CHAPTER VIII

VASUBANDHU'S DEFINITION OF VĀDA

Vāda is discussion for the purpose of establishment and refutation of one's own and another's views.¹

UDDYOTAKARA'S REFUTATION

śvaparapakṣavoh siddvasiddhyartham vacanam vādaḥ - this is the definition of discussion proposed by Vasubandhu.

1. The words sva (one's own) and para (another's) are not justified as the qualification of 'view' (pakṣa). (a) Because neither of the possible alternatives in this regard can be justified and also (b) because the compound involved there is an impossible one.

(a) What is the signification of the words sva and para?

We have here a number of alternatives: (i) Upholding (parigraha) and discarding (varjana); (ii) or, what is to be proved (sāchārya) and what is to be criticised (dūṣaniya); (iii) or, the previous (wrong) view and the final (right) view; (iv) or, a certain view and the contrary view; (v) or, the first view and the second view; (vi) or, are these assertions in meaning to the diverse character of a single thing possessed of several characters, i.e. the assertion of one character by one man being sva and the assertion of
another character by another man being para?

(i) The words *sva* and *para* cannot stand for upholding and discarding. Because it cannot be ascertained of whom it is *sva* and what is *sva*. According to the Buddhist, upholding means 'making one's own' (*svākāra*) ; so that it would be *sva* for the man who advances it as his own. Therefore, the meaning of 'making one's own' would not be possible in the case of word etc. which are non-eternal. Besides, the word *sva* is applied when a man has reasons for having the idea of 'mine' with regard to something, and the word *para* is applied where there is the absence of the above idea. This meaning of *sva* is observed in the case of such possessions as land, grains etc., but no such sense of *sva* or *para* is possible in the case of a philosophical discussion. Then again, what forms a man's possession always accomplishes something for his personal benefit. But the upholder of a theory is not benefitted by that theory in a similar manner. Therefore, the words *sva* and *para* cannot stand respectively for upholding and discarding.

(ii) If the words *sva* and *para* be held to stand respectively for what is to be proved and what is to be criticised, it would mean that the view that a man has got to prove is the *sva* (own) view, and that which he has got to criticise is the *para* (another's) view. But *sādhanīya* is synonymous with *sādhyya*, i.e. what is to be proved. But 'what is to be proved' cannot be a man's 'own view', for the Buddhist himself offers the definition that a man's own view is that which is intended to be proved;² to say that *svapakṣa* is *sādhanīya* becomes a tautological expression.
The opponent might argue that *sva* in the term *svapaksa* serves to differentiate 'one's own view' from 'another's view'. To this Uddyotakara puts the question: As to the qualification *sva* in the term *svapaksa* — does it or does it not serve to specify something? If it does, then, the term *sva* cannot mean only 'what is to be proved' (*sādhanīva*); because the qualification should serve to denote some excess meaning from *sādhanīva*. But no excess meaning is to be found of the term *sva* as the term *pakṣa* only is used to define *sādhanīva* (*sādhavitum istah pakṣah*), — obviously related to one's own view. There is none who goes to prove the opponent's view. Now if the qualification fails to make any specification, then, it is useless as a qualification.

But is it not a fact that even generic terms have specific denotations? This too is not right. Words, which denote particular things, can never be 'generic'; in fact, restricted as they would always be by their context and such other circumstances, they would be 'specific' terms. Hence, *svapaksa*, even though denoting 'things to be proved' in general, can never, in actual usage, have any such wide denotation; it will always be restricted to a particular thing to be proved as determined by the context and other circumstances under which it would be used.

Then again, the view to be proved is 'one's own view' and the view to be criticised is 'another's view' — this Buddhist contention also cannot be understood properly. As the expression 'to be proved' stands for *pakṣa*, the view which is to be proved may be
spoken as 'one's own (view)'. But 'criticising' can have no connection with pakṣa itself (which ex hypothesi is 'what is to be proved'); in other words, parapakṣa becomes identical with svapakṣa as it is also is something intended to be proved.

(iii) If the terms sva and para stand for the previous and the final views, i.e. the wrong view and the right view, it is to be admitted that the above are meant by the two terms svapakṣa and parapakṣa.

