In his \textit{Var\textsuperscript{a}tika} on \textit{NS II. ii.66},\textsuperscript{1} Uddyotakara refutes the \textit{apoha} theory of the Buddhists, though without mentioning any particular name. Uddyotakara records the \textit{apoha} theory\textsuperscript{2} as follows: The Naiy\text{"a}yikas, following Gautama, hold that the denotation of words is constituted by three things — the individual (\textit{vv\text{a}kti}), the shape (\textit{\=akrti}), and the generality (\textit{j\=ati}). The Buddhists raise objections by showing the impossibility of the above - by posing various alternatives. They try to show that the \textit{apoha} theory only explains successfully the problem of denotation.

The word \textit{sat} (being) may be taken, for instance, due to its widest extension, to discuss the Buddhist objection. Does the word \textit{sat} denote (a) a generality, or (b) a particular relation, or (c) an object, or (d) something (an individual) endowed with the generality?

(a) It cannot be a generality (\textit{j\=ati}). Generality must be inclusive only. It cannot be co-extensive with what is exclusive. For instance, in the expression \textit{sad dravyam}, \textit{sat} takes the same case-ending as \textit{dravya}, which denotes itself something as distinct.
from quality and other things. That is, the word *sah* is seen to be co-extensive with the word *drayva* of exclusive denotation. The expression is a correct one. There the word *sah* cannot denote a generality.

It cannot be argued that the word *sah* denotes the generality, *sattā*, and due to its subsistence in *drayva* the co-existence is justified. Because in that case *sattā* would be subsisting in something else, having no independent existence and as such it should be regarded as a quality. There is no instance where a word denoting a substance with quality takes the same case-ending as the word, denoting a quality; in the expression *śāṅkhasya sauklyam*, there are different case-endings in *śāṅkha*, denoting the conch-shell and *sauklyam*, denoting whiteness.

(b) The word *sah* cannot denote a particular relation. Because from the above it follows that an inclusive denotation cannot be co-existent with an exclusive denotation. Yet there is seen the same case-ending in *sad drayvam*, and also, it is seen that by the idea of generality and even quality, the same case-ending between the substance and its relatum is not observed. So a particular relation is not possible.

(c) The word *sah* cannot denote particular objects also, because such objects are innumerable. Other factors are also there: (i) a single word cannot be expressive of a multiplicity of things in the shape of substances and qualities. To be expressive there would have to be some such relation. (ii) If a word were held to be expressive of the particular forms of
objects, it would give rise to an anomaly of the word, expressive of the form of an object being applied to other objects. For example, as when one hears the word sat pronounced, its cognition is in the form of a wavering character, pertaining to substances, qualities and actions. All the three are believed to be possessed of the generality of sattā, denoted by the word sat. Therefore, a denotation, giving rise to a wavering cognition cannot be accepted as the right denotation. Hence the word fails to denote particular objects.

(d) An individual, endowed with generality also cannot be the denotation of the word sat, because of the dependent character (generality depends on individual), that word does not produce any cognition of the jar and other things endowed with the generality of sattā. Inasmuch as the word does not signify these particular things, it should not take the same case-ending as words signifying these things. (i.e. we cannot have such expressions as sañ ghatesa.)

Or, if the word sat is said to be not independent, then the word primarily denotes sattā, being; and while denoting that, it is applied secondarily to that which is possessed of being. But when a word denoting one thing is secondarily applied to something else, it cannot be regarded as denotative of the latter, for instance, the word meñca, the stage. Moreover, the objects, possessing sattā, are innumerable. A single word sat should not denote all these things. That is, except the generality of 'being' the individual things cannot be denoted by the word sat. Moreover, the conception of generality can be transferred to the thing,
endowed with generality - neither by virtue of the similarity of properties (gunasārūpya), nor by virtue of the transmission of properties (gunoparāga). The servant is called the master when he is found to be possessed of qualities similar to those of the master; the crystal is called blue when the blue colour of the flower is transmitted to it. There is no such similarity or transmission of properties of the generality to the thing, endowed with generality; hence, the word expressive of the former (generality) cannot even indirectly be applied to the latter (the thing).

