In the Nyåya-sūtra itself, Gautama (NS I.i.10, III.i.1, 3) mentions a number of grounds by means of which the soul can be inferred. Anyway, the ultimate ground for admitting a lasting entity which is distinct from the body etc. appears to be the fact of recognition or pratyavijñā. The Naiyāyikas infer the existence of the soul: Recognition or recollection is a fact: It must have an agent, which can be nothing but the soul. There is no other way except admitting the soul to explain the fact of recognition.2

The Buddhists say that having a common agent is not a precondition for 'recognition'. In every series of cognitions, each preceding one is the cause of each following one. This following cognition proceeds from a certain potency in the preceding cognition and is itself endowed with all the potency that belongs to the previous cognitions. Thus, even though the cognitions are diverse and many, there is recognition by reason of the cause-effect relation subsisting among them; just as, the seed of the paddy is followed by the sprout; and the sprout, by reason of its having followed from the paddy-seed, is endowed with the potency of the paddy; and from this sprout, with the aid of the several elemental substances, is produced only another grain of paddy, but not a grain of barley. The reason for this lies in the fact
that what has gone before is a paddy-grain, and not one of barley. In the same manner, in the case in question also there is recognition by one cognition when it appears in the same 'series of cognitions', so that there is a causal relation among them, everyone of them being the effect of that which precedes it. On the other hand, there is no such 'recognition' when the cognitions belong to a different 'series', as in that case, there is no necessary sequence and consequent causal relation among the cognitions. Thus, 'recognition', having been found otherwise explicable, cannot prove the existence of the soul.

UDDYOTAKARA'S REFUTATION

The Buddhists declare that recognition is due to causal relation. They cannot therefore set aside the diversity among the cognitions, for the causal relation itself presupposes diversity. If there is difference of the agents (the cogniser and the remembrer), as it is admitted by both the parties, no remembrance is possible; and when there is no remembrance, there can be no recognition either. Hence so long as the causal relation does not do away with diversity, it cannot form a basis for recognition.

The Buddhists' answer, in a negative way, that no recognition — as there is diversity on account of there being no causal relation, (not recognition on account of causal relation) cannot
silence the above objection. Uddyotakara has said, 'where there is diversity, recognition is not found'. Apparently these may seem the same. But the Buddhist assertion is misleading due to taking the reason 'recognition' (which is an argumental basis of the Naivyikas to infer the soul) in a generalised way. The recognition intended is actually a qualified recognition and not recognition in general. A particular kind of recognition is intended which apprehends a certain thing as the common object of the previous cognition, of the present cognition and of the remembrance. No such remembrance or recognition would be possible under the Buddhist theory. Why? In the Buddhist theory nothing is admitted, except the 'series of cognitions', and everything has a momentary existence. Now from this the following are evident: (i) There is no recognition by one sense-organ of what has been previously apprehended by another; (ii) there is no recognition in one form of what has been apprehended in another form and (iii) there is no recognition by one person of what has been previously apprehended by another person. So recognition would be an impossibility according to the Buddhists. Moreover, where each cognition is distinct, no form of remembrance would be possible.

Explaining the possibility of remembrance the Buddhists might argue: In the same 'series of bodily sensations', in which the apprehension appeared, in the remembrance also would appear on the basis of causal relation. So that particular 'series
of bodily sensations’ would be the rememberer as well as aporehender. Therefore, there is no necessity for postulating a soul apart from the body and the sensations.4

But the explanation is not justifiable.

First, all cognitions are transient and as a rule, it is only something lasting for some time that can be impressed upon by an impressing agency. That is, every cognition is momentary. When it disappears, it disappears entirely leaving an impression of itself behind; and it is through the agency of this impression that the subsequent remembrance would have to appear; it is essential for this process that the rememberer should continue to exist from the time of the cognition up to the time of the remembrance. According to the Buddhist, however, no such lasting entity is possible, as he admits of nothing else except a series of momentary cognitions.

Secondly, there is absence of connection. It is only when there is some connection between the two that the one is impressed upon by the other. While, under the Buddhist theory, the cognitions, all appearing at different points of time and disappearing as soon as appearing, can have no connection with any impresser. So there being no impression, no remembrance is possible.

