Chapter IV

NYĀYAVĀRTIKATĀTPARYAṬIKA

The Nyāyavārtikatātparyatikā of Vācaspatimisra belongs to the old school of the Nyāya philosophy, which is, in many a case, quite different from the new one. The striking point of difference, which is an external one, is the style or the way of representing the subject-matter. To explain clearly and to avoid vagueness, the style of the Navya-Nyāya is full of technical terms like avacchinna, pratiyogī, sāmānādikaraṇya -- etc., and is, for the same reason, somewhat difficult to follow at the beginning. The style of the old school is not so much difficult; but at the same time, it has not remained so simple, because of the profound use of the same words e.g. bhāva, pramāṇa -- etc. with different meanings. The Nyāya-vārtikatātparyatikā, which is a commentary on Udyotakara's Vārtika, which itself is a commentary on Vātsyāyana's Nyāyabhāṣya -- the scholium on the Nyāya aphorisms of Gautama,

1 (a) It was published for the first time, in the Vizianagaram Sanskrit Series. It was edited by Mm. Gangādharaśāstri Telanga.

(b) The second available edition was edited by Pt. Rājeśvara Śāstri Dravid and was published by Chaukhambā Sanskrit Series in 1925.

(c) The N.V.T.T. along with the Nyāyasūtras, the the Bhāṣya, the Vārtika and Viśvanātha's Vṛttī was published in the Calcutta Sanskrit Series, in 1936. And this is the most useful edition, as it contains all the necessary texts together.
is held as one of the most authoritative works in the old school of the Nyāya philosophy.

The Tatparyaṭīkā is an elaborate commentary, whose main object was to encounter the objections raised by Buddhistic logicians. It obviously contains all the topics dealt with in the Nyāyasūtras, the Bhāṣya of Vatsyāyana and the Vārtika of Udyotakara i.e. all the problems in the Nyāya philosophy. Moreover, there are additional arguments to support Udyotakara's views and to refute especially the Buddhistic doctrines. Thus, there are hundreds of topics, treated in the N.V.T.T., by Vācaspati. Hence, to treat all these would form a separate thesis by itself. What is intended here is to discuss some problems of vital importance only and to show thereby Vācaspati's method of argumentation, original thinking and his contribution to the Nyāya system of philosophy.

(I) Authoritativeness of knowledge:

As regards the authoritativeness of knowledge, there are three contradictory theories. The Purvamāmsakas hold that the authenticity of knowledge is self-understood and there is no necessity of any pramāṇa, as knowledge is self-luminous. Thus, when we know a jar, the authoritativeness of the knowledge of the jar is also cognised. It is not necessary here to enter into details, as regards the minor differences among the Māmsakas. Still it should be noted, in brief, that according to the Prābhākaras, the knowledge that this is
a jar, according to the Bhatṭas, the inferential knowledge produced from the reason jñātatā (i.e. jñātatālingakānūmiti), and according to Murārimisra, the anuvyavāśya i.e. the knowledge that I know a jar—enable us to know the authenticity of the knowledge that 'this is a jar'. So strictly speaking, the svataḥprāmāṇya theory of knowledge can be said to be held by the Prābhākaras only. In order to include therein, the theories of the Bhatṭas and Murārimisra, the meaning of 'sva' in the svataḥprāmāṇya is to be taken as either knowledge or connected with knowledge. Anyway, all of them agree in saying that nothing like the reason saphalaprvṛttijnānakatya is necessary to know the authority of knowledge.

The followers of the Sāmkhya and the Yoga systems maintain that both the authoritativeness and the unauthoritativeness of knowledge are known by knowledge itself and the Vedāntins like the Viśiṣṭādvaitins, who share the svataḥprāmāṇya theory of knowledge, regard the anuvyavāśya jñāna or knowledge of knowledge as establishing the validity of knowledge.²

The Bauddhas, on the other hand, have propounded quite an opposite theory. According to them, the unauthoritativeness of knowledge is self-understood while the authoritativeness of knowledge is proved by inference.

The theory of the validity of knowledge is dealt with so far, with a view to serve as a proper background for the

² Kirāṇāvali, p.436.
correct understanding of the view of the Naiyāyikas, especially as it is put forth by Vācaspati. The Naiyāyikas hold the theory of the parataḥprāmāṇya. According to them, if knowledge leads to fruitful action, then alone it is valid, otherwise it is not. Thus the reason 'saphalaprayātijjanakatva' or the quality of producing fruitful activity is responsible for the validity of knowledge. Their main argument is that there would not exist any doubt at all, if each and every knowledge be self-authoritative.  

But the Naiyāyikas have to face one important difficulty that the authenticity of this inferential knowledge will not be cognized as there would be regressus ad infinitum, if one more inferential knowledge be admitted to prove its authenticity. Vācaspati, in order to get rid of this difficulty, declares that the inferential knowledge, which is produced from the prayāttisāmarthya or the fruitful activity and also that inferential knowledge, about which all doubts regarding its deviating character have been removed, are self-valid. He further points out that there would be no knowledge of reason in the absence of reason; and there would be no reason if the thing to be proved does not exist at all. Vācaspati thus wants to make a distinction between the perceptual knowledge and the inferential knowledge as regards their authoritativeness. The inferential knowledge, as it is already shown, is produced from a non-deviating reason.

