The Buddhists admit the perception of the parts but denies the possibility of the perception of the whole. When a man sees a tree, his visual organ comes in contact with only the front parts of the tree, but not with the central and hind parts of the tree. So it cannot be called a perception of the whole and is also not possible in this condition. But (in the Nyāya view) we perceive the whole. The Buddhists say that it is not right. The knowledge of the whole is inferred from the perception of the parts. Even the parts are not apprehended in their totality, because some of the parts are themselves separated from others. The whole also is not apprehended in its totality, because it does not exhaust itself only in the parts which are apprehended. This being so, the objection that there is the perception of parts only remains sustained. According to the Buddhists, the thing as a whole is nothing more than the peculiar combination of the constituent atoms.

NS II.1.33 simply expresses the doubt about the existence of the whole because it is yet to be proved. Going to explain...
the sūtra, Uddyotakara gives a series of pūrvapakṣa arguments. Though Uddyotakara does not mention the name yet the Buddhists here are clearly the Sastrāntikas and the Vaibhāṣikas.¹

Uddyotakara says that this contention of the Buddhists may ultimately lead to two conclusions: (a) The non-difference of the whole from its parts and (b) the non-existence of the whole itself.

(a) The non-difference of the whole from its parts:

(1) No distinct thing can form the component part of any object; one thing cannot be the component part of another entirely different thing;² e.g. the cow is not the parts of the horse. But the yarns are the parts of the whole called cloth; from which it follows that the whole, cloth, is not different from the parts, yarns. Some Buddhists explain the above probans as avayavāvavyāvibbhāvāt. It means that 'component' and 'whole' whatever the term may be, anyone itself is the component and the whole at the same time. So there is no whole apart from components.

(2) On the basis of certain usage also, this non-difference can be proved. The relative terms 'whole' and 'part' are used in connection with things that are not different. We meet with such expressions as 'part of sky' (ākāśa), where what is spoken of as the part is obviously nothing different from ākāśa itself.

Thus, the yarns are not things different from the cloth, because they are called its parts.
These objections are already available in MS and its Bhasva. Next Uddyotakara himself gives several arguments explaining the position of the Buddhists.

(3) The next ground for their non-difference is 'because no substance can be produced out of a totally different substance'. We see in our daily experience that no substance is ever produced out of a totally different substance. A man has never been seen to be coming out of a cow or an elephant; in the case of the cloth and the yarns also the cloth is produced out of the yarns because of the fact that the cloth (the whole) is not different from the yarns (the parts).

(4) Now another ground is: 'As the parts of a totally different whole are different from a certain whole'; e.g. the wheels are the parts of the chariot, and they are different from the cloth which is other than the chariot; so that if the yarns were different from the cloth, they also should be the parts of something other than the cloth; as a matter of fact, however, they are not found to be the parts of anything other than the cloth. Therefore, the yarns (the parts) are not different from the cloth (the whole).

(5) Again, as there is no connection with the place of production of a distinct substance, the Buddhists argue that their position is upheld. Whenever one thing is produced, it is produced in a place different from that occupied by the other. e.g. the cow is born in a place different from that occupied by the
horse. But whenever the cloth is produced, it is not produced in a place other than that occupied by the yarns; this fact proves that the cloth is not different from the yarns, or that the whole is not different from the parts.5

(6) Again, what is found to be different from a certain set of parts is only such a thing as is composed of a different set of parts. The wheels etc. are seen to be different from the jar; the jar is composed of a set of components entirely different from wheels etc. which are the components of the chariot. But the cloth is not composed of components other than the yarns; hence it cannot be different from the yarns.6

(7) Yet another ground is given: 'Only that thing can be regarded as different from a certain thing which is found, during the existence of this other thing to be the producer of something other than this latter. Thus the yarns are different from the mat, because even in the presence of the mat the yarns are the producer of the cloth (a thing completely different from mat), but even in the presence of the cloth, the yarns are not able to produce anything different from the cloth. For this reason they must be regarded as identical with the cloth.7

(8) Again, there is identity of part and whole, because the whole is different from things which are produced by causes other than the conjunction of those things; e.g. the mat is produced independently of the conjunction of the yarns and these are different from each other. But the cloth is never produced independently
of the conjunction of the yarns. Therefore, the cloth (the whole) cannot be different from yarns (the components). 8

(9) If the whole be different from the components, it would be without qualities in view of the fact that the qualities of one substance cannot be the cause of the qualities of another substance. The qualities of the horse are not produced from the qualities of the cow. They are different. But the qualities of the cloth are seen to be produced from the qualities of the yarns; it proves that the cloth must not be different from the yarns, otherwise the qualities of the yarns would not be capable of proving the qualities of the cloth at all. 9

(10) The whole is not different from the components as otherwise it would be not perceptible. If the whole be something different from the components it would subsist in the perceptible whole and the imperceptible component atoms; and as such it would itself be imperceptible; just as the conjunction of the mother and the womb is imperceptible, subsisting as it does in the perceptible (mother) and the imperceptible (womb); however, the whole is perceptible; therefore, it cannot be something different from the components. 10

(11) The whole cannot be proved as different from the components because of the absence of conjunction or non-proximity. When one thing is different from another, there is sometimes conjunction between the two and also at times non-proximity. e.g. in the case
of the cow and the horse. But in the case of the yarns and the cloth, there is neither conjunction nor non-proximity between them; therefore the cloth cannot be different from the yarns.11

(12) Moreover, the whole does not show any different weight from the group of the parts, which also indicates that the whole is not different from the components.12

Some Buddhists explain the above that the non-production of a different weight actually points to the absence of the production of any different quality. That is, the denial of 'producing of a different weight' has been mentioned only by way of an illustrative example. To explain the matter: If the colour etc. of the cause were to produce different colour etc. in the product, then the weight of the cause would produce a different weight also. But as a matter of fact, no such different weight is ever perceived in the balance by anybody. Therefore, the conclusion comes that the product is not possessed of colour etc., produced by the colour etc. of the cause.

(b) The non-existence of the whole itself.13

The non-existence of the whole is well-established by the fact that neither of the whole within the parts nor of the parts within the whole is also logically justified.14

'The whole exists within the parts' also gives rise to two further alternatives: (i) the entire whole occupies each one of the individual parts and (ii) the whole occupies all the parts through its segments.
(i) The entire whole which has a greater magnitude cannot occupy any one of the individual parts which has a smaller magnitude, because a substance of smaller magnitude can never contain within itself another substance of a greater magnitude. Moreover, the claim that the entire whole occupies each one of the individual parts leads to an absurdity: That the entire whole inheres in - i.e. is produced from or composed by - one single substance only, for each of the individual parts represents a single and distinct substance. But what is the harm in this? Uddyotakara points out that, in that case, one would have to accept, as the cause of the whole, the individual part as is said to be occupied by the entire whole and thus, there would follow the absurdity of the whole being produced always.

If, however, each of the individual parts taken separately or singly is considered to be the substratum and inherent cause of the entire whole, the conjunction of the different parts would no longer be a precondition for the production of the whole and the whole may come into being always, for so long as an individual part representing the inherent cause of the whole is there, the whole too must be there.

As a further objection from the standpoint of one who denies the reality of the whole, Uddyotakara lastly notes that if one admits the first alternative, one would not be able to explain logically the destruction of a dyad (dvyanuka) which is admitted
to be a substance produced from two atoms, the inherent causes and their conjunction. A dyad cannot be said to be destroyed due to the destruction of the inherent cause, for its inherent causes are eternal. Nor can its destruction be said to be due to the disjunction of the component parts or the atoms. If it is admitted that the entire whole in the form of the dyad occupies each one of its constituent atoms separately - i.e. if it is concluded that each one of the two disjoined atoms is the substratum of the entire dyad, it is also to be accepted that each one of the two atoms singly constitutes the inherent cause of the dyad. Thus, the conjunction of the two atoms not being a pre-condition for the production of the dyad, it cannot be maintained that the disjunction of the two conjoined atoms leads to the destruction of the dyad.

(ii) The segments of the whole are really nothing but the component parts themselves. This second alternative would have been justified only if it could have been shown that the segments of the whole represent some constituent elements of the whole other than the component parts themselves. And when a single part is perceived, the whole, even though perceived, is not, ex-hypothesi, perceived in its entirety (subsisting, according to the Naiyayikas, only partially in that part) so that it still does not cease to be the perception of a part. A single part is perceived; in that part the whole subsists only partially; so the
perception of the whole residing in the perception of that one part must still be the perception of only a part of the whole.

