In course of explaining the pratvaksā-sūtra of Gautama (NS I.1.4), Uddyotakara cites and refutes the definitions of other philosophers also. Of the Buddhists he takes up for discussion two definitions, one of Vasubandhu and the other of Diṅnāga, although in neither case he mentions the authors by name. However, the fact that these were the definitions offered by Vasubandhu and Diṅnāga is quite well-known and there is really no scope for doubt, and in fact Vācaspatī has categorically identified them.¹

DEFINITION OF PERCEPTION GIVEN BY VASUBANDHU

Vasubandhu defines perception as 'cognition coming from that same object'.² It means that when the cognition proceeds from that same object after which it is named, and from no other object, that cognition is called perception. Thus, first, the cognition of shell named after (vāpadiśvamāna) silver is not perception proper because the shell is but a different object unrelated with the name by which the cognition is named. Why is it unrelated with the name? Because the silver, after which the cognition is named, is actually absent from there. So being a pseudo-perception it would not be covered by the definition. Secondly, inferential cognition etc. are not perception and the definition too does not apply to them. How? By implying the addition (adhvāhāra) of the word eva after tataḥ. Where there is fire accompanied by smoke, there may be an inferential cognition, but
Where there is fire only after which the cognition is named, there cannot be an inferential cognition; because in the previous case it is said that there is fire, but it does not mean that there is fire only; as a result there is the possibility of the occurrence of smoke etc., which may be used in connection with the cognition. The word eva stands for avagayavaccheda.

REFUTATION BY UDDYOTAKARA

Vasubandhu's definition of perception is tato\textit{\textasciitilde arthāt vijñānam\textasciitilde pratyaksam}. Uddyotakara says that the word arthāt given in the definition is without any necessity. Without the word artha even, the rest tatah vijñānam is enough to mean 'from that object'. If the opponent claims that the word artha is added to signify emphasis, it would not be proper, because even a single word is often found to express emphasis. In the word \textit{abbhaksa} (feeding upon water), the purpose of the emphasis that the man lives upon water only is served by the word \textit{ap} itself and for that purpose it is not necessary to add any other word.\textsuperscript{3} Likewise the word tatah itself would be enough to lay stress upon the fact. Here Vācaspati comments: If, further, the Buddhist says, let the word tatah alone be enough for laying emphasis, but the mere qualifying expression tatah, with the word eva would be meaningless if a qualificant is not added there, even then, the claim would be wrong, for the word tatah can easily imply the noun arthāt.

From Vasubandhu's viewpoint it may be argued that only the word tatah cannot exclude inferential cognition. Because those other forms of cognition also proceed from something and this 'something', may be
an object, as in the case of perception, or may be a cognition, as
in the case of inference which proceeds from the cognition of the
probans. Hence, all cognitions proceed 'from tat' i.e. tatah. Then
to exclude all these forms other than perception the word arthāt
has been put into the definition. Perception alone proceeds from
only an object.

Nor can there be such exclusion by making arthāt serve the
purpose of emphasis; as such emphasis could exclude only that
which is contradictory to, and incompatible with, what is mentioned;
and certainly in inferential cognition there is nothing incongruous
or contradictory in its being named after its object, even though
it may have other names also, as declared by the propounder of the
definition. There is nothing in these other things, from which the
inferential cognitions proceed, which could be contradictory to or
incompatible with, the 'that object' after which the cognition is
named. Thus then, the phrase tatah arthāt cannot exclude these other
causes of inferential cognition; hence this form of cognition fails
to be excluded by the definition.

The claim that the definition serves to exclude false cognition
(samyrti-ināṇa) is also not correct. As it has been contended, when
the cognition is being named by rajata, but does not actually come
from rajata, the vyanadeśāka, but from śukti which is different from
the vyanadeśāka, then, as vyanadeśāka and vyanadeśa do not coincide,
it cannot be perception. However, in that case, even a right cognition
of the pot would not be perception, for the cognition of the pot, in
fact, proceeds from the qualities of rūpa etc. because the Buddhists
admit only the atoms of rūpa or such other distinctive qualities and not any single composite whole. Hence the cognition of the pot would not proceed from 'that' after which it is named and thus becomes excluded by the definition. But actually this is not desirable.

In fact, the cognition produced from colour etc. must be called 'the cognition of colour etc.', but can never be called 'the cognition of pot'. So every cognition is produced from its own object; hence, the introduction of the word tataḥ in the definition is futile.

Even then the Buddhists may contend that for the exclusion of false cognition, the definition might be effective. When sukṭi is falsely cognised as raiṣṭa, the object before is referred to (vupadisvate) as 'this' and raiṣṭa, but not as sukṭi; though in general form it is a cognition produced from that (tataḥ tat), yet the attribute by which the cognition is named is not from that (raiṣṭa), but from not-that (atasmāt tat) (not-raiṣṭa = sukṭi here). Hence, it is a false cognition. So perception, being unlike it, is named after that (tataḥ tat). Thus the definition can exclude false cognition.

