Gautama in NS III.11. 10-17 discusses the theory of momentariness of the Buddhists and its answer according to the Naiyayikas. Bhasyakara and Uddyotakara examines in great details the simple Buddhist argument embodied in the sūtras.

The Buddhists say that all things are momentary (ksanika). A piece of crystal is seen to be sometimes red, sometimes blue, and sometimes different from those. One cannot say that the same piece of crystal continues to exist as one and the same; it is wrongly characterised as red, blue, etc. because of the difference of the 'extraneous conditions' (upadhi), e.g. something naturally red or blue situated nearby. The actual cause of this difference is that there are produced new pieces of crystal, one after another, in each following moments. That is, in the case of the piece of crystal some prototypes of it are produced and some prototypes of it are destroyed in each successive moments. It happens due to the momentariness of things.

The momentariness of objects is proved by the instance of the body. The same person has quite different bodies in the different stages of his life. This means that one's body in childhood is replaced by a new one in youth and so on. All this,
again, is possible only through a continuous process of creation and destruction in the body, which, in other words, implies that the body goes on changing every moment, and the latter ones are different from the previous ones. A thing that is not found to undergo growth and decay every moment, does not undergo them at any time at all. As we find in the case of the earth. While the earthy object itself remains unchanged by baking, there is no appearance or disappearance, in it, of such qualities as are produced by baking; and just as in the earth, which is being baked, there go on momentary transformations, so are there in every individual thing.

ANSWER BY UDHYOTAKARA

As an answer to the above it is pointed out that the instance of the crystal as momentary is unjust. There is no specific rule regarding momentariness. In the case of human body, growth and decay are observed and therefore one can take the human body as a momentary substance, but in the case of crystal etc. no growth or decay is seen. So in these cases, we cannot conclude as in the previous case.

The opponents might argue that by 'observation' of growth and decay, the momentariness of everything is not being proved here,
but where there are growth and decay, there is momentariness.

It is true. But the Naiyāyikas say that only the object in which the continuous process of growth and decay is observed is different, but it does not prove their momentariness. Actually we have here to consider three facts, namely, observation of continuous growth and decay, difference, and momentariness. Continuous growth and decay can be directly responsible for difference only and not for momentariness. Otherwise how can it be possible that the body with the components already existing and being accompanied by newer components acquired from the absorption of nourishment of food would destroy the previous arrangement of parts and give rise to a different body by assuming a different arrangement of parts? In short, the Buddhist position is not tenable.

The Buddhists may say: How can it be claimed that the body is changed by the components obtained from the absorption of food along with the previous components, but it is not that a new body has been produced due to momentariness. To this, the Naiyāyikas reply: We do not try to establish the difference of the body due to the absorption of food. But, according to the Buddhists, the body is said to be different because of the observation of a speciality and then, its momentariness. That is, they try to establish momentariness from the observation of speciality. But the Naiyāyikas claim on the other hand that such observations cannot be a proper ground for the establishment of the momentariness.
There is also positive argument rejecting momentariness. As Gautama himself states in the sūtra: *na utpattivināśadhārano-nalabdēhe.*

Uddyotakara says that accumulation (upacaya) and diminution (apacaya) can be spoken of regarding present, existent object. Therefore, the expression 'it is growing' cannot be applied to an object, which was non-existent before, but is coming into existence, and the expression 'it is decaying' also cannot be applied to an object which is going to be destroyed. But these expressions cannot be applied to objects which are momentary.

Also, the cause is the 'container' and the effect, the 'contained' ; e.g. the yarns and the cloth. Thus the two must be co-existent. This container-contained relation is not possible in the case of momentariness and without the container-contained relation, there can be no cause-effect relation. Therefore, as we perceive a cause-effect relation, the momentariness of things cannot be accepted.

The Buddhists might say that the container-contained relation itself is unproved. For an effect as contained in the cause is never seen. But it is not correct. There is no such absolute rule that no effect can have a container. Colour is admitted to be a product by all and also, at the same time, it has a container.