If the Buddhists say that as the two cognitions appear at the same point of time, some connection is naturally expected between them, and through this connection one cognition would be
impressed by the other and thereby remembrance would be brought about. To this, Uddyotakara says that the 'particular consciousness' which the opponent holds to be contemporary with the previous cognition, cannot afford any help either to the sensation appearing in the present moment, or to any that will appear at some future time, because, according to the Buddhists, the cognition that appears at the present moment appears in an immaculate form, and also disappears exactly in the same form in which it appears; so it cannot be affected by the 'particular consciousness'. As for any future cognition, no particular consciousness can be regarded as having any connection with what is yet to come, and it cannot affect or impress, that which is not connected with it.

Uddyotakara shows another vital reason for the impossibility of remembrance under the Buddhist theory: Every becoming must require one who becomes (bhavita) or a 'becomer', because it is of the nature of an action, like the action of being produced. In accordance with this rule, remembrance, being of the nature of a becoming, must require a 'becomer'. In this case, the 'becomer' may be either in the form of an object i.e. the object remembered, or in the form of an agent, i.e. the person remembering. That the 'becomer' of an action is either of these two is shown by the fact that in the action of the 'cooking of rice' the 'becomer' is the rice, which is the object cooked (as the condition of being cooked belongs to the rice and not to the cook);
while in the case of the action of 'walking' by Devadatta, the
'becomer' is Devadatta, who is the agent (as the condition of
walking belongs to the man who walks). Now, so far as the action
of remembrance is concerned the 'becomer' cannot be of the nature
of the object, as there is remembrance of even absent things also;
if the 'becomer' of remembrance were its object, then at the
time when one remembers an object which does not exist at that
time, the remembrance would be without a basis, the object not
being there. It can have the agent for its substratum; but this
would be possible only under the Nyāya theory, but not under the
Buddhist theory, for the simple reason that the Buddhists do not
admit of any such thing as 'agent'.

Becoming and becomer, it may be argued, may mean 'effect' and
'cause' respectively. That is, adopting Buddhist terminology, it
may be said that the effect-moment is becoming and the cause-
moment is 'becomer'. Therefore, there is no necessity to infer
the soul.

But the difficulty is that the cause and the effect must exist
at different points of time, and so neither of the two could ever
be the substratum or container of the other.

Again, becoming and 'becomer' may be argued to mean as 'being
produced' and 'that which is produced' respectively. As remem-
brane is something that is produced, its production would be its
becoming and the remembrance itself would be the 'becomer'. So
admission of a further 'becomer' in the shape of the soul would not be right. The postulating of a 'becomer' for what is itself a 'becomer' would lead to a vicious regress.

If the Buddhists hold production to be something different from the remembrance, they would fall into self-contradiction, because the Buddhists do not accept production to be anything distinct from the thing produced. Moreover, 'production' could be explained only either as 'the connection of the thing with the existence of its cause', or as 'the existence of the thing as qualified by the connection of its cause'; and both these are positions not accepted in the Buddhist view as both involve more than momentary existence of the cause and the effect.

Thus remembrance is not possible under the Buddhist theory. So there can be no recognition either. But recognition is a fact, Hence the only conclusion is that that which is the agent of this recognition is something quite distinct from the cognitions and the series of cognitions and it is a single entity, namely, the soul.

The view that the soul is nothing more than 'the assemblage of the body, sense-organs, etc., or that the soul as a distinct entity does not exist at all, has been prevalent from an ancient time and is known as nairatmya-vāda or the doctrine of the denial of the soul. Such a view is referred to in the Katha (i.20) and
the Maitrāvani (vii.8) Upaniṣads. It is also discussed in the Lāṅkāvatāraśūtra and from the refutation of the view by the Naiyāyikas like Udayana and his commentator Mathurāṇātha, it is evident that the view was subscribed to by a section of the ancient Buddhists.7

The ancient Buddhist thinkers advance an inference to deny the reality of the soul: The soul does not exist, because it is not produced, as for instance, the hare's horn.8 The hare's horn is not produced and it is non-existent. The soul also, having no production (origin), is non-existent.

