CHAPTER I

IS PRAMĀNA AT ALL POSSIBLE? THE VIEW OF NĀGĀRJUNA THAT PRAMĀNA ITSELF IS IMPOSSIBLE.

The ultimate goal of mankind, as prescribed by all the systems of Indian philosophy, is liberation, differently known as mokṣa, niḥśreṇya, aparavarga, nirvāṇa etc. In the Nyāya-sūtra of Gautama it is said that the attainment of the highest good (niḥśreyasa) or liberation results from the true knowledge of the sixteen categories, such as, pramāna (instrument of valid knowledge), prameya (object of valid knowledge), samśaya (doubt) and so on. Of these, the instrument of valid knowledge is the most important, as the true knowledge of the nature of the categories is to be attained with the help of nothing but pramāṇas.

As Vātsyāyana points out, in the discussion of the categories a distinct procedure has been followed by Gautama. First, the categories are just mentioned and classified. This is known as enumeration (uddesa). Secondly, the proper definitions of the categories are given and this is known as defining (laksana). Lastly, the categories and their definitions are critically discussed and defended against the objections of the opponents. This is known as critical examination (parikṣa).

The four pramāṇas recognised in the Nyāya system are first enumerated in NS I.1.3. Then follow their definitions, which comprise
The critical examination of the pramāṇas has been made in the first āhnika of the second chapter.

Under the sūtras enumerating, classifying and defining the pramāṇas, Uddyotakara hardly touches upon any opinion of the Buddhist so far as the pramāṇas in general are concerned. But under the sūtras, giving the critical examination of the pramāṇas, he examines and refutes the Buddhist view in detail. From Gautama's sūtras themselves and Vātsyāyana's commentary thereon it appears that the view taken up for refutation is one advocated by a certain section of the Buddhist, the Mādhyamika school of Nāgārjuna. Uddyotakara being the commentator had naturally to criticise the Buddhist position and defend the Nyāya view against the attack of the Buddhists.

Doubt being the precondition for critical examination itself, Gautama first critically examines doubt. After this, he passes on to examine critically the categories in the order in which these are mentioned in the opening sūtra. Logically, therefore, he takes up pramāṇa just after doubt and begins with the critical examination of its general possibility. The doubt which is presupposed by the critical examination of pramāṇa, as explained by Uddyotakara, is as follows:

Since pramāṇa itself is an object of knowledge and since the objects of knowledge are existent or non-existent, the question arises whether pramāṇa as an object of knowledge is existent or non-existent. In accordance with the second alternative, Gautama begins the critical examination of pramāṇa by raising the objection that pramāṇa as such is non-existent, which ultimately means that they have no validity.
But the pramāṇas, being essential for establishing a philosophical view, cannot be ignored. Uddyotakara explains those pūrvapakṣa sutras and uttarapakṣa sutras elaborately. The objections presented are as follows: Pramāṇas as such are non-existent, which means that they have no validity. What is the function of pramāṇas?

Pramāṇas help us to know the object, as it is. To serve this function, pramāṇas must be either prior to, or posterior to or simultaneous with their objects. Apart from these there is no other alternative. But pramāṇas cannot be connected with their objects by way of any of these three alternatives. So how do they prove the objects? Thus, as they cannot do their function, they have no utility and we can dispense with their existence. Pramāṇas, doing its own function of proving the object, prove its own validity, but pramāṇa, in fact, not doing its specific function, prove its invalidity. They can be easily dispensed with.

Now it can be shown that pramāṇa cannot be prior to its object. For example, perception, a pramāṇa, is defined as the knowledge due to sense-object contact. If pramāṇa exists prior to the object then it is to be admitted that the knowledge is prior to the existence of its object. So if the knowledge is already perceived, then to say 'the knowledge is produced by sense-object contact' is not possible. Hence the perception i.e. knowledge produced by sense-object contact would not be possible.

Again pramāṇa cannot be posterior to its object. Assuming pramāṇa to be posterior to its objects, we are to admit that it is non-existing while the object exists. In that case, the objects cannot be determined by the pramāṇas. This would involve the
absurdity that a thing may be called 'object of valid knowledge' (prameva) without being operated upon by pramāṇas. Here Vācaspati brings out the real point of the objection: Though the existence of an object as object may be independent of a pramāṇa, its status as an object of valid knowledge is determined by a pramāṇa and therefore, pramāṇa cannot be posterior to an object of valid knowledge.

In the third alternative, the pramāṇas cannot be simultaneous with their objects. If the simultaneity of pramāṇas and objects be admitted, cognitions would have to be held to appear simultaneously. For example, if there co-exist the contact of the visual sense with colour as well as the contact of the olfactory sense with smell, both colour and smell would be the objects of their respective sense and as such, there will be simultaneous knowledge of these two. In the Nyāya view, however, it is an accepted fact that simultaneous cognitions are impossible. Gautam himself makes this the ground for the inference of mind.

We have seen above that the pramāṇas are incapable of being connected with their objects at any of the three points of time. Now the question arises: Is there any means to know the pramāṇas themselves? There may be two alternatives: Either the pramāṇas, perception etc., may be apprehended by some pramāṇas other than the recognised ones, or, without the help of any instruments, i.e. they are cognised by themselves. But both the alternatives give birth to new problems and hence cannot be admitted.

When a pramāṇa is cognised, it becomes the object of the cognition. Now if this cognition is brought about by means of an instrument i.e. a pramāṇa, then this latter has to be regarded as a pramāṇa.
entirely distinct from the former pramāṇa (perception etc.). Then this other pramāṇa is to be apprehended by another pramāṇa and this another pramāṇa by a still other one and so on. Thus it results in an infinite regress.

If, on the other hand, it is claimed that there is no need for admitting any special pramāṇa for the apprehension of perception etc. then there will result the denial of all pramanas. If perception etc. can be apprehended without any special pramāṇa, then the prameyas may as well be apprehended without any pramāṇa. Thus, no pramāṇa is needed for the apprehension of either perception etc. of the prameyas. As such all pramanas become unnecessary. As, for example, \textit{Vv} says\textsuperscript{10}, if the prameva only needs a pramāṇa in order to be proved, but that the pramāṇa itself does not require another pramāṇa in order to be proved, then there is vaisamvadosa, since certain things will necessitate a pramāṇa and others can be proved without a pramāṇa.

An objection may be raised here. Going to deny the pramanas, the Buddhists advance the thesis: 'Perception etc. are not possessed of the character of pramāṇa (prāmānya).'. Here a particular property i.e. prāmānya is denied to perception etc., but perception etc. themselves are not denied. When the red colour is denied to a pot, the pot actually is not denied; rather it becomes admitted. So denying as they do a particular property of the pramanas, the Buddhists, in the other way, would be forced to admit the pramanas. But this objection is not tenable. The 'character of pramāṇa' is an abstract property. As an abstract property can never subsist by itself, so the 'character of pramāṇa' also can never subsist by itself. When this 'character of pramāṇa' is denied, this denial implies also the denial of the thing
possessing that abstract property.

Again, any fixed characterisation of an object is not possible, e.g. a rope is characterised sometime as a snake, sometime as the edge of a sword. The characterisations, viz. snake etc., are unreal. Likewise there is no fixed characterisation in the case of pramāṇa and prameya. Pramāṇa, when it is itself cognised, becomes prameya and when it becomes the instrument of cognition, it is characterised as pramāṇa. This absence of fixed characterisation indicates the unreality of the characterisations.11

Thus, by any means, one can never prove the existence of the pramāṇas.