Further, when the whole is perceived, in what manner is it perceived? If it is perceived as in the perceived parts, it would have to be regarded as subsisting in its entirety in each of these parts; and yet as a matter of fact the entire whole does not subsist in each of the parts; as in that case all the rest of the parts would be absolutely useless, as has been already pointed out above. Nor can there be a perception of all the parts as the Central and the hind parts would be hidden from view by the front part. Thus then it is found that none of the alternatives is possible in regard to the perception of the whole; nor can any of the alternative views in regard to the subsistence of the whole in the component parts be logically maintained.

Now it cannot be claimed that the parts are present within the whole. The opponent's contention is that of the two possible alternatives in this regard — (i) that each of the individual parts occupies the entire whole and (ii) that each of the individual parts occupies a particular segment of the whole — neither can be defended logically.

(i) The first alternative is not accepted because of two considerations. First, one individual part cannot occupy the entire whole, since they have different magnitudes. Take, for instance, a tree and its branches which according to the Naiyāyika represent a whole and its parts respectively. A tree as a whole is much
larger than any of its branches and obviously no single branch can extend itself over the whole of a tree. Secondly, if one individual part is accepted as occupying the entire whole, the other individual parts cannot be related with the whole, for the entire space enclosed within the whole being taken up one individual part, there would remain no further room that may be occupied by any of the other individual parts.

(ii) The second alternative too is untenable. A particular segment of the whole really represents nothing but some particular individual part of the whole, because the whole has no other section - that may be called a segment - except the individual constituent parts. In other words, to admit that each individual part occupies a particular segment of the whole amounts to conceding that each individual part occupies only its own self, which is, however, absurd.

It cannot also be argued that the whole exists apart from its component parts, because the whole is never perceived within something other than the component parts. To avoid all these difficulties, one upholding the reality of the whole may, as a last resort, claim: We admit the whole to be 'without any substratum' (anādhāra). Then the whole would become an eternal entity, for whatever substance is without a substratum is eternal, as for instance, ākāśa and the like.¹⁶

Nor can it be said that the whole is a property of the parts
(dharma-dharmavabhinna), for the relation of identity (here bheda-bheda) is not possible between them. Two entities either absolutely different from or absolutely identical with each other cannot be related as the property and the property-possessor. Here the dharma, 'whole' cannot be perceived as apart from the dharmin, i.e. parts; if it were so, then, the whole would become eternal as in the previous objection. The whole cannot also be present within the parts through its particular segment, for then every part would be the whole. Moreover, if the whole is present through its segment in any one part, there would be the apprehension of the whole, when there is the apprehension of only a part in which the segment of the whole is present. But as a matter of fact, we never perceive the cloth from the perception of only a yarn. So there is nothing called a whole. 17

REFUTATION BY UDDYOTAKARA

In regard to a single thing, the terms 'entire' and 'part' cannot be used; and hence the question raised by the Buddhists, at the very outset, is an impossible one. That is to say, it is not right to put the question: 'Does the whole subsist wholly or partially?' For the whole is neither 'all' nor 'part'; the term 'all' is applied when the entire lot of a number of things is
meant, without any of them being left out; and the term 'part' is applied when, out of a number of things, only some is meant; so both these terms are incapable of being applied to any single thing.

The whole subsists in the components through the relation of container and contained, - the whole being the 'contained' and the components the 'containers'.

"What does this peculiar statement mean that it does not subsist in them either wholly or in part, and yet it subsists in them?"18

The statement simply means that the thing is described in the form in which it actually exists. The terms 'all' and 'part' do not apply to the whole; when it is said that 'the whole subsists in the components', all that is meant is that they are related by the relation of container and contained; this subsistence consists in the presence of the one in the many. There is no objection against maintaining such a position.'Why?' Because both the alternatives set forth by the opponent are incompatible with the given conditions. When one asserts that 'one subsists in many', one should not be attacked with the question: 'Does it subsist all-in-all or in part?' If, while subsisting in the many parts, the one were to subsist all-in-all in each one of the many parts, it would no longer be 'the one subsisting in the many' (which is the given condition, the hypothesis with which the discussion has been started); on the contrary, it would come to be a case of
'many subsisting in the many'; so that this part of the question runs counter to and upsets the very basis of the discussion. If, on the other hand, (according to the second part of the question) while subsisting in the many, the one were to subsist only in part in each of the many parts, even then it would no longer be 'the one subsisting in the many'; it would be a case of 'many subsisting in the many' (several parts of the one subsisting in the many); and further, in this case, every one of the parts (of the whole) that subsist in the many, would be so many independent wholes; so in this manner also it would not be the 'one subsisting in the many', but would be 'many subsisting in the many'.

But then, it may be objected, what is meant by 'many subsisting in the many' is nothing but 'each of the former subsists in its entirety in each of the latter'.

But even then, the very basis of the discussion (that 'one subsists in the many') becomes set aside. The assertion that 'each of them subsists in its entirety in each of the parts' is tantamount to saying that 'many subsists in the many'; and this certainly runs counter to the very basis of the discussion. Such a question as has been put by the Buddhists, cuts off the very basis of the discussion. Thus, then, it is found that the alternatives put forward are not logically admissible. 19

There would be no diversity with reference to perceived and unperceived components as difference (due to apprehension and non-apprehension) is found also with regard to a thing that is
known to be one only; in regard to a single thing, Devadatta, for instance, there is apprehension when he is seen and there is non-apprehension when he is not seen; and just as Devadatta, as accompanied by a certain thing, is perceived, while he is not perceived, as accompanied by another thing, and yet this does not give rise to a diversity in Devadatta himself — it does not turn the one Devadatta into several persons — the same would be the case with the whole which may be perceived as along with the perceived parts and unperceived as along with the unperceived parts; and there would be nothing incongruous in this.

Another fact that goes against the Buddhists is that the whole is actually apprehended. They have tried to show an absurdity: There is apprehension of the whole 'tree' due to the apprehension of one part of it and there is non-apprehension of it due to the non-apprehension of another part. But there is no room for such duality; because as a matter of fact the whole is actually apprehended. When the whole is apprehended, as along with one component part, what of it is not apprehended, by reason of which there could be any room for duality in regard to its being (in part) apprehended and (in part) unapprehended?

Even if the central and hind parts are not apprehended, there is no harm, for these parts are something distinct from the whole itself; the whole is one thing and its central and back parts are totally different things. Hence it is only natural that the parts should not be apprehended even when the whole is apprehended.
The reason lies in the simple fact that the conditions necessary for their apprehension are not present. That is to say, as regards the whole as along with the front part, there is present the condition necessary for its apprehension -- such condition consisting in having contact with the sense-organ; but this condition is not present as regards the whole as along with the central and hind parts; so it is only natural that while it is perceived as along with the front part, it should not be perceived as along with the central and hind parts.

If the view that the whole is only 'a conglomeration of parts' is accepted, there would be the impossibility of any conception of the 'tree'. Under this theory the 'tree' could be either 'the assemblage of root, trunk, branches and leaves', or 'the conjunction of these parts'; and in either case the conception of the 'tree' becomes impossible; in the former, because all the parts (the assembled ones) can never be perceived, as some of them would always be hidden from view and in the latter, because there can be no perception of the 'conjunction', when the members conjoined are not perceived. Unless there is perception of all the members conjoined, there is no perception of the conjunction, such perception always being in the form 'this is in conjunction with that', which presupposes the perception of both the members.

Thus the inevitable conclusion is that the cognition of the 'tree' along with the 'cognition of one part', can be explained only on the theory that the 'tree' forms a distinct object, and
not on the theory that it is a mere assemblage of parts.

The Buddhist assertion that no distinct thing can form the component part of any object is not tenable, for it gives no ground. It may be pointed out that obviously the ground is 'as these are the components', and the full argument would be:

The yarns are not entirely different from the cloth, because they are its components. But such reasoning involves a self-contradiction. If the yarns are not something distinct from the cloth, they cannot be called its components. Because, the name 'component' is relative, can be used only with reference to a certain whole. So when the Buddhists deny the whole, they can have no basis for regarding anything as component.

Again, as the name 'component' is used only with reference to things (the wholes) that are different, the Buddhist ground 'being components' becomes 'contradictory' proving a conclusion of non-difference. e.g: the component yarns are different from the jar: So this different thing must be a whole. Otherwise without a whole, the use of 'component' involves self-contradiction.

Arguing further, Uddyotakara says that the proposition of the Buddhists is in the form 'the yarns are not different from the cloth' and the probans given is tadevaravatvat, and this must subsist in the (na arthāntaram paṭṭaṃ tantavah) subject. Here the subject is the yarns. Now the pronoun tat must have for its antecedent the most predominant one of the foregoing nouns. Then the premise must be taken to mean that the yarns
are the components of the yarns, which is palpably absurd.

Reversing the form of the premise, if the cloth is made the subject, then the probans would not subsist in the subject at all, for being the component is a property that subsists in the yarns; it is a property of the yarns, and not of the cloth.

