CHAPTER-3

Attitude of the Third World States towards the Intervention by foreign powers & or the UN in the affairs of another country.

In this Chapter, we propose to discuss the attitude of the Third World States towards Intervention by the Big Powers in the international affairs of another state and Intervention by the U.N. This Chapter is a workshop on case studies and divided into two parts. The first portion contains cases of intervention - the Greek Question, the Korean issue, intervention in Hungary, Jordan and Lebanon. The second one deals with the Suez and Congo crises, partition of Palestine, West Irian and Algerian problems. While in the cases belonging to the first half of the Chapter, there was intervention by one or the other Super Powers, in the second category of cases the Super Powers stayed in the background. Both in the Suez and Congo crises the UN stepped in as a peace-keeper. Korean intervention was a US product with UN label. The problems of Algeria and West Irian were primarily struggles against colonialism. Partition of Palestine was unique in itself in the sense that a new nation was born under the supervision of the UN. On the question of intervention, the Third World nations were impaled to the horns of a dilemma - they welcomed intervention in order to quell internal or outside disturbances; at the same time they were scared of it because under its quise they saw the spectre of domination.

Views of the Third World nations reproduced here were based on the degree of emotional heat that a particular issue had generated. Thus on Greek Question, the number of countries quoted are six (Egypt, Costa Rica, Paraguay, Cuba, Dominican Republic and Columbia); on Korean issue
five (Nicaragua, India, Ecuador, El Salvador, Mexico),
On intervention in Hungary fourteen (Iraq, Colombia, Peru,
Venezuela, Argentine, Nepal, Bolivia, India, Burma, Ceylon,
Indonesia, Lebanon, Guatemala, Cuba); on Lebanon and
Jordanian intervention thirteen (Jordan, Egypt, Turkey,
Iran, India, Indonesia, Lebanon, Pakistan, Morocco, Yemen,
Ethiopia, Cuba, Ghana); On Suez six (Ceylon, Panama,
Jordan, Egypt, India, Sudan); on Congo eleven (Ghana,
Cuba, the UAR, Pakistan, Nepal, India, Senegal, Mali,
Saudi Arabia, Niger, Morocco); on partition of Palestine
eleven (Peru, Syria, Philippines, Brazil, Lebanon, Uruguay,
Haiti, Pakistan, Guatemala, Cuba, Iraq, Ethiopia); on West
Irian five (India, Bolivia, Dominican Republic, Burma,
El Salvador); on Algeria nine (Iraq, Tunisia, Pakistan,
Morocco, Ghana, Afghanistan, Cuba, Ceylon and Senegal).

Countries not quoted either dittoed the views of those
reproduced here or did not express anything geometrically
opposite. In the debates on Greek Question, Korean issue,
partition of Palestine and the emancipation of West Irian,
the Third World did not emerge as a solid bloc. Its sense
of identity was being forged at the time when the Suez
crisis, Hungarian-Lebanon-Jordanian intervention took
place. Both the Congo and the Algerian problems were dealt
with by a more matured Third World. If the development of
the Third World Solidarity or voting cohesion is divided
into three stages the issues that got its approbation in
the preliminary period would have run into rough seas in
the final stage. Thus neither the intervention in Korea
would have been sanctified nor the partition of Palestine
carried through in the 1970s.

Let us turn to a discussion of the cases of intervention
and we take up the Greek question first.
ON GREEK QUESTION:

The Greek question was debated in the wee years of the U.N., at a time when most of the Third World countries did not emerge independent. The British in 1944 were in position in Athens. They believed that they could control the situation with the majority of the population. They did not anticipate outside support for the rebels in view of their agreement with Moscow on the Balkans. During the spring of 1946 the East West conflict took such a turn that the rebels started receiving assistance from the communist countries. Britian could no longer bear the cost in resources and the US was drawn in. Many of the Third World countries then did not cut the colonial tie, the umbilical cord to the West, still they felt the Big Power rivalry that caused dissension among the permanent members. The division blunted the effectiveness of the Security Council and necessitated the creation of a committee that would probe and scan the problem. The Commission must not include any permanent members because many of them were involved in the imbroglio. Third World participation in investigation would go a long way in restoring peace in the area, they believed. Their interests aggregated to the extent of keeping peace through the General Assembly although some of them favoured intervention in the internal affairs of a country while others flatly sought refuge under the domestic jurisdiction clause and demanded withdrawal of all foreign troops. The reason for such geometrically opposite views might be the fear of being attacked. That inferiority or fear complex had a double-edged reaction. Non-interference in the domestic affairs of a country would eliminate the chances of an attack while the right of the legitimate Government to invite powerful allies would provide a chance to fight
back in case where there had already been indirect perpetration
of extern aggression. That sense of helplessness and insecurity
among the weaker nations of the Third World was its highest
in those days when many of them feared the spread of communism
and the equally enthusiastic zeal of the First World to balk
or contain it. In either case they were doomed to be the
victims and hence their divergent stances.

Egypt declared that in view of the terms of Article 2,
paragraph 7 of the Charter, the UN should not consider whether
the Greek Government was legally constituted. Furthermore,
a judgement on the guilt or innocence of the parties concerned
would not bring the problem nearer solution, nor facilitate
coop-eration with a commission as proposed by the U.S.\(^1\)

In order to safeguard the independence of the Balkan States,
all foreign troops should be simultaneously withdrawn from
Greece and the neighbouring countries. Indeed, to attain
true peace, it would be necessary to withdraw foreign troops
from all countries where they were stationed contrary to the
Charter. Egypt wanted the withdrawal of all foreign troops
from Greece.

To Costa Rica the Greek question was of great importance to
the small States, which were always liable to be influenced
and have their rights infringed by the major powers. Inspite
of what had been stated by other representatives, the Commission
had established the fact of interference by Albania, Bulgaria
and Yugoslavia in the political life of Greece; and Costa Rica,
considered that the nature of that interference constituted
a more or less open aggression which might become a threat to
international peace.\(^2\)

\(^1\) Official Records 66th Meeting Dt. 4.10.47
Page : 57-87

\(^2\) Official Records Ibid Page : 59
Costa Rican delegate agreed with the representative of China that the character of the political regime in Greece was of no concern to other States, and emphasized that the existence of Civil conflict in Greece did not justify the intervention of the three Governments accused of causing that unrest.

Costa Rica viewed the interference by Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia in the internal affairs of Greece as a kind of aggression and stated very rightly that Civil conflict in Greece did not justify intervention by these three outside powers.

Paraguay believed that the Greek guerrillas had found assistance on the territories of Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. The accusation brought against Greece by the minority could not be justified. Nor could the co-operation between Greece and the U.S. and the U.K. be considered as one of the causes of the situation which was being examined. Paraguay condemned the assistance by Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia to the Greek guerrillas, for the Greek Government was entitled to have powerful allies. The Greek Government was a legitimate Government; any incitement against it was therefore an act contrary to the purpose and principles as laid down in the Charter. The unwillingness shown by Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia to submit to pacific settlement of the dispute was indirect proof that those States lacked a spirit of international co-operation. Thus a note of admonition was discernable in the language of Paraguay.

Mr. Belt (Cuba) declared that the true cause of the grave situation in Greece was neither the internal political situation nor assistance to the guerrillas given by the

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1. Official Records 67th Meeting, Date: 6.10.1947
Page: 71
northern neighbours but rather the growing antagonism between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. The S.C. was incapable of reaching a solution, because the two parties to the dispute, both permanent members, were judges in their own case. To Cuba the real cause of the Greek problem was the antagonism between the USA and USSR. It suggested the establishment by the G.A. of a commission to supervise the recommendation of the G.A. for a solution of the problem. The members of the G.A. must find a just solution and their decision must be made freely in accordance with their conscience and not by voting in blocs. The Assembly should establish a special commission to supervise the fulfilment of those recommendations and investigate whether political and economic independence existed in Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Roumania and Yugoslavia. (1)

Such a commission would not be intervention but would put an end to the intervention. The concept of absolute sovereignty must give way to collective sovereignty, without which there could be no collective security.

Mr. Marchena (Dominican Republic) considered that there was clear and concordant evidence that Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia had assisted the Greek guerrillas. That was why the establishment of a commission of investigation was indispensable. It was, nevertheless, essential to adopt some effective procedure which would be acceptable to each of the States concerned. He therefore proposed that no decision should be taken until the attitudes of Albania and Bulgaria were known... (2)

1. Official Records 1st Committee, 2nd Session, 68th Meeting
   Date: 7.10.1947
   Page: 77-78

2. Official Records 69th Meeting, Date: 8.9.1947
   Page: 83.
To Dominican Republic it was evident that the Greek people were in the throes of a civil war which, it was alleged, was sustained by the interested assistance the insurgent bands were receiving from neighbouring countries. That being so, intervention by the UN in this affair was fully justified by the necessity of clarifying the position and lending Greece such assistance as circumstances might require for the purpose of freeing it from those foreign elements which were trying to create a state of anarchy there in violation of the respect due to the sovereignty of nations...\(^{(1)}\)

Colombia suggested that a Committee should be set up for solving the Greek problem. But he stated that for two reasons he considered it more appropriate not to include the five permanent members of the SC in the Committee. First, whenever the permanent members had met to study a question and to submit a report, as when the SC had dealt with the Greek question, they had been unable to agree. Secondly the suggestion made by the US representative had already fallen to the ground, since one of the permanent members had stated that it would not participate in the discussion on the composition of the Special Committee and would not participate in the Committee itself...\(^{(2)}\)

It will be seen then that on the Greek question the six Third World countries all of which were Latin except Egypt had a somewhat interest aggregation. Almost all of them insisted on non-interference in the internal affairs of a state under Article 2(7) and also condemned all sorts of indirect aggression in the shape of assistance to the rebels by foreign powers.

1. Official Records 70th Meeting, Date: 9.10.1947 Page: 93
By preaching the withdrawal of all foreign troops from the Greek soil, the Third World was promoting its interest which inherently aimed at peace and quiet. To safeguard the small nations against powerful ones they wanted the UN as a shield. Basically the sense of security haunted them – either by inviting intervention or exorcising it in order to make room for the UN. Since the UN more often than not was stymied by Big Power cleavage, friendly allies were more prompt in their action. Had the UN been more effective to ensure the national security of the small nations of the Third World who were threatened often by external interference and internal chaos, they would have surely turned against bilateral intervention from outside allies. Participation of Third World countries in the regional military assistance would have been greatly reduced. Because of the UN failure to act as a policeman, promptly and effectively, the Big Powers took over the surrogate duty much to the odium and chagrin of the toddling nations. Non-alignment was alien in those days and the handful of hapless states could not afford fencesitting when they were threatened internally or externally. Beyond the principle of intervention, Greek question was essentially a bone of contention between the two power blocs in which their stake was practically nil. Compared to the Korean war, the Greek question was, so to say, a non-event.

ON KOREAN ISSUE:

North Korea had been reconstituted after the defeat of Japan by the Soviet Union and Washington assumed that the North Korean attack represented aggression by the communist block. North Korea was considered as the principal bivouac
of Moscow. Therefore to the Western Powers, the invasion in effect, was engineered and orchestrated by the Soviets. If this was allowed to succeed, the whole country would be henceforth be a Soviet Satellite and the security of all other countries would have been threatened. The Domino theory was being evolved in the US in those days. China too was looked as a client of Moscow in Washington.

It was the Korean crisis that wrested the peace-keeping powers from the Security Council to the General Assembly and on the solid support of the Third World states the historic uniting for peace was adopted. The GA was US centric where Washington drew a captive support. Strangely the US interests coincided with those of the weaker nations. All of them wanted to divest the SC of its peace-keeping powers in order to circumvent Soviet Veto and make the GA equally powerful. Under the uniting for peace plan the blue-helmeted UN troops appeared on the theatre of operation and the challenge of aggression contained.

Nicaragua was proud to announce that it was on the battlefields of the Korean peninsula that the military machinery of UN war system was successfully applied and that the aggressive action of unscrupulous imperialists was paralysed.

India observed that UN military action would not solve the problem. The ultimate solution lay in free general election on all Korea basis with adult suffrage and secret ballot; formation of a national Government which would set upon own mutual sacrifices and there should be withdrawal of all occupation troops.
India wanted a political solution and not a military one. Thus while speaking on how the Korean problem could be solved, India suggested that a general election should be held, not on a zonal basis alone but on a national basis under the control of the UN temporary commission. That it believed to be necessary in order to remove the political and moral barrier which had been created by the division of the country.

Secondly, it was important that the election should be held on the basis of adult suffrage without any political discrimination, and by secret ballot. That would facilitate a free election and would avoid any attempt to deny the vote to certain classes of people classified as undemocratic.

Thirdly, the Assembly should meet, immediately after it had been elected, to form a national Government. Fourthly, the national Government, immediately upon its formation, should constitute its own national security forces and dissolve all military and semi-military formations not included therein. Lastly, a definite time limit should be fixed for the withdrawal of occupation of troops. To the Indian delegate that was to be of primary importance.

The Third World countries were almost unanimous with the Indian stand that aggression had taken place by North Korea over South Korea. It was a wrong act that had to be condemned, and resisted. Secondly, so far as possible the war should not be spread beyond Korea. And thirdly, the U.N. should explore means of ending that war. (1)

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1. Official Records 442 Meeting, Date: 23.9.1953
Page: 108
A political conference on Korea was arranged in which India, Pakistan, Indonesia and Burma were omitted. Certain Latin American countries participated. The Indian Prime Minister, Nehru, made a remark in the Parliament on such Asian absence at the expense of Latin Americans. The remark of Nehru sparked off irate statements from the latter. Ecuador declared that the exclusion of India should in no way be interpreted as an unfriendly act or failure to appreciate the value of that country. No Latin-American statesman would be surprised if a problem affecting America which was being considered by the G.A. was settled as a result of the support of the Arab or Asian Powers. (1)

Ecuador found it really incomprehensible in a statesman of the stature of Mr. Nehru that his feelings, perhaps provoked by his natural reaction to his country's exclusion from such an important political meeting, should have made him express himself in a manner inconsistent with the traditional calm and tranquility of the men of his race and culture to whom the mystery of the inner life was revealed in all its sublimity.

El Salvador apprehended that the inclusion of India, Indonesia, Burma and Pakistan, or of some of those countries, might cause serious difficulties and lead to the failure of the conference. Mr. Nehru, the Prime Minister of India, appeared before the Parliament of his country in August, 1953, and stated that India had no special interest in attending the political conference and that it would participate only if the main parties concerned wished it to co-operate in the settlement of the Korean question.

He appeared again before that legislative body to assert, as a reproach to the Latin American states which did not agree to its participation in the conference, that those States had opposed the wishes of almost all the countries of Asia and Europe with regard to a matter which was of particular interest to the Asian peoples...(1)

The dropped Asian countries felt outraged because to them Korean problem was primarily a next door problem, an Asian one, in which their participation was not only inevitable but also a matter of prerogative. Such little incidents did not, however, create any rift or cleavage but a trifle of misunderstanding. Intercontinental issues or interests did not seem to have an edge over regional or local attachments in those days. However, that misunderstanding did not surface anywhere in the debates on the Korean question.

India felt again that the participation of the Chinese troops on the North Korean side was due not to aggressive interest but to the fears of the peoples Republic of China that its political integrity might be affected. India was not prepared to regard Red China as an aggressor.

