THIRD WORLD AND THE PROBLEM OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS.

The idea of human rights for long was confined to the boundaries of sovereign states, evolved as an instrument of revolt against tyrannical or authoritarian regimes. Its precursors were English Bill of Rights, 1689, American Bill of Rights, 1776 and finally the French Declaration of the Rights of Man after the revolution of 1789. All those Bills of Rights and the Declaration stressed certain inalienable rights of man—liberty, property, security and resistance to oppression. Together they enumerated in particular—freedom of speech, of the press, of religion, and from arbitrary arrest. But the Covenant of the League made no mention of human rights.

The Covenant of the League of Nations had envisaged sponsoring only the protection of certain categories of men: national minorities and populations of territories controlled by other countries. The International Labour Organization was the only agency with a broad mandate, limited moreover to the protection of the rights of workers as such.

President Roosevelt laid down four freedoms in January 1941,—freedom of speech, freedom of worship, freedom from want, freedom from fear" everywhere in the world." The human rights provisions of the Charter, as finally adopted, were due largely to the efforts of certain small countries at San Francisco and also of forty-two private organizations who sent their representatives as consultants to the U.S. delegation. By their
energetic lobbying they could push through suggestions one of which culminated in the insertion of Article 63 which required the ECOSOC to set up a Commission on Human Rights. The delegations of Chile, Cuba and Panama all put forward proposals to include provisions which would have made the U.N. guarantee the protection of specified human rights. Panama even urged the incorporation of a bill of rights. None of these proposals were accepted because the great majority of govt., including all the great sponsoring powers, were unwilling to give the new organization the wide powers which such provisions would have implied. (1)

As contemplated by Article 68 of the Charter the Commission on Human Rights had its first regular session on 27 January 1947 in an atmosphere of tense East-West -- confrontation. The Commission, originally composed of eighteen members of different nationalities and diverse occupations, was guided by an accurate instinct in its decision to work out before anything else an international declaration having the character of a manifesto of organized mankind. In less than eighteen months, it prepared a first draft which it submitted to the G.A. and which, at the end of one hundred sessions of elevated, often impassioned discussion, was adopted in the form of thirty articles on December 10, 1948. By its very existence this Declaration, which was thereafter called Universal and which does not have a juridically obligatory character, constituted a historical event of the first magnitude.

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Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt representing the U.S. and the Chairwoman of the Commission, said that the Declaration "was not a treaty or international agreement and did not impose legal obligations; it was rather a statement of principles of inalienable human rights setting up a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations"...(1)

Of the eight states abstaining, as against forty eight voting, at the time of the ballot, six invoked the Declaration as if they had voted. All the states subsequently admitted to the U.N. actively supported it, if not inserted parts of it in their constitutions.

The Commission on Human Rights duly constituted in 1946 was instructed to draft an International Bill of Rights which would have three parts - a declaration, a covenant and measures of implementation. Although the composition and adoption of the Declaration were relatively easy and happily successful, the other two leaves of the triptych making up the Charter of Human

Rights were much more difficult and time consuming to work out. The preliminary draft composed by the commission dealt with the traditional rights like freedom from arbitrary arrest, the right to a fair trial, habeas corpus, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly - liberties known as civil and political rights. These apart, rights of an economic, social and cultural character - the right to work, to health, to social security, to an adequate standard of living - also formed parts of the Universal Declaration. The question arose whether the latter should be incorporated in the draft covenant or spilled over to another document. The G.A. in 1950 favoured drafting of a single covenant embodying all the rights proclaimed by the Declaration. But in 1951 it changed its mind and thereafter directed the Commission to prepare two separate covenants, each to include substantive provisions on the obligations of the state and the respective measures of application and implementation.

To Mexico all rights were of equal importance and hence it favoured one covenant. Participating in the debates on single or dual covenants the representative of Mexico considered that all Human Rights should be dealt with in a single instrument. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights constituted an indivisible whole, which could not be broken up because human rights were interrelated. The Third Committee and the G.A. would be making a serious mistake if they reversed their decision: they could not establish priorities among rights which were equally important and equally difficult to implement, any more than they could break up the Declaration... In some States, it was easier to implement economic, social and cultural rights than civil


2. Official Records - One of the main UN committees dealing with Social, humanitarian and cultural affairs, being primarily concerned with the activity of the ECOSOC under which the Commission on Human Rights was established.
and political rights: it was easier to build a hospital than to revise a code. To Mexico both categories of rights were of equal importance.

