CHAPTER-I

Historical Background

Indonesia is emerging as one of the closest partners of India in the post-Cold War era. The Ramayana and the Mahabharata, along with numerous folklores, stories and myths depict the inalienable relationship. The geo-political realities that the two countries share common maritime boundaries, and common cultural background attract the attention of both towards each other. With a population of more than two hundred million and one of the most fertile, and resourceful area, Indonesia is richly endowed by nature. Indonesia is the largest and most populous country of Southeast Asia and it is situated at the distance of 92 nautical miles from the Indian island of Andamans. Its strategic location on the shores of Indian and Pacific as well commonalities with India makes it natural partner of India. On the other hand, for India’s efforts to establish closer relationship with Southeast Asian countries especially after adopting “Look East Policy”, ties with Indonesia are given special attention.

If we analyse the history of India - Indonesia relations, we find that India had special liking for Indonesia on the eve of independence. India, under the leadership of Jawaharlal Nehru took personal interests in expressing solidarity with Indonesians in opposing the Colonial oppression. The Congress party passed resolutions in favour of the

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decolonization of Indonesia. It tried to present a common front against the colonial rulers. The Indonesian leaders felt inspired by the anti-colonial views of Rabindranath Tagore, Mahatma Gandhi, and Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel. Sukarno himself had acknowledged it and mentioned about the wisdom of freedom fighters of India and support to Indonesian freedom struggle while delivering his long speech before the Constituent Assembly in 1945.¹

As both countries suffered colonial suppression for long and realized the importance of self-governance and freedom, they displayed solidarity with one another. The interwar period saw the intensification of the nationalist struggle and the consequent repression by the colonial authorities in both countries. When the World War II was over, the two most popular leaders of Indonesia, Sukarno and Hatta, proclaimed independence on 17 August 1945.

However, the Dutch who ruled over Indonesia for more than three hundred years could not reconcile themselves to the prospect of losing a vast revenue generating colony in the Indies. The Dutch did not have any other significant possession to claim itself as colonial master. They tried to come back to establish their foothold over the archipelago with the support of Great Britain. Indian National Congress opposed British moves by expressing its resentment over the use of Indian resources, both human and economic against Indonesia and favoured the crusade for decolonisation. Jawaharlal Nehru said: “We must insist that no Indian troop is used against the

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government of the Indonesian Republic and that no material of war is sent from India to help the Dutch government. We must help Indonesians wherever we can." While expressing strong solidarity with Indonesians he stated "I should like to convey Dr. Sukarno that if I can be of any service to the cause of Indonesian freedom, I shall gladly visit Java in spite of the urgent and important work in India".

The Central legislative Assembly of India also passed a resolution against permitting the use of Indian troops in Indonesia. After a great uproar in the Assembly, one of its members, Divan Chaman Lal said: There could not be anything more shameful and disgraceful in the history of this country and in the action of this Government than to permit Indian troops to be utilized for this purpose. Another member, Sarat Chandra Bose stated: "India today, does not want to dip her hands in her Neighbor's blood", demanded that every Indian seaman and soldier in the British troops be withdrawn from Indonesia. Indian Central Legislative assembly passed a motion of censure against the government for its failure to instruct its delegate to the United Nations to convey to the

4. The Manchester Guardian, October 16, 1945
8. Ibid., p 75.
Security Council of her strong view concerning Anglo-Dutch operations against Indonesia. Following the formation of an interim government in India in September 1946, India withdrew its troops working for the British army in Indonesia the Dutch in October 1946. Subsequently under the collective pressure of India, the Soviet and the British diplomats, entered into negotiations with the Indonesian leaders. These negotiations finally resulted in a ceasefire agreement and the initiating of the Linggadjati Agreement, which was concluded on 27th March 1947.

Following the withdrawal of Indian troops from Indonesian soil, Indian government recognized Indonesia diplomatically and consequently invited the Indonesian representative for the Asian Conference which was organized by the Indian Council of World Affairs in Delhi from 23rd March to 2nd April 1947. This was one of the far-sighted step and an important landmark in the history of the Asian nations fighting for the freedom. This Conference provided a common platform for Asian countries to share their common concern on the aspects of development. In his inaugural address at the Asian Relations Conference, Nehru asserted: “The countries of Asia can no longer

10. See the text of Linggardjati Agreement, Jakarta, 27 March 1947.
be used as pawns by others; they are bound to have their own policies in world affairs."

Nehru emphasized about India's future role in Afro-Asian world and emphasized its strategic importance by emphasizing the proximity with Southeast Asia. Indonesia also reciprocated similar views and in the closing ceremony S. Sjahrir extended warm thanks to India particularly for the great moral and material support it extended in the freedom struggle of Indonesia.

The Dutch however, could not reconcile losing its strong grip over the republic and just after four months of the signing of Linggardjati Agreement, they again launched a 'police action' against Indonesia on 21 July 1947, which was nothing but an armed military action. The police action of the Dutch aroused strong emotions in India too. India reacted very sharply against the stubborn nature of the Dutch, which was reflected in Indian newspapers. The Indian media condemned the Dutch for starting armed hostilities in the archipelago. On its part, in a press release the Indian government, on 22 July 1947 stated that it felt great concern at the resumption of hostilities. It also said that urgent representations had been made to the British and the American governments to make every effort to bring about an immediate cessation of the armed conflict and the resumption of negotiations to settle the disputes. Nehru, then Vice President of the

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12. Ibid, p. 54
Interim Government and Member of Foreign Affairs stated: "India has been and is especially interested in the freedom of the peoples of Asia, having suffered greatly in the past from foreign domination and exploitation, is determined to end it. Any attack on the freedom of the people in any part of Asia affects the rest of this great continent. The mere presence of the colonial regime or of foreign troops in any Asian country is an insult and challenge to Asia.\textsuperscript{14}