This also cannot be accepted. Why? The Buddhist himself offers a gūtra: 'The terms sva and para are connected with proofs and criticism, which means that all the proofs should bear upon one's own view and all the criticism should bear upon another's view. By this restriction, the criticism is always to be connected with the latter view (right one) (if the terms svapakṣa and parapakṣa are explained respectively as wrong view and right view). It would thus come to that the upholder of the right view would criticise his own view! Then again, the 'own view' of the upholder of the right view must always be different from the wrong view; so that it is not that the 'own view' is not always the wrong view as the above restriction would have it. Therefore, it is not possible to claim that the terms sva and para signify the wrong view and the right view on the basis of either the etymology of the terms (padārtha), or any specific rule (paribhāṣā), or usage (rūḍhi).

(iv) The above arguments also serve to set aside the claims that the terms sva and para stand for 'a certain view' and the
'contrary view' — or, for the 'first view' and the 'second view'.

(v) The two terms *sva* and *para* are applied to one and the same thing i.e. 'view', but when the view is to be proved it is called 'one's own view' and when the view is to be criticised, it is called 'another's view'.

The above explanation of the Buddhist may be right, but in that case the use of the dual number in *svaparapaksavoh* would not be right. As a rule, when one and the same thing is spoken of as specified by several qualifications, it does not take either the dual or the plural number. e.g. when people observe Devadatta with an umbrella and also with a stick, they do not speak of him as *chattridandinau āgatau*, (two men, with stick and umbrella, have come).

Thus none of the alternatives in this regard is permissible. Therefore, in the expression *svaparapaksavoh* of Vasubandhu's definition, the words *sva* and *para* are not correctly employed.

(b) The second objection is that in the expression *svaparapakṣa* of Vasubandhu's sūtra, the compound is an impossible one.

It cannot be a genitive *tatpurusa*. Wherever there is such a compound the qualification is observed separately from the qualified, and the two are entirely distinct, e.g. in the compound *rājapurusa*. But, no such distinctness of the qualified and the qualification is discernible in the compound *svaparapakṣa*.

It cannot be argued that the rule may not hold, as in the words *senāpati*, *pānakāṇa* etc., *pati*, the commander and *aṅga*, the ingredient are not entirely different from *senā*, the army and *pānaka*.
the drink respectively, although such compound is there, for there the difference can easily be ascertained.4

It has been already stated that the word *sva* cannot mean 'own'.

Nor can *svapaksa* mean that which is one's own as well as something to be proved (*sva+sau pakşa+sati*), by taking the word as a *karmadhārava* compound. Here *sva* would appear as the qualification of *pakṣa*, which as has already been shown, is not possible and also because there is no difference between the two; yet both these conditions are essential for a *karmadhārava* compound. The co-extensiveness necessary for this compound is possible only when there is some difference between the two, but *sva* and *pakṣa* are being considered to mean the same thing.

Here a *bahuvrīhi* compound also is not possible, because in that case, it could only mean 'one who has *sva*, himself, for *pakṣa*, what is to be proved' (*svah pakṣo vasya*). That is, the object of proving would be the demonstrator himself. Again, the word *sva* cannot mean 'what is to be proved' so that it may be considered a qualification of *pakṣa*, to form a *bahuvrīhi* compound. Then, *pakṣa* and *sva* would be clearly synonymous, as *pakṣa* has been said to be 'what is to be proved'. In such a situation, there can be no *bahuvrīhi* compound, e.g. one never says *vrksatarum chinattī*.

The Buddhist explanation also involves a self-contradiction. If the term *pakṣa* denotes something different from what is denoted by *svapakṣa*, as it should do, if the compound *svapakṣa*...
is to be taken as suggested, then it would go against the Buddhists' own statement that 'proposition consists in the declaration of the pakṣa'. Because, as a matter of fact, it is svapakṣa that forms the subject-matter of the proposition and yet the last statement of the Buddhist speaks of the proposition as asserting the pakṣa, which, according to him, is not the same as svapakṣa.

If, on the other hand, pakṣa is not different, i.e. is the same as svapakṣa, then, the definition - svaparapakṣavoh siddhyasiddvartham vacanam vādah - offered by the Buddhist would be an impossible one. Because the term parapakṣa would involve an internal contradiction; pakṣa being the same as svapakṣa, the term would mean parasvapakṣa, where para and sva are contraries. Also, obviously the word sva would be superfluous in the word svapakṣa, pakṣa alone being sufficient.