Here the Buddhists say that admitting state of cause-effect relation also, the momentariness can be held. It is evident that had the colour been receptacleless, then it would
not have been justified in the case of the touch, as a container of the colour. By this example of colour, touch also is being proved at the same time (with the colour). Thus in the case of momentariness also, there can be the cause-effect relation i.e. whenever the things exist there will be the cause 'momentariness'. As one edge of the balance comes lower and the other edge goes up and the two actions occur simultaneously, destruction and production also will be similar. That is, the destruction of cause and the production of effect will be simultaneous.6

The Buddhists do not perceive the Naiyayika view of cause. It is not said that the state of cause-effect cannot be in momentariness, but as effect and cause are concerned with different time, so the state of container and contained should not be connected with cause and effect. There is no example that the effect is receptacleless. So the relation of container and contained as subsisting between the cause and effect is not possible in the case of momentary things.

The Naiyayikas say that the effect must have a receptacle and there are examples as the colour etc. In the case of the balance, rising and falling are not admitted to be different. As they are actually one, their simultaneity (vugapadbhāva) is not justified. So far as the balance is concerned its action is one and it is movement (bhramana) only.

Now between the component parts and action, the relation of cause and effect is not being admitted. So which is to be
connected with which?

The Buddhists might say that only the state of simultaneity is intended here. That is, objects the causes of which are simultaneous, are existent in one and the same time. Falling and rising may be simultaneous yet they are not cause and effect, but their simultaneity is for the simultaneity of their causes.

Are the Buddhists not admitting the contact as different from action? It is answered that the contact also is a different thing and the action also, as a cause of the contact, is a different thing. As the bhāya categories have the cause of production and destruction, the crystal is not like this. So that which is not apprehended, cannot be admitted.

Here the Buddhists might argue that just as a cause for the destruction of milk and a cause for the production of curd, though not apprehended, are admitted, so also in the case of a piece of crystal and its different prototypes that appear in each following moment, a cause for production and a cause for destruction are to be admitted somehow.

But what is known inferentially cannot be said to be not-apprehended. The cause of destruction of milk has as its probans, the effect, namely, the destruction of milk, and the cause of production of curd has as its probans the effect, namely, the production of curd. They are thus known inferentially and hence, there is apprehension of them.
In the case of objects like a piece of crystal etc., however no cause for destruction and production in every moment is observed. There is no ground to indicate that in every moment prototypes of an object are produced, one after another, and hence it is better to admit the absence of such continuous production of an object.

The Buddhists have proceeded to prove the momentariness of things by seeing the different qualities in a thing. Uddyotakara goes to refute that type of argument of the Buddhists: The difference of cold or hot touch cannot prove the difference of a thing, because there is a cause. Cold and hot touch are seen in different things, e.g. in fire and water respectively. In the crystal both these touches are felt. So it may be concluded that the crystal does not remain the same at different times.

It is true that different touches are there, but those appear only because there are different causes. What are the causes? The coldness is felt due to the penetration of water atoms and the hotness is felt due to the penetration of fire atoms.

But it may be argued that it is not right to speak of the penetration of water atoms or fire atoms, because when the case of penetration in a smaller quantity or in a larger quantity of those will have to be considered no cause of them will be found there. In the winter, among wood, ground and iron, all lying under the sky, the last one is felt colder than the previous ones.
Similarly, in summer the growing degree of hotness is felt in the consecutive articles than the previous ones. There is no cause for smaller penetration or larger penetration.

It may be claimed that these things have some speciality in their own selves, which due to some external cause shows such different degrees of coldness or hotness.

No, this also is not justified. By the penetration of the water atoms and fire atoms, the nature of the substances cannot be negated. So as the nature of the substances is same in both cases, the nature of the substances cannot stand as probans (sādhana).

Moreover, the Buddhist probans is contradictory (viruddha). If the penetration of atoms is not admitted, the doctrine of the Buddhists themselves that bhūtas are of the nature of rough, sticky, warm and liquid would be contradicted. Why? Because which is hard at one time, becomes hot at another time. And the thing, which is hot becomes hard. That is, a single thing may become double-natured and sometimes, triple-natured. Therefore, one who accepts penetration of atoms, can easily explain the fact by claiming that the properties of other elements have become mixed.