The 'thesis sought to be established' (pratijñā) by this inference is that the soul does not exist. However, this is an absurd proposition. It is meaningless to deny the existence of something which is absolutely non-existent. The existence of something in a particular time or place can be denied only when it is known to be existing in some other time or place. Thus, the denial of the soul implies its existence in some context or other. But as a matter of fact, the denial of the soul cannot be in a particular place or time, because the soul has no particular place and moreover the soul cannot be denied if the denial is said to pertain to a particular place. That is, the body cannot be the soul, nor is it that the soul is in the body. Nor is it that the soul does not exist. In the soul there cannot be the manifestation of three times, for it is eternal, and so it cannot be said that the soul is non-existent in a particular time.9
Even trying to prove that the soul does not exist, the Buddhist should mention specifically the object referred to by the word 'soul'. If they take the body as the soul, there would be contradiction, as 'the soul does not exist' would then mean 'the body does not exist'.

Now, it may be argued that actually we have a knowledge in the form: The hare's horn does not exist. In such a case, we do deny the existence of something absolutely non-existent. In the same way, there can be the denial of the soul which is absolutely non-existing.

Uddyotakara answers that the real implication of the statement, "the hare's horn does not exist" is the denial of a relation between the hare and the horn, both of which are separately known to be existing. Thus, even a proposition like this does not imply the denial of something absolutely non-existing. Therefore, those for whom the soul is absolutely non-existing, it is meaningless to have the thesis in an inference in the form: The soul does not exist etc.

From this it also follows that the corroborative instance of the inference, namely, the hare's horn, is unjustified, because the non-existence of the hare's horn simply means the absence of a relation between the hare and the horn.

Further, the probans of the inference, namely, 'it is not produced', cannot prove the non-existence of the soul. The absence of 'being produced' i.e. origin, may have two implications. These are: (a) the absolute absence of origin (sārvathā-īnma-rāhitva)
and (b) the absence of origin in a specific form (svarūpateḥ-
janma-rāhitya). That which is eternal may be characterised by the
absence of origin in a specific form, though this does not prove
its non-existence, because it is eternal. Only when something
is characterised by the absolute absence of origin, can its non-
existence be established. The soul, however, has no origin only
in the second sense (i.e. svarūpateḥ-janma-rāhitya), and not in
the first sense (i.e. sarvathā-janma-rāhitya). Thus, the soul
has no origin as such, but it has origin in the sense of being
connected with different bodies in different births. Therefore,
by taking 'the absence of origin in a specific form' as the pro-
bans, the non-existence of the soul cannot be inferred.

Uddyotakara shows why the inference of the non-existence of
the soul is fallacious also because of various other considerations.¹⁰

The probans 'because it is not produced' can be put forward
only in the case of the denial of things which can be produced;
but not in the case of the denial of the soul. A thing can be
said to be produced, when its existence is due to a cause. Thus
a thing can be said to be 'not produced', when its existence is
not due to a cause. 'Not produced', ajīta, has a negative parti-
cle. It denies production. So the premise of the Buddhists
'because the soul is not produced' means only that the existence
of the soul is not due to a cause, and not that it is non-existent.
Just as the expression 'this pot is without water' does not deny
the pot, but only 'its containing water'.

Again, when 'not produced' means that it has no cause, the Buddhist probans becomes contradictory too. Why ? The thing that has no cause is eternal; so that in setting about to prove the non-existence of the soul, the opponent actually proves its eternity, something contrary to what is intended. In fact, Uddyotakara says, the hetu contradicts the pratiṇā. The pratiṇā means that there is no soul and the hetu asserts the permanent existence of the soul.

Further, 'being not produced' is a property. But no property can exist by itself without having a substratum. But the thing in which that property can subsist, according to the Buddhist probans, is the soul. Hence the probans becomes contradictory by indicating the existence of the soul as its own substratum, contradicting the proposition that there is no soul.

Besides, what is the meaning of the expression 'because it is not produced'? If it means that 'there is no birth', the said probans becomes impossible as the soul has its birth. The Buddhists themselves agree that the 'birth' of the soul consists in its becoming connected with a fresh aggregate (nīkāya) of body, sense-organs, intellect and sensation.

Uddyotakara also points out that the Buddhists may no doubt try to deny the soul with various types of probans -- such as (a) because it has no hetu, (b) because no cause of its birth can be pointed out, (c) because it is not an effect, (d) because it has no cause, and so on ; but the objections will be similar to those
that have been urged already against the probans 'because it is not produced'.