In VV we find some additional objections.12 The Naiyāyikas say that there is no other pramāṇa to prove the pramāṇas, just as one fire does not require another fire to prove itself. In the case of fire, it is seen that fire is self-illuminating and it can also, at the same time, illuminate other things. But, it is objected, the example of fire is not fit to be cited. Fire is not self-illuminating, because illumination presupposes darkness, so that either we must admit that fire contains darkness in itself or that it does not contain darkness. In the first alternative, there will be contradiction. How is it that fire, containing darkness in itself, illuminates itself? In the second, since no illumination is possible without darkness, it would be absurd to state that it is self-illuminating. Moreover, if fire illuminates itself as well as other things, then, fire when it burns other things, should at the same time burn itself also. Again, if fire illuminates itself, as well as other things, then we would be compelled to admit that darkness also covers itself as well
as other things. Again, illumination presupposes the destruction of darkness; but in fire as well as in the spots where there is fire, there is no darkness; so nothing can be destroyed by fire there and it would be useless to say that fire illuminates itself as well as other things. Nor is it possible to maintain that in the very moment in which fire is produced it can illuminate, because in that very moment of production it cannot be co-existent with darkness. If we suppose that fire can destroy darkness, without being co-existent with darkness, then, fire in one place only should destroy the darkness in all places, since contact of fire and darkness will not be necessary. But that never happens actually.

So by citing the instance of fire, we cannot prove pramāṇa, as a self-proved object. Further, there is another inconsistency. If a pramāṇa is really self-proved, it cannot have relation with prameya, and if it has relation with prameya, it cannot be self-proved. Now if there is no relation between pramāṇa and prameya, it will be useless to employ a pramāṇa for discerning a prameya. If pramāṇas are proved in so far as they are related to prameya, then, prameya will be proved independently of pramāṇa. Now if prameya is proved without any relation to pramāṇa, it is useless to have recourse to pramāṇa in order to prove prameya. It has been said that pramāṇas are proved in so far as they have some relation with prameya; so then, prameya is in fact the proof and pramāṇa becomes prameya. Moreover, if we say that both pramāṇa and prameya are proved in relation to each other, then, the proof, being itself unproved, cannot prove the object to be proved. So everything will remain unproved. Besides, it will be impossible to distinguish between pramāṇa and prameya, just as it is
impossible to distinguish between the notions of fathership and sonship, since each of them is possible only in so far as the other exists, but not because it possesses a reality of its own.13

In short, Gautama, while examining pramāṇa in general, cites first the pūrvapakṣa objection based on traikālva-siddhi.

Next we come to the question: Is the view of this denial of pramāṇas merely conjectural or does it come from any opponent philosopher who actually expounded such a view? Vācaspati says categorically that this pūrvapakṣa represents the view of the Mādhyamikas, although Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara do not supply any information as to the identity of the opponent. Now do we find this in any actual text of the Mādhyamikas?

In the present context, the NS uses the word traikālva-siddhi. In one of the Mādhyamika works, the VV of Nāgārjuna, we find a very similar expression, traikālva-pratīṣedha.14 There is however one point of difference. In NS traikālva-siddhi is shown to disprove the validity of pramāṇa alone. But the VV claims that traikālva-pratīṣedha disproves the reality of everything. The objection based on time-relation is applied to cause and effect and by showing the impossibility of time-relation, the non-existence of everything is sought to be proved by the Mādhyamikas. Still, there is some special relevance for refuting pramāṇa even in the Mādhyamika view. The claim that nothing is real has indeed been sought to be discarded by pointing out that one has to admit the reality of pramāṇa at least. That is perhaps why the refutation of pramāṇas takes up a separate chapter in VV.15
Again, the objection in कृकी 20 of व्व is in fact the same as the one noted in न्स: त्रैकाल्यासिद्धेऽप्रतिसेधानुपपत्तिः (II.1.12). The refutation is not proved as the refutation cannot be either prior to, or posterior to or co-existent with the refuted. This is the पुर्वपाक्ष in व्व, but in न्स, this is an objection on behalf of the सिद्धांतपाक्ष. Again, the stand taken by the पुर्वपाक्ष in व्व (काः 14), that if there is no प्रमाण, the प्रतिसेध is also impossible, points to that of न्स II.1.13 शर्यप्रामाणयप्रतिसेधाच्च प्रतिसेधानुपपत्तिः.

Thus, from the above, some are inclined to believe that the पुर्वपाक्ष of invalidity of प्रमाणाः in न्स represents the view of the यम्यमकास.

We find the पुर्वपाक्ष view of न्स in the text of व्व of नागर्जुना and it appears from the comparison of the two texts of व्व and न्स that they are here interdependent. Has Gautama taken the view from नागर्जुना's text or vice versa? From the textual evidences, it appears that नागर्जुना might have been posterior to Gautama.

First, the argument of न्स II.1.12 is clearly mentioned in कृकी 20 and refuted in कृकी 70 of व्व.

Secondly, we find great enthusiasm on the part of नागर्जुना for refuting the example of the lamp recorded in the सिद्धांतसूत्राः: न द्वारा प्रदीपप्रकाशसिद्धिवत् तत्सिद्धेऽ (न्स II.1.19). इस सूत्र is interpreted by वात्स्यायन thus: 'As light is a means of perceiving objects, but can at the same time be perceived by the eyes, so the प्रमाण is at the same time the means and object of perception.' But
the interpretation of this example in \textit{VV} differs from that of \textit{Vātsyāyana}. Nāgārjuna records, 'Just as fire is self-illuminating and does not need another \textit{pramāṇa} in order to be illuminating, so also a \textit{pramāṇa}, being self-proved does not require another \textit{pramāṇa} in order to be proved.' Now, this interpretation ascribed to the \textit{Ācārdesiya (NVTT, p.371)}, is in fact alluded to and refuted by Vātsyāyana. Perhaps there were some early Nyāya interpreters who had explained the \textit{sūtra} in that way which was criticised by Nāgārjuna. This evidently proves the posteriority of Nāgārjuna to the Nyāyasūtrakāra. To avoid this criticism Vātsyāyana had to interpret differently.

Not only in \textit{VV} but in \textit{MMK} also, Nāgārjuna criticises the example of the lamp by saying that a lamp cannot illumine itself as there is no darkness in it. If a lamp could remove darkness even without coming in contact with it, why could it not, standing here, remove the darkness of the entire universe?

Moreover, the work \textit{Pramāṇa-viheṭana} \textsuperscript{16} of Nāgārjuna, though found in Tibetan translation only and not extant in Sanskrit, is a strong evidence as to the posteriority of Nāgārjuna to Gautama. It is a review of the definitions of the sixteen categories as mentioned by Gautama. Nāgārjuna even explains those in the same order in which they are enumerated in the \textit{NS} itself, though naturally according to the perspective of his own view.

The eminent scholar Rahula Sankrityayana\textsuperscript{17} proposes the reverse opinion. He says, "the \textit{sūtra} gives the example of balance (\textit{tulā}) showing a \textit{pramāṇa} (source of knowledge) can be both \textit{pramāṇa} and \textit{prameve} (thing to be proved or known) which is not criticised by
Nāgārjuna. This silence shows that the opponent's argument was not before him.

But it is not expected that Nāgārjuna should criticise all the sūtras of Gautama. Contrarily, it may also be shown that the sūtras of Gautama are silent on 'the sudden validity' of pramāṇa, mentioned in Vv. So the silence on tulāpramāṇya cannot conclusively prove the priority of Nāgārjuna.

