Chapter II

NYĀYA-KĀŅIKĀ

Vācaspati's first literary composition, the commentary on the Vidhiviveka of Maṇḍanamiśra, which is otherwise known as the Nyāya-Kaṇikā, ¹ is not popularly studied now-a-days, and even the traditional Pāṇḍits know a little of this work. But, this work of Vācaspati is really very important to his readers, as, very often in his other works, he remarks that a particular topic is dealt with, in details, in the Nyāya-Kaṇikā and hence, no further discussion is desired there. Thus, in order to know Vācaspati's views in regard to the topics like the Sarvajñatva etc., a careful study of his Nyāya-Kaṇikā is quite essential.

To begin with, it is not quite clear why the commentary is entitled as the Nyāya-Kaṇikā. The word Nyāya, in the title 'Nyāya-Kaṇikā', apparently misleads one to regard it a work on logic. So, even Dr. Satīśacandra Vidyābhūṣaṇa, in his learned work 'History of Indian Logic' ² has remarked that it (Nyāya-Kaṇikā) is a work on logic. But, this is wrong as the work avowedly belongs to the Pūrvamīmāṃsā system. It is noteworthy that there are so many works in the Pūrvamīmāṃsā system,

¹ The Vidhiviveka, along with the Nyāya-Kaṇikā, was printed for the first time in the Medical Hall Press at Benares, by Rāmaśāstri Mānavalli, in 1907. No other edition is available.

² p. 134
which contain the word Nyāya in their title. Even the well-known Advaita work, the Vaiyāsikanyāyamālā of Vidyārāṇya, contains the word Nyāya in its title. So, it would not be out of place here, to enter in detail as regards the exact meaning of the word nyāya in the title Nyāya-Kaṭikā.

The word nyāya is not used only in its technical sense viz. 'tarka' or logic. The Jaiminīya-Nyāya-mālā-vistara explains the word 'nyāya' as follows: "न्याया नाम जैमिनिय प्राक्तनिः धर्मोपधेयमप्रभुतः अधिकथानिः" i.e. the topics dealt with by Jaimini are meant by the word nyāya. Or, in order to make the sense applicable to the Vaiyāsikanyāyamālā of the same author, the word can be taken to mean a topic or adhikaraṇa in general. But, this sense of the word nyāya cannot be accepted in the case of the Nyāya-Kaṭikā, as, it mainly deals with the nature of the injunction and other doctrinal differences side by side, although, a summary of some chapters of the Mīmāṃsā-bhāṣya is given at the end of the text. The word 'nyāya' in the remark — 'नीयया नाम न्यायसम्बन्धित्वा नामांस' by Śaṅkarabhāṭṭa, the author of the Bālamīmāṃsāprakāśa, should also be understood in the above sense.

Vāsudeva Dīkṣita, in his Adhvara-mīmāṃsā-kutūhala-vṛtti, explains the word 'nyāya' thus — न्याय: नीयया न्यायसम्बन्धित्वा अनेन जिति. According to this etymology, the word 'nyāya' can

3 Printed at Kasīvidyāvilāsa mudrānālaya.
very well mean 'Yukti' or reasoning. In this sense the word has been used in the Mīmāṃsāsūtras also. The stanza 'तत्त्वप्रकाशः प्रवृत्ती न्याय विलयमोक्षे।', which is quoted by Mm. Abhyamkara-
śāstri, in his introduction to the Mīmāṃsānyāyaprakāśa, as अन्तिमयुक्ती, attaches more or less the same meaning to the
word .nyāya. So, either तत्त्वप्रकाशः प्रवृत्ती or युक्तित्वें तत्त्वप्रकाशः समाप्त
should be the meaning of the word nyāya, and then the title
Nīya-Kaṇḍikā can appropriately be applied to the commentary
of Vācaspati on the Vidhiviveka, as we find therein that
Vācaspati has taken special pains to elucidate the concise
remarks of Maṇḍana by subtle logical reasoning and vast
erudition of all the systems -- both Vedic and non-Vedic.

Vācaspati wanted to comment upon all the orthodox systems
of Indian Philosophy. So, in the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā, he chose to
comment upon the Vidhiviveka of Maṇḍana. It is apparently
very difficult to understand why, keeping aside the most
standard works like the Bhāṣya of Śābara and the Vārtikas of
Kumārila, Vācaspati undertook the Vidhiviveka to annotate.
In fact, the Vidhiviveka was not at all suitable for him in
order to discuss all the philosophical arguments and counter-
arguments, as the scope of it -- as the name itself indicates,
is quite limited. Still, Vācaspati has tried his best to
bring out almost all the important philosophical problems in

5 मीमांसाकार्यमात्रप्रवृत्तीन्यायसंहित: प्रयुक्तं। तत: च सँग्रहयुक्तिरिथिवा।
प्रतीयति। -- मीमांसाकार्य, Part IV, p.2406.
connection with the Pūrvamāṃsā system. But, obviously he had to do all this in a far-fetched manner. So, while dealing with the problem of the apauruṣeyatva, quite consciously, he remarks —

Also, it becomes evident when we come across the Kṣaṇikatva theory in more than five hundred lines, when there was a single line in that connection in the text of Maṇḍana. So, we feel that it would have been far better, had Vācaspati composed the gloss on the more scholarly work — the Mīmāṃsāsālokavārtika of Kumārila, which would have provided him with more natural circumstances, where he could face each and every problem from the Mīmāṃsā standpoint. In such circumstances, the reason why Vācaspati preferred the Vidhīviveka, seems to be that he held in high respect, Maṇḍana, the author of the said work. His utmost regard for Maṇḍana is clearly seen from the fact that he had commented upon Maṇḍana’s Brahmasiddhi, and accepted his views in interpreting the Śāmkara Vedānta, and it is also clear from one of the introductory stanzas to the Nyāya-Kaṇikā — which shows that Vācaspati had equal respect for both Śāmkarācārya and Maṇḍanaṃsiśra. So, it can be remarked that out of regard for Maṇḍana, Vācaspati seems to have composed his Nyāya-Kaṇikā on his Vidhīviveka.

The title Vidhīviveka is not competent enough to give a complete idea about the contents of the work. To put it

6 P.237 Medical Hall Press ed.
otherwise and more frankly, the work contains so many topics that have no direct bearing upon the subject proper. The title of the commentary - Nyāyakaṇṭikā - is also of no use to know the contents of the work. So, it is quite necessary to give a detailed analysis of the text as well as of the commentary. Moreover, as the only available edition of the work does not give the list of the contents of the work, the analysis of the work is quite essential.