Moreover, in the case in question, there is no sequence in the understandings, i.e. the understanding of the individual does not follow that of generality. In the case of indirect signification, it is seen that one cognises the direct meaning first, and then one cognises the indirect meaning. It means that the indirect meaning of the individual should follow the direct meaning of the individual. Again, it is not possible for the two to appear simultaneously, as no two cognitions can ever appear at one and the same time. If two cognitions were simultaneous, then only generality could have been connected with the individual in the present case.

Moreover, if the cognition of the individual be due to the transmission of the properties of the generality, the cognition would only be a wrong one just like the cognition of blue in regard to the crystal. From all this, the conclusion is that
words cannot denote things endowed with generality.

Again, if the alternative that a word denotes the specific individuality of a thing is accepted, then, a word would not be applicable to any other thing except one and further, no convention could be made in regard to specific individualities.

Thus, as to the denotation of the word sat, no alternative in positive approach is possible. Therefore, the word is to be taken as meaning only *apoha* (i.e. negation of other things). In other words, it follows that a word brings about the negation of the denotations of other words to get its own denotation.

**UDDYOTAKARA'S ANSWER TO THE *APOHA* THEORY**

Commenting on the Buddhist view, Uddyotakara at first remarks that their objection is misplaced; it should be directed actually against those who advocate only one of the three (individual, shape, and generality) as the denotation of a word. Naiyayikas are in favour of the fact that all the three are denoted by a word, irrespective of their particular predominance or subordinance.

1. As to the objection that the word for *sattā* cannot denote *sattā*, it may be pointed out that it involves a self-contradiction, for by pronouncing the very word *sattā*, the opponents admit the word as expressive of *sattā*. 
The Buddhists might say that the word for sattā and the like are not actually there, but such expressions are used just following the Nyāya view in which substances, qualities, etc. are accepted. However, even then, there would be no escape from self-contradiction. The points under discussion are regarding the well-known words and to what things they are applicable. There should be the same opinion between the two rivals. This should not be the fact that the Naiyayikas apply the word for sattā to sattā, while the opponents do not. So without removing the contradiction and only by saying that the word is used according to the Nyāya view, there is no chance of eliminating the possibility of self-contradiction.

The Buddhists cannot even say that the words for sattā etc. have been only assumed, where the comprehension of those words is simply for denying them. Because there the exact subject of the assumption remains unspoken. That is to say, when a thing with similarity with another thing is conceived of as the latter, it is because the properties of the latter have been imposed upon the former, that is what forms the subject of 'assumption'; for instance, one (wrongly) assumed the man in the post. Now if the words in question are 'assumed', the Buddhists would have to point out the primary basis underlying this assumption, for there can be no 'assumption' without a primary basis.

2. The Buddhist has also claimed: The word sat cannot denote
the generality, because the co-extensiveness of the word *sat* with the word *dravva* is seen. A rule is to be admitted that a word of inclusive character can never be co-extensive with a word of exclusive character.

This view shows the ignorance of the Buddhists about the meaning of 'co-extensiveness', i.e. taking up of the same case-ending. The Naiyāyikas do not speak here of the co-extensiveness of the word for *sattā* with the word for substance. What they say is that substances, qualities and actions are referred to by the word *sat*, which is expressive of that which is the principal manifesters of *sattā*, being. Now, the words for substance, quality and action also denote the same substances, qualities and actions as qualifying one another. In such a position, the words *sat* and *dravva* can be co-extensive, pertaining as they do to one and the same thing (substance). When, however, the word *sattā* is used with special reference to *sattā* and no importance is attached to its manifesters, there cannot be co-extensiveness, for instance, in *dravvasva sattā*.

3. The Buddhists have said that the word *sat* does not denote a particular relation but a relative word only does so. Relation is a quality and the word *sat* is not a word denoting a relation, and there cannot be co-extensiveness between a word denoting a quality and a word denoting substance.

But this objection has no force, for it has already been
explained how there can be co-extensiveness between the words sat and dr̄yva.

4. Against the Naiyāyikas' explanation that substances, qualities and actions are denoted by the word sat, the Buddhists say that a word, expressive of generality (sat here) cannot denote diverse individuals, because there are endless individuals.2

The word sat does not denote the mere individuals by themselves. What actually are denoted by the word sat are substance, quality or action, whichever it may be, as qualified by sattā, being. One applies the word sat to things in which he perceives sattā and certainly sattā is one only, the same property pervading through all sat things. Hence, many diverse individuals may be denoted by a single word.

