India-Indonesia Strategic Partnership

Indonesia literally means Indian islands and thus the broader issues of security affecting Indonesia are bound to affect security of India. This factor was being ignored during cold war years, but now the perception is changing. Both are trying to understand the importance of one another and recent events such as Pokhara II, East Timor or the rise of terrorism convergence of opinion are visible. The Cold War mindsets have changed and is replaced by partnership feeling.

India attached great strategic importance to Indonesia on the eve of independence. Both sides had signed treaties for defence cooperation in 1950-51. Both had opposed the containment drive of the US. Both had supported the non-aligned movement and both had a strong urge to harmonise Afro-Asian solidarity. However, the differences in perception over Crush Malaysia (1961-65), Cambodian Crisis (1979-91), Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship (1971) etc., drifted them apart. The end of the Cold War and the emerging new world order posed challenges and opportunities to both and hence both have reviewed their policies to cope with their security challenges.

Indian and Indonesian territories share contiguous maritime boundaries in the Indian Ocean. The island of Sumatra is located only 92 nautical miles away from the Andamans. The Indian ocean region adjacent to Andamans are area of intense strategic activities. The Chinese have established their strategic presence at Coco and Hangii to strengthen their surveillance over Malacca Straits, which is indeed a matter of concern to the entire region. If Indonesia and India would cooperate strategically and exchange...
intelligence sincerely, the emerging threats could be minimised. On the other hand, both countries are facing the threat of terrorism and extremism. They are evolving strategies to contain them and in that endeavour, there are ample scope for cooperation.

Indo-Indonesian security relations disrupted during the Cold War, is being resurrected as the perspectives of two are gradually changing for building a cooperative climate. The changing perception of the region has very well been analysed by K.S. Nathan of Malaysia, who wrote that major and unprecedented changes in the Asian strategic environment in the late 1980s have compelled a review of ASEAN’s strategic relationship with India—an Asian power evidencing a keener interest in political, economic, and strategic developments in Southeast Asia at the end of the Cold War. India’s desire to strengthen national Security through nuclear weapons and make this factor count in its regional power status is but the latest expression of security concerns in the context of a changing balance of power in the Asia-pacific region.1

India acquired nuclear status on 11 and 13 May, 1998 when it exploded two nuclear devices, sparking concern among the five established nuclear powers: USA, Russia, Britain, France, and China. While nuclear power alone does not raise a country’s stature in world affairs, the Indian nuclear explosions could not be ignored by the rest of the world of nation-states—big, medium, and small—as developments of this magnitude can alter existing regional and global strategic scenarios. The implications for foreign

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policies of immediate as well as distant neighbours should not be discounted. New Delhi’s newly acquired nuclear status is bound to figure as an important factor in ASEAN’s relations with South Asia — a region in which India’s strategic dominance remains unchallenged. The nuclear explosions have come at a time when the Cold War has clearly ended, with individual countries and groupings such as ASEAN attempting to adjust to new and emerging strategic realities in their relationships with the major powers of the post-Cold War era: USA, China, India, Japan, and Russia. However, this geopolitical balance involving the continental Asian powers (China, India, and Russia), and the maritime powers (USA, Japan and most of the middle powers, such as Malaysia, Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia and Korea— is informed by the geography of Asia and the legacy of political fragmentation, cultural diversity, and historical hostility that have characterised the region’s international relations.²

The aim of this chapter is to examine the implications of the end of the Cold War for India-ASEAN relations. It proceeds on a working assumption that the end of Cold War has presented ASEAN as well as India with challenges and opportunities arising from both continuity and change. Secondly, it identifies the major factors and forces underlying the dramatic changes in Asia’s international relations. Thirdly, it aims to evaluate the strategic role of both India and ASEAN in terms of the past record, and the constraints and opportunities that determine their role in promoting security and prosperity in the emerging Asian balance of power in the 21st century. Finally, it

² Ibid.
examines the impact and influence of the other major Asia-Pacific actors on both India and ASEAN, and the challenges and prospects for India-ASEAN relations in the 21st century.

ASEAN’s security relations in the post-Cold War era in terms of the bilateral and multilateral ties are changing. The new scenario is more complex in terms of actors, power capabilities, interests, and involvement. The regional grouping has taken advantage of the merging strategic space to initiate a multilateral security dialogue via the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). ASEAN has been better able to set the agenda of security discussions to express its strategic relevance in a regional environment that has essentially jettisoned all forms of commitment to ideological concerns which enjoyed high priority in the Cold War era. The ARF framework underscores congruence of strategic perceptions of both India and ASEAN—in terms of the need for preventive diplomacy and cooperative security. ASEAN’s search for autonomy in the post-Cold War international system was partially expressed in its policy of constructive engagement vis-à-vis Myanmar, and in the subsequent admission of the SLORC (State Law and Order Restoration Committee) regime into membership of ASEAN in 1997. Myanmar’s membership of ASEAN has now created a common border with India, so that New Delhi has found a new purpose in dealing with the regional entity on a more serious basis given the visible rise in the diplomatic profile of ASEAN in the years preceding the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis.3

3 Ibid (For further details about ARF, see Michael Leifer, the ASEAN Regional Forum, Adelphi Paper, 302, Oxford, 1996)
India has maintained excellent relations whenever this region has been peaceful and devoid of external involvement. At present, India’s security interests are not critically at state, but it is perceived in New Delhi that developments in Southeast Asia could affect Indian interests.

