript{74} The United States was of the opinion that an interim government should remain in Jammu and Kashmir until a fair plebiscite was held there.\textsuperscript{75}

The United States urged India to withdraw her forces from Kashmir and to agree to a plebiscite Administration in Kashmir for holding a plebiscite there.\textsuperscript{76} India, however, was not against a plebiscite in Jammu and Kashmir.\textsuperscript{77} But she held that "To bring

\textsuperscript{72} Ibid., 153–154.

\textsuperscript{73} See, Year Book of the United Nations, 1948 (Department of Public Information, U.N.O., New York) 387.

\textsuperscript{74} Ibid., 390–391.

\textsuperscript{75} See the statement of the U.S. representative in the Security Council on 29 January 1948 supporting the resolution introduced by Belgium urging for plebiscite in Kashmir under the supervision of the Security Council. Ibid., 390–392.

\textsuperscript{76} See the resolution (S/726) moved by the USA, the U.K. and Columbia in the Security Council on 17 April 1948. Ibid., 397–398.

\textsuperscript{77} India and Pakistan agreed to a plebiscite in Kashmir which was proposed on 11 December 1948 by the U.N. Commission for India and Pakistan. The then U.S. President, Mr. H. S.
outside administration however, would represent an amount of encroachment on the ordinary sovereign power of any state. 78

In 1950 the United States took the stand that both India and Pakistan should make arrangements to prepare and execute a programme of demilitarization in Kashmir. 79 The U.S. suggestion was that Pakistan could retain on the Pakistani side of the cease-fire line an armed force of 3000 to 6000 in number and India could retain on her side an armed force between 12,000 and 18,000 in number. 80 India did not accept the U.S. formula of demilitarization for, she thought that it would make the status and position of Pakistan equal to the status and position of India in Kashmir. 81

So, it appeared that the stand taken by the United States on Kashmir did not recognize the legal and sovereign authority of India over Kashmir as an integral part of the Indian Union. This attitude of the USA irritated India. To many Indians, the U.S. stand on Kashmir appeared to be pro-Pakistan. 82

Truman sent a message, dated 5 January 1949, to the Indian Prime Minister expressing his satisfaction and gratification at India's acceptance of plebiscite. See, Bulletin, 20 (23 January 1949) 114-115.


80 Ibid., 163-164.

81 Ibid., 156-159; 163-164.

By March 1954 it became clear that the United States would soon enter into defence pacts with Pakistan. With this development in the background, the Government of India notified the United Nations Secretariat:

"... the continuation of the U.S. observers among the United Nations observers in Kashmir is not proper and therefore they should not continue ... any officer of the U.S. Army cannot be considered as neutral in this dispute in Kashmir". 83

India held that the Kashmir problem would be more complicated by the U.S. decision to give military aid to Pakistan. 84 Meanwhile, in August 1953, the constitutional Head of Kashmir, Yubaraj Karan Singh, dismissed Sheikh Abdullah, the Prime Minister of Kashmir, on the ground that in many of his speeches, Sheikh Abdullah had been contending for a complete independent status of Kashmir. 85 It was held by some observers in India that Sheikh Abdullah, while making such speeches for an independent status of Kashmir, had been encouraged by some U.S. leaders. 86


86. Ibid.
Mr. John F. Kennedy, who became the U.S. President in 1961, was of the opinion that as both India and Pakistan were friends of the United States, these two countries should establish cordial relations between them. That was why Mr. Kennedy thought that India and Pakistan should find a solution to the Kashmir problem.  

Without going into detail, it could be said that in the following years, too, the United States did not take such a stand on Kashmir issue as recognized India's sovereign status on Kashmir. On the contrary, the USA, according to India, always took a pro-Pakistani stand on the Kashmir issue.

**The Goa Issue** -- The Goa question was another issue which caused misunderstanding between India and the United States. Goa, which was on the mainland of India, had been a colony under Portugal. Portugal was a member of the U.S. sponsored North Atlantic Treaty Organization and was, therefore, the U.S. ally.

After the British withdrawal from the Indian sub-continent, India wanted the elimination of the Portuguese control over Goa.  

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The United States gave military aid to India during Chinese attack on her in 1962. It has been pointed out that President Kennedy's prompt response to India's request for the military help during Chinese aggression accompanied the U.S. insistence that India should seek a settlement of Kashmir problem with Pakistan. See, Bimal Prasad: "The super powers and The Sub-continent", published in M. S. Agwani (Edtd): *Detente: Perspective and Repercussions* (New Delhi, 1975) 153.