3 Cf. प्रमात्व न स्वयं प्राहस्य ऋणात्युपपतिः। Kārikāvai, St.136.

4 N.V.T.T., p.12.
(avyabhicārīlingam), while the perceptual knowledge is caused by the object of perception, (the object) which is simply known as something and not as invariably leading to correct notion. Vācaspati further has shown the fact that the knowledge, derived from the verbal testimony is not produced from the object of perception, as, even in the absence of the object, the word gives rise to the verbal testimony. So, he concludes the topic by remarking that the perceptual knowledge and the knowledge produced from the verbal testimony are not self-valid but they do require, for establishing their validity, the inferential knowledge, caused by the reason pravṛttisāmarthya or fruitful activity; while this inferential knowledge is self-authoritative, as it is generated from the non-deviating reason.

Vācaspati is the first among the Naiyāyikas to put forth the clear-cut view about the authoritativeness of knowledge. The Naiyāyikas, in general, are known to be the propounders of the paratahprāmāṇya theory, without any further distinction. Vācaspati has made this distinction with a view to avoid the anavasthā or regressus ad infinitum. But, this self-authoritiveness of the inferential knowledge, pointed out in the N.V.T.T, needs further explanation. Vācaspati’s argument as such is that the inferential knowledge is produced from a non-deviating reason, and hence it is self-authoritative. To put it more exactly, that inferential knowledge, which is
based on a non-deviating reason, is self-authoritative. Here, a pertinent question may be raised as to how this non-deviating character of a particular reason is to be understood. And the authoritativeness of that knowledge, according to Vācaspati, cannot be accepted without this non-deviating character being understood. How far, then, is it justifiable to regard the inferential knowledge as self-valid, as it also depends on something else? Vācaspati, although he has not made this point clear, would argue as follows. All the inferential knowledge is self-authoritative and the unauthoritativeness of the same is to be decided after the examination of the reason. That is to say, just as the Māṁsakas take their stand in regard to all knowledge, Vācaspati will have to regard self-authoritativeness of the inferential knowledge and the unauthoritativeness of the same as paratah or by something else i.e. by the examination of the reason. This seems to be the possible argumentation, intended by Vācaspati, in regard to the inferential knowledge produced from a deviating reason. It would have been better, had he made it specifically clear. Anyway, Vācaspati is the first commentator on the Nyāya philosophy, who has accepted the self-authoritativeness of the inferential knowledge. Neither the Śūtrakāra nor the Bhāṣyaṭṭa, nor the Vārtikakāra, who can be very well considered to be the pillars of the old school of the Nyāya system, has pointed out this fact. So,
Vācaspati should be given full credit for improving upon the Nyāya system in regard to the authoritativeness of knowledge.  

(II)

The second important point in the N.V.T.T. is the treatment of inference. Vācaspati has very effectively shown why inference, as a separate valid means of knowledge, is necessarily to be accepted even by the Cārvākas. He argues that having understood the authoritativeness of something already experienced, we know the authoritativeness of something unseen. The same is the case in regard to the assumption of unauthoritativeness of unseen objects. This similarity of an experienced object with an unexperienced object is nothing but inference itself. Also, it is not fair to refute inference by resorting to the inference itself. Vācaspati, in order to convince the Cārvākas, enters into further details. He argues like this -- the argument of the Cārvāka that the inference is not authoritative, can be directed to convince a person, who is either ignorant of it or who is not willing to admit it or who is sceptical about it. Now, these feelings like doubt, contradiction etc., although belonging to the body (according to the Cārvākas) of the person, cannot be directly perceived like the whiteness of the body. Nor are

5 Udayana, on the other hand, without accepting the authoritativeness of the inferential knowledge, avoids the anavasthā thus: न चानवस्थापि, प्रामाण्यस्याक्ष्येषत्त्वानानुपुष्पात्।
Kusumāṅjali Stabaka II.5.
they understood by verbal testimony, as the Carvakas have not accepted any pramāṇa other than the pratyakṣa. So, the above mentioned qualities residing in another person, cannot be known without admitting inference as a valid means of knowledge, and the knowledge of these feelings of others is essential to make any argument, as we have seen above.