Moreover, from the commentary of karika 52 (in Vv), it is clear that the objection is directed against those who are strictly Catuspramāṇavadin and whose views are established by the very four pramāṇas, namely, pratyakṣa, anumāṇa, upamāṇa and āgama. The objection is placed in such a language that it shows that the objector is clearly acquainted with the four pramāṇas of NS and the opponents are Nyāya philosophers, whose philosophy was mainly based on NS.

Prof. Tucci has said that in Vv 'Nāgārjuna explains the fundamental tenets of the Sunyavāda refuting the objections raised against him by his opponents, heretics as well as Hinayanists'.

So we can conclude at least that the pūrvapakṣa mentioned in NS is not taken from Vv of Nāgārjuna.

This may not be true of the other tenets, but as to the refutation of pramāṇa there is a possibility that Nāgārjuna might have had the Nyāya as his adversary.
As we have already seen, the Mādhyamikas try to prove the invalidity of pramāṇas by the probans trai-kālvyāsiddheḥ. Bhāṣyakāra first attacks the probans of the opponents, because the probans is the most important means to prove a thesis and if this probans be refuted then nothing can be proved. Thus, with a view to oppos-ing the Mādhyamikas, Bhāṣyakāra begins with the statement that the charge that the pramāṇas, either being prior, or posterior, or co-existent, cannot be connected with the prameva, is not tenable. The cause of knowledge and the object of knowledge are to be connected with each other, but there is no hard and fast rule as to the temporal relation. The relation between them is actually observed to be different in different cases. In some cases the cause of knowledge exists beforehand and the object of knowledge comes into being later, e.g. the illumination of the sun for the objects under the process of being produced. In some cases, the reverse of the above is seen, e.g. light of the lamp for the object already existing. In some cases, they co-exist, e.g. when the knowledge of fire comes from the knowledge of smoke. When the knowledge of fire is produced, at that moment, fire is known as accompanied by smoke. Thus we see that the pramāṇa may be connected with the prameva at any of the three points of time but the reciprocal position of them depends upon the actual case as observed.

The Śūtrakāra himself supports this irregularity of the temporal relation between pramāṇa and prameva when he says: trai-kālva-pratise-dhaśca saḥcātātodyasiddhivattat-siddheḥ (NS II.i.15). Following the Bhāṣya on it, Uddyotakara explains: When we hear some sounds, in them, first we perceive the peculiar character of the sound, which may come from the lute or the flute, or anything else. Then we
cognize the fact that 'this is the sound of the lute', or 'this is the sound of the flute' or 'this is the sound of something else'. Then we infer that there exists a musical instrument, either a lute, or a flute or anything else, prior to that sound, which comes only subsequently. By this fact, it is seen that the object of knowledge which is already existing is known by the cause of knowledge, which occurs later. The instance is cited here as an illustration.

Considering the above fact, Vācaśpati says that the probans, given by the opponent is a pseudo-probans, being 'unproved' (asiddha), (svarūpasiddha in the present case). From the fact that there can be connection between pramāṇa and prameya in any of the times, it is clear that the probans traikālvyāsiddhi cannot be related to the 'subject' (naksā). Thus the probans fails to prove the probandum.

Uddyotakara adds here nothing new, but only clarifies the position of the Bhāsyakāra.

But then, an object is named a prameya only when it is apprehended by means of pramāṇa, so how can the term prameya be applied on the posteriority of pramāṇa? But this fact of the use of the terms pramāṇa and prameya is wrongly apprehended by the Buddhists. The circumstances which from the basis of the use of the terms pramāṇa and prameya are: pramāṇa is the name of that by which a thing will be known, is known or has been known, and prameya is the name of the thing that will be known, is known or has been known. Thus the ground for using the terms is possible
in connection with all the three points of time.

The term **pramāṇa** is applied when we may ascertain that a thing will be apprehended by the proper instrument, and the term **prameva** is applied when we have knowledge that the apprehension of a thing will be brought about by the right instrument. If this fact is denied, ordinary expressions as 'bring the cook, he will do the cooking' (**pācakamāṇyaṃ nakṣyatīti**) would become entirely meaningless, because the suffix **nvul** in **pācaka** is added to the verb **nam** in the sense of a (future) action as dependent upon another action (**kriyārtha kriyā**)²². So long as the cooking is not done, he is not fit to be called a cook. In short, in the view of the Buddhists even ordinary usage would become impossible.

Now we come to another objection raised against the Mādhyamikas. By the proposition **pratyaksādinam aprāmānyam traikālyasiddheḥ**, certainly the Mādhyamikas intend to mean that perception etc. cannot be regarded as instruments of valid knowledge because of the impossibility of connecting them in any of the three points of time. But the question is: 'Is it meant to set aside their possibility, or, to make known their impossibility?' If it is said that it is meant to set aside the possibility, there would be self-contradiction, because perception etc. are offered as the subject of inference only after accepting their possibility and again, their possibility is sought to be set aside.

In the second alternative also, there would be self-contradiction. When the impossibility of **pramāṇa** is intended to be made known, this refutation itself acquires the status of **pramāṇa**, inasmuch as the refutation becomes the ground for the knowledge of the impossibility
of pramāṇas.

Uddyotakara says that the Madhyamikas deny the pramāṇas absolutely, and for setting aside this absolute non-entity they take the help of argument; but there can be no setting aside of what is an absolute non-entity. The absolute non-entity is unproved automatically and it does not need an argument and it is also to be noted that certainly mere denial can have no power to make 'what exists' an 'absolute non-entity'.

In fact, what a denial does is to make known a certain fact and not to set aside possibilities; so that what this particular denial also can do is only to make known a certain fact, and it cannot be taken as setting aside the possibility of pramāṇas. On the other hand, if the denial makes known the impossibility of pramāṇas, then it itself becomes endowed with the character of a pramāṇa.

Later, Uddyotakara, in one of his own arguments, has shown that when the opponent denies the character of pramāṇas, this denial of pramāṇa implies the existence of pramāṇa, for pramāṇa itself is not being denied. This argument of Uddyotakara however seems to be very implicitly implied by the Bhasyakāra when he says that if the opponent wants to deny the possibility, the very act of such a denial implies the admission of its existence. The Bhasyakāra has only noted the argument, but Uddyotakara brings it into prominence.

Moreover, to prove the probandum, the probans alone is not enough. An exemplification also is to be shown. But no
exemplification can be offered by the Mādhyamikas in favour of the probans 'ineffectiveness in any of the three points of time'. Hence, it cannot prove the probandum. In the corroborative instance the efficacy of the probans in proving the probandum is to be shown. In exemplification, perception, a pramāṇa, is vitally involved. But, according to Mādhyamikas there is no pramāṇa. Thus, in spite of being cited, it has no power to show the efficacy of the probans in proving the probandum. In fact, the probans cannot prove the probandum, since the exemplification does not show this power of the probans in proving the probandum. On the other hand, if no exemplification is mentioned, the probans becomes futile.

The very objection of the Buddhists is a case of flat contradiction. The objector is using inference-components to prove his thesis; but to use the inference-components is to admit the validity of the four pramāṇas, inasmuch as they are based on these. At the same time, the objector wants to conclude that the pramāṇas have no validity. So automatically the probans given becomes fallacious. The pseudo-probans involved here is the 'contradictory' (viruddha). As Uddyotakara explains it: The Mādhyamikas have applied some inference-components; each member of these involves one particular pramāṇa. It is found that the proposition (pratiyoga) is verbal testimony (āgama); the probans (hetu) inference (anumāna); the exemplification (udāhāraṇa) perception (pratyakṣa); and the application (upanaya) comparison (unamāna). Though upamāṇa and āgama are not admitted by the Buddhists, yet there remain the other two pramāṇas. By applying the inference-components, two pramāṇas at least become admitted. So the probans offered goes
against the accepted view of the absence of all pramāṇas (of the
Buddhists). Thus the probans traikālyāsiddheḥ becomes a pseudo-
probans called the 'contradictory'.