The Indian Government announced its decision to terminate Dutch air services flying over India on 28 July 1947. Explaining this decision, Jawaharlal Nehru said he was sure that air-traffic "did take big guns and things like that" and that it might have taken officers to Indonesia.\textsuperscript{15}

Not only the governmental side showed friendly gesture to Indonesia but the people of India also demonstrated their solidarity with the Indonesians and its support for them in various ways. On 22 July 1947, Biju Patnayak, a member of the Orissa Legislative Assembly, helped Sjahrir, the former Prime Minister of Indonesia, to escape from Indonesia by piloting in a Dakota which successfully flew over the Dutch blockade. On 24\textsuperscript{th} August 1947, in response to an urgent request from the Indonesian Red Cross, the Indian Red Cross dispatched a medical mission with various life aid supplies to Indonesia.\textsuperscript{16}

\textsuperscript{14.} The Statesman, 29 July, 1947.
\textsuperscript{15.} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{16.} The Statesman, 24 August, 1947.
On 31 July 1947, the Indian doctors opposed a Dutch Cargo Vessel, the Lombok, which berthed at Bombay port to load 300 military lorries consigned for the Dutch, with hostile shouts.\textsuperscript{17}

As a committed friend, India took the Indonesian case to the United Nations and extended full support to Indonesia. Indeed, this was the first chance after India became independent that it took up the cause of decolonisation of Indonesia and demonstrated forcefully her policy of anti-colonialism and Asian solidarity.\textsuperscript{18} It was the first Indian effort to internationalize the issue of Indonesia’s independence. On 30 July 1947, the Indian government instructed its permanent representative at the UN to draw the attention of Security Council on the situation in Indonesia immediately. On the same day, the Indian representative B.R. Sen. forwarded a letter by Nehru to the UN Secretary General which stated that the Dutch had embarked without warning on large-scale military action when a delegation of the Indonesian leaders were actually at Batavia for negotiations with the Dutch authorities for transfer of power.\textsuperscript{19} Indian government maintained that the present situation endangers the maintenance of international peace and therefore it requested the Security Council to take necessary action in the framework of the UN Charter to ease the crisis.\textsuperscript{20}

\textsuperscript{17} The Times (London), 25 August, 1947
\textsuperscript{18} Ton That Thien, India and Southeast Asia 1947-1960, Geneva, 1963, p.92
\textsuperscript{19} The Times of India, 31 July 1947
In yet another instance; Mr. C.S. Jha, Indian native at the UN called upon the Security Council to ask both the parties, the Netherlands and Indonesia to revert to the original position, which they held when the hostilities broke out. C.S. Jha was univocal in expressing support and solidarity for Indonesia at the 171st General Meeting of the UN Security Council.\(^\text{21}\) "He clearly stated that the dispute with which we are dealing today threatens the peace and security of Southeast Asia."\(^\text{22}\)

Australia also supported Indonesia at this juncture. It worked in close cooperation with Indians for the cause of Indonesian independence. This joint effort proved very effective. The Security Council on 1 August 1947 adopted a resolution calling on both the parties—the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia, to stop hostilities forthwith, to settle their dispute by arbitration or by other peaceful means and keep the Security Council abreast about the progress of the settlement.\(^\text{23}\) The Indian representative, Mr. Raman Pillai, in the 192nd meeting of the Security Council, on 22 August, 1947 warned, "No European country has any business to use its army in Asia. The fact that foreign armies are functioning on Asian soil is itself an outrage against Asian sentiments.\(^\text{21}\)


The fact that they are bombing defenseless people is also scandalous. If other members of the UN tolerate this or remain inactive, then the UN would cease to exist. Elo elsewhere in the same debate he said, "Events in Indonesia, which is in the heart of Southeast Asia, are being felt by the rest of Asia and one of surest ways of defeating the objectives of the UN would be the refusal of justice to Indonesia." And he questioned the Security Council's competence to deal with the Indonesian question, "as a prelude for a renewed offensive" against the Republic.

The Indonesian delegate requested the council to set up two commissions, one for supervising the implementation of the cease-fire, and another to settle all points of dispute between parties by mediation or arbitration. At the 193rd meeting of the Security Council India supported the Indonesian request on both counts. India took the credit for setting up of a consular commission on 25 August 1947, and of Committee of Good offices on 1 November 1947. The Indonesian leaders were very worried due to the refusal of the Dutch forces to go back to their previous positions, and the prospects of a Dutch sponsored Federal Government of Indonesia, both highly unacceptable by the Indonesians. The Indian representative at the UN gave unreserved support to the Republic on both these points.

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However, the unsettled problems continued to be debated but the negotiations between the Dutch and the Republican leaders broke down on 23 July 1948. The Dutch resolve the set up a Federal government of Indonesia on its own by 1 January 1949, caused further deterioration of the situation in Indonesia.

The Dutch initiated their second “police action” on 18 December 1948. The leaders of the Indonesian republic regarded this action prejudicial to the existence of an independent Indonesian republic. The next day, the Dutch army detained all the Indonesian leaders including President Sukarno, Vice President Hatta and six other members of the Indonesian government. Indian Prime Minister Nehru reacted sharply: “The action has been started by the Dutch but I may warn them that they will not be able to achieve their objectives. The days of imperialism are over, because no imperialist power can stay in Asia.” Warning about the consequences of the Dutch action, he further said: “The police action of the Dutch will have serious repercussions in India, in Asia and perhaps in some other countries to. Though we cannot give Indonesian Republic an effective aid, we cannot remain idle spectators.”