In this connection, it is extremely necessary to see the problem of 'trividhamanumānam'. It is important from two points of view:-(i) as Vācaspati's improvement on the Vārtika is observed (ii) and as it is helpful for fixing the date of Vācaspati. The problem is like this: The Nyāya Śūtra divides inference into: (i) पूर्वकिर्त (ii) सैकित्त and (iii) सामान्यतृतुत्त. The Vātsyāyana Bhāṣya gives two interpretations of these three sub-types. The Vārtika first classifies inference as (i) anvayī (ii) vyātirekī and (iii) anvayavyātirekī and then gives different interpretations of पूर्वकिर्त, सैकित्त and सामान्यतृतुत्त. Here we are concerned with the first interpretation of pūrvavat and others, in the Vārtika, for the two points mentioned above. Pūrvavat is explained like this. Pūrva means sādhyā and where this sādhyā is present in all the parts of the pakṣa, that is to say where सामान्यतृतुत्त विद्वानरक्षितेन पष्टि is observed, the inference is called pūrvavat. Sāgavat is that type of inference where the reason or the middle term exists in the sapakṣa. The term सामान्यतृतुत्त

6 अन्य दात्तर्के तन्त्रिकात्मपानं पूर्वकिर्त सैकित्त सामान्यतृतुत्त व 1.1.5.
7 If at all the pakṣa consists of different things.
is taken here to mean sāmānyataḥ adṛṣṭa — the meaning which is not generally resorted to. Although Vācaspati also does not explain the term clearly, it appears that sāmānyataḥ adṛṣṭa inference means the inference wherein the reason as well as the śādhyā is particular, and no generalisation can be drawn. These three types indicate three qualities viz. pakṣavṛttitva, sapakṣavṛttitva and vipakṣa-avṛttitva respectively. In the Vārtika, by the word 'ca' in the Sūtra ..., 'sāmānyato dṛṣṭam ca', one more attribute of the reason viz. being not contradictory with other valid means of knowledge, is included. But curiously enough, the Vārtika goes on — वित्ते य पांचलक्षणम् एव-चक्रवर्तिनानामिति। 
That is, Udyotakara observes that the reason thus possesses four or five attributes. It is very difficult to understand what exactly Udyotakara meant by this remark. Most possibly, as Vācaspati has suggested, it may mean -- some reasons are caturlakṣaṇa, while some are pañcālakṣaṇa. But, Udyotakara has enumerated only four lakṣaṇas or attributes and the fifth is not given by him.
Vācaspati, by one 'ca' in the Vārtika adds one more attribute viz. asatpratipakṣatva i.e. wherein, something contrary to the śādhyā is not proved by some other reason. It may be accepted that Udyotakara intended this fifth attribute and desired to remark that some reasons have four attributes while some have five. From the classification of pūrvavat etc. we can

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8 e.g. बल्व-प्रतिकृत्व अद्वैतत्व, अद्वैतत्व।
9 P.48.
10 The word anumāna by the etymology — anunīyate anena iti anumānam, means reason.
conclude that the reason in the 'pūrvavat' possesses four qualities (i) paksavṛttitva (ii) vipaksavṛttitva (iii) abādhitatva and (iv) asatpratipaksatva; the reason in the 'śeṣavat' type of inference, has these four qualities and sapakṣavṛttitva in addition to them; while the reason in the sāmānyato dṛṣṭa also has the four above attributes, as it is not expected to reside on the sapakṣa because of the absence of any analogous instance in its case. Thus pūrvavat and sāmānyatoddṛṣṭa are caturākṣaṇa while śeṣavat is pāncalakṣaṇa. This would be the only meaning of the sentence — ग ।.. ।.. ।.. ।.. in the Vārtika. Vācaspati however, interprets it differently. According to him, the classification would be

(i) वर्त्तित्व, (ii) वाक्यात्मकाभिःस्व, and (iii) वाक्यात्मकाभिःस्व

He clearly says: .... वाक्यात्मकाभिःस्व, वाक्यात्मकाभिःस्व, वाक्यात्मकाभिःस्व, वाक्यात्मकाभिःस्व. That is, pūrvavat is to be taken common with the remaining two jointly and separately. Vācaspati then remarks — तत् चुक्तिनन्द्यम्. It means that asatpratipaksatva, abādhitatva and pūrvavat (i.e. pakṣatāvavacchedakena pakṣavṛttitva) -- these three attributes are common to all the three types of inference. Now, in the first and the second type (according to Vācaspati's new classification), one attribute is added, while in the third, two attributes are added. Thus the first two viz. pūrvavat-śeṣavat and pūrvavat-sāmānyatoddṛṣṭa, are caturākṣaṇa while the last viz. pūrvavat-śeṣavat-sāmānyatoddṛṣṭa is pāncalakṣaṇa. From this it is beyond doubt that

12 Ibid.
Vācaspati intended this above classification which was not at all suggested by the Vārtikakāra. And this classification has been refuted by Vidyānanda in his Tattvārthaslokavārtika.

