CHAPTER III

THE DEFINITION OF INFERENCE BY VASUBANDHU

In course of explaining the anumānasūtra, Uddyotakara refutes two definitions of the Buddhists, first, the one of Vasubandhu and second, the one of Diṅnāga. In both the cases Uddyotakara does not mention the opponent's name as usual. Vācaspati supplies the name of the second opponent, i.e. Diṅnāga. In the first case he mentions it as 'the definition of the opponent'. But there is no doubt about it being the definition of Vasubandhu, for as Stcherbatsky has shown, it definitely occurs in Vasubandhu's Vāda-viśeṣa.

Vasubandhu says: nāntarīyakārthar-dārśanam tadvido'numānam. That is, inference is the cognition of a thing which is invariably concomitant on the part of one who knows the said concomitance. It is explained as follows: When one thing is never present apart from another, it is said to be the invariable concomitant, or nāntarīyaka. Artha, 'the thing' that is so concomitant is called nāntarīyakārtha and the cognition of that this is anumāna. For instance, when one, who knows the invariable relation between smoke and fire, perceives smoke, invariably concomitant with fire, and arrives at the knowledge of fire, that knowledge of fire would be anumāna.
Uddyotakara's first objection is that the word artha in Vasubandhu's definition of inference is superfluous because that which is nāntarīvaka can never be anything other than an artha.

Secondly, nāntarīvakārtha is a compound word. Now which kind of compound is to be taken here?

(1) If genitive tatpurusa (nāntarīvakasva artha) is taken, then, in the case of the inference śabāp'ītvyah krtakatvēti (sound is transient because it is a product), krtakatva is the nāntarīvaka and its artha would be either (a) its dharma, property; or, (b) its pravajana, purpose or aim. (a) Now if nāntarīvakārtha would mean the property of krtakatva, then, sattva, being an entity, pramevatva, being an object of cognition, abhidhevatva, being nameable, etc., would be the properties of krtakatva; and the knowledge of these would become the inferential cognition of anityatva of word. But it is absurd. According to Yacaspati, the implication is this: The properties of krtakatva, the nāntarīvaka, are the sattva etc. but these sattva etc. are not nāntarīvaka with anityatva; now if the properties of krtakatva here are meant to be nāntarīvakārtha, then, we should have the inference of anityatva by those sattva etc. which are not nāntarīvaka (i.e. invariably concomitant) with anityatva. But actually it is not possible at all because sattva etc. occurs in ākāsa but there is no anityatva. (b) If, on the other hand, the purpose or aim of krtakatva is meant to be the artha of the nāntarīvaka, then the cognition of anityatva, which is obviously
the purpose of giving the word kṛtakatva, would become the probans
of the inference. Actually the cognition of anityatva is the pur-
pose i.e. the probandum of the said inference. But it would become
the probans. So it would not be correct to take purpose or aim as
the meaning of the word artha.

(2) If now, a Bahuvrihi compound is taken (nāntarīyakhaḥ arthāḥ
vasya, that to which the nāntarīyaka thing belongs), then also that
to which kṛtakatva, the nāntarīyaka, belongs would become the probans.
Now what is that to which this kṛtakatva belongs? (a) Does it
belong to such things as the jar and the like, or, (b) to sound, or,
(c) to anityatva itself? In every case the thing to which kṛtakatva
belongs, would become the probans because the perception of those
things is said to be anumāna. Hence the inference would assume any
of the following forms: (i) anityah śabdah ghatāt, (ii) anityah
śabdah śabdāt, (iii) anityah śabdah anityatvat. Though in the last
case, kṛtakatva belongs to anityatva, belonging to it as its cause,
or that which proves it, yet kṛtakatva is the artha of anityatva -
in no case would the former (which is a character) be a cause for
the latter (which also is a character) and that is what is intended
to be in the inference anityah śabdah kṛtakatvat.

(3) Now if in nāntarīvakārtha, a karmādhāraya compound (nānt-
arīvakas-cāsan arthaśceti) is taken, the compound itself would be
impossible. Because the exact conditions of the karmādhāraya compound
are not present here. Such a compound occurs between the qualifying
adjunct (viśesana) and the qualified object (viśesya). The
co-ordination or co-extensiveness, necessary for the karmadhārāya
compound is possible only when there is some difference between the
two (the one denoting the qualifying adjunct and the other the qual-
ified object). Otherwise if the two are identical both need not
appear at all. For example, in the case of the well-known compound
nīlotpalam, 'blue lotus', the word 'blue' signifies a colour that
is present in many things besides the lotus and the word 'lotus'
applies to many lotuses besides the blue one. Hence, here, co-ordi-
nation between the two, nīla and utpala, is possible. But in the
case of the words nāntarīyaka and artha, we find that when we men-
tion the word nāntarīyaka there is no such difference in extension,
for the character of being nāntarīyaka is not such that it subsists
in what is artha as also in what is not-artha. It is only an artha
that can be nāntarīyaka. So the word artha in addition to nāntarīyaka
cannot but be regarded as futile and superfluous.

But it may be pointed out that we find the necessary co-ordi-
nation even in a case where only one of the two words and not both are
incompatible; e.g. in the expression prthivi drayyam, 'the earth is
a substance', the word 'substance' applies to things other than earth
also, but 'earth' does not denote things other than 'substance'.
Yet there is co-ordination. The Buddhists may say that in the case
of nāntarīyaka and artha, it is true that the word nāntarīyaka does
not denote anything that is not artha, but the word artha does denote
things that are not-nāntarīyaka. So why should karmadhārāya be
impossible due to lack of co-ordination?
Uddyotakara answers that in *prthivija dravyam*, there is incompatibility in both the words. The opponents have said that though the word 'substance' can denote things other than the 'earth', yet the word 'earth' cannot denote something other than the substance. But this is not correct, when we take into consideration the diversity based upon the relation of subserviency (*pradhaana-angaha-bhaya*) (that subsists between the class as the qualifying adjunct, on the one hand, and the individual, as the qualified on the other), the word 'earth' denotes the 'substance' as well as the class earth and the word 'substance' also denotes the individual substance and the class substance. Hence when the word 'earth' may denote the class 'earth' also, and not only a substance. Thus there is incompatibility between both words as the word 'earth' also denotes something that is not substance; and it makes the proposition 'the earth is a substance' possible. The same conditions however cannot be shown in the case of *nantarIvakarthadarsanam*, because in no case *nantarIvaka* is compatible with artha. People make use of words only for the purpose of making known things intended by them; and as a matter of fact, we find that when the word *nantarIvaka* is mentioned, it provides the idea of artha also as it is only an artha that can be *nantarIvaka*. Not that the idea of 'substance' necessarily follows when the word 'earth' is pronounced although it is only a substance which can be 'earth'. So the inclusion of the word *artha* is not justified.

Vācaspati adds a further criticism in this connection.
If the word *artha* is meant to stand for *vastu* (thing which has external existence), then there is no *laksya* at all and hence the definition would be useless there being nothing to be defined. According to Vijñānavādin Dīnāga, there can be nothing which can be called a *vastu*. Because the idea of *anumāna-anumeva* is only conceptual and not real; it does not depend upon actual existence or non-existence.

Lastly, the expression *tadvidah*, 'for one who knows the said concomitance', also in futile. There can be no idea of anything being *nāntarīyaka* unless the person knows it to be so, e.g. people who live in the *nārikeladvipa* (where there is no fire?), if they happen to see smoke, cannot have the idea of its being *nāntarīyaka* with fire. Hence it is unnecessary to add the phrase *tadvidah*. Vācaspati says that in another Buddhist definition (refuted below) the expression *tadvidah* does not occur. So even the other Buddhists oppose the use of this expression.

**Dīnāga’s Definition of Inference**

Uddyotakara also quotes and refutes a half-verse of Dīnāga explaining the nature of inference. Possibly it is so famous and well discussed that Uddyotakara does not give any exposition at all.
The statement is *anumeve'tha tattulve sadbhāvo nāstitā'sati*. The idea is that *anumāna* or the instrument of inferential cognition is that which is present in the subject of inference (*anumēva = pakṣa*) and also in things similar to it (*tattulva = sanakṣa*) and which is absent from where the inferable property is non-existent (*asati = anumēva-asati = vipakṣa*).

**REFUTATION BY UDDYOTAKARA**

Dīṇnāga’s statement explaining the nature of the inference is not justified at all. First, the statement applies unduly to that also which subsists in only a part of the subject (*anumēva*). How is it? Take, for example, the inference *anītyaḥ paramāṇavah gandhavatvāt ghatavat*, 'atoms are transient, because they have odour, like the jar’. Here, the probans, namely odourousness, may be taken as one present in the subject, because although it does not pervade the subject as a whole, it is present in at least some part of it, viz. earth atoms. So according to the Buddhist statement the inference should be accepted as valid. But this is not a valid inference as odourousness is present only in a section of atoms.

Dīṇnāga may argue here that the statement cannot be applied to such an inference, because what the statement implies as a necessary condition is that the probans should be present in the subject.
(anumeya) as a whole and not simply partially, and odourousness is not present, e.g., in water atoms. Thus, how can there be any difficulty?

This argument is not logical. The probans subsisting in a portion of the subject should be regarded as present in the subject as such. What subsists in a part of an object is also its property — just as what subsists in a portion of the vipaksa (i.e., where the probandum is known to be absent) is regarded as the property of vipaksa. When a certain thing is found to be subsisting in a part of the vipaksa, we do not hold that it does not subsist in the vipaksa. In the same manner, when a thing is present in a portion of the subject of inference, we cannot deny that it subsists in the subject and thus the Buddhist would do well to make an effort to exclude what subsists in only a part of the subject.

Here the Buddhist may say that what has been urged against by the Naiyayikas, can easily be precluded by emphasis implied: anumeya sadbhāvaḥ means anumeya sadbhāvaḥ eva. Thus it is meant that the probans is invariably concomitant with the probandum, so there is not a chance of accepting a probans subsisting only in a part of the subject.

This answer of the Buddhist, Uddyotakara argues, cannot help him. The emphasised assertion anumeya sadbhāvaḥ eva can mean only two things: (a) anumeya eva sadbhāvaḥ, i.e., it subsists in only and only the subject of inference (and it cannot subsist
anywhere else) or (b) anumeya sadbhāvah eva, i.e. it must subsist and subsist in the subject of inference (i.e. in all the cases of the subject the probans must be present).

(a) In the first alternative, what restriction has been done by eva? Does it preclude impossibility i.e. does it mean that it is not impossible for the probans to subsist in the subject of inference, or does it only indicate the possibility of the probans subsisting in the subject? In either case, no useful purpose would be served by the emphasis or restriction. The desired implication can be gathered even without the restriction; the idea that the probans subsists in the subject of inference and that it is not impossible for it to subsist therein, can be had from the simple statement anumeya sadbhāvah without the restriction and consequently, a probans subsisting in a part of the subject does not become excluded by the emphasis. Thus the emphasis fails in the very purpose for which it was brought in. Moreover, the emphasis also fails to exclude the invalid means of inferential cognition which subsists in only a part of the subject. In the inference anityāh paramānavaḥ gandhayattvāt, the probans gandhayattva is existing in some part of the probandum (i.e. earth atoms); it means that there is only a partial absence of the probans in the probandum and thus it cannot be said that it is impossible for the probans to exist in the subject, and the definition would apply to such a probans. Explaining Uddyotakara's implication, Vācaspati says...
that the denial of absolute absence, although it affirms partial presence, does not preclude partial absence too. Where there is no absolute absence, there may be partial presence and from that there follows partial absence. When eva precludes impossibility, it negates the absolute absence of the probans in the subject. But it has no capacity to preclude the partial absence of the probans in the subject. Again, the mere assertion of the possibility of existence also does not preclude the impossibility of existence.

Further, the restriction implied in anumeya eva sadbhāyah would mean that the probans subsists in the subject only, that is, in nothing else, not even in the tattulya and thus there would be a contradiction with the latter half of the definition (tattulye sadbhāyah).

(b) In the second alternative, where the meaning is that the probans must subsist in the subject, it would be implied that there is vyāpti or invariable concomitance between the two. But that 'particular subject', i.e. fire here, which is cognised by means of the inference has no connection with the invariable concomitance upon which the inference would be based; as though the emphasis eva has been put to sadbhāva which together appears to mean that vyāpti has been assured in this particular probandum, but actually the invariable concomitance (of smoke with fire)
has been observed (and assured) in entirely different places, and not here.

Now, the presence of the probans in the subject may assure the probandum. But what purpose can be served by this? In answer, it is said that the probandum is observed as relative with the right cause and is not existent anywhere apart from that. Thus the probandum is always assured by the concomitance with the presence of the probans. But when the presence of the probans is not assured, the probans may logically go to tattulya and vipaksa also. Such being the case, it may be right to preclude the possibility of the real probans in the vipaksa by means of the clause nāstītā asati, 'where the probandum is non-existent'. But for what purpose should there be introduced the other clause tattulye sadbhāvah? If the possibility of the probans to subsist in the subject is there, then, by the rule 'anything not prevented is admitted', there is no necessity of affirmation by tattulye sadbhāvah, because there is no prevention of it.

Yet the clause tattulye sadbhāvah is not futile, because by tattulye sadbhāvah it is intended to indicate that there is the mere possibility of the presence of the probans in the sapakṣa and not its invariable concomitance with it,7 as in the case between the probans and the probandum. And this mere possibility is got at even though there is an uncertainty as to whether or not it is invariably concomitant (hence the clause in question cannot be taken as indicating the invariable concomitance of the probans with the sapakṣa).
Then the Buddhists may say that the clause tattulve sadbhāvah is introduced for the purposes of emphasis.

To this, Uddyotakara asks what is it that is meant to be emphasised by the clause? Does it mean - (a) the probans subsists in the sapakṣa only, or, (b) that it must subsist in the sapakṣa?

(a) If what is meant by the emphasis is that it subsists in the sapakṣa only, then there would be a clear contradiction between the first and second clauses of the statement. It is now said 'in the sapakṣa only', whereas it has been already said 'in the subject only'.