If the Buddhists venture to argue further by offering the argument 'there is no soul, because no such thing is apprehended', the same objections, as have been urged against the proposition and the example in the argument 'there is no soul, because no such thing is produced as we find in the case of the hare's horn', are to be directed against it. Moreover, the probans 'because no such thing is apprehended' is not right. It is wrong to claim that the soul is not apprehended. The soul is actually apprehended by means of perception and other instruments of cognition.11

The cognition of 'I', which is independent of the remembrance of the relation of the probens and the probandum (līgaliṅgisāṃbadda-smṛtyanappakṣam), and which varies with the variations in the character of its object (soul), must be regarded as perceptual, just like the cognition of colour and such things. In the case of a cognition in regard to which one oneself is in no doubt as to its being 'perceptual', it follows that it is a cognition independent of the remembrance of the relation of the probans and the probandum.

The Buddhists may perhaps argue that though the said cognition of 'I' is there, its object is not the soul.

But, then, what is the object of that cognition? It would not
be proper to claim that colour and such things are the objects of that cognition in accordance with the declaration that things are called ātman (soul) because they are the originators of the cognition of 'I'. Moreover, it has been denied by the Buddha in the passage

O Bhikṣu, neither I nor you are this colour. Hence it follows that colour etc. cannot form the objects of the notion 'I'.

Nor does one ever find the notion of 'I' appearing in regard to colour and such things; these is never any such notion as 'I am colour', 'I am sensation', and so on. But there are such notions as 'I am fair', 'I am dark', where the notion of 'I' appears in regard to the body. Uddyotakara says that there are no such notions.

When a person has the notion 'I am fair', it does not mean that he looks upon his fair complexion as his soul; but means the possession of fairness (aham gaurah = aham gaurarūpavān or mama rūpam gaurah), possessive ending being dropped.

The notion representing the 'I', co-extensive with 'my', proves that the possessive ending has been dropped. That is in the notion 'I am fair', the term 'I' is found to be used in reference to that body which is also regarded as 'my', i.e. one speaks of the body as 'mine'. So the expression 'I am fair' is equivalent to 'my body is fair'.

The Buddhists might say that the explanation is not right. The term 'I' may be used as co-extensive with 'my', even referring to a different thing, e.g. in the expression vo'vam so'ham.
But Uddyotakara says that the notion of 'I' appearing with reference to the five 'constituent elements' (aham rūpaḥ, aham samāñā etc.) of colour and the rest, is a wrong notion, apprehending a thing as what it is not.

Thus it is established that the soul, being the object of the notion of 'I', is something apprehended by perception itself. That the soul is apprehended by means of inference also has been explained (under NS I.1.10). There is authoritative word also declaring the soul to be a real entity. There is no source of valid cognition, known to be providing a cognition contradicting and sublating the notion that there is a soul. So the probans 'because the soul is not apprehended' is quite unjustified.

Further, the probans is 'doubtful' also. There are three causes to which the non-apprehension of a certain thing may be due: It may be due to the absence of the apprehender, or to that of the apprehension, or to that of the apprehended object. Now in the case of 'non-apprehension' of the soul, it is doubtful to whose absence it is due. If the Buddhists say that it is due to the absence of the object (soul), the probans becomes identical with the proposition. The proposition itself speaks of the absence of the soul. So the probans does not prove anything. Moreover, one going to prove the non-existence of the soul by 'non-apprehension' would have to show a substratum of the 'non-apprehension'. If it is the soul, there is self-contradiction; if not, the probans
becomes futile. A probans without a substratum is itself not established and cannot prove anything.

Uddyotakara further argues that only by flouting the true spirit of the Buddha's teaching can the Buddhist argue that there is no soul. In the Buddhist canonical works, the soul means the assemblage of the five 'constituent elements' (skandha), namely, (i) bodily form (rūpa), (ii) feeling (vedanā), (iii) perception (samjña), (iv) consciousness (vijñāna) and (v) tendencies generated by the impressions of the past experience (sāṃskāra). The identification of the soul with any of these is denied, but that does not mean the denial of the soul as such. Uddyotakara claims that in the work called Sarvābhisaṃsva-sūtra, the Buddha himself denounced the deniers of the soul as being under the spell of ignorance.