In January 1949 India hosted a conference on Indonesia. Prime Minister Nehru sought to turn the Indonesian issue into a Pan-Asian issue. In his inaugural speech, he described the Dutch action as a “challenge to newly-awakened Asia”.

28. The Hindu, 21 December 1948, Nehru made this statement at the closing session of Indian national Congress at Gandhi Nagar, Jaipur, on 19 December 1948.
Describing the developments of the past three years, he said: “It is a long story of broken pledges and continuous attempt to undermine and break the Republic of Indonesia”. Commenting on the rough treatment meted out to the Indonesian leaders, he said, “even the dulled and jaded conscience of the world reacted to this with shock and amazement.” He pointed out the urgency of the matter and said, “The situation in Indonesia is full of dangerous possibilities and requires urgent action.”

Later Nehru said that the conference on Indonesia was aimed at:

A. drawing a proposal for the Security Council that would restore peace in Indonesia,

B. to suggest the action that the Security Council should take if either party failed to act accordingly to its recommendation.

C. To devise machinery and procedures by which the Governments represented can keep in touch with one another for the purposes of mutual consultation and concerted action.

On January 23, the Conference passed seven resolutions and forwarded it to the Security Council:

1. the freedom should be restored to all Republic leaders and all political prisoners in Indonesia,

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29 For the full text of the Speech, see Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s Foreign Policy, Selected Speeches, September 1946 April 1961, Delhi, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting 1961, pp.407-11
2. an interim government should be made comprising representatives of the Republic and representatives of the territories of Indonesia before 15 March, 1949
2. the Republican government should be enabled to function freely,
3. the Interim government should enjoy full powers of government and the Dutch forces should be withdrawn from Indonesia
4. the freedom of the Interim government in internal affairs should be determined in consultation of the Indonesian Government, the Netherlands Government, the Good Offices Committee and anybody appointed by the Security Council.
5. election for a Constituent Assembly of Indonesia should be held before 1 October 1949
6. the state power should be completely transferred to Indonesia by 1 January 1950; the relations of Indonesia with the Netherlands should be determined by negotiations with the latter.\textsuperscript{30}

The resolutions of the Conference were transmitted to the Security Council on January 23 by Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru with a set of speeches delivered at the Conference with the comment that they “bear witness to the strength of the feeling among the participating governments about the Dutch action in Indonesia” and the request that the council give “due weight” to these resolutions. Nehru also added “effective action by

\textsuperscript{30} For the full texts of the resolutions, see Record of Lok Sabha Debate, January 29, 1949.
the council to bring this situation to an end is overdue". 31

There was positive development in the UN Security Council. The attitude of US also changed after the stern action taken by the Indonesian leadership against the communist rebellion in September – December 1948. An urgent Security Council meeting was held to discuss the Indonesian situation on 22 December 1948 on the special request of the USA. The Indian delegate, M.J. Desai, expressed his government’s concern at the developments in Indonesia and stressed that a just, honorable and peaceful settlement of the Indonesian question was necessary for the maintenance of peace and tranquility not only in Indonesia but in the whole of Southeast Asia. He charged that the Dutch attack was "entirely unprovoked and uncalled for" and was "in flagrant breach of the truce agreement. He commended the conciliatory attitude adopted in the negotiations by the Indonesian leaders and put the entire blame for deterioration in the situation on the Dutch. He urged the Security Council to act ‘immediately, decisively and effectively’ and called for an immediate ceasefire, withdrawal of Dutch forces to the positions as fixed by the truce agreement, and the release of the Indonesian leaders.

The Dutch, observing the changing attitudes of the US and the UK, and the growing resistance in the Indies, decided to stop military action and resume negotiations

31 For the full texts of the resolutions, see ‘Record of Lok Sabha Debate, January 29, 1949
with the Indonesian leaders in April. There was Round Table Conference in Hague in August 1949 for the Dutch-Indonesian Agreement for transfer of power on 1 November 1949. Indonesia became a fully sovereign state on 27 December 1949.

As India always kept herself active in internationalizing Indonesian cause and even extended material support against the Dutch, their efforts created a reservoir of goodwill which ultimately yielded into a treaty of “perpetual peace and unalterable friendship” between India and Indonesia on 3 March 1951. After having done away with European colonialism, the two countries had embarked on, as President Sukarno put it, the policy of intensifying the cordial relations of the past for the benefit of both India and Indonesia. Being a confirmation of the expectations aroused during the struggle for freedom, thus, the treaty provided a framework in which these could be fulfilled.

As the peace was established in Indonesia, a new thrust was given to strengthening the bilateral relationship between India and Indonesia. They entered into a number of agreement, in various fields, namely military, trade and culture. The agreements in the realm of security included:

1. Treaty with the Air Forces on 28 February 1956
2. Treaty with the Navy on 3 December 1958
3. Treaty with the Army on 3 June 1960.

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There were exchanges of goodwill delegations at the highest levels. Stationing of special Indian air missions in Indonesia for improving and reorganizing the Indonesian Air Force (AURI), offer of training facilities to Indonesian officers and cadres belonging to different services in various Indian institutions, exchanges of pilots and officers, sale, loan or exchange of equipment, etc, were among the major highlights of bilateral cooperation in the defense and security fields.