Geographically, India is closer to Southeast Asia than other major powers sharing its maritime boundary with at least three countries. India’s second longest border (Land and maritime together) is with Myanmar. Andaman and Nicobar Islands in the Bay of Bengal are closer to Southeast Asia than mainland India. Southern Indian tip is astride some of the most critical sea lanes of communication in the Indian Ocean connecting Southeast Asia (and East Asia) with West Asia and Europe. India does not think any threat would arise from Southeast Asia, but it would be wary of extra-regional powers operating in the Indian Ocean using Southeast Asia as a conduit. The other area of importance from an Indian point of view is the market for arms, now that India has removed a self-imposed restraint on the export of arms. After considerable success in establishing some defence links, New Delhi would be interested to tap this region to market some of its defence products.¹

The economic turmoil at the regional level and domestic political developments in Indonesia have started impinging on strategic issues directly. Defence spending has already started coming down and a number of programmes to acquire weapons have been either cancelled or postponed indefinitely. This means that the ability of these countries

for long-term plans to defend themselves with little or no external support has been seriously impaired. Secondly, a number of ASEAN countries also have plans to acquire Russian military equipment for a variety of reasons. Those plans have to be shelved and are unlikely to be revived in the near future. Had these countries acquired those defence systems from Russia, India’s relevance would have gone up because of India’s own experience of operating a large number of Russian weapons. On both these counts India stands to lose.5

The end of the Cold War removed most of earlier cleavages between India and ASEAN and it was quite natural that India renewed its interest in Southeast Asia. Two factors that had widened the strategic divide between India and ASEAN in the recent past have disappeared, i.e., India’s economic policies and the Cambodian issue. India’s avowed position has been that a peaceful, stable, and prosperous Southeast Asia best serves the country’s interests and India will strive to promote these objectives in whatever fashion it can. With this view in mind, India has supported all major regional political moves earlier and will continue to do so in the coming years.6

The events of May 1998 in Indonesia are not only totally unexpected but will have serious implications for the neighbouring countries, and for ASEAN as an organisation. Domestic peace and stability and continued economic prosperity in Indonesia, the largest and most important constituent of ASEAN, and the crucial part

5 ibid, p.64
6 ibid
Indonesia has played in the success of ASEAN needs no underscoring. Indonesia continues to be the linchpin of ASEAN and regional security, and if the transition is not smooth and economic recovery is not fast, the impact on ASEAN would be immense. Developments in Indonesia might turn out to be a bigger challenge for ASEAN than even the worst economic crisis they are faced with.\footnote{Ibid. p.65.}

From an ASEAN point of view, a possible Indian naval role in the waterways that pass through Southeast Asia connecting Bay of Bengal with Southeast and East Asia, was of major concern, particularly given the close proximity of India’s newly expanded and upgraded base on the Andaman island, called Fortress Andaman (FORTRON). These straits are important international sea lanes of communication that form the main link between the Indian and Pacific Oceans. As noted, because of its close links with the former Soviet Union and Vietnam, it was feared that India alongwith these two could undermine the Chinese role, and to a lesser extent, even the American role in Southeast Asia. ASEAN’s second worry was a possible clash of maritime spheres of influence between India and China. It was reported that “the Indian military officials in private have suggested that an understanding should be reached with China to delineate naval spheres of influence between the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea. Indian strategic cooperation could extend eventually to member-countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and Vietnam in an effort to check Chinese encroachment into Southeast Asia.
India's image as a fast growing military power trying to extend its influence beyond South East Asia remained even after drastic changes in international security. Even while the Cold War had decisively wound up by the early 1990s, India was looked upon by the ASEAN states as one of the strong competitors to project its power into Southeast Asia and possibly fill the power vacuum that would inevitably ensue after the Superpower withdrawal.

The spectre of great powers, China, Japan and India, competing with each other to fill that void was certainly looming large in the minds of ASEAN leaders. Undoubtedly the geo-political and geo-economic interests of China and Japan are far greater than India. Though the power vacuum theory has been discounted, there is no denying the fact that there is a sort of vacuum that exists and, given the current political turmoil in Indonesia and economic hardships the other ASEAN countries are faced with, both China and Japan are likely to compete with each other to extend and entrench their influence in Southeast Asia. India, though it was often mentioned as one of the middle-sized powers that has been on the rise, its stakes have never been as great as those of China or Japan. India was compelled to undertake an intensive diplomatic exercise to explain its position and role in Southeast Asia.\(^8\)

The impact of events at the global level on India and Southeast Asia are crucial in order to understand the new bonhomie that began between India and ASEAN. It may be

\(^8\) Ibid., p.25
useful to recall the state of affairs both in India and Southeast Asia at the time of transition from the Cold War to the post-Cold War, particularly in 1990-1991. Compelling reasons on all major fronts, which paved a way to the beginning of a new era in India-ASEAN relationship, particularly from the Indian side are explained below.

The crisis that gripped India in the early 1990s left New Delhi clueless about its own position and standing in global affairs. At the same time, it became increasingly clear that the earlier foreign policy paradigm (centered around moribund non-aligned movement and Cold War calculations) had become irrelevant. The whole process needed urgent and thorough overhauling so that certain areas of immediate concern could be delineated and prioritised and a new set of goals could be set. The quandary India’s foreign policy faced earlier of balancing the stated goals of an independent foreign policy based on non-alignment and South-South cooperation with closer ties with Moscow because of security compulsions was sorted out with the demise of the former Soviet Union. It then became imperative for New Delhi to chalk out its priorities in Asia to make itself politically relevant and perhaps play a meaningful role commensurate with its size. Realistically speaking, even the end of the Cold War did not dramatically alter India’s position in the region. The atmosphere especially in Asia in the early 1990s was such that notwithstanding India’s unquestioned, predominant position in South Asia, most South Asian neighbours looked at India with extreme suspicion. Given the complex security scenario and the involvement of great powers there was little India could do in West Asia, but Southeast Asia offered a glimmer of hope to revive India’s political and economic links, as the region had started bracing itself for a radically changed
environment. India was looking to play a meaningful role, however minimal, in Southeast Asia.