Having refuted this compound-type-classification, Vidyānanda unambiguously remarks

\[ \text{तत्त्व्यायात्मकस्त} \text{समासानम्} \text{अनुभवन्} \text{विश्लेषकरणं, प्रत्ययवृत्त वृत्तिपरिभ्रमणम्} \]

It clearly means that Vidyānanda refers to and refutes Vācaspati. Nyāyācārya Darbārilāl Koṭhīā,\(^{14}\) however, takes the Nyāyavārtikaṭīkā to mean the Nyāyavārtika only, resorting to the Karmadharaya compound. Because of his strong inclination to put Vidyānanda before Vācaspati, Koṭhīā seems to have made a deliberate mistake of saying that this classification is not found in the N.V.T.T. but is given in Udyotakara’s Vārtika. But the above discussion logically disproves Koṭhīā’s misleading statement and Vidyānanda cannot be placed before Vācaspati, as this classification is found nowhere in the Nyāya literature, except in the N.V.T.T. of Vācaspati.

Having thus established inference as a valid means of knowledge, Vācaspati takes into consideration the vyāpti-grahopāya or the means of invariable concomitance. According to the Bauddhas, the invariable concomitance can exist between two things, which are either identical with each other or if there exists cause-effect relation between them. Vācaspati deprecates this Buddhistic view by pointing out that it is

\[ \text{Tattvārthaslokavārtika, p.206.} \]

\[ \text{Introduction to the Āptaparīkṣa of Vidyānanda, p.49.} \]
altogether an illogical statement that there exists the
invariable concomitance when two things are identical. For,
when one thing infers the other, it is presupposed that one
thing is the subject and the other is the object. This subject-
object relation cannot exist between two things, which are
completely identical. Whenever there is gamyagamakabhāva,
there must be at least some sort of difference. The case of
vrkṣatva and śimśapātva, which, according to the Bauddhas, are
not really different but are imagined to be so and which still
admit of the gamyagamaka relation, is then taken into considera-
tion.

Vācaspati, altogether denies the view that there is no
real difference between vrkṣatva and śimśapātva and brings to
notice that even, according to the Bauddhas, when there is
imaginary difference, non-difference or identity also cannot
be real. The Buddhistic view that the case co-ordination
(sāmānādhikaranya) is not possible unless the non-difference
between two things is assumed, is also not tenable, in-as-much
as, the krṣṇatva and the ghaṭatva - the quality and the
generality respectively reside in the ghaṭa, even though they
are quite different from each other. That is to say, in a
sentence like 'krṣṇo ghaṭah', the ghaṭa is the common substra-
tum for blackness and jarness. And these two would be
identical if the Buddhistic view is accepted. For these
reasons, Vācaspati concludes -- वस्त्रां वर्ण जलमेकामः न तत्र वादालेक्ष्यः
As regards the other condition viz. tadutpatti or the cause-effect relation being necessary for the invariable concomitance, Vācaspati, or in fact, any thinker is not reluctant to admit that wherever the cause-effect relation exists, the invariable concomitance does exist there. But Vācaspati wants to point out that even in the absence of the cause-effect relation, the vyāpti is possible. It is interesting to note that for the sake of reasoning, Vācaspati tries to refute that even between fire and smoke, the cause-effect relation does not exist. He argues — Does that relation exist simply because smoke comes into existence after fire? Then even the ass, as it exists prior to smoke, would have to be regarded as the cause of smoke. The fact that the presence and the absence of smoke depends upon the presence and the absence of fire, and not of the ass, is also not conclusive. For, there may be some case wherein smoke, as being created by a devil, would be found even in the absence of fire. Hence, the cause-effect relation between fire and smoke cannot be proved. All this and further refutation is merely for the sake of refutation. What Vācaspati really wanted to establish is that the invariable concomitance requires the natural

15 N.V.T.T., p.164.
relation -- it may or may not be the cause-effect relation. This argument of Vācaspati, is quite sound, as he has further shown that the Sunrise of to-day is invariably inferred from the Sunrise of yesterday, even though the former is neither produced by the latter, nor is there identity between the two. The rise of the moon and the tides of the sea are also neither identical nor is the cause-effect relation, but the one can be very well inferred from the other.  

In this way, Vācaspati has completely refuted the arguments put forth by the Buddhistic writers like Dharmakīrti. Here, it has been dealt with, in detail, only to show Vācaspati's skill and depth in argumentation, as all this treatment is his own and nothing is borrowed either from the Vārtikakāra or from the Bhāsyakāra. This refutation of the 'anumityānga' or the means of inference, was quite necessary as the whole structure of the Buddhistic philosophy was based on inference only.

Vācaspati, having refuted the Buddhistic conception as regards the 'anumitigraha', has taken into consideration, the Vaiśeṣika view-point. The Vaiśeṣikas hold that there can be four types of relation between the reason (hetu) and the thing inferred (sādhyā). These are -- (i) the cause-effect relation, (ii) relation in general, (iii) being connected with a common thing, (iv) being contrary to each other. Vācaspati points

16 Ibid, p.163.
out that relation in general can very well include other relations and hence, it is not necessary to mention them separately. It is not reasonable to argue that these three particular relations are noted in order to avoid other relations. For, in that case, the mention of 'relation in general' would be redundant. Moreover, the last relation viz. being contrary to each other cannot point out or lead to the invariable concomitance. Vācaspati has not made it specifically clear why contradictory things have no invariable concomitance. But his view is quite logical and justifiable. What he intends to argue is that, when two things are contradictory, one thing is invariably absent in the presence of the other. So, it would be logical only to hold that the invariable concomitance exists between the presence of one thing and the absence of the other thing and not between two things themselves. This is a subtle point, which has been left by Vācaspati for the readers themselves. In this way, the treatment of this topic by the Vaiśeṣikas is far from being satisfactory.