To begin with, Vācaspati discusses, an introduction to the work, the purpose of the 'vidhi' or injunction, which is the main subject of the work. By the injunction, three purposes can be served. (i) To prove the authority of the Vedas, (ii) to apprehend the mutual connection between the meanings of the words in a sentence and (iii) to know what is favourable and what is unfavourable. It may be argued that none of these purposes is admissible, because, in order to establish the authority of the Vedas, there is no necessity of an injunction. The view that in the absence of an injunction, everything would be bhūtārtha or accomplished and as the accomplished thing depends upon other means of knowledge, the Vedas would lose their authoritativeness just like the ordinary sentences, is altogether a misrepresentation, as, the authoritativeness of the Vedas need not be sacrificed at the description of the accomplished thing therein. The sāpekṣatva does not arise simply because, the thing described is an accomplished one, but
it is really due to its being originated from the intellect of man. Otherwise, the knowledge, obtained through the means of perception, would also lose its authoritativeness, as it has got the accomplished thing as its object. Moreover, the Buddhistic texts which proclaim the salutation to चैत्य, would be authoritative as they obviously speak of some कार्या. So, we must admit that a thing is dependent and hence unauthoritative, when there is परुषाभिप्रभावम् वै i.e. when the thing is originated from the intellect of a man. This sort of unauthoritativeness cannot be pointed out in the case of the accomplished things in the Vedas, as there is no परुषाभिप्रभावम्, while it can very well be shown in the case of the sentences, which speak of some कार्या but which are produced from the intellect of men. For this reason, the injunction need not be resorted to, for establishing the authority of the Vedas.

The second purpose viz. the apprehension of the mutual relation between the meaning of the words, is also not reasonable, because, even without any injunction, in the sentences like स्माचा प्रभा प्रभा प्रभा प्रभा, the apprehension of the पदार्थसम्प्रभा or the mutual relation between the meanings of the words in a sentence, is easily understood. Here, it is just possible to argue that these sentences are spoken of by human beings and the statements of human beings require विवक्षा or the desire for expression, for their construction. This

7 Nyāyakaṇḍikā, p.2.
vivakṣā obviously presupposes the cognition of the desired object by other means of knowledge; and the Padārtha, along with the Padārthasamsarga, is understood when the object is known by other means of knowledge. That is to say, for the apprehension of the Padārthasamsarga, there is no necessity of resorting to the injunction in the sentences, uttered by human beings, as it is already known. But, in the case of the sentences in the Scriptures, as there is no vivakṣā or desire for expression, because of its not being a work of any human being, something should necessarily be admitted for the knowledge of the Padārthasamsarga, and it is the injunction which serves this purpose. But this is also not admissible. For, even accepting the injunction, the mutual connection between the meanings of the words cannot be understood. It may be said that in order to make the injunction complete, the expectancy must be fulfilled and when the expectancy is fulfilled, the Padārthasamsarga, which depends upon the expectancy of the injunction, is easily understood. But, this also is not reasonable because, this sort of expectancy, which is due to the incompleteness of the injunction, is quite possible even in the case of actions etc. which cannot be complete without the apprehension of the 'Kāraka' (or the agent etc.). So, these actions, when accompanied by expectancy, compatibility and proximity would possibly inform the mutual relation between the meanings of the words in a sentence. Also, it should be taken into account that in the worldly
usage, we understand the words as qualified by their mutual relation. And the meaning of the Vedic words is based on the meaning of the words in the worldly usage. Thus, the injunction is not at all necessary for the understanding of the meaning of the Vedic words.

Finally, the injunction need not be admitted to apprehend what is favourable and what is not favourable, because, even from the sentences like सन्तापममति च लघुम
ललितवेः ॥, दृष्टि च ज्वलन्वतालकामापारिक्षमुम ॥ etc. which speak of some accomplished fact, we do know what is favourable and what is not. For all these reasons, the injunction cannot be said to have any special purpose to serve.

The view, treated so far, though it is not shared by Vacaspati, serves as the scientific introduction to the text of the Vidhiviveka, while it also takes into account and controverts the Prabhakara theory of the authority of the Vedas.

The answer to this view, is contained in the first stanza of the Vidhiviveka —

लाधने पुरुषार्थम शोभितम् स्वीरिविद्।
श्रेष्ठ विध्वा समायमतः च प्रविधिते॥

Unlike other stanzas, this stanza has not been commented upon by Manḍana. So the due credit should be given to Vacaspati

8 Ibid p.3.
for stating clearly the idea about the purpose of the injunction. He says that Puruṣarthaśādhanatāvabodha - i.e. the knowledge of something as the means of the desired object, is not possible in the absence of the injunction. He explains it as follows:- In a Vedic sentence like 'Svargakāmo yajeta', if we do not accept an injunction, svarga cannot be known as something to be achieved by the particular action. That is to say, the bhāvanā requires only something to be attained and not necessarily svarga. We see in our everyday life that the thing to be attained comes into existence in future. So, the sacrifice itself would be regarded as the thing to be achieved, as it comes into existence in future and not heaven, as it is already in existence. Moreover, the sacrifice is directly connected with the bhāvanā as they both are denoted by one and the same word viz. yajeta, and the sacrifice is the Prakṛtyartha or the meaning of the stem, while svarga is denoted by a different word (svargakāmaḥ) and that also is an attribute of the person. Hence, for all these reasons, the bhāvanā or the word-force would never, in the absence of the injunction, accept the heaven as its bhāvya or something to be achieved, but instead of it, it will admit the sacrifice itself as its bhāvya. But this bhāvanā, when it is associated with the injunction, which points out the exact means for the benefit of the doer, admits svarga only as the object of

9 Cf. अव इत्यकामामार्योऽस्मान्योऽस्मातः गच्छति तस्मिन्नस्मातं किं स्मागः।
| साधनत्यतं सम्बंधते कुल साधनत्यतेनति मवति किवारणम्। साधनालयम्। |

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achievement, because the sacrifice in itself is nothing but the storehouse of painful actions and hence not desired by the doer as the object to be achieved. In short, the function of the injunction is to show what exactly is the thing to be achieved by the bhāvanā.