Moreover, the Buddhist objection in question is not based on valid reasoning. Words, expressive of generality cannot denote diverse individuals, because there are endless individuals - in this regard, no corroborative example can be furnished, either positive or negative, i.e. it is not possible to state the example in the form 'all that is endless is incapable of being denoted by words expressive of generality'; because all diverse individuals are included in the proposition, which leaves none that could form an example. Nor can the example be put in the form 'what is denoted by words expressive of generality is not found to be endless'; as the very conception of generality is inadmissible in the Buddhist theory.
To avoid this charge, it also would not be right to say that there some diverse individuals are the subject, and endlessness, the probans, and then, the other individuals may form the example, for it would lead to absurdity. If the proposition be proved, it would also be proved that diverse individuals could not be denoted. Now, if diverse individuals cannot be denoted, there is nothing that can be denoted, there being nothing apart from individuals (according to the Buddhists).

The Buddhists do not know the exact meaning of 'anomaly' (vyabhicāra). That term or character is regarded as anomalous, too wide, which while applying to its own object and other cognate things, subsists in other things also. Certainly the word sat does not apply to anything other than its own object when it denotes the diverse individuals. Secondly, sattā has not been put forward as a probans; who has ever put forward any such reasoning as -- 'substance, quality and action, because of sattā'? For this reason also what has been urged by the opponents is not right; vyabhicāra is a defect of probans; and in the cognition of things, word is not a probans; vyabhicāra does not vitiate any and every means of cognition; for instance, the visual organ apprehends the blue colour, as also the other colours.

Further, if the Buddhists actually deny the fact of a word denoting diverse individuals, then it is not right for them to
speak of co-extensiveness between the words sat and dravya; as such a statement would involve contradiction in terms. That is, the Buddhists, admit on the one hand, co-extensiveness between the word sat and the word for substance, and on the other, charge the Naiyāyikas that it is not possible for them (Naiyāyikas) as the word sat cannot denote diverse individuals. Hence, there can be no 'word for substance'. So to use the expression 'word for substance' involves a contradiction in terms.

5. The Buddhists contend that a word does not denote the individual endowed with generality. The word sat does not produce any cognition of the jar and other things - thus the expression san ghatah cannot be justified.

The above objection is not tenable. Uddyotakara has shown how in the expression sad dravyam there can be co-extensiveness by pertaining as they do to one and the same thing. In the same manner, there will be co-extensiveness between san and ghatah. The word sat is a denotative word. But that alone can be regarded as denoted by it the cognition whereof proceeds from that word. The word sat has three denotations: (a) sattā, the summum genus, (b) the connection or presence of satta, by virtue of which substance etc. are regarded as sattā, and (c) other things beyond substance, quality and action. In this regard, the principal factor is that which is the most efficient indicator or manifestor related to effects, and which, as such, serves to render sattā manifest or perceptible. This is nothing but the
substance, while sattā itself and its connection are subordinate factors. The predominant or subordinate character depends upon the effect produced; whenever sattā brings about an effect, it does so through a particular thing; by itself, it cannot do anything; so that thing only is regarded as the principal, and sattā itself as subordinate. Specially as sattā serves to bring about the cognition of the principal thing—'this thing being qualified by sattā'; and also because as a rule when the subordinate factor is absent, the thing is not cognised as before. In the case in question, when the subordinate factor, namely, sattā is absent, the thing is not cognised as sat. So the Buddhists have not rightly said that the word sat does not bring about the cognition of the jar and other things endowed with the generality of sattā.13

6. Here the Buddhists argue that the above explanation is not justified. The fact is that the word sat primarily denotes sattā and while denoting that, it secondarily denotes that which is possessed of sattā.

It shows that the Buddhists hardly know the signification of the word sat. They say that the word sat primarily signifies sattā; in fact what the word signifies are substance, quality and action, by virtue of the fact that these latter are the manifesters of sattā.

7. It has been argued that the words sat and dravya cannot be co-extensive, because the former is one and the latter is
many. So there will be anomaly. But it is easily removed by establishing the threefold denotations of the word sat and other relating arguments.

8. The conception of generality cannot be transferred to the thing endowed with the generality by virtue of the similarity of properties, as is found to be the case when the word 'master' is applied, by transfer, to the servant.