Moreover, according to their own view, the Mādhyamikas cannot
claim that their argument is valid. If they claim so, it means
that the pramāṇas, which are involved in the inference-components
cited by them, must be valid and all other pramāṇas excepting
those would be invalid. But such a position is not acceptable. For
on what ground would they claim that only pramāṇas involved in
their own assertions are valid? On the same ground, the pramāṇas
involved in other's assertions also may be proved valid. Therefore,
by no means, it can be said that there are no pramāṇas.

Mādhyamikas have said that the absence of fixed characterisation
proves the unreality of the characterised. It is seen that a thing
is sometimes designated as a pramāṇa, and the same thing sometimes
becomes designated as a prameya also.

But this is not correct. The terms pramāṇa and prameya may be
applied to the same thing, and there is no inconsistency. The
cause that determines the application of the names pramāṇa and
prameya consists respectively in 'being the means of apprehension'
and 'being the object of apprehension'. When a measuring instrument
determines the weight of an object, it is characterised as a pramāṇa,
and when by a piece of gold, whose weight has been already ascer-
tained by means of a reliable balance, is weighed again in a balance
of doubtful accuracy, the balance becomes an 'object of valid know-
ledge' (prameya). Thus the same thing in different circumstances
can really be both a pramāṇa and a prameya. So the absence of
fixed characterisation is not necessarily indicative of the unreality of the characterised.\textsuperscript{25}

Grammatical use also corroborates the above fact. The gist of the discussion is: The words denoting grammatical cases (\textit{kāraka}s) can each be applied to the same thing when there is ground for their use. 'Act of standing' or 'absence of motion' or 'existence' or 'unbrokenness' or 'continuity of existence'—whichever may be the meaning of the word 'stands' in the sentence 'the tree stands', the tree is the subject (\textit{kartā}), because it depends upon nothing else for its existence. In the sentence 'one looks at the tree', the tree is the object (\textit{karma}), because by the act of seeing, this is sought to be attained most. In this way, the tree may become the instrumental (\textit{karana}) etc. also.\textsuperscript{26} The Mādhyamikas have said that as the use of the terms \textit{pramāna} and \textit{prameva} is not fixed to any object, so the characterisation must be false. The admission of such a position would do away with the use of \textit{kāraka}s.

It is seen above that neither the substance by itself nor the action by itself forms a grammatical case. Grammatical case consists in being instrumental to the action as well as being characterised by some activity of its own. \textit{Pramāna}, \textit{prameva} etc. are also, in a sense, words denoting grammatical case (\textit{kāraka-sabda}).

Perception etc. are the instruments of valid knowledge in their capacity of producing knowledge and at the same time are objects of valid knowledge in so far as these are subjected to another knowledge. When we say 'I apprehend by perception', perception is a \textit{pramāna}; but when the expression is 'my knowledge is perceptual', then, perception is made an object of a subsequent valid knowledge.
We have seen already that a measuring instrument may be at the same time a pramāṇa and a prameva. Similarly perception etc. also may be, at the same time, a pramāṇa and a prameva. But, still, it may be argued, the question is not fully settled. Assuming that a pramāṇa also becomes a prameva, there arises a question: Is this pramāṇa cognised by any of the recognised pramāṇas or without any instrumentality of pramāṇa? The second alternative is naturally not expected because it is an accepted fact that there is nothing which can be subjected to valid knowledge without any operation of pramāṇa. But in the first also, there is illogicality. The admission of further perception etc. results either in a vicious infinite regress or in the denial of all pramāṇas.

But this objection of the Mādhyamikas does not stand. Perception etc. do not need any further pramāṇas other than perception etc. For their own apprehension, they are themselves the instruments. It is just like the case of a lamp. A lamp, when it becomes the means for bringing about the apprehension of things, is called pramāṇa. Now when it is itself apprehended by perception etc., it is seen that for its own operation, it does not necessitate the operation of any pramāṇas other than perception etc.27 In the case of the apprehension of pramāṇas themselves, the same thing is observed.

In support of his contention that a pramāṇa is known by one of the four established pramāṇas and not by any distinct one, Uddyotakara formulates his argument in the form of an inference. It is found that whatever is endowed with generic and specific characters (sāmānyavishēsa) does not, for its apprehension, stand
in need of the operation of any pramāṇas other than perception etc. We find this in the case of the lamp. Perception etc. are endowed with generic and specific characters. So they must not stand in need of the operation of other pramāṇas.

It may be claimed that the above two answers do not fully remove the possibility of a vicious infinite regress. Even assuming that a pramāṇa is apprehended by only a similar one, the need of apprehending this second pramāṇa remains, which can be fulfilled only by a third pramāṇa and so on. Thus, there will never be any final knowledge of any pramāṇa.

In answer, it is pointed out that the need of apprehending a pramāṇa does not necessarily arise. When an object is apprehended by a pramāṇa, we do not invariably feel the necessity of apprehending this pramāṇa itself, just as when an object is revealed by a lamp, we do not feel the need of separately knowing the lamp itself.

Here the Mādhyamikas raise an objection. Perception etc. cannot be apprehended by themselves. If they become apprehended by means of themselves, it is to be admitted that the same thing may be the instrument in respect of its own self. But this can never be logically admitted.

The answer is easy. It is not being claimed that the same perception perceives itself. But one perception is apprehended by another similar one. They are really different from one another but similar in character. Just as the light of a lamp is a cause of perceptual knowledge i.e. a pramāṇa, so also the light of a lamp is apprehended through its contact with the visual sense, which
contact, again is an instrument of perceptual knowledge. Thus one
perception can be apprehended by another perception.

Again, there is no such absolute law that a thing cannot be
apprehended by means of itself as sometimes such apprehensions do
happen; for instance, in the case of the self, we find that the
same self is the cogniser as also the cognised, whenever a person
has any cognition in regard to his own self.

Moreover, there is nothing that is not apprehended by means of
any of the four pramāṇas. If there were anything as is not cognised
by means of perception etc., we could have accepted a pramāṇa other
than perception etc.; but one can never prove that is any such
thing. So as everything existent as well as non-existent are appre­
hended by means of perception etc. only, the conclusion follows
that it is by means of perception etc. alone that the pramāṇas
themselves are apprehended.

But here the Mādhyamikas may try to object. When the self is
cognised, it is observed that the cogniser-self apprehends itself
as qualified by happiness etc. So the self would be the cognised
only when qualified by happiness etc., but it would be the cogniser
in the pure state, independently of any such qualification. Thus
when the self is the cogniser, the conditions are entirely different
from those that are present when it is the cognised. Uddyotakara
says that exactly so is the case of perception etc.; these become
the 'object of cognition' only when apprehended by means of pramāṇas,
while when appearing as the instruments whereby something else is
apprehended they become the instruments of cognition.

The Mādhyamikas advance the following as the thesis:
'Perception etc. are not instruments of valid knowledge' (pratyā-ksadīnām apramāṇavam). It means that perception etc. do not rightly indicate the existence of their objects. But this statement involves a self-contradiction. They call 'perception etc.' by name and then say 'they do not indicate the existence of things'. If there is nothing called perception etc., then it is not possible to call them by those names. When one says 'this thing is not known', then, to call it 'this thing' and then, to say 'it is not known' involves a self-contradiction. The assertion of the Madhyamikas also is similar. So there must be some proof for the existence of the things which the Buddhists call by those names and then, they would fall in self-contradiction. If there is no such proof then, the statement 'Perception etc.' becomes meaningless.