In answer, Uddyotakara says that it is not a fact that false cognition is produced from an object which is not 'that', but the fact is that from the superimposed form, the cognition acquires falsity, i.e. there is another superimposed form already which is not the actual form of the object and false cognition (tāt) is produced from that (tataḥ). This is expressed as atasmīn tat, but not as atasmāt tat. The Buddhist fails even to explain the fact of false cognition; so where is the possibility of exclusion of
false cognition by the word \textit{tatah} of the definition? The word \textit{artha} also has been shown to be futile already. Thus what is left of the definition is only the expression \textit{vijñāna} and then, obviously the definition becomes too-wide, as all cognitions would become perception.

Next, Uddyotakara points out that the definition does not stand even if the standard explanation of the definition given by the Buddhists is accepted. The cause always precedes the effect, as antecedence is the very essence of cause. In the case of cognition, the object is the cause. This cause, being present at the immediately preceding moment, would produce the cognition at the very next moment; but at the next moment the object does not exist at all according to the Buddhists' general concept of momentariness. So no relation between the object and the cognition is possible. Hence the cognition cannot be characterised as \textit{tatah} caused or produced from \textit{tat}. Moreover, the cognition revealing the object as 'present' with regard to an object that is actually past, would be a wrong cognition and hence the cognition would not be a case of perception as intended to be covered by the definition.

As to the objection against the Buddhists that in accordance with their doctrine of momentariness the relation of \textit{grāhya} and \textit{grāhaka}, based upon a cause-effect relation, between an object and its cognition, cannot be justified, it may be replied that even then the object regarded as the cause may be called the \textit{grāhya} of the cognition, because \textit{grāhyatva} does not imply a cause-effect relation; it implies rather the capability of imputing one's form (\textit{ākāra}) to a cognition. Thus, for example, the jar is the \textit{grāhya} of the cognition
of the jar, even though the two may be simultaneous, because the jar has the capability to impute its own form to the cognition produced, which reveals the jar.

As against this, Uddyotakara answers that there is no instance available of such peculiar simultaneity of destruction of cause and appearance of effect. In fact, the charge of falsity of the cognition would remain as before, because the object would be prior to its cognition and hence, the 'past' would appear as 'present' in the cognition.

Moreover, Vācaspati says that the blue etc. are apprehended as different from cognition, not as identified with cognition. If the Buddhists accept the difference between the object and its cognition as false, then, 'the cognition in this' would also be false naturally because 'in this' is only possible when the 'this' is different from the cognition. So if perception is to be brought about, the object and its cognition would also have to be regarded as different.4

Here Vasubandhu might argue: In the case of the Naiyāyikas also the object is a cause of the cognition and therefore the object should have gone before the cognition. Then naturally the simultaneity would be of destruction of cause and the appearance of effect. But as Uddyotakara objects this kind of simultaneity, so there is no instances of simultaneity, and consequently, all will be momentary. Uddyotakara says that the Naiyāyikas do not hold such a view. The successive production and destruction of cognitions are observed. It is observed that the cognitions of
the various objects of the senses are produced as well as destroyed only in succession.5

DEFINITION OF PERCEPTION GIVEN BY Dīnāga AND ITS REFUTATION

Dīnāga defines perception as that which is free from kalpanā or mental construction.6 Mental construction is generally admitted to be of five forms7: (i) mental construction of a universal (jāti), e.g. it is a cow; (ii) that of a quality (guna), e.g. it is white; (iii) that of an action (kriyā), e.g. Devadatta is moving; (iv) that of a name (nāma), e.g. this is Chaitra and (v) that of a substance (dravya), e.g. this is a man with a stick.

Going to refute the definition of perception, given by Dīnāga, Uddyotakara makes the following points.8

First, the Buddhists have said that perception cannot be spoken of through words. What exactly is the meaning of the word pratvākṣa? If they say that it means a perceptual cognition, it would be wrong to say that perception cannot be spoken of through words,9 this forms the first differentium in the Buddhist definition. If, on the other hand, the word pratvākṣa does not mean the above, the word becomes meaningless and yet it is included in the Buddhist definition.

If the Buddhists say that nothing like the above is meant, but
they only mean that the word *pratyakṣa* conveys an unspecified (lit. generic, *sāmānyā*) thing. Then the question arises: Is this unspecified thing, something other than perceptual cognition or the same as perceptual cognition? In the first case if the word *pratyakṣa* does not mean perceptual cognition, the definition, given by them would not be of perception, yet it is this very type of cognition that the definition is meant to define. In the second case, it can never be said that it is 'not spoken of through words', as the very term also is involved to mean perceptual cognition.

Secondly, if the word *kalpanāpādha* (free from mental construction) is meant to denote perceptual cognition, there would be self-contradiction. While actually defining perception by using a name, *kalpanāpādha*, it is said that it is not spoken of by a name. If, on the other hand, the word does not mean perceptual cognition, then, the word itself would be useless.