(b) If then the meaning of the emphasis be simply that the probans subsists in the sapakṣa, then, a probans which subsists in a part of the sapakṣa, (i.e. not in all sapakṣas, but only in a few cases) would cease to be a true probans; e.g. in the inference 'the character of being preceded by effort', (pravatnanentarīvakatva) which subsists only in a few, and not in all, things belonging to the same class as the subject of inference (all transient things in the case in question).

While criticising the last component of the statement, asati nastitā, Uddyotakara takes the meaning of asati literally, 'in the non-existent'. Hence he criticises the clause asati nastitā in the following manner: The last clause of the statement asati nastitā, 'it should not be present where the subject is itself non-existent', has been introduced without due consideration. That
which is non-existent is by itself a non-entity at the time; and a non-entity could never be the substratum (of the probans; and hence a denial of this impossible contingency of the non-existent subject being the substratum of the probans) is meaningless.

To avoid this charge, the Buddhist may say that this clause also is introduced for the purpose of emphasis.

Uddyotakara criticises this point also. He asks the Buddhist: What is the meaning of this emphasis? Does it mean (a) that the probans never subsists (nāstītaiva) or, (b) that it does not subsist in the non-existent subject only (asaṭveva)?

(a) If the former, the addition of the word asati (in the non-existent subject) becomes superfluous; as even without this word, the intended non-subistence may be understood; i.e. when a thing is spoken of as 'not subsisting' at all, it is implied that it does not subsist in the non-existent subject also.

(b) If the emphasis means that the probans does not subsist in the non-existent subject only, then, the probans in the inference 'this is a cow because it has horns' would be a true probans; as horns are absent only in the non-existent subject (i.e. the vipakṣas; it is only animals other than the cow that are hornless), and they are not entirely absent in all vipakṣas (e.g. the buffalo, which is not a cow, has horns).

Up to this Uddyotakara has criticised the statement taking part by part. Next he proceeds to criticise the statement as a whole.

The Buddhist contends that his statement contains three conditions and with these three conditions, taken jointly, the
statement stands. If any of the conditions is dropped, the definition becomes faulty. By this the statement also one may reject the six other forms of definition, such as by the omission of any one, in turn, of those conditions we would have three forms, similarly by the omission of any two, in turn, of the conditions we would have other three forms. Adding these three are six forms. Vācaspati has shown the faults in all these six forms. So these undesirable forms are being rejected by the fully formed statement.

Uddyotakara rejects this explanation. The three conditions taken as a whole would be inapplicable even to genuine cases. First, the kinds of affirmative probans (anyāvāḥ hetu) are covered by only the first two clauses of the statement; and secondly, the negative probans (vyātiyāḥ hetu) is covered by only the first and the third clauses (and yet both these are accepted as true probans). For instance, (1) for one who does not accept sound to be eternal, the two reasons - because it is a product and because it is preceded by effort - serve as true probans and yet fulfill only the conditions indicated by the first two clauses of the definition - there being, in this case, no vipakṣa (and thereby the condition nastītāḥ agati being impossible); (2) in the case of the negative probans, as there is no sapakṣa or tattulva, the qualification indicated by the second clause being impossible, only two conditions - indicated by the first and the third - are fulfilled; and yet it is accepted as a true probans; e.g. 'the living body is not soulless, as otherwise it would be without life-breath'. 
In short, inasmuch as the definition fails to cover the two kinds of probans thus noted, it becomes 'defective' (too narrow). 9

THE ACTUAL NUMBER AND NATURE OF THE INFERENCE - COMPONENTS

It is generally believed that of the five inference-components, recognised in Nyāya, the Buddhists reject three and admit only two, namely udāharaṇa and upanaya, 10 purpose of the others being easily served thereby. In the famous śloka of Jñānaśrī vat sat tat kṣaṇikam vathā jalācharah santastu bhāvā ime ...., the udāharaṇa and upanaya are mentioned to prove the view.

But in the Nyāyavārtika, we find the definitions of pratiññā and hetu propounded by Vasubandhu and Dīnāga. By this it is known that pratiññā and hetu also were admitted by some of the Buddhist logicians.

However, from the discussion made by Santaraksita and Kamalaśīla in the Tattvasaṅgraha and its commentary, it appears that the three inference-components - pratiññā, upanaya and nigamana were not admitted by the Buddhists. Thus they admitted only udāharaṇa and hetu. In fact, in his commentary Kamalaśīla expressly mentions the name of Dīnāga attributing clearly to him the rejection of upanaya and nigamana. 11
It may be that there was dispute as to the number of the inference-components among the Buddhist logicians themselves.

**BUDDHIST OBJECTION ON PRATIJÑĀ-SŪTRA OF GAUTAMA**

Thesis is defined by Gautama as *sādhyanirdeśāḥ pratijnā* (NS I.i.33). This statement contains two expressions *sādhyanirdeśā* and *pratijnā*. Now the Buddhists contend that restriction (*avadhārana*) must apply here also to both the expressions as it is in the case of other statements. The implication of the Buddhist is that although no term signifying restriction may be actually there, a statement by implication may really point to restriction. For example, the simple statement *ayam Devadattah* involves restriction in relation to both the terms. For, if the meaning of this statement is fully understood it would be equal to saying, on the one hand, that this is Devadatta and nobody else, such as Yajñadatta, Viṣṇumitra etc. (*Devadatta eva*); and on the other, that this and none else is Devadatta (*ayam eva*). This is true of most statements. Hence in this definition of thesis also there must be restriction.

But the question arises - 'to which should the restriction apply - to both or to any one'. (1) If the restriction is upon *pratijnā*, not upon 'the assertion of the probandum', this would mean that there can be no *pratijnā* apart from 'the assertion of the probandum', though 'the assertion of the probandum' can
be there even as apart from pratiñā. In that case, it would not be correct to say that 'the assertion of the probandum' must be thesis; and this would mean that the definition provided by the sutra is not a correct one; many an 'assertion of the probandum' not being 'thesis', ex hypothesi; and the definition thus becomes too wide. (ii) Now if the restriction be taken upon the other word sāchvanirdeśa, then pratiñā is not restricted and the meaning would be that there is no 'assertion of the probandum' apart from the pratiñā, though there is pratiñā also apart from the 'assertion of the probandum'. Thus the defining factor 'assertion of the probandum' would fail to indicate all cases of the pratiñā. So the definition would become too narrow and in either case the definition is not justified at all.

If in order to escape from these difficulties, the definition be taken as denoting neither of the two restrictions, the thesis becomes meaningless because without restriction the doubt as to the relation between the thesis and the assertion of the probandum will not be removed. But, apart from these three interpretations, no fourth one is available. Hence it is not right to define thesis as 'assertion of the probandum'.

The definition is liable to further criticism. The thesis is defined as 'assertion of the probandum'. But this would become applicable also to the assertion of such probans and example as are yet to be established (sāchya) e.g. the probans in the reasoning 'sound is non-eternal because it is visible'; and the example
in the reasoning 'sound is eternal because it is not tangible; like cognition'. Here 'visibility of sound' and 'eternity of cognition' being both such as are not ever known, stand in need of being proved and as such, can be called 'probandum': so the assertion of these would be 'the assertion of the probandum'.

Naiyāyikas cannot say here that visibility of sound or eternity of cognition is not really sādhyanirdeśa (the assertion of the probandum), for the term sādhyanirdeśa means the non-assertion of what is not sādhya. In fact, what is 'not sādhya', 'not something to be proved', is what is siddha, already known; so 'assertion of the sādhya' is the non-assertion of the siddha or known; and when visibility of sound or eternity of cognition is spoken of, there is the assertion of what is not known at all; and this is certainly the non-assertion of what is known, which is the same as 'the assertion of sādhya'.

If the Naiyāyikas reject visibility of sound etc. on account of the impossibility of giving any ground for them and hence argue that they cannot be probandum, in that case, when some character (of sound), e.g. krtakatva (being a product), which is known to and recognised by only one of the two parties in a discussion, is put forward as a probans, the mention of this character of krtakatva would be an 'assertion of the probandum', and would, therefore, have to be regarded as pratijñā.
UDDYOTAKARA'S ANSWER

There is in fact no question of restriction in the śūtra. It is strange that the Buddhist thinks that every sentence must signify some sort of restriction; for instance, when a cowherd indicates the path by saying 'this is the path leading to the city of Srugha' we do not find any restriction being applied to anything in the statement. It is a case of restriction only when after a general statement some sort of specialisation is intended; that is to say, when a sentence directly signifies something general, and it is found that such generalisation leads to undesirable contingencies, people have recourse to restriction for the purpose of avoiding these contingencies. In the case of the definition in question - pratiñña is the 'assertion of the probandum' - no undesirable contingency is found in the shape of undue extension and the like for avoiding which recourse should be taken to restriction. Indeed, if recourse were to be had to restriction in the case of each and every sentence, this would go directly against ordinary usage. In ordinary usage also there is room for restriction only where there is occasion for qualification and there is no incongruity if in any particular case neither of the two restrictions is found possible.

As to the Buddhist objection that the definition unduly applies to some cases of probans and example, Uddyotakara says that the
objection of the Buddhist is based upon ignorance of the real meaning of the śūtra. In the śūtra, 'assertion of the probandum' means the acceptance of the object as qualified by a character to be demonstrated. But the assertions of visibility of sound as also the eternity of cognition (claimed to be pratiṇā by the Buddhist) are the mere mention of characters, and these are not true statements of an object as qualified by a character to be demonstrated.

In answer to the third objection Uddyotakara says that a thing is called asādhyā, 'not-probandum', for two reasons: First, it is called 'not-probandum' (not something to be demonstrated) when it is well-known (i.e. siddha) and secondly, it is also called 'not-probandum' when it is something of which any demonstration or proof is impossible. The term 'the assertion of sādhyā' precludes both these kinds of 'not-probandum' (asādhyā); and the two instances that have been cited by the Buddhist, 'visibility of sound' and 'eternity of cognition', belong to the latter category of 'not-probandum', i.e. there is no proof to establish these. So the statements of these two cannot fall within the category of 'the assertion of the probandum'.

The objection that the mention of kṛtakatva would unduly become abpratiṇā does not affect the Naiyāyika position as neither of the two alternative meanings of that objection has any force at all. For, in the first place, if what the objector is referring
to is the proposition in the form 'kṛtakatva is the sādhyā',
it is to be said that the opponent comprehends very little
of the meaning of the sūtra. The sūtra means a statement of
an object as qualified by the character sought to be proved,
but here there is only the mention of a character. Secondly,
if the Buddhist is referring to some such statement as 'sound
is a product', in that case, what is urged as an objection
against the Naiyāyikas, namely that the statement in question
becomes a pratiṇā, would be something that can be readily
admitted; as a pratiṇā in the said form would not go against
the Nyāya position.

The above answers are given for the sake of argument, assuming
that 'assertion of the probandum' is used to mean 'the rejection
of not-probandum'. But actually this is not right, for, in
reality the significance of words may be either positive or
negative. It is not right to restrict the significance of words
to mere negation. In some sentences the significance consists of
affirmation, while in others it consists of negation; so that one
who holds that the significance of every sentence must consist
of negation only, or of affirmation only, lands oneself in
difficulties.

The Buddhist has further argued that the definition of
pratiṇā would apply to the mention of probans and example also
as these are sādhyā, still to be known. But in the definition the
word sādhya is meant to be qualified by the word siddhānta; it is not to be taken as mere sādhya. It means the assertion of that sādhya which represents a conclusion, and as such, how can it apply to the unknown probans and example? A doctrine is only that conclusion which is based upon valid proofs; and certainly that which is unknown cannot be said to be based upon valid proofs. That siddhānta is meant to qualify the sādhya of the present sūtra is shown by the sequence of the sūtras; i.e. by the fact that pratijñā which is one of the necessary factors for the establishment of a conclusion or doctrine is mentioned immediately after siddhānta.

But naturally here arises an objection: If on account of sequence, sādhya is qualified by siddhānta, then, pratijñā should be defined not as sādhvanirdeśā, but as tannirdeśā (pratijñā consists in the assertion of that, i.e. of the siddhānta).

The above objection would not be proper. If the word sādhya is not added there, the pronoun tat would refer to all forms of doctrines (siddhānta), so that a doctrine common to all philosophies also would become included, which would not be right; and it is for the purpose of avoiding this that the word sādhya is added.

Still the Buddhist may contend that the force of implication will exclude a common doctrine. Only in the case of a doctrine which is peculiar to one philosophy and where difference of opinion arises, demonstration is needed. A common doctrine needs
no demonstration. It will be automatically excluded. Therefore, there is no use for the word sādhyə. The answer to this is that even the words tannirdeśah pratijnā should not be said in that case. Instead, pratijnā pratijnā should be the proper form of the definition; all the specification and restriction needed would be got at by the force of implication. In short, the principle would go against the Buddhist himself.

The Buddhist says that the definition is open to contingencies of applying to unknown probans and example and as such restriction is needed. This is not correct because the presence of the desire to know is meant to be a qualifying factor of the pratijnā-sūtra, and the other factors give rise to dissension; so that what is meant by the word sādhyə is an object with regard to which there is a desire to know etc. and the assertion of such a sādhyə is pratijnā. Then the definition cannot apply to the (unknown) probans and example. So with regard to 'visibility of sound' or 'eternality of cognition' there is a palpable absurdity, for no one ever entertains any doubt or experiences any desire to know with regard to them.

The Buddhist contention is liable to further objections. The verbal affix in sādhyə, nyat denotes 'deserving' (arhati). Thus it means 'that which is deserving of being demonstrated' and as the assertion of such a sādhyə only would constitute pratijnā, the definition cannot apply to the unknown probans and example as these are not deserving of being demonstrated.
Again, there is a clear difference between the character of the object (karman) and the instrument (karana). The character of the object is that it is the most desired by the agent, while that of the instrument is that it is the most effective means. In the case in question, in the sentence 'pratijñā consists in the assertion of the sādhyā', the word sādhyā denotes the object, i.e. what is desired to be proved, while the word cāksusatvā, 'visibility' denotes 'the means'. So there is no chance of the latter being regarded as sādhyā, and having the definition applied to it.