The second aspect of India’s relations with Southeast Asia is related to strategic issues. Perhaps it was on this front that India figured prominently. Initially for the wrong reasons, and later on, for the right ones. It was for the wrong reasons that India had come under intense focus in the ASEAN countries. It was the Indian military buildup, especially the Navy, that had become the focus of political discussion and had generated a plethora of strategic literature starting from the mid-1980s. The biggest apprehension was the possible Indian naval role in Southeast Asia, especially with regard to geostrategically significant waterways that run through Southeast Asia. Acquisition of certain ships and weapon systems, particularly from the former Soviet Union, such as the nuclear-powered submarine, called Chakra, on lease, modern conventional submarines (Russian Kilo class and German HDW), TU-142MR long-range maritime reconnaissance aircraft, the second aircraft carrier (from the UK), ambitious programmes to build a variety of major surface ships indigenously (destroyers, frigates, large landing ships, missile boats, etc.), enhancement of naval facilities on the Andamans, and the creation of a naval marine force that gave the impression that India was determined to acquire a blue-water capability that fuelled suspicions in the ASEAN countries. Initially, because most of these ships were procured from the former Soviet Union and in light of India’s close links with Vietnam, it was perceived that these three powers might join hands if a situation so warranted to contain China. And, given ASEAN’s hardline position on Cambodia, which was akin to Beijing’s line, the implication of a Sino-Soviet rivalry with active Indian and Vietnamese participation if it were to happen was deemed to be
devastating for the rest of Southeast Asia. The upgradation of facilities on the Andamans was looked at from this perspective. It was also perceived that given the limitations the Indian Navy faced in establishing its supremacy in the Indian Ocean because of large-scale presence by extra-regional powers, it would attempt a thrust towards the east after reasserting its dominant position in South Asia.9

To be fair, the Indian Navy has always been a Cinderella service. Starting from the early 1960s at least, because of overwhelming concerns on the land borders in the west and north, most of India’s military build up has been geared to meet these threats. Even a cursory look at the map clearly reveals that India is as much a maritime power as continental. It occupies a peculiar, but very strategic position in the Indian Ocean. However, the Indian Navy has never received the kind of attention it deserves within the Indian defence establishment despite strong geographical compulsions. Its share of funding is yet to reach the level of 15 per cent of the total defence allocations.

Virtually all Asia-Pacific states are engaged in arms acquisitions, military modernization, and the development of force projection. While most agree that the short to medium external security environment (five to ten years) is remarkably benign and that no regional power in the next ten years has either the intention or capability of becoming a new hegemon, there are still concerns which motivate military buildups. Most revolve around problems with neighbors over disputed land and sea boundaries (Japan/China, China/Vietnam, Malaysia and all its neighbors), problems of illegal refugees, smuggling, drugs, piracy, fishery poaching, and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) patrol capabilities.

Longer term considerations include the increase of Chinese and Japanese military might.\textsuperscript{10} Typical of regional security conceptions is Indonesia’s first formal defense White Paper. It reveals a “concentric circles” approach to security where “the deepest layer is domestic security, followed by subregional (ASEAN) security, regional (Southeast Asia) security, and the security of neighbouring regions. Thus, for Indonesia the bulk of its armed forces are assigned to territorial duties with an army of about 240,000, the navy and air force comprise only 47,000 and 23,000 personnel respectively. Nevertheless, the necessity of protecting and exploiting the Natuna gas field and Jakarta’s longterm energy commitments to Northeast Asia portend a naval and air buildup to help keep the peace within the ASEAN region.\textsuperscript{11}

Thai naval officials explain their submarine requests along similar lines: to protect the country’s marine resources given frequent encroachments in territorial waters. According to Naval Operations Director General Rear Admiral Thawisak Somapha, “Submarines will encourage those with designs against us to treat us with due respect. No. one knows where a submarine is exactly.” And the Thai air force argues that since neighbors are acquiring MIC-29s and Su-27s, Thailand should have weapons of equal standard, that is, F-18s.\textsuperscript{12}

The foregoing concerns are not threat driven but rather uncertainly based. They reflect the growing multipolarity of the Asia-pacific; and multipolarity implies a balance


\textsuperscript{11} ibid

\textsuperscript{12} Ibid, p.390.
of power arrangement rather than hegemony. Arms acquisitions, then are moving away from concerns about domestic insurrection and toward external balance, particularly with respect to maritime disputes. Diplomacy, too, is focussed on sustaining a balance against a potential hegemon. For example, the 1992 ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea and such “followons” as the 1995 Brunei meetings of the ARF may be seen as ASEAN attempts to handle China’s challenge in the Spratlys through nonmilitary means. They are efforts to commit the PRC to a multilateral negotiated solution to conflicting claims. As serious as the Spratlys conflict is, however, the dispute does not threaten the national security or existence of any of the claimants. Hence, it has not triggered an arms race. National survival is not at stake.13

In Northeast Asia, a gradually declining U.S. military presence and growing concern about American political will have fuelled Japan’s interest in cooperative security dialogues, while sustaining support for the American presence as a regional balancer. However, Tokyo’s new National Defense Program Outline reduces the Self Defense Force’s overall strength by twenty thousand, demobilizes four army divisions, eliminates three hundred tanks, and takes ten surface ships from the navy. Clearly, the downsizing of JSDF forces, when compared with the military potention of South Korea, Taiwan and China, should not feed the perception of Japan as a military threat.

The ROK seems to be intent on creating a regional force projection capability in line with its growing trade. South Korea’s navy plans to operate in the South China Sea now, since most of the country’s energy and half of its international

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13. Ibid., pp390-91
commerce transits the Strait of Malacca. Tension between China and Taiwan as well as the Spratly Islands disputes motivate the ROK navy’s “Independent defensive capability to cope with an emergency. Additionally, there is a belief that the country must prepare for a time after the peninsula’s reunification when there may no longer be a dominant U.S. Naval presence in the western Pacific. As for collaborative Japan-U.S.-ROK security structure, Korean analysts remain skeptical, citing the long history of animosity between Japan and Korea as well as repeated statements by high-level Japanese officials indicating a lack of remorse for Tokyo’s colonial brutality in Korea during the first half of this century.\(^\text{14}\)

Finally, it should be noted that with the possible exception of China whose longterm plans include the creation of a blue water navy and the acquisition of an aircraft carrier, no other Asian state’s armed forces current modernization is bent on power projection beyond its EEZ. None anticipates developing a sea control capability in the vast Pacific. None plans to add long-range bombers of surface-to-surface ballistic missiles. In Southeast Asia at least, more than twenty-five years of cooperation within ASEAN has reassured its members that the weapons being acquired are not intended for use against each other. And, in Northeast Asia, there is also a growing recognition that a dialogue among the two Koreas, China, Japan, the United States, and Russia is desirable. Indeed, that dialogue has already begun at the Track II level.\(^\text{15}\)