The Sāmkhya conception as regards the seven relations between the hetu and the sādhya has been just referred to and declared to have been refuted by the same reasons, put forth above, as it also includes the relation of being contrary.

\[18\text{ नायानिमित्तश्चिदिराक्षिष्ठचारिषिव: स्वस्वामिन्ध्वणातो: सांख्यानिः क्षत्यात्तुमा} \text{ -- N.V.T.P. 165.}\]
Having thus refuted rival theories, Vācaspati has concluded that whatever may be the relation, it should be natural and invariable, in order to have the invariable concomitance. He further explains how his definition — *(निमित्त: सम्बन्धोऽनुपानाभ्यम्)* — (which is popularly referred to as *(कौण्ठाशः सम्बन्धोऽध्यितः)*) is void of any defect. In the stock example — *vahnimān dhūmāt* —, the relation of dhūma with vahni is natural and the former cannot be apprehended without the latter, while the relation of vahni with dhūma is not natural as the former can be had, even in the absence of the latter. Their relation is conditional — the condition being the contact of fire with wet fuel. That is to say, it is aupādhika and not anaupādhika.

This, in short, is the treatment of the subject by Vācaspati. It can be remarked here, that Vidyānanda, in his *Tatvārthaslokavārtika*, while declaring the anyathānupapannatva as being essential for the invariable concomitance, assumes, more or less, the same position.

(III) Vācaspati has taken special pains to refute the Buddhistic view that there is nothing like an 'avayavin' or an entity endowed with parts. Buddhist logicians hold that mere parts assemble without giving rise to any particular thing, which consists of these parts. Vācaspati has discussed

19 Ibid.
20 P.203 (Mirçaya Sāgar Edition)
and criticised some new inferences of the Baudhāyas, which have not been referred to in the Vārtikas. Having explained in detail, the necessity of accepting an aggregate (avayavin), on the lines of the Vārtika, Vācaspati examines at great length, the following inference —

\[ अवैयविन्यस्याविचारम् \]

\[ गण्डोकत्वंविधानम् \]

\[ कृत्तिकोद्वद्वैविचारितम् \]

i.e. whatever exists is not possessed of parts; and as all the objects like a black jar exist, they must be void of parts. Vācaspati explains this view further as follows —

When the part in hand etc. is moving, the advocate of the aggregate (avayavin) will have to hold that the thigh is also moving, because, the so-called aggregate at the place of hand is moving and there can be no difference between the aggregate at the place of the thigh and the hand. But, in fact, when the hand is moving, the thigh is not necessarily seen moving. Thus, one and the same thing viz. the avayavin is moving and not-moving, according to the view that admits the separate existence of an aggregate. In this way, some other contradictory qualities like red and not red — etc. would have to be accepted in regard to one and the same thing, if it is possessed of parts i.e. an aggregate. This involves the fallacy of viruddhadharmasamsarga or attributing contradictory qualities to one and the same thing. And it is logical to accept that the existence of a thing is pervaded by its not
being related to contradictory qualities. For these reasons, to be logically perfect, an aggregate, apart from parts, can have no existence.

Vācaspati, with his logical subtlety, has silenced the opponent in a remarkable manner. He argues that the Baudhāṇas establish by the above inference, what has been already established. For, even according to the Naiyāyikas, the attributes like nīla etc. are not possessed of parts. If the Baudhāṇas mean the substratum of the nīla - etc. and not the qualities, by the word nīlādi, even then, there is nothing like a jar, except the qualities - form, taste, smell and touch - which serve some sort of purpose (arthakriyākāraṇaḥ). So, there is no possibility of an aggregate in the case of qualities. To admit a thing like a jar, which is the substratum of the said qualities, for the time being, on the part of the Baudhāṇas, and to deny of it the avayavitva or the quality of being possessed of parts, is really ridiculous. For, the sādhya and the 'dharmin' or 'pakṣa', which are altogether unexperienced, would not be able to prove anything. Moreover, the fallacy of the viruddhadharma-samsarga does not exist, even if the aggregate is accepted. For, even when some parts are concealed, it cannot be reasonably said that one and the same thing is cognised and not cognised. Although, the grossness of a thing, when some parts are hidden, is not fully cognised, it cannot be remarked that the aggregate as...
such is not cognised. For, the grossness is just an attribute of the thing and not the thing itself. Thus, when the attribute is not seen, it is unfair to say that the thing itself is not cognised. Hence, there is no grahaṇa and agrahaṇa, in regard to one and the same thing.