But the Buddhists say that nothing is to be produced; all effects to be entities ever before the generation of the cause. What happens is that the same yarns, by arranging themselves in a particular position, obtain the name of cloth.21

This is highly illogical. There is no point of similarity between the cloth and those yarns; and in the absence of some such similarity there can be no basis for the misconception that the yarns are the cloth. The idea of cloth cannot rest entirely upon the yarns. So, under the circumstances, if anybody conceives of the yarns as 'cloth', it must be regarded as a misconception.

Now as to the contention that only the arrangement of the yarns in a new position comes to be called 'cloth', a question may be asked: Is this new state of the yarns something different from the yarns, or not? If it is something different, then, the Buddhists should declare clearly what that something different is. If they fail to do so, the assertion 'arranged into a new position' becomes meaningless. The Nyāyāyikas can easily maintain that the new state is their mutual conjunction (combination),22 and that is something different from the yarns.
By no means the expression *avavyavayavibhāvāt* can come from the original probans *arthāntarānavavavatvat*. By the process of reaffirming, *avavyavayavibhāvāt* may be meant, but it would be a contradictory reason. The yarns are not the 'component' and whole of themselves, nor in the cloth itself of these both characters, because the terms 'component' and 'whole' are relative terms. So if either of the two relatives is rejected it should be impossible to use its relative term. Therefore, where the Buddhists propound this kind of reasoning and reject the whole --- thereby his own reasoning *arthāntarānavavavatvat* cannot mean *avavyavayavibhāya*.

The argument based on 'the part of akāsa' also cannot save the Buddhist. The word 'part' (*pradeśa*) is different from what is meant by the word 'component' (*avava*). 'Component' is the name of a particular kind of cause (the constituent cause), while part is the name of the receptacle, called *pradeśa*, because the whole is indicated as contained in it (*pradīvate asmin*).

But here an objection may be raised: *akāsa* can never be said to be contained in anything, nor has *akāsa* any kind of cause; so when used in connection with *akāsa*, neither the sense of cause, nor that of receptacle would be possible.

Actually, in connection with *akāsa*, the use of the word 'part' should be explained as due to its similarity to such things that have parts. Here similarity consists in the fact of
the conjunction of *ākāsā* being as non-pervasive (not extending over the whole of it) as that of things having parts.

Again, the Buddhists have said that as the parts form the very essence of the whole and as the parts of *ākāsā* does not differ from *ākāsā*, hence the whole is not different from the components.

Here the probans is too-specific (*asadharana*). In the first place, the character of 'being a part of it' is such as is found neither in any different thing (*vipaksa*) nor in any non-different thing (*sapaksa*) (when two things are really identical, one is not called the part of the other).

Secondly, if the term 'part' (*pradeśa*) is synonymous with 'cause', the probans becomes 'contradictory' (*viruddha*, proving a contrary conclusion). When the yarns are called the 'parts' of the cloth, it means that they are its cause, and the product must be different from the cause.

Thirdly, as a matter of fact, being called its part can have no connection with the 'yarns' (the subject of the Buddhist inference); so their probans becomes 'unknown' (*asiddha*). Also, the inference is stated in the form *tantavah* *patat* arthāntaram *tattvadesavyapradesāvyāvayat*. now the pronoun *tet* in the last clause must refer to the *tantavah* of the preceding clause, that being the principal noun there; and certainly the yarns are not called the parts of the yarns; so that *tantavah*, not being *tattvadesavyapradesāvyāvayev*, the probans turns out to be an impossible one.
Fourthly, the instance 'part of ākāśa' is impossible, because all that is meant by the phrase 'part of ākāśa' is the 'conjunction of ākāśa', non-pervading in its character; and certainly the non-pervading character of its conjunction does not constitute the essence of ākāśa (which is what the instance is meant to corroborate); so that the instance also turns out to be an impossible one.

The probans, as implied by the reaffirmation is tebhvastūt-sattēh, 'because of production from those'; and in the first place such a probans is too-specific (asaḥcāraṇa), being precluded from different as well as non-different things.

Secondly, the probans is contradictory, because it is found that the cloth is actually produced from the loom etc. which are totally different things.

Thirdly, inasmuch as cloth has been made the subject, the probans is also meaningless. The proposition being in the form na pataḥ tantubhyāḥ arthāntaram, if the probans be stated in the form tebhvastūt-sattēh the pronoun tat in this last term must refer to pata of the preceding sentence; so that the meaning of the probans would be pataḥbhyāḥ uto-sattēh pataḥsya; and this would be absurd. If to escape from this difficulty the pronoun tat (in tebhvah) be made to refer to the yarns, even then, the probans becomes contradictory, as the yarns themselves are not produced from the yarns and this is what it would come to if the yarns were the same
as the cloth. Inasmuch as this is not possible, the probans 'because it is produced from the yarns' must be taken to prove that the cloth is something different from the yarns; and this is contrary to the proposition of the opponent.

The probans avavavantarēvavānārayavavantarārthāntarabhava, is too-specific (asadharana). Simply it means tadvatirekena anyānvayavatvāt, 'because they (the yarns) are not the components of anything other than that (cloth)'. But as the yarns cannot be their own components, this probans turns out to be 'contradictory'. The yarns are not the components of anything different from the cloth; this means that the thing of which the yarns are not the components must be different from the cloth. Now as the yarns cannot be the components of the yarns themselves, the yarns must be different from the cloth!

Further, as the Buddhists deny the whole being anything different from the component, they cannot have any such proposition as 'the component is the whole', the component being the same as the whole.

Here the Buddhists may say that those components which are different from the whole are always the components of some other whole, e.g. the wheels, different from the cloth, are the components of the chariot. But this statement involves a self-contradiction on the Buddhists' part in both ways: (a) When they say that the wheels are the components of the chariot, they admit thereby the
fact of the components being different from the whole, for the
wheels are certainly different from the chariot. (b) But if they
deny the components being different from the whole, it would not
be possible to maintain that the wheels are the components. So
the ground for using the terms 'whole' and 'components' would be
rejected, and the probans in the argument cannot be taken as valid.

The probans जरवेणेतरोपत्तिदेववावचछेति is too-specific
(साधारण).

Here the probans simply comes to तद्देशौपत्तेऽि i.e. because
it is produced in that very place occupied by that (component).
But it is 'contradictory' and proves a contrary conclusion (non-
difference of whole from components), as the yarn itself is not
produced in the place occupied previously by itself. According
to the Buddhist argument, the yarn should be different from
itself.

Again, as the Buddhists deny any such substance as the cloth,
there can be no 'production' of it and hence the term 'produc-
tion' (उत्पत्ति) in the probans of the Buddhist assertion would be
a misnomer. Indeed, the production may be that of the yarn only
which is already there, and there is no such thing as the cloth.
According to the Buddhist, what 'production' signifies is the
unprecedented birth of things (i.e. which did not already exist
before) as qualified by individuality and other such distinctive
properties.23 But the above certainly goes against the Buddhist
view of things.
Difference between two things is to be admitted when the first thing, during the existence of the second thing, can be the producer of a third thing. Here the intended probans is satyanya-kāraṇāt, 'because while one thing is present, there is production of another thing'. The Buddhists say that 'while the mat is present, the yarns produce the cloth'. From it, it comes out that the yarns must not be different from the cloth; otherwise in the presence of the mat, the yarns would not produce the cloth.

But certainly the yarns do not produce themselves, and if the cloth also were not different from the yarns, it follows that the yarns could not produce anything different from themselves. So there would be nothing that could be the object of the 'production'.

In this argument, the form of the probans would be tantusamyo-gabhavastadutpattēh, 'because it is produced from the conjunctions of the yarns'; and this probans also is too-specific. When the Buddhists speak of the production of the cloth from the conjunction of the yarns, they admit that the cloth and the conjunction are different from the yarns; for if they do not admit this, the probans becomes meaningless.

The Buddhists also have to admit the production of the qualities of the cloth from the qualities of the yarns, and yet they stick to the unreasonable conclusion that the cloth is not different from the yarns. According to the Buddhists, the cloth being the same as the yarns, the production of the qualities of the former from those of the latter would be impossible as the production of the qualities of the yarns from the qualities of the yarns themselves.
The Buddhists have argued that if the whole be different from the components, it would have to be admitted that the whole subsists in things both perceptible (whole) and imperceptible (component atoms). But then, it would itself be imperceptible, just like the conjunction of the mother and the womb. But as the whole is perceptible it is not different from its components.

However, it is clearly a contradictory argument. For the fact of the whole being perceptible while the components are imperceptible should rather prove that the two are different.

Further, when that conjunction (of the mother and the womb) is not perceptible, (i) is this imperceptibility due to the conjunction being produced from one perceptible and another imperceptible thing? (ii) or, is it due to the conjunction subsisting in one perceptible and another imperceptible thing?