Bilateral relations in the trade and cultural fields, however, was not so comprehensive.33 The framework for cooperation in these fields were provided by a Trade Agreement signed on 20th January 1951 and a Cultural Agreement on 29 December 1955. The process of bilateral trade was resumed as early in August 1946 when a steamship Empire Favour carrying Indonesian rice load of 6,000 tons reached Cochin port (India) to deliver its cargo. The follow up action following the Trade Agreement, however, did not show an appreciable increase. During the nineteen sixties, India’s exports to and imports from Indonesia reached only once or twice the level of one percent of her total world trade. Obviously, the two countries showed reluctance to change the direction of their trade. Moreover, certain Indian imports like copra, rubber and palm oil being competitive in nature, India went in for markets like Ceylon and Singapore where these were cheaper. Hence the disturbing trend of Indonesia’s adverse balance of trade began.

Both the governments had strongly emphasized many cultural programmes to be

33 The Journal of Industry and Trade, (New Delhi), Vo,12, No.11, November 1962
carried out in future, but the implementation of Cultural Agreement left many things unfulfilled. Many of its provisions relating to establishment of educational centres, cultural societies, Chairs in Universities remained unimplemented. Article X of the Agreement called upon the two Governments to set up a special commission for “supervising the work of the Agreement” for advising the Government concerned on details of implementing the Agreement and for suggesting “possible improvements”. The two governments were also to hold joint consultations in not less than once in three years to coordinate the working of the Agreement. On the basis of the available records, it could be contended that neither such machinery was brought into existence nor any triennial consultations were held. Under the Colombo Plan for Cooperative Economic Development in South and Southeast Asia, the number of Indian experts and training places as provided to Indonesia was ranked below than what it had expected. Indonesia offered two scholarships for Indian students but was not sufficient. The slow progress achieved in the field of cultural cooperation reflected a lack of will on the part of two countries to contribute meaningfully to the shared cultural heritage of the past.

Notable constraints in developing relations of the two countries were divergent thinking of Prime Minister Nehru and President Sukarno after 1955. The allegations of “Big-Brother attitude” the role of Indians in Indonesia, the nature of emerging political system and the attitudes toward each other’s foreign policy became too sharply divided.

34. For the details of the 10 Year Cultural Agreement, see Foreign Affairs Record Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi Vol.1 No 12 December 1955, pp.246-7.
35. By 1961, out of a total of 169 Indian experts, only 3 went to Indonesia, Indonesia’s share in the training places offered to the Colombo Plan countries was only 5, out of total Indian contribution of 1,694. See the tenth Annual Report of the Consultative Committee of the Colombo Plan (Kuala Lumpur, November 1961) pp. 221-2.
Being a charismatic leader of Indonesia, Sukarno harbored a notion that he would remain the President of Indonesia for life.

Indonesian Parliament struggled with the implementation of the constitution for secular ideology but it was sharply divided on the communal line. Apart from religious issues another force which was emerging during this period was communism. Backed by the Peoples’ Republic of China with full consent of Sukarno, the emerging development irked the religious sentiments of the Islamists. All these factors had cumulative impact one the Indo-Indonesian relations with indications of the deteriorating trends.

Earlier during 1960s there was deterioration in the Indo-Indonesian relations. Prime Minister and Indira Gandhi being an exponent of socialism adopted the pro-USSR policy. The socialist orientation also manifested into a foreign policy which was more concentrated in cultivating relationships with the socialist block led by Soviet Union. For the first time radical views of Indonesia’s foreign policy reflected when Sukarno addressed the UN General Assembly on 30th September 1960. Its importance lay in the fact that it constituted the ideological basis of Indonesia’s foreign policy. There were two major components of Sukarno’s speech. These related to the principal source of international conflict and his call for restructuring of the UN. While explaining his perception of the new world balance of power, he divided the world into two categories—the new emerging forces demanding freedom, equality and justice and the “old established forces” resisting these efforts and maintained to keep the status quo. The former category, according to him, included the socialist countries and newly independent countries of Asia and Africa and the latter category, the West European countries and the United States, and between these two groups, he emphasized, conflict
was inevitable. It was inevitable because western colonialism and imperialism will not yield ground and permit a meaningful role by the “new emerging forces” in the international system without a fight.37

Sukarno’s ideological formulation was different to Nehru’s approach. Nehru was fully aware of the continued existence of some colonial pockets in Asia and Africa and wanted their early freedom and independence. But, according to him, “the basic problem of all” was the necessity to preserve “peace” in the world. “Without peace”, he said, “all our dreams vanish and are reduced to ashes.” He believed that the danger to peace arose from the conflict between the two super powers on various issues like disarmament, Germany, West Berlin and Congo.

Sukarno wanted restructuring of the UN in the revolutionary dichotomy of the “new emerging forces” and the “old established forces” with inevitability of conflict as a necessary concomitant of it. Nehru believed that such an ideology would rather aggravate cold war tensions and threaten world peace. The differing perceptions of India and Indonesia reflected openly in the Conference of Non-aligned countries in Belgrade in September 1961. Participated by heads of states of twenty five countries and observers from three others, this conference provided the first ever opportunity to the leaders of India and Indonesia to express their differences openly. President Sukarno found this as a great opportunity to emerge as an

ideologue and utilized this opportunity to still further explain his ideas outlined in his address to the UN General Assembly. He refused to believe that the real source of international tension and strife is ideological conflict and asserted: "In every single case, the cause, the root of international tension, is imperialism and colonialism and the forcible division of nations". For him, different social system can coexist, but there can be no coexistence between independence and justice on one side and imperialism-colonialism on the other. This was the essence of his doctrine and the "old established forces". Sukarno also pleaded for overhauling of the structure of the UN in order to suit the present day realities. To ensure that the world body did not "become the instrument of any power block", he urged that the new emerging forces should get adequate recognition there so that they can exert influence in the world forums where major world problems are considered.