Thirdly, in the same way, the objection can be made also with regard to the whole of the definition. What exactly is meant by the sentence 'perception is that which is free from mental construction'? If the Buddhists say that the whole expression stands for perception, then there would be the same charge of self-contradiction, for perception is actually being expressed through words, yet it is called inexpressible. If they say again that it does not mean perception, then the expression becomes simply meaningless.

Besides, we find in the Buddhist scriptures, such statements as 'perception is non-eternal', 'perception is free from pain, and also selfless'. Here also we see that perception is being spoken of
through words. So this definition of perception goes against the Buddhists' own scriptures. For the sake of argument, if it is said that it cannot be spoken of by these words, this would mean that perception is not non-eternal and so on. Then the tenet of Buddha 'All that is samskrta is non-eternal', would be an unjust declaration, for perception is also included in 'all' and if it is not non-eternal, all cannot be non-eternal. In short, if the Buddhists have to uphold the authority of their own scripture, they would have to admit even against their will that perception is not totally free from connection with words and thus Diṅnāga's definition does not stand logically.

Fourthly, if Diṅnāga offers the explanation that by the term kalpanāroṣṭha is meant that the specific individuality of a thing cannot be spoken of, then, all things would become perception. Because according to the opponent, the specific individuality of each thing is inexpressible, something that cannot be definitely grasped and spoken of. Perception too has been defined in the same term, i.e. it too is described to be inexpressible. Therefore, all objects would be the same as perception.

Moreover, it cannot be claimed logically that a thing becomes inexpressible when its special characteristic has not been stated, although its general characteristic has been spoken of. In fact, every object has two kinds of characteristics-general and special. An object can be spoken of by any of these characteristics. The absence of reference by one does not mean that it is not spoken of at all. For example, when pointing to a certain person, one says 'this is a man' it does not follow that the man cannot have the special characteristic of Brahminhood and also that since the
person's special characteristic is not revealed, but he is spoken of only as a man, he is not spoken of through words at all. Similar is the case with perception, which also has two kinds of characteristics. Even though it may not be spoken of specifically, it can very well be spoken of generally. Therefore, Dinnāga's definition does not stand.

Now it may be argued from the Buddhist standpoint that it may be true that a thing can be spoken of in two ways - generally and specifically; still in the context of the definition of perception only specific reference is to be taken into account irrespective of its reference generally; if there is no reference by specific characteristic it would be accepted as inexpressible and the definition of perception would apply.

As against this Uddyotakara objects that in that case the definition of perception would apply not merely to perception but to the whole universe because it is hardly possible to speak of any object in the world in its specific form.

Fifthly, to avoid these difficulties, if the opponent says again that by the word kalpanāpoḍha, the specific nature of perception only is meant, even then there would follow the charge of contradiction. It is said on the one hand that the specific nature of perception is inexpressible, while on the other hand the expression kalpanāpoḍha is employed to express verbally its specific nature.

Thus the only alternative left for the Buddhists would be to claim that the word kalpanāpoḍha has no meaning. But then, what
is the use of pronouncing the words *pratvaksam kalpanāpodham*?
Expressing nothing at all, it would exactly be like the dream of a dumb man. The more one examines the definition, the more one meets with inconsistencies.

THE NATURE OF SENSE-ORGANS (INDRIYA)

*Pratvaksā* is generally agreed to be dependent upon sense-organs. As a consequence, there is also found some discussion about the nature of them. We have thus two alternatives, posed by the Buddhist and the Naiyāyika: aprāṇya-kāritva and prāṇya-kāritva.

The sense-organs are aprāṇya-kārin i.e. operative without getting at the object. To establish this tenet, the Buddhists say that both the eye and the ear must be operative without getting at the object for two reasons, namely, (a) sāntara-grahana, 'apprehension of things at a distance' and (b) prthuta-grahana, 'apprehension of things very much larger'. Further, in the case of perception by the eye there are observed (c) digdeṣāvyapadesa, 'mention of the particular direction in which the thing is perceived', and (d) sannikṛṣṭa-viprakṛṣṭavos tulyākāla-grahana, 'apprehension of things near as well as remote, at one and the same time'.

(a) It is our common experience that we see with our eyes a thing which is at some distance from ourselves. It cannot be said
that the eye gets at the thing seen, because the eye, being only a particular kind of material substance, is not capable, by itself, of moving up to a thing at a distance. Thus, it follows that the eye perceives without moving. So the eye must be aprāpyakārin and the other sense-organs also should be similar in nature.

A section of the Buddhists explains the reason sāntaragṛahāṇāt in a slightly different manner: In the case of the nose and the other organs that operate by getting at objects, things are not perceived as 'this is at a distance from us'; while in the case of the eye, things are so perceived. Therefore the eye must be aprāpyakārin, although there may be some sense-organs which are prāpyakārin.