The probans is contradictory in another way also. Why? The same thing is said to become hard and hot at different times and it becomes double-natured. But then, why not admit that two different things with two different properties have come into being? Does it not go against the theory of momentariness?
If the Buddhists contend that any type of speciality does not prove the difference (nānātya), but only opposed speciality (virodhi viśesa) does so, then also, it would not be justified. They have not rightly understood the contention of the Naiyāyikas. The Naiyāyikas do not say that any type of speciality proves the difference, rather it is intended that an opposed speciality which is absent from the other is the mark of difference. Now, if three definitions are applied to one thing, what will be the name of that thing? Thus, an earth substance should not be called by the name earth, because there is hotness; it should not be called fire because there is hardness. Then, in the case of air, these two are inapplicable (there is hotness, but there is no hardness, yet it is not fire, because there is no colour). So the probans virodhi-viśesa contradicts the definition of substances (bhūta), and thus does not prove the difference. So by the above rule, the attachment of hotness to water would be prohibited. But, actually, there also, hotness, coldness and movement should remain simultaneously. So the case of subduing of fire-form in water is not justified, because of absorption (of water by fire). Actually, it is not the final opinion that the fire-form is subdued by the water-form, but as the fire is fourfold, so there is no need of admission of 'form'-conception here.10

The Buddhist proposition was 'the crystal is different in each stage' (aṇyāśca aṇyāśca). What is the meaning? If mere difference
is intended, then, it would be proving the proved. It is well-known that the crystal is different from the pot etc. and it need not be proved separately. If it is said that a certain crystal is different from another crystal, it would be same as before. If again it be said that this crystal is different from the previous crystal (in a stream), then, what is the exact serial position of that previous crystal, from which the latter is different? As a matter of fact, it being impossible to identify the exact position, the above statement can hardly make any sense. The discussion regarding pot etc., whether it is different or not from colour etc., admitted by both the parties, is permitted; but likewise the establishment of the present crystal as different from the previous crystal, is not admissible to both the parties. Now is it that the previous crystal is different, which is admitted by both the parties? Here the establishing probans (sādhana) will be futile. Is now the past crystal being established as different one after the present crystal is perceived? If the above is the case, then the difference of cold and hot cannot be the qualities of that crystal because these differences (hot, cold) are the qualities of the present crystal. Therefore, by no means the past crystal can be proved as different from the present crystal. If it be claimed that the same one becomes a different one, it would be simply a contradiction in terms. How can it be both same and different?

Is it the meaning of the proposition that the crystal is not the subject (ālambana) of the cognition of crystal, generated in
different times? There is no example in support of this. Do the Buddhists give the example of a lamp---a lamp which is not the subject of cognitions in different times, yet possesses the qualities of existence etc.? But here the example of the lamp would not be useful because the lamp exists through many moments. Therefore, it cannot be said that the lamp is not the subject of cognitions in different times. All things are like the lamp. It is also to be remembered here that without any cause of destruction, nothing is destroyed.

The Buddhists might say that there is no cause of destruction and therefore, a thing, destroyed now, is generated at once. But this statement would justify no alternative: There is no cause of destruction---is it equal to saying that destruction is non-existent or that destruction is eternal?

The Buddhists admit the absence of cause in two cases---eternity and non-existence. But the Naiyāyikas admit the absence of cause in the case of eternity only. If due to the absence of cause, destruction would be eternal, then, the production of a thing would not be possible and there would be co-existence of a produced thing (bhāva) with its destruction. Then, as there would be no conflict of existence with non-existence, there would be permanent existence.

Now, would the destruction be non-existing, then also, everything would become eternal, on account of the absence of the
destruction. Then again, as there would be no destruction, the cognition 'it is destroyed' would not occur. Is it now that the destruction is regarded as causeless for its eternality? But how is it known that the destruction is not destroyed? Is it that had the destruction been destroyed, the destroyed thing would have been produced again? It is not justified. There cannot be the production of the negation of destruction (vināśabāhāva), because that negation is produced by the destruction of that destruction (previous). But that a bhāva category, having cause is produced when the causes are all present. The destruction (here absolute negation) has cause, but it cannot be destroyed because it is a negation (absolute). It is the characteristic of a bhāva that that which has a cause can be destroyed. The case of negation is a little peculiar. A negation though causeless may be destroyed, as the prior negation and negation possessing a cause also cannot be destroyed, as the posterior negation.