Next, in the proposition pratyakṣadīnām apramāṇavam, the validity of perception etc. is being denied. This validity is a particular character of the pramāṇas. When this particular character is being denied, the characterised is not being denied. But automatically the characterised i.e. the pramāṇas become admitted. When one says 'this man is without an umbrella', he simply denies his possessing an umbrella but admits the existence of the man himself.

Against the above, the Madhyamikas may say that an abstract property cannot subsist by itself; validity is an abstract property; so its denial leads to the denial of perception etc. themselves.

In answer, Uddyotakara says that even then self-contradiction cannot be avoided. It is only by means of pramāṇa that anything can be proved. Therefore, the absence of validity also is to be proved by means of pramāṇa. So it is a clear case of self-contradiction.
If there is actually no pramāṇa, the thesis would remain unproved.

Now, Uddyotakara, taking a different meaning of the opponent's proposition, shows self-contradiction in a different way. It seems from the proposition that the Buddhists want to deny only the character of being pramāṇa and not the very existence of perception etc. If it is so, this would mean that they admit the existence of perception etc. as apart from their character of being pramāṇa. Just as when one denies the presence of the 'king's man', he may admit the presence of a man, apart from the character of his belonging to the king. In this case, it is impossible for the Buddhists to describe this character of theses perception etc. So how can the non-existent character be denied? Thus the contention that 'the pramāṇa is existent', but 'the character of pramāṇa is non-existent', is only a case of self-contradiction.

Every right word (śādhu-sābda), whenever we utter it, invariably indicates something as its object, and we can say the same in case of the very utterance of word prāmāṇya. Thus the word prāmāṇya must indicate its object. And pramāṇa only can be its object. So again, when the Mādhyamikas say that there are no pramāṇas, they contradict themselves. Now if they say that there is no indication of an object by the word prāmāṇya, then, how is it that the Mādhyamikas proceed to argue with a meaningless word?

Moreover, what would be the precise significances of the genitive ending in pratyakṣādīnām and that of the nominal suffix in prāmāṇyam? The assertion pratyakṣādīnām prāmāṇyam nāsti may be taken in two ways. Either, it may be taken as a denial; then it means that the character of being pramāṇa does not belong to
perception etc.; or, it may be taken as an affirmation; then, it means that the character of not being pramāṇa belongs to perception etc. In either case, what is denied/what is affirmed must be something distinct, otherwise the genitive ending would be meaningless. Then it becomes necessary to demonstrate the form of perception etc. as apart from their 'being pramāṇa'. But as soon as the Buddhists would proceed to describe this difference, the argument would not stand as it does not connect 'the difference' (the subject intended here) at any of the three points of time.

To justify the nominal suffix (svaḥ) in pramāṇyam, some other thing (i.e. pramāṇa), different from 'the character of being pramāṇa', has to be admitted and if they go to describe this difference, the intention of the Buddhists would not be fulfilled because the argument denies connection at any of the three points of time. So from the two terms pratyaksādinām and pramāṇyam, it is clear that there are two distinct things, pramāṇa and the character of being pramāṇa, but the Buddhist contention is that there is no pramāṇa. So the self-contradiction comes out clearly.

Next, if the meaning of the proposition be 'the character of pramāṇa cannot belong to perception etc.' the implication would be that perception etc. are not pramāṇas, but there are some others apart from perception etc. to which the character of being pramāṇa would belong. Otherwise the negation in respect of perception etc. would be entirely meaningless.

The Buddhists cannot escape even by admitting pramāṇas other than perception etc.; for these other pramāṇas also will be open to the charge of not being 'connected with the three points of time'. The
objection directed against perception etc. will equally apply to those other pramāṇas also. Hence there cannot be other pramāṇas too, pramāṇas other than perception etc.

Another objection raised by Uddyotakara is as follows: traikāl-vāsiddhi i.e. 'impossibility of connecting them with any of the three points of time' is the probans of the Buddhist proposition. This probans is not co-substrate with the subject (pakṣa) of the proposition because in the term traikāl-vāsiddheh, asiddhi i.e. 'impossibility', apparently belongs to traikālva and not to the pramāṇas.

The meaning of traikāl-vāsiddhi is 'impossibility of connecting the objects in any of the three points of time'. We have already seen how Uddyotakara has interpreted the meaning of traikāl-vāsiddheh: 'as pramāṇas do not serve their purpose at any of the three points of time', how does this meaning come? To be connected with the objects at any of the three points of time' is the main task of pramāṇas; and impossibility of this connection means that pramāṇas fail to serve their task. This position which is sought to be established by the probans is already implied by the proposition itself.

Pratvaksādīnām aprāmāṇyam implies that perception etc. do not serve their purpose, that is why it is said that perception etc. have no validity. So the probans becomes entirely superfluous. Therefore, the Buddhists cannot prove the non-existence of pramāṇas by the probans traikāl-vāsiddheh.

Gautama himself opposes the Mādhyamikas by saying that the refutation itself is untenable, because of its ineffectiveness in
any of the three points of time. That is, if the refutation is prior, then there being nothing to be refuted, what can be refuted by it? If it is posterior, there can be nothing called the refuted, because there is no refutation. If the two are co-existent, then the refutation becomes redundant, because the refuted is already accepted. So the refutation of pramāṇas being impossible, the validity of perception etc. is established.

While explaining the Bhāṣya on the above Uddyotakara has added some further arguments. Thus, Uddyotakara asks the Mādhyamikas, is the denial 'pramāṇas do not serve their purpose' to be considered as a pramāṇa or not? If they say that their inference is a pramāṇa, they admit the existence of pramāṇas and then, trying to deny the possibility of pramāṇas, involves a clear self-contradiction. If they say, on the other hand, that they do not consider their inference as a pramāṇa then it would be as good as the utterance of a lunatic or a delirious person.

In the statement, pratyakṣa-dīnām aprāmāṇyam traikālvāsiddheḥ, the denial may relate either to the efficiency of perception etc. or, to the very existence of perception etc. Which of these two is being sought to be proved here by the Buddhists? If the efficiency is intended to be denied, there can be no denial of perception etc. On the other hand, if the denial of the very existence is meant, there arises a further question: Does this denial mean the non-existence of pramāṇas in general, or, that of the particular pramāṇas mentioned? The former cannot be accepted because there the reference is not in the form 'pramāṇas do not exist' which should have been the proper way. If again the denial is meant of particular pramāṇas,
then, this implies that the denier admits of pramāṇas other than those mentioned.

Continuing his tirade against the Mādhyamikas, Uddyotakara says, let one consider the two proposition, namely, (a) perception etc. cannot be regarded as pramāṇas because of their ineffectiveness in any of the three points of time and (b) perception etc. should be regarded as pramāṇas, because of their effectiveness in any of the three points of time. Now, a question may be put to the Mādhyamikas: Do these two assertions mean the same thing or not? If the two assertions mean the same thing, then the latter assertion should be taken because the latter is simpler and briefer. In the other assertion, there are the two negative particles in the words aprāmāṇyam and asiddheḥ. But the latter is without these two particles. Further, how can the Buddhists know that the same thing is meant by the two assertions? If it is by means of an instrument of valid knowledge, then there is a clear case of self-stultification (vyāghāta). Whichever the means of knowledge may be, that will have to be a pramāṇa and then it will be a mere difference in name.