Interesting to note in this connexion that India on the basis of the most authoritative information was not convinced that the participation of Chinese forces in the fighting in Korea was due to any aggressive intention. It was more probably due to the fears of the Government of Peoples Republic of China for China's territorial integrity. The Indian delegate was unable to see how Red China could be declared an aggressor. The Security Council's resolutions of 25th and 27th June, 1950, had not used that term with regard to the North Korean authorities ... (2)

1. Official Records  442nd Meeting  Date : 23.9.53
    Page : 144
2. Official Records  5th Session, 1st Committee, 435th Meeting  Date : 29.1.1957
    Page : 580
The Government of India had been informed that the proposal made by twelve Asian countries had been regarded in Beijing on 26 January as providing a genuine basis for a peaceful settlement. The Government of India further understood that on the basis of the Asian draft resolution, Red China would be willing to co-operate in negotiations for a peaceful settlement. The Indian Government had also been informed that it was because of Beijing Government's desire for peace that the Central People's Government had agreed to arrange a cease-fire at the first meeting of the proposed conference ...(1)

It was on this point - whether Red China could be branded as aggressor - there was a clear division among the Third World countries. The countries who took their cue from the First World countries, particularly from the US, resisted Red China's admission for its non-peaceful behaviour or aggressive role in Korea, Tibet and the Sino-Indian border skirmishes. India, though a victim of Chinese military adventure, had all along been a champion of Red China's entry into the UN and in fact introduced it to the Afro-Asian circuit at Bandung. Ostracism would drive China to desperation; India felt.

Mexico while speaking on Korean POW problem suggested that it would be neither logical nor reasonable that the UN because of its status as a belligerent, should be prevented from fulfilling the tasks entrusted to it by the Charter and assuming the care of these prisoners who refused to return to their countries of origin. The military action undertaken by the UN was sui generis. It was a police

1. Official Records Meeting 437th, Date : 30.1.51
Page : 590
action by a collective body whose essential purpose was to prevent breaches of the peace and acts of aggression. Consequently the rules regarding prisoners which were made for belligerent states were hardly applicable to it...(1) At the fifth session, the draft resolution calling for the establishment under the UN supervision of a united, stable, independent and democratic Korea was submitted by the UK, Australia, the Philippines, Brazil, Pakistan, the Netherlands, Norway and Cuba. The resolution containing implicit authorisation for the crossing of the 38th parallel by the UN forces, was adopted in the first Committee and in the plenary session by votes of 47-5-8 the Soviet bloc, minus Yugoslavia, which abstained. Other abstainers in committee were India, Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Afghanistan, and Yemen. In the final vote, Indonesia joined the abstainers. On Korean issue it was manifest that the Arab League states, certain other middle eastern powers and India tried to retain a neutral position while Iraq defected from the Arab League group...(2)

Korean issue thus had three aspects - (1) Was North Korea an aggressor? (2) The Constitution of the Political Conference on Korea - composed of some Latin America States but the Asian states like India, Pakistan, Indonesia and Burma were dropped - was it fair? (3) Was China an aggressor in sending Chinese troops to the Korean front?

On these issues there was no complete interest aggregation of the Third World States. Third World States while agreeing more or less on the point that North Korea was aggressor differed sharply on the two other aspects. The Korean problem was ultimately solved and in that solution Third World states, that large in number at the time, could not have any effective say.


Core of the Middle East problem has always been the Palestine issue. To the Syrian President, Hafez Assad, it is the "mother problem". All other Middle East problems are somehow directly or indirectly related to this problem. The Moslem countries in general and the Arabs in particular never wanted a partition, always questioned the propriety of Israel, moral as well as legal, and formed a seemingly unified platform against the common enemy. Barring ethnic, linguistic and religious commonness the Arabs are always a diverse group. Monarchical Saudi Arabia does not talk to republican Egypt on the same wave length. Similarly, Socialist Syria finds in dictatorial Libya a political gadfly. All these differences are buried the moment they confront Israel. Since the partition of Palestine was necessitated by their arch-enemy and since the state of Israel was carved out of Arab lands causing refugee problem for fellow Arab brethren the logic for their unified stand vis-a-vis Israel and Palestine is understandable.

Similar feelings exist in other Third World Moslem countries. These aside, there were other Third World countries like India, Ethiopia, Haiti who queued up with the Arabs. The main argument put forward by them was that the partition would encourage similar divisions all over the world, particularly where there were diverse political, social and religious elements. India was partitioned on religious ground. The Lebanese civil war was fought between the Christian Phalangists and left Moslems and PLO apparatchicks also aimed at its partition. To the Anti-partitionists in the Third World, partition in Palestine would encourage similar division in many of their countries.
There are also pro-partitions in the Third World - as they are not faced with the possibility of partition on grounds of race, religion, and language. All the Latin American countries are Spanish except Brazil which is Portuguese and Haiti which is French. The pro-partitionists like Brazil, Peru, Guatemala, Uruguay had a pronounced Latin element in their background and there were lesser chances of division and disruption within their national boundaries on grounds of race, religion, or language. The Latin American countries, all of which are inhabited by caucasians felt somewhat guilt-ridden to the Semitic people, -"a reparation owed by humanity" - for the wrongs done to them. In fact it became the white man's duty to rehabilitate the Jews somewhere after the diaspora. Almost in reflex action they laid their hands on Palestine. Whether the new State of Palestine would comprise the West Bank and the Gaza strip only is a different matter but a bulk of the original claim for Palestine now under Israel has become a fait accompli. Once the Palestine problem is solved other side issues would gradually recede in the backyard of Middle East politics. One encouraging factor in this bleak atmosphere is that the new generation of Arabs and the Sabras (Israeli born native Jews distinguished from the hard headed immigrants) have learnt to appreciate the new realities of compromise and co-existent living. The so-called confrontation states Egypt, (1) Syria as well as Lebanon and Jordan are wary of the Palestine refugees. They want to get rid of them as these refugees create more problems and incur Israeli reprisals.

1. Egypt signed a Peace Treaty with Israel and according to the camp David accord, Sinai was returned to Egypt. For bringing peace to the region Begin and Sadat received the Noble Peace Prize in 1978. Autonomy talks on West Bank and the Gaza Strip were on between Israel and Egypt. At Camp David Palestinian autonomy plan was accepted in principle by Jerusalem and Cairo.
The Palestinians religiously carry their refugee cards given by the United Nations. They are more skilled and educated than the local Arabs. As such most doctors, engineers, administrators holding responsible and important posts in government and in society in the Arab countries are Palestinians. As hard workers they have usurped the job of the native Arab population. They are disdainfully called "the Arab Jews". When Jordanian Bedouin army beat them up in September 1972, the incident gave birth to the band of terrorists known as "Black September". Because of the Saudi patrimony and combined Arab pressure the Hashemite King of Jordan decided to cede the fertile and populated West Bank of the Jordan River.

At the Rabat Conference of 1974, the Jordanian King Hussein conceded the West Bank even at the prospect of his position being reduced to that of an Emir. If the PLO, the authorized organization of the Palestinians, softens its hawkish propaganda, abandons its objective to destroy Israel and disowns the guerrillas, Israel too would be soft on the proposed Palestine state, though truncated, yet at least a solution of a vexed problem. The Third World stands united on Zionism issue and took side with the Arabs in all the Middle East wars, condemned Israeli occupation of Arab territories. Zionism to them is a form of racism and colonialism which they swear to fight to the end. The Arab League, armed with petrowealth, does a good deal of meaningful lobby in the Third World, the way the Zionist lobby is active in the First World countries. It should be noted that on this score the godless interlopers as the Soviets are known in the Arab World, played the Third World off against the US in spite of the fact that Islam and communism are incompatible and internecine.
On the partition question, the Arab League had the backing of India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, Turkey, Thailand and Cuba in committee. In the plenary session, the League was supported by these states (except Thailand) and Greece. Bloc lines were drawn by Arab League, the Soviet block (except for Yugoslavia's abstention), the Scandinavian states and Benelux, but not by Latin America. Of the states which changed position between the Committee and plenary sessions, the three most remarkable were Chile, Haiti and Philippines. The Chilean position from pro to abstention was a kind of a revolt against American pressure tactics. The Haitian and Philippine votes in favour of partition were clearly the result of pressure, since both delegations had categorically stated only two days before that their delegations would vote against it. The victors comprised part of the Commonwealth, the Soviet block (solid except for the Yugoslavian abstention), Western Europe (solid), and a considerable number of Latin American states, the Philippines and Liberia. The nucleus of opposition was the Arab League, which was supported by the middle east, Greece and Cuba...

As for Palestine Peru believed the best solution to be partition of the territory and the establishment of two States in which the opinion of the respective majorities would be essentially respected. But it considered that the State to be constituted for the Jews, in fulfilment of an old multilateral international promise, should be sufficiently large, within reason, to ensure not only the normal development of the life of the Jews in Palestine, but also of at

least another generation and of the tens of thousands of dispersed or exiled Europeans awaiting the fulfilment of that promise on nearby shores.

The reason why Peru talked of partition was that its own national constitution was based on respect for nationalities and human rights, and because it believed that if the Jews did not find a modest but safe national home, the only result would be time and future events might aggravate. (1)

That the Arab feelings were wounded and ignored was evident from Syria.

Syria contended that the Arab States, as well as several other delegations, raised this legal issue before the first Committee and before the General Assembly. They contested the legality of the Balfour Declaration and the exceptional terms of the Palestine Mandate. They emphasized the contradictory nature of these terms and their violation of a contradiction to the Covenant of the League of Nations, as well as to International law and the sacred rights of peoples.

But the First Committee did not consider this legal aspect at all. It gave it no attention. It overlooked the question of the illegality of the documents which gave birth to this problem. Had it not been for that Mandate and its exceptional terms and stipulations, and the extravagant imperialistic ambitions of the First World War victors, Palestine would have remained as it used to be for centuries, a province of Syria. (2)

1. Official Records 84th PM 18.9.47
   Page : 79
2. Official Records 88th PM 22.9.47
   Page : 199
The members of the Special committee took the liberty of giving the term "national home" much wider scope than was intended and interpreted by the authors of the Declaration and the authors of the Mandate themselves. The term "national home" was never construed to mean a sovereign State.

The Arabs revolted against the idea of the national home, which was made possible only by the invasion of their fatherland and the settlement upon their soil of foreign immigrants under the protection of the bayonets and armed forces of a great Power. The Arabs never thought that this national home would undergo a metamorphosis which would turn it to a sovereign State. (1)

For more than thirteen centuries Palestine has been an integral part of the Arab and Ottoman empires, enjoying all the rights and privileges and bearing all the duties and responsibilities of the other provinces of the empire, including the prerogatives of independence and sovereignty.

The Committee assumed that the Jews were a race and only a nation was entitled to cherish national aspirations. But Syria argued that the Jews were not a nation. Every Jew belonged to a certain nationality. None of them in the world was stateless or without nationality. In their entirety they embraced all the nationalities of the world. Nor were the Jews a race. The Children of Israel were a very small fraction of the Jewry of the world, for the Jews were composed of all races of mankind from the Negroes to the blond, fair-skinned Scandinavians. Judaism was merely

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1. Official Records 88th Plenary Meeting Dated: 22.9.47
Page: 200
The followers of a certain religion and nothing else. The followers of a certain religious creed could not be entitled to national aspirations.

Syria continued that there were many religions in the world. The Charter did not recognize the establishment of any State on the basis of religion. States were established on the basis of their existence as nations, irrespective of religion, creed, faith, colour, race, and so on. Everybody knew how the Jews first came to Palestine. They were not the original inhabitants of Palestine. They came from outside as invaders, massacring everybody before them, and killing every living creature in order to take a small part of Palestine on the eastern side in the mountains. Even Jerusalem was not occupied by them until the days of David in the tenth century before Christ.

According to the proposal of the majority of the Special Committee, the Jewish State was to be on the seacoast. The seacoast was always held and fought for by the Philistines. The name of Palestine was taken from the Philistines of history, of antiquity, who fought against the Jews and strove with them for a very long period, and did not allow them to reach the seacoast. The country given to the Jews was never occupied by the Jews and the Jews never settled there.

The world had always been faced with the problem of Jewish refugees and displaced persons and Jewish persecution at some time or other. Why was that? Asked Syria. The only reason was the special manner of life which the Jews adopted for themselves and to which they adhered in spite of all the developments and the metamorphoses which had taken place all over the world for all nations. (1)

1. Official Records 88th Plenary Meetings Dated: 22.9.47
Page : 202
Syria declared that the USSR prepared a way to satisfy the Jewish aspiration of a sovereign State, as it was asserted that they had aspiration, which ought to be satisfied. The USSR gave them a certain area which was vaster than Palestine, and called it the Jewish Socialist Republic of Birobidzhan. Birobidzhan had an area, which was more than double the area of Palestine, and already there were about 200,000 Jews who had immigrated there and who were very happy. The country there was sufficient to contain perhaps all the displaced Jews, and more than that number.

Syria felt that US could solve the problem by withdrawing all support to the Jews and by not supplying money and arms to them. Syria was convinced that the United States of America, whose money financed the widespread Zionist propaganda and their terroristic underground activities, was able, if it wished, to put an end to all these evils, and render, by such an act of justice and fairness, an honest service in support of the principles of the United Nations. United States arms and money were willingly sent to aid a minority of intruders against the lawful indigenous majority, and against the mandatory authority itself.

Philippines declared that it could not give its support to any proposal for the political disunion and the territorial dismemberment of Palestine. It was clear to the Philippine Government that the rights conferred by mandatory power, even if subsequently confirmed by an international agreement, did not vitiate the primordial right of a people to determine the political future and to preserve the territorial integrity of the native land. (1)

It held that the issue was primarily moral. The issue was whether the United Nations should accept responsibility for the enforcement of a policy which, not being mandatory under any specific provision of the Charter nor in accordance with its fundamental principles, was clearly repugnant to the valid nationalist aspirations of the people of Palestine. The Philippine Government believed that the United Nations ought not to accept any such responsibility. (1)

Philippines could not believe that the General Assembly would sanction a solution to the problem of Palestine that would turn humanity back on the road to the dangerous principles of racial exclusiveness and to the archaic doctrines of theocratic governments. Philippines made it clear that the partition plan was illegal, being contrary to the United Nations Charter and unjust, since it imposed an institution upon a country without its consent. The partition plan, furthermore, was unworkable. (2)

The United Nations was an organization of international law and justice, and not one of appeasement or force. The partition decision was contrary to these fundamental principles. It substituted force for right, injustice for equity, and disunion for unity. Philippines stand was total, clear and unexpurgated against partition. But in the case of Brazil there was a triffle vote-vace. Its initial stand was no partition but a federal or cantonal government with local authority for Christians, Arabs, and Jews. It's later stand was - Partition as a temporary measure as the Big Powers were in favour of partition.

Brazil would favour a plan which would preserve political unity in Palestine. The solution of problems could not be sought through division and sectionalization, but rather in unity through the organization of patterns covering the greatest possible number of aspects. It would favour, along these lines, the constitution of a federal or cantonal government, organized in such a way as to give the widest scope possible to the local autonomy of the Christian, Arab and Jewish communities.

The tenseness of the two nationalisms prevailing there did not permit at that time the constitution of a single government, it appeared to the Brazilian delegation that GA was faced with the contingency of having to accept partition as a temporary measure, capable of leading eventually, through experience, to the creation of organic unity in that area.

The Brazilian delegation would vote for partition. Could anyone act otherwise, especially since the partition plan was presented with the full endorsement of the great powers which were more directly interested in the case, Brazil wondered. (1)

Lebanon warned that partition of Palestine if conceded would encourage the political, racial and religious minorities to break away to form independent States and thus the political and Social structure of many member states would be destroyed. (2) Since Lebanon's was multi-racial society, the fear of disintegration was deeply ingrained in it.

Uruguay was on the side of those who advocated the creation of two independent States in Palestine, so that through their progress and social development they might become members of the community of democratic nations of the world. (1)

Haiti declared that it would vote against the partition of Palestine.

Pakistan suggested three formulae first, those Jewish refugees and displaced persons who could be repatriated to their own countries should be repatriated; secondly, those who could not be repatriated should be allotted to Member States in accordance with their capacity to receive such refugees; and, thirdly a committee should be set up to determine quotas for that purpose. (2) The stand taken by Pakistan was somewhat unclear but it was more against partition.

Pakistan maintained that there were 1,300,000 Arabs in Palestine and 650,000 Jews. Jews constituted 33 per cent of the population and Arabs 67 per cent, but 60 per cent of the area of Palestine was to go to the Jewish State in the proposed partition.