To India the two groups of rights were not of equal importance and hence India was in favour of having two separate covenants. It was, indeed, according to India, not necessarily axiomatic that the two groups of rights were equal in importance. Political and civil rights were of an absolute nature and, even making allowance for periods of national stress and emergency, governments were under the undeniable obligation of guaranteeing those rights to the citizens, and the citizens had an equal obligation to retain and exercise them. The conception of political and civil rights was also of extremely long standing, whereas the principle that the State should contribute to the welfare of the citizens by the provision of social and economic rights and amenities emerged at a much later date. Furthermore, those rights were not absolute since they admitted of degrees of application: it was impossible to lay down, for example, to precisely what standard or level of education a person had a right; it was generally conceded that only primary education should be regarded as a right, but there was no inherent reason why secondary or university education should not equally be considered as a right to which all had a claim. Lastly, there was no obligation to exercise economic, social, and cultural rights as there was in the case of political and civil rights. (1)

The last consideration was closely connected with the grave differences in political and social ideology with which the world was faced. The democratic way of life, involved the maximum of respect for individual liberty, and consequently for private initiative. Accordingly, the tradition in many countries had been and still was to entrust considerable responsibility for the great social services essential to the maintenance of cultural and economic rights to the initiative of private agencies.

Those who believed in the value of that method would naturally entertain considerable mistrust of a single covenant vesting the supreme authority with respect to those rights in the State... (1)

The fact that a proposal to that end had been rejected by the Commission on Human Rights was by implication approval for the principle of a dual covenant. The rejection of the proposal had been an expression of the healthy feeling of the majority that an attempt to combine two non-identical types of obligations and degrees of responsibility would lead to a weakening of those of an absolute nature, without any corresponding strengthening of those of a relative nature.

India, throughout its long history, had pursued the ideal of metaphysical unity with a steadfastness of elsewhere unknown and with a willingness to sacrifice many mundane benefits. Nevertheless, in the drafting of its constitution, India had confined political and civil rights to the Chapter of fundamental rights made justifiable by an appeal to the Supreme Court. Cultural and economic rights were regarded more in the nature of objectives, and the Government had to report to Parliament from time to time on their implementation. India pointed out that the categories of rights were of different importance—civil and political rights being of primary importance and the economic and civil rights of secondary importance.

Chile supported one single covenant covering all the rights. Chilean delegation felt that all rights should be embodied in a single covenant. It would be inconsistent with the provisions of those two instruments to prepare several separate covenants and authorize Member States not to sign them all. If the more advanced countries which were opposed to the inclusion of the economic, social and cultural rights were to think of the under-developed countries, they would modify their attitude. Chile was an under-developed country, but it was against

development bought at the price of poverty of the people. It had no desire for industrialization obtained at the expense of cheap labour, and it would not accept economic progress unless the working class could acquire and retain all the human rights. Hence a covenant containing only the civil rights would mean nothing to Chile: either the people already possessed them, or economic conditions would not allow them to make use of them. It was not right to adopt in 1951 a covenant more suited to 1914. (1) Chile was for one covenant covering both categories of rights.

Peru admitted that the task of drafting and ensuring the implementation of a covenant applicable to all was a tremendous one; it was hindered by prejudices, interests and basic differences of ideology. A decision on whether one or more covenants should be drafted was therefore premature, since those covenants would be referred to the Commission on Human Rights for improvements in the light of the debates in the Third Committee. (2) Although the important right to self-determination was stated in the Charter, it would be mentioned again in the covenant with advantage. To Peru the question of having one or more covenants was premature.