Dīnāga argues that if it is said that the eye is prāpyakārin, then the ground sāntaragṛahāṇa cannot be applied to it. But sāntaragṛahāṇa is an established fact in the case of visual perception. If the Naiyāyikas say that sāntaragṛahāṇa is possible even though the eye is taken as prāpyakārin, because the sense-organ is located outside, in that case, Dīnāga objects, the sense-organ is not something apart from its receptacle; when we make a treatment of the eye for any disease, the treatment is seen to be done in the very receptacle of the eye, and not anywhere outside. If the eye is said to be located outside, the eye would not have the power to perceive objects. If the eye would have the power, the eye should perceive objects even after the eyelids have been shut as the sense-organ exists outside also. But it is not actually so. So the eye must be aprāpyakārin.
(b) A contact between two things occurs only in some small portions and not covering the whole of the two things. If the eye would be operative by getting at the object (prāpyakārīṇa), the cognition would be of only that portion of the object which has actually come in contact with the eye. But our common experience is that we see things of larger and varying dimensions, viz. a city, a forest and the like as a whole, while the eye is never found to be of such a large size. Hence it is to be said that the eye is aprāpyakārīṇa.

(c) When we see something we often express it in the form 'the thing that I see is to the east of me'. If the eye would be prāpyakārīṇa, the mention of such particular direction would not be possible; as we find no such mention in the case of perceptions by means of the nose and such other organs which definitely operate by getting at their objects.

(d) It is seen that when a thing in motion continues to move, it gets at the nearer object sooner than it does at the remoter one. But in the case of the eye, we find that we see the branch of the tree, which is nearer and the moon, which is far off, at the same time. So the eye must be aprāpyakārīṇa.

Refuting the Buddhist claim Uddyotakara says that, first of all, it is hardly possible to get a definite meaning—which can be logically accepted - of the ground sāntaragṛahaṇa, for none of the possible alternatives in this regard can be justified.

Does the probans sāntaragṛahaṇa (= sāntarasya grahaṇa) mean the perception of that which is not got at (sāntarasya = aprāptasya), or, the perception of the thing along with antara (distance)?
If saññaratragahana means 'the perception of that which is not
   got at', the probans would become identical with the thing to be
   proved, for the debate here is concerned with the fact whether or
   not only a thing in contact with the sense-organ is perceived. What
   is meant to be the probans is already implied by the proposition
   sought to be proved. So the first alternative cannot be accepted.

Now, in the second alternative in which it is said that there
is a perception of the thing along with antara, what is the meaning
of this antara which is perceived by the eye along with the object?
Is it ākāśa, or, some other substance, or, mere negation? If it
is ākāśa, then it could never be an object fit for the eye; ākāśa
is never perceived by means of the eye, like air etc. which are
all without colour. If the word antara means some substance that
has colour, then, as no coloured substance can be transparent, such
an intervening substance would act only as an obstacle to the per-
ception of the other object; and hence there could be no perception
of this object along with that other coloured substance. Lastly,
if the word antara means 'negation' (abhāva), then it is a well-
known fact that negation, independently by itself, can never be
perceived by means of the eye; when for example we perceive the
cool touch of water, along with it, we perceive the negation of
heat also. But the sense-organ can do so only after actually
getting at its object. So saññaratragahana i.e. perception of negation
along with the perceived thing, cannot conclusively prove (anākāśa-
tika) that the eye does not act after getting at its object.

Now those who have explained saññaratragahana as the perception
of a thing in the form 'this is at a distance from us', are also wrong. The notion that 'the thing is at a distance from us' is due entirely to different causes and not to the sense-organ being prāpyakārin or aprāpyakārin. It is with reference to our body that we regard a thing as remote from us; a thing is regarded as near or remote to ourselves only with reference to our body; and this idea is not due to the thing being got at or not got at by the sense-organs. In a case where the body and the sense-organ are both in touch with the object, we regard it as near; and when the object is related only to the sense-organ and is not in touch with the body, it is regarded as remote. That is, the perception of the thing as remote being due to other causes, such a perception cannot be accepted as a proof for the eye being aprāpyakārin.

As against the second point of the Buddhist, Uddyotakara says that it is not logical to say that the eye is aprāpyakārin as it apprehends things larger than itself. To be prāpyakārin it is not necessary to admit a connection between the sense-organ and the object wholly. Mere connection with the thing is enough to bring about its perception; as a matter of fact, all our perceptions of things of varying dimensions, of the large as well as the small, proceed from mere connection with the sense-organ.

The third reason digdesāvyanadesa, can be easily refuted, for the reference to a particular direction is really with reference to the body and not to the sense-organ. It is the same as when we perceive a thing farther or nearer in relation to our body. It has been pointed out already. As a matter of fact, we find that in
cases where the sense-organ and the body of the perceivever are both in contact with the object perceived, there is neither a mention of the direction, nor any idea of the thing being near or remote; when, however, the object is in contact with the sense-organ only and is not in touch with the body, then alone we have such notions as those of direction, of proximity or of remoteness - all these notions being relative to the body and dependent upon the largeness or smallness of the number of conjunctions or connections of the sense-organ, which is in contact with the object, with points of space intervening between the object and the body.