By the above the opponents mean here 'transfer of conception'. But it is not applicable here. If it is meant that the servant comes to be cognised as the 'master', this clearly is not a transfer of conception. Because the conception of 'master' does not go over to the servant. All that happens is that when one finds the servant to be grave and agreeable like the master, he applies to him the word 'master' in a figurative sense.

Here the opponents mean that the servant resembles the master, that is why the word 'master' is applied to him secondarily. But in the case of the word sattā, it is never found to be so applied to substance etc.

When the term sattā stands for the character of existing things (gunaśvalī) and not for the generality (jāti), in that case, the existing things do come to be indirectly signified by the word sattā, as qualifications and hence subordinate factors; in this case, the fact of their being qualifications forms the basis of the secondary signification. But in the case in question the term sat does not denote the character of the existing things, in which
there would be a secondary application, as is found to be the case when the crystal is called blue.

9. There is no sequence in the conceptions i.e. the conception of the individual does not follow after that of the generality; and it is impossible for the two to appear simultaneously. That is, the word sattā, first should be applied to sattā and then, to things possessed of sattā, but as a matter of fact no such order or sequence is perceived. Again, it is not possible for the two to be simultaneous, because the cognition of sattā and the cognitions of substance etc. do not appear at the same time. But it has been already pointed out that sattā directly denotes substance etc., though not as principal factors.

10. Buddhists have also contended: The word for generality cannot denote diverse individuals.

In the above statement the qualification of word, indicative of a generality is useless. Because the Buddhists do not accept any kind of word to be expressive of diverse individuals. It is only when the unqualified thing is there and there is also a general cognition in regard to it that the qualification comes in useful to specify that general cognition. In the case in question however there is no unqualified thing (i.e. mere simple word, expressive of diverse individuals), nor do the opponents accept anything to be denoted by words for generality. Hence the qualification is futile.

Further, it is to be noted that if words for generality were
expressive of diverse individuals, they would no longer be words for generality. Diverse individuals must be regarded as expressed by totally different words. Now if diverse individuals are not expressed by words for generality, nor by the other words, they would be inexpressible by both kinds of words. So the Buddhist assertion amounts to: "Diverse individuals are never denoted -- words are never expressive."

11. Again, as there is no such thing as generality in the Buddhist view 'word for generality' cannot denote even generality also. To call it a 'word for generality' would involve a contradiction in terms. Again, it is tentatively being admitted that the word for generality does not denote diverse individuals. But what does it signify? If nothing, the assertion becomes meaningless. It results in the clear admission that words are inexpressive. Then the proposition and the probans 'because of endlessness' must be inexpressive, ex hypothesi, as both of these are nothing but words.

Here the Buddhists may say that they are not trying to prove words as inexpressive, nor the things as inexpressible, but their purpose is to deny the particular explanation of the denotive process which the Naiyāyikas put forward; they claim that words do denote the generality, but only by way of the 'exclusion of others', apoha. In short, the words for generality etc. do not denote generality etc. as admitted by others, but they denote the generality etc. as postulated by themselves only.
12. By saying 'their special generality as found by applying apoha is denoted by the words for generality', the Buddhists fail to point out the exact form of generality. As a matter of fact, no other form of generality can be pointed out except that it is what forms the basis of comprehensive conception. The possibility of the comprehensive conception cannot be denied; and it is not possible that the comprehensive conception should crop up suddenly out of the exclusive conceptions. Hence that from which the comprehensive conception arises is the generality; there can be no difference of opinion on this point.

13. Even the reference to the co-extensiveness of the words sat and dravyam by the Buddhists involves an incongruity, being self-contradictory. Vacaspati clarifies: substance and generality are denoted by the words sat and dravya. These are positive entities. If those words were expressive of the 'negation of others', it would be obviously illogical, for positive words do not express the negation of others. Again, no co-extensiveness is possible if the two terms do not denote individuals; words are co-extensive only when even with their different significations, they are applicable to one and the same thing (e.g. san ghatah). Under the circumstances, if the words do not denote individuals, they could never apply to any single thing. They would be like the words gauh (cow) and as'vah (horse). There is another incongruity involved in the Buddhist theory: The words are 'not expressive of individuals' and yet they are regarded as 'co-extensive'.
Here the opponents might explain the co-extensiveness by the *anohā* technique thus: The words *sat* and *dravya* have been used secondarily. Actually the words directly negate what is not-*sat* and not-*dravya* respectively, and then, when those are used for the purpose of negating, they come to be applied to a single thing i.e. which happens to be neither not-*sat* nor not-substance and thence come to be regarded as 'co-extensive'. As a matter of fact, there is no single word that directly denotes any positive thing.