As regards the moving and the non-moving of one and the same thing, Vācaspati argues that the aggregate is not moving when some part of it is moving, because the aggregate is different from the parts. The contingency that the cloth will be partly red and partly not-red, if the separate existence of the whole is admitted, does not stand to reason, as the redness belongs to the safflower and not to the cloth. That the cloth is apprehended to be red is merely an illusion. In this way, objections and counter-objections are raised and answered; and Vācaspati concludes the topic by remarking that the existence of qualities like red and non-red, does not involve any contradiction, as these qualities are considered to be 'avyāpyavṛtti' i.e. those which do not necessarily pervade the substratum completely. The fallacy of the viruddhadharmasamsarga, which the Bauddhas wanted to point out, is possible only in the case of qualities like 'form' etc. which do not reside without fully pervading the substratum i.e. which are technically called 'vyāpyavṛtti'.

Vācaspati has then refuted one more important inference, put forth by the Bauddhas, to support their view in regard to
the non-acceptance of the whole (avayavin). The Bauddhas argue that whatever is anekavr̥tti or residing in many (parts), is many. The whole is treated by the Naiyāyikas as anekavr̥tti but not many (nānā). Hence it is inadmissible. That is to say, the acceptance of one aggregate whole is illogical according to the Bauddhas. Vācaspati ingeniously proves that the vyāpti or the invariable concomitance assumed by the Bauddhas is itself fallacious, because ekatva i.e. being one and anekavr̥ttitva i.e. residing in many are not contradictory. Technically speaking, nānātva is not vyāpaka or more extensive than anekavr̥ttitva. Hence, the absence of the former need not lead to the absence of the latter.

Vācaspati, who seems to have represented the view of the Bauddhas very faithfully, does not leave the problem here only, but enters into further logical subtleties and once again puts forth the Buddhistic view, which, in short, can be stated as follows. When a jar is cognised, its absence is denied; otherwise the jar itself would not be apprehended. In the same way, things other than the jar, which coexist with the absence of the jar, are also denied by the perception of the jar. Analogous to this, when the conjunction of the whole with one part is perceived, its absence is contradicted, and conjunctions with other parts should also be regarded as being denied; as they coexist with the absence of the conjunction with the first part. Otherwise, the absence of the
conjunction with the first part also cannot be contradicted. And this is highly undesirable as the presence and absence of one and the same thing will have to be admitted (at one and the same time), if the absence of the thing perceived is not contradicted. This sort of contradiction is involved when the Naiyāyikas presume that the 'whole' resides in many parts.

But, Vācaspati says that what is, in reality, responsible for the non-existence of such things is that they are not experienced in that way. That is to say, wherever there is such non-experience, the conclusion of the Bauddhas may be considered to be valid; but where such co-existence is actually observed, it cannot be objected to. What is seen, cannot be denied. So as we actually experience the whole residing in one part as being identified with the whole residing in other parts, it cannot be challenged. Thus, there is no contradiction in accepting one thing residing in many parts.

These are the arguments, set forth by Vācaspati to controvert the objections raised by Buddhistic writers against the Naiyāyika idea of a whole. It should be noticed here that the Buddhistic view is refuted in the Sūtras, the Bhāṣya and the Vārtika; and what is Vācaspati's own is the refutation of new arguments put forth by later Buddhistic writers.

Similarly, Vācaspati has controverted the most
important doctrine of the Buddhistic philosophy viz. the doctrine of momentariness. He elaborately explains the inference भव सत्त कथा शरिर जन्म घट॥ वैष्णव विद्वान गार्धिकः सत्तम्।

According to the Bauddhas, 'sattva' is nothing but 'arthakriyākāritva' or the capacity to serve some purpose. Now wherever, there is this capacity to serve some purpose, there is either 'krama' (order) or the absence of krama, as no third alternative is possible. The thing, which is not momentary i.e. aksanika, cannot have some krama in serving the purpose. For, it is the universal rule that things by their own inherent nature or power serve some purpose; and that inherent power should necessarily be present in the first moment also. Hence, there is nothing which prevents the thing to serve the purpose in the very first moment, as the capacity of producing some effect is present then also. Moreover, the permanent thing cannot serve the purpose, or produce the effect by akrama or without resorting to any order i.e. it cannot serve the purpose in the first moment only. In that case, there is nothing left to be done in the second and further moments, and hence the thing would lose its sattva or existence; i.e. it would then become momentary and not permanent. In this way, the arthakriyākāritva is not possible in the case of a permanent thing. And as the sattva is nothing but the arthakriyākāritva, the only conclusion that follows is the absence of any thing permanent in the world.