The fourth reason sannikṣṛta-viprakṣṛtāya tulyakālegaravat also cannot be accepted as the fact cited is not admitted. Is there anybody sane enough who would admit that the perception of the branch is simultaneous with that of the moon? This idea of simultaneity is erroneous due to our non-apprehension of the time-difference in the two perceptions; just as it is in the case of the piercing, with a needle, of the hundred petals of the lotus. Here the piercing of all the petals is felt to be simultaneous - a fact logically impossible, only because the difference in the time-difference of the different petals being pierced, is not apprehended by the observer.

Now the Buddhists may ask: How is it known that the idea of simultaneity is due to the non-apprehension of the difference in time and not to real simultaneity? In answer, Uddyotakara says that the Naiyāyikas have nothing to be afraid of. There is indeed very cogent arguments for their view.\footnote{19}
Thus what leads us to the conclusion 'the eye is praṇayakārin' is an inference based upon the impossibility of obstruction. That is to say, if the eye were operative without getting at its object, it would not have been possible for a wall or a screen to obstruct the vision; and thus there would be an impossibility of obstruction; as a matter of fact, however, there is no perception of things hidden behind the wall and such other things; hence the conclusion is that the eye cannot operate without getting at its object. Further, if the eye were to operate without getting at the objects, we would not be able to explain the well-recognised fact that we see things near us, and do not see those far away from us; if it were true that the eye apprehends its object without getting at it, then it could not be that it would apprehend things near it, and not those away from it. The only explanation for this fact is that the eye or the light from the eye can go up to a certain distance and not beyond it, so that it falls upon the nearer object, which is therefore seen, and not upon the remote object, which, therefore, is not seen. So this also leads to the conclusion that the eye does not operate without getting at the object.

The Buddhists may try to explain away the fact in their own way. For the perception of an object it does not matter whether the sense-organ gets at the object or not. Only when the object is fit to be perceived, it becomes an object of perception and when the object is not so, it does not become an object of perception. That is why when the thing behind the wall is not perceived, the fact is
that the thing is not at all fit to be perceived.

This is not at all logical. Nothing can become an object of perception without some sort of connection. There is nothing intrinsic in the thing which makes it fit for being perceived; this fitness must consist in its having some relation with something. The argument of the Buddhists rather tends to be ludicrous: 'As a matter of fact, that thing which becomes an object of perception for the eyes, is perceived and that which does not become such an object is not perceived; and things hidden behind obstructions or placed at a distance, do not become objects of perception for the eye; and it is for this reason that these things are not perceived and not because the eyes do not get at them.' Against this, Uddyotakara says, that the Naiyāyikas do not admit that a thing can become an object of perception, without some sort of connection with something else. Apart from such connection, what could this 'becoming an object' be? Hence, what the Buddhists differ in from the Naiyāyikas is only in the matter of names, and not in reality: What the Naiyāyikas call 'connection', the Buddhists call 'becoming an object'; and there is no real difference as to facts.

All this is by way of the refutation of the Buddhists. But where is the śādhaka argument to establish that the eye gets at its object? Here it is. 'The visual organ operates by getting at the object, because it is a sense-organ like the olfactory; we find that the olfactory and other sense-organs operate by getting at objects and the eye also is a sense-organ; therefore the eye must operate by getting at the object'. In case no sense-organ is
admitted to be operative by getting at objects, another ground applying to all sense-organs has been cited, namely, 'because they are instruments'. We find that the axe and such other instruments operate on their objects only by getting at them; the sense-organs also are instruments; therefore, the sense-organs also should be operative by getting at their objects.

Now, the Buddhists may contend that the cause produces its effect through its intrinsic potency. It is an admitted fact. So the sense-organ, being a cause of perceptual cognition produces its effect, through its intrinsic potency, irrespective of its getting or not getting at the object. How then would the Naiyāyikas prove their case? In answer to this, Uddyotakara says that this Obstinate Buddhist should be met with the argument that even potent causes do not bring about their effects in the way that they should do, if their effectiveness depends solely upon their own intrinsic potency, and is not aided by other auxiliary circumstances; that is to say, if all these causes bring about their effects, only by themselves, irrespective of getting at one another, without having any potency added to them, by additional co-operating circumstances, then, how is it that effects are not produced in all places and at all times as there is no time at which the cause may not be present somewhere or the other, and its mere presence is capable of bringing forth the effect? Thus then, the conclusion is that there is no cause that is operative without getting at the object; and of this there are many instances in ordinary life, e.g. the potter's stick, his wheel and so forth.
IS MANAS A SENSE-ORGAN?