Moreover, things may be divided into three distinct groups: the sādhyā, the asiddha and the siddha. That is called sādhyā, which is accepted and known by one of the two parties and is addressed to another party as the object of demonstration; that is called asiddha which is not accepted by either party; and that is called siddha which is accepted by both the parties. Consequently, the mention of a particular term excludes the others. So when the sūtra makes use of the term sādhyā, it cannot apply to either the well-known or to what is absolutely unknown; and if even things to which the term in question does not apply were to be included, things that are well-known and accepted by both the parties could be regarded as included in the definition of the pratijñā, and thus the Buddhist himself would land into an absurdity.

In short, in the definition sādhyanirdesah pratijñā, the word sādhyā stands for the thing which forms the subject of the pratijñā
and the other factors of reasoning, and it is an object, which is qualified by a well-known character, but comes to be demonstrated or made known as the substratum of some other qualification (not known to the other party) and certainly this cannot apply to the unknown probans or example.

So the definition of pratijñā as formulated by Gautama is alright.

THE DEFINITION OF PAKSA BY VASUBANDHU AND ITS REFUTATION

Uddyotakara has criticised and refuted the Buddhist contention that Gautama's definition of thesis applies to probans and example also. Even then some Buddhist logicians have argued that if in the definition of thesis, the word ista, 'desired' is not added to sādhyā, the definition cannot but unduly apply to probans and example and in view of this, they have proposed other definitions of pakṣa or subject.

Vasubandhu gives the definition of pakṣa as 'pakṣa is that which is desired to be demonstrated' (pakṣa vah sādhyātum istah). But, Uddyotakara points out, the word 'desired' here serves nothing. Inasmuch as the wrong probans and example are both excluded by the term sādhyā, it will not be right to say that the addition of the word ista is for the purpose of excluding those.
Further, the fact that it is 'desired' is already got at by the fact that paksā is made the object of the action of being demonstrated, for object or karmā is defined to be Īpsitatem. As īsta and Īpsita are synonymous terms and the object is that which is the most Īpsita, when the paksā is made the object, it naturally follows that it is Īpsita, which is the same as desired.16

Even then, if the Buddhist says that the word īsta should be given for the purpose of excluding the undesired paksās, then, Uddyotakara says, the undesiredness of thesis is to be known by its meaning only; the thesis which is contrary either to the arguer's own assertions or to some other valid proofs, can never be 'desired'. For instance, in the thesis 'words are not expressive' (avācakāḥ sābdāḥ), inexpressiveness of words is being affirmed, yet it is words that are used to express that idea. So it is a clear case of self-contradiction. Then, as regards the thesis 'fire is not hot' this is contrary to perception.17

All the cases cited by the Buddhists as 'undesired' are nothing but ones contrary to pramanās. So for these there is no need of accepting the special case of the undesired and the addition of the word īsta in the sūtra becomes unnecessary.

It may be further pointed out that as a whole the Buddhist view involves 'self-contradiction' and the other alleged defects are the defects of the thesis, which is the 'assertion of the probandum'; all these defects are possible only in regard to the thesis, not to paksā. The object remains the same; the character
of the object when it is affirmed is precisely the same as when it is desired. Contradiction occurs in the thesis, but not in the object.

Here the Buddhist may urge that if such is the fact, the same may be said with regard to the thesis also. Uddyotakara says that in reality the defects do not pertain to the object; nor do they pertain to the thesis; they pertain to the person who offers the thesis. For example, sometimes defects, though primarily belonging to the agent, become attributed to the action and we come to speak, figuratively, of the 'defective action'. Thus here also the defect of the speaker becomes indirectly attributed to the thesis and we speak of the 'defective thesis', though primarily the defect belongs neither to the object nor to the assertion.

Every object, by its nature, is endowed with a capacity for performing its own functions; and if it happens to be employed in a function other than its own, this only proves the inexpertness of the person so using the object; similarly, every assertion is, by its nature, capable of expressing its own meaning and if it happens to be used for conveying some other meaning, it only proves the ignorance of the person concerned.

The Buddhist may point out that as the nakṣa becomes the subject of the thesis, the defects of the thesis should be called the 'defects of the nakṣa'. But that would not be proper, for then the defects of the probans etc. also would have to be
regarded as 'defects of the pakṣa'. It might be said, with equal logicality, that inasmuch as the probans and others spoken of in the syllogism are concerned with regard to pakṣa, the defects of all these also should be only 'defects of the pakṣa' and the result of this would be that all the defects of reasoning will have to be regarded as such.

Yet the Buddhist may try to stick to the conclusion that the defects of the thesis are 'the defects of the pakṣa' on a different ground. The defect of one will vitiate another when there is vaca-vācaka-bhāva; if there is sādhyā-sādhana-bhāva there will be no vitiation.¹⁸

To explain, the pakṣa appears in the reasoning not only as an object of proof (forming, as it does, part of the proposition which puts forward the probans), but also as an object of the statement of the proposition (in form of the conclusion); (vacanaviśavatvena ca); and the defects of this latter assertion may vitiate the pakṣa because this latter is expressed by that, and not because it is proved by it (which is the relation subsisting between the probans and the subject); so it is not to be argued that the defects of the probans are the defects of the pakṣa; while as for the defects of the thesis, these are attributed indirectly to the pakṣa.

Uddyotakara answers that such indirect attribution is not permissible so long as the direct significance remains possible. When we say 'the platforms are crying out' (mañcāh kroṣanti), it is found that the action of crying out is not possible for the platform, and on the ground of this impossibility, the ordinary
direct signification of the sentence is rejected and to the word 'platforms' is attributed the indirect sense of 'men occupying the platforms'. But in the case in question, it is not impossible for the defects of the thesis to apply to the thesis itself; and it is only if there were such impossibility that the defects would be rejected in regard to the assertion itself and be attributed, indirectly, to the pakṣa. If the rejection of the principal or direct meaning is done arbitrarily, without sufficient reason, it would go against the Buddhists' own declaration: 'If the reason of the Naiyāyikas is denied the rejection of the principal meaning becomes quite arbitrary' (where the arbitrary rejection of the principal meaning is censured).

Now, the Buddhist may say that the word istsa means what it ordinarily means. That is, istsa is that which, even though not directly asserted by the person as the sādyya or what he is going to prove, is yet intended by him to be proved.

In answer, Uddyotakara points out that surely what a man wants to prove or not is implied by the very fact of his proving it; no one ever proves what he does not desire to prove; even in a case where a man proves an undesired thing through fear etc., he cannot be said to be proving what he does not desire to prove as by the act of proving it he succeeds in avoiding the undesirable and this avoidance is for him, at that time, what is desired by him. So on this ground also the insertion of the word 'desired' is useless.
DIFFERENT DEFINITIONS OF PAKSA PROPOSED BY DIFFERENT BUDDHISTS
AND THEIR REFUTATION

A certain Buddhist scholar proposes to define paksa as 'that which is desired in the course of an enquiry'.

Here also objections against the word 'desired' (ista) may be raised as before. There may be another point of objection also. Thus, as to the expression 'in the course of an enquiry' (vicāra-nāyam), Uddyotakara asks, what is an 'enquiry' (vicāraṇa)? Does it mean putting forward reasonings for and against a certain conclusion? If it does, then there must be, in this, a congregation of several things; and it would not be possible to know what is 'desired' as what; it cannot be ascertained whether what is 'desired' is 'desired' as what is proved, or as what proves, or as what refutes, or as what is refuted.

Here the Buddhist may answer that 'enquiry' stands for doubt; it is seen that when we speak of an 'enquiry' as to whether the self exists or not, the phrase 'doubt regarding the existence and non-existence of the self' becomes synonymous with the expression 'enquiry as to the existence and non-existence of the self'.

To this, Uddyotakara says: The word 'enquiry' does not signify doubt; nor does the word 'doubt' (samsaya) signify enquiry. In fact, the name 'enquiry' is given to that process of putting forward reasonings for and against two contradictory opinions, which follow...
after a 'doubt' has arisen on a point, and which ends in the ascertainment or demonstration of one of these opinions.\textsuperscript{22} Certainly this process is not 'doubt', for 'doubt' is an unsettled cognition; and, in a discussion, there is no presence of doubt, there being certainty in regard to both the opinions in the minds of their respective exponents, who engage in a discussion only when they have a firm conviction in regard to the opinion held by themselves.

\textbf{(by triṃśa)}

Another proposed definition of \textit{pakṣa} is \textit{sādhvatvenapsitaḥ paksah viruddhārthānirākṛtah}, 'that which is desired to be proved and which is not negated by anything to the contrary'.\textsuperscript{23} But it is pointed out that since the phrase 'that which is desired' (\textit{ipsita}) serves the purpose of excluding what is not desired, there is no need of a further qualification 'which is not negated by anything to the contrary' (\textit{viruddhārthānirākṛtah}). As in the other definition proposed by the Buddhist - 'the \textit{pakṣa} is that which is desired to be proved' (\textit{pakṣo vah sādhavātumīṣṭah}) -- the qualification \textit{ista} has been held to serve the purpose of excluding the undesirable \textit{pakṣa}, so also in the definition being discussed here, the qualification \textit{ipsita}, 'desired' would serve the same purpose of excluding the undesirable \textit{pakṣa}. So the latter half of the definition \textit{viruddhārthānirākṛtah}, 'which is not negated by anything to the contrary', need not have been added. If it is argued that the qualification \textit{viruddhārthānirākṛtah} would preclude
the defects of the *nakṣa*, then, the qualification *ipsita* would be useless. If both the qualifications are said to be necessary for the purpose of precluding the defects of the *nakṣa*, then the second qualification *viruddhārthānirākṛtah* should be added to Vasubandhu's definition also (*nakṣo vah sādhavitumīstah*). Thus when the two Buddhist definitions of *nakṣa* are examined, it is found that while the one is deficient, the other is burdened with superfluous qualifications.

Here is yet another definition: *svayam sādyatvēṇa ipsitah*, 'that which is desired to be proved by the person himself'.

Uddyotakara criticises it as follows: The qualification *svayam*, 'by the person himself' need not have been introduced. Because as a matter of fact, an action always requires an agent; when it is said that 'one is cutting the tree', it is naturally implied that one is doing it by oneself; in the same manner, when a certain thing is being proved by a person, it is naturally implied that it is being proved by himself. It seems that the propounder of this fresh definition, having indicated superfluities in the definitions propounded by others, lost sight of this defect in his own assertions.

In the *Vādavidhanātikā* the justification of the qualification 'by himself' (*svayam*) has been shown. There it has been said that the word *sādhavati*, 'proves' is applicable to both cases - where the man
does the proving himself and where he gets it done by another person; hence the qualification svayam becomes necessary; otherwise the definition would become applicable to that case even where the vādin gets his thesis proved by another person just as it is applicable to the case where he himself proves his thesis.

Uddyotakara says that it is true that the word sādhayati is applicable to both cases; but why should such a common word be used whereby there is the necessity of adding of a further qualification? The definition might very well be stated simply as 'paksa is that which is desired to be proved' which has at least the virtue of brevity, not requiring the addition of a further qualification.

Moreover, in the case of every word, as between its primary and secondary significations, it is only the former that is generally accepted; so there should be no objection even if the verb 'proves' applies to the man who gets the proving done by another person. It is true that the word 'proves' is applicable to both, the man who does the proving himself as well as one who gets it done by another person; but as a rule, it can apply to the man who is made to do the proving as it is, he that actually does the proving, and not to one who gets it done by another person; to the latter the word could apply only indirectly, while to the man who actually does the proving, it applies directly. In fact, so long as it is possible to get the primary agent, there is no justification for applying it to the secondary agent.
The word *svayam* again is objectionable. The infinitive affix *tumun* always indicates the identity of the nominative agent. The word *sādhavītum* in Vasubandhu's definition of *paksa* has this affix. Now, it is seen that when we say 'I am going to bathe' (*snātum cacchāmi*). The nominative of 'going' is the same as that of 'bathing' and here no one says that 'I am myself going to bathe' (*svayam vaṃi*). In the case in question also, *tumun* in *sādhavītum* indicates the fact that it cannot apply to the man who gets the proving done by another person, although the verb *sādhavati* may be common to both. So *svayam* does not serve any additional purpose.

Now, if the Buddhist says that the qualification *svayam* is intended to indicate that the conclusion desired to be proved is independent of *Sāstra* (verbal authority), then, it may be asked, what is that *Sāstra* of which the conclusions would be independent? If the Buddhist means by *Sāstra* scripture which is not contrary to perception and inference, then, by the statement 'the man proves a conclusion that is independent of *Sāstra*, it would be meant that his conclusions are not valid, not supported by proofs and a conclusion that is not supported by proofs cannot be adopted by any person in his senses; nor would it be right to seek to prove such a conclusion.
Uddyotakara also criticises a definition of thesis which is found in the *Vādavīdhī*. There thesis is defined as 'the mention of the probandum' (*sādhyābhīdhanam pratiṇā*). Though it looks very similar to Gautama's definition of thesis, yet it is not a correct definition. Because if the definition is considered with reference to the *pakṣa* that has been spoken of before, the mention of the word *sādhyā* becomes superfluous. Here *tat* could easily refer to *pakṣa*. If, on the other hand, the definition has no reference to the *pakṣa* and is meant to be independent it becomes open to all the objections (i.e. objections urging restriction etc.) that have been urged by the Buddhist against Gautama's definition, for *sādhyābhīdhanam* and *sādhyanirdeśa* are synonymous. The Buddhist cannot escape simply by saying that the answer which has been put forward by Uddyotakara against them (the Buddhists) can be brought here in support of the Buddhist definition of thesis. As Uddyotakara points out, the Buddhists cannot reasonably adopt Uddyotakara's answer to throw off the charge as they admit the force and validity of those objections, whereas the Naiyāyikas have never admitted it. For instance, when a man urges against another 'your mother is bad, because she is a woman', the person thus addressed to can say in answer that being a woman is not a reason for being bad; a woman is said to be bad only by reason of her relations with men other than her husband; while this answer would be quite effective in setting aside the bad character of the mother of the second man,
any such answer would not be effective in setting aside the same charge against the mother of the man who originally sought to prove the bad character of one on the ground of her being a woman as he apparently admits the fact that being a woman is a reason for being of bad character. If, on the other hand, he puts forward the answer that what proves bad character is, not being a woman, but having relations with men other than her husband, he contradicts his own assertion that a 'certain woman is bad (banādhakī) because she is a woman'. In the same manner, the Buddhists also would land in self-contradiction.