In late October 1992, the Indonesian Foreign Minister, Ali Alatas, noted that

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Ibid, pp. 390-91.
\item Ibid, p. 391.
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although the risks of conflict in the Asia-Pacific were at their lowest level ever, 'there have been rather disturbing reports of increased arms purchases by several countries in the region'. Although his reference was to the Asia Pacific as a whole, defence-spending trends in ASEAN are by no means down. On the contrary, as Singapore’s Defence Minister Yeo Ning Hong had earlier observed, none of - Singapore’s ASEAN neighbours had reduced defence spending. Malaysia, for example, announced in June 1991 that it would allocate about US$2.15 billion for defence in its 6th National Development Plan—a rise of over 230 per cent over the previous plan. Thailand raised its 1991 defence budget by 13.5 per cent to US$2.75 billion. Singapore itself spends about US$1.5 billion or 5.5 per cent of GDP on defence each year. Even the Philippines, beset by natural disasters and a battered economy, has had to consider force modernization in the wake of the US military withdrawals. 16

Indonesian case, however, is different

Indonesia’s defense and security doctrine states that the ideal of the national struggle is to realize a unitary Republic of Indonesia that is independent, united, sovereign, just, and prosperous based on Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. The struggle is aimed at transforming the Indonesian national condition from that of a colonized and backward people into an independent and successful nation, freed from exploitation, poverty, ignorance, backwardness, and other forms of suffering. Within

these general rational ideals one can distinguish several distinctive but closely related security goals: sovereignty, unity and integrity, stability, economic development, and regime security.\(^{17}\)

First is the need to maintain Indonesia as an independent and sovereign state. This is regarded as sacrosanct and not subject to compromise. This national commitment is clearly reflected in the country’s defense and security principle that “the Indonesian nation loves peace, but it loves independence and sovereignty even more”. Without independence and sovereignty the Indonesian nation cannot achieve any of the other national goals.

As a country that suffered colonialism and foreign exploitation for centuries and that obtained its independence only after a bloody revolutionary war, Indonesia is understandably zealous with regard to its independence and sovereignty. As a result it is generally opposed to any activities or associations that may impinge on its sovereignty. Indonesia is a member of many regional and international organizations such as ASEAN, APEC and the Nonaligned Movement. All of these organizations, however, are fairly loose in nature, emphasizing deliberation and consensus in decision making. Membership in such organizations is generally seen as a means to enhance the country’s independence and economic development.

National sensitivity over sovereignty is very pronounced in the political and defense arenas. Indonesia’s violent opposition to defense alliances during the Cold War

period was due to the fear that such alliances would subordinate Indonesia’s interests to those of the major military powers that usually dominated them. Indonesia’s adoption of and continuing adherence to a “free and active” foreign policy doctrine and its membership in the Nonaligned Movement are clear testimonies to its unwillingness to share sovereignty in the fields of politics and security. Even after the New Order came to power and Indonesia developed close relations with Western countries, including relations in security areas, Indonesia has refused to take part in defense alliances. This stance, however, seems to have softened in recent years, clearly as a consequence of the end of the Cold War and the emergence of new security challenges and threats in the wider Asia-Pacific region. In December 1995 Indonesia signed a “Framework Security Agreement” with Australia, the first such agreement that Jakarta has ever signed, though officials in Jakarta have strenuously denied that the agreement constitutes a defense alliance between Indonesia and Australia.\textsuperscript{18}

Goal of the government is clearly the maintenance of its own power, authority, and legitimacy. The security of the state and that of the government are usually portrayed as one and indivisible, so that challenges to government authority are construed as challenges to the state. In other words, criticisms of government policy or officials are usually regarded by the government as attacks against the state itself and as evidence of disloyalty to Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. Public officials and military leaders often argue that without the existing political system and form of government Indonesia

\textsuperscript{18} Ibid, p.485
would fall back into chaos, probably resulting in the disintegration of the unitary republic and the destruction of whatever economic development has been achieved. For obvious reasons, regime maintenance as a security goal is not usually articulated in official documents. The New Order, however, had closely identified itself with Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution, two increasingly sacrosanct principles. The maintenance of the New Order government was thus presented as synonymous with the preservation of national security.

The security goals described here have been encapsulated in a comprehensive security doctrine known as ketahanan nasional, or "national resilience". As noted earlier, it does not emphasize military strength alone; rather, it refers to a balanced resilience in all aspects of national life—ideological, political, social, economic—as well as in the defense and security fields. Economic development is the foundation for all the other components of national resilience. Indonesian leaders believe that to ensure national resilience, the country must avoid involvement in ideological confrontation and bloc politics, whether military, ethnic, or religious.

Indonesia's internal security goals are seen as directly dependent on global peace and especially on regional peace and stability in Southeast Asia. Although Indonesia's security conception has tended to emphasize the domestic and nonmilitary aspects of security, Indonesian leaders have always been very conscious of the direct link between national security and international conditions.

To Indonesia, South East Asia represents her main interest, not meant for domination as feared by some countries, but through which Indonesia honestly sees her own survival. This can be understood from the fact that Indonesia is a territory richly
endowed with potential wealth and large population, forming an archipelago with the longest coastline which is exposed to infiltrations and very difficult to control. The sea no longer represents a barrier, but instead has become a highway in the communications of nations. Therefore, any threat to Indonesia's security and its internal stability has to come through neighboring countries.19

The obsession with internal sources of insecurity is clearly the product of the first two decades of independence, during which the central government, particularly the army, had to deal with a multitude of domestic challenges including regional rebellions, Islamic insurgencies, and attempted communist coups d'etat. This political turbulence was mainly due to the lack of a national consensus among the post independence national elites regarding the form—that is, the state structure and political system—that the new republic should take. Another factor was the growing regional differences with the central government. Differing political orientations, which during much of this early period were shaped by the so-called aliran, or "streams" (such as Islam, secular nationalism, traditional Javanism, socialism, and communism) resulted in considerable tensions. Each aliran had its own ideals of what the Indonesian state should be and its own notion of the most serious threats to that ideal. In many cases, the presence of an opposed sociopolitical group was regarded as the greatest danger to national and group security. This was the situation between the Muslim parties—especially the modernist Muslim party, Masjumi—and the PKI< the two most antagonistic groups in Indonesian politics in the 1950s.20

19. ibid, 489
20. ibid, p.490.
The Secessionist Threat

In the past three decades of independence Indonesia did not face any serious threats of regional rebellions like those that engulfed the country during 1998-99. There were, however, three secessionist movements active in Aceh, West Irian, and East Timor. Publicly the government referred to those regional secessionist movements as Gerombolan Pengacau Keamanan (GPK, or Security Disturbance Bandit Groups), a pejorative term that denies their legitimacy as political groups. Although the three provinces accounted for only a very small percentage of Indonesia’s population and territory, the government viewed secessionism as a threat to the idea of the Indonesian nation-state as well as to its territorial integrity. It had therefore acted vigorously to confront and contain them with the eventual goal of eliminating them.