Having thus explained in detail the purpose of the injunction, Vācaspāti, with his unique scholarly insight, tries his best to justify the necessity of the work undertaken by Maṇḍanamīśra. While commenting on the word 'pravivicyate' in the first stanza, in order to show the significance of the letter 'pra', he says that although the Vārtikakāra and others have already dealt with the injunction, it is as good as not dealt with, because of the use of the doubtful wording like 'भविष्यामाक्षामाहुः' - etc. therein. In the present work, on the other hand, a clearcut idea about the injunction as the means of the object desired by the doer, is propounded.

After this introduction, the exact nature of the injunction is discussed. Three alternatives have been put forth. The injunction must be either the word itself or the operation of the word Ādavāyapāra or the sense of the word. Out of these, the first alternative is not probable, because in that case, the word would lose its authority, in as much as, it would produce then the activity which is different from the Pramā. In other words, the word as it is apramājanaka or

10 Cf. उ: लदे यान:। सच्चाप्रत्येकः। अक्षर:। Ibid.
producing something different from pramāṇa, cannot be accepted as the pramāṇa or the means of valid knowledge. But the Sabda in the form of codanā, has been admitted as the means of valid knowledge. Moreover, if the injunction be admitted to be of the nature of the word, there would be no reason why the action should be seen sometimes and not always, as the word is always present in a sentence. Also, the inferential cause requires the knowledge of its own nature, action and mutual relation, and not the productive cause. Now, the injunction or the optative form is the productive cause and not the inferential one. So, it would not require the knowledge of the action and its relation with other things. Hence, it would follow that even a man who has got no knowledge of the action to be done and its relation with other things, would engage himself in the activity. But that is not the case. For these and other reasons, the injunction cannot be admitted to be of the nature of the word.

The second alternative viz. the Sabdavyāpāra or the operation of the word is the import of the injunction, is also not supported by reason. Because, the order, instigation etc. cannot be said to be the operation of the word. On the contrary, these qualities belong to the speaker. It may be urged that the optative form creates some facility which leads to some activity. Hence through its operation, the optative form produces the activity. It can be proved on the analogy
of the fire which is described as the teacher — कारीव.
अन्वायकति in the sense that the fire dispels the cold and creates inclination towards study. But this view is also not satisfactory because of the dissimilarity between the दुर्गम and the दार्शंतिका. For, the fire can at least be the indirect cause of the study by dispelling the cold while the word cannot.

The analogy of the wind is also of no use, because in that case, there is no necessity of the knowledge of the operation, as the wind is the impelling force by its own nature even when its operation is not known; and the activity would go on for ever, because the word is ever present and nothing else is required for the activity. Moreover, we resort to actions only when we know that the commanding personality is trustworthy. So, in the case of the word, even if we assume that it has got the commanding ability, nobody would follow it, because it cannot be said to be trustworthy as it cannot lead either to obtain something or to avoid something — the fact which is quite necessary to prove one's own capability to be obeyed by others. Also, if we accept that the operation of the word is the import of the injunction, the word like ghaṭa etc. would lead to some activity, as the abhidhā has got its function in all the words. It may be urged that although
'abhidhā' is the same everywhere, the difference in regard to the things denoted by that abhidhā or the natural power of the word to express its meaning, is responsible for the fact that the activity is produced by the particular bhāvanā and not by all. But this is unconvincing, because the proper way in that case would be to admit the 'abhidheyaviṣeṣa' or the particular thing expressed by the abhidhā, which is supposed to be responsible for the activity and not the bhāvanā or the Śabdavyāpāra — the efficient force of the word. It should also be taken into consideration that the abhidhā cannot even be the meaning of the word; because, according to the general maxim, the Šabdārtha must be ananyalabhya i.e. that which is known by the word only and not by any other means of knowledge, while the abhidhā is cognised by its effects viz. the apprehension of the meaning of the word. Thus, the bhāvanā is not ananyalabhya but anyapramāṇalabhya. So it cannot be the Šabdārtha. Also, there would be regressus ad infinitum if the abhidhā is taken to be the injunction as it would require one more abhidhā to denote its meaning. In this way, the bhāvanā or the Śabdavyāpāra i.e. the efficient force of the word cannot be admitted as the nature of the injunction.

The last alternative in regard to the nature of the injunction viz. the 'arthabheda' or some meaning of the word is
discussed at great length. The 'prāśa' or the order etc.,
which are the attributes of human beings cannot be accepted as
the sense of the optative form as the Vedas are not produced
by any human being. Although the 'pravartanā' or the instiga-
tion in general is the meaning of the optative form in the
worldly usage, it cannot be resorted to, in the case of the
Vedas; because the 'pravartanā' also presupposes some operation
by the instigator and the instigator in the form of human
agency is not found in the case of the Vedas. Further on, it
is discussed that neither the 'phala' nor the 'karman' nor anything
else has got the capacity of being the instigator.

Vācaspati, while discussing the pravartakatva of the
phala, deals with the Satkāryavāda in details, while Maṇḍana
touches the point only casually. Then a point of vital
importance in connection with the Prabhakara view viz. the
'niyoga' as the meaning of the optative form is taken up for
discussion, and Vācaspati seems to have taken special pains to
refute thoroughly the Prabhakara view.

According to the Prabhakaras, the meaning of the 'lin'
or the optative form is the 'niyoga', which has been described
as being 'aparāmrśṭakālatraya' i.e. not connected with any of
the three tenses. It is only experienced like bliss and is
generated as soon as the sentence consisting of the optative
form is heard. This 'niyoga' cannot be known by any other means of knowledge. The self-authoritativeness of the Vedas is then established, because when the niyoga is accepted as the meaning of the optative form, the Vedas need not depend on anything else for their authority. This Prabhakara view is satisfactorily refuted by Vācaspati. It cannot be the 'vākyārtha' or the meaning of the sentence, if it not be the 'padārtha' or the meaning of the word; because, the general maxim is that the 'vākyārtha' should necessarily be the 'padārtha'. Vācaspati, in his commentary, clearly explains this maxim and points out the logical necessity of admitting the 'niyoga' as being the 'padārtha' or the meaning of the word in order that it should be the 'vākyārtha' or the meaning of the sentence. It is then pointed out that the 'niyoga' cannot be the 'padārtha' even, because, the 'niyoga' is admitted by the Prabhakaras to be not known by any other means of valid knowledge, and that which is not known by any means of knowledge, other than the 'Sabda' or the verbal testimony, cannot be the 'padārtha'. That is to say, in order to become the meaning of the word, the thing should not be cognised by the word alone. There must be some more 'pranāga' to know it, because the meaning of the word requires the apprehension of the convention on the word. In order to have the knowledge of convention, we must know the sambandhins or the words related. And the sambandhins can be known only if
there is some means of knowledge to know them. So, in order that the niyoga should be the meaning of the word i.e. the optative form, it must be known by some pramāṇa other than the sabda. But in the case of niyoga, no other means of valid knowledge has got any scope. So, it cannot be the sabdārtha. It may perhaps be said that the sabda or the verbal testimony itself would convey this relation of the niyoga with other words. But, this leads to the fallacy of interdependence as the relation of the niyoga with other words will be known when the niyoga will be cognised by the verbal testimony, and the niyoga will be understood by the verbal testimony only when the relation between the words is known.