Philippines pointed out that the effective application of the covenant on human rights would depend very largely on international co-operation. That would apply particularly to economic, social, and cultural rights, especially in the under-developed countries. If the most enthusiastic supporters of a single covenant belonged to those countries, that was because they knew at first hand how meaningless civil and political freedoms could be when unaccompanied by economic and social rights. In the absence of adequate international assistance, the countries which had recently achieved their independence would have to embark on a lengthy struggle to place their political freedom upon a stable economic

and social foundation, and might even find themselves faced with failure which would entail for them the loss of the rights and freedoms they were seeking to secure. It was therefore necessary, in the interests of those countries, to adopt an international covenant on human rights which would merit the widest possible support. Philippines noted that the underdeveloped countries mostly were supporters of a single covenant covering both categories of rights as they knew that civil and political rights would be meaningless without economic and social rights.

To Cuba measures of implementation were much more important than the categories of rights. Cuba considered the measures of implementation to be of vital importance because the contractual force of the covenant would depend on them. It doubted the advisability of granting individuals the right of petition; the granting of that right might increase the number of complaints. Cuba laid greatest emphasis on measures of implementation and did not have much faith in the individual right of politics.

To Venezuela the effective implementation of civil and political rights depended on the goodwill of the State and its subjects; whereas such goodwill was in itself inadequate for the implementation of economic, social and cultural rights. Thus the implementation of the former rights must involve certain sanctions; whereas the implementation of the latter rights called for mutual assistance by nations. Moreover, civil and political rights which had been established for centuries might be regarded as more or less static; whereas a covenant embodying economic, social and cultural rights must be as flexible as possible in order to keep pace with the evolution of civilization.

To Venezuela the implementation of civil and political rights depended on the good will of the states and its subject - whereas that of the economic and social rights depended on mutual assistance by nations. Moreover the former were more or less static whereas the latter must be flexible.

The most important aspect of the question was the ratification of the covenant by as many states as possible. More states would probably be able to sign one of two covenants than a single covenant.

Pakistan noticed that some countries would refuse to sign a covenant covering both categories of rights. Actually there were only two reasons why a country would refuse to sign a covenant containing reasonably well defined articles on economic, social and cultural rights: either that it objected to the principle of a state guaranteeing economic, social and cultural rights to its citizens; or that it objected to entering into commitments which it might not be able to fulfil with the resources at its disposal.(1)

Mr. Husain thought, that the existence of the two covenants might be used as an excuse for failure to implement either. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was a single, unified document; it would be better to dispense with a conventional instrument altogether than to detract from its moral force by splitting up the rights it proclaimed into two separate covenants.(2)

Pakistan was arguing in favour of one covenant.

Ethiopia felt that opinions were divided on the question of drafting one or more covenants; one group held that political and civil rights had to be protected before economic, cultural and social rights could be developed, whereas the other group considered that no political and civil rights could be enjoyed

1. Official Records - 390th Plenary Meeting, Date : 16.1.1952
Page : 252

until economic, cultural and social rights were secured. In order to avoid further fruitless discussion of those conflicting views it would be advisable to recognize the interdependence and equal importance of those categories. Ethiopia instead of indulging in the debate over one or two covenants wanted to recognize the interdependence of the two categories of rights.

The Saudi Arabian delegation favoured a single covenant. It did not see the use of reaffirming once again rights which were already proclaimed in the Bible, the Korean, Magna Carta, the United States Declaration of Independence, the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, and elsewhere. The sincerity of neither side was in doubt. He did not accuse the advocates of two covenants of insincerity, but feared they were refusing to be realistic and were too little concerned about what might happen in ten years' time. Saudi Arabia was for a single covenant.

It was paradoxical that the most highly developed countries should be those opposed to a single covenant. But they should not forget that they were living in revolutionary times, that half the population of the world was suffering privations, that there was a lack of food, clothing and housing. In such a situation the threat of rebellion and the menace of war were normal. That was why the highly developed countries should set an example by signing a single covenant. They should not forget that civil and political rights were valueless if not accompanied by economic, social and cultural rights. Saudi Arabia noted that the highly developed countries were opposed to a single covenant but they should remember that civil and political rights were meaningless without economic and social rights.