**VASUBANDHU'S DEFINITION OF THE PROBANS**

In course of explaining the definition of *vaicharyavahetu* offered by Gautama, Uddyotakara records the definitions of the Buddhists for the same. First, he mentions Vasubandhu's definition of *hetu* without mentioning the name. Vācaspati clearly says that this definition is of Vasubandhu.29

Vasubandhu defines *hetu* as *hetur vinaksād viśesah*. The probans is that which is disconnected from the *vipakṣa* (where the probandum is known to be absent). Uddyotakara explains the implication of the Buddhist as follows:
(i) The necessity of the word *vipaksat* : If the probans were defined simply as that which is disconnected (hetuvisēṣa iti), every case of 'disconnection' (visēṣamātra) would constitute a probans and every similarity (sādharmyamātra) or connection would become excluded by the definition. Such would become the situation that at the same time the desirable things (in the first case) as well as the undesirable things (in the second case) would become included. How is it? Vācaspati explains that if every connection to the *vipakṣa* were excluded, it would be quite desirable; if on the other hand, connection to *sāpaka* also were excluded, it would include such reasons as the contradictory and the like, which would be undesirable. Hence the phrase 'from the *vipakṣa* (vipaksat) is necessary for the definition.

(ii) The necessity of emphasis on *vipakṣa* : Now if the definition consists of the word simply that the probans is that which is disconnected from the *vipakṣa*, anything and everything that would be 'disconnected from the *vipakṣa*' would be a probans. So to exclude them, there is the necessity of emphasis on the word *vipakṣa*, so that it follows that which is disconnected from the *vipakṣa* only is the probans.

(iii) The necessity of further emphasis on *visēṣa* : Even after the emphasis on *vipakṣa*, the definition would apply unduly to even such properties as abide in a part of *vipakṣa*, e.g., the probans in the reasoning 'this is a cow because it has horns';
in this reasoning the property of having horns is one that is disconnected from *vipakṣa* (non-cow here) only. But the definition with the emphasis on *vipakṣa* would permit this kind of inference, for in the present case the probans (having horns) cannot be disconnected from all *vipakṣas*, *kāvaca* and the like. So, such emphasis only would not be enough to exclude this kind of reasoning. That is why it becomes necessary to add a further emphasis on *viśeṣa* that the property should be one that is always disconnected from and never connected with *vipakṣa*. The property of having horns thus becomes excluded as it is not always disconnected from *vipakṣa*. So to preclude a probans which may be a common property of *pākṣa* and *sapaṭkṣa*, and which is present in a section of *vipakṣa*, emphasis on *viśeṣa* too is necessary. Thus the definition taken with such double emphasis implying thereby the three characteristics—residing in the *pākṣa*, residing in the *sapaṭkṣa* and not residing in the *vipakṣa*—would be quite proper.

REFUTATION BY UDDYOTAKARA

Uddyotakara says that it is true that the Buddhist definition succeeds in indicating the three characteristics of the probans; but at the same time it excludes that which, though
subsisting in a part of the \textit{sapakṣa}, fulfils all the three conditions of a valid probans. How? By the first emphasis, the definition implies that a probans is disconnected from \textit{vipaṅka} only (it is not disconnected from \textit{pakṣa} and \textit{vipaṅka}, or it is not disconnected from \textit{sapakṣa} and \textit{vipaṅka}). But then, the one which subsists in a part of \textit{sapakṣa} is certainly being excluded by the definition, as this latter is disconnected, not from \textit{vipaṅka} only but from a part of \textit{sapakṣa} also.

The Buddhist may argue that, by the second emphasis, the probans which subsists in a part of \textit{vipaṅka} has been excluded. Herefrom comes the implication that the subsistence of a valid probans in a part of \textit{sapakṣa} may be permitted and then, logically, it follows that that which is always disconnected from \textit{sapakṣa} (\textit{= all the sapakṣas}) would not be a probans, e.g. the probans in the reasoning 'this is a horse because it has horns' is always disconnected from \textit{sapakṣa} and hence, is not accepted as a valid one. But the probans, 'being a product of effort'\textsuperscript{31} (\textit{pravatpānantarīṣaṅka}), e.g. is not always disconnected from \textit{sapakṣa}, since it is 'connected' also, by reason of its subsisting in a part of the \textit{pakṣa}. So it can be taken as a valid probans. In short, it follows that one which is disconnected from \textit{sapakṣa} also, i.e. is subsisting in a part of \textit{sapakṣa} also is a probans.

But this explanation is not correct. The Buddhist proposes an essential condition in the definition, by the first emphasis,
'that which is disconnected from vipaksa only'. But this is being rejected by the Buddhist's own explanation that there is no difficulty in being disconnected from a part of sapaksa also. The characteristics of 'being produced by effort' etc. are not such as are disconnected from vipaksa only; being as they are disconnected with a part of sapaksa also.

The Buddhist may no doubt say that both points of emphasis are effective and the above objection is not right. How? The fact is that the probans having been defined as that which is always disconnected from the vipaksa, a further qualifying emphasis is added in the form that the said disconnection should be from the vipaksa only. Then even though a property that is connected with as well as disconnected from the sapaksa could be a real probans, and this fact does not go against the emphasis that the probans should be disconnected from the vipaksa only. So the Naiyāyika's charge against the two points of emphasis is unjust. The emphasis on vipaksa has no power to reject the disconnection from a part of sapaksa. Now though the definition has not said anything about a property subsisting in a part of sapaksa as being a valid probans, yet it is found that the validity of such a probans is not precluded by the emphasis 'that which is disconnected from the vipaksa only'. In other words, it may be taken as accepted.

If such is the Buddhist position, then, just as that which subsists in a part of the sapaksa is accepted as a valid probans, so also that which subsists in only a part of the paksa would have
to be accepted as a valid probans, e.g. the probans in the reasoning 'atoms are non-eternal, because they have odour'. The Buddhist has urged that the probans subsisting in a part of the *sapaksa*, although valid, is not directly mentioned; it is taken as implied by the fact of its not being directly denied. The same line of argument may be applied to a probans which subsists in only a part of the subject. Obviously, it would be absurd. Thus, if the two points of emphasis are taken as they stand, the character of being produced by effort and the like, accepted as valid cannot be so because they cannot survive the Nyāya charges.

Even then the Buddhist may claim that the above charge (i.e. that which subsists in a part of the *pakṣa* not being a valid probans) does not affect their position because the commentary (*vrtti*) has proposed a further qualification to the definition - 'the probans should subsist in the *pakṣa* (*vo dharma pakṣasya*); naturally it excludes that which subsists in only a part of the *pakṣa*.

To this, Uddyotakara points out that the proposed qualification is actually added to exclude probans like 'visibility' (*cāksusatya*) etc. which do not at all subsist in the *pakṣa* (e.g. atom or sound); but how would it exclude that which subsists in a part of the *pakṣa*? It cannot be said to be not subsisting in the subject. Similarly, that which subsists in a part of the *vipakṣa* also cannot be said to be non-subsisting in the *vipakṣa*. So to avoid
the difficulties the Buddhist should invent some other explanation.

The Buddhist may contend that certainly no other explanation is necessary; the desired exclusion may be got at by means of emphasis; that is, a probans subsisting in a part of the pakṣa will be excluded by the emphasised implication of the qualification 'that which subsists in the pakṣa'.

But then, it may be asked, is the emphasis to be put on dharma or on pakṣa? If no dharma, it means 'it must subsist in the pakṣa'. How would it exclude the pakṣaikavṛtti hetu i.e. probans subsisting in a part of the pakṣa? Does it indicate only the possibility of subsisting in the pakṣa? Or, does it preclude the impossibility of the subsistence? As a matter of fact, the emphasis cannot be taken as serving either of these two purposes as both the indication of possibility and preclusion of impossibility, may be got at even without the said emphasis. Nor is it possible for the emphasis to serve the purpose of excluding that which subsists only in a part of the pakṣa, even though it may be admitted that it does exclude that which is absolutely non-existent in the pakṣa. Thus the emphasis in question is useless.

The Buddhist may continue that the emphasis indicates ir

\textbf{viorable concomitance, the implication being that the probans must subsist in the pakṣa and should never be non-substistent in it and certainly that which subsists in only a part of the pakṣa is non-substent also and as such becomes excluded by the emphasis.}
It is true that the emphasis excludes that which subsists in a part of the \textit{naksya}; but even then in seeking to remedy one evil, the Buddhist tumbles into another. Even if it is granted that thereby that which subsists in a part of the \textit{naksya} is excluded, it is to be asked, what is the use of the expression \textit{sanaksya siddhe}, being known to subsist in the \textit{sanaksya}? In fact, it serves no purpose, for the emphasis which implies invariable concomitance would be sufficient. The fact is that the emphasis in the form \textit{dharma eva naksasya}, shows that the \textit{naksya} is restricted, while the property subsisting therein is unrestricted. When the property is unrestricted, there is an uncertainty about its concomitance being precise or too wide. There is a possibility of its subsisting in \textit{vapaksya} as well as \textit{sanaksya}, and under the circumstances, the expression \textit{vapaksya nasti} may be accepted as serving the purpose of precluding the possible subsistence in the \textit{vapaksya}; but what need is there of the expression \textit{sanaksya siddhe}, 'subsisting in the \textit{sanaksya}', (this subsistence being, according to the Buddhist, already indicated by the emphasised expression \textit{yo dharma naksasya})?

Now, if the emphasis is accepted as in the second alternative \textit{naksasya eva dharma}, 'the property must subsist in the \textit{naksya} only', even then, it would lead to the rejection of both the other expressions \textit{sanaksya siddhe} and \textit{vapaksya nasti}. Thus the former may be easily rejected in view of the emphasised form \textit{naksasya eva}.
dharmah: it is absurd to say that it subsists in the pakṣa only and also that it should subsist in the sapakṣa; no one ever makes such an assertion as 'feed Devadatta only and also Yajnadatta'. The latter too is unnecessary. From the emphasised declaration that it subsists in the pakṣa only (pakṣasya eva dharmah), it easily follows that it does not subsist in anything else; so there is no need for adding that it should not subsist in the vipakṣa. Further, the qualification that it subsists in the pakṣa only does not exclude that which subsists in a part only of the pakṣa; so the emphasis fails to achieve the purpose for which it has been proposed.

If it be held that the former is added for the purpose of emphasising that it should subsist in the sapakṣa only (sapakṣey eva siddhah) and that it must subsist in the sapakṣa (siddha eva sapakṣa)? Now, in the first case, if the emphasis implies mere possibility (of subsisting in the sapakṣa), this possibility may be understood even without the emphasis by the simple assertion that it subsists in the sapakṣa. If, on the other hand, it implies invariable concomitance (of the probans with the sapakṣa; i.e. siddha eva sapakṣa = it must subsist in the sapakṣa = it subsists in all the sapakṣas), it leads to the position that which subsists in only a part of the sapakṣa is not a valid probans. Further, the emphasised expression ---- it should subsist in the sapakṣa only ---- leads to the rejection of the other two expressions pakṣasya dharmah and vipakṣe nāsti; the former,
because it is contradicted by the emphasised expression 'it should subsist in the sapaksa only' (sapraksa eva siddah) and the latter, because it becomes superfluous, on account of being already implied by the emphasised expression.

Lastly, if it be held that the expression vipakse nāsti is also meant to be for the purpose of emphasis, then, it is to be asked, what is it that is emphasised: vipakse eva nāsti (i.e. it should be non-subsistent in the vipaksa only) or, nāsti eva vipakse (i.e. it must be non-subsistent in the vipaksa)? If the probans be defined as that which is non-subsistent in the vipaksa only (vipakse eva nāsti), the probans in the argument 'this is a cow because it has horns' (gaurvisānityāt) will have to be regarded as valid; as it is non-subsistent 'only in the vipaksa' i.e. all the animals that are hornless (vipaksa) are also not cows. If, on the other hand, the probans be defined as that which must be non-subsistent in the vipaksa, it will make the middle expression superfluous. Of the three expressions, the first 'subsisting in the subject' is for the purpose of denoting invariable concomitance and the third, 'not subsisting in the vipaksa' is for the exclusion of that which subsists in a part of the vipaksa; but what purpose would be served by the middle expression, 'subsisting in the sapaksa'? It cannot be held to serve the purpose of indicating mere possibility as this would be already indicated by the invariable concomitance denoted by the first expression as interpreted by the Buddhist, and the
addition of a separate expression would be superfluous.

Thus, in short, a critical examination of the definition along with the explanation (vṛtti) points to the following objections: (a) acceptance of the validity of an invalid probans, (b) rejection of the validity of a valid probans and (c) rejection of the things concomitant with what is desirable (grantham vā nirākaroti).

Next Uddyotakara takes up the definition hetur vipakṣād viśesah, offered by the Sautrāntika. He means that even a section of the Buddhists themselves cannot tolerate this definition, so what of the Naiyāyikas. According to Vasubandhu, all the Buddhists propound the view of non-eternity of things in general. Thus, no vipakṣa would be possible and it becomes incumbent on the propounder of the definition to explain what he means by the term vipakṣa in his definition. Vācaspati adds that even if there were some eternal things, which could be the vipakṣa, it would be impossible for the Buddhists to explain it, as for him everything is inexpressible (nirupākhya). Moreover, it is not possible to use the ablative (in vipaksāt) in connection with what does not exist. So the Buddhists should explain the sense of the ablative affix here. Again, when the vipakṣa is non-existent, the locative (vipakṣe nasti) cannot denote the sense of adhikarana. So there also they should explain the sense of the locative affix. Then again, the probans 'being a product' (kṛtakatvat) or the like (to prove non-eternity) is always present in the
pakṣa and the sapakṣa but it is difficult to determine from what such probans is to be 'disconnected' as there is no vipakṣa (i.e. an eternal thing).