Not only this, it is also to be admitted that the statement 'perception etc. do not exist' itself cannot convey the absolute non-existence of perception etc. When the term 'jar' is coordinated with the term 'does not exist', it does not convey the absolute non-existence of the jar, but expresses the denial of the connection of the jar with a particular place or with a particular point of time or the denial of the efficiency of the jar. In the above statement, the term 'perception etc.' is coordinated with the term 'do not exist'. The denial may be either of such pramāṇas, as are
postulated by other philosophers, or of the existence of the pramāṇas at a particular time or of the efficiency of the pramāṇas; in either case, the existence of the pramāṇas themselves is to be admitted. Hence, the denial in question, would only involve self-contradiction.

Again, the Madhyamikas are not surely arguing with themselves; they are propounding their view to some one else. Now, if this propounding is by means of an instrument of valid knowledge, there results self-contradiction. Someone knows it by some other means. An instance too is to be shown there. But the Madhyamikas can have no instance. Further, from the same fact, it follows that there is a difference between the propounder and the person to whom the view is propounded. But how can this difference be known? That very means for knowing whatever it may be is to be called pramāṇa. If the difference is not admitted, then also, self-contradiction would result, for the inference-components may be used only to convince others, and here they are used by the Madhyamikas.

Further, if the Madhyamikas are asked "how do you know that the pramāṇas do not exist" they would have to put forward proofs. But they can do so only by surrendering their own thesis. They know that there are no pramāṇas, yet they, being asked, supply inferential proof. Nor can the Buddhists remain silent, because if they do not show any proof their purpose would not be served.

Even from ordinary experience we can prove the existence of pramāṇas. When one consciously pronounces a sentence, his action presupposes so many factors -- desire for speaking, effort, emitting of wind, striking of the palate etc., motion of the lips and so forth. So it would be in the case of the Madhyamikas also. They also
would pronounce a sentence presupposing all these. But their presupposition only indicates inferential knowledge.

If there are no pramānas, a man cannot proceed to walk even, for when he walks, he avoids obstacles in the shape of pillars, thorns, snakes, etc.; without the help of pramānas, these functions cannot be performed by him, as their effects may not be produced yet. So in every step of life, the ordinary activities of people would not have been possible if there were nothing called pramāna.
THE NUMBER OF PRAMĀNAS ADMITTED BY THE BUDDHISTS

As to the number of pramānas the Indian systems of philosophy differ among one another. The materialists admit only perception. All other systems admit unanimously at least two different sources of knowledge, perception and inference. The Sāṁkhya school, by adding verbal testimony, counts three pramānas. Analogy is an additional pramāna, admitted by the Naiyāyikas. Others admit other additional kinds. In this manner, the number of the pramānas may rise up to eight gradually.30

Like the Vaiśeṣikas, the Buddhists also accept only two pramānas, perception and inference, although their approaches in this regard are quite different.

Thus the Buddhists say that things may be of two kinds, svalaksana and sāmānvalaksana. There remains nothing which can constitute a third category and there is no other criterion except the difference of categories for the admission and division of the pramānas. Thus, svalaksana is apprehended only by perception and sāmānvalaksana only by inference. There being no other kind of thing, there is no necessity for admitting any other of pramāna.31

But in this matter, the Vaiśeṣikas say that the number of pramānas cannot depend upon the number of prameyas (categories). Nor is it logical to claim that there are only two kinds of things. The pramānas are only two because the other pramānas, analogy, verbal testimony etc. which are admitted as separate ones by others, may easily be
included in inference.

But why are the pramānas two according to the two kinds of things and why are the things of two kinds only and not more? What is the argument of the Buddhists? All this has been discussed by Jayanta in his Nyāyamanjarī in a somewhat detailed manner.32 Uddyotakara however does not discuss such problem but some objections against the admission of analogy and verbal testimony are recorded and refuted by him.33

ANALOGY 34 - objection and refutation

According to the Buddhists, analogy cannot be different from perception and verbal testimony. When an observer actually sees the cow and gavaya, then, by perception he only recognises that this animal is similar to the cow. Again when he hears that the gavaya resembles the cow, then also he cognises the gavaya as having similarly with the cow. Here actually a group of words is the instrument. So where is the necessity of analogy as a distinct pramāna?

As against this Uddyotakara contends that the Buddhists have failed to comprehend the actual nature of analogy. They are mistaken in viewing that the result of analogy is the knowledge of a thing with similarity. The view of the Naiyāyikas is that from the cognition of the similarity of a cow in the gavaya, there arises a new cognition, a cognition of the connection of that particular animal with that particular name. This new cognition is entirely different from the cognitions, brought about by perception and the words. Vācaspati too emphasises this point for the admission
of analogy as a separate pramāṇa. 35

VERBAL TESTIMONY - objection and refutation

At the end of the explanation of the sūtra defining verbal testimony, Uddyotakara records an objection against it, but he does not mention who raises such an objection. Vācaspati however clearly mentions that the upholder of this view is Diśnāga. He also explains the pūrvapakṣa view in detail. 37

Gautama defines verbal testimony as āptopadesa. Diśnāga asks, what exactly is the implication of Gautama? Does he mean thereby the avisamvādītya of the trustworthy person or that of the objects themselves? In the first case, the purpose can be served by inference, whereas in the second case, the purpose can be served by perception itself. Therefore, there is no need for verbal testimony as a distinct pramāṇa.

Uddyotakara's comment here is quite brief. This is because, as it has been pointed out by some scholar, the whole passage is actually a quotation from Diśnāga's work which is itself very brief and terse. For the purpose of refutation Uddyotakara here simply gives the view of Diśnāga without offering any elaboration and illustration.

Clarifying the position of Diśnāga, Vācaspati refers to the logical grounds for it. Even admitting that the object is conveyed by the word, one has to admit that there must be some kind of relation between the two, because when one thing is conveyed by another thing, the two cannot be unrelated. Now what would be the relation between the word and the object -- the relation of identity or the
relation of causality? The first is obviously not possible, because there is definitely no identity between the word and the object. Nor can the word be accepted as the direct effect of the object, for the word may appear even in the absence of the object simply according to the will of the speaker. Thus from the word—which is the effect—is inferred its cause, namely, the desire to speak; the cause of this desire to speak is the knowledge of the object. In other words, the knowledge of the object can be said to be an effect of the object. The speaker again may be trustworthy or untrustworthy and thus there may be a question regarding the trustworthiness or otherwise of a speaker. That is why in the first alternative, Diññāga puts the question: Does Gautama imply in his definition of śabdapraṇamā, the reliability of the person concerned?

Now, if it be so, Diññāga contends, the reliability of the speaker is arrived at by inference and when we come to the conclusion that he is a reliable man, we infer from that fact that what he says must be true.39

In the second alternative, if Gautama implies only that the fact asserted is true, then this also can be known by perception. But how does this kind of meaning, i.e. the truth of the fact, come from the sūtra? Vacaspati clearly shows how the second alternative is implied by breaking up the term āptopadesa: āptah prāpta upadeso vasmāt sa tathokto etaduktam bhavati vasmāt śabdādavasamvārtham pravartamānah prānottita tamevārtham sa āptopadesāḥ śabdāpramānām.40

Uddyotakara's refutation also is very brief. He simply says that just as the Buddhists do not comprehend the meaning of the upamāna-sūtra, likewise they have failed to comprehend the meaning of the
śabda-sūtra also. The Buddhists want to mean that the word aided by the reliability of the speaker, gives the knowledge of the object and the truth of the fact averred is known by actually coming by the things spoken of, but the sūtra neither means the first in which case alone would it be regarded as inferential, nor means the second in which case alone could it be regarded as perceptual.