Now there might arise a disputation. If the destruction is admitted as with cause (karanavat) then the producer would become the destroyer; i.e. the fire-contact which is the producer of the pākajas, would also be the destroyer of the previous pākajas. So it is seen that the producer might become the destroyer. Is it so? No. The Buddhists do not know the Kāśvadvīpa darśana (Vaiśeṣika). The Naiyāyikas never admit that the fire-contact, which produces the posterior pākajas, is the same as which
destroys the past pākajās. But after the fire-contact had destroyed the previous colour etc., then, the new colour etc. are produced. The previous qualities and posterior qualities are different. Hence there is no chance of the destroyer being a producer also. Again, an object which is a producer may also become a destroyer. The connection of water etc. produces the sprout and the same connection of water destroys that sprout. As it is an observed fact, it cannot be declared as false.

But if one tries to prove the difference by the above there will be objections. The Buddhists want to prove momentariness by the observation of the peculiarities (in the living bodies) and by the absence of the cause of destruction. They should be asked: What is the meaning of the word kṣanika when they say kṣanikāh saṃskārāḥ? If the word kṣanika means destructible (vināśin), it will be proving the proved. It is proved universally that everything which is kṣanika has destruction. If the word means instantly destructible (āśuvināśīn), then the qualification (visesana) would be contradictory to the established tenet (siddhānta). The qualification 'instantly' implies that there must be something which is not destroyed instantly, but destroyed after some time. In that case, the existence of durable things would be admitted. If then the word means 'that which is destroyed at once is produced', then also it would be like the previous. How? Is it meant thereby 'which is produced is destructible', or 'the produced is destroyed'? In the first,
it is proving the proved. Then, the moment of production and destruction would be the same. That is to say, the production of the unproduced would be same as the destruction of the unproduced. In the second, it will be proved that the destruction has cause as also the production has. Just as production being an action and being temporary has a cause so also should be destruction --- it must first get a cause of destruction and then it should be destroyed. If the destruction occurs without cause, then it will be an absurdity.

The word kṣaṇīka may be dissolved as that which has kṣava (kṣaṇa), by adding the matvarthīva suffix than. But that would not be possible, for the suffix cannot be justified because of difference of time. When there is kṣava, the object itself is not present, and what will possess the kṣava?

Now it may be said that a bhāva category as qualified by the immediately subsequent destruction is called momentary. This is also not possible. Because when the category is there the destruction is not there, and again, when the destruction is there the category is not there. How can one possess the other? Thus the matvarthīva will not be justified.

If a thing is called momentary for its existence only for a moment (kṣaṇa)? Does kṣaṇa mean sārvāntva kāla and which exists in that is momentary? It also is not correct. The term sārvāntva kāla is only a name; it does not indicate the existence of a
distinct entity.\textsuperscript{14}

The attribute \textit{ante} in \textit{ante viśeṣadārasanāt} has no use, because the meaning of the word \textit{anta} is not demonstrated. That is the particular serial position with reference to which the expression \textit{ante viśeṣadārasanāt} is used? If \textit{anta} means the destruction, then obviously there cannot be the 'observation of peculiarity'. If \textit{anta} means the final member of a thing, then it is illogical to say that \textit{viśeṣadārśana} occurs in one thing, and it becomes a contradictory probans. (Final member is different from the previous members of that thing and naturally it cannot be said that the peculiarity is observed in the same thing.)

Uddyotakara explains a Buddhist argument here.\textsuperscript{15} According to it, in the case of a thing like a lamp which is being carried away the production is seen in one place, and the destruction is seen in another place and because of those there are perception and non-perception of the thing. So it may be concluded that where there are perception and non-perception, there are production and destruction in every step. Now, by the above, it would be proved that as there are perception and non-perception (in one place, i.e. in the first moment the contact with a place is perceived, but in the next moment the contact with that place is not perceived) of Devadatta, who is moving, so his production and destruction in every moment also are to be admitted. But this is not right. Devadatta's perception and non-perception have another
cause, which is contact and separation. The spot from which the contact is destroyed, the contacted (samvogin) is not perceived there, and the spot in which the contact is produced, it is perceived there.