In fact, the character of being a product is under the circumstances common to all, and as such it should be spoken of as sāmānaya, 'present, concomitant', and not as visēṣa, 'absent, disconnected'. Thus the definition of the Buddhist, being in contradiction with their own doctrine, cannot become a definition at all.

DIḤNĀΓA'S OBJECTION AGAINST GAUTAMA'S DEFINITION OF HETU (PROBANS, THE SECOND INFRINGEMENT-COMPONENT)

While discussing the definition of hetu (under NS I.i.34), Uddyotakara records an objection of the Buddhist. This objection obviously comes from Diṁnāga, though Uddyotakara does not mention the name.34

Gautama's definition of the probans runs as udāharasādharṇyāt sādhyasādhanam hetuḥ. That is, the probans (hetu) is the proposition stating the 'cause of the establishment of the probandum' (sādhyasādhana) through the resemblance of the subject or pakṣa with the 'instance cited' (udāharana). Diṁnāga objects here that the means of demonstrating the probandum is not anything
distinct from the property common to the example. It is certainly 'the property common to the example' which demonstrates the probandum. So there is no justification of introducing the word sādhyasādhana in the sūtra.

To avoid the above charge, the Naiyāyikas would explain that the word sādhyasādhana is introduced to specify udāharanasādharmya. The purpose is that there are numerous properties common to the example, but among them the particular property, 'the cause of the establishment of the probandum' (sādhyasādhana), is only relevant here. So the common property (an object) is signified by the cause of the establishment of the probandum (an object), and hence sādhyasādhana is a qualification of udāharanasādharmya. Yet there is a further objection. The qualification and the qualified should have the same case-ending. There cannot be any expression like nīlad uṭpalam etc. How then is the ablative justified in udāharanasādharmvāt?

A section of Diṅnāga's followers explain the uselessness of the employment of the ablative in the following way: The ablative is used always in connection with a different thing, e.g. we say grāmād āgacchati. The village, grāma, is something different from the man who comes, āgacchati. But in the case in question, sādhyasādhana is nothing apart from udāharanasādharmya and hence the ablative case is not justified.

Now, if the Sūtrakāra means that the hetu is defined as udāharanasādharmya as qualified by sādhyasādhana, then, according to the definition, the probans comes to be that which can be spoken
of through words only (abhīcheva hetuḥ). Vācaspati explains the contention as that when sādhyaśādhanā is not something different from udāharanaśādarmanā, the mention of the former becomes a mere verbal expression and this would mean that the definition would be qualified by a verbal expression. Hence, the hetu comes to mean a thing stated (abhīcheva) and not a statement (abhidhanā). But this would lead the Naiyāyikas into inconsistency. The thesis (pratijñā) is defined as the 'assertion of the probandum'. It is no doubt verbal and the reason (hetu), shown above is meant to be an object. Now these two are called 'inference-components' or avayava. There must be a 'composite whole' (avayavin), so that they can be called avayava. But there cannot be a composite whole of what is composed of word (thesis) and what can be spoken of by means of word (object = reason). So the name 'inference-component' cannot be applied to those.

Dīnnāga puts forward another objection: The common property (sādharmanā) may be invariably concomitant with the probandum or may not be so. That is why a qualification should be given to it, but not to its statement. The qualification cannot belong to a verbal expression. It is only that to which a qualification is fit to belong may be qualified. So the qualification sādhyasādhana can belong only to 'common property', but not to the statement of the common property. The nature of the subject is determined by the predicate and the predicate in this case, viz. capability to prove the probandum, belongs to the common property, and not to the statement
of the common property.\textsuperscript{37}

Nor can the Naiyāyikas take sādhana in a double sense here, as direct or immediate means of proof, on the one hand, and as indirect or mediate means of proof, on the other. For either way there would be difficulties. If the reason be what is indirectly the means of proving the conclusion, it would really be the speaker's knowledge - directly derived from the likeness - which is indirectly the means of producing the knowledge of the probandum in the hearer; and it is therefore the speaker's knowledge which should be the 'reason' for the hearer's conclusion, which is quite absurd. If however the reason is taken to be what is directly the means of proving the conclusion, then, the hearer's knowledge - indirectly derived from the likeness - would be the direct means of proving the conclusion for him, and therefore, the hearer's knowledge would become the reason. But it will not be consistent with the Nyāya definition, according to which the reason is derived from the likeness; but the hearer's knowledge is not derived from the likeness but from the speaker's statement. The Naiyāyika may no doubt protest at this point that he is not talking about 'knowledge', whether of the speaker or of the hearer. He is talking about 'reason' in the context of syllogism or the 'five-membered statement', and as part of the five-membered statement, the reason must be taken to be itself neither more nor less than a statement. To this Dīṇāga replies: "Even taking the reason in the strict sense determined by the context, i.e. as a statement, so as to exclude the knowledge of the speaker and the hearer and so forth, your definition is still open to the objection
that other things as well are 'derived from the likeness'. For the application, the fourth member of your syllogism, is also 'derived from the likeness of the subject to the example'." 38

UDDYOTAKARA'S ANSWER

Uddyotakara answers the first and the second objections by saying that Dīnāga does not understand the actual meaning of Gautama's definition of probans. In fact, the definition itself refutes all the objections. It can be explained thus: The probans has been defined as the statement which is the conveyer of the establishment of the probandum, with the help of the property common to the example. Here the definition refers to probans as an inference-component and there is no difficulty in it. On the contrary, the 'property common to the example' refers to only what is actually the probans, but by this, it cannot be said that the property common to the example becomes applied only to the actual probans. The definition demands the application by the property common to the example. Only the assertion of the probans can fit with the application of the property common to the example. Because considering the probans as such, as identical with the property common to the example, the statement is only the conveyer of the fact (iñēpaka). So the property common to the example i.e. the probans as such becomes the actual ground (nimitta or pravijaka). Then
in the definition the fifth case-ending is justified and necessary also. It is right that the ablative is not justified when the definition is of the probans as such. But as the definition is of the verbal assertion of the probans, Dinnaga’s objection is not an objection at all.

In the third objection Dihnaga has said that the common property is an actual object and that is why a qualification is fit for it, otherwise the verbal statement of common property cannot possess such a qualification (śādhyasādhana). Uddyotakara says that the statement ‘a verbal expression has no qualification’ is rather foolish. We see, in our daily use, that there are qualifications of a verbal expression just as much as there are of the objects. For regarding objects only as having qualifications, the Buddhist offers the reason that it is the fact that the objects are actually found in both forms: The objects may be both eternal and non-eternal, corporeal and non-corporeal. This means that the qualification belongs to objects. In the same way, the verbal assertions also are capable of being spoken of as eternal or non-eternal, corporeal or incorporeal, and actually it is found to be so mentioned. For instance, one man asks, ‘What does this man say?’ and he is answered, ‘He says that it is a cow, gauḥ iti’; and here the particle iti serves the purpose of differentiating the word ‘cow’ from all other words and there can be no differentiation without qualification. Uddyotakara says that Dinnaga himself has made use of many expressions qualifying verbal
assertions. Moreover, Yasubandhu has defined vyāda an assertion which is intended to establish one's own view and refute that of other's.\(^{40}\) It is clear here that the author gives the qualification of 'being that which is intended' etc. etc., to an assertion. So, if Dīhnāga now asserts that a verbal assertion can have no qualification, he clearly contradicts many of his own assertions. Uddyotakara further retorts that by having recourse to extreme subtlety in finding fault with others, the Buddhist philosopher himself falls off from popular estimation.

Till now Uddyotakara has answered generally; next, he takes up the particular faults in the objections one by one. We have seen that a section of Dīhnāga's followers has said that the fifth case-ending is always found in connection with a different thing. But in the sūtra, udāharanaśādharma is not different from śādhasādhana. So how is the ablative justified in udāharanaśādharma? But this objection would not be at all favourable to their own position. Actually this goes against Dīhnāga's own view. The Buddhists do not admit of any composite whole, such as 'the army', 'the forest' and so on, as different from their component parts, e.g. the horses etc., or trees etc.; and yet people often make use of the ablative in such assertions as vanāt avam uśka śānitah, 'this tree has been brought from the forest', senāto avam āśvah, 'this horse has come from the army'. The Buddhists also are no exception and often use such like expressions. In fact, sometimes the ablative is found to be used
even when there is no difference between the things spoken of. The statement \textit{sandhi}vigr\textit{ah}bh\textit{vy}am \textit{s\text{\textagamma}}\textit{d}gunv\textit{am} samp\textit{ady}ate,\textit{\textagamma} the six kingly accessories follow from peace and war; shows the ablative in the word \textit{sandhi}vigr\textit{ah}bh\textit{vy}am, though \textit{sandhi} (peace) and \textit{vigraha} (war) are included among the six kingly accessories. Lastly, Uddyotakara says that even though the Buddhist philosopher (i.e. Vasubandhu) does not admit the existence of a \textit{vipaksa} (= a substratum where the probandum is never known to exist) as a distinct thing, yet he speaks of the probans as \textit{vipaksa\text{\textagamma}} \textit{vis\text{\textagamma}}\textit{esah}, 'distinct in character from the \textit{vipaksa}'. In view of his own assertion, the ablative cannot be regarded as always connected with and denoting a different thing.

\textit{Dh}in\textit{aga} has also said that although the genitive ending may appear to be right, yet, it would lead to the uselessness of the qualification. Uddyotakara answers that this also is not right; because what special case relation he will express depends entirely on the option of the speaker.

\textit{When the speaker intends to convey the fact that ud\text{\textagamma}har\text{\textagamma}nasad\text{\textagamma}harm\text{\textagamma}va may be expressed by sad\text{\textagamma}hyavac\text{\textagamma}na, it should be with the genitive ending. But what is actually intended to be asserted is the fact that ud\text{\textagamma}har\text{\textagamma}nasad\text{\textagamma}harm\text{\textagamma}va is the cause (or basis) of the sad\text{\textagamma}hyavac\text{\textagamma}na (assertion of the probandum); and it is only right to use the form ud\text{\textagamma}har\text{\textagamma}nasad\text{\textagamma}harm\text{\textagamma}vat, with the ablative denoting 'cause'. But how can the 'property common
to the example' be the cause? Uddyotakara answers: It can be so spoken of because the 'assertion of the probandum' is possible when there is a 'property common to the example'; that is to say, as a matter of fact, we find that it is only when the speaker who asserts the probandum has observed a 'property common to the example', he is led to make the said assertion accompanied by such accessory causes as the desire to speak, the effort put forth, the rising of the wind from the throat, the striking of the palate etc. by the out-going wind and so forth; so the said 'property common to the example' also indirectly becomes a 'cause' of the assertion. For these reasons, it is more reasonable to use the ablative than the genitive, as proposed by Diṅnāga.

DIṅNĀGA'S DEFINITION OF THE PROBANS

Uddyotakara quotes a half-verse of Diṅnāga containing the definition of probans. Vācaspati clearly identifies this as of Diṅnāga and he also records Diṅnāga's discussions in detail in this context. Diṅnāga says that the probans is that which subsists in the sanakṣa in two ways and which does not subsist in its contrary i.e. in the vipakṣa. Subsisting in the sanakṣa in two ways is explained thus: (a) entirely - subsisting in all sanakṣa;
e.g. the character of being a product (krtakatva) as proving non-eternity, and (b) partially subsisting in some sanaksas, e.g. the character of being produced by effort (yatnajatva) as proving the same. Thus the Buddhist says that by this definition, the definition of the probans with its adequate three characteristics has been stated. Those three characteristics are (a) subsisting in the subject, (b) subsisting in the sanaksa and (c) not subsisting in the contrary (vipaksa).

REFUTATION BY UDDYOTAKARA

Uddytakara says that the three characteristics cannot be gathered from the wordings of the definition of Diṅnāga. For example, which word is there to indicate that the probans should subsist in the paksa?

The Buddhist may say that almost every probans and pseudo-probans alike must subsist in the paksa and this condition has been generally declared by the definition. But then, the objection is that though such an assertion has been made, it cannot mean moreover that it is only what subsists in the paksa can be a probans. Rather it comes to mean that what does not subsist in the paksa is neither a probans, nor a pseudo-probans. In that case, the wordings themselves of the definition indicate, by implication, that the probans as well as the pseudo-probans must subsist in the paksa.
Uddyotakara admits that the idea that the probans or pseudo-probans should subsist in the pāka comes by implication, but at the same time points out that there is nothing to imply the necessary and invariable character of this subsistence i.e. by implication it is not confirmed that every probans must subsist in the pāka. How? When the fact 'which does not subsist in the pāka cannot be a probans' is interpreted, it can imply only that the probans is possible, i.e. may subsist, in the pāka. This possibility is two-fold — it may be invariable, i.e. every probans must subsist in the pāka or may be variable, i.e. the probans (so called) may subsist in the pāka and also in the vipāka. So if by way of a negative explanation the fact of subsistence of the probans in the pāka is proved, even a variable probans (which does not necessarily subsist in the whole of the pāka) would be covered by the definition.

The Buddhist may answer that even then it is not actually so, for there is directly mentioned the expression pākṣadharma eva, which stipulates that the probans must subsist in the pāka. But that which subsists in only a part of the pāka cannot be said to be one that must subsist in it.

The above is not right, because the emphasis has been given to serve a different purpose. By the emphasis the Buddhist actually wants to restrict the scope of the probans and pseudo-probans and when its purpose is served thereby, how can it serve also the purpose of excluding the probans which does not subsist
in the whole of the pakṣa?