Gautama's definition of perception is \textit{indriyārthasannikaros-trannam jñānam avvapades'vam avvabhicāri vvayasāvātmakam pratyaksam.} To be a perceptual cognition, the first condition is that it is to be produced by a sense-object contact. In the normal cases of perception, as regards those of colour, smell etc., there is no problem. But there are also perceptual cognitions of pleasure, pain etc. for which the mind is to be admitted as a separate sense-organ as no external sense-organ is obviously capable of such perceptions.\footnote{22}

But Gautama in his list of objects of knowledge (\textit{NS} I.i.9) mentions 'sense-organ' and 'mind' separately and again, in the enumeration of sense-organs (\textit{NS} I.i.12) refers only to the external ones and leaves out mind. Bhāṣyakāra says that the mind is not mentioned in the \textit{sūtra} I.i.12 as the mind is different in nature from the other sense-organs being not composed of material elements. He shows another ground for the same - that the mind in contrast with the other sense-organs is not endowed with any specific quality\footnote{23}; and moreover the other sense-organs are operative upon only a limited number of things whereas the mind operates upon all perceptible things.\footnote{24}

Here Uddyotakara records an objection of the pūrvapakṣin. There is no doubt that the pūrvapakṣin is a Buddhist. From Vācaspati's quotation from Diṅnāga's text it is clear that it was Diṅnāga who raised this objection, although Uddyotakara does not mention him by name.

In the Buddhist view, mind is not considered a separate
sense-organ. It follows from the mention of mental cognition as a special form of perception over and above sense-cognition.²⁵

Dīnāga urges that, according to Gautama also, mind cannot be regarded as a sense-organ as it is not mentioned in the sūtra I.i.12. Nor is the mind mentioned as a sense-organ in any other sūtra; hence there is no authority for regarding the mind as a sense-organ. Thus then, the mind not being a sense-organ, the awareness of pleasure etc. as brought about by the instrumentality of the mind would not be perception. So the definition of perception being inapplicable to such cognition becomes too narrow. Moreover, the Naiyāyikas cannot say that as nowhere they have refuted the indriyatva of mind, so by implication one should understand that it is rather accepted as such, for in that case the mention of the other sense-organs also becomes futile as they would be accepted, though not mentioned, being simply not refuted anywhere.

Moreover, one cannot reject the perceptual cognition of pleasure etc. It is a fact that pleasure etc. are amenable to perception and not to inference, for there is no probans or inferential indicative available, and the inferable cannot be inferred without a probans. Nor is there any other means of cognition capable of providing the cognition of pleasure etc. and they are not amenable to inference; thus then there is no alternative left. Thus, although the cognition of these should be included in perception, following the proposed definition of Gautama, it is found to be impossible.
In answer, it is pointed out that the mind is obviously a sense-organ. But it is not mentioned in the sūtra, enumerating the sense-organs, only on account of the difference of character between the mind and the other sense-organs. This difference is that the mind operates upon all perceptible things, whereas everyone of the other sense-organs operates upon only a limited number of things. The effectiveness of the mind on all objects can be proved by a number of grounds: The mind is effective on all objects (a) because it is the substratum of that contact which is the cause of remembrance, like the self; (b) because it is the substratum of that contact which brings about the cognition of pleasure, like the self; and (c) because it governs over all sense-organs, like the self.

The opponent has said that there is no mention of mind as an organ of cognition. But it is not true. In the NS I.1.16 vugapāj-iñāṇānutpattir manaso liṅgam, it is said that the impossibility of simultaneous cognitions is indicative of the presence of the mind. From this, it follows by implication that the mind must have a function in the production of cognition, which in its turn indicates that the mind must be a sense-organ, like the eye etc.26

Moreover, Uddyotakara upholds the additional argument of Bhāsyakāra that we can learn from such mention in other system that the mind is a sense-organ. The mind has been mentioned as a sense-organ in another philosophical system and this position has not been controverted in the Nyāyasūtra. From this non-controversing it follows that the fact is accepted and this is what is known as tantra-mukti.
As we have already noted Dīṇāga has urged against it that if acceptance be implied by the mere absence of denial, then there would be no necessity of mentioning the other sense-organs also, as in the Nyāyaśāstra, no objection can be found against the nose etc. as a sense-organ. Uddyotakara says that this objection is not at all logical and it only indicates Dīṇāga's misconception about tantra-vukti. Where a philosophical system lays down certain positive propositions, there, if one of the theories of the other systems is not directly negatived, it is meant to be accepted as a tenet in the system. This is the essence of tantra-vukti. If Gautama would not mention the sense-organs at all, then there would be no scope of applying such tantra-vukti. When one has at all no theory of one's own it cannot be said that 'the other's theory is here accepted'. How can it be known that this is the theory of one's own or this is the theory of the other, when on a certain topic one maintains complete silence? So one's own theory is to be expressed through words, and then only conclusions can be drawn by applying tantra-vukti.
The Naiyāyikas hold that the soul is perceptible by the mind because it is the object of such mental cognitions as 'I am happy' or 'I am unhappy'. The Vaiśeṣikas maintain that the soul is not perceptible even mentally, because the cognition 'I am happy' refers not to the pure ego, but to the quality of pleasure or pain which thus becomes the sign of the existence of soul. A still greater objection of soul is that he being the perceiver of everything cannot perceive himself, the knower and the known being always different.

The qualities like sukha etc. are produced by the contact (sannikāraṇa), samyoga etc. between the sense-organ and the object. The perception of the soul and the sukha etc. are mental perception.