A very fair division for one-third of the population to receive 84 per cent while two-thirds receive 16 per cent ridiculed Pakistan. (3)

Partition took the Jewish State down to the Gulf of Aqaba and gave it access to the Red Sea. Practically the whole of Jewish industry was within the Jewish State. If there must be partition, at least fair boundaries should be drawn demanded Pakistan.

2. Official Records, 126th Plenary Meeting Date:28.11.47 Page : 1369
3. Official Records, 126th Plenary Meeting Date:28.11.47 Page : 1375
Finally it appealed that the United Nations must find a solution which was not only just and fair, but which had the best chance for success as regards the largest number of Jews and Arabs in Palestine.

Guatemala found that there was no remedy but partition. The creation of a Jewish State was a reparation owed by humanity to an innocent and defenceless people which had suffered humiliation and martyrdom for two thousand years. It actually voiced the white-man's sense of guilt that prompted most of the Latin American States to vote for partition.

To Cuba partition of Palestine was neither legal nor just. In the first place, all their claims were based primarily on the Balfour Declaration, the root of the problem. But the Balfour Declaration, in Cuban opinion, was not legally valid because in it the British Government was offering something which did not belong to it and which it had no right to give. The Balfour Declaration promised to the Jews a "national home" in Palestine, without prejudice to the civil rights of the Arab population; but it did not offer a free State, the creation of which must necessarily prejudice those very rights which the Declaration was trying to safeguard. Partition was also illegal when considered in the light of the League of Nations Mandate.

Article 6 of the Mandate provided that the rights and position of the non-Jewish population of Palestine should not be prejudiced. Thirdly, the plan was illegal because it was
inconsistent with the self-determination of peoples, an essential principle of the Covenant of the League of Nations. In fact, the plan would mean deciding the fate of a nation without consulting it on the matter, and depriving it of half the national territory which it had held for many centuries.\(^{(1)}\)

The plan violated Charter provisions too; for the principle of self-determination of peoples was recognized in paragraph 2 of Article 1 in a general manner, and reaffirmed in paragraph b of Article 76 which states, in connexion with Non-Self-Governing Territories, that the Trusteeship System (equivalent to the League Mandate) should take into account "the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned". So Cuba was against partition.

Iraq observed that the United Kingdom, France, and the United States all made it clear that their aim in the war was not conquest but liberation, and that self-determination and the wishes of the people of any country should be the guiding principles for future adjustments. To this end, the late President Wilson sent the King-Crane Commission to Syria, Lebanon and Palestine to determine the wishes of the people. That Commission did not fail to make clear the wishes of the people and their keen desire for independence.\(^{(2)}\)

The Covenant of the League of Nations, Article 22, paragraph 4, recognized the right to independence of the communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire and prescribed a mandate which would provide administrative advice until such time as the people could stand on their own feet. Thus, Arab rights to Palestine were indisputable. Their right to the

1. Official Records 26th P.M. Page : 1382 Date: 28.11.47
2. Official Records 26th Plenary Meeting
   Date : 28.11.47
   Page : 1386
ownership of the country and to their independence therein was supported not only by the right of continued occupation but also by all principles of democracy and self-determination for which two world wars were waged.

The Zionists, on the other hand, made two claims to Palestine. The first was that of historical connexions of two thousand years ago. The second Zionist claim was based on the Balfour Declaration, which promised a Jewish national home in Palestine and which was included in the Mandate based on Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, but which, in fact, was contradictory to the letter and spirit of the same Article.

The proposed plan would give the Jews something which was never promised to them. The Jews were promised a national home in Palestine and not a State. The home was already established by the very declaration of the mandatory Power. A Jewish State meant a further concession by the General Assembly at the expense of the Arabs.

Palestine as a whole, was a Holy Land. Partition would dissect its holiness - Iraq declared. It felt that the United States, Australia, and Birobidjan could easily provide areas for a Jewish State.

Iraq quoted a distinguished Belqian who wondered whether the map of partition was drawn in a madhouse or in the offices of the United Nations.

Ethiopia found itself unable to subscribe to the principle of partition involved. (2)

1. Official Records 126th Plenary Meeting Date : 28.11.47 Page : 1393
2. Official Records 127th Plenary Meeting Page : 1405
The U.N. proposed on November 29, 1947, the partition of the biblical land into an Arab and Jewish state and the internationalization of Jerusalem. But the decision came through force of arms in a war between Zionists and Arabs. The state of Israel was proclaimed on May 14, 1948 and immediately within eleven minutes recognized by the U.S. Armistice lines were negotiated under U.S. auspices giving Israel more territory than provided by U.N. resolution.

The plan of partition was okayed by an America-centric G.A. on November 29, 1947 against opposition from most of the Third World nations. The Third World countries that lent their support to partition were Peru, Brazil, Uruguay and Guatemala. The hub of their arguments was that partition would ensure peace as it was based on the principle of self-determination. It was also intended for restoration of the Holy places to their rightful owner. The Brazilian support was prompted by the fact that since the plan was conceived and endorsed by the three Big Powers, it did not have the audacity to refute it.

Arab reactions varied from pained resentment to outright anger. Not only the small nations were a minority in those days but there were defections also in their ranks. The same partition plan could never have been carried through in the 1970s when the G.A. was dominated by the Third World nations. Moreover, the Third World solidarity and sense of identity did not galvanize much in those days. True that they were the products of the same struggle against colonialism, domination and exploitation but queuing behind the Arabs en masse was not dreamt of in those days because of communication gap and lack of co-ordination. In addition, the Arabs did not have that kind of political or economic leverage to wield in the 1940s. The Arab League, based
on a pact signed in Cairo on 22nd March 1945 by seven states, Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Transjordan, and Yemen, came into effect on 10th May, 1945. There was no black African state to pledge its wholehearted commitment to the Arabs' campaign against Israel. There were no Palestine guerrilla movement and black liberation groups in S. Africa to become joint Afro-Arab Causes. The prospects of something better than partition were bleak even if there was complete interest aggregation and articulation at a time when the Third World credibility or clout could have been taken with a pinch of salt. Partition, however, turned the area into the fulcrum of future hostilities and internecine feuding.

Undoing the partition is almost made impossible by a powerful nation like Israel now securely ensconced there. The past Arab moves to un-seat Israel triggered off wars all of which were lost by them. In a future trial of strength, the odds are likely to be against the Arabs. Only a peaceful solution, creating a "homeland" for Palestinians, is the only way out. That homeland might be an independent, sovereign Palestine state between Israel and Jordan or a federated or affiliated one with Jordan. Israel also occupied huge swatches of Arab land—the Sinai, the Golan Heights, the Gaza strip and the West Bank (Judea and Samaria) after its extraordinary military triumph over the combined forces of Egypt, Syria and Jordan in the six day War of June 1967. These occupied territories have always been sources of Arab frustration, humiliation and resentment. Peace in the area depends largely on the return of the lost land to the Arabs. To the devoutly religious "Gush Emunim" the ancient Judea and Samaria
(entire West Bank) is part of Eretz Israel. New Jewish settlements sprang up in these occupied areas much to the Arab chagrin. To hawkish Israel Jerusalem is non-negotiable. The gloom can be cut with a knife once the wandering -- Palestinians are rehabilitated and the front line Arab states shed their jingoism. The Peace treaty between Israel and Egypt is a step towards solutions. Once the Palestinian problem is solved, Middle-east would no longer remain world's number one flashpoint.

There was thus no absolute interest aggregation of the Third World States on the issue of Partition of Palestine. Latin American States spoke in favour of partition: The other Third World States were against it. Partition is now a reality. The State of Israel has been very much in existence. Partition cannot be undone. Here Third World could not play any decisive role.

**West-Irian Problem.**

Indonesia's aim to drive the Dutch from West Irian was based on the need for self-determination. Self-determination did not relate to the Papuans exactly but to the Indonesians and the Third World nations which supported it. In their original struggle for independence from the Dutch, the Indonesian leaders defined the extent of the nation which included all the peoples of the Netherlands East India. Papuas of West Irian were to be freed as part of the nation. To the Third World, Netherlands was an imperial power and a staunch enemy of self-determination. On the same ground many of them backed Spain in its claim over Gibraltar against the British - another imperialist enemy of national self-determination. Self-determination was viewed as an antidote to colonialism. Truly speaking, the subject of colonialism

1. The holiest of Jewish Holy places, the Wailing Wall, is in old Jerusalem. Rabbinical authority over Israeli life is third in importance after defense and the economy. Torah lessons are almost compulsory in schools.
always roused a kind of emotional orgasm among the Third World nations. Since the support was unequivocal and clear we quoted only five countries (India, Bolivia, Dominican Republic, Burma and El Salvador) to reflect the mood prevalent at that point of time. As the question was more political than legal the Third World in general which was averse to the I.C.J. at the Hague, wanted a solution at the UN forum. In matters of status-quo which colonialism tried to perpetuate, the I.C.J. at the Hague, created an emotional and psychological distance to the emerging nations. In dispute among themselves, where the imperial powers were not involved, they preferred the adjudication of the International Court of Justice. Therefore, all the while they stressed the political colour and origin of the West Irian problem in order to avoid the I.C.J. at the Hague.

Indian declared that historically, politically and legally, West Irian had always been a part of Indonesia. The Netherlands Government always administered West Irian as a part of Indonesia. India did not see any reason why that Government should consider it as a territory quite apart from the rest of Indonesia. (1) To India it was as good as Goa which was under the Portuguese at that time. It was said sometimes that the people of West Irian, or Papuans as they were called, were ethnically different from the rest of the Indonesians. "Indonesia" was not an ethnic term. It was a geographical and political term. In Indonesia, as in India and others, for example in the U.S., there were many different ethnic and religious groups. Indeed, there was hardly any State in the World that contained just one race or one people. Then the argument was put forward that the Indonesian question was before the Security Council, and Article 12 of the Charter was invoked. The question of Indonesia that was before the Security Council was a totally different one.

In 1949, the Kingdom of the Netherlands transferred "unconditionally and irrevocably" complete sovereignty over Indonesia to the Republic of the U.S. of Indonesia. It was true that the political status of West Irian was left outstanding at that time, and it was stipulated that it would be settled within one year of the date of the transfer of sovereignty. That only meant that the administration was not transferred; that had nothing to do with sovereignty. (1) Again, if the Netherlands Government communicated certain information to the U.N. under Article 73e of the Charter, that was because, pending the settlement, the Netherlands Government was still responsible for the administration of that territory. Article 73, or indeed any other part of Chapter XI of the Charter, had nothing to do with sovereignty. That word was not even mentioned in that Chapter. (2)

India insisted that the question of West Irian was that of the elimination of the last vestiges of colonialism in Asia, so that all old animosities and bitterness between East and West could be removed from that part of the World. Indian support of the Indonesian claim to West Irian was based not only on its opposition to the continuation of colonialism in Asia, on however small a scale it might be, but also on the close historical, geographical and political association between Indonesia and West Irian. (3)

To Bolivia the dispute between the Netherlands and Indonesia was purely political in character and colonial in origin. It had no material interest in the matter. It was anxious

1. Official Records, 477th Meeting Page : 51 Date : 24.9.54
only to defend the principle of anti-colonialism, as was natural since Bolivians had their own freedom over a century ago after a long and bloody struggle against colonialism. (1)

In the relationship between the Netherlands and Indonesia there was a thorny issue. It believed that to hope that two sides should come together to negotiate was not committing either party to any conclusion.

Dominican Republic felt that the question of West Irian was primarily juridical in character. It accordingly declared that not only would it be impossible for the U.N. to settle the question but that it could not prejudge the question or prejudice the position in which that preeminently legal character placed the parties. For this reason, it announced its opposition to any draft resolution which contained more than a clear expression of the hope that agreement would be freely reached on a basis of conciliation and as a result of friendly and cordial relations. (2) This was a different stand from the Indian and Bolivian one.

To Burma it seemed to be admitted by all those concerned that there existed some kind of political link between what was then Indonesia and West Irian even before the Dutch appeared on the scene. In fact, the Netherlands Government seemed to have relied, at least in part, on the existence of this link to justify its annexation of West New Guinea. Having annexed it, the Netherlands Government in effect confirmed the existence of this link by placing West New Guinea

1. Official Records, 509th Meeting Page: 455 Date: 10.12.54
under the administrative control of Batavia. This was no temporary expedient. It lasted right up to the time when Indonesia obtained it independence. It was then, and only then, and only then, that it seemed suddenly to have dawned on the Dutch that West New Guinea was not, after all, a part of Indonesia. (1)

El. Salvador believed that the issue between Indonesia and the Netherlands was colonial in origin. It was eminently a political issue which no doubt had its legal aspect, although it was not the legal aspect but the political issue which predominated. (2) It was common knowledge that the Charter of transfer of sovereignty was signed at the Hague in the presence of the U.N. Commission for Indonesia, and that the Charter was signed by delegations from the Netherlands and delegations from the republican part and the federal part of Indonesia. In other words, the people aspiring to independence, the former mother country and the U.N. which had sponsored that movement and which, by signing the Charter of transfer of sovereignty, became to some extent the guarantor of the Charter, were all represented. That Charter was the birth certificate of the Republic of Indonesia, and El. Salvador considered that the U.N. to the extent of its responsibility, was bound to ensure that the terms of the Charter of transfer of sovereignty were observed.

Krishna Menon of India once described colonialism as permanent aggression. The question of West Irian was colonial in nature and the Third World countries stood committed to the liquidation of the last vestiges of colonialism. They themselves were once victims of it and to them the present ills of imperialism, racism and economic domination were all the by products of colonialism. They believed that their defenceless societies were raped by the colonial Powers, their resources plundered and their economies strapped by a system manipulated by the First World countries to

their advantage. In fact, Third World rhetoric revolves round the central theme of colonialism, born out of a conviction that attributed all the ills of the present day world to colonialism. It is highly debatable indeed to say that Third World pressure and manoeuvre led to the gradual extinction of the vicious system called colonialism. But to a great extent their exhortations, relentless efforts to wake up the down-trodden denizens of the under developed areas, to mobilize International Resources, both moral and material, did help exorcise it from the face of earth. On this point their score is high and their support has always been unequivocally one and unflinching. The West Irian Question was no exception. As a matter of fact Decolonization was the greatest historical event after the Second World War that brought about a peaceful transition without much blood-letting.

Third World's effort against colonisation was at least partially instrumental in securing the independence of West Irian from the clutches of Dutch colonial rule.
INTERVENTION IN HUNGARY:

Soviet crackdown in Hungary and its resultant draconian measures were denounced and condemned by the Third World nations without hesitation and in clear terms. Stories of appalling atrocities splashed on the First World mass media shook their conscience and prompted them to gang up against intervention. As weaker nations, dependent on stronger allies, they apprehended such intervention would make them victims of aggression. It was their common concern to check and prevent future military adventures even on client states. Thus they declared that even partners in defence could ill afford in such meddling in the internal affairs of one by the other. Like a dame in distress, they felt, Hungary was raped by the strongman. Such helplessness could only be prevented, the pristine purity of sovereign integrity, defended only by outlawing foreign intervention.