No other compound except the abovementioned ones are possible in the term svapakṣa and parapakṣa. Therefore, the expression cannot be taken as a compounded form. Nor can it be taken as a sentence. Thus the conclusion is that the expression svaparapakṣavoh is useless.

2. The second term of the definition siddhyasiddvartham, 'for establishment and refutation' also is not justified.

Establishment here is to be taken to mean either 'to manifest' (vyakti) or 'to produce' (utpatti). Neither of the meanings is permissible. Establishment cannot mean producing, because in that case 'proposition' (pratijñā) and the other factors of reasonings
would cease to be 'the means for the establishment of a conclusion' (sādhana); as things are not produced by the proposition etc., they only bring to light what is already there.

Establishment may no doubt mean manifestation and such a meaning would be more satisfactory. Still, for the Buddhist, it would lead to self-contradiction. Here is a Buddhist sūtra 7: Establishment and refutation consist in convincing the judge,8 so that establishment and refutation, being in the form of the conviction produced in the judge's mind, would be related to the judge. But establishment in the sense of manifestation obviously means manifestation of the view, the relation must be with the view and not the judge. Thus, in the disputed sūtra, establishment is meant to be in relation to 'the view', but in the other expression adhikarāṇapratvāyanam siddhyasiddhi, establishment (and refutation) are clearly meant to be in relation to 'the judge'. Hence, there is contradiction.9

Again, it cannot be said that establishment and refutation are 'of the view', for it might be argued that the view is the subject-matter of both establishment and refutation. Even then, the question may be put:10 At the time establishment and refutation take place, (a) is the view itself an already fully accomplished fact or (b) is it not so? (a) The view is an already accomplished fact, next comes establishment - if such a claim be made it involves a contradiction. A view is said to be established when it becomes related to establishment beforehand. If it means that the
thing is really as the view in question represents it to be, then
it actually means that the judge is already convinced of the correct-
ness of the view. So here to make the claim that establishment of the
view consists in convincing the judge would be unjustified. Moreover,
establishment is not the same as conviction, but in the Buddhist
sūtra, they are described as same. Actually, conviction (pratyāyana)
follows from establishment (siddhi). (b) On the other hand when the
view is not an accomplished fact, then, at that time, how does its
conviction to the judge come about? It would mean that the convinc-
ing (= establishment according to the Buddhist) of the judge is
brought about before the application of the proofs that would make
the view an established fact. Then there would be no need for the
discussion, because there would be no connection between the use of
proofs and conviction of the judge.

3. Neither is the word artha, 'purpose' justified. Possible
meanings of the word in this connection are three (a) aim, (b) motive
and (c) denotation. But none of these is possible.

(a) The Buddhist asserts that four kinds of statements are aimed
at by the word artha, which are proof (sādhana), criticism (dūṣana),
apparent proof (sāchanābhaṣa) and apparent criticism (dūsanābhaṣa),
applied in the course of discussion. But the inclusion of all these
has been rendered impossible by the subsequent addition of the
qualification 'right and wrong'; the inclusion of all statements
embodying proofs and apparent proofs would be in support of one's own view,
and all criticisms and apparent criticisms would be against another's view; but the view supported by apparent proof would not necessarily be the right view; similarly, the view attacked by an apparent criticism would not necessarily be the wrong view; hence having added the qualifications 'right and wrong', the Buddhist has made the inclusion of apparent proof and apparent criticism impossible. This being so, there is no point in taking the word *artha* to mean aim.

(b) *Artha* in the sense of motive: When a person puts forward apparent proofs or apparent criticisms, he cannot be said to be a true debater, carrying on discussion, because a man wishing to establish and refute, can never put forward apparent proofs and apparent criticisms. So the motive of establishing and refuting can never be for apparent proofs and apparent criticisms. Thus the person urging the apparent proofs and apparent criticisms would not be true debater so that the Buddhist position leads to the absurdity that one who has been defeated, by being shown to have brought forward apparent proofs and apparent criticisms, is a person who was not a debater, i.e. not a party in the discussion!