Aceh, one of the most volatile provinces in Indonesia because of the independent and warlike nature of its people, was one of the earliest supporters of the Republic of Indonesia. But because of political mishandling by Jakarta, the province soon turned against the central government. Trouble began when the central government incorporated Aceh into the province of North Sumatra, reducing its status, from a province to a district or regency in early 1953. The Acehnese protest was interpreted by Jakarta as a revolt. Government military action pushed the province into an open revolt led by Daud Beureuh, who launched an armed struggle to establish an Acehnese Islamic state (DI/TII) in 1953. The rebellion lasted until 1959, when the central government promised to give the province a special status with autonomy in religious and customary laws.
Although Daud Beureuh and most of his followers returned to the fold of the Indoneisan republic, a few, such as Hasan Tiro, continued the struggle to set up an independent Acehnese state (Aceh Merdeka) and from time to time take up arms against the government. Although the separatist movement has dwindled into insignificance, Aceh is still occasionally engulfed in violence, mostly due to religious and socio-economic grievances. As hosts of the country’s largest liquefied natural gas (LNG) plant, the Acehnese feel that they should have benefited more from this natural wealth. Instead, the industry is owned and controlled by the central government because the 1945 Constitution clearly stipulates that all the country’s natural resources belong to the state. The most serious recent disturbance took place in 1990 and lasted several months. Order was restored only after the government launched a major military offensive spearheaded by the elite Special Force Command.

Although there are many similarities between them, the West Irian problem in many ways much more intractable than that of Aceh. The trouble dates back to 1962 when West Irian was finally made part of Indonesia. The Dutch had supported West Papuan nationalism in an attempt to abort Indonesia’s takeover of West Irian. In 1965 Permeans Ferry Awom, a sergeant major in the Dutch-created Papuan Volunteer Army, started an armed rebellion for the independence of Western Papua. The Indonesian government dubbed the movement Organisasi Papua Merdeka (OPM, or Free Papua Movement). On 1 July 1971, the OPM proclaimed the establishment of the Government of Western Papua under the presedincy of General Seth J. Rumkorem. Between 1971 and 1984 there were at least seventeen major OPM offensives. The OPM also carries out international campaigns from its bases in the Netherlands.
The OPM resistance is much more difficult to eradicate than the Aceh problem because of the intractable differences that separate the Irianese from other Indonesians. Whereas the majority of Indonesians are ethnic Malays, the Irianese are Melanesians. Islam, the majority religion, has not had much influence among the Irianese, most of whom still adhere to their traditional beliefs or have been converted to Christianity. These differences, however, do not really constitute major stumbling block to the West Irianese integration with the rest of Indonesian society; Indonesia compresses more than 300 different ethnic groups and five recognized religions. Although Melanesian solidarity has pushed the West Papuan nationalists to forge closer links with other Melanesian states in the South Pacific, there are in fact more Melanesians living in eastern Indonesia than in the Pacific islands.

The fundamental problems relating to West Irian arise from the huge gap in the level of development between the local economy (most of the Irianese depend for their livelihood on hunting and gathering) and the rest of Indonesia, as well as from the government’s socioeconomic policies. To relieve the population pressure in other parts of Indonesia, particularly in Java, the government has encouraged migration to West Irian, which is sparsely populated. The government has also sought to exploit West Irian’s natural resources, especially copper, with little benefit to the local population. The central government’s policies on migration and resource exploitation underscore the political unrest that has periodically erupted in West Irian. The intrusion of the modern economic sector into Indonesia’s most undeveloped province has clearly disrupted the traditional mode of living of the Irianese, stimulating support for the separatist movement.
Strategic analysts have tended to view the end of the Cold War order as a catalyst of new forms of regional conflict, including conflicts previously suppressed by superpower rivalry. Early into the post-Cold War period, the Director of the US Defense Intelligence Agency warned of the emergence of "regional flashpoints" in the Middle East, East Asia and South Asia, because the end of bipolarity "has removed the tampering mechanism that often kept these situations under control". In a similar vein, Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew has warned that the end of the Cold War and the consequent reduction in US military presence in Asia may lead to a situation in which "all the latent conflicts in the region will surface". Regional economic linkages developed through private initiatives, sometimes in defiance of state policies and directives, may be less fragile and more costly to break. Transnational production is more complex and entangling in scope and create a great number of stake-holders in the process of cooperation than simple trade-based interdependence.

Amidst the strategic uncertainties of the post-Cold War period, hopes for regional stability rest critically on the realization of efforts to create a multilateral regional security structure. While ideas about a multilateral security system for the Asia Pacific have come from many quarters, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations has played a central role in providing a viable institutional framework for regional security cooperation. What must be regarded as the landmark event for multilateralism in the Asia Pacific was the inauguration of the ASEAN Regional Forum in July 1994. The ARF has

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22. Ibid, p.23
18 founding members, including the six ASEAN states, the US, Canada, Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, the European Union, Russia, China, Papua New Guinea, Vietnam and Laos.

The founders of the ARF hope that the institution will “work towards the strengthening and the enhancement of political and security cooperation within the region, as a means of ensuring lasting peace, stability, and prosperity for the region and its people”. Although no one (including the ASEAN members) see multilateralism as a substitute for the existing security arrangements, they acknowledge that the ARF could promote healthier alternatives to deterrence-based security strategies. To this end, the ARF, as its inaugural Chairman’s statement put it, hopes to “make significant contribution to efforts towards confidence-building and preventive diplomacy in the Asia Pacific region”.