What the sūtra does mean is that in regard to things connected with the senses, as well as those not connected with them, we have a cognition which we express in terms of the word i.e. of which we speak of in the form 'I have the cognition of such and such a thing by means of words', and it is connection, thus expressed, that forms the result of the 'word' as the instrument of cognition. Vācaspati further points out that it is only after the word has brought about the cognition of the fact expressed by it, that its reliability is inferred from the fact of being actually found to be as averred by the word. But because the reliability of the word is inferred, it does not follow that the effect, the cognition produced by the word, should also be inferential. As to the Buddhist contention that between word and object, there is the relation of neither identity nor causality, Vācaspati adds further that this much only is quite true, but the absence of any such relation between the two does not necessarily imply that, of the two, one cannot be conveyed by another. Some other special kind of relation may indeed be possible between the two, and on the basis of it one can be conveyed by the other.
Chapter One

1. E.g. kṛtānakarmaksavah moksah. (Tattvārthādhigamasūtra, 10.3)
   tad-atvantavimoksah apavargah. (NS I.1.22)
   pramāṇa-prameva .............tattvajñanat niḥśrevasādhigamah.
      (NS I.1.1)
   tadevam bhāvanācatustavavasāt nikhilavāsanānivṛttau paranir-
      vānam sūnyarūnam setavyati. (SOS , p.30)

2. pramāṇad-arthādhigacitirbhavati hetutvam. pramāṇapārtham sādhanavat
      tītī sādhakatamavat karanārthah. (NV on NS I.1.1)
     pramāṇaṁantarena nārthapratipattih. (NB on NS I.1.1)

3. tṛividhā cāsya śāstrasva pravṛttir-uddeśo laksanam parīksā
ceti. (NB on NS I.1.3)

4. The Mahāyāna doctrine of the Buddhists has developed on two lines,
   viz. that of Śūnyavāda or the Mādhyamika doctrine and the Vijnā-
   navāda or the Yogācāra doctrine. There are different opinions
   regarding the name Mādhyamika for the followers of Śūnyavāda.

   Mādhyavācārya in his Sarvadarṣanāsaṅgraha (p.30) says : For the
   attainment of the unattained thing, one should ask and this
   asking is yogā. And the admitting of the sayings of the pre-
   ceptor is ācāra. Those who admit the sayings of the preceptor,
   are superior (uttama) and those who does not ask anything are
inferior (adhama). But as the Mādhyamikas admit the Nirvāṇa in the form of voidness, which is the advice of their preceptor, the lord Buddha, and at the same time they say that they have no asking, so they are the followers of middle path. That is why they are called Mādhyamika. However, it seems Mādhavacārya's own explanation without having any factual basis.

In this connection we may refer the views of some other scholars:

(a) The Buddha used to characterize his teaching as madhyama-pratītipad (the middle path). When Nagarjuna evolved his philosophy, he seized upon this important word, and called his philosophy Madhyamaka (madhyamaiva madhyamakam) or Madhyamaka-śāstra. The followers of this system came to be known as Mādhyamika (madhyamakam adhīvate vidanti vā Mādhyamikāḥ). (The Concept of Buddhist Nirvāṇa, p. 4)

(b) Mādhyamika: The M. School held that this was a view which steered between the ātman, or self-affirming doc., and the nairvātma, or self-rejecting doc. of Theravāda; hence the name 'Middle view' (Mādhyamika Dārsāna), by which this school came to be known; this designation does not, however, seem to have been used by Nāgārjuna or his contemporary and associate — Āryadeva. (A Dict. of Buddhism)

(c) Previous to Nāgārjuna's school Buddhist doctors were divided into two extremes: into a belief in a real existence and in an illusory existence; a perpetual duration of the Sattva
and total annihilation. Nāgārjuna chose a "middle way" (mādhyamika). He denied the possibility of our knowing that anything either exists or did not exist. By a sophistic nihilism he "dissolved every problem into thesis and antithesis and denied both". There is nothing either existent or non-existent, and the state of Being admits of no definition or formula. (Buddhism and Lamaism of Tibet, pp. 124-25)

Here it is not right to think that Nāgārjuna first preached the doctrine of Śūnyavāda (essencelessness or voidness of all appearance), but in reality almost all the Mahāyāna sūtras either definitely preach this doctrine or allude to it. Thus if we take some of those sūtras which were in all probability earlier than Nāgārjuna, we find that the doctrine which Nāgārjuna expounded with all the rigour of his powerful dialectic was quietly accepted as an indisputable truth.

(Vide A Hist. of Indian Philosophy, vol I pp.126--28)

5. samsāvatpurvakā eva vicārāh tannu layaktyat parīksā-vidheh

samsāvat pūrvam parīksyate. NY (Vide ND, p.408)

6. pratyakṣādinām aprāmenyam traikālyasiddhe. (NS II.1.8)

7. pūrvam hi pramāṇasiddhau nendriyārthasannikārasāt pratyaksot-pattih. (NS II.1.9)

8. nācāt siddhau na pramāṇo bhavah pramevāsiddhiḥ. (NS II.1.10)
9. \textit{vugapatsiddhau pratvarthanivatartvat \ kramavrttitvabhavo buddhinam. (NS II.i.11)}

All the three arguments taking the preceding two, \textit{VV (Ka 20)} clearly represents the same idea in the case of 'rejection' (pratisedha):

\textit{pūryam cet pratisedhah pasēt pratisedhyam iti ca nopapannam/pācācānunapanno vugapacca vatah svabhāvo'san/}

10. \textit{anyaih vadi pramāṇaih pramāṇasiddhirbhbhayatvanavsthā/nādeh siddhis-tatrasti naiva madhvasya nāntasya/ (VV, Ka 32)}

11. Vācaspati says in his NVTT on NS II.i.16 that the unreality of the characterisation is a possible objection of the Buddhist, against which NS II.i.16 is formulated.

12. \textit{VV, kā 34 -- 40}

13. \textit{VV, kā 46 -- 51}

14. \textit{va esa hetuḥ traikālve pratisedhavācī sa tūktottaraḥ pratya-vamantah. (Vṛtti on VV, kā 70)}

15. \textit{VV, kā 32 -- 52}

16. This work is also called Vaidlya-sutra. Vidyabhusana certifies it as probably spurious. (Vide Buddhist Logic, fn. p. 28)

17. Vide \textit{VV, preface.}

18. \textit{... na cānyakasmāt pramāṇānām/ (VV, kā 52)
19. Vide 'Pre-Dinnaga Buddhist Texts on Logic From Chinese Sources', Introductory p. xiii.

20. NS II.i.15

21. *samprati asiddhatodbhavanaram sutram pathati.*
   
   NVTT (Vide ND, p.430)

22. *tumumuṇyulau kriyāvām kriyārthāvām.* (AST III.iii.10)

23. *asaṭvudāharaṇaṃ kena sādharmvam vaśādhyā-sādhanam upādīyeta? kasva vā sādharmvavyasādunasāgharāh pravarteta?*
   
   NB (Vide Catur., p. 574)

The exemplification (udāhārana) is the third inference-component. The probandum is to be proved by probans in the subject. But until the invariable relation is not being proved between the probandum and the probans, the doubt is quite natural whether the probans in the present case will prove the probandum or not. So the invariable relation between them is to be shown in an instance. Thus the citing of that instance must be necessary for the ascertainment of this relation in an inference.