22 N.V.T.T., p.551.
This is how the doctrine of momentariness has been established by the Bauddhas. So many objections and counter-objections are raised and answered. Having thus represented the Buddhistic view quite faithfully, Vācaspati has controverted it for the following logical reasons: (1) The sattva as the reason for establishing momentariness of a thing does not stand to reason. For, in that syllogism, the reason resides where the thing to be proved (i.e. sādhyā) is absent. This defect is technically called the fallacy of the reason being asādhāraṇa. His basic argument is that just as according to the Bauddhas, the sattva is pervaded by krama and akrāma and these are not possible in the case of a non-momentary (akṣaṇika) thing, which, for the same reason, is void of existence (i.e. it cannot exist); in the same way, a thing must be either dependent on or independent of other accessories, in order to produce the effect. But, a momentary thing cannot be said to be dependent on other things, in order to maintain its momentariness. Further, it cannot be independent of other things, because, in that case, there would be no need of assistants to it, and the seed in the storehouse would also be able to give rise to the effect. In this way, neither sāpekṣatva nor anapekṣatva which is essential (from the logical point of view) for the existence of every thing, cannot be shown in regard to a momentary thing. That is to say, there is nothing like a momentary thing in the world. 

23 There are some more sub-arguments but the main point does not go beyond this.
It is also interesting to see how Vācaspati has refuted the Vedāntic concept of God as the material cause of the world and especially the Advaitic concept of Vivarta. Brahman as the regular material cause of the world is not possible, because transformation on the part of Brahman is not justifiable. It should be transformed either completely or by parts. In the first case, Brahman as It is considered to be pure, unchanging etc., will no longer exist. In the second case, Brahman will be śāvayava and hence not eternal. If at all Brahman pervades all things without changing Its nature, then there is no transformation of Brahman. As regards the vivarta doctrine, Vācaspati remarks that vivarta or illusion is absolutely impossible in regard to Brahman, because illusion universally requires the apprehension of the object, in general, and the absence of the cognition of the object, in particular. That is to say, some parts of the object of illusion are cognised while some are not. But Brahman is partless. So illusion of Brahman is not possible. Further, as Brahman is self-illuminative, It cannot be the object of any illusion.

Vācaspati concludes -- 'तत्त्वादौरोगः चाप्रेदेन क्षिति: भ्रितयुक्तम्'.

It is worth-noting that Vācaspati has not even indicated the possible justification of the vivarta doctrine, from the Mānistic point of view, which he has done to the best of his ability in the Bhāmatī.

24 N.V.T.T., p. 594.
These are some of the important topics in the Nyāya-vārtikatātparyāṭīkā, wherein, some original arguments of Vācaspati are found. In this connection, it should be noticed here, that the refutation of the kṣanikatva theory in the N.V.T.T., is sometimes, word by word, identical with that in the Nyāyakaṇḍika.*

Here follows the discussion of some striking points, worth-noting, in the Tātparyāṭīkā.

Vācaspati, while commenting upon the Sūtra 'वादिक्षम्भाविधो विपरीत'! 25 criticises the position taken by Vātsyāyana, in his Bhāṣya. While explaining the positive illustration (anvayī drṣṭānta) and the negative illustration (vyatirekī drṣṭānta) in 'साध्यावलम्बीकस्मात्वा कुत्त्वाद ग्रुद्धारसम्' 26 and 'वादिक्षम्भाविधो विपरीत' respectively, Vātsyāyana gives one and the same syllogism \( \text{व्रत: \ ब्रतिः, कुत्त्वविभावतो} \) with different illustrations. In the first, as a positive illustration, he says, 'स्थायीदिवत -- like a dish (which is utpattidharmaka and hence anitya); while commenting on the next sutra, he gives a negative illustration, along with the syllogism as follows:-

\( \text{व्रत: \ कुत्त्वविभावतो, कुत्त्वविभावतो नित्यमात्मादिः} \) \( \text{i.e.} \)

like Ātman and others, which are not created and hence eternal.

By way of explanation of this illustration, Vātsyāyana adds --

\( \text{साध्यावलम्बीकस्मात्वा कुत्त्वविभावतो, कुत्त्वविभावतो} \)

\( \text{चेतसा कार्यत्त्व घरय: अन्तस्तर्वं तस्मान नयं} \) \( \text{i.e. \ in \ this} \)

25 Nyāya Sūtra I.1.37.
26 Ibid, I.1.36.
* See Appendix V
illustration, the absence of the reason leads to the absence of the thing to be proved (sādhyā). That is, he seems to understand that in the case of a negative syllogism, there is sādhanabhāvapravayuktā sādhyābhāva (The absence of reason leading to the absence of the thing to be proved). But this is not correct at least in this illustration, because, it cannot be said that wherever there is utpattidharmakatvābhāva (i.e. the absence of creation), there is nityatva, as the prāgabhāva or 'the absence prior to its creation' has not beginning but is not eternal. That is to say, there is sādhanābhāva but no sādhyābhāva. Avidyā of the Advaita Vedāntins is also beginningless but is not endless. Vācaspati has not explained this in detail. He simply points out that the vyāpyavyāpakabhāva or relation of the pervader and the thing pervaded, in the case of negative entities, is quite opposite to that in the case of positive entities. So, although it is legitimately said that wherever there is reason or sādhana, there is sādhyā, it cannot be held that wherever there is sādhanābhāva there is sādhyābhāva. To this effect, Vācaspati remarks — अन्य भाष्यकारणम् ।

And Vācaspati is quite right in showing this mistake of Vātsyāyana. But to be more logical, he should have referred to the case of sama-vyāpti or equal invariable concomitance between the sādhyā and the hetu (i.e. none of them is vyāpya or vyāpaka); where sādhanābhāvapravayukta sādhyābhāva i.e. the absence of the

27 N.V.T.T., p.296.
reason leading to the absence of the thing to be proved as Vātsyāyana understood, is logically admitted.