(i) If it be the former, the small snow ball formed by the contact of the smaller snow particles at the summits of the Himalaya should be imperceptible; as of the two things (the mountain and the smaller snow particles) from which it is produced, only one (the mountain) is perceptible, the other (smaller snow particle) is imperceptible.

(ii) If the other alternative (imperceptibility due to the conjunction subsisting in the perceptible and the imperceptible thing) is accepted, then bhāva, 'being' should be imperceptible; as it is something that subsists in perceptible and imperceptible
things (the character of 'being' subsisting in most of the categories, perceptible and imperceptible alike).

Here the Buddhists might argue that as conjunction depends for its ascertainment upon the ascertainment of the two conjuncts, it becomes imperceptible if one of the conjuncts is imperceptible; in the same manner, when the components are both perceptible and imperceptible, the whole should be imperceptible. Uddvotakara points out that the Buddhists however do not put forward the above kind of argument, which would have at least been more logical.

Even then, the above instance cannot be applied in the case of the whole and the components. Though the ascertainment of the conjunction is dependent upon the ascertainment of the conjuncts, the ascertainment of the whole does not depend upon the ascertainment of the components e.g. the triad is quite perceptible even though its components, the diads, are not perceptible. Again, if the imperceptibility of the whole should result from the imperceptibility of the components, then, all things would be imperceptible, as of no object are the inner and hind parts ever perceived.

Again, when the Buddhists urge the fact of 'being perceptible' as the probans, they thereby admit that the whole is something different from the components; because atoms, which are the components of all things, are beyond the reach of the sense-organs. So the probans is clearly 'contradictory' (proving the difference and not non-difference of the whole).

In the inference with the probans 'absence of conjunction and non-proximity', the whole has been made the subject (paksa). The
probans 'absence of conjunction and disjunction' should pertain to that, but it is actually such as pertains to conjunction and disjunction, but it can have no connection with the proposition. If, in order to escape from this difficulty, it be held that what are intended to be the probans, are asamyogitya (the character of being not conjoined), and avibhāgitva (the character of being not disjoined) and these certainly pertain to the whole, then also the probans is liable to be charged as 'unknown', as the whole does become conjoined with and disjoined from the other things, and as such, the said two characters do not belong to it at all. In order to meet this it might be urged that what is meant to be the probans is 'the character of being not conjoined with its components'; but in that case the probans becomes 'inconclusive'; no conclusion, either affirmative or negative, can be deduced from it. 'Absence of conjunction and disjunction' bears the same relation to different as well as non-different things; e.g. the yarns cannot be conjoined with or disjoined from themselves. So that from the said fact one cannot deduce either the difference or the non-difference of any two things.

The Buddhists here cite the example of the serpent's coil and argue that since the coil is not in conjunction with the cause (the serpent) it is non-different from it and this example enables us to deduce the affirmative conclusion that there is non-difference where there is 'absence of conjunction and disjunction.'
But the example is useless, for the fact is that the serpent's coil is something different from the snake (as has already been shown).

Then, again, the Buddhists assert that 'the coil is not in contact with its cause'. But this also is open to doubt as to whether it is not in contact because it is a quality of the cause and as such subsists in it by inherence, and not by conjunction, or because it is not different (from the cause). The Naiyayika view is that it is so because of its being a quality and not because of its being non-different. As a matter of fact, the serpent's coil consists only in the peculiar conjunction of the serpent's limbs; and conjunction is a quality; and that the quality is something quite different from the substance to which it belongs is an established fact. Further, even in the Buddhist view 'absence of conjunction and disjunction' may be shown in the case of different things, which makes the Buddhist probans 'contradictory'.

Another probans given is: 'Because of its not producing an effect of a different weight' (gurutvāntarahāryāgraṇāt). But it can have no relation with the subject (ṇaṇḍa) of the Buddhist proposition, namely, the whole. From the non-production of an effect of a different weight, all that the Buddhists can deduce is the negation of an effect of a different weight -- and not either weight, or different weight, or the whole; e.g. from the
denial of water it will not be right to deduce the denial of either the pot carrying water or the potsherds.

An effort to connect the probans with the subject would lead to the rejection of a well-established fact of observation. For instance, the Buddhists admit the product, but deny the presence in it of colour etc. But in admitting the product itself, the Buddhists in fact admit what they seek to deny; for when they assert that 'the colour etc. of the cause do not produce the colour etc. of the product', their product should be entirely devoid of qualities; but as a matter of fact, no product is found to be devoid of qualities. If in order to escape from this difficulty, it be held that the product too does not exist, then, the assertion -- 'the product is not possessed of qualities etc. produced by the colour etc. of the cause' -- becomes meaningless; e.g. when the waterpot is non-existent, it is not right to make the assertion that 'the waterpot is without water'. The same reasoning gets rid of the conjunction of colour etc. as existent in the product.26

Again, the Buddhists have urged that if the whole were something different, it would have a different weight (lesser or greater). But it has little relevance inasmuch as from the Nyāya standpoint it is admitted that the weight of the product is quite different, and no question being of lesser or greater does arise.

The Buddhists may try to contend as follows: Proposition:
'The balance indicates no effects of a different weight'; Reason: 'There is absence of a different lowering of the scales'. But then, the reason or probans would be one that subsists elsewhere than the subject; for the absence of a different lowering of the scales is not a property of the balance; the absence of the different lowering (being a negation) cannot be a property subsisting in the balance.

The Buddhists can neither proceed by modifying the reason that 'the balance does not indicate the effect of a different weight, because it is not the receptacle of a different lowering'. The probans here becomes open to the charge of being 'unknown' as 'the character of not being the receptacle of different lowering' does not (in fact) subsist in the balance.27

Uddyotakara himself answers that even so, the Buddhist probans is 'inconclusive' (i.e. not invariably concomitant with the probandum). Because, as a matter of fact, in some cases it is found that 'the character of not being the receptacle of a different lowering' is present in 'things of different weights' also. For instance, when a substance endowed with a certain weight,—in the shape of the atom of clay, e.g. is weighed, it is found to have a certain weight; and then there may be produced in it the triad in the shape of the dust-molecule, and then, in due course also the final product (in the shape of the jar); and though each of these latter (the triad and the subsequent
products up to the jar) is endowed with a weight different from that of each component atom of which it is composed, yet this does not produce in these atoms, which continue to be possessed of their own simple pristine weight, a different lowering. So here we have a case where even though things, having different weights have fallen into a certain receptacle, the atom, the character of not being the receptacle of a different lowering is present in it. The opponent may argue that the balance cannot indicate the effect of a different weight because it is not the receptacle of different lowering, which implies that there is concomitance between the presence of things of different weights and the different lowering. But in the case of the atom it has been shown that though several things of diverse weights fall into it, yet the atom does not become the receptacle of a different lowering; e.g., the atom is not lowered differently than before; this shows that the said concomitance is not true.

This is not right; because the limits of the weights of the product and the component cause cannot be discerned; that is to say, if it could be definitely discerned that when a certain thing is weighed, so much is the weight of the thing itself and so much of its component particles, then alone it could be said that the product can only be either equal to or weightier or less weighty than the component cause; however, it is never ascertained that so much is the weight of the product and so much of the component cause.
The Buddhists cannot say that in the absence of the above discernment, the notions like 'this weighs two pulas, this weighs five pulas', would not be possible; for what the said notions represent is the recognition of the weight of the aggregate; in the above notions there is no discernment of the weight of the product and that of its component particles; what it represents is the result of the weighing of the whole aggregate, from the ultimate atom to the final product; and such being the case, no mortal man (unable to perceive the atom or anything belonging to it) can say that 'so much represents the weight of the component atoms, and so much that of the product. Nor can the 'aggregate' be regarded as the 'cause' and certainly the weight of the atom can never be discerned by ordinary men.28

Here the Buddhists may object that if the addition of things of different weights do not produce any appreciable effect in the shape of the different lowering, how can it be known that the product has any weight at all? The diads and the triads (being particular products) as well as jar etc. are the direct effects of atoms. Then there must be the weight of the atoms at least, otherwise no effect in the form of lowering would be seen.

Uddyotakara answers that the weight of the product is recognised by the act of falling; for the falling of the product there can be no other cause except its weight.

So the conclusion is that the product has a weight of its own
different from that of its component parts. These same arguments also serve to reject the argument that 'the product has no weight of its own, because we do not perceive a different lowering of the scales of the balance.'

If the whole is not admitted as apart from components, there would result non-apprehension of all things. As the atoms are never fit to be perceived, non-acceptance of whole which is composed of the atoms, would lead to the denial of many accepted facts, such: The conception of 'substance' (there is a jar), the conception of 'quality' (this is dark.), the conception of 'action' (it moves.), the conception of universal, particularity, conjunction etc. As a matter of fact, we do have valid apprehensions about substance, quality and the rest. So it is to be accepted that there is such a thing as the whole apart from the components.