1. 6th Session, 3rd Committee, 39th Plenary Meeting, p.253, Dt.16.1.52
2. Official Records- 383rd Plenary Meeting; Date : 18.1.1952 Page : 272
To Iran the two sets of rights were essentially interdependent, and ratification of the one was valueless without the other. The effect of two covenants would be rather to widen the rift between the two factions; the best way to ensure the maximum number of ratification was to draft an uncontroversial covenant, covering all rights. Iran was for one covenant as the two sets of rights were interdependent and two covenants would widen the rift between the two factions.

To Ecuador the distinction between two categories of rights was artificial, and gave rise to the possibility that one of the two proposed covenants would be regarded as being more important than the other. No convincing arguments had been raised to refute the intrinsic unity of human rights. The representatives who favoured two covenants asserted that method would promote the effective implementation of both instruments; that view seemed to be unduly pessimistic. The adoption of a single covenant would leave the door open for future general acceptance of the instrument and to any necessary amendments and extensions. Ecuador wanted one covenant for the above reasons.

According to Afghanistan if economic, social and cultural rights were not adequately protected by the covenant, man would be unable to accomplish his essential tasks and would be deprived of the qualities which made him a citizen. In those circumstances, it would be impossible for him to enjoy civil and political rights. Afghanistan felt that without the implementation of the economic, social and cultural rights, man cannot be a full citizen to enjoy civil and political rights. Afghanistan was for one covenant.

1. Official Records - 394th Plenary Meeting; Date : 19.1.1952
   Page : 279
2. Official Records - The G.A. 6th Session, 3rd Committee,
   394th Plenary Meeting; Date : 19.1.1952
   Page : 283
   Page : 284
From their bitter experience with abysmal poverty, the countries of the Third World felt and believed that civil and political rights did not appeal to empty stomachs. A man becomes conscious of his civil rights only when he gets two square meals a day, when he can support himself economically. Because the poor countries knew the meaning of hunger, malnutrition and starvation, they were insistent on the incorporation of the second set of rights. To that extent their interests coincided and converged. But beyond that line of unity divergence started. While some of them supported the idea of one covenant, others joined the chorus of another document mooted and orchestrated by most members of the First World. The idea of one covenant was rejected by the narrow majority of four and the two covenants were adopted by the G.A. in 1966.  

Though some of them shared the idea of dual covenant along with most of the First World countries, the stance taken by the Third World on the inclusion of the colonial clause in the covenant was unanimous and rigid. It could not compromise with anything colonial. The Indian delegation, a supporter of two covenants, felt convinced that the colonial clause would give the metropolitan powers the right to impose their will upon the peoples of NSGT. It was paradoxical to Syria that the colonial powers that had often been the first to violate the right of self-determination posed as champions of NSG countries. The retention of colonial clause would deprive the fundamental rights of millions of human beings. Since the whole colonial system was based upon discrimination, Saudi Arabia, urged the metropolitan powers to grant the peoples in their colonies enjoyment of human rights, even at

the risk of rebellion or rather liberation. The Saudi
delegation opposed the inclusion in the covenant on human
rights of a colonial clause or any clause resembling it.\(^{(1)}\)
The colonial clause was ultimately jettisoned as a result
of aggregated pressure of the Third World.

With regard to the provisions for implementation, Syria
regretted that the method of international inspection was
not mentioned, although survey missions were already commonly
used by the specialized agencies. The establishment of the
petition system and the appointment of an attorney - general
seemed interesting ideas, but international inspection, with
adequate guarantees of impartiality, should be considered as
an additional method.\(^{(2)}\)

Chile regretted that the commission on Human Rights had
refused to allow individuals the right of petition, even
through non-governmental organizations. The machinery for
giving effect to the civil and political rights thus offered
only the method of denunciation of one State by another a
method hardly likely to promote international understanding.\(^{(3)}\)

The representative of Liberia wondered how the international
community could adopt enforcement measures against a State
which refused to observe the provision of the covenant.
Experience had shown that governments which wished to violate
their international obligations had frequently invoked Article 2,
paragraph 7 of the U.N. Charter. His delegation recognized
that the provision in that paragraph protected small states
from any foreign intervention. However, the nature of the
'matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction
of any State' should be more clearly defined.\(^{(4)}\)