Moreover, Uddyotakara quotes another sūtra, bhāram vo bhikṣavo deśāvijñāmi bhārabhāram vā, .... vascā" tuṣṭāti sa mithyādvra-tiko bhavati. 15

Though some of the later Buddhists rejected the very concept of the soul, it appears that it was not the view of the Buddha himself. 16 Besides, as a philosophical view, it is quite absurd, because the soul is directly apprehended by the ego-consciousness (aham-pratvaya). The consciousness of the ego can have for its object only the soul and it is impossible for anyone to deny such a consciousness. Everybody has the experience in the form: 'I know this or that'. The knower or the ego in such an experience
is nothing but the soul. If the existence of the soul were not indubitable, one could have an experience in the form 'I do not exist' or a doubt in the form 'Do I exist'? But no same person can have an experience or a doubt like this.

Further, a philosopher trying to deny the existence of the soul must himself exist in order to be able to deny the soul. It is fantastic to imagine that somebody wants to deny the existence of the soul without himself existing. Besides, any effort to deny the soul can be made only with the aid of pramāṇa. But whose 'valid knowledge' can it be, if there is no soul? Therefore, the use of pramāṇa presupposes the existence of the soul which alone can have the experience of valid knowledge. The very question concerning the proof for the existence of the soul presupposes the existence of the soul, because one must oneself exist in order to be able to raise this question. Moreover, practical activity in no form can be possible in the absence of the soul because practical activity presupposes the knowledge in the form: 'This is desirable for me, etc.' In short, it is impossible to deny the facthood of knowledge and knowledge having no substratum in the form of the knower is inconceivable. This substratum can be nothing but the soul. Therefore, Vācaspati17 argues that one who totally denies the soul cannot even try to prove its non-existence, for any inference intending to prove the non-existence of the soul must have the soul for its subject (raksā) and if the subject of
an inference is fictitious there will inevitably be the defect of asra'vasiddhi, i.e. the fallacy of having an unproved subject.

Some Buddhist scholars seek to deny the existence of the soul also with the help of the following inference: The living body is without a soul, because it is characterized by existence (sattā), as for instance, the jar. Anything existent is without a soul; the living body also, being existent, must be without a soul.

In answer to this, Uddyotakara says that it is necessary to determine first the exact meaning of the expression 'without a soul' (nirātmaka). Does it mean 'having no use (anupakārin) for any soul'? Or, does it mean the absence of the soul? The expression 'without a soul' cannot be taken in the first sense, because there can be no instance to corroborate the inference, inasmuch as there can be no object which has no use for any soul. In the second alternative, i.e. assuming 'without a soul' to mean 'the absence of the soul', -- the very purpose of the inference is defeated. If the 'absence of the soul' means its absence only in some specific locus, the inference will prove its existence in some other locus. If, however, the absence of the soul means its absolute non-existence, its denial can have no signification.

There are some further objections too against the view of the
Buddhists, the deniers of the soul.

According to the Buddhists the soul is nothing but an aggregate of the body etc. From the Buddhist point of view, everything is momentary; therefore, so also must be the said aggregate. Again, they consider causing injury to the living beings to be a grave sin. However, since the aggregate of the body etc. is ever-changing and there is nothing called the soul excepting this, the actual agent that causes injury cannot suffer the sin thereof; the aggregate that causes the injury ceases to exist and is replaced by another aggregate at the time of the fruition of the action. In other words, one who commits the sin does not suffer from it while one who does not commit the sin suffers from it.

But here the Buddhists may say that the notions of 'doer' of acts and 'experiencer' of their results can be explained with the help of the fact that there is the relation of cause and effect between the preceding body which did the act and the succeeding body which experiences the results. That is, there is no need of admitting the soul. There is a single series of body and mind, where one member of body-and-mind is the cause of the other and in this same series, we have the body that does the act and also that which experiences its results, so that both the doing and the experiencing belong to the members of the same series. So there is no absurdity that one who did the
act does not experience its result, while the result falls upon one who had nothing to do with it. There would have been such a contingency, (a) if the act brought its results to a series different from the series that did the act, or (b) if the Naiyayikas were able to prove that the experiencer is actually the same individual and not the series as the doer. As a matter of fact, neither of these is found to be the case.

However, the individuals constituting the series are in reality different from one another. So the postulation of the mere series would not help the Buddhist in any way to avoid the absurdity.

The Buddhists may cite the case of paddy and its seed, and say that after the destruction of the original seed, there is the appearance of the sprout, the stalk and so forth. In this case there is no one individual thing permitting through the entire series. In the same manner, there is a series of causes and effects; certain modifications in the inner mind are preceded by the act of doing. So where is the need for admitting a 'single agent'?