To admit extraordinary capacity in the case of the optative form to produce the meaning of the niyoga, without the cognition of the convention and thereby to accept it as an exception to the general rule, in regard to the process of the meaning of the word, is surely not reasonable. Vācaspati explains it further by pointing out that just as the optative form, which has been heard of for the first time, gives no sense, the convention being not understood, for the same reason, it will make no sense even if it be heard for hundred times, if the convention is not understood.

The clarification of the Prabhākara view of the niyoga,
by Vācaspāti, is remarkably noteworthy. The terms 'āpūrva', 'kārya' and 'niyoga', which are generally very difficult to understand correctly, are explained very clearly by him. He says that the 'āpūrva' is so called because of its not being the object of any other means of valid knowledge; it is also called 'kārya' because of its being cognised as something to be done, and it is designated as 'niyoga' because of its impelling nature. In this way, one can easily understand that all the three terms 'āpūrva', 'kārya' and 'niyoga' are synonyms and are used to express one and the same thing with different connotation.

In brief, according to the Prabhakaras, the import of the optative form is the 'niyoga', in the absence of which, nobody would engage himself in any action.

The only answer given again and again to the Prabhakaras is that there is no convention of the 'niyoga' on the optative form and hence it cannot be spoken of by the 'lin'. Vācaspāti, while commenting on the line 'सङ्क्षिप्तः विद्यमानाः किंचिदः' in the Vidhiviveka, has explained in more than hundred lines how the 'āpūrva' or the 'niyoga' of the Prabhakaras cannot be the meaning of the 'lin' or the optative form. He has very reasonably drawn our attention to the fact that even assuming the capacity of the optative form to denote the 'kartavyata', the 'āpūrva' need not be resorted to, because, as the worldly
experience goes, the \textit{\`{k}artavyatā} can possibly belong to the action itself and not to the \textit{\`{a}pūrva}. Vācaspati has endeavoured to point out that whatever purpose is expected to be served by the \textit{\`{a}pūrva} of the Prābhākaras, can very well be fulfilled by the \textit{kriyā} or the action also. In addition to this, the action is the object of other means of valid knowledge while the \textit{\`{a}pūrva} is not. Thus, there is no point in specially favouring the \textit{\`{a}pūrva} as the meaning of the optative form.

Moreover, the \textit{niyoga} cannot be accepted as the meaning of the optative form, because of the impossibility of any \textit{niyokta} or the commanding personality, who should necessarily be omniscient. Two theories in regard to the possibility of an omniscient being, held by the Svāyambhūvas and the Naiyāyikas, are put forth and controverted. Then the idea of \textit{dharma\~{j}āna}, instead of \textit{sarvaj\~{n}a}, is discussed and refuted by pointing out that it cannot be cognised by any means of knowledge.

Although, the topic was not referred to in the Vidhi-viveka by Maṇḍana, Vācaspati deals with the problem of the \textit{apauruṣeyatva}. And then, that is after more than half of the work is over, we come across the Karika 1 in which the main doctrine (Siddhānta) in regard to the injunction, is pointed out. That is, only \textit{\`{i}stābhuyatva} or \textit{\`{i}stasādhanatva} has got the capacity of
impelling a person to do something. Vācaspati elucidates this theory as follows: The actions of wise persons presuppose some sort of operation (prayatna), which is the result of inclination. Inclination is possible only in the case of those things which bring pleasure, and not in the case of things, which are painful or indifferent to both pain and pleasure. The action itself is painful and if it not be even a means of attaining pleasure, nobody would resort to it. So, it should necessarily be admitted that the fact that the actions like the sacrifice etc. are the means of attaining pleasure is known through the injunction and hence people resort to actions. That is to say, the meaning of the injunction or the optative form is īṣṭasādhanatva (to know the means of the thing desired).

While discussing in detail the Prābhākara view of 'Kartavyatā' as against the 'īṣṭasādhanatva' of Maṇḍana, a reference to pratibha as the meaning of 'kartavyatā' has been made. The 'pratibha' -- a particular type of knowledge, is refuted on the ground that there is no possible substratum for it. The Buddhistic theory of 'nirālambana jñāna', is examined thoroughly by Vācaspati, in this connection.

An objection against the 'īṣṭasādhanatva' theory of Maṇḍana is put forth as follows: If the knowledge of something
as the means of desired object is quite essential for activity, every 'Karma' would be 'kāmya' and there would be no difference between 'nityakarmans' and 'kāmyakarmans'. Also, there would be no 'pravṛtti' in the case of 'nityakarmans' or the actions which are to be performed daily and not on particular occasion, because, these actions are not the means of attaining any desired object. Also, in the case of these so-called 'nityakarmans' or the daily rites, one will have to perform all the subordinate rites and 'yathāṣakti angopasāmhāra' or the performance of subordinate rites according to one's own ability would not be allowed. And it is utterly impossible to perform 'yavadangopasāmhāra' in the case of daily rites. Moreover, the word 'yavajjīva' in regard to the daily rites would be meaningless, if all the rites be accepted as 'kāmya' and hence 'anitya'. This objection is answered by declaring that the destruction of demerit ('duritanirharaṇa'), which is always desired, is the fruit of daily rites. For this reason, a man will always perform these daily rites.