As regards perception, it has for its object only such things as are present and are possessed of magnitude; that alone which is present and is possessed of magnitude can be perceived by means of the external organs; so that if the Buddhists deny the existence of such whole as the jar and the like (which alone are possessed of magnitude), there can be no object for perception by means of the external organs.
Where there is no perception, there can be no inference or other forms of cognition also. In this manner there would be a cessation of all forms of cognition. Yet things are actually apprehended by means of perception and the other instruments of cognition. So from the fact of their apprehension by means of various instruments of cognition, it follows that there is such a thing as the whole.

As there are the facts of 'being gripped' (dharanā) and 'being pulled' (äkarsanā) the whole is a different substance.29

These two facts prove the existence of the whole. These are never found either in any admittedly non-whole substance like äkāsa or in any purely component substance like atoms (which are always components and never composites); but these are found in several substances, from which it follows that they must belong to the whole, for substances must be either whole or component or non-whole.

The Buddhists may contend that 'being gripped' and 'being pulled' are not the effects of the composite character of the substance, by which the whole can be proved as a distinct entity. These two are due to adhesion; for example, they are not found in the dust heap, while they are so in the straw-stone-wood packed together with lac.

This is not quite justified. The Naiyāyikas would retort that 'being gripped' and 'being pulled' do not appear elsewhere than the whole. If they are seen in the case of the straw-stone-wood
packed together with lac, the combination must be a composite. Against the Buddhists it may also be urged that there is no special reason to think that 'being gripped' and 'being pulled' are due to adhesion and not to composite character. Viscosity (śnēha) and fluidity (dravatva) are present in the components of the substance. They are absent in a dust heap and hence, there is no gripping or pulling and as a result there is no adhesion. So adhesion is not the cause of 'being gripped' and 'being pulled'.

One who denies the whole and with a view to avoid the contingency of perception becoming impossible holds that what is perceived is the 'mass of atoms', should be asked: "What is the object of a unitary conception, i.e. the conception that we have in the form 'this is one substance'? Does it pertain (i) to several (diverse) things, or, (ii) to a non-diverse thing?"

(i) It cannot pertain to diverse things because a unitary conception is never actually found to appear in regard to diverse things; and even if it were found to so appear, the idea of 'one' in connection with several things would be but false.

(ii) If the unitary conception pertains to a non-diverse thing, it is to be admitted that that non-diverse thing which forms the object of the said conception is the whole.
Then, again, it is also to be kept in mind that the conceptions of 'one' and 'many' must pertain to different objects, because while the former pertains to an object in the aggregated form, the latter pertains to non-aggregated or disintegrated things; thus, the former is referred to simply as 'this', while the latter is referred to as 'this', 'this', 'this', and so on.

The Buddhists may say that the said conception of 'one' in regard to the 'many' would be similar to the notion that we have in regard to such collective things as the 'army', the 'forest' etc. It is a fact that even in cases where there is no diversity in the things themselves, we may have a difference in our conception of them. This distinction is also found while one thing is single and the other is diverse. For instance, the conception of the 'army' is different from the conceptions of the elephants etc. (constituting the army). Similarly, the conceptions of the 'Khadira and other trees' (constituting the forest) are different from the conception of the 'forest' itself and yet either the army or the forest is not different from its constituent factors. So there is no hard and fast rule that the unitary conception must be of an integrated thing.

In fact, collective things like the army and the forest are entirely different from their constituents. Even granting that there is a notion of non-difference between the forest and its constituents, it is not right to urge this as proving absolute
non-difference, for such a notion can be due to several causes. For instance (a) there may be a notion of non-difference when two things are actually non-different, and (b) there may be such a notion, even when the two things perceived are really different, but their difference is not somehow perceived.

(a) The first alternative is admitted by both the parties. Some have said that there is really no one (non-different) thing. But this is not right as in that case the notion of 'many' being only a collection of several 'ones' (unities), the notion of 'many' which is actually admitted would be impossible.

(b) In the other alternative, even though the things perceived are actually diverse, yet there is sometimes a notion of non-difference due to the non-perception of the difference between them, this non-perception of difference being due to remoteness.

But the case of atoms is different. Atoms are never perceived by anybody. It is only an object which is perceptible by the sense-organs and is capable of having its distinctness perceived that can form the basis of the notion of non-difference. When the said distinctness fails to be perceived on account of distance when there are a number of things and the particular species to which each belongs is ordinarily perceptible, the particular species fails to be perceived on account of remoteness; or in the case of such things as have their diverse characters ordinarily perceptible, the diversity fails to be perceived on account of
remoteness. The reason for this lies in the fact that the non-perception of a thing that is ordinarily perceived is due to other (extraneous) causes. That is to say, whenever there is non-perception of a perceptible thing, it is due to some extraneous cause, as in the case of 'army' and 'forest'. The atoms, however, are never perceived, being by nature beyond the reach of the sense-organs. Hence, their non-perception cannot be said to be due to any extraneous causes like remoteness etc.

It is said by the Buddhists that the atoms constitute the basis of the conception of jar and such other substances. But the question is: When atoms give rise to the conception of a thing different from themselves as only atoms, do they do so when a new character is produced in them or without having any such character produced?

If they have a new character produced in them, it would constitute the whole, while if they have no such character produced in them, it would come to this that the same atoms that were imperceptible have become perceptible, which is absurd.

This special character of the atoms cannot be the conjunction and it is not correct to say that because of this conjunction the atoms become visible. Conjunction of imperceptible things can never become perceptible and in the case of imperceptible things, there can be no such perceptual cognition as 'this is in contact with that'. Thus the conjunction even cannot be regarded
as the new character that renders the atoms perceptible.

The Buddhists may say that no new character is produced in the atoms, yet a different conception (i.e. unitary) cannot be rule out.

The notion of 'one' is actually in regard to the diverse atoms and it is only a misconception.

Uddyotakara answers that misconceptions are due to perception of similarity and non-perception of difference. That is, the perception of similarity imposes a contrary character through the impression left by a previous perception of that character which does as a matter of fact belong to the thing.

Now, as regards atoms, inasmuch as they are entirely imperceptible, 'perception of similarity' is not possible, and hence, non-perception of difference also is not possible. As a result, the imposition of a contrary character also is not possible. Thus then the cause of misconception being absent, the appearance of the effect in the shape of misconception would not be possible.

This same reasoning also takes care of the contentions that (a) 'the unitary conception in regard to atoms is secondary (indirect or figurative)', and (b) that 'it is merely analogical'.

(a) That upon which the secondary or figurative conception is based is bhakti, literally meaning 'that which is divided or held in common (bhaivate) by two things', which stands for
the similarity of a thing to that which it is not; for instance, when one perceives the 'dull intelligence of the ploughman', he speaks of him as an 'ox'. But no such perception of similarity is possible in the case of atoms, which are imperceptible.

(b) Nor again will it be right to regard the notions of 'one' in regard to the many atoms as analogical, because there in no analogy between what is really what is conceived (i.e. what is really one) and what is not really so (i.e. what is many); and without some likeness between them, analogical cognition can never be possible.

Then again, the conception of 'one' in regard to the many atoms cannot be regarded as wrong cognition, as there is no such right cognition (of 'one' in regard to many) as could form the prototype of such a misconception.

Further, when the Buddhists say that "the notion of 'one' in regard to such objects as sound and the like is the correct prototype of all unitary conceptions, while the notion of 'one' in regard to such objects as the jar and the like is a misconception" --- they admit the real existence of such things as the jar and the like; for if the existence of the jar etc. is not admitted, there can be no occasion for any such assertion as that 'similarity to sound etc. forms the basis of the conception of one in regard to the jar'.

The Buddhists may say that the existence of the jar etc. is
not admitted; but the unitary conception which arises in regard to the massed atoms is based on the analogy of sound etc. But still this would not be possible, as atoms are imperceptible.

Then again, the Vaibhāṣikas regard even sound etc., the basis of the right primary (prototypal) unitary conception, as nothing more than mere masses of atoms; so that, there also being as much massed atoms as the jar etc. the unitary conception in regard to them cannot be right. For in regard to sound (which is a mass of atoms) the notion of 'one' would arise only when there would be a cessation of the notion of its being a conglomeration (of several things); and as such the said conception (being due to the cessation of a correct notion with regard to the thing concerned) could be only figurative, proceeding on the basis of the similarity (of sound) to things really possessed of unity; things possessed of real unity are naturally such that with regard to them there is always an absence of the notion of their being a conglomeration of several things; so that in regard to sound also, when there is similar absence of the notion of its being a conglomeration of several things, this constitutes a similarity between sound and things possessed of real unity; and on the basis of this similarity, there arises the notion of 'one' in regard to sound also; and this notion can be regarded as only figurative.