(c) The sense of 'meaning' or 'denotation' too cannot be accepted, because in the present case the exact nature of that denotation cannot be determined. Specially as neither the *sūtra*-writer in his *Vādavidhāna*,¹² nor the *Bhāṣya*-writer in his *Vādavidhāna-ṭīkā* has vouchsafed any such explanation as that such and such 'denotation' is expressive of 'establishment' and
refutation'. Certainly, it has been declared: "That which is capable of expressing the establishment and the refutation constitutes their 'denotation' (vācaka)." This explanation is true but according to this explanation the use of the actual words 'establishment' and 'refutation' would come to constitute discussion as these words are per excellence 'that which denote establishment and refutation'.

An additional inconsistency in the words of the sutra is shown by Uddyotakara: When propounding the definition in the form - vāda is discussion for the purpose of establishment and refutation, etc.'., the writer did not properly examine what he had said before and what he was saying now. For in view of what he had said before, the word 'discussion' (as occurring in the proposed definition) would clearly be that which had been put forward against the (orthodox) logician's reasons; while the aphoristic style in which the definition has been put forward gives to it the appearance of a generalised axiom; from which it would seem that all 'assertions' were meant to be included.

Even the commentary on the above sutra does not offer proper explanation on discussion, because of wrong conceptions about it.

1. In the commentary, one of the expressions is svasya pakṣasya. Unjustifiability of the use of the word sva has already been shown in course of discussing the sutra. Here again any expression like svasya pakṣasya cannot be maintained, because 'what is to be proved' (sādhyā) is a certain conception and the receptacle of conceptions
(knowledge) is the soul, while, according to the Buddhist, conceptions have no receptacle. So in either case the nākṣa (view), could not be regarded as the receptacle of the establishment.

In the sūtra we have the expression svaprapaksayoh. Here a confusion may arise whether it is with the sixth case-ending or the seventh case-ending. But it has been cleared by the expression svasa naksasā indicating that the sixth is intended. But no such indication is necessary here. It is evident that the meaning of locative is not at all possible here. Apart from the 'view' itself, there is nothing to be established of which the view could be the receptacle, so that the locative case would be possible.

2. Another expression is yuktavyuktayoh. The intention is that the qualifying terms 'right' and 'wrong' should be added to 'one's own view' and 'another's view' respectively. Proof and criticism are to be connected with 'one's own view' and 'another's view'. But rightness and wrongness (a) neither can be (consist in) proof and criticism; (b) nor can have any connection with proof and criticism; (c) nor can consist in the fact of the thing actually being and not being respectively as represented.

(a) The statement of the Buddhist clearly indicates that rightness and wrongness are distinct from proof and criticism, for the sūtra means that they are due to proof and criticism. If they mean proof and criticism, they should not be mentioned separately. If it be argued that proof and criticism are meant to qualify and
specify rightness and wrongness? That is, the particular kind of rightness meant is that which is ascertained by the fact of there being proofs in support, and wrongness is ascertained by the fact of its being open to criticism; so that 'rightness and wrongness' and 'proof and criticism' are not exactly synonymous. But Uddyotakara points out that in that case there should be the nominative case in the word sādhanā-dūṣana, as no different case (kāraka) is seen of the qualifier (vīsesa) and the qualified (vīsesya).

(b) To escape from the above difficulty the Buddhist might argue that the meaning here is that 'connection with proofs constitutes rightness and connection with criticism constitutes wrongness'. This meaning certainly would not be arrived at by the use of the nominative case-ending.

This is not right. The Buddhist cannot specify that connection with proofs and criticisms is to be of such and such a kind. Connection with proof can only mean 'the presence or existence of what proves what is to be proved'; and similarly connection with criticism can only mean 'the presence or existence of what vitiates what is to be criticised'; in both cases, real existence of certain things is implied and no such real existence of anything can be admitted by the Buddhist.