1. 5th Session, 294th Meeting, dated 26.10.50, Page 164
2. Official Records - The GA, 6th Session, 3rd Committee,
   364th Plenary Meeting, Date: 10.12.1951, Page 104.
3. Official Records - The GA, 6th Session, 3rd Committee,
   362nd Plenary Meeting, Date: 8.12.1951, Page 94.
4. Official Records - The GA, 6th Session, 3rd Committee,
   366th Plenary Meeting, Date: 12.12.1951, Page 115
Among the arguments put forward in reply were the formidable burden of handling, sifting and investigating the anticipated avalanche of complaints by individuals under a covenant of global scope and facilitating the appearance or legal representation of the petitioner in cases which the Committee of Human Rights might find a hearing necessary. The proposals for individual petitions were abandoned in 1954 when deep division in the Commission surfaced ominously. The draft covenant on economic, social and cultural rights does not contain any implementation provisions. States are required to report on progress made in following the directive principles in accordance with a programme to be established by the ECOSOC after consultation of the state parties. The draft covenant on civil and political rights urges states, within one year of becoming parties, to submit a report on the legislative or other measures adopted to give effect to the rights recognized in the covenant; further reports are to be submitted, whenever the ECOSOC upon recommendation by the Commission, and after consultation with state parties, so requests.

The debates before the G.A. went on for eighteen years i.e. during the six years of drafting the covenants and almost thirteen years of considering them. The debates also centered round the problem of peoples' right to self-determination. Once considered a principle of political and essentially collective nature the right to self-determination tried to snatch a niche in the Universal Declaration Covenants which dealt with rights exercised, separately or communally, by the individual.

According to Syria the principle of the right of peoples to self-determination had two aspects, according to whether it was considered from the domestic or the international point of view. From the domestic point of view, it took the form
of self-government, that is to say, a people's right to adopt representative institutions and freely to choose the form of government which it wished to adopt. From the international point of view, it led to independence. It mentioned President Wilson's message of 11 February, 1918, the three essential points: peoples and provinces must not be objects of bargaining; all territorial settlements must be carried out in the interests and for the benefit of the populations concerned; and lastly, all well-defined national aspirations should be given the fullest satisfaction that could be granted them without perpetuating old quarrels and antagonisms or creating new ones.\(^1\)

The principle of the right of peoples had also been sanctioned by the Atlantic Charter of 14 August 1941, the points 2 and 3 of which repudiated all territorial changes that did not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned and reaffirmed the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they would live. That instrument further provided that sovereign rights and self-government should be restored to those who had been forcibly deprived of them. International co-operation had reached its highest degree of development since the admission of independent States to the U.N. and the specialized agencies. Co-operation freely undertaken had always been the most productive type of co-operation, and the implementation of the principle of the right of peoples to self-determination was an indispensable condition in effecting co-operation in an atmosphere of peace and general understanding.\(^2\)

The problem of deciding whether the right of peoples to self-determination, which had previously been considered a principle of a political and essentially collective nature, should be

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inserted in the Covenants intended to implement the rights
proclaimed in the Universal Declaration, which was concerned
only with the rights exercised, separately or communally,
by the individual was ultimately solved by inserting this
right in both the Covenants. The solution arrived at can
be explained historically by the movement toward decolonization
and, more exactly, toward the political emancipation of
territorial entities, which was a logical outcome of the
victorious libertarian principles fostered in the course of
the Second World War...\(^{(1)}\)

In the opinion of Mexico, F.D.R. (Franklin D. Roosevelt) had
always emphasized that the powers fighting against nazism and
Japanese militarism had committed themselves to assisting the
countries of Asia and Africa in securing their independence
and the Recognition of their legal status as free and sovereign
nations.\(^{(2)}\) A true democratic spirit was required to guide
the restlessness, the spirit of revolt and the aspiration for
independence shown by various peoples in Asia and Africa along
peaceful and productive channels. If the age of conquest and
exploitation had really passed and if all the inhabitants of
the world were ensured the enjoyment of human rights, a new
day would dawn when values other than force and material wealth
would be recognized.