For one thing, the Soviet Union justified its action by declaring that there was an invitation from the Hungarian authorities a stance always taken by the outsider and sometimes gained concurrence of the intervened country and the like minded. There were occasions when some of the Third World countries supported foreign interference if it was sought by the legitimate government. But here on the score there was no divergence of opinion, no defection and the Soviet action was deplored in unmistakable terms. They also demanded immediate withdrawal of foreign troops, release of the political prisoners and return of the deportees. Rounding up of Imre Negy by the Soviet authorities and large scale deportation of Hungarian people were instances of committing genocide. Usually the Third World's tirade is directed against the First but here on this issue the Soviet Union alone became the target of weaker nations' scorn and wrath. But with stoical indifference the Soviet Union flexed its muscles, tightened its grip on Hungary and later on brought back any East European country that had strayed from its orbit with a
big stick. True that small and medium nations of the Third World wielded moral authority, like the Chorus in a Greek tragedy, and roused international sympathy. But condemnation alone could hardly bring out the desired result. Soviet Russia successfully flaunted world public opinion, stifled the voice of dissent, withdrew its troops only when Moscow-backed leaders were placed at the helm. The six East Bloc clients of Soviet Russia remained unreformed backwaters of totalitarianism. Their long-cowed citizens who lay on the rails to stop the train of history must expect to get their legs cut-off, warned Rude Pravo, the Czechoslovak party daily... (1)

Between 1944 & 1948, Albania, Bulgaria, Rumania Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia & East Germany all fell under Soviet control, either by Soviet army conquest or political subversion. In 1948, Yugoslavia was expelled from the cominform - the international alliance of Marxist-Leninist states headed by the USSR. Rumania, although economically & militarily tied to the Warsaw fact, since 1966 has tried to go its own way in diplomatic matters.

Although Hungary did not belong to the Third World fraternity, it was never miserly in sympathizing with the Hungarians & condemning the Soviets for their naked bully-tactics. Incidentally, intervention by the mighty in the affairs of the weaklings, like bad breath, can not be banished by pious resolutions or moral fiat alone.

Irag observed that thousands of freedom-seeking people of Hungary were destroyed by Soviet guns, and thousands of freedom-loving Hungarians were being deported to Siberia. Those representatives of free Hungary who went to negotiate with the Soviet Union were arrested by Soviet authorities. That was a flagrant violation of the independence of Hungary and a naked

interference in its internal affairs by the Soviet Union. Irag appealed to the Soviet Union to reconsider the methods and tactics of its policies, to respect the freedom of peoples, to accept opposition, to accept freedom of point of view, to accept freedom of political belief and freedom of political action. In other words, one-sided dictatorship and one-party politics must give way to the human right of others to be free to enjoy their own political thinking and not to be destroyed because they were reactionaries. A man was entitled to be a reactionary; he was entitled to be conservative; he was entitled to be a liberal; he was entitled to be socialist. He must be free to exercise his thought.

Irag appealed to the Soviet Union -

i) to let the air of freedom penetrate all the States of Eastern Europe which suffered under Communist regimes, and all Asian dependencies of the Soviet Union;

ii) to withdraw its troops immediately from Hungary, without delay;

iii) to return the Hungarian deportees immediately and to let them be free and act freely in their own country;

iv) to the authorities in Hungary to see to it that a neutral U.N. body could enter Hungary to supervise and implement the wishes of the overwhelming majority of the General Assembly.

It believed that the people of Hungary must enjoy the right to live in their own way and to set up their political institutions as they choose, by the rule of the majority - not by suppression and not by external force subjugating the will of the people.

2. Ibid. Page: 153
Colombia felt that by its invasion of Hungary, the Soviet Union had acted against the precepts of the Charter, creating a precedent of the utmost gravity, prejudicial to the spirit of democracy everywhere, and committing an act of imperialism and political expansionism which negated the right of nations to express their will in freedom. It was reprehensible that a foreign power, even an ally, should participate in a country's internal disputes and use its armed forces to obstruct the natural course of events. (1)

The corollary to this was that only the people of Hungary were entitled to work out their own destiny and that the final outcome of the dispute should be determined by the unhampered interplay of their own forces. To take action in opposition to a country's will was to destroy the achievements of civilization and to shatter ancient traditions which mankind defended with honour and pride as the irreplaceable basis of the historic personality of nations.

Peru looked at the matter from the point of view of the treaty obligations existing between Hungary and the Soviet Union, from the point of view of the Warsaw Pact. Now the Warsaw Pact, which governed the relations between Hungary and the Soviet Union in regard to collective defence, in imitation of the North Atlantic Treaty, was not a secret treaty. It was registered with the U.N. on 10th October, 1955. That meant that the U.N. took official cognizance of the Warsaw Pact, the Soviet Union notified the U.N. of the arrangements it had made and the rights it had assumed with regard to Hungary in the event of external aggression. Articles 4 and 5 of the Pact referred to the use of Hungarian and Soviet forces only to repel external aggression. There was no mention whatsoever of the internal affairs of the

Soviet Union, or of the internal affairs of Hungary. What was more, article 8 clearly prohibited Soviet intervention in the internal affairs of Hungary. (1)

Peru therefore submitted that the USSR, in registering the Warsaw Pact with the U.N. had contracted a solemn obligation before the whole world not to intervene in the affairs of Hungary. When that Pact, which was publicly registered in the official registry of UN, was violated, how could it be argued that the Assembly were not competent to defend Hungary in the name of this treaty which had been officially communicated to the Members to appeal to the Soviet Union dispassionately, and even respectfully, not to intervene in the affairs of Hungary, wondered Peru. It concluded by saying that with 200,000 men and 5,000 tanks, the Soviet Union invaded the sacred territory of bleeding Hungary, whose unarmed people were guided only by the knowledge of a duty to be done and by their love of freedom and fatherland.

Venezuela always defended the principle of non-intervention with the greatest zeal. (2) Venezuela opined that the Kadar Government, which came to power solely through the support of Soviet troops, and against the will of the Hungarian people, lacked the authority to make such an appeal. In the second place, the so-called fascist forces were in fact made up of the great Hungarian masses, in which were represented all political shades of opinion, united in a common struggle for the sovereignty of their country. The very fact that Mr. Kadar could not control the internal situation without the help of foreign forces showed that the national aspirations of the Hungarian people were not on his side, either among civilians or among the military, and that the Kadar Government did not represent the will of the people.

In view of the foregoing, it could hardly be denied that the U.N. was competent to discuss the tragic events in Hungary, for although it was true that the U.N. might not intervene in the domestic affairs of States, it was equally true that it had an obligation to use all the means in its power to prevent any State from violating the political independence of another. (1)

Argentina urged the Assembly to continue its efforts to see that, first, Soviet troops leave Hungarian territory; secondly, that the Hungarian people were allowed to exercise their right of self-determination, freely choosing the government they desired; thirdly, that the patriots forcibly deported from their country were returned to Hungary; fourthly, that the Hungarian people received all possible assistance to alleviate their suffering. (2)

Nepal declared that the armed intervention of a big country in the affairs of a small country, even on the plea that a request came from the latter, was apt to interfere with the free expression of the will of the people, and to that extent it was apt to hinder the process of democracy. On a previous occasion, during the second emergency special session (571st meeting) the Nepalese delegation deplored the armed intervention of the Soviet Union in the affairs of Hungary, which led to the massacre and deportation of innocent men, women and children in large numbers. Nepal wondered if the stories of Soviet massacres and brutalities in Hungary that appeared in large sections of the World's Press were false, then it was difficult to understand what had actually prevented the Hungarian authorities from allowing U.N. observers to enter Hungary, since their investigation

might have helped to clarify the confused situation in Hungary and to bring about a solution. (1)

According to Bolivia neither the moribund government of Gero nor the headquarters of the Communist Party was authorised to call on the Soviet Union to intervene against the Hungarian people and by means of a brutal massacre to deprive them of their right to establish whatever government they wished to choose. The Bolivian delegation firmly maintained that the principle of non-intervention must always take precedence over appeals by a government which, because of its unpopularity, was having difficulties with its own people. But the brutal massacre which was taking place was accompanied by political measures which clearly stamped the action of the Soviet army in Hungary as genocide. The Bolivian delegation did not consider that deportation or other political measures constituted genocide in themselves; but the circumstances surrounding such measures could be such that the measures did in fact constitute genocide. If whole families, including children, were being deported from Hungary, then this was genocide as defined in Article II(e) of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. It was also genocide if deportation, or repression inside the country, were used as a means of inflicting on the Hungarian patriots, whom the present government of Hungary called fascists, conditions of life calculated to bring about their physical destruction in whole or in part. If the deportation or imprisonment of Hungarian citizens was not accompanied by guarantees safe-guarding the rights and persons of the deportees or prisoners, this constituted a typical case of genocide, since it gave reason to anticipate the disappearance or the destruction, in whole or in part, of the group concerned, a point which was covered by Article II(e) of the Convention.

India stood, without any reservations, for the right of a people to have the form of government they desired and to order their own affairs in their own way, without any external pressures, from whatsoever quarter they might come. India did not believe that the basis of any modern government, of any civilized government, could rest on the power of arms from outside. It condemned violence in unmistakable terms. It did not believe that the government of any country should be based upon foreign intervention or upon the armed might of any other country. In Indian point of view, the existence of foreign forces in various countries in the world was inimical to the cause of peace and progress. It stood unqualifiedly by the sovereignty of Hungary, whose dismemberment it would not wish in any way whatsoever; neither would it wish to have intervention by any party whatsoever. Prime Ministers of Burma, Ceylon, Indonesia and India were of the opinion in a joint communique that Soviet forces should be withdrawn from Hungary speedily, and that the Hungarian people should be left free to decide their own future and the form of government they would have without external intervention from any quarter. The Indian delegate categorically stated on behalf of his government its sympathies were with the Hungarian national movement. It regarded the action of the Soviet Union in not complying with the repeated resolutions of the General Assembly as deplorable and not a service to world co-operation and peace. (1) The Soviets literally turned a deaf ear to the denunciations.

Lebanese Government deplored the tragic happenings in Hungary. Its position was based on its unaltering stand in the face of aggression and brutal repression. It upheld unwaveringly the rights of all peoples to live in freedom, in dignity and in honour. It stood firmly by the principles of equal rights and self-determination of all peoples. (2)

Having described the atrocities committed by the Soviet troops in Hungary, Guatemala commented on the violation of the right

of asylum in Nagy's case. It was evident that the right of asylum was recognized by Hungarian law and was also proclaimed in the 1949 Constitution. The general principle was an accepted rule of international law. The simple fact that negotiations had been started with the Government of Yugoslavia for the purpose of providing a safe-conduct to a person who had taken asylum clearly proved that the Hungarian regime recognized the validity of the principle of asylum. If that had not been so, it would immediately have demanded his surrender, without considering under what conditions the safe-conduct would be given, and it would not have made statements regarding the safety of the persons who had taken asylum. The majority of the Latin American countries could do no less than censure the violation of that right, particularly when negotiations had been entered into in good faith and been broken off, as there was not only violation of the right of asylum itself but to certain extent, violation of diplomatic immunity, on which the right of asylum rested.

Further, the fact that Nagy was arrested by Soviet troops added to the heinousness of the crime, as these troops had absolutely no right to act as agents of the Hungarian Government because, under the Warsaw Treaty of 14th May, 1955 in force between Hungary and the Soviet Union, the presence of Soviet troops on Hungarian territory was not to impair the sovereignty of Hungary in any way and the troops were forbidden to meddle in the country's internal affairs.

The initial offence - the abduction of Imre Nagy by Soviet troops - was aggravated by the fact that he was imprisoned in

another country behind the iron curtain and then returned to Hungary for trial and execution in spite of Government assurances that the full protection of the right of asylum would be extended to Nagy and his followers. (1)

Another fact which Guatemala found deserving of attention was the attitude of Janos Kadar's government to Cardinal Mindszenty, whose only crime was to have been faithful to his flock and to the highest principles of humanity and freedom. On the death of his Holiness Pope Pius XII, the Hungarian Cardinal, who represented the millions of Hungarian Catholics should have gone to Rome to take part in the conclave which was to elect the new Pope. All the efforts made to enable Cardinal Mindszenty to attend were fruitless, and the Hungarian regime thus deprived Hungarian Catholics of the right of having their primate take part in the election of the new pontiff and all Catholics everywhere of the presence of this Prince of the Church in the Conclave. The Hungarian regime's refusal to give Cardinal Mindszenty the safe-conduct he required to leave Hungary was a further unjustifiable violation of the right of asylum and must be condemned by all civilized peoples. As a Roman Catholic country Guatemala's concern was understandable. (2)

Cuba described the Soviet intervention in Hungary as Dantean. It alleged that the Soviet troops took the lives of over 60,000 compatriots, wounded more than 100,000 and forced more than 200,000 men, women and children into exile. That was a possibility Dante never envisaged in his description of hell. Cuba declared that the Soviet troops invaded Hungarian territory in force and carried out the greatest massacre in history.

2. The cardinal found refuge in the US embassy at Budapest.
400,000 soldiers and 13,000 tanks were used to bring Hungary under the Soviet colonial yoke. It was an example of colonialism in its most savage form. But this stance was reversed as soon as Batista regime was replaced by Fidel Castro's administration. Cuba under Castro acted more as a surrogate than as a critic of the Soviet Union.

Soviet intervention did not affect any Third World nation directly. East European countries, being members of the Warsaw Pact, seem to be more or less at par with the West European nations who are NATO constituents. To the Third World, the impact of intervention, in a hypothetical case, would have been the same if it were perpetrated by the US in any of its NATO allies. The point the Third World drove home by condemning intervention was to exorcise interference in the domestic affairs from outside.

In order to fend-off outside assault, to preserve their pristine purity known as national sovereignty, all they wanted was to buckle in a kind of chastity belt—a device invented and inured by women in the middle-ages—by condemning intervention anywhere on earth. In Lebanese intervention some of the Third World countries were involved but in Hungarian one there were none. The Third World chorus was bawling and undiscordant. All the 14 Third World states noted above were unanimous in their condemnation of Soviet intervention in Hungary. The grounds put forward were more or less the same. There was interest aggregation among them on the issue. At present Third World states are much larger in number. If any such case of forced intervention occurs, at present, the Third World's condemnation would act as an effective check to put it down instantly as these Third World states through the GA would generate a strong world public opinion against such misdeed.

A stinging rebuff to the Soviet Union was given by the Third World when it intervened in the sleepy mountaineous country of Afghanistan in the winter of 1979-80. Afghanistan has always been a peaceful, non-aligned, moslem country bordering the Soviet Union. A full orchestration of Third World condemnation was heard in the general Assembly as well as at the Islamic Conference at Islamabad which was attended by thirty five foreign ministers. After the Hungarian intervention the Soviets never had it so bad. By a strange coincidence the US which had scorned the Assembly for its being partisan and one-sided courted the Third World for its support against the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. That underscored the basic truth that a country, however powerful it might be, could not ignore the world public opinion "for all the time", to use the famous Lincolanien aphorism, "you can't be fool (defy) all the people all the time."

INTERVENTION IN LEBANON & JORDAN:

In the wake of independence from France in 1943, the relations between the mostly Druze Moslems and Maronite Christians were governed by a string of understandings that the Christians should have a majority in the legislature, that the President should always be a Christian and the Prime Minister a Moslem. The Christians would not invoke the intervention of Western powers nor make treaties with them. Moslems would drop the idea of union with Syria or its subjection to external Arab influence. That fragile cohesion was snapped in March 1956, when the Moslems suspected that the Christians wanted to bring Lebanon into the Baghdad Pact. In the Suez crisis of the autumn, the Christians viewed the Moslem demand for a breach of diplomatic relations with Britain and France with suspicion. In March 1957, the atmosphere grew tense when President Chamoun endorsed the Eisenhower Doctrine which seemed to the Arab opinion an attempt by the U.S. to step into the old imperialist shoes. Finally, the Moslems indicted that the Christian President had rigged the June elections of 1957 in order to vindicate his pro-western bias.
In Jordan the dissidents showed solidarity with Egypt and demanded a new political order in the cause of Arab liberation and social progress. The leaders of the opposition were forestalled in using force as the army was loyal to the King. The radical wing of Arab nationalism found its haven in U.A.R. President Nasser struggled to unite the Arab world against alleged western imperialism. The struggle against imperialism was a vital factor in the Arab confrontation with Israel. The landing of American and British forces thwarted the forces of subversion but sparked off controversies in the Third World capitals. While India and Morocco -- questioned the propriety of intervention within the U.N. framework except of course under Chapter VII, Ghana and Yemen considered the presence of foreign troops as a threat to the neighbouring countries and to the world peace. Ghana, however, supported the legitimate right of the sovereign states to invite intervention but that legitimacy must stand on the solid rock of the majority approbation. Ghana doubted the popular support behind the regimes that welcomed foreign troops. These were the Third World countries who were known as more or less progressive and often rallied behind Cairo as the area's undisputed leader. Nasser was raised to the status of a demi-god before he was maligned in the six day Arab-Israeli bout in 1967. In fact he was basking in the sun-burst of popularity so much so that his much-admired confidence seemed alike grating arrogance sometimes.