In fact, the expression 'connection with proof' can be used only when the exact denotation of these words has been ascertained; and when this has been already ascertained, there is no further
necessity of advancing 'proofs'. As Vacaspati explains: If the Buddhists admit illusory or conceptual existence of things, then, 'connection with proofs' may be possible. But the Naiyayikas would answer that even then the determination of the exact meaning of the expression 'connection with proofs' will depend upon the ascertaining of what is 'proof' and 'what is to be proved'. So the definite knowledge of 'what is to be proved' is necessary before the conception of 'connection with proof'. This will mean that the conception that 'a certain fact is proved' will have to be present long before there can be any conception of 'connection with proof'. But when it has been already known that a certain fact is proved, where will be the necessity for advancing any further proofs, or of pointing out its 'connection with proof'? Thus, if the proofs become useless, the convincing of the judge would not be effected by means of rightness and wrongness. Therefore, the assertion 'the convincing of the judge is by means of rightness and wrongness' would be contradicted. In short, it is to be concluded that the meaning of rightness and wrongness cannot consist in 'connection with proof and criticism'.

(c) The Buddhist has said that 'the convincing of the judge is to be by means of rightness and wrongness'. Here rightness and wrongness have been stated as the instrument for convincing the judge. But when rightness and wrongness would be explained as the fact of the thing being actually there and not being actually there respectively, then, rightness and wrongness would be something to be
determined, i.e. the object of determination (= an ascertainment, conviction of the judge) and not the means of that determination. So the instrumental ending would not be justified (vukta-vukta-tvam); there should be the genitive ending (vukta-vukta-tvasya).

3. The expression 'convincing of the judge' also is not relevant in this context.

The Buddhist has said that 'the purpose of the treatises is for removing doubts and misconceptions.' But the statement that 'establishment and refutation consist in the convincing of the judge' would not be in agreement with the above, for there are no doubts and misconceptions in the judge's mind.

The convincing of the judge will naturally bring about the convincing of the disputant. Because, the disputant, due to his partiality to his own view, fails to cognise the thing correctly, what it actually is. That is, the disputant does not want to give up his own view due to partiality and attachment, though his view may not represent the actual thing. Therefore, the judge should be convinced so that the disputant also would become convinced.

Here, 'the thing which actually is there' (santam-artham) and 'failure to comprehend properly' (na pratipad-vate ca) are contradictory to each other. For if a thing is cognised to be otherwise by a capable man, then, how can it be called the 'actual thing'?

Moreover, the cause of the convincing of the judge is different from that of the convincing of the disputant. Again, there is no
hard and fast rule that discussion is carried on for the purpose of convincing the judge only. Discussion is often found to be carried on with one's teacher and such other persons, in which case there is no judge at all.

But when the man, not merely desirous of getting at the truth, enters into a discussion with a desire for reward, honour and fame - there is certainly the necessity for a judge. Here also the discussion may be termed as vāda because the Buddhist admits one process of debate termed as kathā and its purposes are several - getting at the truth, reward and so forth. Indeed, the Buddhist will be silenced due to his own inconsistencies. Vasubandhu himself prohibited the holding of discussion for a man desirous of obtaining praise, honour and reward.

Now, regarding the non-acceptance of the three-fold division, it may be pointed out that mere acceptance or non-acceptance does not prove existence or non-existence. If a thing is actually there it is to be accepted. Naiyāyikas have valid grounds to divide debate (kathā) into three sub-divisions - vāda, jālpa and vitandā, based upon their special characteristics distinct from each other.

4. The Buddhist has said that the term paksasiddhi, 'establishment of the view' means 'conviction regarding the establishment of the view'. This meaning is not primary but secondary. Just as the term 'void' secondarily indicates the 'contemplation of the void'. Here secondary indication (upacāra) is not justified. It is
not arbitrary. It is permitted only when the expression is one that is met with in common usage and yet its literal meaning is found to be an impossible one. Uddyotakara contends that it is not proper to use expressions in a secondary sense in the body of a definition.

5. The use of the term adhikarana also is not correct here. It refers to 'one who has been appointed (adhikrta) by the two disputants'. But here the meaning of the term adhikarana cannot be related with the judge. If it is said that the judge, as receptacle of the conviction is called adhikarama, then it will be rejected. Because the conviction is with regard to the view and not with regard to the judge. In conclusion, other meanings of adhikarana also are refuted by Uddyotakara.
NOTES
Chapter Eight

1. svaparānaspūtathāḥ siddhāsiddhyartham vacanam vādah.
   NV (Vide Catur., p.601)

   vāsubandhavam laksanam dūṣavitum upanvesvati etc.
   NVTT (Vide Catur., p.612)

   Gautama's definition of vāda is pramāṇatarkasādhantarālambhaḥ,
   siddhāntaviruddhah pācāvavayopananeḥ paksapravipaksaparigraho
   vādah. (NS I.ii.1). i.e. Discussion is (the form of debate
   in which the two contestants) 'uphold the thesis and the
   anti-thesis' by substantiation and refutation with the help
   of pramāṇas and tarka, 'without being contradicted by proved
   doctrine' and 'employing the five inference-components'.