In this connection, we may discuss a point. To reject the mental perception, the word jñāna is put to the pratyakṣa-sūtra of Gautama. Uddyotakara and Vācaspāti have said of that very necessity of the word jñāna. But Jayanta in his vāyamañjari after a long discussion comes to conclusion that this purpose can be served by the word vvyavasāvyētmaka. The word jñāna, being a noun is mentioned to make a complete sūtra-sentence.

Moreover, the Buddhist do not admit sukha, dukha etc. as different from other perceptual knowledge, because those perceptions are produced by the same causes of perceptual knowledge. Referring this, there is the famous kārikā of Jayanta.
In this context Jayanta says more in his discussion of pratyakṣa-lakṣaṇa in the Nyāyameṇḍārī.

The difference between the perception of pot etc. and that of sukha etc. is clear. Jayanta says: sukhaṁ samvedyamānām ānandādirūpaṁ annbhūvate, jñānam viṣayānubhavaśvabhāvataḥ. So there can be no inference of identity between them.
1. ... vāsubandhavem tāvat pratyakṣalaksanam dūsayitum
   upanyasyati - apare punaritā. laksanam vyācaste tato'rtadhīti.
   NVTT (Vide Catur., p.238)
   samprati Diṅgāgasva laksanam upanyasyati - apare iti.
   NVTT (Vide Catur., p.240)

2. tato'rtadhād vijnānam pratyakṣam. Quoted in NV (Vide Catur., p.206)

3. Vide Catur., p. 207

4. NVTT (Vide Catur., p. 240)

5. Vide NV under NS III.11.9

6. pratyakṣam kalpanāpodham (nāmajātyādyasyamvutam).
   Quoted in NV (Vide Catur., p. 207)

7. All these five forms of mental construction are to be considered false, because in the cases of the first three there is an attribution of difference to what are actually identical, and in the cases of the last two, there is an attribution of identity to what are actually different. As for instance, though 'cowness' (gotva) is never perceived by anyone as a separate entity and is really identical with the cow itself, one wrongly constructs a difference between the two by saying 'it is a cow' (i.e. it is an animal characterised by cowness). Similar are
the cases where we have the mental construction of a quality or of an action. Again, as in the example of mental construction of a name given above, we have really two different things. 'This' stands for the actual object and 'Caitra' is merely a naming word. But the two are represented as identical with each other. (c.f. NM.i,p.87). So true perception is only self-cognisable.

It may be objected that if mental construction is really false and imputes identity or difference to what are actually different or identical, there should subsequently appear some form of knowledge contradicting such false construction, as for instance, the false apprehension of silver in a shell is contradicted subsequently by the right knowledge of the shell. The answer to this objection would be as follows. A false apprehension is contradicted by a subsequent apprehension only when one real thing is represented as another real thing. The above objection therefore does not arise in the case of mental construction, for the universal etc. are themselves unreal in the Buddhist view. (c.f. NM.i,p.88).

Śantaraksita (TS verses 1219 ff), however, objects this five-fold classification of mental construction. He argues that the 'mental construction of a name' is the only form of genuine mental construction, and the other forms of mental construction cannot be admitted on the grounds: (i) the universal etc. are themselves unreal and (ii) the universal etc. even if their reality
be admitted, can never be perceived as distinct from their substrata and there can thus be no question of their being related (i.e. imputed) to anything, for a connection can be established only between two such entities as can exist separately from each other. As to the charge that this explanation would be in contradiction with the statement of Dīnnāga (viz. nāma-jātvādvasamyutam). Sāntarakṣīta answers that Dīnnāga here actually refers to two classes of mental construction - namely, nāma-vojana and jātvādi-vojana - with a view to explaining that the first one alone which conforms to his own doctrine is to be admitted (upādea) and the second one which conforms to the views of others only is to be rejected (heva). The charge may also be answered as follows. Even in the cases of mental construction concerning a universal or the like the meaning is always conveyed through a nāma and thus all the forms of mental construction may be included under the only class of 'mental construction of a name'.

In this connection, we may note another point. What is the nature of cognition in the Buddhist view? Why and how do these mental constructions bring about the invalidity of perception? Udiyotakara says hardly anything in the matter. We may quote here at some length the comments of Stcherbatsky who has summed up the position very well: "A fire which burns and cooks is a real fire. Its presence is physically efficient and it calls up a valid image, an image whose degree of vividness changes in a direct ratio to the nearness or remoteness of the physical fire.
Even reduced to the shape of a remote point-instant of light, it produces a vivid image as long as it is real, i.e. present and amenable to the sense of vision. A fire which is absent, which is imagined, which neither really burns nor cooks nor sheds any light, is an unreal fire. It produces a vague, abstract, general, image. Even if intensely imagined, it will lack the immediate vividness of a real, present fire. The degree of vagueness will change in an inverse ratio to the force of imagination, and not in a direct ratio to its nearness or remoteness. Only the present, the 'here', the 'now', the 'this', are real. Everything past is unreal, everything future is unreal, everything imagined, absent, mental, notional, general, every universal, whether concrete universal or an abstract one, is unreal. All arrangements are all relations, if considered apart from the terms related, are unreal. Ultimately real is only the present moment of physical efficiency." (Stcherbatsky: Buddhist Logic, vol I pp.69-70)