The first meeting of the ARF in Bangkok in July 1994 saw agreement by the member nations to prescribe a regional “code of conduct governing relations between states” based on ASEAN’s 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation. The Treaty was endorsed by ARF members as “a unique diplomatic instrument for regional confidence building, preventive diplomacy and political and security cooperation”.

Through its largely consultative agenda, the ARF aims to contribute to regional security in three important ways: (1) by promoting transparency in strategic intent and threat perceptions; (2) by building mutual trust and confidence with regard to military capabilities and deployments; and (3) by developing a “habit” of cooperation which will facilitate peaceful resolution of conflicts. Some of the measures which have already been proposed and debated within the ARF framework include enhanced transparency in
military activities, creation of a regional arms register, exchange of defence white papers, allowing the presence of observers in military exercises, greater exchanges of military personnel and the establishment of a regional peace-keeping centre (The Strait Times, 1994).

But the Asia Pacific nations have different expectations of, and responses to, the ARF. Canada and Australia want quick progress by the ARF in developing concrete measures of security cooperation. The ASEAN states have adopted a much more gradual, informal and cautious approach. These differences have raised some doubts as to how soon will the ARF be able to provide practical solutions to regional security problems. Furthermore, the ASEAN states and China are also of the view that the ARF should not develop into a forum for promoting human rights and democracy because this will lead to the interference of Western powers in their internal affairs.

Security issues in the Asia Pacific region are too diverse to be tackled within a single regional framework. The ARF may not be the most appropriate forum for handling the Korean Peninsula problem. While ASEAN has developed a strong tradition of multilateralism in Southeast Asia, many Northeast Asian countries notably China, lack any significant historical experience in multilateral security cooperation. A subregional multilateral institution in Northeast Asia is therefore of considerable significance and should compliment the ARF’s role in developing a wider regional security regime.

A more difficult challenge to security multilateralism in the Asia Pacific region is the attitude of two of the region’s major powers, the US and China. Major powers often prefer bilateral relationships with lesser states to a multilateral security regime because while the former are easier to dominate and control, the latter could become an arena in
which weak powers could "gang up" against the interests and policies of major powers.

This was part of the reason for the US' preference for security bilateralism after World War II.

Indonesian Official Handbook has stated that the State Defense and Security is focused on the integrated power of Indonesian Defense Forces or TNI, the Police and the people, supported by all national wealth. Therefore, the system of defense and security of the Indonesian State is called SISHANKAMRATA (the System of Overall People's Defense and Security).

The people's rights and duty in national defense is stipulated by the 1945 Constitution and further regulated by law. The level of people's involvement in national defense is adjusted with the level of existing situation.

As the concept of state defense and security that is oriented to the future must be capable to anticipate development that influence defense-security problems. The existing concept cannot be separated from historical process of a nation and based on the objective condition of certain period. That's why, the concept must be capable to cover its environment, completely and comprehensively oriented to the future without ignoring past experience.

Based on that concept, the government forms the basic policy regarding defense and security:

- To maintain and step up national defense by growing and fertilizing the sense of love towards the motherland, national, social and state consciousness in order to realize a nation in an integrated society based on Pancasila and 1945 Constitution;
• To realize the Nusantara archipelago with its national jurisdiction territory as a state defense and security unity in forming the Nusantara Outlook.\textsuperscript{24}

The strategy and policy of defense and security forms a factor of national strategies existed in an integrated concept with other components. In national sphere, national security contains the interest to keep the national system, welfare improvement and poverty alleviation and the efforts to realize regional security environment to be safe and peaceful used to establish world peace.

Amitav Acharya, in his study Regional Security in the Asia Pacific: Trends and Prospects, has expressed concern that the end of the Cold War order could be followed by strategic competition among a host of powers, including China, Japan, the US and India, leading to a highly unstable regional balance.\textsuperscript{25}

The scenario of a scramble for influence by the regional powers replacing superpower geopolitics of the Cold War period depends critically on the role of China. As superpower military presence in the Asia pacific region declines, China has emerged as the key variable in the region's future power balance. China's military build-up has received considerable attention, which does not need to be elaborated here. But one aspect of it is worth noting. Unlike the Soviet military build up during the Cold War, China's is backed by a booming capitalist economy. Unlike the pre-Gorbachev leaders of the Soviet Union, Chinese leaders have chosen to embark on military modernisation only after putting into place the essential

\textsuperscript{24} Indone\textsuperscript{sia: An official Handbook, 2002, Jakarta, 2002, p.163.
ingredients of economic and technological modernisation. Now, the potent combination of annual double-digit economic growth rates and double-digit increases in military spending (since 1990) places China in a position to dictate the regional balance of power.

While China's military expansion is motivated by a range of domestic and external considerations, its sense of rivalry with other regional powers is a major contributing factor. One such power is Japan. Despite increasingly close mutual economic relations, Chinese leaders continue to harbour deep misgivings about Japan's potential to be an independent military power. Chinese security planners worry about the possibility that Tokyo may raise its military profile in the region as a result of the decline of the US military presence in the Asia Pacific. Chinese leaders and media sources not only oppose Japanese military programs to enhance the SDF's capabilities and strategic reach, but also find Japanese military participation in UN-backed peace-enforcement operations "deeply repugnant". Although Chinese military planning continues to take into account the capabilities of Russia, Vietnam and India (Cheung, 1993: 20), China's increasing emphasis on naval and air power in South China Sea suggests a long-term strategy to prevent an expanded Japanese role in China's maritime neighbourhood.26

Relations between India and China may be another, if less important, element of the future balance of power in the Asia Pacific region. Some analysts have cast India
and China as "natural rivals" for influence in Southeast Asia. They foresee an intensified Sino-India competition as a threat to regional security in the post-Cold War era. China's security links with Burma forged through massive arms sales and Chinese acquisition of naval facilities in Burma, have fuelled such suspicions. Some analysts even project the possibility not only of the Chinese navy operating in the Indian Ocean, but also of the Indian navy developing a presence in South China Sea as a counter to Chinese naval power. Comments by a senior PLA official, General Zhao Nanqu, could give credence to such as scenario. The General has been quoted as having expressed fears about an Indian move "to penetrate" the South China Sea. Such a move would be unacceptable to China and warrant increased Chinese military links in South Asia, since Beijing "cannot recognize the Indian Ocean as India's Ocean".27

On the positive side, however, Sino-Indian border tensions have decreased markedly in recent years. There is no immediate reason for a new round of rivalry in the maritime sphere. India's naval build-up appears to have peaked. The Indian navy is seeking to ally regional suspicions about its power projection potential by conducting a series of bilateral naval exercises, including one with the Chinese navy. Sino-Indian political relations have also continued to improve. Evidence of a strategic push by the Chinese Navy towards the Indian Ocean is far from complete. Such a move will have to await its mastery over the South China Sea waters, which is the current focus of Beijing's naval programme.