But the Third World's other wing did not appreciate Arab radicalism much. They rather wanted to preserve the traditional Arab background. The so-called upholders of status quo were Iran, Pakistan, Ethiopia, Turkey and Cuba. Of these Iran and Ethiopia were monarchies whose unstinted support for the Hashemite King of Jordan was understandable. Equally inevitable was the support of Pakistan and Turkey, aligned militarily with the intervening powers. Cuba in those days under the Batista regime was no better
than a lackey of the imperialist forces. To the resurgent Third World military alignment and monarchies were obscurantist forces of reaction whose war against imperialism and status quo was partial and qualified. This division did not surface in other incidents in which no Third World country was involved as in the case of intervention in Hungary or in Greece.

Jordon cited instances of outside interference that is, indirect aggression to justify the request it had made to the UK and the US governments to intervene in Jordan. In April 1957, a state of chaos, inspired from outside, prevailed in Jordan. Students broke out of their schools and joined the mobs in revolutionary demonstrations, carrying red banners on one side and pictures of President Nasser on the other. For no apparent reason they were shouting slogans denouncing Western imperialism and hailing friendship with the Soviet Union. Pamphlets were scattered here and there against King Hussein and his regime. Explosions echoed everywhere. Certain government officials went around making fiery speeches to the crowds. Personal safety became uncertain. Shops and stores were closed to avoid the mobs.

During that confusion a military coup d'état was plotted by the Chief of staff against the King. The Chief of Staff ordered the encirclement of Amman, the capital, by one brigade. He ordered a number of officers at key posts to go out on manoeuvres. On the other hand, the disposition of the Syrian forces which were stationed in Jordan in accordance with the mutual defence pact with Syria was changed in such a way as to separate Amman from the northern district of Jordan, which borders Syria. Investigation later showed the existence of a big file of secret correspondence in the office of the Egyptian military commander.
at the headquarters of the Jordan Army in Amman. It contained information from him and instructions from Cairo about the progress of those events and "the weakening position of the Palace". Moreover, the Cairo broadcasting station and the Egyptian newspapers day and night kept calling upon the Jordanians to revolt. The situation deteriorated into actual fighting within the Jordanian armed forces between the loyalists and those misled by their officers. The King, therefore, asked his Prime Minister to resign, but the Prime Minister received a telegram from President Nasser of Egypt asking him not to do so. (1)

Jordan insisted that those who called for the withdrawal of these forces from Jordan under the existing circumstances meant, in fact, to give a free hand to indirect aggression against Jordan in particular and against the area in general.

It assured that the presence of British forces in Jordan was a temporary measure necessitated by the special circumstances in which Jordan was subjected to the threat of aggression and to conspiracies plotted from without. As soon as the Government of Jordan was convinced that the measures and arrangement taken by the United Nations would in fact ensure Jordan's integrity, safety and independence, the stationing of British forces in Jordan would no longer be required. (2)

Egypt grumbled that the recent attitude of the present Government of Jordan was unlikely to relax the tension in that part of the world. The Government of Jordan, for instance, broke off diplomatic relations with the United Arab Republic on the pretext that the latter recognized the new Government of Iraq.

Moreover, the Chief of State of Jordan stated on several occasions that he intended to liberate Iraq asking the help of the Iraqi people in overturning the new Government, merely because the sovereign of Jordan wished, contrary to the wishes of the Iraqi people, to be king of the former Arab Union, a union which the new Government of Iraq immediately repudiated.

Thus, Egypt protested that these accusations were intended only to justify the presence of British troops. No one was threatening Jordan which was making belligerent statements and if there was a disturbed situation in that country, that was due to internal reasons. Egypt alleged that the Jordanian government did not seem to enjoy the confidence of the Jordanian people.

Egypt felt threatened as long as British troops remained there. World peace also was injured and threatened as long as British forces were not withdrawn from Jordan because the presence of foreign troops in that part of the world could not but be a threat to the maintenance of peace and security. (1)

Turkey confirmed its belief in the inherent right of any independent sovereign country to request and receive the assistance of its friends and allies for its self-defence; Second, the right of any Member of the United Nations to request and receive appropriate assistance and protection from the Organization in defending its independence. (2) Turkey as a member of the NATO endorsed the intervention of the British, a fellow member of the same organization. In other words, in a veiled suggestion, it wanted to convey that by becoming a member of the UN no nation forfeited its right to depend on allies. Since the UN could not ensure security, Turkey supported the sovereign right of Jordan to call for the British troops.

Iran stated that while the legality and propriety of the response made by the United States and the United Kingdom to the requests for assistance from Lebanon and Jordan could scarcely be questioned on the basis of the provisions of the United Nations Charter and the forms of international law, Iran was confident that, if so requested by Lebanon and Jordan, and with the effective presence of the United Nations in Lebanon and Jordan, the United States and United Kingdom forces would be totally withdrawn from these two countries. (1) It should be noted both Iran & Jordan were absolute monarchies. Therefore, they thought in tandem.

India could not but see very grave dangers inherent in the situation created by the entry of relatively large numbers of foreign forces, armed and equipped in a manner which could let loose such a carnage of destruction as had never been seen in the long history of the Middle East. And moreover, these forces by their very presence—the presence of massive striking potential—could not but interfere in the normal political and other forms of expression of the life of the people. (2)

In Indian view, the whole situation would continue to be full of danger and would continue to be explosive so long as foreign forces remained on the soil of Lebanon and Jordan. There could be no settlement, and indeed no talk of an acceptable, workable and dignified settlement, and no return to normalcy until this element of foreign troops had been removed. (3) The interventions took place at a time when Egypt's Nasser & India's Nehru, as doyens of non-aligned cause, were practically on a honey moon. So India's censure was clear and loud. Personal chemistry of the leaders was another factor.

1. Official Records, 736th Plenary Meeting. dt.15.3.58 Page : 49
3. Ibid. Page : 69
India found nothing in the Charter which would even remotely sanction the sending of armed forces into the area in the circumstances and in the situation which existed. Apart from the provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter, the whole spirit of the working of the Charter was that there should be no use of force whatsoever and no threats of force and no display of force. India excluded Article 51 of the Charter because none of the circumstances of which it spoke was applicable to the situation which confronted the Assembly.

In Indonesian view, the situation in the Middle East called for the rigid observance of the lofty sentiments expressed in the United Nations Charter, particularly in Article 2 (4), which called upon all Members to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State. It wondered at the sorry state of affairs and the burlesque mockery of Art 2 (4).

Lebanon admitted that there were United States troops on the soil of Lebanon. These troops were there only because the Government of Lebanon had asked for them under Article 51 of the Charter, and the Government of the United States had responded to that request. It was grateful to the United States Government for this response. The Government of Lebanon asked for this assistance only to help it secure the political independence and territorial integrity of Lebanon against subversion directed from without. When the Government of Lebanon would determine that the political independence and territorial integrity of Lebanon were secured by adequate United Nations action or in any other way, it would forthwith ask for the withdrawal of these troops. It tried to hide behind the so-called "subversion from without" cliche.

2. Ibid. Page : 82
Pakistan asserted that the right of a sovereign government to request assistance from another government could not be denied or alienated. The whole concept of sovereignty would be virtually meaningless if a government were not free to decide, first, when and by whom it felt itself threatened and in what way, and, second, to request assistance from whatever sources or combination of sources it might choose. The government to which any such request was made was free to respond to the request or to refuse to do so. It must determine for itself whether it considered the request to be meritorious and whether and in what way, it would respond. Pakistan had always in its mind the spectre of Indian intervention. In that eventuality it would seek help from its military partners.

Pakistan believed that the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom acted fully within their rights, and in accordance with the spirit and the letter of the Charter, in responding to those requests by sending their armed forces to Lebanon and Jordan. Pakistan welcomed the bold initiative taken by the United States in Lebanon and by the United Kingdom in Jordan, in proceeding promptly to the assistance of these small countries at the urgent request of their lawfully constituted Governments. It was absurd to suggest that this assistance, rendered to countries who considered their very existence at stake, constituted an aggression or a violation of the Charter of the United Nations, declared Pakistan. From Pakistan’s “Indo-Phobia” and its being a member of the military organisations, its unflinching support was understandable.

The Moroccan Government regretted the dispatch of United States and United Kingdom troops into these two countries. It considered that there was not legal or practical justification for the presence of these troops in Lebanon and Jordan, and the reasons advanced to justify it appeared to it to be artificial. In the first place, it thought that the arguments used conformed neither with the letter nor with the spirit of the Charter. In the second place, Article 51 of the Charter had been cited. It must point out that the difficulties of those countries were purely domestic in character. In fact the Security Council had not established the existence of any aggression against these two countries. (1) In effect Morocco did not support the interventions.

The presence of the foreign troops was certainly not a means of reducing tension in that part of the world.

Yemen stated that foreign troops had recently been landed on the pretext of preserving the integrity and sovereignty of certain Arab countries. On the contrary, it firmly believed that the stationing of these troops was actually impairing the sovereignty of these countries and constituted a real threat to both their integrity and the peace of the area. It could not imagine any other mission for them except the thankless task of subduing by brute force any expression of national and patriotic sentiment and quelling by military might any tendencies towards the fulfilment of Arab nationalism and liberation. (2) In otherwords, it deplored the intervention.

The Ethiopian Government deplored the deterioration to such an extent of the situation in Lebanon and Jordan that the Governments of these two countries found it necessary to appeal to the United Nations and to request military assistance from friendly governments.

As to the legality of such appeals and requests for assistance, the view of Ethiopian delegation was this: every Government of a sovereign State had the inherent and inalienable right to make such an appeal and to request and receive military or other assistance whenever it felt that its territorial integrity or political independence was threatened. It was also the inherent and inalienable right of any sovereign Government to give or to refuse military assistance when requested by another Government. Consequently, the presence of United States and United Kingdom troops in Lebanon and Jordan, in so far as such presence was at the specific requests of the lawfully constituted governments of those two countries, to safeguard the integrity and independence of Lebanon and Jordan, seemed to Ethiopian delegation to be in order. (1) Haile-Selassi's Ethiopia sang the chorus of Iran & Jordon. Only powerful allies could save the monarchies from internal or external subversion. Sovereign right was, as though, almost divine.

Cuba felt that the legal Government of Lebanon was confronted simultaneously with both direct and indirect aggression of the worst kind. Direct, in that arms, munitions and men—the quantity was of no significance at this point—were being sent from a province or associated State of a foreign Power for the purpose of fomenting and supporting a revolution to overthrow the legal Government by illegal means. Indirect, in that the rebels were being urged through all the broadcasting stations of the State protecting the aggression, through its Press and the statements of its highest officials to continue with their efforts; indeed, they were even incited to assassinate President Chamoun and the Prime Minister, and they attempted to do so several times. (2)

In Cuban opinion, the response of the United States to that request by immediately furnishing such assistance—far from

deserving censure—should be fully approved by all non-aggressor Member States, particularly those weak in military power. To do otherwise, would be to give official sanction to a kind of licence to modern pirate-States. In olden times, pirates used to seize ships and merchandise and imprison men and women; today there were States which seized other States and coolly claimed that international public opinion endorsed their depredations without a blush. This was not Castro's Cuba that sided with the so-called reactionary forces. Dictatorial Cuba, under Batista regime depended heavily on foreign assistance.

Ghana supported the view that it was the legitimate right of any country, through its Government, to seek the help of a friendly country when it considered itself threatened by external aggression. This was in conformity with the Charter and also with accepted international practice. However, when such aggression or intervention was not proven conclusively, the introduction of foreign troops into another country could lead to much controversy. (1)

Ghana conceded that the issue became even more complicated and risky when foreign troops were requested under conditions where it was not quite clear that the intervention was designed for the preservation of the territorial integrity and independence of a State but might be construed as an attempt at the preservation of a Government not having the support of the majority of its people. In a situation like this the role of the United Nations become a very difficult one; for, owing to the very nature of the Organization and the extent of its mandate, it was difficult to see how it could be expected to guarantee the continued existence of any particular regime which had lost the confidence of its people. Furthermore, the unilateral introduction of troops into a country under conditions which admitted of doubt as to the

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validity of such action might invite reaction within the area which might not be conducive to a speedy solution of the problem. Thus the presence of foreign troops might lead to instability instead of creating an atmosphere of calm which might have been the motive for the introduction of foreign troops.

Ghana continued that other problem posed by the introduction of foreign troops into an area was the threat which neighbouring States, rightly or wrongly, might see in such action. To find out the popular support for the soliciting regimes was indeed difficult. It was really a million dollar problem. But there is no gainsaying the fact, that the presence of occupation troops, even on a friendly invitation, always creates tension in the area, both inside and outside the country. Why a Third World country does not invite a fellow Third World country to intervene is not very clear. May be there is a crisis in confidence. But there should be a total ban on bilateral intervention of any shade.

The intervention in Jordan and Lebanon took place at the initiative of the respective governments who wanted to counter domestic upheavals caused by outside influence and interference. Outside interference amounted to external aggression that threatened their independence and territorial integrity. The countries so threatened felt that it was their legitimate right and duty to seek assistance from friendly allies. This argument found favour with many Third World countries but there were others to whom it remained unsold. They deplored such intervention and demanded early withdrawal of foreign troops. The reason why the house of the Third World on two intervention issues, one in Hungary and the other in Jordan - Lebanon, remained divided, seemed to stem from different contexts. In the former case, Hungary was a client state of Moscow where dissident groups under the leadership of Imre Nagy threatened a showdown. The dissidents, according
to many Third World nations, enjoyed the confidence and popular support of the silent majority and as such were entitled to vindicate their wishes against the political czars. Because of Hungary’s military subservience to Moscow the swiftness and brutality exceeded the permissible limit of Third World conscience. Hence their condemnation was unequivocal. In case of Jordan and Lebanon, the skittish neighbours of those two countries fired by socialist ideas and armed with well engineered plots virtually pushed those countries on to a boiling cauldron of social and political upsurge. Having thus been compelled by forces beyond their control they sought outside help. It should be noted that most of the countries of the Third World were non-aligned and militarily -- un-strung like Jordan and Lebanon. They might any day face the same fate of those two countries because they too had similar problems. In the event of such an eventuality they would be left to themselves. Prospect of such a calamity dictated support to the ruling regimes. As for those critics who did not change their clouts, like India, they possibly put a premium on conviction that preached intervention in any form was sinister and domestic jurisdiction a forbidden place intrusion where was tantamount to sacrilege.

Intervention and Article 2(4) are competitive. True, that the Third World could never aggregate its interests in this score. Even if it did it could not prevent those interventions. Equally is true the fact the Big Powers could not do anything for the Shah of Iran and Haile-Selassie when they fled their countries. Of course they did not seek intervention also. Unless the political stakes are not very high, Big Powers do not feel tempted to intervene. Suspension of total bilateral intervention still remains a distant goal.
SUEZ CRISIS:

Between Anglo-French pride and Egyptian obduracy to nationalize the Suez canal there seemed to have little room for reason. Britain felt that nationalization of the canal would permanently destabilize British presence and influence in the areas east of Suez. Joint Anglo-French misadventure was promoted and carried out by the age-old Arab enemy, Israel. The line-up itself was disproportionate, the odds being against Egypt. So much so that the aggression drew sympathy not only from the Third World but also from the Big Powers. The pre-emptive joint venture threatened to become an international cause celebre and the world public opinion was whipped to a fever pitch. British valour, French military pyrotechnics and Israeli intransigence failed to achieve the objects of the expedition and hapless Egypt, bleeding and panting, stood martyred at the altar of justice and righteousness. Because the Super Powers wanted an immediate cease-fire and the Third World poured all the venomous rhetoric, the blitzkrieg did not escalate and the Suez went to Egypt's possession. Since the military derring-do was so obviously unequal and naked there was not an iota of disagreement among the comity of nations. It was a black chapter which happily was closed soon. Here the Third World hit its target, won the race by putting the money on the right horse.