However, President Sukarno's worldview was not attuned to Nehru who viewed that the international community was facing problems of peace. The further deterioration caused by the Soviet resumption of nuclear tests on 30 August 1961 called for urgent attention, if the impending world war was to be saved. Thus, in the course of his speech at the Non-Aligned Conference, Nehru urged all to realize the gravity of the situation and sought priority for his own line of thinking which was different from that of Sukarno.38 Nehru asserted, "Therefore it becomes inevitable for us to pay attention to make sure that the dominant note of our thinking and action and what we say and put down is this crisis that confront

38 Ibid
humanity”. He wanted all to see things in the proper perspective and categorically declared, First things must come first, and nothing is more important or has more priority than situation of war and peace. He was fully aware of the vice of colonialism still existing in certain places in Asia and Africa. But in the face of imminent threat to world peace, he was rather averse to discussing any other issue except that of war and peace. “What is the use of discussing Tunisia, Algeria, etc., if neither the colonies nor the imperialists would exist any longer”. Nehru thus refused to accept Sukarno’s thesis that colonialism and imperialism were the root cause of the world tension. He instead attributed to the prevailing cold war which enabled colonialism to hang on a few pockets and it was this cold war that needed most to be defused through the efforts of the non-aligned countries. He showed a difference of approach compared to Sukarno on various important issues, such as those relating to Germany and West Berlin, disarmament and the United Nations. Although he shared Sukarno’s views on the necessity of “a change in the structure” of the United Nations he reminded all the importance of the “balance of power in the world on which the present international system existed and which the UN cannot easily ignore....” On Sukarno’s demand for “active” participation by non-aligned countries in the disarmament parleys, Nehru told the gathering of their limitations by saying “we don’t control the strings of the world”. Nehru also omitted any reference in his speech to Sukarno’s urgent call for convening a second Asia-African Conference of the Bandung type.39

39. ibid. pp.107-19
The differences between India and Indonesia were publicly voiced by Ruslan Abdulgani, a member of the Indonesian delegation. He said: "We (Indonesia)......believe that actually at this very moment there is no nuclear war as yet. However, in a colonial war, like in Angola, Algeria, Tunisia, etc, ordinary bombs alone can kill numerous Asians and Africans. Of course, we do not close our eyes to the danger of a nuclear war but neither could it be accepted that colonialism is not a major issue. I can understand the India frame of mind has developed within the perview of its relations with Britain and the Common-Wealth, and it is different from Indonesia, Indo-China, Tunisia, Algeria, Angola, etc as they experienced different colonial rulers.\[^{40}\]

Thus different perception which reflected at the Belgrade Conference proved a source of tension and ill will between them in the following years. This led to deterioration in India-Indonesia relations. During the early 1960s the communists in Indonesia started reflecting its ideology in the politics of the country. Sukarno lost control over PKI leaders, which ultimately led to 1965 pustache.

India’s attitude towards Indonesian efforts to recover West Irian from the Dutch was positive. It supported Indonesian claims over West Irian consistently. While speaking in the Rajya Sabha on 12 December 1957 Nehru emphasized the Indonesian claim to West Irian as right and legitimate.

\[^{40}\] Antara (Indonesian News Agency), 4 September 1961, and Harian Rakjat, 5 December, 1961, Ruslan Abdulgani, Minister and Vice-Chairman of the Supreme Advisory Council of Indonesia.
He supported every proposal which called upon the Dutch and the Indonesians to resume negotiations for a settlement. He was, however, sorry for the use of mob violence against the Dutch and their property in Indonesia as it was against the non-violence norms. In a similar statement in the Lok Sabha on 17 December 1957, Nehru viewed the anti-Dutch activities in Indonesia with concern and suggested "that is always better, it is always desirable to settle these matters peacefully by negotiation, even through that might take some more time".

However, the attitude of India was misunderstood by Indonesian government. The context of moderation and a peaceful approach created misunderstanding and misgivings in Indonesia which were expressed at different times by various Indonesian leaders. Former Prime Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo and former Defence Minister General Abdul Haris Nasution while commenting on the attitude of V.K. Krishna Menon, Indian Defence Minister was critical. In 1951 Ali Sastroamidjojo stated that India had lost her zeal on the West Irian issue. Similarly, while explaining his impressions of visit to India and Pakistan on way back home from Moscow in January 1961, General Nasution told that "frankly speaking, President Ayub Khan’s support to our struggle (for West Irian) was more spontaneous" than Jawaharlal Nehru. He appreciated the diplomatic support given by the non-aligned countries including India and the UAR, but he stressed that the Soviet support was stronger.

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41. India, Rajya Sabha Debates (New Delhi: Rajya Sabha Secretariat, 1957), vol. 19, pt 1, 12 December 1957, Col. 2347
42. India, Lok Sabha Debates, Series 2, vol. 10, No 10, 17 December 1957, Cols.5880-1
43. Interview by Dr. B.D. Arora, Jawaharlal Nehru University, Jakarta, 24 September 1969, in India-Indonesia Relations, New Delhi, 1981.
Meanwhile Indonesia continued to create forceful pressures against the Dutch, such as the expulsion of the Dutch nationals, nationalization and expropriation of the Dutch property, etc. and hence the relations between Indonesia and the Netherlands considerably deteriorated. On 30 March 1960 the Dutch announced the dispatch of their aircraft carrier “Karel Doorman” to the West Irian and started rushing reinforcements in men and arms. In April they initiated the moves to prepare the Papuans (the West Irianese) for eventual self-determination. It was a clearly designed scheme to ensure that Indonesia shall be denied West Irian.45