One more technical objection against the 'iṣṭasādhanatva' theory is advanced as follows: Every optative form gives rise to the knowledge of the desired object, according to this theory. Then the sentences like 'yadantim eva śraddhākāraḥ' etc., which are admitted to be of the 'utpattividhi' type, would cease to be
so, as the purpose also is spoken of therein -- a fact which is not allowed in the 'utpattividhivākya'. In the same way, the 'karman' in the 'utpattividhivākya' would be different from that in the 'adhikārividhivākya', because both would be independent, and none of them would require the other. But this goes against the established arrangement of 'karman' and 'vidhi'. The third difficulty is that the 'prayājas' would not be the 'āngas' or subordinate to the 'darsapūrṇamāsa' sacrifice, because they have got their own fruit which is 'śrutyupāta' or acquired directly, while the fruit viz. to serve the purpose of the 'darsapūrṇamāsa' is only 'prakaraṇalabdha' or obtained through context. Moreover, if we admit the 'iṣṭasādhanatva' as the meaning of the optative form, heaven alone would be the 'sādhyā' of every sacrifice and not other things like cattle etc., as the pleasure alone is 'iṣṭa' and that is heaven. These are some technical objections against the theory of 'iṣṭasādhanatva'.

The first objection is answered by assuming that every injunction is of four kinds -- (i) 'Utpatti' (ii) 'Viniyoga' (iii) 'Frāyoga' and (iv) 'Adhikārī'. That is to say, it does not involve any contradiction, even if all the four kinds of injunctions are admitted in one and the same sentence. The fact that a certain injunction is said to be the 'utpattividhi' and another as the 'viniyogavidhi' etc., is due to that particular
point being stressed therein. The remaining points, even though they exist, are unintended there. Vācaspati makes it clear why the remaining points are regarded to be unintended sometimes. He says —

That is, the injunctions, when they are known by other sentences, are treated to be unintended, even though they are present there, as inherently related to the injunction.

Two more objections against the 'iṣṭasādhanatva' theory, which are already pointed out, are not answered directly either by Maṇḍana or by Vācaspati. But, when the above position is accepted, these objections can be answered as follows:-

As regards the objection that the 'Prayājas' would not be subordinate to the 'dārsapūrṇamāsa' sacrifice, as they have their own fruit — 'iṣṭa', it can be very well pointed out that although 'iṣṭa' is understood because of the very nature of the injunction ('vidhisvābhīvyāt'), it is 'iṣṭa' in general and when the particular 'iṣṭa' is desired to be known, it is known through the context. The context here, points out the 'Prayājas' being subordinate to the 'dārsapūrṇamāsa' sacrifice. Hence, there is no difficulty whatsoever in admitting the 'Prayājas' as subordinate to the 'dārsapūrṇamāsa', even though 'iṣṭa' is accepted as the meaning of injunction. The subtle point to be remembered is that विवेकाधित्यमेव दूरेष विवेकाधिणात्व is not desired to be the

* Nyāyakārikā p. 380.
meaning of the injunction by Maṇḍana. When he says,

"पुरीते नैदययायात्सत्त्वण: विप्रस्त्वयः प्रवत्तिते |
प्रवत्तितेऽपि धर्मैः क प्रवत्तितेऽपि प्रक्ष्याम्।"

it is understood that प्रवत्तितेऽपि धर्मैः क प्रवत्तितेऽपि प्रक्ष्याम् is the
meaning of injunction. This प्रवत्तितम् has the expectancy of
‘bhāvyā’ for which it will be connected with the ‘darsapūrṇamāśa’.

In regard to the second objection viz. heaven alone
and not any other thing would be ‘sādhyā’ or the thing to be
achieved by every sacrifice, as the ‘istā’ is the ‘sādhyā’ every­
where and the pleasure alone is ‘istā’ and that is heaven, the
arguments can be put forth in the following manner: The
objection is based on the wrong notion that the ‘istā’ is the
‘sādhyā’ everywhere and it must be heaven as it is the most
desirable thing. The Pūrva-pākṣin seems to have deliberately
taken this position so that there cannot be the relation of
general and particular (sāmānyaviśeṣasambandha) between the
two ‘sādhyas’ — heaven and cattle — etc. as both are parti­
cular; and the only thing that can be done in such cases is
that the weaker is sublated by the stronger, modification
being not possible. So, the objection may be answered on the
following lines. The ‘istā’, known on the strength of injunction
in the sentence like 'वुद्धिदा येचेत पुरा:’ is ‘istā’ in general
(‘istatvena ista and not svargatvena’) and not particular, and
the same is modified by the word 'paśukāma', as the cattle --
the particular desired thing is directly mentioned therein.
That is to say, now, there is no 'bādhyabādhakabhāva', as one is
general and the other particular, the general itself changes
into the particular ('सामान्यसौंदर्य निकृष्टे पर्याप्तान्म्'). Thus there
is no difficulty in admitting cattle etc. as the 'sādhya' where
it is directly stated and there is no contingency of accepting
heaven as the 'sādhya' everywhere.

In this way, these objections can be answered, although
they are not directly refuted in the text.

After this main theory of the work, the summary of the
second, third, fourth, fifth and the sixth chapters of the
Bhāṣya of Śabarāswāmin is given in order to deal with the four
kinds of injunctions and the work is finished.

Now, some important topics from the Nyāya-Kaṇḍikā, which,
as we have already referred to, have no direct bearing on the
subject proper but which are of greater philosophical import­
ance and which are specially dealt with by Vācaspatī, are taken
into consideration.

(1) The most striking point, which has not been noticed
hitherto by any scholar and which will undoubtedly impel the
scholars like Sūryanārāyaṇa Ṛṣṭri to overhaul their criticism against Vācaspati, is first discussed.

While examining the 'pratibhā' of the Prabhakaras and refuting it on the point that there is no possible substratum for it, Maṇḍana excludes the possibility of the 'Sphota' as being the substratum of the 'pratibhā'. For this purpose, he refutes the 'Sphota' theory. Vācaspati remarks — 'स्फोटानिराकारणकारणिकारणि मद्दद्वस्तवाभावान्हेत्यूक्तं भास्यकृताः' i.e. according to Vācaspati, Maṇḍana here quotes the words of the Bhāṣyakāra, without challenging their authority. That is, he accepts the refutation of the 'Sphota' as it is found in the Bhāṣya. Curiously enough, the word 'Sphota' does not occur in the text of Maṇḍanamisra. But Vācaspati explains the Bhāṣya line — 'मद्दद्वस्तवाभावान्हेत्यूक्तं' as follows: 'कौन्यो निःस्ते मिति मेद: स्फोटं अमिले, वेद्वस्तवाभावात्' That is, 'bheda', according to Vācaspati, is the 'sphota' and it is refuted by Maṇḍanamisra. While commenting upon the concluding line of the topic — 'पराग्राहान्तरेण व बहुः स्थितिरिति प्रथतिविप्रेक्ष्येत', Vācaspati unhesitatingly remarks — 'स्फोटाकारणकारणकारणिकारणिकारणिकारणिकारणिकारणि व बहुः स्थितिरिति प्रथतिविप्रेक्ष्येत'. Thus, Vācaspati has not the slightest doubt in his mind about the fact that Maṇḍana intended to refute the 'Sphota' theory. Now the problem arises like this. Maṇḍanamisra was the staunch follower of the 'Sphota' theory — a fact which is clear from

* N.K. p. 256.