Ceylon was more interested in the early clearing of the Suez Canal. There was another important thing the early clearing of the Suez Canal. That was very important to that country. Most of the trade of Ceylon—75 per cent of it—passed through the Suez Canal. The withdrawal of foreign forces from Egypt immediately and the very quick clearing of the Suez Canal must then be followed by negotiations regarding the Canal on the basis of those six principles which were endorsed by the Security Council in a resolution 5/3675. Closure of the canal hit all the countries east of the Suez. Bulk of the merchandise pass through the canal.
The Suez Canal crisis had, from the outset, been a matter of particular concern to the Republic of Panama. In August 1956 the Panama Government informed the Government of the United Kingdom of its surprise and charged it at having been excluded from the conference of Canal users, held in London and attended by eighteen countries, despite the weighty reasons which militated in favour of its participation.

They were, first, just as Egypt had undisputed sovereignty over the Suez Canal, so did Panama, on whose soil the Panama Canal was constructed, have sovereignty over the Canal Zone irrespective of its having granted to the United States rights, powers and authority for specific purposes relating to the maintenance, improvement, operation and protection of the Panama Canal, a task which, under the provisions of the treaties in force, was a matter of joint and vital interest to both countries.

Secondly, the Panama Canal, which was of vital concern to Panama had many points of similarity with the Suez Canal.

Thirdly, the provisions of the Constantinople Convention of 1888 relating to neutralization and freedom of passage were also applicable to the Panama Canal under the Isthmian Canal Convention between Panama and the United States and the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty between the United States and the United Kingdom.

Fourthly, Panama had the sixth largest merchant marine tonnage in the world and was thus one of the main users of the Suez Canal.

Notwithstanding these facts, Panama was told in reply that it had not been invited to the London Conference because it was not considered a party concerned in Suez Canal matters.

In September 1956, in response to a request by the Government of Egypt, the Government of Panama made a statement to the effect
that the Suez Canal crisis should be resolved by peaceful means without infringing Egypt's sovereignty, and it expressed agreement with Egypt's proposal of 20 September that a negotiating body consisting of all users of the Canal should be established for the purpose of resolving the following questions:

(a) The freedom and safety of navigation in the Suez Canal;
(b) The widening and development of the Suez Canal to meet the future requirements of navigation;
(c) The establishment of just and equitable tolls and charges.

Panama also expressed the view that the negotiating body should review the Convention of 1888. Panama or the whole of Latin America was jittery about the US domination of the Panama Canal. At the slightest opportunity the anger was vented.

Panama trusted that, although it was excluded from the London Conference, recognition would be given to its right, which was second to that of no other nation, to be a member of a committee responsible for studying, and recommending solutions for, the Suez problem. (1)

Jordon asked what was the minimum protection which a Member State could secure from the United Nations against aggression, and whether Egypt, which was the victim of a triple invasion, was afforded such minimum protection? Egypt, a Member State of the United Nations, was the target of a sudden attack from the air, the sea and the land, by the combined forces of France, the United Kingdom and Israel. Egypt resorted to the United Nations for protection. Egypt went to the Security Council with a very clear case. The Security Council failed to take any decision because of the opposition of two of its permanent members which were themselves pressing the attack against Egypt.

Egypt turned to the General Assembly and won the greatest moral support, which was expressed in several resolutions adopted at the first emergency special session. These resolutions were also challenged by the invading forces. None of them heeded the injunctions. None of them was willing immediately to withdraw its forces from Egyptian territory. (1)

India argued that the only "justification" for the attack was that it was a preventive war, and the whole conception of preventive war was contrary to the principles of the Charter and the ideas of civilized existence. Preventive war was the doctrine of the blitzkrieg, and on 29 October was launched a surprise attack. (2)

On 30 October, the Governments of France and the United Kingdom issued an ultimatum to the Governments of Egypt and Israel.

The Israel Government and the Egyptian Government were asked to withdraw ten miles from the Canal. The Canal was within Egyptian territory, and for the Egyptians to withdraw ten miles within their own territory while the Israelis were permitted to go within ten miles of the Canal would mean an open licence for the latter to come across the Sinai peninsula to the border of the Canal.

Secondly, the Egyptian Government was asked by the United Kingdom and French Governments to agree that their forces should occupy Port Said, Ismailia and Suez; that was to say, there was a demand made upon a sovereign country to permit the military occupation not only of a part of its territory, but of its key strategic positions. It should not be forgotten that so far as the United Kingdom was concerned, only two or three years ago, after a great deal of negotiation, the evacuation of those bases had taken

2. Official Records, 596th Plenary Meeting, 26.11.56 Page: 328
place, and the conditions for re-entry had been incorporated into the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of 19 October 1954.

Therefore this ultimatum was a violation of the principles of the Charter and of international practice, an aggression against a sovereign nation and a threat to violate its territory. Also, so far as the United Kingdom was concerned, it was a violation of a specific agreement. Therefore any idea that this was permissible or could be justified in any way because notice had been given fell to the ground.

India did not admit that it was a war to prevent a greater war. It denied the right to wage the war. It stated emphatically that it was a violation of the provisions of the Charter, particularly of Article 2, paragraph 4. The invasion of Egypt by the United Kingdom Government stood on a par with the attack on Alexandria in 1880 and the occupation of Egypt thereafter. (2) Thus in the strongest language possible India denounced Britain for its senseless action in the Suez.

To Sudan the Suez Canal was an integral part of Egyptian territory, and subject to the sovereign control of Egypt. The Suez Canal Company, by its statute, was an Egyptian company subject to the laws and exclusive jurisdiction of Egypt. The freedom of navigation in the Canal was governed by the Constantinople Convention of 1888, and the remedies for any disputes, the way to settle such disputes, were all clearly provided for in the Convention.

Egypt, as a sovereign Power, had the absolute right to nationalize the Canal Company, and if the shareholders, individuals or States, were aggrieved, they would have recourse to the Egyptian courts for remedy. If there was an alleged breach of the 1888 Convention,

2. Ibid. Page : 330
the International Court of Justice, one of the agencies of the United Nations, had full jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute; indeed, the Security Council and other agencies of the United Nations could satisfactorily deal with the matter. But the dispute was between two big Powers, on the one hand, and a small Power, on the other. (1) A sense of despair prevailed in the Sudanese mood.

As a member of the African-Asian group, Ethiopia felt that, as an inextricable part of the concept of "territorial integrity" and by virtue of the fact that the Suez Canal was recognized as an integral part of her territory, Egypt had the clear right to nationalize the Universal Suez Canal Company, subject to indemnification, indemnification which she had promised at the time. On the other hand, Egypt had always recognized that there was an international interest in the maintenance of the freedom of the Canal. To all the Third World countries, the right to nationalize is an inalienable right which cannot be traded for anything.

There was more or less complete interest aggregation of the Third World on the Suez issue. Moreover, the Big Powers, the USA and the USSR, wanted the war to stop. Hence Third World stand ultimately was accepted and peace restored. This was an achievement of the Third World.

ALGERIAN QUESTION

Algerian struggle for freedom drew aficionados from all over the Third World. French repression and brutality stirred world conscience. The Third World countries that we quoted in this connection punched France from different angles. Only Cuba spoke as if it was holding the brief for France. No wonder the Batista regime was as repressive as that of France.

It will be seen that Third World support to Algerian freedom struggle hastened the process of change. France had to bow out of Algerian soil and to leave Algeria to Algerians - particularly because of the Third World anger and its crusade against Colonialism.

Iraq observed that the Algerians were not Frenchmen, as Arabs could not be transformed into Gauls, and it was sheer mockery to pretend that they were. So it appealed to the United Nations to act according to common sense and to save the millions of Algerians from the ravages of modern warfare.

The war in Algeria could only be called the butchery of a small and under-developed nation, carried out by the Government of a civilized nation. (1)

Tunisia felt that disregarding the lessons of history, and the spirit and the letter of the Charter, which proclaimed the inviolability and universality of the right of self-determination of peoples endeavouring to turn the inexorable tide of history, the French Government clung to its intransigent position and went so far as to say that discussion of the Franco-Algerian question by the United Nations would be mischievous and harmful.

In view of the intransigence and the regrettable obduracy of the French Government, the leaders of the National Liberation Front, who were the representatives and guardians of the interests of the Algerian people in its struggle for freedom, were forced by circumstances to take precautionary measures. They decided to set up a provisional government of the Algerian Republic.

On 19 September 1958 Tunisian Government recognized the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic under the presidency of Mr. Ferhat Abbas. This recognition was in conformity with the solidarity between the North African countries and their determination to work in a constructive spirit for the restoration of peace in this area.

Tunisia firmly believed that the establishment of an Algerian Government would help to inspire a fuller awareness of the

responsibilities incumbent upon the Algerian people and their leaders and would subsequently promote mutual understanding. (1)

Pakistan thought that it was not for the Pakistan delegation to formulate a plan for settlement of the Algerian question, but it would seem entirely proper to express the most earnest hope that a peaceful solution of this difficult problem might very quickly be found. It would seem essential that a solution be sought in the spirit of all of those provisions of the Charter which were concerned with human rights, the self-determination of peoples and the peaceful settlement of disputes.

It would seem equally proper to make a most solemn appeal to the people of Algeria and their leaders, as well as to the Government of France, to enter as speedily as possible into arrangements which would ensure cessation of the further use of force. (2)

Morocco recognized the provisional Government of the Algerian Republic and considered its establishment to be an important step towards a final settlement of the conflict. This recognition "must not be construed in any way as an act of hostility against France. (3)

To Ghana, the war in Algeria was not a "phony" war. It was not a cold war. The war in Algeria was a hot war, a war of fire and steel. The Algerian nationalists were fighting for nothing less than the same democratic freedom and justice which was the inalienable right of all human beings. (4)

Ghana argued that Algeria was part of Africa. The Algerian question was, therefore, essentially an African question, and it must be put within the context of the struggle of the African

2. Official Records, 769th Plenary Meeting. 3.10.58 Page: 308
3. Official Records, 772nd Plenary Meeting. 6.10.58 Page: 345
peoples to free themselves from foreign domination. Algeria was not part of Europe, and therefore could be part of France. From Ghana's standpoint it appeared that there was interest aggregation of African states.

The Nationalist Army, which had engaged the French Army in the field so courageously for nearly five years, was an army under the control of the nationalist leaders of Algeria. If there was to be a cease-fire and peace in Algeria, then, in Ghanian view, the leaders of France must negotiate with the leaders of the National Liberation Front in Algeria.

Afghanistan had always supported the right of peoples and nations to self-determination and to independence everywhere. It did not think that the solution of the Algerian problem should be based solely on the declaration of intentions by France. Whatever measures to be taken should be dependent on peaceful negotiations between France and the rightful leaders of Algeria, with a view to reaching a complete understanding on the restoration on an honourable peace, realization of the legitimate rights of the Algerian people to decide their own destiny. In these considerations the United Nations should fully realize its responsibilities, urged Afghanistan. (1)

In Cuban opinion, Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter deprived the United Nations of any jurisdiction with respect to the question of Algeria, since that was a domestic matter which concerned only France. At the time when the United Nations had been established, Algeria had been an integral part of France and no country had raised any objection on that score. Without the consent of France, therefore, the United Nations could not arbitrarily alter that country's political geography, and no one could validly maintain that Algeria was a Trust Territory or a Non-Self-Governing Territory over which the United Nations exercised a certain authority. It seemed absurd that some of those who were calling passionately for the freedom and independence of the Algerian people were representatives of States which were keeping other countries under their domination. (2)

It was even more absurd to accuse France of colonialism that it had set the world a magnificent example by permitting its colonies to decide their own future, especially when not the slightest criticism was made against that great contemporary colonial Power which in forty years had conquered and colonized peoples and nations to an extent never before recorded in history. In that connexion, it should be recalled that when the United Nations had considered the question of Hungary—at the request of the legitimate Government of a country which had been invaded by a foreign army, a fact which established the Assembly's jurisdiction beyond any dispute—some of the Member States which were trying to intervene in the domestic affairs of France had not voted for the draft resolutions aimed at the strict application of the principles of the Charter. With these words Cuba concluded. This view was not only contray to those most of the other Third World Countries but was reversed completely when the Batista regime was overthrown by Fidel Castro & others. Unbelievable but true, particularly when it came from a country, only a few years after, that tried to "export revolution".

Ceylon was sad to witness the situation in Algeria. It refused to accept the French thesis that Algeria was an integral part of France. It did not recognize the right of a colonial Power to declare any of its colonies an integral part of its metropolitan territory. The people of Algeria gave ample proof of their determination to be free. The spirit of independence and freedom of the Algerian people was as strong as the spirit of their Arab brothers elsewhere, whose struggle for liberation from colonial rule had been successfully completed. The French would do well to recognize the Algerian claim to independence and to put an end to the needless destruction and slaughter in that territory. A prolongation of the conflict could not but lead to a further embitterment of relations between the two racial groups in Algeria and also to an increase in tension in the North African region as a whole, to the detriment of harmonious relations with the West. (2)

1. Official Records, 698th Plenary Meeting. 2.10.57 Page: 245
Senegal opined that to resort to partition as a solution would be to prolong the Algerian conflict indefinitely. The only solution would be that any minority wishing to remain in Algeria, should become truly integrated in the national community and take part in the development of the new Algeria, accepting all the rights granted to Algerian citizens, including political rights.

As regards the integrity of Algerian territory, Senegal believed that the moment a colonized territory acceded to independence, its new sovereignty must extend to the boundaries of the former colonial sovereignty. (1)

Algerian problem was primarily colonial, the underdog's desperate attempt at liberating itself from the colonial yoke. Its aspirations to gain independence were frustrated and — ruthlessly denied by French military machine. The struggle for independence bore awful semblance of freedom movement everywhere. This was the process through which other Third World countries had passed. The fighting Algerians needed support of the Third World and there was no dearth of it. Short of sending troops against the forces of Occupation, the Third World countries were prepared to go to any length in their historic mission of crusade against Colonialism.

Added to the common cause was the new-found sense of Africanness that made it an African Question as well. The new resurgence of Africa wanted to sweep away everything that stood on the continent's liberation. No wonder that the full blast of Third World anger was felt by France. The aggregated support of the small and medium powers boosted up the morale of the fighting Algerians. France realizing the new realities bowed down to the inevitable, although the retreat could have been more graceful and dignified than what it was. But at the same time it should be noted that France has always been keeping a paternal eye on its former African colonies. It has been unusually successful in sending highly trained paratroopers in lightning speed to any troubled spots in Africa. Its back-stage role in African politics is still vital today.

1. Official Records, 1012 Plenary Meeting dt.22.9.61. Page : 45
The Congo crisis was a major crisis in world politics. It became another centre where the Big Powers tried to wage their battle in the territory of other. UN intervention, however, changed the colour. Let us see the attitude of the Third World States on the issue. From Ghana's description we got a graphic picture of how Belgium mounted a pincer attack - military as well as economic - on its erstwhile colony. Neo colonialist forces were candid, brutal and desperate. Ghana, Cuba, Mali and S. Arabia exposed them sufficiently well.

While speaking on the Congo crisis Ghana demanded that the UN need not go to the assistance of any country which invited its intervention, but that once it had done so, it owed an obligation to the Government and people of that country not to interfere in such a way as to prevent the legitimate Government which had invited it to enter the country from fulfilling its mandate. In other words, it was impossible for the UN at one and the same time to preserve law and order and to be neutral between the legal authorities and the law breakers. That was, unfortunately, exactly what the United Nations had attempted to do in the case of the Congo and that was the cause of all the difficulties and disagreements.