88. See Mr. Nehru's statement in the Lok Sabha on 12 June 1952. See, J. Nehru: *India's Foreign Policy*, 57.
India requested Portugal to part with its sovereignty; but Portugal refused to do so. India considered that Goa was a part of India and so it should be independent; no outside power could claim the right to rule Goa. The Soviet Union in 1955 supported in principle the Indian stand on Goa. The Soviet support to India on Goa, however, irritated the U.S. official circles. Since 1955, the U.S. attitude towards Goa was a clear evidence of the U.S. support of colonialism. The Foreign Minister of Portugal, Mr. P. Cunha, visited the United States from 30 November 1955 to 2 December 1955. On 2 December 1955, a joint statement of Mr. P. Kunha and Mr. John, F. Dulles, the then U.S. Secretary of State, was issued. The Statement referred to Portugal's Asian colonies as 'Portuguese provinces'.

The Government of India sharply reacted to the Cunha-Dulles joint statement. In a note to the U.S. State Department, dated 13 December 1955, the then Indian Ambassador to the USA stated that the Government of India regretted that the U.S. Secretary of State should have issued a statement with Mr. Cunha which was


91. See, Subimal Dutt, n. 89, p. 235.

"at variance with facts". The note further stated that India had hoped that "the U.S. government would view the struggle of the Goan people for freedom with sympathy and would appreciate the natural desire of the people of India and Goa".

In a news conference on 6 December 1955, Mr. Dulles again indicated that Goa was a Portuguese colony for 400 years and that the people of Goa enjoyed the full rights of the Portuguese citizens. India was naturally very much irritated over the U.S. position on the Goa issue and thought that it was supporting colonialism of its ally, Portugal.

In reply to the note of the Indian Ambassador, dated 13 December 1955, the Government of the United States stated on 29 December 1955 that it favoured a peaceful settlement of the dispute over Goa and the U.S. Secretary of State regarded the term 'Portuguese provinces' as "descriptive from the standpoint of Portuguese internal law". But the Government of India could not agree with the U.S. explanation of Cunha-Dulles joint statement. India considered it as the U.S. - Portuguese interference in the


94: Ibid.


98: See the text of Government of India's reply, dated 17 January 1956, to the U.S. letter of 29 December 1955. See
political system of India. 99

In 1961 the Goa question again caused misunderstanding between India and the United States. The Portuguese authorities resorted to force to suppress the demand of liberation by the people of Goa. In December 1961, India alleged that Portugal had been provoking India by border incursions. 100 The United States assessed that India might intervene in Goa. 101 Washington also assessed that Portugal would peacefully withdraw from Goa, Damao and Diu in course of time. The then U.S. President, Mr. Kennedy, therefore, wrote a letter to Mr. Nehru asking him not to use force in Goa. 102

On 18 December 1961 the Indian troops marched into Goa because of a complete breakdown in civilian administrations there and because of Portuguese provocations against Indian border positions. The United States took strong exception to it. It maintained that Goa was legally a Portuguese colony; by invading Goa, India had violated the United Nations Charter;

Government of India, Minister of External Affairs: Foreign Affairs Record 1956; 31-32.


as a member of the United Nations, India could not "Lawfully use force against Goa". The U.S. official reaction was that India failed to use the United Nations machinery for peacefully settling the dispute with Portugal and also rejected the U.S. offer to act as an intermediary in this dispute. On 18 December 1961, Mr. Dean Rusk, the then U.S. Secretary of State, was reported to have told the Indian Ambassador in the USA, Mr. B. K. Nehru, that the United States "deeply" regretted India's use of force in Goa. Against the U.S. criticism of the Indian action in Goa, Mr. Nehru stated on 19 December 1961 that the U.S. criticisms were meaningless as the United States was "obviously ignorant of the facts" in Goa. It was very much disappointing to India that the United States did not appreciate India's stand in Goa. Thus, the Goa question was an irritant between India and the United States and it also stood in the way of the smooth development of relations between these two countries.

It appeared from the above account that the United States and India, the two largest democracies of the world, had some


basic differences on some issues. Consequently, Indo-U.S. relations between 1947 and 1965 often suffered set backs. Although, Indo-U.S. relations, on occasions, became strained, they, however, never deteriorated to the point of the severing of their ties. On the contrary, there were some positive aspects in their mutual relations which would justify the belief that both the countries desired to maintain friendly relations between them amidst their differences.

Both India and the United States believed in the principles of democracy and freedom of the people. Their common belief in the ideology of democracy was a great unifying force in their relations. Prime Minister Mr. Nehru believed that friendship, cooperation and closer relations between these two democracies, India and the United States, were natural. 107 Similarly, President Truman, President Eisenhower and President Kennedy too felt that as India was striving to establish democratic institutions, the United States had the responsibility to help maintain and strengthen them in India. 108 The adherence

107. See Prime Minister Nehru's statements on 13 and 19 October 1949 in the USA during his visit to that country: J. Nehru: India's Foreign Policy, 590-591.

to the principles of democracy was, therefore, a binding force and the positive side in the relations between India and the United States.