Irritated by the Dutch maneuvers, President Sukarno announced severance of diplomatic relations with the Netherlands on 17 August 1961. He also reiterated his Government’s continued Policy of confrontation in every field against the Dutch.46

However, in the midst of these growing tensions, India took up Indonesia’s cause against the Dutch at the UN. While speaking in the UN General Assembly on 20 November 1961, Krishna Menon, the Indian Defense Minister refused to agree to the Dutch Resolution of 9 December 1961 (Calling upon the UN to appoint a commission for West Irian) stating that this means that the question of sovereignty............is in dispute. He categorically asserted that West Irian, so far as the Government of India is concerned, is an integral part of Indonesia.46

44 Written replies by Gen. Abdul Haris Nasution, Chairman of the MPRS (Majelis Permusjawaratan Rakyat Sementara (Provisional People’s Congress) Jakarta, 15 November 1969, in response to a questionnaire submitted Dr. B.D. Arora, JNU, New Delhi. During his visit to Indonesia.
46 In a role call on the Indian draft resolution, 41 voted in favour, 40 against and 21 abstained. See GAOR Session 16, plen. mtg. 1066, 27 September 1961, pp 875-7.
Seven days later, India’s Permanent Representative at the UN, C.S. Jha, criticized the Dutch Resolution (it was submitted earlier by Krishna Menon and called upon the two parties to cooperate and resume negotiations for a peaceful settlement of the dispute). Nevertheless, there was a deadlock and despite all efforts, the Indian draft resolution failed to muster two thirds majority.

On 18 December 1961 India took action against the Portuguese colonization and liberated Goa. This had significant impact on Indonesia. Only a day after India’s action in Goa, President Sukarno announced a three-point plan (TRIKORA), for the liberation of West Irian. This was followed by general mobilization, air dropping of Indonesian volunteers in the West Irian territory, and clashes with the Dutch. In January 1962 there was a naval skirmish in which an Indonesian ship was sunk.

After a month, as the US changed its stance and exerted pressures against the Dutch. The Dutch melted down from their rigid posture and came out with negotiations with the Indonesians under the UN auspices. These negotiations ultimately resulted in the conclusion of Indonesian-Dutch agreement in New York on 15 August 1962, providing for the transfer of West Irian to Indonesia. Both the press and the government in India hailed the New York Agreement on West Irian and offered congratulations to the two countries, Indonesia and the Netherlands. In a statement on 22 August 1962, Prime Minister Nehru considered it a “matter of good augury for the peace of Southeast Asia”

and expressed the hope that there will be peace in the region of which, in a sense, India is a part. While speaking at the UN General Assembly on 21 September 1962, Defense Minister Krishna Menon offered his good wishes to the two Governments, recalled the last phase of the Indonesian struggle for independence and said: Since then, our position has been that Indonesian is one and sovereign, and we have repeated that year after year in this Assembly. India, however, was against military adventurism against the Dutch, who had demonstrated its powers by sinking an Indonesian ship and by swiftly rounding up the air dropped Indonesian volunteers in the West Irian territory. But the Indonesian leadership was unhappy with Indian postures and blamed India for half-hearted support on the question of West Irian issue.

After three weeks of the resolution of the West Irian dispute, an incident occurred in Jakarta which soured India-Indonesia relations. On 3 September 1962, a mob of 20,000 Indonesians demonstrated at the Indian Embassy in Jakarta and badly damaged the building of the Indian Embassy by hauling down the Indian flag. The pent up anger among Indonesian youth reflected the next day when thousands of them jeered on the Indian athletes participating in the Fourth Asian Games and continued their hooting during /


the signing of India's national anthem. The immediate and spontaneous provocation arose from a statement by Mr. G.D. Sondhi, the then Senior Vice President of the Asian Games Federation. In pursuance of the decision taken earlier by the Games Executive Committee, he called for the use of another name for the Games being held in Jakarta. He attributed it to non-participation in the Games by the athletes from Israel and Taiwan who had been refused visas by the Government of Indonesia. Incidentally because Sondhi was an Indian, the Indonesian reactions had a significant bearing on the two countries relations. The fact that he was in no way representing the opinion of India government and was simply ignored. The Indian Government even tried to de-link itself from Sondhi's statement, but the tensions continued.

The first official reaction to Sondhi's statement came from Suharto, the then Indonesian Trade Minister. In a statement on 31 August 1962, Mr. Suharto said that Sondhi's attitude is deeply regrettable and will adversely affect our stand towards the Indian government and the people in the future." He also disclosed the instructions he had issued to all key government officials: Pending further developments around Mr. Sondhi's activities, you are all instructed to refrain from entering into new trade relations with India because such relations will become an object of criticism by society.51

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50. The Hindustan Times, 4 September 1962 and the Statesman and the Hindu, 5 September 1962. The Indonesian Herald gave the number of demonstrating as 5,000.
51. The Indonesian Herald, Indonesian Observer, Harian Rakyat, the Hindu, 1st September 1962.
The entire Indonesian Press, which was vehemently criticizing Sondhi, took the cue from Suharto’s statement and started bracketing Sondhi with India. A correspondent of the PKI daily, Harian Rakjat went to the extent to say that Sondhi’s attitude not only showed lack of friendship towards Indonesia, but also was a stab in the back of Indonesia.

This insensible remark came from a minister severing all the cultural and strategic links with India at one go. It deeply hurt Indian sentiments. The government and people of India felt agonized at the developments in Indonesia. The Government’s reaction was one of shock and surprise. In a statement in the Lok Sabha on 4 September 1962 Prime Minister Nehru said, it is highly deplorable that this kind of thing should happen. Indirectly charging the Indonesian authorities with complicity in rousing mass hysteria against India, he said that they encouraged the attack on the Indian Embassy in this way is extremely distressing and deplorable as also the statement made by the Trade Minister. He also expressed his fears that some people had instigated the Indonesians against India, although he refused to identify them saying they are behind the scenes.