It cannot be argued here that there are no contact and separation, because the contact (and separation) have been proved already as a separate entity. So the perception and non-perception of a thing are due to the production of contact and separation, not due to any other factor.

'The production of the lamos in another place'--- this statement also is not intelligible. Why? Because a thing produced, according to the Buddhists, may be destroyed in any place. That which is about to come forth, without possessing any sanskāra, cannot be produced in another place. A thing is not produced in another place except its own specific self. If the Buddhists admit the cause as having some speciality, then an effect also will be produced having some speciality. But just as there can be no speciality in the effect so also there can be no speciality in the cause.

Momentariness has been sought to be proved by unequal falling also. In the case of the falling of stone etc., no hindrances, by which some of them fell quickly and some late. Hence for the momentariness it is to be admitted that there some such conditions are created, which have no power to produce the lower series (santāna), again some conditions are created, which have power to produce the lower series.
The above is the fruit of misconception. Among the things of similar weight, one has causes like weight, effort and throwing, another only weight and the other, weight and effort. In this way, the weighty things, being directed by the difference of the causes, fall down quickly or slowly and therefore 'unequal falling' (etulyapata) does not indicate momentariness.

The Buddhist has contended that "the non-apprehension of the causes for the production and destruction in the case of a momentary object is to be explained just like the non-apprehension of the causes for the destruction of milk and the production of curd."

Here Uddyotakara argues as follows. The destruction and production of the prototypes of a piece of crystal etc. are without causes, as in the case of milk and curd, but they are not so as in the case of jug, where there are causes --- there is no ground for this distinction.

The production and destruction of crystal are not perceived in every moment, and thus there should be no doubt about the crystal being with cause or without cause. It is like the case where if anybody says, without proper knowledge of the theory of words, 'krtakatvath anityah sabdah.' Therefore, as the dharmin is unproved, there is the absence of example. After assuming the production and destruction of the crystal tentatively, which is here the probans (sadhaka) -- by its tentative assumption there is no objection. Here the examples are both 'like milk and curd', and 'like jug etc.'. Here either the first or the second should be the
example. In this situation, the example of jug etc. should be given, because there are the causes of production and destruction seen. The example of milk and curd should not be given, because it is a case of inference.

Only the refutation against momentariness cannot prove non-momentariness. The proofs should be given in favour of non-momentariness. Now what is the proof? The proof is: *adhārādhevy-abhāvāt ekakālānubhāvinī kārvakārane kundebadaravat*, i.e. the cause and its effect, being related to each other by the relation of container and contained, must exist at the same time, just like the cup and the *badara* fruit in it.

Uddyotakara says that there are more reasons also by which it can be said of things, as non-momentary:

(i) The series of cognitions regarding the crystal, which are not simultaneous, must pertain to a single object, because, while being co-extensive with such cognitions of the thing as are not wrong, they are called by means of the same words. It is the same as the cognition of one thing appeared by several persons at the present one and the same moment. To explain: when several persons come to have cognitions in connection with the single present moment, these cognitions - being co-extensive with such cognitions of the thing as are not wrong, and also capable of being called by means of the same words - are found to pertain to a single object. In the same manner, the non-simultaneous cognitions in question also - being co-extensive with such cognitions of the thing as are
not wrong and capable of being spoken of by means of the same words—
must pertain to the same single object. This proves the continued
existence of single objects.

(ii) Secondly, the continued persistence of the soul can be
proved: The cognitions of each single soul cannot belong to
several agents. For, if they were so, no recognition or recollec-
tion should be possible. As for example the cognitions belonging
to Devadatta are not recognised or recollected by other diverse-
individuals, or the vice versa.

(iii) Thirdly, it also proves the continued persistence of the
soul. The cognitions of colour, taste, odour and touch must have
one as well as diverse causes, i.e. the one cause being the soul
and the diverse causes being, the eye, tongue, nose etc. respec-
ively. Those cognitions can be said of one cause because they are
all recognised as 'mine'—just like the cognitions of the present
single moment by several such persons as have entered into an
agreement with one another and as such form a single entity, in
the shape of the composite group of individuals.

(iv) Alike the above case, the cognitions of yesterday and
today, falling within a single contiguous series—have one as well
as diverse causes—because they are recalled as mine.