But as according to the Buddhist theory there is no possibility of any direct denotation, the question of secondary denotation does not arise. It is only if the words *sat* and *dravya* were capable of being used in their direct denotation that any secondary or indirect use of them would have been possible in regard to things other than these directly denoted by them. Such indirect use becomes possible by reason of some similarity between what is directly denoted and what is indirectly indicated. As direct denotation for the two words is not possible, there can be no secondary use of them either.

Then again no secondary usage of words is compatible with the *anohā* theory, both what is directly denoted and what is indirectly indicated by any word, would be equally primary; for instance (in 'this boy is a lion') the term lion is applied to the lion, only by reason of its signifying the exclusion of the not-lion, and to the boy also it would be applied by the same reason.
And as the term would be equally applicable to both, on what grounds could either of the two be regarded as indirect or secondary?

Uddyotakara has pointed out some further objections to the Buddhist theory of *apoha*.

(a) If words have a positive denotation, then alone it is possible that this positive denotation having been previously cognised should be negatived by means of another word. That is, the word 'cow' can signify the negation of the non-cow only after the non-cow has been duly perceived somewhere in its positive form, say, of the horse, the camel and the like. So the Buddhists who deny positive denotations can never speak of *apoha*. As a consequence, one who does not know the cow (positively) can form no idea of the cow, in the form that the word 'cow' denotes what is not the non-cow, nor can one form any idea of the non-cow.

(b) The word 'cow' is said to what is not non-cow. Is it something positive or negative?

If it is positive, is it the cow or the non-cow? If it is the cow, there is no dispute with the Naiyāyikas. If non-cow, then, the Buddhist position would be ridiculous, the word 'cow' denoting the non-cow.

It cannot be something negative also. Because nothing negative can form the subject of any injunction (*apaisa*) or
comprehension (sampratipatti) thereof; when one hears the word 'cow', neither the injunction nor its comprehension pertains to anything merely negative; and the meaning of a word is always recognised through the cognition produced by it and certainly no one ever comprehends anything negative on hearing the word 'cow'.

(c) Also, anoha cannot be applied to the denotation of every word. In the case of words where there are two mutually exclusive contradictions, it may be that when one is affirmed the other is denied; for instance, it may be true that when the word 'cow' is heard, the cow is affirmed and the 'non-cow' is denied ('cow' and 'non-cow' being two mutually exclusive contradictories). But this is not possible in the case of the word sarva, 'all'; as there is no such thing as asarva, 'not-all', which could be denied by the word 'all'.

The Buddhists may object that in the case of the denotation of 'all', there is the denial of one etc.; certainly, 'one etc.' are opposed to 'all' — the not-all to be excluded by the word 'all'.

But this is not right as it involves the absurdity of words abandoning their own meanings. If the word 'all' excludes one and the rest, inasmuch as these latter are what go to make up the 'all' and for the Buddhists the whole has no existence apart from its constituents\(^16\) and there would be nothing left for the word 'all' to denote; and this word would thus become meaningless. Similarly, all collective words (words denoting group or
composite) would become meaningless, if they were to be used for the exclusion of their own constituent parts, as it is held that the group has no existence apart from the members that make up that group. As for the words 'two' and the like, these also pertain to groups (of two, three etc.) so that if they denote the exclusion of one etc. (that go to make up the higher members, two, three etc.), as these, being precluded, would not be there to make up the said groups, the words would become meaningless.

(d) Now, *apohā*, exclusion is a form of action. Here the Buddhists should point out its object, which is being excluded. That is, *apohā* when it is explained as 'not being the non-cow', what would be its object -- the cow or the non-cow? If it pertains to the cow, how can there be a negation of the cow in the cow itself? If, on the other hand, it pertains to the non-cow, how can *apohā* or exclusion of one thing (non-cow) lead to the comprehension of another thing (cow)? Certainly, when the kha-
dira is cut, the cutting does not fall upon the palaśā.