If it be said that in every case the notion of 'one' might
be due to the absence of the notion of their being a conglomera-
tion of several things, then in the conception 'not-two' there
could be no such doubt as to whether it is 'one' or 'several'
(more than two). By the theory of 'negation of conglomeration',
it is always the notion of 'one'. That is, whenever the term
'not-two' is used it gives rise to a doubt as to there being
'one' or more than 'two', the negation of two being common to
both, but if 'not-two' means the negation of conglomeration in
all cases, then it could not give rise to the doubt as to its
being one or more than two; but it does give rise to the said
doubt, and with a view to removing this doubt, 'it is one only'
is added, which restricts the conception of 'not-two' to 'one'
only. The notion of 'one' = absence of the notion of conglome-
ration.

Hence the case of sound will not serve to explain the unitary
notion of 'two' etc. in the case of the jar and the cloth, both
being mere conglomeration of atoms. Thus the case of sound is
similar to that of things possessed of real duality: i.e. con-
glomeration is as much present in sound as in a substance posse-
sing duality.

How can it be held that in all cases (atoms included) the
notion of 'not one' is due to the presence of the notion of
conglomeration?
If the notion of 'two' etc. were always due to the presence of conglomeration, then, whenever the denial 'this is not one' is made, it will always give rise to the ascertainement of the thing being 'two' and not 'three' etc. and there should be no such doubt as to whether the thing is 'two' or 'three' - both of these being equally 'not one'. (Tatparva does not appear to be satisfied with all this. It says: The ultimate criterion for all things is our uncontradicted notion of them; and as we have the notion of the numbers 'two', 'three', etc., these have to be admitted as realities; the Vārttaka has carried on with a series of reasonings simply with a view to show that the idea is amenable to several proofs.)

Again, one who does not admit of the conception of 'one' or 'two' etc., for him there cannot be either 'conglomeration' or 'negation of conglomeration', because for one who does not admit of unity how can there be conglomeration, negation of which amounts to unitary conception (according to the Buddhists)? Duality is to be admitted directly. Whose denial would there be in the negation of conglomeration? So the conclusion is that 'one', 'two', etc., are to be admitted as distinct entities by themselves, otherwise ideas of 'one hundred', 'one duality', etc. would not be possible. If duality etc. is only 'conglomeration' and 'negation of conglomeration' is 'one', and 'one' and 'two' are no distinct entities, then, the notion 'one duality', involving
co-relation or identification between 'one' and 'duality',
would be impossible, for they would involve mutual contradiction
--- 'conglomeration' and 'negation of conglomeration'.

As a matter of fact, in the case of sound etc. the notion
of 'one' is due to the non-perception of diversity, when these
are perceived their diversity is not perceived. There is no such
possibility in the case of atoms for the simple reason that atoms
are imperceptible.

If the Buddhists do not admit the whole to be something dif-
fferent, the notions - 'this is large, possessed of magnitude',
'this is in contact with that', 'the animal, the horse, is moving'
-- would not be possible; for none of these notions can rightly
apply to atoms, which are imperceptible.

The Buddhists may contend, that the disputed point is in
regard not to such notions, but to the notions of 'one' etc. Do
they pertain to the mere mass or conglomeration of atoms or
something different from the atoms? What is the special reason
for pertaining to one and not to the other?

Uddyotakara answers that the special reason for the percep-
tion pertaining to a distinct 'whole' is that it consists in the
co-extensiveness of these with the notion of magnitude; that
is to say, whenever the notion of 'one' arises, it does so in
regard to what is large, possessed of magnitude; and as a matter
of fact, whenever two conceptions are found to be co-existent,
the thing in regard to which the conceptions arise is found to
be possessed of both the characters conceived of; e.g. whenever we have the notion of 'blue' as co-extensive with lotus in the phrase 'the lotus is blue' - it means that the blue lotus refers to a thing which is possessed of both the characters 'being lotus' and 'being blue'; so that when the conception of 'one' is actually found to be co-extensive with the conception of 'large', the conclusion is that what is conceived of as 'one' is what is also 'large' and not atomic.

Largeness (loudness) and smallness (faintness) of sound are not due to atoms, in different degrees. So the case of sound should not be cited here with a view to reject the whole.

The notion 'these two things are in contact' which involves the cognition of contact as co-extensive with (having the same substratum) duality also proves the existence of the whole. That the notions of largeness and 'being in contact' must pertain to the same object is because there is coalescence of the two just like the notions of blue and lotus (the characters 'being blue' and 'being lotus', both subsisting in the blue lotus). Thus the characters of 'being large' and 'being in contact' must be subsisting in the same which cannot but be the whole. A similar other notion proving a distinct whole is 'one large thing is moving'.

One who holds that the whole is nothing apart from the group or mass of components, should be asked the following questions:

The notions like 'cow', 'horse', 'man', etc. as are based
upon the several particular universals (jāti), to what do these pertain?

But, then, it may be asked in turn, there is no such thing as universal (jāti); how could there be any conception based upon universals? 34

But it is not possible to deny the existence of universals without which there can be no basis for a comprehensive cognition. Inasmuch as no universal can be manifested without a substratum, it is necessary to explain what that substratum is.

The Buddhists may say that it is the group of atoms in a certain state, and it is also to be noted that the mere necessity to provide a basis for the comprehensive conception does not establish the existence of the whole.

In answer, Uddyotakara says that again and again it has been clearly shown that the grouping of atoms is only another name for 'conjunction' and it is quite different from the atoms themselves.

Further, if the Buddhists think that it is the peculiar grouping of the atoms that manifests the particular universal, they should be asked: Is the 'grouping', when it manifests the universal, perceived? Or, does it manifest it without being itself perceived?

If the universal be manifested by a 'group' (of atoms) that is actually perceived, then, inasmuch as its inner and back parts would be hidden from view by the front part, the group
would not be perceived and hence, the universal could not be manifested by the unperceived parts? If the perceived part be enough, there would be diversity in a single thing, i.e. one tree would be recognised as many. Hence the accepted notion of 'one' would not be possible.

Further, as the mere front part of a tree is not 'tree' and yet that part is all that is perceived, and in which, as such, the universal 'treeness' is manifested, ex hypothesi, there would be nothing in which the universal 'treeness' would subsist. So there would not be a real object for the concept 'tree'.

From the above the conclusion follows that what serves to manifest a particular universal is an entirely distinct substance as subsists in the ground atoms, and this distinct substance is the whole as something different from the component atoms.

That of which the 'grouped atoms' are the substratum is the one which subsists in the grouped atoms.

That 'distinct substance' which subsists in the grouped atoms is that to which belongs the character of manifesting a particular universal and not to atoms; that is what establishes the existence of the whole as something distinct from the component atoms.

Uddyotakara also gives a fresh argument which is not found in the Bhāṣya. One who does not admit the whole as something different from the components, should be asked to explain the real signification of the term paramāṇu (smallest particle). The term
\textit{paramāṇu} denotes the lowest stage in the descending scale of dimension, so that unless there is a corresponding 'large' substance, the term \textit{anu} (particle) cannot take any such qualification as \textit{paramāṇa}. That is to say, the qualification \textit{paramāṇa} would have a meaning only if there is a corresponding higher dimension; and if there is no such higher dimension, the qualified term \textit{paramāṇu} becomes meaningless; but the presence of higher dimension is possible only if there is a whole as different from the components and possessed of a higher dimension in relation to which the components could be called 'smallest'.

In answer, first it may be briefly noted that the doubt concerning the reality or unreality of the 'whole' is not justified. Because the grounds previously mentioned in \textit{Nyāya-sūtra} II.1.34--36 for proving the existence of the 'whole' stand unfuted and the emergence of a distinct substance in the form of the 'whole' is necessarily to be admitted.

That the parts reside in the whole is easily liable to be discarded at the very outset, because the cause does not reside in the effect, rather the effect resides in the cause and this is an admitted fact. But, it has been asked by the Buddhists, how does the whole occupy each of the individual parts - in its entirety, or through some particular segment only? This very question is unjustified, because each 'whole' like the tree etc. is a single
and separate entity. The question of the opponent is not at all possible in respect of any such single 'whole', because there is no difference within its own self. Difference can be spoken of only if there are more than one entity, and not in the case of a single one. Thus, the use of words like krtsna and ekadesa which signify difference is not justified in the case of a single whole and as such, the opponents' conclusion too remain unjustified.36

It may, however, be pointed out that a single whole too is constituted by many individual parts, and the words krtsna and ekadesa may even be employed in respect of a single whole to mean respectively the aggregate of all the individual parts and any one of the various individual parts. Even if there existed a segment in the form of some other part, one part would have been present within another part, but not the whole within the parts. Thus, since the whole is not proved to be present within the parts in spite of the existence of some other part, the argument that the whole cannot occupy the different individual parts through its various segments, because there is no other part of the whole, cannot be a proper ground for denying the reality of the whole.