27. Ibid, p.16

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If rivalry between China and Japan develops, it could be of greater intensity and consequence for Southeast Asia than the Cold War rivalry between the US and the Soviet Union (for whom Southeast Asia was but one, and not the most important one, theatre of competition). Attempts by Japan and other regional countries to respond to China’s military build-up could prove highly destabilising for the region.

Some scholars have argued that competition among the regional powers could be prevented and constrained if the US agrees to play the role of “regional balancer”. This calls for a modern Pacific version of the 19th Century role that Britain played as Europe’s regional balancer. Asia Pacific governments generally agree that the US is the only power capable of maintaining a balance to deter the ambitions of rising powers. But the US role as a balancing wheel is an unrealistic one. It will require the US to adopt a more flexible pattern of commitments, including a willingness to switch sides in response to the particular circumstances of regional conflict. Such a posture will be inconsistent with the maintenance of its existing and fixed alliance commitments to Japan, South Korea, Thailand and the Philippines.

The US role as a regional balancer is also marked by other constraints and uncertainties. Three sets of problems are particularly noteworthy. Military-strategic uncertainties relate to the status of US regional military presence, the decline of which has created doubts about US credibility. Economic-trade frictions threaten the stability and longevity of the US-Japan alliance. Political-diplomatic problems relate to the US policy on human rights and democratisation, which could seriously strain relations between the US and some of its regional allies. Managing these problems would be a key test for American policy-makers in the post-Cold War era and would
be vital to the preservation of a balance-of-power security structure in the East Asian region.

After World War II, many Asia Pacific countries had embraced the US security umbrella to seek protection against the perceived dangers of communism. Under current circumstances, the US may be seen as a less credible power to bandwagon with. The diminishing credibility of the US security guarantee is not just because of questions about the future US military presence in the region, but also because of doubts about US willingness to involve itself in a major regional conflict outside of the Korean Peninsula, including the Spratlys Islands dispute.

If US power in the Asia Pacific region declines, China and some other regional powers have the potential to become the region’s new security guarantor. Both Burma and North Korea have developed extensive security linkages with Beijing which have given them certain measures of immunity from international sanctions. Some regional countries may come to view security ties with China as a necessary hedge against a possible revival of Japanese militarism. But it is hard to see an overarching Chinese security umbrella developing in the Asia Pacific region. Unless China accepts greater transparency and moderates its policy toward territorial disputes, it is more likely to be seen as a threat, rather than as a provider of security.

Indonesia has been in great turmoil ever since the rise of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) in the country. Islamic fanatics have raised their influence and network. As JI have transnational links, Indonesia is compelled to look for deterrent steps at the regional and extra-regional levels. They attach importance to India in order to strength in
strategic profile and restore security links. This factor has been very well explained by Ambassador Dounilo Anwar in an interview to Syed Sultan Kazi.

When Kazi stated that Indonesia and India, from the Treaty of Friendship in 1951 to a Defence Agreement in 2001, the two sides have travelled a long distance. But still, there exists further scope in making our ties robust. Do you agree? Ambassador of Indonesia replied “Absolutely. The time span of our shared history is in itself an undeniable fact of strong ties and has acted as a solid base upon which our future relations could actually be built. We have witnessed the ups and downs of our relations for many reasons. Admittedly, a slight slackness in our relationship cropped up after some years of steady cooperation”. He further said that “It is our expectation that our future together, as much as our past, will make us even closer friends. The visit of the former President Abdurrahman Wahid to India in 2000, followed by the visit of Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee to Indonesia in 2001 and President Megawati Soekarnoputri’s visit to India last year are proof of the current positive trend of the relationship between the two countries. Both sides seem to be swift in taking the opportunity to ensure that the chance for reviving the ties should not slip away”. He added further that “Both sides have a lot to offer to each other. In the regional context, Indonesia and India play significant roles, which could be mutually beneficial for both countries. Regional dynamism of ASEAN is an area in which India could increase its positive participation and, which in turn, could enhance its direct cooperation with Indonesia. As we have seen recently, bilateral links have ascended quite significantly but both sides should continue striving towards better ties.”

He said that “We have, indeed, signed a number of agreements since we
assumed relations over five decades ago. But much to our disappointment, when it comes to implementation of these agreements, especially in bilateral economic cooperation, not much seems to have come out yet according to our expectation". He expressed the hope that “Highest level visits that have taken place in the last few years can certainly be seen as dynamic attempts to reach such endeavours. And whater deals reached during the encounters, leaders of both sides have given earnest efforts to see that the concerned accords were thoroughly enacted. It is, therefore, my main purpose during my tenure as the Indonesian Ambassdor to materialise those agreements, apart from increasing people-to-people contact between our nation.”29

When queries were made that Terrorism and security are prime issues of mutual concern. How is Jakarta willing to coordinate with New Delhi on these critical areas? Indonesian Ambassador was fath right in saying that Indonesia and India have suffered tragedy as a result of brutality of terrorists. Indonesia extended her deepest sympathy to the Government and people of India, particularly the families of individuals who were killed and wounded in the bomb attack in Mumbai. During the first meeting of the Joint Commission between Indonesia and India held in Yogyakarta on 1-2 September 2003, among other things, the two countries, discussed was the real threat of terrorism and jointly condemned all acts of terrorism. The meeting emphasized the importance of cooperation in the field of anti-terrorism and

29 Ibid.
agreed to enhance the exchange of intelligence and information between the Indonesian and Indian authorities. In this regard I would like to note the visit of the Head of Indonesian National Intelligence Agency to India last August in 2003.30

Regarding possibility of Defence Cooperation Agreement between the two countries, he wanted the necessary steps to fulfill internal institutional requirements that are needed to ratify the MoU.