The Buddhist may easily say that the word paksadharma has been given to serve both the purposes: To exclude the partially subsisting probans as well as to restrict the scope of the probans and pseudo-probans. But then, the clause san saijātīye dvedhā ca (which subsists in two ways in that which is homogenous to the pakṣa) in the definition becomes unnecessary. Why? The emphasis which is given to indicate the invariability between the necessary character of subsistence of the probans and the pakṣa restricts the pakṣa as well as the necessary character. When there is no such restriction with regard to the property there is a twofold possibility of its subsisting, (a) in the sapakṣa and (b) in the vipakṣa, and as the definition would otherwise become applicable to the undesirable probans also, it is necessary to add the qualification that it should not subsist in the vipakṣa. But what would be the purpose of the qualification that it should subsist in the sapakṣa (san saijātīye)? If it is for the purpose of indicating possibility (of subsisting in the sapakṣa), it would be useless, for the indication of mere possibility would keep it unrestricted. Actually, the mere possibility of subsistence would imply both entire and partial subsistence. So the qualification (san saijātīye) has no need at all as it has a too wide connotation. The phrase 'in two ways' (dvedhā) also is not justified. This qualification is already implied in the expression 'subsisting in the sapakṣa' (san saijātīye). Actually the word
'subsisting' (sāp) signifies both kinds of subsistences, partial and entire; even then the use of the phrase 'in two ways' is nothing but useless.

Now the Buddhist may argue that sāp sajātīya would be for emphasis and it is not unjustified.

But, the emphasising itself is not right. If the emphasis is interpreted to mean that the probans must be always subsisting in the sapakṣa (sanneva sajātīva), the 'character of being produced by effort' (prayatnānāntarīyakatva) will not be a true probans for proving non-eternity, according to the Buddhists, because the 'character of being produced by effort' is both subsisting and non-subsisting in the sapakṣa (being present in some and not present in other non-eternal things); but it will not be covered by the (proposed) emphasised qualification. It would be as good as saying 'feed the Brahmin only, and the kṣatriya also'.

If again the emphasis is meant in the sense that the probans should subsist in the sapakṣa only, the other two qualifications would become illogical. How? One of them being actually contrary to the sense of the emphasised qualification, and the other being already implied in the latter. As already noted, the three characteristics are: (i) That it should subsist in the sapakṣa, (ii) that it should subsist in the pākṣa and (iii) that it should not subsist in the viṇakṣa. Now, the emphasis 'it should subsist in the sapakṣa only' excludes that which subsists in the pākṣa also; and as for non-subsistence in the viṇakṣa, this would be
implied in the emphasis 'that it should subsist in the sapakṣa and sapakṣa only.

If, lastly, the emphasis is laid on the phrase 'in two ways', what would be the meaning of the emphasis? Does it mean that the two-fold subsistence is in the sapakṣa only, or that it should subsist in the sapakṣa in two ways only? (a) If the first, then it follows that the two-fold subsistence does not pertain either to the pakṣa or to the vipakṣa; thus, 'subsisting in the sapakṣa' is unnecessary, as this subsistence is already implied by the emphasis.

If again the emphasis is laid upon the phrase 'in two ways' to mean that the probans would subsist in the sapakṣa in two ways only, even then such universal probans as 'being a product' and the like would not be valid, for such characters do not subsist in two ways only as it subsists in non-eternal things in only one way, i.e. in their entirety, never only in some, but always in all non-eternal things.

Further, in propounding a definition with three conditions the Buddhist excludes the probans which fulfils only two conditions and which has to be accepted even by them. The negative probans (vyatireki hetu) also, under his definition, ceases to be a true probans as it does not subsist in the sapakṣa in two ways. If it be argued that the negative probans is really not a true probans, then, why has the Buddhist philosopher made a great
effort to establish the validity of the negative probans? Since he has actually done so, it cannot be right for him to argue now that it is not a true probans.45

If, in order to avoid all these difficulties, the Buddhist does not lay any emphasis on any term of his definition, then he accepts also such probans as subsists in only a part of the naka, and also that which is inconclusive, not being invariably concomitant with the probandum, being non-subsistent in things other than the naka also.

ANOTHER DEFINITION OF PROBANS BY SOME BUDDHISTS

Another definition of the probans given by some Buddhists runs thus tadrgvinabhavicharnopadarasanam hetuh.46 That is, the probans is that which is indicative of the presence of a character which is never apart from similar things. Here the terms (a) 'which is never apart from similar things' (tadrgvinaabhavi = tadrga vinā na bhavati) indicates the two characteristics of not subsisting in the naka and of subsisting in the saika, and (b) the term 'indicative of the presence' (upadarasanam) denotes presence in the naka; and thus the probans with its three characteristics has been stated.47
REFUTATION BY UDDYOTAKARA

The explanation of the first phrase तद्र्गविनाभवित (dharma) is not justified. It is true that the words 'which does not subsist apart from similar things' indicates that it does not subsist in the विपक्षा; but in what way does it indicate that it subsists in the सापक्षा? There is no such invariable rule that when a character does not subsist in the विपक्षा, it must subsist in the सापक्षा. So if this rule is not indicated by any term of the definition, audibility (स्रवणत्व) etc. also could be a valid probans to prove the non-eternity of sound as audibility never subsists apart from non-eternal things.

The implication 'subsistence in the भेक्षा' cannot be indicated by the word उपदर्शन, which means only mention or indication; the word उपदर्शन, which is explained as उपदर्शन्वेत केन, only means 'that by which things are indicated', and certainly it has no power to imply that it is indicative of presence in the भेक्षा or anywhere else. Here 'anywhere' means 'in the सापक्षा'. Even assuming that it is so indicative the definition comes to be: 'The probans is that which is indicative of the presence, in the सापक्षा, of a character which is never apart from the सापक्षा'. If it is such, then, 'visibility' would be a valid probans for proving non-eternal things. The Buddhists do
not admit such eternal generality as rūpatva and according to the definition subsistence in the sapākṣa being the condition, the absence of visibility in sound would not matter.

Even if for the sake of argument, it is accepted that upadarsāṇa does indicate presence of the character in the pākṣa 'which is never apart from the sapākṣa', even then, by what means can be excluded the probans which subsists in a part only of the pākṣa? This also cannot be done by the same word upa-
darsāṇa, for this word expresses mere possibility of subsistence in the pākṣa, and hence, it also cannot be said that this word expresses pervasion (i.e. subsistence in the whole of the pākṣa). Unless the word upadarsāṇa is being made to indicate the sub-
sistence in the whole of the pākṣa, the partially subsisting probans cannot be excluded.

Besides, the definition would not apply even to some well-
known examples of valid probans. For example, the Buddhist has cited as valid probans 'the character of being produced by effort' as proving non-eternity of sound, or, smoke as proving fire. Of these, 'the character of being produced by effort' cannot be a valid probans, because it does not subsist in the pākṣa (sound), so it is not a property of sound; there is no sound that is produced by effort, every sound being produced by conjunction and disjunctions (i.e. contact and separation of the wind thrown out of the throat with the vocal chords). It may be that effort is certainly the indirect cause of sound
(the contact of the vocal chords, for instance, being due to the effort put forth by the speaker). But in that case all things may be said to be the indirect cause of sound.

Then again, when the Buddhists put forward, in proof of the non-eternity of sound, the ground pravatna-antarīvakatva, what does the component expression nantarīvakatva mean? Does it mean production or perception?

If it means production, that alone would be enough to prove non-eternity, and hence there is no need of the word pravatna. It would be enough to say 'because it is produced'. If, 'being produced' were not invariably concomitant with non-eternity, then perhaps the fuller expression pravatna-antarīvakatva would have been purposeful.

If, on the other hand, it means perception, then also, it alone would suffice to prove the non-eternity and hence, there is no need of the term pravatna. As things perceived are not of two kinds according to the Buddhists, eternal and non-eternal; nor are things of two kinds in that they are perceived after effort and not perceived after effort. Here the Buddhists cannot argue that ghatatva is eternal and it is also perceived after effort, because they themselves have denied this. So in proving the non-eternity of sound pravatna-antarīvakatva cannot serve as a valid probans. Further, pravatna-antarīvakatva is also not invariably concomitant with the naksar because here all sounds
have been taken as pakṣa, but actually all sounds are not produced by effort. Even if the Buddhists mention a particular sound as the pakṣa, then also, the probans, 'being produced by effort', would apply only to the first sound-unit, but not to the continuing sound-units that follow from the first sound-unit. So the conclusion that can be logically held would be only that a particular sound which is produced by effort is non-eternal. But, in that case, quite a different character would have to be supplied as the probans as pravatpanāntarīvakatva has to be applied as a qualification of the pakṣa.

Smoke does not prove fire. Uddyotakara in his vārtika on NS I.1.5, discussing the opinion of Diṅnāga, rejects that the smoke can by no means prove fire. What is it that is cognised by means of the smoke? Is it the fire? But it cannot be that the fire is cognised; as between fire and smoke, the relation of dharma (quality) and dharmin (qualified) is not possible; as neither the fire is the quality of the smoke, nor the smoke of the fire. And further, inasmuch the fire is something already known (in the premises as concomitant with smoke), it does not stand in need being inferred. Hence the fire cannot rightly be regarded as an 'object of inference'. 
In the Vārtika on NS I.i.5 Uddyotakara has discussed about what is the object of inference. Diṇṇāga expresses his opinion that 'the particular place along with containing the fire' is cognized by means of the smoke.

Uddyotakara objects this view: The place in general as containing the fire cannot be inferred by means of smoke, because smoke is not a quality of the place containing fire or concomitant of any and every place that may have the fire. Then again, as for the relation of fire to any place, such relation is not unknown i.e. already known; and as such, it cannot be an object of inference.

The actual place from where the smoke is issuing is not seen by the observer. As according to the Buddhist what is seen is not any perceptible composite substance, e.g. mountain. The mountain, like everything else, is only atoms, which are all imperceptible; and for the same reason, the smoke also cannot be perceived. But even for those who do admit of composite substances, when one sees the smoke moving in the sky, it is quite possible that he may not see the actual place from where it issues.

But it is a fact that the smoke brings about the cognition of fire, by reason of its invariable concomitance with it. But
here what is the meaning of 'the invariable concomitance between
smoke and fire'? (i) Does it mean that the two are related to
each other as cause and effect? (ii) Or that the two are rela-
ted by the relation of 'inherence of the same object'? (iii)
Or by mere relationship in general?

(i) It must be the relation between the effect and its
material cause in which it inheres. But the smoke does not in-
here in the fire, nor the fire in the smoke. In fact each of
them inheres in its own particular cause, smoke inheres in its
Ayavara and fire also inheres in its Ayavara.

(ii) Inherence of the same object may mean: that some one
object inhere in both; or that both inhere in some one object.
There is no single object produced by both fire and smoke, nor
are smoke and fire ever found to subsist in any single object.
So inherence of the same object is not possible between smoke
and fire.

(iii) If there is some sort of relationship in general
between smoke and fire, then also there is difficulty in case of
inference. If the inference were put forward in the form
'there is some (permanent) relation between smoke and fire',
this would not be true; as no such (permanent) relationship
is really known at the time of the inference. In fact the smoke
is actually perceived even in the absence of fire as when one
sees smoke issuing from the hill-side and he does not see the
fire.
There would be some companionship, as there is in the case of colour and touch. But we have often seen smoke without fire, as well as fire without smoke. So no constant companionship between smoke and fire is possible as between colour and touch.

What really happens in the case of the universally recognised inference of fire is that by seeing certain peculiarities of smoke we infer the presence of smoke as qualified by fire. The fire becomes a qualification of smoke, simply because the fire is subordinate to the smoke, - as what is inferred is 'this smoke as accompanied by fire'.

BUDDHIST DEFINITION OF THE 'STATEMENT OF EXAMPLE'

Some Buddhists have defined the 'statement of example' (drṣṭānta = Naiyāyika's udāharaṇa), as tathā siddho drṣṭānta. Here the word tathā implies similarity. Thus, statement of example would be one referring to a thing which is proved to be similar to what is sought to be proved by a probans, namely, an instance in which both the probans and the probandum co-exist.
REFUTATION BY UDDYOTAKARA

It is said by the Buddhists that in the drṣṭānta both the probandum and the probans are present. But to prove this, the Buddhists will have to discard his own views. They want to prove non-externality by 'being a product'. But in the example, they cannot show the concomitance of the two characters, because according to the Buddhist tenet (advocating momentariness of all things), there is difference in the time and there is cessation of the thing. The character of being a product is present at one point of time and non-externality at an entirely different point, for, at the time the thing exists, its prior negation and posterior negation are not present. According to the Buddhists, everything has only a momentary existence; so that at the moment there is prior negation of the dish, the dish itself is not there; nor is it there when its destruction is present; and it is only when both prior negation and destruction are possible for a thing that it can be regarded as non-eternal. Then again, the dish that is produced must be entirely different from that which is destroyed; as the same dish cannot continue for three moments the co-existence of 'being produced' and 'non-externality' is impossible for the Buddhists.

The same grounds also serve to discard the other definitions of example given by the Buddhists. For example, it has been defined as the demonstration of the relation between the two,
the probandum and the probans; or, as the demonstration of the probans' agreement with the probandum and its absence on the absence of the probandum.

**OBJECTION AGAINST REASSERTION AND CONCLUSION (UPANAYA AND NIGAMANA)**

The objection against the admission of reassertion and conclusion has been recorded very briefly: Reassertion and conclusion are not distinct inference-components as they do not serve any special purpose. It is not clear whether it is a quotation or simply Uddyotakara's own formulation of the objection.54

**REFUTATION BY UDDYOTAKARA**

The contention of the opponent apparently is that reassertion serves the same purpose as the statement of the probans, and the conclusion the same purpose as the proposition. But it may be asked, in the statement,55 is arthāvisēsāt 'given as a probans by identifying the statement of probans with the reassertion? If it is, then, the probans (arthāvisēsāt) would become an argument for the opposite, as it is found to subsist in things where
the probandum (identify) is known to be absent; that is to say, it is found that there are cases where 'non-difference of purpose' is not found when the things are identical, while it is found when they are diverse and many: e.g. when there are many and diverse jars, the purpose served by them—that of containing the water which is fetched—is one and the same, and yet the jars are not identical.