The whole is contained within the parts, that is, the whole is the superstratum (āgrīta) and the parts, the substratum (āgrava) and thus, the presence of the whole within the parts means only the 'substratum-superstratum relation' (āgrevāgrīta-sambandha) between the two. This relation is nothing but the 'relation of inherence' (samavāva-sambandha).
The Buddhists have further argued that if there be a distinct entity in the form of the whole, it must have some colour of its own as distinct from that of the parts. Otherwise, there cannot be any visual perception of the alleged 'whole', for no substance without colour is observed to be known visually. But the whole is not observed to be characterised by any colour of its own as distinct from that of the parts and hence, there is no whole distinct from the parts. In answer, Uddyotakara says that since the whole is undoubtedly visually perceived there is no denying the fact that the whole too has some colour of its own; but there is a cause-effect relation between the colour of the parts and the colour of the whole, the former being the 'non-inherent cause' (agamavāti-kārana) of the latter. That is why the colour of the parts and the colour of the whole are generally of the same type. So if a distinct entity in the form of a whole is not admitted and every object is equated to a mere aggregate of atoms, no object would ever be perceived, because the atoms are imperceptible entities.

Here the opponents may try to answer the charge with the help of a new illustration. A person suffering from morbid vision cannot see a single hair due to the weakness of his eyes and the thinness of the hair; yet he has no difficulty in seeing a mass of hairs, that is, when a number of hairs is clustered together. In the same way, the opponent contends, we may not be able to
perceive one single atom; still we may have the ability to perceive an aggregate of atoms, that is, when many atoms stand conjoined with one another. Thus, it follows that when we seem to perceive an object we really perceive nothing but a particular aggregate of atoms and the question of admitting a distinct whole does not arise.

The distinctness or the indistinctness of the cognition of objects results from the soundness or the deficiency of the sense-organs only with reference to their own specific objects. The visual sense-organ, though sound enough, never perceives smell which is not its own specific object and, again, even if deficient, does not cease to operate in respect of its own specific object. A man suffering from morbid vision does not perceive a single hair which is a specific object for the visual sense-organ, and yet he does perceive a mass of hairs. But both of them i.e. a single hair as well as a mass of hairs are perceived through the visual sense-organ by one who is not suffering from morbid vision. The atoms, on the other hand, are imperceptible, not of the nature of an object of a sense-organ and are never perceived by any sense-organ.

Moreover, the opponents' view involves contradiction. The atoms, when conjoined with one another, become perceptible. But again, the same atoms when disjoined from one another, become imperceptible. Thus, if the production of a distinct substance
(= whole) over and above the parts is not admitted, there would result a grave contradiction. It would therefore, be only logical to maintain that there is produced a distinct substance in the form of a whole, which really constitutes the object of an apprehension. If it be argued that just the 'mere collectivity' (samuccavamātra) is the object of perception, it would not be correct, because collectivity is really of the nature of conjunction and conjunction which is located in imperceptible substances is never perceived. This is because one perceives conjunction in the form 'this substance is conjoined with that substance' which presupposes also the perceptibility of the substances conjoined. Therefore, the answer of the Buddhists to the charge of contradiction is illogical, for the atoms being imperceptible entities their collectivity or mutual conjunction too must remain equally so.
Chapter Four

1. Vide Nyāya Philosophy, Part II, p.57. If the four schools such a view cannot belong to the Śūnyavādins because they do not admit the real existence of anything and neither to the Viṣṇuavādins because they accept the existence of nothing but consciousness or viññāna. But both the Sautrāntikas and the Vaiśāśikas admit the reality of external objects, but since they do not admit a distinct whole they must admit every external object only a collection of atoms.

2. idam premānam arthāntarānāvāyavatvam. NV (Vide ND, p.479)

3. dravyāntaṃbhena dravyāntarāṇiśparternānvo'vavāyavavāvebhvaḥ. NV (Vide ND, p.486)

4. nānyo'vavāyavavāvebhvaḥ avavayantarāvāvānām avavayantarārthāntarābhāvāt. NV (Vide ND, p.486)

5. nānyo'vavāyavavāvebhvaḥ dravyāntarotpattidesāvavacchedat. NV (Vide ND, p.487) (vavacchedha = rejection ?) vavaccheda means absence of avaccheda or connection. c.f. dravyāntarotpattidesānāvavacchord vavaccheda. NVTT on NV

6. nānyo'vavāyavavāvebhvaḥ avavāyantarāvavāvino'vavāyantarārthāntarabhāvāt. NV (Vide ND, p.487)
7. nānyo'vaya vaya vaya vaya vayabhyaḥ satvayakarturarthaṁ tarabhavat.  
   NV (Vide ND, p.488)

8. nānyo'vaya vaya vaya vaya vayabhyaḥ svātmasaṃyogavatirekabhāvyavavyapanatvat.  
   NV (Vide ND, p.488)

9. nānyo'vaya vaya vaya vaya vayabhyaḥ dravyāntara-ragunānām dravyāntara-ragunākāra- 
   natve agunatvaprasaṅgāt.  
   NV (Vide ND, p.488)

10. nānyo'vaya vaya vaya vaya vayabhyaḥ apratyakṣa-tvaprasaṅgāt.  
    NV (Vide ND, p.488)

11. nānyo'vaya vaya vaya vaya vayabhyaḥ saṃyogaprāptvabhaṅvāt.  
    NV (Vide ND, p.491)

12. nānyo'vaya vaya vaya vaya vayabhyaḥ gurūtvan-tara-kārvāgrahāṅgāt.  
    NV (Vide ND, p.492)

Literary meaning: The lowering of the scale, which is the effect of the weight of the composite, is not different from that which is the effect of the weight of the components, i.e. the composite weighs exactly as much as its components.

13. This argument is seen in the fourth chapter of Nyāyasūtra (NS IV,ii 4-10). Vācaspati says that this further discussion by Gautama is with a view to refuting the right knowledge or tattvavijñāna as advocated by the Vijnānavādins who admit the reality of knowledge alone and neither of the 'whole' nor of the atoms.

The beginning about this topic in Nyāya-darsāna is as follows: Apprehension is of two kinds, for one may apprehend sometimes
an object which is actually present there and also sometimes an object which is not actually present there. In the same way, we can speak of two kinds of non-apprehension also, according as the object not apprehended is actually present or absent there. Thus, due to such duality of apprehension and non-apprehension, neither the apprehension nor the non-apprehension of the whole becomes capable of removing the doubt as to its reality or unreality, for, even after one apprehends the whole there may be produced a doubt in the form 'Does this apprehension pertain to an actually existing whole or to an actually non-existing whole?'. Again, even if one does not apprehend the whole, there may be produced a doubt in the form 'Does this non-apprehension pertain to an actually existing whole or to an actually non-existing whole? And either of the doubts ultimately leads to a doubt concerning the reality or unreality of the whole itself.

14. **NS IV.i.i. 6**

15. **NV under NS IV.i.i. 7**

16. **NV under NS IV.i.i. 9**

17. **NV under NS IV.i.i. 10**

18. *avam khalu avayavasu vartamāṇe ekasmin kārtṣṇena vā vartate ekadesena va ?*  

   **NV** *(Vide ND, p.471)*
19. The same fact of running counter to the very basis of the dis-
cussion may be urged against any such alternatives being put
forward in regard to all such things as subsist in many subs-
tances; such things for instance as Number, Separation, Con-
junction, Disjunction, Universal and the like.

20. na hi prāṇitmati agṛhyamāne prāaptisrahaṇam asti,
bhayati hi idam apena saṃvuktaṃ iti. sevam
ekadēṣa saṃrahaṇasahacaritā vrksaduddhiḥ dravyaṁtarotpattipakṣe
kelpate na samudāvanātre. NV (Vide ND, p.477)

21. naiva hi naḥ kiścin nirvartvam asti, ta eva tantaḥ
samsthaṇa viśeṣāvasthitah pataṅkhām labhanta iti apatākhvāstan-
tavaḥ pataśabdenābhidhiyanta ityuktam bhavati.
NV (Vide ND, p.480)

22. The Buddhists : A thing that is different from another is not
called its combination. e.g. the cow is not the combination of
the horse; while there is a combination of two hoofs. So com-
bination cannot be the criteria of difference. And again com-
bination itself is not a different thing.