**U.S. Food Aid to India** -- The single issue which brought the two countries closer was the generous Food Aid by the United States to India. The United States thought that the food and economic crisis could not be allowed to pose a threat to the stability and the democratic system of India. It considered that it was the U.S. responsibility to help India overcome those crisis.

From 1951 India faced several times severe food crises. The crises were such that those threatened the very existence of India. In order to help India overcome the crisis in 1951, President Truman sent a special message to the U.S. Congress on 12 February 1951 recommending assistance of two million tons of wheat to India. 109 On 15 June 1951, President Truman signed the Indian Emergency Food Assistance Act. 110 In 1951, Indo-U.S. relations had already become strained as a result of the differences in their attitude towards the China issue and the Korean war. But these differences did not stand in the way of the U.S. food aid to India. President Truman had the

109. For President Truman's Special Message to the Congress. See, H. S. Truman: *Public Papers of the President, 1951* (Washington, 1965) 149-152.

idea that unless India could overcome its food and economic crises, the communists' propaganda and promises would gradually gain ground in India. In his Radio address on Mutual Security Program on 6 March 1952, President Truman, therefore, stated that unless the United States helped India meet its food crisis, she would be faced "with the same kind of threat which overpowered the Chinese. We have a chance to help stop that threat in India". 111

On its part, India expressed gratitude to the Government of the United States for the emergency food assistance to India in 1951. 112

Since 1956, the U.S. Government began to supply agricultural commodities to India under the U.S. Public Law 480 (Food For Peace Program), known as PL480.113 Although India vehemently criticised the U.S. decision to give military assistance to Pakistan during the Eisenhower Administration (1953-1960), the Eisenhower Administration, however, did not stop giving food and economic aid to India in times of India's needs. 114 President John, F. Kennedy (1961-1963) believed


112. See the statement of Prime Minister Mr. Nehru on 10 May 1951 in the Parliament of India: India, Parliamentary Debates, 70 (10 May 1951), 4131-4132.

113. See, Fact Sheet (No.23), n.110; p.2-5.

that the United States should give food and economic support to India for the interest of establishing democracy in the world and for the U.S. national interests. 115 Although during the Johnson Administration (1963-1968) the U.S. food aid to India was not always smooth and easy, the United States, however, continued to give food aid to India during her needs. 116

The U.S.A's continued food aid to India in spite of differences over many issues is a positive proof of that country's earnest desire to maintain good relations with India. As a result, India, on her part, had approached the USA for help in times of her need. This shows that India too realized the importance and value of keeping on friendly term with the United States. The National Congress, the ruling party of India, expressed thanks and gratitude to the people and Government of the United States for the food aid given by them during India's need. 117

U.S. Interest in India's Security:-- Although India vehemently criticised the U.S. policy of sponsoring military pacts and was not a U.S. ally, the United States was not


116. In this context see, L. B. Johnson: The Vantage Point (New Delhi, 1972) 228.

117. For reference See: All India Congress Committee: Indian National Congress, Resolution on Economic Policy Programme and Allied Matters 1924-69 (New Delhi)170-175.
however, indifferent to the security interests of India. The security of India vis-a-vis communist China was one of the important elements of the U.S. security interests in Asia.

In 1953, the Eisenhower Administration of the United States (1953-1960) gave to India 180 M-4 Sherman tanks. Moreover, in a letter, dated 24 February 1954, President Eisenhower wrote to Prime Minister Mr. Nehru:

"If your government should conclude that circumstances require military aid of a type contemplated by our mutual security legislation, please be assured that your request would receive my most sympathetic consideration".

Mr. John Foster Dulles, the U.S. Secretary of State (1953-1959) and the chief formulator of the U.S. foreign policy in the decade of the fifties, was also in favour of giving U.S. military aid to the neutral nations like India and Burmah if it served the U.S. national interests.

Since the latter half of 1950s, India and China had developed border disputes. According to Mr. John, F. Kennedy, who became the President of the United States in 1961, communist China was a threat to both India and Pakistan, and to South

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118. See SIPRI: Arms Trade Register. The Arms Trade with the Third World (Cambridge, 1975) 33-40.
Asia in general. 122 And, in fact, China attacked India in October 1962. India then sought military help from the United States, and the Kennedy Administration immediately responded by supplying military materials to India. 123 This proved that the United States had a positive interest in the security of India vis-a-vis China.

The U.S. military aid to India increased after the Chinese aggression in 1962. 124 The Kennedy Administration had a plan (after the Chinese aggression in 1962) under its consideration to modernize India's defences; the plan, however, did not materialize. 125 Mr. Y. B. Chavan, the Defence Minister of India, visited the United States in May 1964. One of the reasons of his visit to that country was, according to him, to seek military assistance from the USA for the defence of India against external aggression. 126


124. On 29 May 1967, Mr. M. C. Chagla, the then Foreign Minister of India revealed in the Lok Sabha that in November 1962 the U.S. government agreed "to supply stores and equipments of value of $ 60 million to meet the Chinese threat". This was followed by two further programmes of an estimated value of $ 50 million each, making a total of $ 160 million". See, L.S. Deb; 3 (29 May 1967) 1357.