If in order to avoid this difficulty, the Buddhist may explain that what he means by the two components (hetu and upanava) being not different is not that they are identical, or one and the same, but that they serve the same purpose; even then, the probans (arthavisesa) fails to be valid, for in that case the probandum and the probans, viz. eka-pravojanakatva and arthavisesa would mean the same thing, which is however absurd.

Actually, the probans and the reassertion are clearly different in their implications. That is the purpose of hetu is to state how an object, by virtue of its similarity or dissimilarity with the instance cited, proves the characteristic sought to be proved. But the purpose of upanava is to indicate the coexistence (in the subject) of the two characteristics, which are the probans and the probandum. What the Buddhist thinks that nigamana is nothing but pratiññā is not correct. The purpose of pratiññā is to state the subject as having the characteristic sought to be proved of it. But the purpose of nigamana is to exclude the contrary possibility of the absence of the probandum (i.e. the characteristic sought to be proved) in the subject, after the probans—probandum relation between two characteristics
perceived in an instance is ascertained.\textsuperscript{56}

PSEUDO-PROBANS (HETVARHĀSA) \textsuperscript{57}

Uddyotakara shows his erudition on pseudo-probans and categorically shows many examples of them. He says that if we take into consideration the diversities of time, of person, and of the thing to be proved, the number of pseudo-probans is uncountable; but in a general way, if we take into consideration only the diversity due to the relation of the probans to the probandum, the number of probans, right and wrong, on being computed, comes to be 176. Finally it rises to 2032.

Objection against 'unproved' (sādhyasama) pseudo-probans:

The Buddhist has objected to Gautama's sūtra defining the unproved pseudo-probans on the basis of the example 'sound is eternal, because it is intangible' (like buddhi).\textsuperscript{58} This has been given as an example of the unproved pseudo-probans. But it does not fulfil the conditions of the definition. The term sāchvāvisiṣṭah in the sūtra can only mean that whose example is not different from the probandum, and, in the example, intangibility is seen in eternal things as well as in buddhi. But, the example in the said reasoning, buddhi, is one that is known to be not eternal; so it is not 'not different from the probandum',
which is eternality.

Refutation:

To this, Uddyotakara remarks that the Buddhist has understood neither the meaning of the śūtra, nor the literal meaning of the words nor the exact nature of the fallacious probans, nor the exact nature of the wrong example.

We may elucidate these as follows:

(1) The unproved pseudo-probans is the mark which being yet to be properly established' is 'not different from the character sought to be proved'. But the example of an unproved pseudo-probans shown by the Buddhist is actually the example of the counteracted pseudo-probans.59

(2) Again, the Buddhist has not understood the literal significance of the term śādhvāvisistah, which was never meant to be taken as a bahuvrīhi compound as the objector has taken it.

(3) He also has not understood the difference between the wrong probans and the wrong example. He should have pointed out that the defect is in the probans, 'intangibility', while what he actually does is to point out a defect in the case of buddhi which is only an example.

Objection against 'mistimed' (kālātīta) pseudo-probans:

Uddyotakara in his exposition (NS I.ii.9) gives the answer in a passage against a misconception on the Gautama's śūtra of mistimed pseudo-probans. Vācaspati clearly says that 'indicating the Buddhist, Uddyotakara writes the passage' and he in his
Tīkā explains the objection.\textsuperscript{60}

Refutation:

The \textit{sūtra} cannot mean that what constitutes the 'mistimed' pseudo-probans is the reversing of the order of the inference-components, for the power of the components remains as such; that is, by merely being stated last, after the other components have been stated, the probans does not lose the character of probans, which consists in 'similarity to the example'; and so long as it does not lose the character of probans, it cannot be called a fallacious probans. Then again the 'reversing of the order of the inference-components' has been mentioned as a point of defeat called 'inopportune' (aprāptakālam) under \textit{sūtra NŚ V.ii.11}; so that if the same were meant by the present \textit{sutra} also, there would be a needless repetition.

The Buddhist may argue that in both the cases of the 'inopportune' and the 'mistimed' it is seen that the probans is not given in proper order and as the probans is stated last, instead of coming after the statement of the proposition, so there is no need of the 'inopportune' and it is to be called a pseudo-probans, because here the defect belongs to the probans, namely, that it is stated last.

The above statement of the Buddhist is not right. The mistimed probans occurs when one puts it in an incomplete form, not mentioning the probans at all, and then, being asked by the opponent
about the reasoning he adduces the probans and thus it becomes mistimed. So here there is no 'reversing of the components' whereas in the point of defeat there is a spontaneous perversity on the part of the reasoner, who puts the probans last.

Again, the mention of the probans last, in any case, is not a defect of the probans; it is the fault of the speaker; as a matter of fact, by itself, the probans cannot prove anything; its doing so is dependent upon its being adduced by the reasoner so that the fault lies with the reasoner, and not with the probans; specially as the probans remains valid even when adduced afterwards.

So the sūtra cannot mean that the 'mistimed' pseudo-probans consists in the reversing of the order of the inference-components, nor in its being adduced after the proposition has been levelled down.

Objection against 'inconclusive' (anaikāntika):

The term anaikāntika (inconclusive) is a negative term (na aikāntika). (a) Does the negative particle here connote paryudāsa, exclusion? That is, non-conclusive denoting exclusion of something, implies the inclusion of others, and stands for something positive, which is other than conclusive.

(b) Or mere prasajyapratiseda, preclusion? That is, non-conclusive, denoting mere preclusion which, does not imply inclusion, stands for a simple negation or non-existence, the
absence of the conclusive. 63

(a) If exclusion is meant, every fallacious probans can be called 'inconclusive'. If 'inconclusive' stands for what is non-conclusive, every kind of fallacious probans would become included in the term; as it is only the true probans that is 'conclusive', which would mean that there is only one kind of fallacious probans, namely, the inconclusive.

(b) If, on the other hand, the negative particle 64 means simple preclusion or non-existence, the term 'inconclusive' would mean the non-existence of the conclusive; and certainly this non-existence could not stand for indecision or non-concomitance. As concomitance and non-concomitance are properties belonging to positive things; and they can never subsist in mere non-existence, which, by its very nature, is something with regard to which nothing can be predicted. So in this case also it would be wrong to call any fallacious probans 'inconclusive'.

Refutation:

Uddyotakara says that here the negative particle in 'anaikāntika', cannot be admitted as connoting exclusion. It connotes preclusion. But, then, preclusion (non-existence of certain things) would be mere negation with regard to which nothing could be predicted. In answer to this, it can be said that non-existence is
not mere negation as it serves to qualify a positive character; for example, the non-subsisting of a character may appear as a definite qualification of a thing, and as such, it cannot be regarded as a mere negation.

Vācaspāti says 65 that the negative particle in a negative compound should always connote exclusion (पर्युदास). But, Uddyotakara explains it to be preclusion, which is generally intended by the Buddhists and they very often employ it to criticise everything. Uddyotakara, in order to make his answer all the more effective, offers it on the basis of the Buddhists' own view. Thus the text means that 'even admitting your view that the negative particle connotes preclusion, we hold that what is precluded is not a mere insignificant non-entity, but a positive entity qualified by the non-existence of another positive entity'.
NOTES
Chapter Three

1. **NS I.i.5**

2. Somewhere there is found anantāriyākārtha, and Uddyotakara records nāntarīvākārtha, the two being obviously the same.

3. Vide *Catur.*, p.327

4. The author has already refuted the definition *tādṛga-śvānāḥbhūti dharma-pada-śānam* hatuḥ proposed by Dīnāga; he now proceeds to criticise a statement made by Dīnāga in support of his own definition. NVTT on *NS I.i.5* (*Vide Catur.*, p.327)

   Though Vācaspati says *svākhyalaksanaprapancartham vākyaṃ*, Uddyotakara, however, takes it as a definition, for he remarks in conclusion: *ato avyāpakatvād alaksanam etad iti.* *(Vide Catur.*, p.302).

5. Vide *Catur.*, p.301

6. ne hi atvantāvayyacchedena avoko vyvacchinno bhavati, nālo samabhavamātrevichānena asambhayo vyvacchinno bhavati. tataśc eva svacchacinno ekadesāvṛttih anumāṇābhāso na vyvacchina itvarthah. NVTT (*Vide Catur.*, p.327)

7. If the invariable concomitance with the *sakṣa* were meant,
then the statement would not apply to the case of the valid inference 'this is transient because it is preceded by effort' (caṣṭāmūryavakatvāt); as in this case the probans 'being preceded by effort' is not invariably concomitant with all transient things, for instance the jar, which is transient is not always preceded by effort; it is only when it is produced that it is so preceded.

8. vadvanti ekadvipada-parvudēsena saptikāsambhāvena satpratisedham uktvā tripadanarigrāhena trilaksāno hetub ahbhidhivata.

Vācaspati explains this Buddhist view that from the definition if one word or, in term, two words would be omitted, then there false inferences would appear as right. He says:

tatraiva padaparaudēsena travah paksā, dvapada-paṛvudēsenāpi trava iti satkam. tatraipaṛudēsaṇa saptikāparigrāhah.

(i) vathānumevu sadbhāva itvacyamāne vasva tattulve nāstitā vinakse ca vṛttih so'pi hetub svāt, vathā nīṭvah śabdah kṛtakatvāt iti. (ii) tattulve asti itvacyamāne vipakśavṛttah anaksadharmsva ca hetutvam svāt, vathā nīṭvah śabdah cākṣu- satvāt sāmānvavat iti. (iii) nāstītāsi ti itvacyamāne vo'pakṣa- dharmah tattulve ca nāstita se hetub svāt vathā nīṭvah śabdah asattvāt. (iv) anumeve tattulve ca itvacyamāne, anīṭvah śabdah prameyavṛttiditi vinakṣavṛttih hetub svāt. (v) anumeve asti asati ca nāstitā itvacyavṛttvacyamāne nīṭvah śabdha iśtimattvā sati.
9. Two kinds - (1) that which is invariably concomitant with both sādhya and sapakṣa; and (2) that which is invariably concomitant with the sādhya only; its concomitance with the sapakṣa not being invariable.

10. vākyam upakṣiyate - upanava-nigamane tu na svavavāntare arthāvijīśat. NV (Vide Catur., p.575)
    paresām vākyam pathati. NVTT (Vide Catur., p.578)
    cf. upanavavacanam na sāchanam. uktahetvarthapraṅgāśakatvāt, 
    dvitiśahetuvacanavat. (Quoted in Tattvasamgraha-pañjika, p.514)
    nigamanam punarukta-vādeva na sāchanam.
    (Quoted in Tattvasamgraha-pañjika, p.515)

11. Vide TSP, pp. 514-15

   NS I.1.37 Vasubandhu has made the remark that the Naiyāyikas have become confused while trying to define the exact character of pratiṇā and the other two inference-components. Uddyotakara has answered these in the relevant places.

   cf. NS I.1.39 Nāgārjuna (in his Upāvakanaśālva-sūtra, chap.I) says that a thesis can be established through a reason
and an example (udāharaṇa), which may be either affirmative or negative. A syllogism according to him consists of three members and not of five, the last two members, viz. application (upanayya) and conclusion (nigamana) being superfluous and not better than 'analogous rejoinders' (jātyuttāra).

A Hist. of Indian Logic, p.119

12. asādhyam ca dvedhā siddham anupapadyamānasādhanam ca. tatra sādhyanirdesa itvanena ubhayam nivartvata siddham anupapadyamānasādhanam ca. tatra anupapadyamānasādhanam sābdcākṣuṣatvam buddhītvatvam ca. tasmāt na tatra prasamāghā.

NV (Vide Catur., p.515)

13. arhatvarthe vā kṛtyābhidīhānam. NV (Vide Catur., p.516)

14. karturīpsitamam karma (AST I.i.49) iti karmadharmam, sādhakatamam karanam (AST I.iv.42) iti karanaadharmam.

NV (Vide Catur., p.516)

15. Vācasapati remarks under NS I.i.33 pākṣo vah sādhavitumīṣtāḥ itvatrāni vasyabandhulakṣaṇe etc. (Vide Catur., p.524)

16. karmagrahanāt ca prāntem etad istam īpsitam iti ca anarthēntam.

NV (Vide Catur., p.517)

17. Some have cited the proposition 'sound is not apprehended by the auditory organ' as one contrary to perception. But this
is not right. Vacaspati makes this remark in course of his criticism of the Buddhist definition; the author of the Vāritika also criticises some of the statements made in this connection by the Buddhist writers. The main point of the objection is that the functioning of the sense-organs is not amenable to sense-perception; so no one can ever have any such perceptual knowledge as that 'such and such a thing is apprehended, or not apprehended, by the sense-organ'; actually, the functioning of the sense-organs is always a matter of inference, such functioning being inferred from the fact of the apprehension of colour etc., they appear when the organ operates and do not appear when it does not. Hence, the proposition is not a true example of 'contrary to perception'; a true example of it would be the proposition 'fire is not hot'.

18. pratiññavāḥ paksaviśayatvāt pratiññadoṣāḥ paksadoṣā iti ucyante. .... vācavācakabhāvena nivamo bhavisyati, na sādhyasādhanabhāvena iti? NV (Vide Catur., p.518)

19. Neither the Tātparyya nor the Parisuddhi says anything as to the author of this declaration. The declaration is Naiyāyika-hetupratisēdhena ākasmiko mūkhvārtha-vyavatikramo labhyate.

NV (Vide Catur., p.518)

20. Though it is not known from two scholars (Uddyotakara and Vācaspati) as to the author of the definition, yet from the nature
and continuation of argument of Uddyotakara, it is clear that this definition is of a certain Buddhist. Ganganath Jha in his 'The Nyāyasūtras of Gautama' vol I p.337, narrates this as a Buddhist definition.