23. vadi tantubhyah pataḥ nopravatvah, ka utpattiśabdaśva arthaḥ,
na tanturupadvate na pataḥ iti utpattiśabdaśva vaccedāt iti
utpattiśabdaśva artho vaktavva iti. sa ca nirupvamāno vyaktyā-
didbarmabhedena apūryam janmāheti viruddah. NV (Vide ND, p.487)
24. The Tatparya explains that the word paramāṇu in the text does not stand literally for the atom; as the atom is not productive of anything larger than the diad (which is also imperceptible); so what the term mean is only small particles of snow. What is meant is the snow-ball, which is a composite formed by the conjunction (combination) of the mountain top and the smaller snow-particles. Now if the contention of the pūrvapakṣin were right, this snow ball should not be perceptible.

25. Udayana in the third chapter of his Atmatattvaviveka discusses in a great detail, the Buddhist view of quality and qualified.

The Buddhists hold the view that the qualified is not distinct from the qualities. On the contrary, the Naiyāyikas hold the opposite view.

Uddyotakara, in course of explaining NS I.1.14, cites the Buddhist view and refutes also in detail. He begins the discussion by referring an objection against darsana-sparśanābhyām ekārthagrahaṇāt (NS III.1.1), i.e. as a single object is cognised by visual and cutaneous sense-organs, therefore that object must be accepted as one substance as distinct from the qualities of which it is a common substratum.

Uddyotakara mentions the main argument of the Buddhists in favour of the identity between them: tad-agrahe tad-buddhy-abhāvāt. To explain, there is no cognition of a substance without the cognition of its qualities. It is only when
something is identical with another that there is no cognition of it when the other is not cognised, as in the case of a row of trees, or meat-soup. A row of trees is not different from the trees, and therefore it is not cognised when the trees are not cognised. Similar is in the case of the other. On the other hand, when one thing is distinct from another, it may be cognised, even if the latter is not cognised. As in spite of absence of the cognition of colour etc., there is the cognition of taste.

As a matter of fact, what is cognised is only the qualities, colour etc., which happen to be in a particular shape. It is these qualities that the man actually perceives in that shape and it is by reason of this that he has the cognition of the jar. There is no such substance as the 'jar' as distinct from colour and the other qualities.

Stcherbatsky says: "...the conceptions of substance and quality seem to have found a back-door through which partly to re-enter in their usual position. For the division of the elements of matter into primary (bhūta and bhavattika) and of the mental elements into fundamental and derivative (citta and caitta) approach very nearly the relation of substance and quality."

(Uddyotakara answers that admitting the qualities only, the Buddhists cannot be able to explain the fact: We perceive the thing before us. According to the Buddhists, the cognition
of the jar etc. proceeds only from the qualities appearing in that shape (ākāra). The shape is the similarity of present thing with the absent thing in that place (atathābhūtasya tathābhutena sāmānyam ākaraśabdasya artho'bhicheyam) but both the thing must be real somewhere. But this conception of shape is no longer valid in the Buddhist view. Because the jar etc. themselves are not accepted as real and then the similarity of the qualities with the jar can never arise. If the opponents say that the cognitions of the 'jar' etc. are caused by the innate impressions (vāsanās) of those shapes existing in our mind from the eternity of the succession of lives; then Uddyotakara says that every false cognition presupposes a right cognition and so there is no cause of the cognition of 'jar' etc. as being permanently false. The said objection could be raised only in the case of an error having a beginning. Here Uddyotakara’s distortion of the Buddhist view is clear from Vācaspati’s comment in this connection. The opponents’ view is error without beginning. In this case Uddyotakara, finding no objection, wants from the Buddhists, the argument in favour of the 'qualified substance as not distinct from qualities'.

tad-agrahe tadyuddhy-abhāvāt is the Buddhist argument to prove the non-difference of qualified from qualities. By a sort of verbal quibbling, Uddyotakara shows that the Buddhist statement comes to the meaning that 'there is no cognition of the earth,
when the earth is not cognised'. The pronoun *tad* (that) in both places, would stand for earth which is said to be identical with qualities.

Moreover, the colour, etc. are many, and the earth is only one. Two objects which are expressed in different numbers cannot be identical just as 'the stars and the moon', expressed in plural and singular numbers, are not identical. Therefore, in *rūpādāvah pṛthivī*, the colour etc. (qualities) are distinct from earth (qualified substance) by the different numbers in two words.

Moreover, the quality of lotus etc. is distinct from the lotus etc., because we do very senseful verbal use *indīvarasva rūpam*, like the verbal use 'the horse of Caitra, where it is clear that the horse is distinct from Caitra.

A white crystal appears as blue owing to the proximity of a blue object. Its own white colour is not cognised, but the crystal is still cognised. It is the perceptual experience for the qualified thing. But above all, the said argument does not prove that the substance is perceived without colour, but with the changed colour, Kamalāśīla strikes that very point by saying (*Tattvāsamgraha*, p.236) *jaśākusumādvaradēhān raktādirūpena śanve na svaśīkonalaabhavate.*

As against the verbal support on the non-identity between the qualified and the qualities, Kamalāśīla says that this-like verbal expressions (sixth case ending in *indīvarādeh*...
rupam; different number in rupadaveh narihavi) cannot prove the fact. If it proves the fact, then the existence of the matter would depend on the verbal expressions alone. But the verbal expressions are according to the speaker's own will. For instance, there are different expressions patasva rupadaveh, pato rupadaveh, nate rupadaveh etc.

Meeting the Buddhist objection that a substance is never perceived apart from its qualities, says that the non-perception of an object may be due to two reasons: (a) non-existence of the object in question, as in the case of a hare's horn and (b) absence of the means of its perception. Here may be either of the reasons, or may not be any of them, but by this question Uddyotakara tacitly admits that a substance apart from its qualities is not perceived.

26. The Tatparya adds the word nivedhyatvena; as the sentence stands, it means that the 'conjunction of colour etc., is rejected'; which cannot be what is meant, as that would go against the Siddhanta view. By adding nivedhyatvena we get the meaning that 'there is rejection of the view that the cognition of colour etc., is to be denied'. The sense is that when the product and its colour etc. are denied, there cannot be any denial of cognition of these in the product.

27. This is apparently a weak answer; the Tatparya says that it is an answer given by one party (ekadesvin) of the Siddhantin. This answer is easily rejected by the opponent in the next sentence. (Vide ND, p.493)
28. Some have held the view that "certain atoms having produced a particular product (the molecules and the smaller particles of dust, for instance), also go on to produce the further products (such as the potsherds, the jar etc.) so that all products, from the triad down to the jar are the direct effects of, and as such, inhere directly in, the atoms themselves".

Against this view, the following observations may be made:
The primary and the secondary products (the clay particles and the potsherd etc.) can never occupy the same points in space, because they are corporeal substances; the cow, the horse etc., being corporeal things, no two of them are found to occupy the same points in space. Further details are not added as it would not be quite relevant.

29. dhārana-ākāraṇa-upāpatteḥ ca. (NS II.1.35)

30. By conceptual evidence, Uddyotakara wants to prove the existence of the whole (unitary conception must be in integrated thing).

31. As atoms are imperceptible by themselves, so a mere collection of atoms also should be ever imperceptible as in the case of wind. Hence if the conglomeration of atoms (in the jar etc.) does not constitute something different from themselves (in the shape of the composite substance, jar), it
would mean that the same atoms which are imperceptible are also perceptible; and this would be absurd. Non-perception of diversity or any extraneous cause cannot be said in the case of atoms. This is the intention of Tātparya.

32. etena bhakta aunamikas ca pratyayo vyākhvātah.

NV (Vide ND, p.504)

33. The notion of 'one' in regard to sound cannot be right. According to the Naiyāyikas no quality can reside in a quality; and both sound and number are qualities; and 'one' is only a number; so that, the notion of 'one' in regard to sound can be only figurative. NVTT

34. There can be no such real entity as universal, as the substratum of which it would be necessary to accept the existence of a real substance. For instance, does any particular universal subsist only in a particular object, or, in all? If in all, then all things would belong to the same community, of cow, for instance; and in the word there would be nothing but cows and cows! If, on the other hand, the 'universal' were held to subsist in a few individuals, the Naiyāyikas would have to explain how that universal becomes related to a particular individual — a particular cow that is newly born? For certainly before the individual came into existence at a certain place, the 'universal' was not there, at that
particular place; nor could the 'universal' subsisting in the older individuals go over to the newborn individual for according to the Naiyāyikas, it can have no motion; and also because if it does go over to the new thing, the older thing would become bereft of it, so that the older cow would cease to be a 'cow'! Nor will it be right to hold that when the individual is born, the 'universal' also is born with it; for in that case it would be something transient. The only way in which the Naiyāyikas can extricate himself from the meshes of these difficulties is to regard the idea of 'universal' as purely illusory.

35. Vide ND, p.513
   anabhūvataṃtārthāntarāvavavina etc.

36. IV under ekāsāṁ bhedābhāvā́d bhedasāhda-pravogānąnapatteh
    aprasnah. (NS IV.ii.II)