8. Vide Catur., pp. 207-8

9. The Tātparva says this would be contrary to the Buddhist tenet that words express only unqualified cognitions.
   (Vide Catur., p.241)

10. anityam pratyakṣam duḥkham sūnyam anātmakam ca pratyakṣam. NV (Vide Catur., p.208)
11. na sarvam sanskritam anityam itvetat Tathagatena akhvatawam. NV (Vide Catur., p.208)

12. Dinnaga has not put forward his definition in connection with 'Right knowledge' as Dharmakirti has done; hence the definition cannot be restricted to cognition only. NVTT (Vide Catur., p.241)

13. Vide Catur., pp.201 -- 3

14. Vide Catur., p. 201

15. anare tu ..... NV (Vide Catur., p.201). Vacaspati also does not say specifically. He says kecit etc.

16. vathoktam Dignagena —

santaragrahanaṃ na svat prāptaḥ jñāne'chikasva ca/ adhiṣṭhānād bahirmāksam taccikitsādivogataḥ//

sativaḥ ca bahirbhāve na śaktirvisvesvage/ vadi ca svāt tadā naśvedapunmīlva nimālanāt//

NVTT (Vide Catur., p. 215)

17. Here by coloured substance, the transparent (prasāda-svabhāva) fire cannot be taken; non-transparent things only are to be taken. The quality cannot be the antara of the substance. NVTT (Vide Catur., p. 215-16)

18. The connection meant here is that of the sense-organ with the object; i.e., of the object with some parts of the organ, of
the organ with some parts of the object; of parts of the object with parts of the organ; this connection is possible only if the light emanating from the eyes goes on expanding outwards, spreading wider and wider as it proceeds farther and farther; the passage of the text therefore shows that the author accepts this view of wider expansion. The light from the lamp, though originally centred round the wick, moves out of it in gradually expanding circles; and it is only thus that the light illumines objects of varying sizes; so, in the case of the eye, the light centred in it, moves out of the eye, and moves out in gradually expanding circles, and thereby renders perceptible things of varying sizes.

Ref. NVTT (Vide Catur., p.216)

19. vusapadgrahanam asiddham, tadabhimānastu anyathāsiddheḥ. acintyo hi tejasā lāghavatīśavene vaGaśiśavo vadhavāyagiriśi- kharām ārohatyeva mārtandemandale bhavanodāresvāloka ityabhimaṇo lāukikānām. tādṛśam cāksusamapi teja iti kramenāpi gacchad vusapattatra tatra prāptam iti laksyate. na caikasmēdeva vusapad durāntikasmeyogā bhavanti iti yuktam. taddhi svakārye janvitaivvye svāśravaprātyaśtakim apekṣate. anyathā māthurāsthasya devadattasya karma pātaliputraṇa devadattem vojavet. vēgākhyasamskāryajamāni karma na sahasā sāramantarāla- deśena na laksyate ca vojati. tasmāt mithyaiva vusapadvābhimaṇā iti. NVTT (Vide Catur., p.217)
20. Vide *Catur.*, p.203

21. *NS* I.1.4

22. *anindriyanimitāḥ samtvādavāh karanāntarnimitāḥ bhavitum arhanti.*  
*NB (Vide Catur., p.438)*  
*anindriyanimitāḥ = abāhvendriyanimitāḥ. NVTT (Vide Catur., p.441)*

23. The first two grounds of Vātsyāyana are rejected by Uddyotakara. Against the first, Uddyotakara says that materiality and non-materiality are properties belonging to products. Hence to say that the mind is non-material would mean that it is the product of something other than matter. Actually the mind is not a product at all and as such it cannot be either material or non-material. Moreover, the character of materiality cannot possibly belong to the ear which being ākāśa itself, cannot be regarded as a material product. So like the mind the ear also should not be mentioned in the *sūtra* as the ear also is neither a material nor a non-material product.

As to the second, Uddyotakara says that if this argument be accepted, it would follow that there should be no mention of the ear as well. It has been contended that the nose etc. become sense-organs by virtue of their possessing the respective qualities, but the mind does not become a sense-organ since it possesses no such quality. If this is the criterion
for leaving out the mind, then the ear also should not be mentioned in the list.

The ear does not, through its own quality of sound, perceive another sound exterior to itself, as the other senses do. For instance, the nose perceives the odour outside itself, through the odour inherent in itself; but the sound that is apprehended by the ear is actually the one produced within the ear itself.

24. sarvavisayam manah. asarvavisavani indrivi.

NY (Vide Catur., p.205)

25. na sukhadi pramevam va mano va stvindrivañtaram.

Quoted in NVTT (Vide Catur., p.235)

26. Ref. NB (Vide Catur., p.439)