21. vicārāṇām īnā tṛthaḥ pākṣah. NV (Vide Catur., p.518)

22. vicārāṇā hi nāma sānāvottarakālabhāvīni śāchānadūṣaṇapraṇavārupā anvataddhikarāṇanirṇayavāyasāṇā .... NV (Vide Catur., p.519)

23. Diśnāga in hi Nyāyānumāṇa, proposed this definition. The Tātarpāva simply says sthāntarīvam ca bhāyāntarasva laksānām. A somewhat similar definition is found in the Nyāyabindu, which defines the pākṣa as svarūpenaiva svavamīsto'nirākṛtah.

24. Uddyotakara refutes a series of Buddhist definitions of subject (pākṣa). This definition is one of them.

Vide Catur., pp.418--20

25. sāyam parasya aksārādbhikyadoṣāṃ vicīnyānaḥ svaśacanapraṇavagā sāmmudha iti. NV (Vide Catur., p.519)

26. Uddyotakara mentions the name of two works, Vāda-vihā and Vāda-vihāṇa-tīkā. Neither the Sanskrit original of them is found, nor the works have been translated into Tibetan but an incomplete Chinese translation of a portion of the works of Vasubandhu exists.
Regarding this we may refer the controversial points:

(i) Vasubandhu wrote *Tarkasāstra*, a work on logic.

(ii) The definitions of sense-perception, of inference and of a sound thesis are not to be found in the preserved part of the Chinese translation, but they are quoted by Dhānāga.

(iii) Tucci thinks that the *Tarkasāstra* has nothing to do with *Vāda-vidhi*.

(iv) Mr. Boris Vassiliev establishes that *Tarkasāstra* was originally a work on the 'science of logic' (*ju-shih-lun = Tarkasāstra*) in three volumes, the extant Chinese translation represents one volume of collected fragments.

(v) Mr. Andrew Vostrikov establishes that the *ju-shih-lun* collection contains at present fragments of two or three different works, one of them is the *Vāda-vidhi* of Vasubandhu. Vasubandhu wrote three different works on logic, called the *Vāda-vidhi*, the *Vāda-vidhāna* and *Vāda-ārdava*, the second work being an emendation of the first.

(vi) *Vāda-vidhāna*, is a title meaning the same with *Vāda-vidhi*, but slightly different in form. Vasubandhu is supposed to have corrected his formulations.

Vide *Buddhist Logic*, pp.29—31

It is not clear whether by *Vāda-vidhāna-tīkā* is meant a commentary called *Vāda-vidhāna* or a separate commentary on the *Vāda-vidhana*. 
27. *tumunasca samanakartikayeva nis intermittent. NV* (Vide Catur., p.519)
   cf. *samanakartikayam tumun.* AST III.iii.158


29. *Samprati vasisbandhayam hatulakshanam du savitumuanysvati hatuvipaksadvisea itvanve. NVTT* (Vide Catur., p.550)

30. Three kinds are possible: (1) That which is disconnected from *sapaksa* as well as *vipaksa*, (2) that which is disconnected from *paksa* as well as *vipaksa* and (3) that which is disconnected from *vipaksa* only. If the first two of these were included, then the Unique (or singular) and the Unattested probans also would have to be regarded as valid. Hence the necessity of the third alone being emphasised.

31. In the proving of the non-eternity of sound.

32. *vasmaad vrttatu shat, vo dharma pakṣasya iti anena caṅgaSATVAĐIHI pakṣasambhavī nirākrite, pakṣasikadesavṛttistu katham? NV* (Vide Catur., p.541)

33. *hetur vipaksād viśeṣah iti ca vādā sautrāntika-pakṣam āśritvā laksanam vicārvate .... NV* (Vide Catur., p.542)

34. Dr. Jha says in a footnote to vol.i, p.348 of his translation of the Nyāya-bhāṣya and Vārttika that Vācaspāti in his *Tīkā*
actually quotes fifteen lines from the works of Diṇnāga. In this connection, by mentioning four complete lines and two half-lines, H.R. Randle, in his 'Fragments from Diṇnāga' (p.36) remarks in the footnote 'as just stated, I cannot find more than the fragment given above, but Vācaspati's paraphrase or exposition seems to imply a passage of eight or ten lines'. At the same time he declares his inability to identify the complete metrical fragments. Anyway, the metrical portion, which can be recovered so far is this:

udāharaṇaśādharmvāt/kimanyat śādhvaśādhanam// Quoted in NV
śādhanam vadi śādharmyam/na vākyāmśah na peñcamī//
vākyam cet tadvisēvam svāt / sādhanatvādāsambhayah //
na tatṛāpi dvīdha dosāt / prakṛte tvanyasambhayah //
svalaksanena bāda cen / na vikalpādisambhayāt //
tasmāt saṣṭhvastru tatṛāpi / visēṣaṇamanarthakam // Quoted in NVTT

35. anye tu pañcamvanadeśāparthahkram anyathā varṇavanti.
   NV (Vide Catur., p.523)

36. vāda hi śādhvaśādhanam nāma udāharaṇaśādharmvāt sthirktaṁ nāsti
    kim tu sābdamātram avāśīśvate, tadā udāharaṇaśādharmyam anena
    abhiśhevatvena visēṣaṇvam. NVTT (Vide Catur., p.532)

37. Uddyotakara does not explain any further from na tatṛāpi dvīdha
    dosāt etc. Diṇnāga has suggested the genitive case-ending in
    udāharaṇaśādharmya in lieu of ablative. This suggestion has
been discarded by Uddyotakara without mentioning it in the 
pūrvapakṣa.

38. If it be said that the view that the means of proof is the 
thing itself, is contradicted by the Buddhist theory of the 
thing as being unique particular, this is not so, because 
there arise 'fictions of the understanding' (which somehow 
correspond to the unique particular; and these fictions 
comprise the 'likeness' which serves as the probans in 
inference).

The Naiyāyikas might reply to certain of the above criticisms 
by saying that the possessive case might be substituted for 
the ablative. The reply to this is that in that case also the 
qualification (śādhyā-śādhana) has no meaning (because, as 
Vācaspati says, it is put as qualification of the statement 
of likeness NVTT, p.190, 1.19. So that the objection remains 
-- you cannot qualify the statement of the likeness as 
'probative', any more than you can qualify the statement 
arising from the likeness as 'probative').

(Vide Fragments from Dhāńga, p.45)

39. As for example, the Mīmāṁsaka speaks of words being 'eternal' 
and Vaiśeṣika speaks of them as 'non-eternal'.

40. svaparapakṣayoh śiddhyasiddhyartham vacanam vādaḥ.
This definition is of Vasubandhu (NVTT, Vide Catur., p.612). 
In Nyāyavārtika (Vide Catur., p.528), Uddyotakara, after
explaining Diśnāga's view, says that he himself (svavam) has made many expressions qualifying verbal assertions. For example, Vāda is a discussion which is intended to establish one's own view and refute that of others. Perhaps Diśnāga quoted Vasubandhu's definition of Vāda. \[\text{[Referred to]}\]

41. Nitisāstra - Jha, Tantrāntara - Uddyotakara
Arthasastra - Randle.

42. NVTT (Vide Catur., p.552-3)

43. Uddyotakara cites another definition of the probans for refutation. As to the identification of this definition, Vācaspati says that this definition is certainly of Diśnāga, though occurring in another context.

(Dihnāga saiva pradesāntaralaksanam. NVTT, Vide Catur., p.554)

In this definition Diśnāga says that the probans is that which subsists in the pakṣa and is invariably concomitant with a part of it (i.e. the probandum in general).

(grāhyadarmastadamāsa vṛṇāto hetah. NV, Vide Catur., p.554)

However, Uddyotakara argues, this does not stand. Because it includes also that which does not extend over the whole of the pakṣa. It has already been explained how this is so.
Reverting again to Diṇṇāga's former definition, it is found that the term asan tadataye (in tatra yah san sajātive dvedhā cāsamstādatvaye) is exactly similar to the vinakṣa nāṭi of a previous definition. Uddyotakara suggests the same way to criticise the concerned expression as in the case of criticism of vinakṣa nāṭi.

44. tatra yah san sajātive dvedhā cāsamstādatvaye.

NV (Vide Catur., p.543)

cf. atra Dīgnāgena

sapakse sanasan dvedhā paksadharmah punastrichā /
pṛtvakam asapakse ca sadasaddvīdhatvatah //
iti navapakṣaḥ dhrān ābhāsān dārśavatyā —
tatra yah san sajātive dvedhā cāsamstādatvaye /
sa heturiparitośmād viruddho'nvatvanisciteḥ //
iti vēlāna hetudābhāsāviveko dārśiḥ. NVTT (Vide Catur., p.552)

45. trilaksanam ca hetum bruvānena svasiddhāntopattayordvinad- vuktavoh hetvoh ahetutvam uktam bhavati. vratireki ca na hetuh iti prāntam. naiva hetuh iti cet kṛtaṣṭasya hetutve yatnaḥ iti anuttaram. NV (Vide Catur., p.544)

46. anyesām hetulaksanam dusavitum upanyasvitādy iti.

NVTT (Vide Catur., p.554)

Here from Vācaspati’s discussion, it is seen that the target is the Buddhists.

47. The Tātпарva says paksadharmā ityena hetorabhindānem,
tena trilaksana apravibhāvitatmā hetuh itvarthah. From this it is clear that in place of naksah we should read naksadharma.

48. Bauddhānāṃ rūpāvādi hitāḥ nītvārah-abhāvāḥ .... NVTT (Vide Catur., p.554)

49. samvogībhāgasabdayonitvāt sābdasya. VS II.ii.36

50. Dīnāga, after rejecting the former three views, stands on the fourth view.

atra Dīnāgena dhūmadagnirūpadharmantārañānumānām aprīdēśayoh sambandhānumānaṃ ca dūṣāvitvā aprīdisistadesānumānaṃ samarthitam. tathā cāha kecid dharmaṇtaram navam lingasaśavyabhi-cāratah/

sambandham keciducchantī siddhatvāḥ dharmaḥ dharmaḥ //
lingāṃ dharman prasiddham cet kimanyat tena mīvate /
atha dharmaḥ tasvasva kimartham nānumāvatā //
sambandhe'pi dvaram nāṣṭī gaśṭhī śruveta tadvati /
avācvo'nugṛhitatvānne cāsa liṅgasamgataḥ //
a hi sambandhādharmaṇaśa liṅgāṃ pratīvate, ani
tu desasamgataimitvarthah, iti. tatra
liṅgasāvvyābhicārasaḥ dharmenaṇyaatra īrṣvate / tatra prasiddham tadvuktaḥ dharmāṃ samavīṣvati // iti

NVTT (Vide Catur., pp.319-20)

51. Neither of Uddyotakara and Vācaspati supplies any particular name of the opponent. But it is, no doubt, of Buddhists as
it is clear from the discussion of Vācaspati (Vide Catur., p.568) and mention of the term Buddhist.

52. Dr. Jha has quoted the definition as tathā druto drṣṭānta:

53. etena tavah sambandhanidarsanam drṣṭānta iti pratvuktam.

NV (Vide Catur., p.567)

54. See note No.10

55. See note No.10

56. See NB on NS I.1.39.

57. THE CITATION OF JUDGEMENT CONTRARY TO SCRIPTURES BY CITING THE VAIŚEṢIKAS - ITS REPUTATION

The Buddhist cites as an example 'contrary to the scriptures' (āgama-viruddha) : 'sound is non-eternal', which is the judgement of the Vaiśeṣikas. The Vaiśeṣikas accept the non-eternity of sound on the strength of what is declared in the sūtra of Kaṇāda; so that an assertion contrary to that is a case of one contrary to scriptures.

This is not an example of 'contrary to the scriptures', as the Vaiśeṣikas accept the non-eternity of sound on the basis of inference, not on the basis of scriptures. This inference is based upon such facts as sound undergoing modification through its cause, and so forth (kāraṇato vikārāt).
If 'contrary to scriptures' is considered as in the Buddhist manner, then, the judgement 'the jar is eternal' also may be regarded as being 'contrary to scriptures'.

A true example of being contrary to scriptures would be: 'wine should be drunk by the Brāhmaṇa', because it is a liquid substance, like water.

Judgement contrary to well-known facts (prasiddhi-virodha) is not an additional form

Another undesired judgement cited by the Buddhist is 'that which is contrary to well-known facts'. Uddyotakara says that that alone is called a 'well-known fact' which is cognised by means of one of the pramāṇas, sense-perception and the rest; so 'contrary to well-known facts' is nothing apart from being 'contrary to pramāṇas'. The Buddhist has cited the assertion 'the moon is not candra' as an example of prasiddhi-virodha. But it is really a case of 'contrary to pramāṇas'. The word candra is a name for the moon; this fact is known only by means of inference based upon premises derived from ordinary usage, where it is found that whenever the elders use the word candra the younger always understand it to mean the moon. So the assertion in question is only contrary to inference and falls under the category of being 'contrary to pramāṇas'.
58. *nitvah ābādhaḥ asparśatvāt buddhivat.*

59. The counteracted pseudo-probans is a mark which 'when employed for final ascertainment', gives rise to the suggestion of 'doubtful alternative possibilities', *(vasmat prakaranacintā sa nirnavārthamapadistah prakaranaśamaḥ. NS I.ii.7).*

60. Vide Catur., p.667

61. *pradhānātvaṃ vīchēr vatra pratisedhe pradhānataḥ / paryudāsah sa viñjēvo vatrottarapadena naḥ //*
   
   *Mīmāṃsāvārtika of Kumārila*

62. *aprādhānvaṃ vīchēr vatra pratisedhe pradhānataḥ / prasajvapratisedho' sau kriyāvā saha vatra naḥ //*
   
   *Mīmāṃsāvārtika of Kumārila*

63. As a rule, in negative compounds the former connotation is accepted.

64. As to the significance of the negative particle, vide Jha-Prabhakara Mīmāṃsā, p.237.

65. *na punah abrahmanādeu ant Vārtikakāraśva prasajvapratisedho' bhimatab, kim tu paryudāsa eva iti. NVTT (Vide Catur., p.645)*