The analogy of the paddy-seed is falsely applied. The seed is not entirely destroyed. There is continuity of the constituent particles of the seed. The constituent particles of the same seed abandon their former composition and take up another composition. The particles of earth in which the seed has been
planted, combining with the water-particles and heated by the internal heat, bring about a certain juice and this juice, operating upon and along with the constituent particles of the seed, becomes modified into the form of the sprout etc.; so there is a continuity of the particles of the seed throughout.

A further argument is put forward by Uddyotakara against the Buddhists' theory.

Under the theory of the Buddhists according to which a new set of skandhas or constituent elements appear simultaneously with the destruction of the preceding constituent elements, the appearance of the new set of constituent elements cannot be said to be due to karma, the acts of the preceding entity; and if the appearance or birth of entities be not due to their acts, then there would be no point in regarding acts as bringing about good or evil to the doer of the act. The Buddhists might say that the act would be done with the notion ot being happy, i.e. the idea in the mind of the doer being 'may I be happy by this act'. But if they mean by it that "the entity itself does the act with the ideas, that he may, by the act, be happy and free from unhappiness," it would not be right. For in the Buddhist position happiness is not experienced by the entity that does the act. As a matter of fact, when some one entity has actually experienced pleasure resulting from a certain act, and that same entity also remembers the
relationship of cause and effect between the pleasure and what had produced it - then alone can that same entity take up or employ at some future time, that which had brought about the pleasure; when however the entity itself has but a momentary existence, and the impressions of the entity are such as undergo destruction in a moment, the entity can have no remembrance of the connection between the pleasure and what brought it about; so that it is not possible for such an entity to undertake an act with the motive of deriving pleasure from it. Nor, under this theory, would it be possible for any effort being put forth for final release; as such release will have been accomplished without any effort; that is to say, the entity naturally becomes released by reason of its existence having entirely ceased, the very moment that it comes into existence; and hence it would be rather futile to lead the life of a religious student as laid down in the scriptures for the purpose of obtaining release. Nor is there any need of catechism, such as we find in the Buddhist scriptures, where the Buddha is described as questioning the mendicants -- 'I expect you have been duly instructed by me', -- when they answer -- 'we have been duly instructed'; because the reformation or the refinement due to training cannot accrue to the past, present and future entities which according to the Buddhists, are what constitute every person; the said reformation cannot accrue to the future entities, simply because they do not exist at the time the instruction takes place; similarly with the past entities; as regards the present entities,
it is impossible for them to undergo any reformation, for the very character of the present is such that the present thing cannot be affected by any reformation as according to the Buddhist theory that everything perishes as soon as it comes into existence, there can be no point of time at which the reformation or refinement could accrue to it. It may be argued that refinement would be possible even if the refiner and the refined, coming into existence at the same moment.

But it would not be proper. If the two things come into existence at the same moment, there could be no rule as to which is the refiner and which the refined; that is, between the two things, there would be nothing to determine that 'this one must be the refiner and that one the refined'.

Still the Buddhists might say that what happens is that, through the help of the refiner the refined is able to bring about a particular kind of effect; and it is this capability of bringing about a particular kind of effect that is called refinement.

This also cannot be accepted; as the very name 'refined' being impossible for the Buddhists, how could they assert that this is the 'refiner' and that the 'refined'? Unless one thing produces a peculiarity in another thing, the former cannot be called the 'refiner', nor the latter the 'refined' and no such production of peculiarities is possible unless the thing continues to exist for a certain time.
NOTES
Chapter Nine

1. It is seen that recognition is a strong argument in Nyāvamañ- jari. (Ref. Nyāvamañjari, pt.II, p.11). In Nyāvakusumāñjali (I.15) also we find:

nāyadrśtam smaratvanyo naikam bhūtamanakramāt /
vasānāsamkrama nāsti na ca satvantarem sthīre //

2. Ref. NVTT (Vide Catur., p.393-4)

3. Between the cognitions of Devadatta on the one hand, and those of Yajñadatta on the other hand, we find two differences: they have different agents, and they are not the cause of each other. We also find that there is no 'recognition' of the one as the other. Is it due to first difference or to the second? There is nothing to determine the exact answer to this question. The inference drawn by the Bhāṣyakāra (in NB on NS I.i.10) from 'recognition' cannot be conclusive as to the difference or non-difference of the agents.