Mexico preferred the Spanish equivalent of "human rights" as
derchos humanos to avoid ambiguity and ensure concordance
between the letter and substance of the covenant. Similar
liking was posted by Dominican Republic because the word,"hombre" of the suggested Spanish version" derechos del hombre"
meaning human rights could mean men only as opposed to women

   Nobel Lectures Peace 1951-1970 (Vol.3),
   Page : 398 - 402, Edited by Frederick W. Haberman.

2. Official Records - The G.A., 6th Session, 3rd Committee,
   397th Plenary Meeting,
   Date : 21.1.1952, Page : 301
whereas humanos applied to the whole of mankind. The demand
was conceded and the Charter worded accordingly. Possibly
male chauvinism met with the first Women's Lib Salvo. Or
the dig was intended for the macho-minded males of the region?
The Latin Americans are said to have erected elaborate
psychological "masks" to shield themselves from a world that
they "regard instinctively to be dangerous". One such mask
is machismo, the image of the ultramasculine tough guy who
shows no emotion, whether fear, pity or love.

During the fifth session of the AD HOC Political Committee
Bolivia, Mexico, Lebanon, Chile, Dominican Republic, Thailand
and El Salvador among others censured Bulgaria, Hungary and
Romania for refusing to appoint representatives to sit on the
Commission - as suggested by the I.C.J. in its advisory opinion
dated 30.3.50 that would look into the human right violations,
civic and religious, there. The arbitrary measures adopted by
the three governments were tantamount to breach of the peace
treaties and utter disregard of the Yalta Declaration and the
accepted standards of International conduct. Word of caution
in condemning the gang of three came from 5. Africa a habitual
violator and a great defender of Article 2, para 7.

Genocide Convention.:.

The G.A. adopted the resolution on genocide unanimously on
11.12.1946 and proclaimed that the crime of genocide which
shocked the conscience of mankind was contrary to the aims
and principles of the U.N.

Venezuela declared that a human group might, however, be
destroyed not only by the physical extermination of its
members but by other methods though it continued to exist
physically. Thus the destruction of the place of worship
of a religious group deprived that group of its reason for
existence and led to its disappearance. No legislation could
refuse to take steps to condemn such atrocious crimes, which
outraged the conscience of humanity. It demanded that the convention should include a provision for the protection of religious edifices without distinction with regard to sect... (1)

Similar was the feeling of Pakistan. It said that to deprive a human group of its separate culture could destroy its individuality as completely as physical annihilation. Moreover, those guilty of the crime of mass extermination committed that crime because the existence of a community endowed with a separate cultural life was intolerable to them. In other words, physical genocide was only the means; the end was the destruction of a people's spiritual individuality. This was an oblique hint at the communal riots just after the partition which dropped primarily to safeguard minority interests... (2)

It was regrettable that the peoples who had most enriched world culture belonged, in general, to small groups, and were in most cases, of no political importance lamented Pakistan.

The reason why India accepted the genocide convention was, in spite of its various shortcomings, that ... it was a useful step towards the final goal... (3)

Egypt noticed in the convention several gaps such as the complete absence of any reference to cultural genocide or of any provision for an international penal tribunal competent to try those guilty of acts of genocide, especially in the case of responsible Governments or highly-placed officials... (4)

Panama conceded that the draft convention might contain certain deficiencies, but there were no fundamental omissions. Genocide, whether perpetrated in peace or in war, was defined in the convention as a crime against international law which the

1. Official Records 178 Plenary Meeting, Art.9,12,44, P.816-817
the signatory parties undertook to prevent and to punish. Genocide covered certain acts committed with the intent of destroying, in whole or in part, national, ethnical, racial, or religious groups.\footnote{1}

Mr. Alfaro added that punishment would be meted out to all people who committed the crime whether they were private individuals or public officials. Punishment under national legislation would also be covered but the door was left open to the possibility of establishing an international penal code. The draft convention specified that genocide would not be considered as a political crime and that extradition could be applied to those found guilty.