Further, if the phrase 'the cow is not the non-cow' is explained as the negation in the cow of the non-cow, then, the Buddhists should explain who has ever conceived of the cow as the non-cow, which conception would be denied by the said *apohā*. How too can there be any such negation as is involved in the term non-cow unless there is some idea of the cow already? For in the case of every negative word (such as non-cow) it is found
that the negation is not possible without some idea of the signification of the second term (cow). But according to the Buddhist view the previous conception (i.e. conception of cow) is not possible and unless there is this previous conception, no subsequent negation of it is possible.

(a) If *apoha* theory is admitted, then it is not possible for the Buddhists to answer some further questions also.

1) The *apoha* or exclusion of the non-cow in the cow -- is this different or non-different from the cow? If it is different, does it abide or not in the cow? If it does abide in the cow, then, inasmuch as it abides in it, it becomes a quality; that is, the word cow denotes a quality and not the cow. Under the circumstances, there can be no such co-ordination as that expressed in the words 'the cow is sitting', for no quality can sit. If, on the other hand, it does not abide in the cow, then, what is the significance of the genitive ending in the phrase *goh* *apohah*, 'the *apoha* of the cow'? If the *apoha* is non-different from the cow, then, it is the same as the cow, and its postulation would be futile.

ii) Is this *apoha* one and the same in regard to everything, or different with each individual thing?

If it is one and the same, and is related to several cows, then, it is the same as the generality 'cowness'. If, on the other hand, it is many, differing with each individual, then it is as 'endless' as the individual objects themselves so that
any conception of it would be impossible, which means that no comprehension of the meaning of the word would be possible.

iii) Is the *apoha* itself capable of being denoted or not?

If it is denotable, then the contention, the *apoha* of other things is only the process for the denotation of words cannot be justified. When *apoha*, itself is denotable, it is not true that what is denoted is only the *apoha* of something else. Or else, it leads to a regressus ad infinitum, for if the *apoha* be held to be denoted only as the *apoha* or exclusion of the non-*apoha*, then, the denotation of the other will consist of a further *apoha*, and so on and on, there would be no end of *apoha*.

If, on the other hand, the *apoha* is not denotable, then the assertion that 'the word means the *apoha* of what is signified by other words' becomes anomalous; for if the *apoha* cannot be denoted by any word, then the Buddhists should explain what the word *apoha* (in the said assertion) signifies apart from what is denotable by it? If the same *apoha* forms its denoted meaning, then also this would be incompatible with the declaration that 'a word is said to denote something when it is found that it brings about, in its denotation, the exclusion of what is denoted by other words'; as the only meaning that this sentence could have, (under the theory that *apoha* is not denoted) is that 'the impressive or non-denotative word (*apoha*, which is supposed to be non-denotative and the word cannot denote anything else) denotes something else (which is absurd)'.

(f) In the case of words like many (not-one) and the like, inasmuch as they pertain to two etc., for the explaining of the generic conception (of many), it becomes necessary to postulate the particular things (that go to make up the many); as unless the particulars are posited, no generic conception can be possible (so that the cognition of no particular thing could preclude the mere general 'exclusion of others').

(g) In the case of the compound nilotpalami it is found that the word nila is placed first because it denotes the qualifier 'blue' and the word utpala is placed last because it signifies the qualified object, lotus; this would not be possible under the pada theory; as under this theory the word 'blue' denoting 'the exclusion of not-blue' in the same way as the 'lotus' denotes the 'exclusion of the not-lotus', both would be equally predominant, which would make any relation of qualifier and qualified impossible between them. The same holds good in regard to the terms rājan and puruṣa in the compound rāja-puruṣa.

(h) One who holds the 'exclusion of other things' to be the denotation of words, has got to explain the meaning of 'co-extensiveness'; when one holds that all words denote the exclusion of other things, the word 'blue' would signify the exclusion of not-blue and the word 'lotus' would signify the exclusion of not-lotus; the Buddhists have to explain how could there be any co-extensiveness between these two exclusions. For one who holds that words denote positive entities, the two words 'blue' and 'lotus' denote
a substance endowed with a particular generality (lotus and a particular quality, blue); and in this case, there is co-extensiveness, for the simple reason that both, generality and quality subsist in the same substance -- which cannot be said of the two exclusions of not-blue and not-lotus. Hence, for the Apohist there can be no such thing as 'co-extensiveness'.