† Ibid, p. 294.
his Brahmasiddhi and the Sphoṭasiddhi. Prof. Sūryanārāyaṇa Śaṭṭri has deplored the fact that Vācaspati, who generally follows Maṇḍana in points of difference with other Advaitic scholars, has unwisely deviated from him in regard to the refutation of the 'Sphoṭa' theory. Here, we want to show that the whole criticism by Sūryanārāyaṇa Śaṭṭri against Vācaspati, proves ineffective when we come across the refutation of the 'Sphoṭa' theory by Maṇḍana himself in his Vidhiviveka. Of course, the fact that Maṇḍana established the 'Sphoṭa' theory in some of his works and refuted the same elsewhere, cannot be pointed out as the holding of contradictory views, because Maṇḍana, while elaborating the Mīmāṃsā doctrine, followed the Mīmāṃsā Bhāgyakāra in refuting the 'Sphoṭa', while in his Brahmasiddhi, he tried to incorporate this theory of the grammarians into the Advaita system and formed the system quite different from that of Śaṅkarācārya. So, it clearly seems that Prof. Sūryanārāyaṇa Śaṭṭri had not come across the refutation of the 'Sphoṭa' by Maṇḍana. Otherwise he would not have criticised Vācaspati in that manner.

(2) 'Apaṇuṣeyayata': The idea of the 'apaṇuṣeyayata' has been dealt with by Vācaspati as follows:

The general view that does not admit the 'apaṇuṣeyayata'

theory is first represented. Every sentence is seen to have been produced by some Puruṣa or other. So, the case of the Vedas should not be brought forth as an exception to the rule, as, they are also a collection of sentences. The peculiar order of the words in a sentence and the subject-matter etc., also, should not be pointed out as conducive to the 'apauruṣe-yatva' of the Vedas; because, the same can be shown in respect of the works like those of the Bauddhas, which are admittedly Pauruṣeya. To this, Vācaspati replies -- as the 'varṇas' are eternal and all-pervading, the order in space and time in regard to them, is not possible. So, this order should necessarily be supposed as belonging to the manifestation of these 'varṇas'. And this manifestation after all, is the result of human effort. So, if the idea of 'apauruṣe-yatva' implies that the Vedic sentences are originated with the particular order, by human agency, this sort of pauruṣe-yatva is not inadmissible to the Mīmāṃsakas. But, if at all by the term 'pauruṣeyya', it is meant that an independent author is responsible for the creation of the Vedas, just as in the sentence 'mā niṣāda - etc.' the Mīmāṃsakas would not agree with it.

Vācaspati argues that 'svatantrapuruṣapraṇītatsva' or independent authorship cannot be proved in the case of the Vedas, because the reason viz. 'vākyatva' is fallacious in as-much as it lives where there is no 'sādhyā'. That is to say, even in
the sentences like 'mā niśāda - etc.', which are uttered by
us, there is obviously no 'sādhya' viz. 'svatantrapuruṣaPaṇī-
tata'. Now, it may be said that instead of 'svatantrapuruṣa-
paṇītata', 'svatantrapuruṣapūrvakatva' is present, as it
presupposes the independent authorship of Vālmīki. But that
is also not reasonable, because, only 'puruṣapraṇītata' should be accepted as the common point between the worldly
sentences and the Vedic ones, and it is not at all necessary
to admit the independence in the composition of the Vedas.
For, the similarity between worldly sentences and the Vedic
sentences is not affected, even if we do not admit independent
composition in the case of the Vedas.

Vācaspati then considers the wellknown inference\textsuperscript{12}
refuting the ṣapauruṣeyatva theory and controverts the same
as Kumārilabhaṭṭa, in his Ślokavārtika, has already done it,
by pointing out that the Vedic studies are beginningless --
the fact, which cannot be shown in the case of the Mahā-
bhārata and other works, where the authors are too wellknown.
The names like 'kāṭhaka' - etc. found in the Vedas, can be
explained as being the names of the expounders of the
particular branch of the Vedic literature. The last
objection, which is raised against the 'apauruṣeyatva' theory,
is, as follows --

\textsuperscript{12} वेदाक्षरणि स्कन्त्यपुरुषप्रणीतानि, वाल्मिक्यादृश्यः। मायात्मादाहादाहानि
p.236.
In order to know the meaning of the word, there must be 'puruṣasamketa' or the convention by human beings, and the convention implies the relation between the word and its sense. So, in the case of the Vedas, also, it is reasonable to accept that somebody, having understood the relation between the words and their sense, has composed them. It cannot be said that the words have got the natural power to denote the sense and it is merely manifested by the convention, because, in that case, we should come across such instance, where, notwithstanding the presence of the convention, the word does not give rise to the sense. But that is not experienced. Also, as we do not find any instance, where there is no convention but the sense is understood, there is no point in assuming the natural power of the words to denote the sense, which is merely manifested by convention.