Ghana's proposition was that in any sovereign State there could only be one national army. If a soldier disobeyed a superior officer and used his arms to murder and to loot, he was a mutineer. There was, however, no difference between his position and that of a colonel who disregarded the authority which had appointed him and used the troops under
his command for his own purposes. The United Nations, in enforcing law and order, must deal equally sternly with either of these two types of mutineer.

The failure by the United Nations to distinguish between legal and illegal authorities led to the most ludicrous results, embarrassing both to the Ghanaian forces who were called upon to carry them out, and to the UN itself which was exhibited in a ridiculous light. For instance, the very troops which Ghana sent to help the legitimate Lumumba Government, at the request of Mr. Lumumba, were employed by the UN in preventing Mr. Lumumba, the legitimate Prime Minister of the legal Government of the Congo Republic, from performing the most obvious of his duties—for instance, using his own radio station. (1)

The UN was invited to enter the Congo in a message from the Head of State, Mr. Kasavubu, and the Prime Minister, Mr. Lumumba. Both these gentlemen were appointed to their respective offices in accordance with the Constitution and with the will of the Congolese people expressed through elections. This was the legal Government which should be supported and behind which the United Nations should throw its weight and authority. From the very beginning Ghana like other Afro-Asian countries demanded the withdrawal of foreign troops as Belgium even sent mercenaries recruited from Europe and the US.

Ghana contended that these proposals, if accepted, would result in the withdrawal of all non-African troops from the Congo and make it easy to identify and eliminate the Belgian troops who had been infiltrating into the territory in defiance of the SC resolutions.
In the 961st Plenary Meeting, 7.3.61, Ghana gave a brief history of the Force Publique in order to trace out the roots of the present evil. The Force Publique was founded some seventy years ago by King Leopold II of the Belgians in his capacity as personal ruler of the Congo, and its object was to enforce what was known as "King Leopold's System".\(^1\) That system was described by the UK Foreign Secretary of the day, Lord Lansdowne, as "bondage under

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1. Official Records

Page : 5
the most selfish character". This army of King Leopold was allowed to live on the land in return for assisting him to enforce such tyranny.

Ghana declared that it had been the consistent policy of Ghana throughout that the Force publique should be disarmed and reorganized. It took the same view on this issue when the Force publique still professed allegiance to the Government of Patrice Lumumba, when the Force publique was divided into a number of commands some of which supported the legitimate government of Mr. Gizenga, and some of which comprised the private armies of Tshombe, Mobutu and Kalonji. (1)

The Ghana proposal was that all these forces should be disarmed irrespective of whom they were serving. It was impossible for a country like the Congo to be ruled by a military organization steeped in a colonialist tradition of brutality and organized for the purpose of suppressing popular liberties in an inhuman fashion.

Then Ghana referred to the Berlin Conference of 1885. The Berlin Conference was a gathering of the fourteen most important nations of the world at that time, and they included the US, the UK, Czarist Russia and France, whose successors in title provided four out of the five permanent members of the SC. The only interested parties not represented were the inhabitants of Africa whose welfare and progress it was the ostensible object of the Conference to assist. From the point of view of the Powers attending, it would be impossible to quarrel with the proposals of the Conference which were to exclude colonial rivalry—the cold war of those days—from Africa by friendly agreement on how the continent should be divided up.

1. Official Records
The settlement arrived at by the Conference of Berlin was of course no settlement of the African problem. It split up the continent arbitrarily, dividing peoples of the same ethnic or historical background and drew frontiers through old established lines of trade and communications. It ushered in for Africa an era of unparalleled colonial oppression. \(^1\)

In the same way as Africa was broken up into colonies by the great Powers in their own interests, so the Congo was in danger of being fragmented into small States—the clients of one or other of the great Powers. There was danger of this being done, either directly, as in the case of the separatist movement in Katanga, or indirectly by means of a federation imposed through outside pressure which might dismember the Congo as effectively as if it had been formally partitioned into separate States.

Ghana noted that the confidence of the uncommitted countries in the administration of the UN enterprise in the Congo was being destroyed by a series of contradictory and inconsistent acts by the United Nations administration on the spot.

At one stage in the affairs of the Congo, the UN authorities on the spot considered that their mandate of non-interference in the internal affairs of the Congo nevertheless entitled them to prevent the Prime Minister of the Congo, Patrice Lumumba, from broadcasting at Leopoldville radio station. He was, in fact, forcibly prevented from doing so by the Ghanaian troops under UN command. The action of the troops on this occasion was entirely consistent with Ghana's policy of supporting the UN, although, on this occasion, the Government of Ghana considered that the action of the UN was a most improper interference in the internal affairs of the Congo and an abuse of the powers granted to the UN forces by the Security Council.

\(^1\) Official Records 961 Plenary Meeting Dt.: 7.3.61 Page: 7
If it was proper for Ghanaian troops to stop Patrice Lumumba from broadcasting at Leopoldville radio station, why was it not equally proper for Swedish troops at Elisabethville airport to intervene to save Lumumba's life? Why were the Ghanaian troops at Fort Franqui forbidden to intervene to prevent the arrest of Lumumba by the Force publique? How was it possible to argue that the United Nations had authority to prevent Lumumba from broadcasting yet lacked authority to prevent him from being murdered? asked Ghana.

At one time UN authorities interpreted their mandate as giving them power to close the airfields of the Congo so as to prevent the Lumumba Government from moving troops to put down the rebellious forces in Katanga province despite the fact that the Secretary-General had given an explicit undertaking that the Central Government would not be hindered in any way in using its own resources to restore law and order. In contrast to this, the United Nations authorities on the spot had apparently no authority to seize the military aircraft delivered to Tshombe by a US aircraft. These aircrafts were admittedly shipped aboard a US Globemaster. They were apparently part of a consignment of aircraft being provided to Belgium under the auspices of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. It was known that they were manufactured in France and that the aircraft carrying them to Katanga stopped in Malta for some days for repairs. All the countries concerned, the US, whose aircraft carried these planes; France, where they were manufactured; Belgium, which had ordered them on NATO account, and the UK, through whose colonial territories they passed, denied any knowledge or complicity in the matter.

Ghana asked representatives to pause for a moment and to imagine what type of speeches would have been made in the Assembly if these aircraft had been manufactured in
— Czechoslovakia for Poland, under the terms of the Warsaw Pact, and then had been delivered to Stanleyville in Soviet aircraft which had stopped for repairs and refitting in Romania on its way out.

It was difficult to escape the conclusion that there were highly paid officials in Belgium and France who were in a position to organize the wholesale disregard of the Security Council resolutions, and who did not appear to be subject to any penalties either from the French or from the Belgian Government for what they had done, alleged Ghana.

The supply of arms to one side was bound up with the failure of the UN to exercise any control over the financial dealings of Katanga and Belgium. Through the control of the Congo banking facilities, the Belgian Government or, if not the Belgian Government itself, financial interests in Belgium closely associated with the Government had money at their disposal to hire mercenaries from abroad and to purchase the most modern and up-to-date arms and munitions. Indeed, the UN officials on the spot seemed to have looked at this issue in the most narrow and bureaucratic sense. This played completely into the hands of those Belgian interests which were financing Mobutu, Kalonji, Tshombe and Kasa-Vubu.

Ghana continued, when the Congo became independent in July 1960, it inherited a public debt of roughly £350 million sterling. The servicing and redemption of this debt required almost a quarter of the Congo's annual budget. The greater part of this debt had been incurred in the development of Katanga province, a development which, incidentally, permitted the Union Miniere and other industrial enterprises to make large profits. In exchange for this debt, the Congo Government inherited a portfolio of some £240 million sterling of assets which were mainly situated in Katanga and which included a large holding in the Union Minieres. If the Government of the
Congo was to have access to these assets, or was to be able to discharge its obligations with regard to the public debt, it had to have control over Katanga, in which the assets were situated and which provided 60 per cent of the national revenue.

A speedy reassertion of the authority of the Central Govt. of the Congo was therefore necessary, not only upon political grounds, but for strictly financial reasons. If the Govt. had access neither to the assets in Katanga nor to the revenue derived from the province, then it could only meet its liabilities by borrowing from the Central Bank.

By the time of independence, however, all control over the Congo Central Bank had passed to the Belgian National Bank. In the months before independence the Belgian Govt. allowed an unprecedented flight of capital from the Congo to take place. In consequence, the Congo Central Bank found itself unable to meet its obligations. The Belgian National Bank thereupon agreed to guarantee the Central Congo Bank on two conditions. First, the Central Bank's total gold and currency reserves were to be removed from the Congo and lodged in Belgium. Secondly, the monetary policy of the Central Bank was to be agreed with the Belgian National Bank.

When the Govt. of Patrice Lumumba came into power at independence, it found as a result of this dis-organization caused by the mutiny of the Force publique, by the withdrawal of Belgian administrative staff and by the separation of Katanga, that revenue was only one-tenth of what it had been before independence. On the other hand, despite the separation of Katanga and the departure of the Belgian civil servants, essential expenditure still remained at two-thirds of its original figure.

The only way in which this gap between revenue and expenditure could be bridged was by advances from the Central Bank. The Central Bank, however, could not do this without the concurrence
of the Belgian National Bank which refused assistance.
Mobutu’s engineered rebellion was successful largely because
the Lumumba regime was in danger of being unable to pay the
soldiers or to meet other public expenditures.

Ghana reiterated that this was a typical case of concealed
colonialism in which independence was theoretically granted,
but was in fact denied by the exercise of the most powerful
financial pressures, capable of making or breaking any
government.

What fatally compromised the UN administration in Leopoldville
was that as soon as Mobutu, with outside assistance, usurped
the authority of the Central Government, it threw behind him
the whole weight of the Monetary Council which incidentally
was not even set up until after his rebellion.

Ghana also alleged that Tshombe had admitted that the commander
of Patrice Lumumba’s guard was a Belgian and even the doctor
who certified his death was of Belgian nationality and apparently
a Belgian official. Visitors to Elisabethville reported that
military executive functions were in the hands of Belgian
Nationals.

Ghana demanded that the Belgian troops must all be expelled
whether they were themselves volunteers or not. In regard to
Belgian civil technicians, there could be no objection to
teachers, doctors and the like carrying on with their work.
However, Belgians controlling the banks and monetary policies
of the Congo must be expelled if the Congolese people were to
be in a position to assert an independent monetary policy of
their own.

Ghana then cited British Press reports which the Belgian
Government never denied, that between 11 July 1960, the day
upon which Tshombe set up his so-called "independent State",
and 8 September, more than one hundred tons of arms and
ammunition were flown from Brussels to Katanga including mortars, submachine guns and FN automatic rifles. Twenty-five Belgian air force aircraft were transferred to the Katanga government. Eighty-nine Belgian officers and non-commissioned officers who had previously served with the Force publique, were seconded by Belgian non-commissioned officers and technicians were sent to Elizabethville from Brussels. In addition, Belgium transferred from the Kamina base great quantities of arms and ammunition to the Katanga army.

The Soviet Union delivered to the legitimate Government one hundred military trucks and twenty-nine Ilyushin civil transport aircraft accompanied by two hundred technicians. This demonstrated African fears about the danger of the cold war being fostered and established in Africa were real.

Ghana demanded that all foreign diplomatic missions and representatives should immediately be recalled from the Congo by their respective Governments.

Ghana suggested, therefore, that there should be an end to the intrigues in the Congo, and that all missions, including those of African States, should be withdrawn so that there was only one centre of outside influence, the UN.

Connected with this proposal was its next proposal that all sea and air ports in the Congo should be occupied immediately by the UN. Unless this was done, each of the great powers would suspect that the other was in fact delivering arms, aircraft and munitions to one side or the other.

Ghana's last proposal was the release of all political prisoners, the reconvening of the Congolese Parliament, the establishment of a legitimate Government, the holding of a general election under UN supervision and the reassertion of territorial integrity of the State as provided in the SC
finally Ghana put forward four measures:

(1) The UN Command in the Congo must immediately fulfill its duty to maintain law and order and to preserve the integrity of the Republic. The maintenance of law and order included the enforcement of the Constitution and the laws of the Congo as at present existing. The UN command could no longer remain neutral between order and disorder.

(2) The UN civil and military command in the Congo must be reorganized so that the initiative in producing a solution comes primarily from the African States with military support from the uncommitted countries of Asia and elsewhere.

(3) All initiative and aid from Powers outside Africa, and particularly from those countries which were allied in pacts against one another, must cease. The flow of arms and equipment into the Congo provided conditions which would lead to a civil war of the Spanish type, or worse with grave consequences for the whole world.

(4) As soon as the military situation was stabilized, the Congolese Parliament should meet under UN protection normally in accordance with the Constitution. In order that the will of the people might prevail, new general election should be held as soon as possible under UN supervision and under conditions free from intimidation and violence.

Cuba alleged that in the first place, the UN forces failed to act against the intervening forces, the purpose for which they had been summoned. They waited long enough for the first disagreement to arise there. When that was not enough,
they allowed time and opportunity for the second dissension to arise. Lastly, during the occupation of the radio stations and airfields they made it possible for the so-called "third man" to come forward. In the Congo, his name was Mobutu. (1) Cuba quoted Time Magazine, defender of monopolies and stated that Mobutu became a frequent visitor to the US Embassy and had long talks with officials there. One afternoon in Sept., 1960, Mobutu conferred with officers at Camp Leopold and won their vociferous support. That night he went to Radio Congo - the same Radio Congo that Lumumba had not been allowed to use and abruptly announced that the Army was assuming power. All this happened after frequent visits to and lengthy conversations with, officials of the United States Embassy. Cuba complained that the hand of the colonial interests had been plain and obvious in the Congo, and in Cuban view was, consequently, that a mistake had been made, that colonialist interests were favoured and that all the facts indicated that the people of the Congo, and right in Congo, were on the side of the only leader who remained there defending his country's interests namely, Lumumba.

The UAR declared that the UN went to the Congo invited by the legitimate Government of the Congo, which was born the same day of independence and was, so to speak, its fruition, entrusted with the realization of two aims - to safeguard the independence of the Congo and to preserve its national unity. The first necessitated the withdrawal of imperialist armies, the second imposed the necessity of removing the artificial barriers whereby imperialism and its agents sought to disrupt the country's unity and divide its people.

But the UAR regretted to note that the legitimate national govt. of the Congo was unable to function, while the dissident group, manipulated by imperialism, alone had a free hand in Katanga. It was a situation which was dangerously deteriorating, but the greatest danger was that all this happened while the
flag of the UN was flying over the Congo. How did it happen? Who was responsible for it? These were questions to which everybody had the right—nay, the duty—to answer not for the sake of the Congolese people alone, but also and equally for the sake of the UN and the honour of its flag. (1)

It seemed hardly necessary for Thailand to say that the UN had more than fulfilled its expectations. (2) In the delicate and complex situation in the Congo the UN rendered the most valuable services and it continued to do so. It saved the Congo, and perhaps the whole world, from chaos. The Secretary-General, Mr. Hammarskjold, and all his associates deserved high commendation and gratitude. The Secretary-General in particular, in the face of the most difficult circumstances, showed a keen insight, great courage and wisdom.

According to Pakistan the threat of unilateral intervention by the great Powers in the heart of Africa, and the consequent danger to peace in the African continent, had not been removed. If Africa was to be saved from becoming an area of conflict between the East and the West, it was imperative for the UN to play a positive and impartial role there. It believed that as far as possible the Secretary-General endeavoured scrupulously to comply with the spirit and the letter of the resolutions of the Security Council (3).