1. **vyaktavākrtijātavastu nādārthah**.

2. The argument for the apoha theory may be explained as follows: "Bifocal and round about is the view of the Bauddhas in regard to the theory of cognition. The view is based upon their philosophical stand that all knowledge must be an uncontradicted experience (<i>stādvyāavarttakah</i> - <i>Pramāṇasaṃuccaya</i>, ch. V, st.1). A thing outside cannot be taken as real unless its unreality is contradicted by sufficient evidence. Bauddhas admit means of cognition and even a word is taken as an authority only when its denotation or connotation stands uncontradicted. A word may not be an adequate expression of an external reality and hence any language according to them must have a 'bibasic force'. In all words, names, or concepts, whether referring to universals (<i>jāti</i>) or particulars (<i>vyakti</i>), the indirect or conditional reflex or vision (<i>bhāsa</i>) of reality, is only an echo of the real one. Nothing is real though logically real. So far as a Baudha is concerned, cognitions are all negative or dialectical (<i>apoha</i>). To an apohavādin (negativist), verbal knowledge is not direct. But it is inferential, relative and dialectical too."

G Marulasiddaiah, <i>Sabdavyārttis</i>, p.51
Vācaspati makes a long discussion on *apoha* theory of the Buddhists and refutes also in a detailed manner (ND, p.681-686). For the Buddhists, he says, there is the common experience of negation of the opposite: 

\[
\text{tatha hi tada pratibhāsane gām badhāna iti desītaḥ svam badhnīvad gṛh asvad abhedena apratibhāsanāt.}
\]

Critics credit Dīnāga, the famous logician as the propounder of the *apoha* theory. There is a chapter (V) on this topic in *Pramanāsamuccaya*. Uddyotakara, however, does not quote any stānga or line from that work.

3. When the word *mañca* is applied figuratively to the man on the stage, it is not regarded as denoting the man.

4. The Buddhists say that the word denotes neither (a) a generality, nor (b) an object, nor (c) a particular relation, nor (d) an individual endowed with the generality.

5. Vācaspati in this connection explains: Somewhere the individual may be predominant, somewhere not. Somewhere generality is predominant and individual is subordinate. There is no fixed rule in this regard. Where in a word the individual is endowed with the generality, there the Buddhist cannot give objection based upon the two kinds of 'want of independence'. Words may not
invariably bring about the cognition of the generality before the cognition of the individual. Always there may not be determinate cognition. For instance, in the case of doubt. In this case the perception is valid and at the same time the application of the word to the individual not direct. There is indirect where word, other than its (that thing's) own name is used to a thing. While in the case in question, according to the Naiyāyika view the word denoting the generality is not other than the word denoting the individual; as the same word denotes both; and inasmuch as the word denoting the generality (sat) and the word denoting the individual both denote practically the same thing, there is nothing incongruous in both taking the same case-ending.

6. The word sat denotes that which is existing; and it is the principal manifestor of being or existence; while the word sattā denotes only the comparatively subordinate factor, the character of being; and hence the word sattā can never be co-extensive with the word denoting substance. We say sat dravyam and not sattā dravyam.

7. Though the word dravya is lacking in the text, yet the sense permits its presence.

8. anantvānā jātiśabdo bhedaṁ vācakaḥ.

9. VS I.ii. 4--9
13. It may be true that substance, quality and action are not
directly denoted by the word sattā, yet Uddyotakara says that
Naiyāyikas may assert that the word sattā also denotes substance,
quality and action, as subordinate factors even though it cannot
denote them as principal factors.

14. Dravam iti hi vidhīmu'jam evam sat itvāni vidhitāpam tacchabdau
tavoryacakau tavānvānochartvam vyāhetam, vidhīśabdau ca
anvānārchīthau iti na sambhavati. NVTT (Vide ND, p.680)

15. The Apohists do not admit any such class as 'lion' the presence
whereof would make the term 'lion' applicable to the lion directly,
and only indirectly to the boy in whom that class is absent.
According to them the term 'lion' can only denote the negation
of the not-lion, i.e. of those qualities that are not found in
the lion; and as these qualities are as such absent in the boy
as in the lion, there would be no justification for regarding
the application of the term in one case as direct and in the
other case indirect.

16. The exclusion of one and the rest would mean the exclusion of
everything that goes to make up the 'all'. 