Although highly agonized of developments in Indonesia and compelling reasons for review of relations, the government played it cool. It sent a protest note and asked Indonesia to desist from displaying such unfriendly acts. At this stage, Sukarno’s militant ideology had begun to influence Indonesian foreign policy. Clearly, the two countries’
priorities were distinctly divergent on the one hand, India showed eagerness to give priority to business, trade, and culture on the other hand, Indonesian attached importance to political and foreign policy matters. Keeping in view India’s well-known attitude towards the Indonesians, and in the light of differences between Prime Minister Nehru and President Sukarno, conflicts were inevitable.

When China attacked Indian territory on 20 October 1962, Indonesia was lukewarm in extending support. When India’s Minister of State for External Affairs, Mrs. Lakshmi N. Menon visited Indonesia on 30 November 1962 she did not find friendly atmosphere. Again during the six nation conference in Colombo on 10-12 December 1962, Indonesia adopted an attitude of treating both India and China at par, refused to pass judgement on the rightness or wrongness of China’s armed invasion on India and sought only points of concurrence between the two parties in order to arrange a peaceful settlement of the dispute. At the six-power Colombo Conference, Indonesian Foreign Minister, Dr. Subandrio refused to agree to UAR representative in Ali Sabry’s contention that, “there must not be any military operation for territorial gains. Subandrio simply suggested a proposal for settlement without touching on the substance of the conflict, who is the aggressor and who is the expansionist. Indonesian attitudes caused serious disappointment in India. In course of his Republic Day address in Jakarta on 27 January 1963, the Indian Ambassador, A.B. Pant, expressed this sense of disappointment

54. Ibid.
in these words, “If a friend doesn’t help you when you are in danger what is the worth of such a friendship.”  

Apart from reminding Indonesian leadership of India’s contribution in Indonesian freedom struggle, A.B. Pant tried to arouse the feeling of friendship for India, by suggesting to them the worth of a friend in need. But Indonesia had by then adopted a different course.

In the following months Indonesia’s lukewarm attitudes on the Sino-Indian border dispute changed into a clear-cut pro-China. In the joint statement issued in Jakarta during President Liu Shaochi’s visit to Indonesia in April 1963 Indonesia expressed solidarity with China against India.  

On the other hand, China supported Indonesia on question of rush Malaysia. India and Indonesia had adopted different approaches on the question of Malaysia.  

In April 1962, Mrs. Lakshmi N. Menon had observed that the emergence of Malaysia was a welcome proposal. She expressed the hope that endeavours to form this unit would be a success. Prime Minister Nehru also gave the same impression to Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew in April 1962. at a Press Conference in New Delhi on 25 April, the Singaporean leader said that “Nehru understood my point of view very well and expressed sympathy with my view that this (Malaysia) is a logical way of liquidating the British Empire in Southeast Asia”. About five months later, in September 1962

56. For the text of Joint Statement see, New China News Agency (NCNA), 13 April, 1963.
57. The New Federation was proposed to include Malaya, the British Southeast Asian Colonies of Singapore, Sarawak and Saleh (North Borneo territories) and the British Protected State of Brunei.
59. Straits Time (Singapore), 26th April 1962.
Commonwealth states in expressing its satisfaction with the great progress made towards the establishment of the Federation of Malaysia.\(^6\) Nehru while explaining India's stand in the Lok Sabha on 22 February 1963, considered the freedom of British colonies as the first thing and observed: "The major thing it seemed to us was that the colonies should cease to be colonies, the rest, it was for them to decide."\(^6\) Experiencing the expansionist nature of the Chinese, India kept itself neutral and viable political force in the region. It viewed any state which is emancipated from the colonialism would enhance the prospects for peace and stability in the subcontinent.

Indonesia continued its confrontationist attitude towards Malaysia particularly after the Brunei revolts in December 1962. Indonesia's response was based on a set of considerations different from that of India. Firstly, the Indonesian leadership was concerned about the adverse impact the new Federation would have on her security. Their apprehensions arose from their experiences during the PRRI and "Permesta" rebellions of 1957-58, when Malaya and Singapore provided shelter to the Indonesian rebels.\(^6\) The new pro-British Malaysia Federation, would jeopardize her security as it would allow British colonialism to exist and have a major say in the region.

Indonesia's Malaysia policy also served useful functions in its domestic politics. For different reasons and very often conflicting motivations, various forces and factors that emerged stronger in the Indonesian politics during the era of Guided Democracy,

\(^{60}\) The Statesman and Hindustan Times, 20 September 1962.


\(^{62}\) See the statement of Indonesian's representative at the UN Security Council in SCOR, meeting 1144, 9 September 1964, pp. 160-22.
came to have a vital development in the continuation of the anti-Malaysia policy. These included the emergence of the coterie of President Sukarno’s PNI the armed forces, and the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) to accept the framework of Sukarno’s viewpoints. It fitted well into the framework of his concept of ‘NEFOS’ (new Emerging Forces) vs. ‘OLDEFOS’ (Old Emerging Forces). It also enabled him to seek and try to establish Indonesia’s major power role in Southeast Asia. The Indonesian armed forces leadership also approved of the policy of confrontation against Malaysia. When the armed forces crushed the regional rebellions during 1957-1958, the Indonesian army had been playing an important role in politics and administration because of the imposition of national emergency. With massive Soviet arms aid received during the struggle for restoration of West Irian, it had still further consolidated its position. The Malaysian issue justified the continuance of its expanded budget. It also served to enable the Army to restrict the growing influence of the PKI. As far as the PKI was concerned, it was a vital opponent of the Federation of Malaysia plan as it was perceived pro-British. In fact, the PKI was the first to have vehemently denounced it as a “neocolonialist” venture as early as August 1961.63

