In this dissertation I am concerned with the reaction of later Wittgenstein to certain issues in philosophy.

The original source of these issues may not be philosophy itself; their original home may be science, literature, art or daily life, for Wittgenstein was not a philosopher in the conventional sense of the term. His interest in science, mathematics, fiction, poetry, music, etc., is well-known and he draws inspiration and analogies from all these areas.

However, one may question what has been done in this dissertation, for one may question the very distinction between early and later Wittgenstein. The reason being simply that what Wittgenstein said in his later work has some kind of continuity with his earlier work. One may feel that the ideas which Wittgenstein expressed in the later part of his life were already there in the Germinal form in his earlier work. But the issue whether there were two distinct phases of Wittgenstein’s thought or whether there was only one thought, could be a subject of an independent research work and is beyond the scope of this dissertation.

Here I follow the convention prevalent among a section of Wittgensteinian scholars who distinguish the later Wittgenstein from the earlier one. And there are considerable reasons for the acceptance of this convention. Even if some thought is present in its Germinal form in Wittgenstein’s earlier work, it is to be articulated and expressed, we are interested in its articula-
tion, in its expression. This articulation and expression take place only in the later thought of Wittgenstein. Even if we grant that there is an unexpressed continuity of thought, such continuity alone is not sufficient, for we have instances and instances of Wittgenstein’s thought which show a complete departure from his earlier thought.

There is no latent or open continuity in them. Consider his reactions to ethics, aesthetics and religion.

In the Tractatus Wittgenstein threw all these disciplines into the realm of transcendent, but later he thinks that aesthetics is a very stimulating subject, even more stimulating than the conceptual questions of science. Similarly, early Wittgenstein wanted to remain silent (even though he talked) over the issues of religion. In the Tractatus Wittgenstein thought that how things are in the world is a matter of complete indifference to what is Higher. But later Wittgenstein does not hesitate in expressing his views on religion, as if what is Higher could have an attitude of indifference to the world but the world should not behave in the same manner. Similarly, early Wittgenstein was not interested in psychology; he considered psychology to be one of the sciences, and as a philosopher he thought he should not have any special interest in it. He was practising therapeautic positivist, and one of the ways in which he used to treat a philosophical problem (an illness, a disease) was to show that the problem in question was really a psychological one, and therefore not having any philo-
sophical significance. Philosophical worries and anxieties were converted by him into psychological worries and anxieties and then given up because philosophers should have their own worries and anxieties and not worries belonging to others. However, the same Wittgenstein, in the later stages of his life, finds psychological problems to be very interesting philosophically he discusses psychological issues with the same zeal with which he discusses philosophical issues. He is interested not only in the philosophical analysis of psychological concepts, but Freud too has attracted his attention.

Similarly Wittgenstein has second thoughts about logic of language and science, the two highly favoured disciplines of his earlier days. Logic of language is no more what it used to be in the Notebooks and the Tractatus, for his conception language has later changed. The change in his conception of language led him to change his conception of logic of language. Further he found it not possible to retain the same relationship between language and reality which he maintained in his earlier days. The kind of issues which attracted him later are quite different from the kind of issues which attracted him earlier. While with early Wittgenstein one gets the impression that language and reality are inseparable, as language is a mirror image of reality, with later Wittgenstein one gets the impression that language has obtained a separation from reality even though it may have failed to get a complete divorce from it. And it is natural that when language is separated from reality it develops its own complexities, and
problems. As far as later Wittgenstein is concerned the Gothic structure of science, and its grandeur, is considerably lost. He now finds science as mixed up with superstition. Thus in doing philosophy the later Wittgenstein has tried to untie the knots of our thought, and is certainly not whistling (Ramsey's expression) or talking nonsense (his own earlier view).

The later turn, or the later change, in Wittgenstein's thought becomes visible at the time he started developing the view that our language is a game. And there is not one language game, but a variety of language games. There is no such thing as the language game, exhibiting the essence of all language games. This turn in Wittgenstein's thought is most significant for this is the turn which has converted a Socrates into a Gorgias.

There is no doubt in my mind that if the views of the later Wittgenstein on philosophy or on science or on any other academic discipline are accepted then there can be no objective criteria of rationality. The demand for objective criteria of rationality exhibits essentialism which later Wittgenstein rejects. What is required is that the views in question are accepted. I am persuaded to accept them. I am charmed by the reasoning (persuasion) and this charm is similar to the one I have when I am charmed by the dancing steps of a dancer or the rhythm of a piece of music. If Wittgenstein was a sophist he was the Noblest and the greatest sophist the world has produced. Wealth and power never attracted him as they attracted Plato and his followers. Philosophy and only
philosophy, was his attraction. And he practised and preached, a novel method of doing philosophy.

After his death the philosophical world has shown renewed interest in his work. Strawson describes him as "the first philosopher of the age." He undoubtedly shared the fate of a great man; such a man is generally praised after his death.

Concerning the plan of this thesis I have imposed some restrictions on my writing. The first chapter is devoted to study the transition from, the Tractatus to Wittgenstein's later writing. The second is concerned with language game which is responsible for Wittgenstein's jumping out of the Tractarian cave. The third chapter deals with the advent of new rhetoric in Wittgenstein. The fourth chapter deals with Wittgenstein's philosophical psychology. The fifth discusses the contribution of Wittgenstein to philosophy of science.

Originally I thought of including Freudian psychology, religion and aesthetics too in this dissertation. Later I discovered it would be too ambitious a plan, and therefore, I decided to postpone writing on these issues for some future occasion. However something on both these issues has been written in the first chapter. The first chapter allows such writing because of its introductory nature.