The Ambassador said that "As developing countries, India and Indonesia face many challenges. In the first place, we must strive for national development in the midst of inequities and imbalances in international relations. India and Indonesia are expected to work closely together in addressing these challenges at the bilateral as well as interregional and international levels. Therefore, Indonesia, being Chair of ASEAN would like to see substantive growth of the relationship between India and ASEAN."

Regarding The upswing in Indo-ASEAN relations the ambassador stated that The India-ASEAN Summit in Bali has seen a marked improvement in India-ASEAN ties. The framework agreement on comprehensive economic cooperation signed between India and ASEAN is bound to pave the way for a free trade agreement between the two sides. It would supposedly cover details of main areas for a free trade agreement, including in goods, services, investment and other areas of economic interest. This

30. Ibid, p.10
would naturally lead to further strengthening of the ties existing between India and Indonesia as well. With Indonesia looking towards India as a future potential market, I have every reason to be positive that India and Indonesia could also enter into a similar kind of agreement sooner than later. In fact we are working out to see what kind of cooperation could be established based on our potentiality for mutual benefits.\textsuperscript{32}

It is noteworthy to point out that there are many areas of fruitful cooperation in Andamans between India and Indonesia. From an Indian viewpoint, the most significant maritime issues are the developments in the Anadaman Sea region, especially the perceived growing nexus between China and Myanmar. India acknowledges that association with the ARF are of relevance to Indian security, but for its navy the immediate concerns are developments in the Andaman Sea. The Indian navy became conscious of the danger that Andaman & Nicobar Islands faced during the 1965 India-Pakistan War, both from East Pakistan and from Indonesia. A series of events in the 1970s considerably enhanced the strategic significance of these islands from the Indian viewpoint. First, the sailing of the American carrier battle group Enterprise during the 1971 Indo-Pak War into the Bay of Bengal; second, the US decision to expand its presence in a big way at Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean in 1978; third, fears of a Chinese nuclear submarine deployment in the Indian Ocean and a Beijing-Islamabad naval axis emerging; and finally, the 1979 UN-sponsored

\textsuperscript{32} Ibid.
Law of the Sea Conference which provided for two hundred mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). The Andaman & Nicobar Islands alone constitute over one-third of India’s total EEZ. The emergence of East Pakistan as separate political entity (as Bangladesh) and the change of leadership in Indonesia removed the threat from these sources. However, the 1971 Enterprises incident left a deep mark on naval policy-makers. The superpower naval build-up in the Indian Ocean, especially in the light of close links India had with the former Soviet Union, had been a constant concern to India. Whether India liked it or not, as far Washington was concerned, during the period India belonged to the Soviet camp. Even the countries in Southeast Asia had a similar impression about India, whereas India was more worried about the ripple effect of the superpower rivalry and the close links among the US, China and Pakistan. These were factors that led to the strengthening of facilities at Port Blair in the eighties, called Fortress Andaman (FORTAN).

From a strategic angle, the Andaman & Nicobar chain of islands are highly strategically located in the Bay of Bengal in close proximity to some of the busiest and important trade routes connecting the East with the West. For instance, estimated oil flows through the Malacca Straits in 1996 comprised 8.2 million barrels per day to Japan, South Korea, China and other Pacific Rim countries. If these straits were closed, nearly half of the world’s fleet would be required to sail farther, more vessels would be required and freight rates would go up worldwide.

thousand km long, and an EEZ of 250,000 km. While the northern most Landfall Island is just twenty nautical miles (nm) away from the Little Coco Island of Myanmar, Indira Point in Great Nicobar is only ninety-eight nm. From Northern Sumatra. The Malacca Straits are within three hundred nm. from the southern tip of Nicobar and the western shore of Thailand, and Malaysia is located five hundred and twenty to six hundred and forty km away from Port Blair; whereas, the closest point to the Indian mainland are at least one thousand two hundred km. Despite the closeness to Southeast Asia, the maritime boundaries are clearly delineated and settled. With Indonesia, "the first agreement was signed in 1974, which settled the boundary between the Great Nicobar and Sumatra. In 1977, the boundary line was extended both into the Indian Ocean and into the Andaman Sea by another agreement. In the same year, the boundary between India and Thailand in the Andaman Sea was negotiated and an agreement and an agreement was signed in June 1978 and came into force in March 1979. The maritime boundary agreement with Myanmar was ratified in 1987. 34

With these treaties in the background, and with mechanism of the ASEAN dialogue partnership and ARF, India and Indonesia could innovate measures to strengthen not only the security matters but also the issues of trespassing, drug trafficking, and other undesirable activities adversely affecting the politico-security environment of the two countries. Jusuf Wanandi in an article has stated that.

34. Ibid, pp.288-89
"India, which has a potential in the future of having a security role in the region is mainly confined to the subcontinent and still has to go through her structural changes economically before she can really play a greater role in the region." 35

He further stated that the ARF as a new regional forum will have confidence building and preventive diplomacy as its priority program in the first stage. It could then enhance the non-proliferation efforts in the region especially in mass destruction weapons such as nuclear, chemical and biological ones, as part of a strengthening of the international regime, and in so doing get into arms control of conventional weapons as well, such as through the Arms Register efforts, and other Arms Control Regimes; these include among other things:

- a Regional Airspace Surveillance and Control Regime;
- a Regional Technology Monitoring Regime;
- a Resource and Information Center on Arms Transfer and Production;
- a Regional Security Assessment Centre. 36

In the end, after the medium term efforts to establish CSBMs and Arms Control, the ARF should strengthen both the collective security mechanism internationally (at the UN level) and regionally for the Asia Pacific. In all these efforts NGOs' second-track activities and networking are crucial for the governments, and a close cooperation among them is a prerequisite for success. 37

35 Jusuf Wanandi, "The Regional Role of Track two Diplomacy: ASEAN, ARF and CSCAP", in Hadi Soesastro and Anthony Bergin, ed. The Role of Security and Economic Cooperation Structures in the Asia Pacific Region Jakarta, 1996, p.166

36 Ibid

37 Ibid

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