PKI had opposed the emergence of Malaysia for various reasons. Ideologically, formation of a pro-British or Pro-West federation was not acceptable to it. It viewed the

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63. "Apa itu Malaysia Raja?" (What is Great Malaysia?), Harian Rakjat, Jakarta 31 August 1961.
Malaysian proposal as an effort to stem the spread of communism in the region. Indonesia’s anti-Malaysia policy also served to widen the gulf between Indonesian and the Western powers. It also enabled the PKI to enlarge its area of operations, consolidate its political position and dominate at the corridors of power.

However, India welcomed the inauguration of Federation of Malaysia in September 1963. It also sought to make the new Federation acceptable to the Afro-Asian world. At the Preparatory Meeting of the second Afro-Asian Conference in Jakarta in April 1964, the leader of Indian delegation, Swaran Singh proposed among others, an invitation to Malaysia for participation in the main conference. Despite opposition from China and Indonesia, India succeeded in persuading the meeting to keep the options open on the question of inviting Malaysia.\(^{64}\) India’s support for a Malaysian candidature for one of the non-permanent seats in the UN Security Council still further embittered Indonesia’s opinion towards India.

At the end of 1964 and the beginning of 1965, the relations with India had deteriorated. The entire Press in Jakarta were full of anti-India coverage. India’s support for Malaysia was publicly criticized by the Indonesian leaders on the occasion of the Tenth Aniversary (Dasa Warsa) celebrations of the Bandung Conference in April 1965. Significantly out of frustration Sukarno also discarded his earlier restraint and, in his inaugural speech on 18 April 1965, bracketed India in category of Formosa, South Korea,

\(^{64}\) For test of the Final communiqué of the Preparatory Meeting, see Proceedings of the Meeting of Ministers in Preparation of the second African-Asian Conference (Djakarta, 1964), pp.92-3.
South Vietnam, etc., and called them a 'non-Asian country in Asia.\textsuperscript{65} The Indonesian Deputy Foreign Minister, Ganis Harsono, said, "We consider India's attitude towards, Indonesia, particularly in regard to Malaysia, as unfriendly and unwise. Why should we hurriedly and prematurely throw your weight? He pointedly asked.\textsuperscript{66}

At a preparatory meeting of Second 'Belgrade' conference, held in Colombo in March 1964, the Indonesian representative proposed the inclusion in the agenda of the main conference of the possibility of convening a conference of the "new emerging forces." But majority of participants refused to oblige. In the following months, at the preparatory meeting of the second Afro-Asian Conference, held in Jakarta from 10 to 15 April 1964, the leader of the Indian delegation, Swaran Singh, submitted a set of proposals, including the one relating to sending invitations to Malaysia and the Soviet Union for participation in the main Conference, which were designed to embarrass all the three protagonists of the second 'Bandung' meet, viz., Indonesia, Pakistan and China, and thereby, attempt to neutralize their combined hostility towards India.\textsuperscript{67} Except one, all other Indian proposals were accepted. The main conference was stated to be held in April next year, only after the second non-aligned Conference scheduled for October 1964.

\textsuperscript{65} Indonesian Herald, 19 April 1965 and The Hindu, 20 April 1965.
\textsuperscript{66} The Indonesian leader made these remarks in the course of an interview with B.K. Tiwari of the Indian Express, See Indian Express, 23 April 1965.
However, the Indian success was a source of serious embarrassment to Indonesia. It was bound to cause further deterioration in bilateral relations. In the following months, Indonesia joined by China engaged in high-level diplomatic efforts to canvass for the second Afro-Asian Conference. Side by side, the Indonesian Government continued to project status of the world as divided only between two forces, the “NEFOs” and the OLDEFOs”. The second Conference on Non-aligned countries in Cairo in October 1964 provided President Sukarno a valuable opportunity to propagate his doctrine. In course of his address Sukarno made a scathing attack on the policy of non-alignment and peaceful coexistence and emphasized the need for polarization of the world into two blocs. It was a clear case of alignment with the Chinese position. By 1964 non-alignment and peaceful co-existence had become totally irrelevant for Indonesia.

Regarding the Second Afro-Asian Conference the Indonesian leaders had every reason to believe that India had done every bit to foil their efforts to convene it as scheduled. India, in fact, worked hard to seek postponement of the Conference thinking that it would promote disunity rather than unity in Afro-Asian ranks. By insisting on Malaysia’s participation in the main Conference and later by making efforts to seek postponement of the Conference itself, India had foiled Sukarno’s views on conflicts regional as well as Afro-Asian solidarity. The Indonesian press and leadership had already been condemning India's attitude on the question of Malaysia.

68. For President Sukarno’s speech, see Sukarno, Address to the Second Conference on Non-Aligned Countries, Cairo, 6 October 1964. The Era of Confrontation, Jakarta, Department of Foreign Affairs.

This led to recurrence of mob violence at the Indian embassy in Jakarta in June 1965. There was a hostile attack on Indians in Medan and West Java outside Jakarta. Indian property was put under government custody and this had disturbing impacts on Indian community in Jakarta and elsewhere. The Indian press came out with serious condemnation of mob violence against Indian missions and called for the severance of the diplomatic relations with that country. But, India was deterred from taking any drastic action, because it was convinced that Sukarno was not reflecting resilience and consensus in decision making ever since adopting the policy of guided democracy.