2. paksāḥ vah sādhavitumīstah. It is the definition of paksā of
   Vasubandhu referred in NV on NS I.i.33.

3. te sādhanadūsanaiḥ svaparānaspūtah sambadhvante.
   NVTT (Vide Catur., p.614)

4. The difference is discussed in course of the treatment of the
   relation between 'qualifying adjunct' and 'qualified object'
   (gunaguni-vāda). For the discussion on this see Chap.IV, .25.

5. parapaksavacanam pratiśūla. NV (Vide Catur., p.604)
6. i.e. As a combination of syntactically related terms not compounded for the single reason that there are no syntactical terminations at the end of the words.

7. *adhikaranapratyāvanam siddhyasidhhī*. NV (Vide Catur., p. 605)

8. *prāṣṇika* (lit. questioner) a judge, one who frames the question to be discussed by the two parties.

9. Here Uddyotakara shows the conflict between two sūtras of the Buddhist.

10. Here Vācaspati clears the intention of Uddyotakara's alternative questions to the Buddhists: Actually the convictive knowledge may be with regard to pakṣa, or may subsists in the judge, but in this form this is not possible in the Buddhist view. Because the knowledge, acc. to them is receptacleless and the matter of visaya and visayā is false. (Vide Catur., p. 615)

11. *vuktavuktatva* : this another passage of the Buddhist work has been added.

12. See chap III *nośa* No. 26

13. The exact meaning of this whole sentence cannot be clear without reference to the actual text of Vasubandhu's work.

14. Uddyotakara mentions only words and certain expressions used significantly in the commentary (Vṛtti), but does not record
those fully in the form of exact quotations.

15. It is a qualification of svaparapaksyoh, added in the commentary.

16. te sādhanadūṣanaiḥ svaparāsabdāh sambadhvante.

17. sāchanena yogah. NV (Vide Catur., p.608)

18. ani ca samyuto'pi yogah sādhyasādhanajānādhiśānāmāṇirūpantavā nānirūpite sāadhve nirūnito bhavati, nirūpam ca nirūva iti vayanirūpaṃ prak sādhyanirvāvāt kṛtam vayanirūpaṃ sādhyanirvāvārthenati. vuktāvuktatvenā karanenādhiśākaraprayāvanam iti vyāchātah. NVTT (Vide Catur., p.618)

19. vuktāvuktatvenādhiśākaraprayāvanam. NV (Vide Catur., p.608)

20. adhākaraprayāvanam. NV (Vide Catur., p.608)

21. saṃdehabhīparyavapratisēdhārthḥā sāstrasyārmabhāh. NV (Vide Catur., p.608)

22. prājñākaraprayāvanādeva pratīvādīprayāvanam kṛtam bhavisyati.

23. trīvidyābhivyayagamāt eka evam kathāmārghāh. NV (Vide Catur., p.608)

24. bhavadbhireva pratīṣedhāt. NVTT (Vide Catur., p.618)
25. **vāda, jālpa and vitanda** is the three kinds of debate.

**Vāda** is a discussion where establishment and refutation of the views are with the help of *pramāṇas* and *tafka*, without being contradicted by proved doctrine and employing the five inference-components.

**Jalpa** is a discussion where establishment and refutation of the views are with the help of *chala*, *jāti* and *nigrahamsthana*. All other characteristics are same as in *vāda*.

**Vitanda** is a kind of debate where the opponent has no care for establishment of any thesis of his own.

26. *vaccoctm paksi siddhivisavam pratvāyanam pakṣa siddhisahdnenpracaritam, vathā sūnyatāvisavah samādhīḥ sūnyatā iti.*

    **NV (Vide Catur., p.608)**