Commonly the 1960s are known as the U.N's African decade on the ground that there was a spate of admission of newly independent African States. Once under Colonial yoke and having experienced excruciating colonial rule, these Black African States knew to their marrow what could white domination mean. In those days Angola was not liberated and Portugal in a kind of rearguard action tried to clamp its talon hard on to its overseas possession by launching ruthless repression. Not only did it trample the human rights in utter defiance of international conscience but tampered with the provisions of Chapter IX also by not furnishing information as required by Article 73 c of the Charter. To the Third World, human right violation apart, Portuguese atrocities were a part of its crusade against colonialism and it stood solidly unified by burying their internecine hiatus momentarily. The sixteenth session of the G.A. 1961, devoted much of its time to the angry accusations and vehement rhetoric as spouted by the Third World States.

Burma accused Portugal of committing genocide in Angola as a part of its civilizing mission (once branded as whiteman's burden) and in that abominable man's laughter it was aided by certain powers, insinuating thereby some of the First World countries, particularly those who were NATO members.

Angola, described as an obscene manifestation of tyranny, flourished on forced labour which the Portuguese administration claimed it had resorted to, to balk men from living off their wives. In education the Portuguese record was dismal. There was no university in Angola and instructions were issued to fail students so that they could not go to Portugal on university scholarships. This was an instance of human right violation.

Indonesia alleged that the anachronistic practices through which Portugal tried to retain its status and wealth and perpetuate domination were possibly copied from its comrade-in-arms, the neighbouring S. Africa which too earned its notoriety for practicing apartheid and racial discrimination.

Mauritania believed that mere words would not deter the hardheaded colonial power from committing genocide in Angola. Togo declared that slavery still persisted in Angola. Denied of civil right and the right to education Angolans were ruled by settlers employing abominable methods. Angola had only one hospital bed per 2,250 people and the literacy rate stood at 27 percent in 1950. Books and newspapers were censored and passes required for travel. Corporal punishment was customary.

Iraq quoted an UNESCO source which spoke of a 7 percent Black African literacy in 1958. The whole economy being based on forced labour, only the dead were exempt from compulsory labour. No economic practice seemed more abusive of human rights than forced labour. Among other forms of repression used by the Portuguese authorities to reduce the African population to silence, the Iraqi delegation mentioned the frequency of corporal punishment. The authorities found it cheaper and more effective than imprisonment. All workers employed in urban centres, both men and women, must carry a pass book containing a complete record. A visa was to be obtained for moving from one place to another in the same territory. Deportation and the curfew were the further repressive administrative measures. The institution of assimilation, interpreted in the system of

"assimilados" and "civilizados" was designed solely to alienate a few thousands of Africans from the other millions in order to ensure Portuguese domination. The process of assimilation, of converting Africans into Portuguese, was mainly an attempt to put an end to African nationalism. Iraq cited horror stories in which Portuguese Army had executed a number of village headmen and stuck their heads as a form of reprisal. It also showed concern for the imprisoned leader, Dr. Augustinho Neto - the same maverick who drove the settlers out in 1970s as head of MPLA, one of the four factions which was aided by Russians and soldiered by Cubans. Finally, Iraq blurted out that a part of the guilt for the crimes of Salazar in Africa ought to be borne by every NATO member. The details of defiance though varied were hewed to a common theme: Portugal must pack and leave Angola.

Guinea complained that infant mortality was as high as sixty percent and the death rate among workers forty percent. For forced labour a black labourer, called a "contratados", received a pittance worth less than $40 for two years they were required to work and even that paltry sum was subject to tax. They were expected to work fourteen hours a day, including Sundays. It urged Portugal's expulsion from the NATO because western credibility to Black Africa would be nil so long as Portugal received NATO arms and First World largesse.

Congo alleged that in its desire to retain Angola the Portuguese govt. had said that Angolans were Portuguese. Elections there took place once in seven years and it was known in advance that the electors were obliged to vote for Salazar. Out of an African population of 4 million only 30,000 "assimilated" Africans had the right to vote. The political parties of African nationalism were regarded as illegal and had therefore become a clandestine movement. There was no freedom of the press and as such social,

1. Official Records - Date : 6.11.1961
   Page : 689
2. Official Records - 16th Session, 4th Committee Date : 7.11.1961
   Page : 273
political and economic abuses flourished. As for racial
discrimination, it was often clothes which determined status,
as when those who wore European clothes were allowed to enter
European restaurants. An "assimilation" card was required for
entry to certain private cinemas or theatres.