Nepal opined that the territorial integrity and the political independence of the Congo should be preserved, secondly, every assistance to the Congo of a military nature should be channelled through the UN agency. This was the only way in which the Congo could be kept out of the cold war and the ramifications of power rivalries so as to enable the Congolese people to pursue

1. Official Records 873rd Plenary Meeting date: 27.9.60 Page: 147
2. Official Records 874th Plenary Meeting date: 27.9.60 Page: 156
3. Official Records 878th Plenary Meeting date: 29.9.60 Page: 236
their economic and political destiny in accordance with their 
wishes and without external pressure of any kind; thirdly, 
financial assistance should be made available through 
voluntary contributions by Members, and placed under UN control 
to help the Congolese people back on their feet. Nepal also 
urged African leaders to play a constructive role in solving 
the differences between the Congolese leaders. Regionalism 
or even nationalism must not be carried to the extent of 
others’ exclusion. (1)

While speaking on the Congo crisis India observed that the 
role of the UN was a mediatory one: to reconcile and to help 
in the proper functioning of the Central Government. (2) Help 
in the development of the Congo was again a tremendous and 
long-term problem. Ultimately it was the people of the Congo 
who would have to produce their own leadership, whether it 
was good or bad. Leadership could not be imposed, and any 
attempt to do so would lead to conflict. The UN obviously 
could not act all the time as policeman, nor should any 
outside Power intervene. There was at present an elected 
Parliament in the Congo, though it did not appear to be 
functioning. It should be the function of the UN to help 
this Parliament to meet and function so that, out of its 
deliberations the problems of the Congo might be dealt with 
by the people themselves. Decisions must be those of the 
Parliament as representing the people of the Congo, and not 
of others the functioning of Parliament might itself lead to 
the ironing out of internal differences.

India continued that the Security Council repeatedly laid 
stress on Belgian military personnel’s leaving the Congo. 
These decisions had apparently not been given full effect. 
That was highly undesirable. It seemed to be of great

1. Official Records 878 Plenary Meeting Page: 253 Dt. 29.9.60
2. Official Records 882nd Plenary Meeting date: 3.10.60 
Page: 327
importance, in view both of past history and present conditions, that every type of Belgian military or semimilitary personnel should leave the Congo. The General Assembly might well consider sending a delegation to the Congo to find out what foreign troops or other personnel, apart from those sent on behalf of the UN, were still there and how far they were interfering in local affairs.

Senegal did not see the relationship between the Congo issue and the structure of the UN. The problem of structure was raised in connexion with many other questions, in particular the question of increasing the membership of the Councils, which showed that, in the minds of those who were raising it, the Congo issue was merely one of many pretexts. But it knew that if the office of Secretary-General were abolished or transformed into a board of directors, the problem, far from being resolved, would be further complicated.

Secondly, it was opposed to any suggestion that UN troops should be withdrawn, just as it was against any suggestion for a trusteeship.

Thirdly, the Congo issue should be regarded as essentially an African problem. The African countries should come to an agreement on a common platform to be adopted by the UN.(1)

Mali reiterated that ever since the United Nations intervened in the Congo all the difficulties, real or fictitious, came invariably from the same men: Tshombe, Kalonji, Mobutu and Kasa-Vubu. With regard to the last mentioned, it must be remembered that he held directly from the UN General Assembly powers which the legal representatives of the Congolese people did not recognize. The UN saw fit to impose on the Congo the person of Mr. Kasa-Vubu under the protection of Mobutu, whom it generously rewarded - Mobutu, a former sergeant of the Force publique, an intelligence agent of the Belgian Deuxieme Bureau, who was made a colonel through the good offices

1. Official Records 967th Plenary Meeting
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of a general in the UN force after having been maliciously foisted on Lumumba as military adviser. That was the UN's poisoned gift to the Prime Minister of the Congo at his own request, which had been skilfully suggested to him, fumèd Mali.

Mali then narrated the story of Lumumba's death. Lumumba, the Prime Minister, despairing of his cause, decided to leave his home at Leopoldville under the protection of the blue helmets and to go back to Stanleyville, where he hoped to rejoin his wife, who was mourning the death of their young child. At that moment in the history of the Congo something particularly horrible happened: Mobutu managed to obtain helicopters from the UN military Command to pursue Lumumba through the bush. The latter was soon overtaken and after disgraceful parleys the blue helmets who he hoped would protect and defend him simply handed him over to Mobutu, who exposed him before the flash-bulb photographers of the world press. Acts so degrading to those who committed them led everybody believe that there was no longer any respect for legality or sense of honour or any room for the confidence which the African-Asian States persisted in placing in the UN. (1)

Mali noted that several delegations of States which had furnished contingents to the UN for its operation in the Congo declared on many occasions that their troops had not been used for the officially announced purpose. As far as Mali was concerned, its battalion was simply placed at the disposal of the Katanga authorities to protect the Belgians and their Tshombe, against the wrath of the Congolese patriots in Katanga, who clinged fiercely to the territorial integrity of their country. The Malian soldiers naturally refused to carry out the vile tasks assigned to them and Tshombe complained of treachery, declaring - quite groundlessly - that the Malians had turned their weapons against Katanga.

1. Official Records 967th Plenary Meeting. Page: 56 Date: 24.3.61
Mali quoted a young army officer who served in the UN command in the Congo. He wrote Gendarmerie platoons existed for that purpose to which Belgian military contingents were transferred automatically and compulsorily. Measures were under way which would bring the total of this repressive Gendarmerie to the astronomical figure of 7,000. This Gendarmerie was patrolling night and day, armed with automatic weapons; it acted provocatively, searched houses, maltreated, arrested and massacred unarmed people. At Albertville, on 24 August 1960, over a hundred victims, ten of whom were killed in a cold-blooded shooting in the streets of the African quarter; at Nyunzu, on 5 October 1960, Congolese demonstrators massacred with automatic weapons, resulting in twenty-three dead and fifteen wounded on the only four-kilometre stretch investigated out of a total length of fifty kilometers.

In fact everywhere in Katanga the colonial administration continued on its old footing. The whole former system was retained, even down to the portrait of King Baudouin I of Belgium, which was on the walls of all the administrative offices. (1)

Saudi Arabia reasoned why Belgium engineered the Katanga separatist move to secede from the Congo. Katanga was called, by the Belgians in their own French, "the geological scandal". Because of the variety and quantity of its mineral riches, it was a scandal of wealth. It produced 8 per cent of the world's copper, 60 per cent of the uranium of the Western world, 72 per cent of the world's cobalt, 80 per cent of its industrial diamonds, as well as important quantities of gold, zinc, cadmium, manganese, columbium and tantalum.

Under Belgian rule, Katanga contributed 60 per cent of the revenues of the Congo. Katanga was the economic heart of the Congo. Without Katanga, the Congo would be miserably poor.

1. Official Records 967th Plenary Meeting Page : 57
Dt. 24.3.61
A blessing by nature, these riches of Katanga were converted into a curse upon the people of the Congo by policies of imperialism. These blessings were veritably reduced to a curse. Having failed to silence the cry of independence in the Congo, Belgium aimed at partitioning the Congo and nothing could be more fatal nor deal it a more mortal blow than to carve Katanga, the economic heart of the Congo.

It was against this background that Belgium conceived a double-edged policy against the Congo: secession on the one hand, and aggression on the other. Belgium placed its troops at Tshombe's disposal. A Belgian commander took control of the army. Belgium ordered its civil servants, the colons of Belgium who had fled to Rhodesia, to return to Katanga under the heavy penalty of economic sanctions. Belgium warned the UN to keep its troops out of Katanga and began to lobby Western countries to recognize Katanga's independence. In a word, Belgium spared no effort to establish Katanga under the suzerainty of Belgium with Tshombe as its puppet.

In its report to the UN, the Conciliation Commission for the Congo referred to the army of Tshombe as being officered by large numbers of Belgians and other foreign elements. The Commission came to the conclusion that considerable sums of money at the disposal of Tshombe came from foreign, particularly Belgian, sources, and that the Belgian Union miniere financed the Katanga authorities to an appreciable extent. In his second report to the Secretary-General, Mr. Dayal gave a full account A/4557 and Add. 1 of the military and paramilitary, as well as the civilian, personnel of Belgium in Katanga. In the same report, Mr. Dayal described the Belgian influence as "omni-present" - a very eloquent expression by Mr. Dayal. Instead of the UN being omnipresent, Belgium became omnipresent, and the UN was "omni-absent" from the Katanga province, regretted S. Arabia. (1)

1. Official Records 971 Plenary Meeting Page :131
S. Arabia demanded that Belgium should get out of the Congo; and, to allay fears here or there, let everyone decree the neutrality of the Congo—not as belonging to the West, not as belonging to the East, not as being communist, not as being Western, but as being Congolese, as being really the Congo. Let UN Africanize the Congo. With Belgium out of the Congo, the prospects for peace, for unity and for progress in the Congo could be established on solid ground. The moment Belgium pulled out of the Congo, all these so-called states, including Katanga, would disappear and a unified Congo would emerge.

According to Niger the Congo was an immense country whose very diverse national regions formed what the colonial administration had designated as provinces. Traditionally administered from Leopoldville, the capital of a unitary State, these provinces did not enjoy the autonomy which would have allowed them to develop fully within the structure of a federal State. There was doubtless a certain degree of administrative decentralization; but only local political institutions could have sufficiently taken into account the crystallization of interests, the self-awareness which had come into being around each of the little capitals constituted by Bukavu, Elisabethville, Stanleyville etc.

The birth to political life of these provinces constituted in reality the foundation of the new Congolese structure. Around each of the new capitals, national sentiment had crystallized and the leaders had begun to recover their prestige. Already they were speaking of consulting together. "Why, in such circumstances, try to impose solutions which, far from bringing about an alleviation of the sufferings of the country, would contribute to creating new difficulties for it"? inquired Niger. (1)

1. Official Records 974th Plenary Meeting date: 3.4.61 Page: 157
In Moroccan opinion there were more or less four causes of the deterioration of the Congo crisis.(1)

First, the weakness of the UN towards Tshombe. It was paradoxical to see an international organization making contact with the governor of a province and thus investing him with the importance which the Belgian Government wished him to possess instead of confining its contacts to Mr. Lumumba's Central Government and treating the Belgian Government firmly as being responsible for all the obstacles placed in the path of the United Nations mission.

Secondly, the physical elimination of the opposition. This elimination was directed not only against the leaders who were its victims, but more especially against the policy which those leaders represented: the policy courageously followed by the legal Government of Mr. Gizenga because Prime Minister Lumumba was often accused of calling for Soviet military assistance; and it was said that, for this reason, he had made many enemies in the Western Camp. If this were the only good reason, it should also apply to Mr. Kasa-Vubu, who signed the same appeal to the Soviet Union for military assistance. It was therefore clear that what neocolonialism disliked was not Mr. Lumumba himself, but his pure, free and courageous nationalism, as subsequently displayed in his letter to Mrs. Lumumba. Mr. Kasa-Vabu, on the other hand, was given a seat in the United Nations.

Thirdly, the accrediting of Mr. Kasa-Vubu's delegation to the United Nations—a political act which helped to inaugurate the policy of crime. Prime Minister Lumumba was naturally discouraged. In order to continue the struggle, he escaped.

Fourthly, the coup d'etat of a pre-fabricated colonel, who became more and more important as the struggle against democracy and Congolese legality became fiercer. The United Nations...
Nations bore the responsibility for negotiating with him, instead of obeying the law of the land and negotiating only with the Minister of National Defence, Mr. Lumumba, and with the general commanding the Congolese armed forces.

Then Morocco suggested five measures:

1. Belgian military and para-military personnel and Belgian political advisers must be immediately and unconditionally withdrawn, under penalty of sanctions which should be specified by the Security Council and approved by the General Assembly at that session.

2. The same position should be taken with regard to any other country whose nationals fell within the scope of the resolutions which were adopted.

3. Security measures should be immediately agreed upon for the protection, when Parliament reconvened, of the elected representatives and of the successors of those who had been killed. Naturally, this should be preceded by the freeing of the political leaders.

4. An investigation of the economic and financial situation must be made, and Belgium should be asked to account for the State's missing gold—within the framework of the Country's sovereignty, and in co-operation with the recognized Central Government.

5. The UN should in the future maintain relations only with the recognized Central Government, and should deal with the various provincial governors only in regard to local questions and through the responsible civil and military officials in those areas....

On 12th July, the Congolese Government asked for UN military assistance to protect the national territory of the Congo.
against external aggression. Two days later, the Security Council called upon Belgium to withdraw its troops from the Congo and authorised the Secretary General to provide the Congolese Government with such military assistance as might be necessary until the national security forces might be able to meet fully their tasks. In less than 48 hours, the UN troops, supplied largely by neutral powers, including Asian and African states, began to arrive in the Congo. Simultaneously, UN civilian experts were rushed to the Congo to help ensure the continued operation of essential public services.

At its peak strength, the UNF (UN Force) totalled more than 20,000 officers and men... The main instructions of the SC to this multinational force were to protect the Congo from outside interference, particularly by eliminating foreign mercenaries from Katanga, where secessionist activities were the most serious threat to the country's territorial integrity. In February 1963, after Katanga had been reintegrated into the national territory of the Congo, a phasing out of the UNF was begun. At the request of the Congolese Govt., however, the General Assembly authorised the stay of a reduced number of troops for a further six months. The Force was completely withdrawn by 30th June, 1964.

But the civilian aid continued in the largest single programme of assistance ever undertaken by the world organization and its agencies, with some 2,000 experts at work in the nation at the peak of the programme in 1963-64. By early 1970, there were still some 270 international experts working in many sectors of the country's life...
Peace-keeping role of the UN in the Congo in 1960s though welcome by the Third World faced an avalanche of criticism for the ways things were carried out. The I.C.J. laid down the definition of peace keeping in Certain Expenses of the UN case as a non-coercive operation carried on with the consent of the State and within its territory. The essential distinction is that enforcement action is hostile, coercive and directed against a state, while peace keeping is not. In the Congo, the UN resorted to the so called "preventive diplomacy", trying to "hold the ring" against intervention by rival Super Powers by creating a UN "presence".

UN intervention was solicited by the legitimate state authority of the Congo apprehending breaking down of law and order, anarchical chaos, secession and blood-letting. The intervention got the approbation of the Third World but its operation could never rise above criticism. For one thing, the Congo crisis was multi-faced. There were departing Power's interests and men in uniform who assisted the break-away leaders. Belgium was NATO member and therefore the African states suspected covert Western compliance. The seceding Katanga was the financial hub of the Congo where Tshombe and Co were well protected by mercenaries. Unless these mercenaries were driven out of the country and the Force Publique stripped off unlimited police powers, the African contingent of the Third World believed the crisis would deepen. They had a grievance against the white colonial rulers born-out of a deep-seated treachery that the latter had indulged in the infamous Berlin Congress of 1885. At a time it seemed to have assumed a straight fight between the black and the white. Many of the Third World countries wanted the UN command force to be composed of troops drawn from Afro-Asian countries. So that the blue helmeted men remained neutral.
Accusations were hurled at the Secretary General also, although the poor soul died in harness, in his mission to restore peace there in the Congo. Barring a few African countries who criticized the UN operation, the majority of the Third World offered bouquets. Had there been no intervention the Congo would have slipped into the morass of international power politics. True that the African states were the victims of a spoliation system where the black people suffered most than anyone else on earth. Asian colonialism was not that brutal and de-humanizing. But converting the Secretary General's post into a kind of Board of Directors or Troika as proposed by the Soviet Union would not obliterate the partisan paranoia.

By and large the Third World throws its weight on UN intervention wherever it is sought for, be it the Congo, Cyprus or the middle East. The type of peace-keeping job that the UN was required to do in the Congo was the first of its kind and as an apprentice it was likely to make some mistakes and could well claim a beginner's margin of faults. As for the composition of the UN forces mostly they are recruited from non-aligned or un-strung nations. The Congo operation as a whole did find commendation from the Third World and mitigated the birth pangs of a nation through its meaningful midwifery. But it ruined the UN financially.

In the Congo crisis the Third World lent support to the UN intervention not because it was perfectly just and good but because it averted the graver evil viz. intervention by some Big Power or converting Congo into a chess board of power politics. The UN intervened and ultimately the problem was settled. And in all the Third World lent its support. It criticised the UN for its deficiencies in performance but ultimately supported the UN action. Here also the Third World through the GA played some creative role, though marginally.