4. From a particular consciousness, which is produced along with a previous sensation, there follows another sensations, which is endowed with the potency of its predecessor; and the appearance, with this potency of this latter sensation, in the consciousness, is what is called 'impression' and this is quite possible under the theory of 'momentary cognition'.

The 'previous sensation' is that cognition which sets up the 'series of cognitions'; this is of six kinds - five related to the five organs of sensation, and the sixth the cognition of attributes. From the previous sensation there follows, coeval with it, that particular consciousness or stream of cognitions, which is known as ālayavijñāna or basic consciousness; from this comes the next sensation which is endorsed with the potency of remembrance, in the form of the I-consciousness. Though this is nothing apart from the sensation itself, yet it is regarded as 'potency' only figuratively for the purpose of explaining the phenomenon of remembrance.

5. There is no soul and every phenomenon depends upon causal relation among cognitions.

6. Remembrance cannot be baseless. Inference kāryam sarvam ādharavat drṣṭam vathā rūpādi. Kāryam ca smṛtiḥ. tasmāt ādharavat iti. NV (Vide Catur., p.390)

7. Phanibhusana comments that, though Uddyotakara elaborately refutes this ancient Buddhist view that rejects the reality of the soul, Uddyotakara himself does not admit that such a view was true to the real teachings of the Buddha.

8. nāsti atmā ajñātavat āsābhisāpravat.

9. Uddyotakara has shown the eternity of the soul in pūrvābhvastasmrtyanubandhī jātasva harsa-bhava-soka-sampratiṇātāt.

NV III.1.13.
10. Phanibhusana adds that assuming the soul to be absolutely unreal, there is no scope to infer its non-existence, inasmuch as something which is absolutely unreal can never be the subject (nākṣa) of an inference at all. Such an effort will result in the pseudo-probans called āśrayāsiddhi or having for its subject an unproved substratum. It becomes as absurd as trying to infer: The lotus blooming in the sky has fragrance, because it is a flower. 

11. anupalabdhiḥ asiddhāḥ - pratyākṣadipramāṇavācavatvāt ātmanāḥ. 

12. rūpādir visasva iti ca - atha manvase rūpādayaḥ eva ahamkārasva viṣava, tathā coktam - ahamkārālambanotpattinimittatvāt ātmā iti ucvate iti. 

13. rūpam naḥam evametad bhikṣo rūpam na tvam. 

14. Though Phanibhusana fails to trace such a text, he nevertheless feels convinced that from various other evidences it is clear that the Buddha himself believed in a permanent soul. The Buddha's silence in response to questions regarding the soul does not necessarily imply the denial of the soul, the real significance of this silence being that the nature of the soul was not easy to comprehend and as such was not worth expounding to everybody. If the Buddha actually denied the soul, there could hardly be any sense in his preaching the doctrine of
nirvana, for it was the soul that was supposed to attain this stage beyond sorrow. Further, the doctrine of rebirth, which formed a part of his teachings as recorded in the Dhammapada, would make no sense without the assumption of a permanent soul. From the Milindapañha and other ancient Pāli texts it appears that the early Buddhist philosophers interpreted the Buddha's view of the soul as an assemblage of the five skandhas, though in such a view the soul is taken as something which is not-soul from the Vedic standpoint. Vātsyāyana also refutes here the view according to which the soul is only an assemblage of body, sense-organs, etc. and not the view which totally denies the soul.

15. NV (Vide ND, p.703). Similar view is seen in Saṁyutta Nikāya, i.e. in the discussion in the cảnh, sec. A, p. 126-127.
16. na ca ātmanam ana-maṇgacchatā tathādārsam arthavattavām vīvavasthānāvītum sākyam. NV (Vide ND, p.702)
17. nanu ca ātmāsattve pagareṇa premāṇam ajñatavaḍini unavastāti, tatra katham na tatsattve. vaddi evāsāna na bhevati vo dharmini viratipadyate. na hi dharmini viratipadyānāsanāva asti kiñcit premāṇam sarvasva tasvā aśravaśiddheḥ apramāṇatvāt. NVTT (Vide ND, p.698)
18. Tathāgatena bhiṣakvah parinirvāṇante 'kaccid vīvam marā vinītā iti? te ca"hurvinītāh sva iti'. NV (Vide ND, p.720)