Guatemala spoke hard against the other racist regime of S. Africa
for its policy of apartheid and genocide. Since all those charges
were parts of colonialism as well as human rights the Third World
grew monolithic against the First. Thanks to the inevitable
process of history, Angola was unyoked and the event hailed
with glee all over the Third World. For that Moscow and Havana
earned its gratitude. As for, Human Rights' other violators,
Pretoria and Salisbury, the days of racial jeremiad and pregnant
non-chalance seem to be numbered as guerrilla war sputtered across
Rhodesia and unrest smouldered on in the black ghettos of S.
Africa. Majority rule was ultimately established in March 1980 in
Zimbabwe - the new name of Rhodesia.

There were deprivations of human rights even more brutal in
varying degrees of guilt in Uganda, South Korea, Chile,
Philippines, Uruguay, Cuba and Iran. Uganda's mercurial porcine
President for life, Field Marshall Idi Amin Dada, a strutting
martinet, mounted a selective genocide through his personal goon
squad, expelled a few thousand Indians from what was once "the
pearl of Africa" over the past few years ever since his ascendancy.
According to Amnesty International, he was responsible
directly or indirectly for the murder of as many as

1. There is a half-joke about DNA tinkering. Someone once
accidentally mixed the genes of Jack the Ripper with
a donkey. The reproduction was Idi Amin. According
Kenneth Kagnada, President of Zambia, he is as bad as
Hitler but many Third World heads of Govt. are unwilling
to speak aloud because of skeletons in their own cupboard.
300000 Ugandans. Amin in fact shared co-billing with Jean Bedel Bokassa of Central African Republic as "most villainous black ruler". Of the fifty govs. in Africa only five have multiparty political systems in more than name. The remainder are dictatorships of varying degrees. Fifteen are under direct military rule. Thirty have rulers who originally gained power in free elections but have decided not to risk their posts at the polls again.

South Korea's repressive presidential decrees prescribe prison terms for dissent and many well-known political, intellectual and church leaders were bundled off to jails for dissent. President Ferdinand Marcos of Philippines rules by decree and the Amnesty International accused him of torturing political prisoners. Similar charges were levelled against Shah of Iran, the rightist regime of General Pinochet in Chile and Uruguay. Restrictions on political activity still prevail in Spain and Britain admitted extensive violations of human rights in jailing dissidents in Northern Ireland. Time was when the leader of the First World, the U.S. went to bed with some of the worst regimes in the world - Franco's Spain, Salazar's Portugal and Greece under the junta. Administrative finger could be pointed at the Soviet Union and its six European clients. In fact, to quote Solzhenstyn, barring a few places the world is turned into a Gulag Archipelago from time to time to suit the needs of the triumphant forces that appear as arbiters of unsuspecting citizenry of the world. Generalized mender for reasons of state is perpetrated by leaders, who like actors in a Kabuki

1. Time March 7, 1977
drama, wear masks of ideology and expediency to suit the moment. The trouble is sovereign nations cannot allow themselves to be pushed around. (1)

In the matter of Human Rights and Genocide the Third World in the G.A. and other U.N. bodies through interest aggregation surely played a significant role. But interest aggregation could not be complete always for various reasons - Moreover some Third World states followed double standard (e.g. speaking for Human Rights in principle but violating the same at home). Had they been faithful, their interest aggregation would have been more solid and their say in these issues would have been more effective.

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1. The U.S. state department diffidently issued its first, 143 page round-up, based on reports from US embassies. Of the 82 countries that receive US aid, human rights seem to be alive and well in only 23, barely one quarter of the total. The 23 states are: Austria, Australia, Belgium, Botswana, Canada, Costa Rica, Denmark, Fiji, Finland, France, Greece, Israel (except The occupied territories), Italy, Japan, Malta, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, The UK (except Northern Ireland), Venezuela and West Germany - Time March 28, 1977.