24. Contradictory (viruddha) pseudo-probans: It is a mark which is in contradiction with one's own accepted thesis. (Vide NS I.ii.6)

25. *prameyatā ca tulāprāmāṇyavat.* (NS II.i.16)

   pramāṇam prameyamiti cēvam samākhvā samāvesaśa bhavati, samākhvānimittavasāt. samāvesah anivamah. (NV on NS II.i.16)
26. Vide NV on NS II.i.16

27. na, pradīpaprakāsāvat tatsiddheḥ. (NS II.i.19)

28. vaccedam vākṣam pratyakṣādīnām aprāmānyam trākālvasiddheḥ iti kimīdām pramāṇasvarūpam atha neti. vadi pramāṇasvarūpam taddā vyāghātāḥ. (NV on NS II.i.14)

29. NS II.i.12 etc.

30. pratyaksamekam cārvākāh kaṇādasugatau punah/ anumānaṇca taccānī, sāmkhyāḥ sābdaḥ ca te api// nyāvaikadeśino'prevam upamānaṇca kecana// arthāpatvā sahātānī catvāryāha prabhākaraḥ// abhāvaśaṭhānvetānī bhāṭaḥ vedāntinastathā// sambhayaitihvayuktānī tānī purāṇikaḥ jaguḥ//
(Maṇḍalasa. II.17—19)

31. te hi prameyadvaśidhrat pramāṇam dvividham jaguḥ/ nānvaḥ pramāṇabhedasya heturvisavabhedāḥ// pramāṇadvaśīnīh ca visavadvivaśedane/ vada kasvānurodhena trīyam mānaniṣvetām// (NM, p. 27-8)

32. According to the Buddhists all the categories of the world are divided into two categories, svalaksanā and sāmānyvalaksanā (it is the Thing-in-itself and it is 'in the other'), not more and to apprehend these two kinds of categories, only two pramāṇas are necessary. They urge that the categories are arranged by negation of the opposite (paraspara-parihāra-yyavasthita).
So there third kind does not exist. Well, by the arrangement it has been known that there exist two categories, but how it is known that there does not exist a third category.

Here the Buddhists say that in this issue the fact of the perception is the proof. The perception, being present in the blue, demarcates the blue by 'blueness'. Here is no dispute. Now that very perception separates non-blue also, because in the 'blue'-knowledge, its impression does not occur. The blue itself is impressed by the 'blue'-knowledge. Other than that is non-blue. And at the same time the third kind also is separated by that perception. Now does that third kind come in 'blue'-knowledge or not? If comes, blue is that, because that is not another kind. If not, then it is non-blue as there no other kind remains.

So the definition of 'blue' and 'non-blue' are which is impressed by the 'blue'-knowledge and which is not such, respectively. In this way, the perception, going to its own object, establishes its object directly (pratyaksata) and rejects the unimpressed object indirectly (paroksata). Third kind also is being rejected likewise. In this way, except svalaksana and samanyalaksana categories, the others, whose negation, though not be obtained, can have this way only. By this process, the svalaksana category becomes confirmed. So the perception specifies that svalaksana category, rejects the other and also declares the non-existence of a third one — these are the capacity of a pramana.
Though the indeterminate perception works only in the visualizing activity \( \text{pradārsanamātra} = \text{ālokanamātra} \) in the \text{svalaksana} object situated in front and it is not the examiner, yet its consequent determinates are the very factors, which specifies the visual object, rejects the objects other than that and declares the non-existence of the third kind. The procedure is not seen otherwise.

Moreover, the Buddhists here take the help of inference also to prove the non-existence of the third kind as follows:

"In the time of the ascertainment of one within the two opposites, the rejection of second also is expressed, because they are opposites; like cold and hot; the third kind also is opposite to that, as that (i.e. third kind) does not appear in that's knowledge (whose knowledge occurs)."

Now the question is that when the third kind is rejected like second kind, then how can it be ascertained that the unaccepted object (i.e. the third kind) is whether contradictory or not? Here the Buddhists say that the third kind, being different to other two kinds, does not matter. In that apprehension, only non-impression \( \text{anavabhāsa} \), does not prove the contradiction of the third kind. But that is the contradictory which cannot be accepted while the other is already accepted. So there is no scope for acceptance of third kind. There is no third figure among the objects, established with the fact of rejection between each and the rest. So the objects always are of two
kinds. In this way, in existent and non-existent, eternal and non-eternal, graduation and simultaneity -- there is no third variety.

Now in the svalaksana object, the perception occurs. But in that object, which is indirect in general form (sāmānyākāra parokṣa), the inference works.

Let it be that there are more pramāṇas like verbal testimony (śabda). Like inference, verbal testimony etc. may proceed to indirect object in the general form. What harm? Here pramāṇa-samplava (mixing of pramāṇas) will occur. But according to the Buddhists pramāṇa-samplava is not admitted due to contradiction and fruitlessness. If an object is apprehended by any previous pramāṇa, in the same object again if apprehension is expected by another pramāṇa -- there is no result of next pramāṇa. Here we cannot take that posterior pramāṇa as a producer of different knowledge of the same object, because there will be contradiction with the previous pramāṇa. It is to be remembered that perception and inference also should not be mixed with each other, i.e. two should not proceed in one object. (Vide NM, pp. 27 -- 30)

33. Vide Catur., p. 356, p.367

34. The controversy regarding the analogy as a separate pramāṇa is very ancient. We find certain references of this in Nyāyaśāstra and Nyāyakusumāñjali. E.g. NM, pp. 129-30; NKM, pp. 193--204.
Ganganath Jha in his *The Nyāyasūtras of Gautama* (fn. p. 198) says: In chapter IV of his *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, Dīnāga objects to *upamāna* as a separate instrument of cognition; he includes it under perception.

Uddyotakara says that analogy does not differ from perception and word. (But *āgama* is not admitted as a separate *pramāṇa* by the Buddhists.) (Vide *Catur.* p. 356). Vasubandhu accepted *āgama* as a separate *pramāṇa*. (Vide *Buddhist Logic*, fn. p. 72)

Stcherbatsky: The Buddhists from the time of Dīnāga fall in line with the Vaiśeṣikas. They admit only two different sources of knowledge, which they call perception and inference. Verbal testimony and reasoning by analogy is for them included in inference. (*Buddhist Logic*, p. 72)

35. In this regard the refutation by Uddyotakara appears to be slightly different. The flaw in the Buddhist assertion is shown thus. Which one of the two knowledge is acquired by perception or words— the knowledge of similarity of the cow in the *gavāya* or the knowledge of the presence of the *gavāya*? The Buddhists have said that by perception, the knowledge of the thing with the similarity of the other is produced. This implies that the cognition simultaneously apprehends the similarity of the cow in the *gavāya* and also, the presence of the *gavāya*. But there is one instrument only, perception or words whichever it may be. How can these two cognitions appear by one single instrument? Uddyotakara taunts
Diññāga by saying that Diññāga neither knows the nature of the pramāṇa, nor apprehends the meaning of the sūtra.

36. āptopadesāh sābdah. (NS I.i.7)

37. Vide NVTT pp. 370-71

38. Ganganath Jha. He notes: Vide Satish Ch. Vidyabhusana's 'Mediaeval Logic', from which it appears that the objection as found in the Vārttika is a quotation from Diññāga's work. (The Nyāyasūtras of Gautama, p. 207)

39. vathoktam bhadantena - āptavākyāvisambādasāmānyādanumānata. NVTT (Vide Catur., p. 371)

40. NVTT on NS I.i.7 (Vide Catur., p. 371)