Vācaspati has shown one more defect in the same Bhāṣya passage, from another point of view. Vātsyāyana gives one and the same reason 'utpattidharmakatva' to explain both the positive and negative illustrations. Thus, the reason utpattidharmakatva can be called anvayavyatireki, as both the positive and negative illustrations are possible in its case. According to Vācaspati, in the case of a reason which is anvayavyatireki, although negative illustration is possible, the positive illustration alone should be given. His contention is that the apprehension of the negative illustration is possible only after the apprehension of the positive one. Thus the positive illustration strikes first, and then there is no necessity of giving a negative illustration. Vācaspati remarks —

28 Hāṁśeṣe kṛśnaḥ vādabāvanāt
dharmādyāt
dharmakatva... As he intends to say that the negative illustration should be given only when the hetu is vyatireki i.e. in whose case positive illustration is not possible. For instance, 'ghataḥ gandhavan, prthivītvāt'. In this syllogism, positive illustration is not possible, because every positive illustration would be included in the pakṣa, and hence it would cease to serve as a drṣṭānta. So, in this case, only a negative illustration in the form of 'yat naiyam, tat naiyam, yathā jalam', should be admitted. So, this sort of illustration should have been given by Vātsyāyana

28 Ibid.
while commenting on the Nyāya sūtra — ‘तद्विकल्पान्तः वियोगलम्’

Although Vācaspati’s position is more practical, we cannot say in this case, unlike in the previous one, that Vātsyāyana has committed any mistake in giving one and the same syllogism for two illustrations. Vātsyāyana might have used the same ‘hetu’ with different illustrations, with a view to pointing out the distinct nature of positive and negative illustrations. And logically it is not all unreasonable.

Vācaspati has made it clear that his explanation of perception as being determinate (savikalpa) and indeterminate, is derived from his preceptor Trilocana guru. It is indicated neither in the Bhāṣya nor in the Vārtika. The determinate knowledge admits of specification. The object as being particularised by its genus etc. is known in the determinate perception. The indeterminate perception admits of no specification. It is the knowledge of an object in the first moment, in the form of ‘this is something’. Although this sort of distinction is not made in the Bhāṣya and the Vārtika, Vācaspati, in his characteristic way, says —

‘तद्विकल्पितकाविनिविकल्पकामेति नाम्यविचित्रितकाम्यविचित्रितपि’

30 The Niruktakāra, before Vācaspati used the term nirvikalpaka. But, it was explained by him as the knowledge of an object in which its general and particular features are combined. But, Vācaspati contradicts this view by calling

29 I.i.37.
30 Ibid, p.133.
attention to the difficulty that if in the nirvikalpaka stage, an object combines in itself its general and particular attributes, there would be nothing to separate them in the savikalpaka stage, without which, the idea of one thing being predicated of the other, in the form of 'this is a man', will not be arisen.

These are some of the striking points in the Tātparyatīkā. As it has been said at the beginning, a thorough treatment of all such points, is difficult in the scope of the present thesis. Any way, from the discussion so far, we are led to conclude that the N.V.T.T. of Vācaspati is a detailed and scholarly commentary with its special aim to refute the charges levelled by Buddhistic logicians against Udyotakara. Vācaspati considered it to be a meritorious deed to controvert the objections instituted by the Baudhhas. It is clear from the last introductory stanza --

चित्रांि निविधि पुण्यं दुःस्तस्रविन्ननामुपूवनानाम्।
अङ्गकरणतीतितत्ततिनां धन्यदर्पणः॥

To him, it was as if to rescue poor speech of Udyotakara, which was plunged in the mud in the form of harsh treatises. And it should be carefully noticed that Vācaspati was quite confident of his success in the work undertaken. For, while at the beginning, he says that he wishes to get some puṇya,

31 If we get an opportunity to edit the work more scientifically, with a special study of Buddhistic works, we hope to do all this.

at the end he remarks\textsuperscript{33} that he has attained the desired punya by rescuing the poor speech of the Vārtikakāra, from the clutches of the Bauddhas.

\textsuperscript{33} गदाचर्म फिमपि पुण्यम् दुस्ततुनिभिन्यक्षुरनामाम्।
खेतकरक्षणामतित्तीवो समुददर्जर। \textit{Ibid}, p.726.