This objection is answered by Vācaspati by pointing out that the sense of the word can be understood, even without the convention. The 'vṛddhavyavahāra' or the usage of the old would very well serve the purpose, which is to be served by convention. The 'vṛddhavyavahāra' will manifest the power of the words to denote their sense and no necessity of resorting to convention should be felt. So, the point of convention cannot be raised against the 'apauruṣeyatvā' theory in regard to the Vedas.
(3) Sarvajñatva theory: The Mīmāṃsakas, in admitting the apaurūṣeyatva theory as regards the Vedas, had to deny the possibility of any omniscient personality, in order to refute the Naiyāyikas and others who hold that the Vedas are created by Isāvara, who is omniscient. The sarvajñatva theory is a controversial problem, discussed in both orthodox and non-orthodox systems. The Nyāyānaṇikā deals with the sarvajñatva theory in the following way:

The advocates of the sarvajñatva theory argue that the omniscient personality cannot be denied, because there is no pramāṇa or the means of valid knowledge to know its absence. That is to say, the absence of the omniscient being can be assumed, only if there is not a single means of valid knowledge to prove its existence. But, that is not the case in regard to the omniscient being. The pratyakṣa or the direct perception cannot be said to be contradictory to the omniscience which is atyantaparokṣa or extremely indirect. The inference also cannot be pointed out as disproving the omniscient being. This is explained as follows: The inference either proves something or denies something. The first type of inference is of no use in denying the omniscient personality, because of its very nature. The second type of inference may have some scope in regard to the denial of the omniscient personality. This inference can serve the purpose, either by assuming something
contradictory to the omniscient being or by denying the cause of it, which is vyāpaka or more pervading. But, both these alternatives are not probable, firstly because, no experienced object is seen to be contradictory to the omniscient being, who is, as has been already pointed out, never experienced; secondly because, no relation of cause and effect can be understood, in connection with the omniscient being -- who is ever unknown directly. Hence, the question of vyāpaka and vyāpya does not arise at all. Thus, there is no bādhaka-pramāṇa in regard to the omniscient being. As regards the second alternative viz. that there is no means of valid knowledge to know the omniscient being, Vācaspati remarks that the pramāṇa is not at all vyāpaka to the prameya. That is, it is not the universal rule that every prameya should be cognised by some pramāṇa. Hence, the absence of any pramāṇa to know the sarvajña, would not possibly deny him.

This detailed treatment of the possibility of sarvajña is given by Vācaspati, only in order to serve the purpose of an introduction to its refutation in the Vidhiviveka. The only answer given to the view stated above, is that it is utterly impossible to know all the objects in the world, because, there is no pramāṇa to know them and the cognition of all the objects must be said to be the result of some pramāṇa. That is to say, the pramāṇa is the cause of
sarvārthasamvid and as there is no cause, no effect would be produced. So many technical points as regards the perception are raised. Special importance has been given to the point whether the mind is independent in regard to the perception of external things or it is dependent upon other sense organs. The decision is given that the mind is dependent upon the sense-organs for the knowledge of external objects and as the sense-organs cannot give rise to the knowledge of all the objects in the world, there is no possibility of any omniscient personality.

According to the Naiyāyikas, each and every object of all times can be comprehended by Yogic perception. Vācaspati makes this view clear by pointing out that this theory of the Naiyāyikas admits that the mind of the yogin is independent in knowing external objects, as it is unveiled by constant meditation (bhāvanā). Thus, there is the plausibility of a sarvajña. But, this position is unceremoniously deplored by remarking that the knowledge of the yogin without the help of other sense organs, is merely pratibhāna or conjecture, which is not decisive in character. So, it cannot be admitted as authoritative.

Moreover, the knowledge of all the things in the world is not possible through other means like inference etc. as they
are based on the pratyakṣa, which itself is unable to cognise them.

The Svāyambhuvas or the Pātañjalas postulate the theory that admits the omniscient being as follows: Whatever is sātiśaya has got its ultimate limit somewhere. For instance, the mahatva of ordinary things, which is sātiśaya, has reached its ultimate limit in ether. In the same way, as the knowledge of ghaṭa, paṭa etc. is sātiśaya, it should also reach its limit in some or other personality, who is none but omniscient.

This view of the Svāyambhuvas is rejected for the following reasons: If, by the word kāśṭhā or limit, the highest available thing is meant, the sarvajña would be one who knows many objects and not all the objects -- just as the earth, in comparison with the mountain etc., pervades much space and not all the space. If at all the word kāśṭhā implies the highest possible thing, so that the omniscient being would be proved, then there is vyabhicāra as the things like jar, jewel etc., although sātiśaya, they are, in regard to their form and space, cannot prove something which possesses the highest possible form and space; because in that case, that thing would cover all the space and no other thing would get any space to exist. It may be assumed that this rule is to be applied to guṇas only, and hence, there is no vyabhicāra as the jar etc. are not guṇas. But even then the position is not
admissible, as there are some guṇas e.g. gariman etc., which go against this rule. That is to say, it is not possible to admit that all the things possessing garimatva would come together to produce a thing with the highest gariman. It may be said that this general rule of सातिसाया things reaching their highest limit somewhere, is not to be applied to all the guṇas, but to the असाधारण guṇas. Thus, the scope of the rule is restricted in order to exclude the qualities like gariman etc., which are shown as going against the rule. But even then, the असाधारण guṇa viz. prayatna of men, wind, deer etc., which is सातिसाया, cannot be said to have reached its highest limit; because, the space, which is to be crossed over, is limitless -- अनात. On the other hand, if it be accepted that niratiśayaprayatna is seen in some creature, the only result would be that it will fall down, as there is no space to stay. So, the universal rule of limit -- कार्त्त्वा cannot be established.

The argument that knowledge of God is produced from the pure dharma and hence, on the analogy of vairāgya and aisvarya, it should also be niratiśayaya, i.e. God is sarvajña, goes against the view of Patañjali, who declares that God is not at all related to the actions or their impressions which come under the field of dharma and adharma. If one does not pay any heed to the opinion of a maharṣi like Patañjali and
assume that knowledge and other things of God are the outcome of merit, there would be the contingency of admitting the plurality of Gods, because, whoever would be possessed of such merit, would be designated by the term God. And if they are many, there would be no unanimous commanding because of their diverse opinions, due to the fact that all of them are equally independent. For all these reasons, the omniscient being, even according to the svāyambhuvas, cannot be proved.

The Naiyāyikas, on the other hand, maintain that God is omniscient simply because He is the author of the whole universe. Even the potter knows in details what he is going to produce. Vācaspati has put this view in the form of a logical inference. So, as God is the creator of all the objects in the world, He knows them all and hence he can very well be called sarvajña.