Exchange of Visits by State Dignitaries -- Both India and the United States emphasized the importance of maintaining closer and cordial relations between them. Their desire to maintain closer relations was manifest in the exchange of official visits of the heads of the two governments.

Prime Minister Mr. Nehru officially visited the United States in October 1949. During his visit to that country, Mr. Nehru, on more than one occasion, stated that friendship, cordiality and co-operation between India and the United States were "natural". 127

At the invitation of the U.S. President Mr. Eisenhower, Prime Minister Mr. Nehru again visited the United States from 16 to 21 December 1956. The joint statement, issued on 20 December 1956, after the talks between Mr. Nehru and Mr. Eisenhower, could be described as a step forward towards a greater understanding of each other. The joint statement read:

"The talks confirmed the broad area of agreement between India and the United States who are bound together in strong ties of friendship deriving from their common objective and their adherence to the highest principles of free democracy ...". 128

127. See Prime Minister Mr. Nehru's address before the U.S. Congress on 13 October 1949 and his address before the East and West Association, New York, on 19 October 1949, J. Nehru: India's Foreign Policy, 590-591, 593-596.

At the invitation of the Government of India, President Eisenhower visited India from 9 to 14 December 1959. The Press Communique, issued on 14 December 1959, confirmed the bond of shared ideals between India and the USA. The communique said:

"... The President and the Prime Minister expressed their deep satisfaction at the friendly and cordial relations existing between these two countries, and their firm belief that their common ideals and objectives and their quest for peace will ensure the maintenance and development of strong ties of friendship between the two countries". 129

Prime Minister Mr. Nehru again officially visited the United States for ten days beginning on 5 November 1961. On arrival in Washington on 6 November 1961, the then U.S. President, Mr. John, F. Kennedy, welcomed Mr. Nehru describing him "as a friend" of the United States, as "a great leader" and as "one who has in his own life and times stood for those basic aspirations which the United States stands for to-day". 130 President Kennedy (1961-1963) had particular interest in Indian democracy and he considered India as "the key area" in Asia. 131

Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, the President of India paid a state


visit to the USA from 2 to 11 June 1963. Welcoming the Indian President on 3 June 1961, President Mr. Kennedy stated that the United States had "most intimate associations" with India.  

The exchange of visits by the Heads of the Indian and the U.S. governments could be taken to have helped both India and the United States in greater understanding of each other's policies and positions.

There were also instances of agreements and cooperation between them on some other issues. For example, in 1955 the United States and China issued an agreed announcement at Geneva inviting India to assist in the repatriation of the Chinese nationals in the United States who were desirous of returning to China, and India agreed to assist. Again, in 1956, Britain, France and Israel invaded Egypt following Egypt's act of nationalization of the Suez Canal Company. The United States and India together criticized both inside and outside U.N.O. the


134. The Suez Canal Company was an Egyptian Joint Stock Company, but the majority shareholders were British (43 per cent share) and then there were the French shareholders. The Head Office of the Company was in Paris. The Company enjoyed a 99 year concession from the Egyptian government, and the concession was to expire in 1968. But Egypt announced its intention not to renew the concession. On 26 July 1956 the Egyptian government nationalized the Company. This resulted in Anglo-French invasion of Egypt in 1956.
Anglo-French aggression against Egypt. 135 Against this background of agreement and cooperation, Prime Minister Nehru visited the United States in December 1956.

It would appear from the above study that after 1949 India and the United States differed on many issues. As a result, the relations between these two countries often became very much strained. But the disagreements between India and the United States never led to the severing of their ties. Prime Minister Nehru did not believe that friendship and cordiality between India and the United States rested only on "complete agreement" between them on all issues. 136 Similarly, President Truman also thought that political differences with India should not "blind" the United States to the needs of the Indian people". 137 Thus, it could be observed that there were differences no doubt, but the two great democracies of the world seemed to maintain good and friendly relations between themselves in the interests of their common ideals and aspirations.


136. See, Mr. Nehru's address before the East and West Association, New York, on 19 October 1949; J. Nehru: India's Foreign Policy. 596.

137. See, President Truman's Special Message to the U.S. Congress on 12 February 1951 for food aid to India; H. S. Truman: Public Papers of the President, 1951 (U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1965) 150-152. See also, the statement of Mr. Dean Acheson, the U.S. Secretary of State, before the U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, on 20 February 1951, on India Emergency Food Aid Programme; Bulletin, 24 (12 March 1951).