(v) The cognition of things described in the scriptures must
have one as well as diverse causes because they are recognised—
like the cognitions of several persons just referred to—and
also because there is no such recognition in the case of the several cognitions belonging to several agents just as shown before.
NOTES
Chapter Five

1. Momentariness is one of the famous doctrine of the Buddhists. Sarvam kṣanikam kṣanikam is one of the four sayings of the Lord Buddha. Taking this doctrine the Buddhist logicians and the Hindu logicians have spent pages after pages to prove their views. We meet this in the pages of Jñānaśrīmitranibandhāvalī (pp. 1-150), Nyāyabhūṣana (pp. 509-41), Āttatattvaviveka (1st chapter), and so on. The arguments for momentariness based on the technicalities of the terms arthakṛivākārītya, sahākārītya, kurvādrūpya, etc. on which the discussion in later times was mainly dependent, are absent in Uddvyotakara's discussion.

It is to be noted that logical arguments are equally strong on both sides, for momentariness and non-momentariness. But recognition (pratyavijñā) is an additional proof in favour of the thesis of non-momentariness.

2. Moment (ksana) means the minutest division of time and an object is called momentary because of its existence for that unit of time only, i.e. a thing is produced in the first moment and destroyed in the very next, which means that a thing, can at best be related with two moments only.
3. This argument is formulated thus: *pratikṣanam ārīram anvaccānyacca bhavati bāhvanaratvavabhede sati ante viśasadasanat pacvamānabhūmipāka javat apacvamānabhūmipāka javacca.*

   NV (Vide ND, p.823)

4. The opponent's contention was: Momentariness means the production - in a continuous stream of substance (i.e. the prototype of a substance) - of a 'completely new prototype' (apūrva) which appears after the 'complete destruction' (aśesa-nirodha) of the preceding prototype and has no connection (with the preceding one).

5. kārvakāraṇe skakālanubhavinī ādhārādhevabhāvāt kṣīram kunda varttate taccā kundakālamanaubhavati tathā ca kārayam kāraṇe varttate tasmāt tadapi kāraṇakālamanaubhavati.

   NV (Vide ND, p.827)

6. vāda kāraṇam vināsvati tadā kārayam utpadvate vināsvacca kāraṇam asti kāraṇavināsenābhinnakāla kārvotnādah.

   NV (Vide ND, p.828)

7. Cf. *vadāniruddhadhārmadhvaṇam tannāna vathā śītose etc.*

   Here we get one of the Buddhist arguments for the momentariness in *Sarvadarsānasamgraha* (p.94).

8. siddhāntam adhvyupatva tadvirodhi viruddhah. (NS I.i.i.5)
9. \textit{vādi avayāṇupraśvesām na pratipadyave kharānehośvaraṇātmaśakāni bhūtāni iti vyāhanyate.} \textit{NV (Vide ND, p.831)}

10. \textit{caturvīdhānca tejo bhavati - udbhūtarūnapārasam vathā āśītrāśmiḥ udbhūtarūnam anudbhūtapārasam vathā pradīpaścām udbhūrapārasam anudbhūtarūnapārasam vathā vāristhitam tejaḥ.} \textit{NV (Vide ND, p.833)}

11. How does the lamp exist in many moments? \textit{svakāraṇasaṭṭā-saṃbandhaḥ koṭh, saṃvyāhiṃvaktikālah, avayavakamkālah, saṃdānterāni viḥārahe kālah saṃdānterāni tatasvvyavaiṃvāsākālah tato dravyānāsāḥ.} \textit{NV (Vide ND, p.837)}

12. tada viśesānāṃ siddhāntavirodhi. \textit{NV (Vide ND, p.837)}

13. ata initihanau. \textit{AST V.ii.ii5)}

14. Cf. \textit{paṇcā bhikṣavah saṃjñābhedamātram iti sastram. na hi saṃjñāmātram vastuviśesānatvena vyuktaṃ. kṣetā iti ca pratiṇāṃ krtvā na drṣṭānto'sti ityuktam pradīpādarasiddhātvāt.} \textit{NV (Vide ND, p.838)}

15. \textit{vop'pyavaḥ heturdarśanādārśanād iti...} \textit{NV (Vide ND, p.844)}