This view of the Naiyāyikās is controverted by pointing out the defect in the illustration of the potter given by them. The potter cannot be said to have the knowledge of all the means and other things in connection with the pot. For instance, adṛṣṭa or the unseen factor, which is necessarily to be regarded

13 Nyāyakaṇṭhā, p.211.
as one of the efficient causes of each and every object in the world, is not known to the potter. Also, the potter is not expected to know the exact and detailed purpose of the pot and also the person, who will be using the pot and so on. In this way, on the ground of the illustration, cited by the Naiyāyikas, the omniscience of God cannot be proved. He would know some things only and not all. Also the point of the creatorship of God is challenged. Although, it is just referred to in the Vīdhīviveka, Vācaspati, with remarkable understanding of all the systems, has represented the view of the Naiyāyikas and refuted it. This inference, just like the view of the svāyambhuvas, would prove many Gods, on the basis of the illustration, because the pot, chariot -- etc. which are cited as illustration are not produced by any single personality. In this way, so many defects have been pointed out in the inference put forth by the Naiyāyikas, in order to establish the omniscience of God.

While discussing, in connection with the sarvajñatva theory, the problem of the dependence of mind on the sense-organs, in regard to the knowledge of external objects, the doctrine of momentariness is referred to, in one sentence in the Vīdhīviveka. But Vācaspati, who does not lose any opportunity to refute the Buddhistic views, has dealt with fully the
momentariness in seventeen pages. The detailed treatment of the kṣaṇikatva theory in the Nyāyakaṭikā is as follows:

Momentariness cannot be known either by perception or by inference.\(^{14}\) The perception of a jar has the jar as its object and not the momentariness belonging to the jar. So, the momentariness cannot be known by perception. An objection is raised that the momentariness is not at all different from the jar, because of the same arthakriyākārītvā (purpose) served by the both and hence when the jar is perceived, the momentariness should necessarily be said to have been perceived. But, this goes against the experience and the experience is never to be made the subject of debate (न तत्वात्यथात्यथानां,\(^{15}\) it is to be accepted as it is. Here, we have the experience of the nīla (i.e. some object) and not of the momentariness. It may be pointed out that although in reality, the object is perceived, the momentariness is also perceived because of its being non-different from the nīla, it may very well be argued -- may be for the sake of argument, that the permanence is non-different from the nīla and is perceived in the cognition of that object. If at all the kṣaṇikatva is proved by other means of knowledge, it is a meaningless talk to say that it is proved by perception.

\(^{14}\) And any other means of knowledge, according to the Bauddhas is included in these two pramāṇas.

\(^{15}\) Nyāya-Kaṭikā, p.123.
The Boddhas may again argue that the momentariness belonging to the object is itself the object of experience. That is to say, momentariness itself is perceived. Now, just as when we perceive a jar, we know three things viz. -- (i) that there is a jar (ii) that the absence of the jar is not there (iii) that the things other than the specific jar are not there, in the same way, in the perception of kṣaṇikatva, we know three ether things:- (i) that the jar is conditioned by the moment in which it exists\(^\text{16}\) (ii) that there is no absence of its existence in the moment in which it exists and (iii) that there is no possibility of its existence in the former and the latter moments. This last point viz. the absence of the possibility of the existence of a thing in the former and the latter moments, obviously proves the momentariness of the object perceived. Thus, by the perception, we know the jar along with the momentariness belonging to it.

This view of the Boddhas is controverted for the same reasons, referred to already. That is, the ghta is the only object of the perception and nothing else like the momentariness. So, we cannot cognise it as it is different from the ghaṭa. It is quite impossible to assume that we perceive the momentariness, simply because it exists in the moment in which

\(^{16}\) Here the printed edition reads astasamayāvacchinna which should be amended to svasamayāvacchinna which gives the required sense.
the ghāta or the pot exists. The momentariness cannot be understood as the viśeṣaṇa of the thing perceived, because, in the first moment of the perception, the relation of the thing that qualifies with the thing that is qualified, cannot be cognised. It may be maintained that the perception continues to exist further -- so that the momentariness may be cognised as being the epithet of the thing perceived. But in that case, the doctrine of momentariness will have to be sacrificed, because of the existence of the objects in subsequent moments. In this way, the perception is of no avail to prove the momentariness of the objects.

Then follows a detailed discussion in regard to pratyabhijñā or recognition, which, according to the Mīmāṁsakas establishes the permanency of the objects. According to the Bauddhas, recognition cannot prove the permanency of the objects. In this connection, Vācaspati has represented their view as follows. Recognition does not constitute one knowledge. But, in fact, it is the combination of two cognitions. 'Soyam Devadattah' is the stock example of recognition. In this form of knowledge, the word 'saḥ' produces indirect knowledge, while the word 'ayam' gives rise to direct knowledge, because the object of 'saḥ' is indirect while that of 'ayam' is direct. So, these two cognitions, which are by nature quite contradictory to each other, cannot possibly be remarked as
being one. Even though the object of these two cognitions is designated by one and the same word Devadatta, it should necessarily be admitted that the object of each cognition is quite different from that of the other, because the time and the space belonging to each object is different and because they possess contradictory qualities like directness and indirectness, as has been just pointed out. The main argument of the Bauddhas is that where there are two different causes, the effect cannot be one. That is to say, the cognition of 'saḥ' is produced by the samskāras or the former impressions, while the knowledge of 'ayam' is generated by the sense-organs. So, these two different causes cannot give rise to one knowledge. They produce two different knowledges, the objects of which are also different. Thus, the recognition cannot prove the existence of a single object in the former and the latter moments and thereby the permanency of the object. Moreover, this knowledge is of vikalpa type — and not nir-vikalpa, which alone is authoritative. Also, this knowledge is not different from memory. Hence it is not authoritative, even if it be accepted that recognition establishes the permanency of the objects.

This Buddhistic view is refuted by Vācaspati as follows - If directness and indirectness of knowledge lead to the difference in knowledge, the inference also will have to be admitted
as constituting two cognitions and not one, because, even in
the inference, the knowledge of the reason is direct, while
that of the sādhyā is indirect. But, to accept two cognitions
in the case of inference would not be admissible even to the
Bauddhas. The justification which would be advocated for the
inferential knowledge as being one, can possibly be put forth
in favour of recognition too. That is to say, just as in the
case of inference, directness and indirectness are due to the
difference in objects and the one-ness of the inferential
knowledge is proved by the experience itself. In the same
way, in recognition, directness and indirectness are the
results of 'idam tā' and 'tattā' respectively and the oneness
of the knowledge is an honest experience. Also, it is not
reasonable to say that one and the same thing cannot be related
to the space and time in former and latter moments, because,
we do observe such relation in the world. For instance, when
we perceive a padmarāga jewel, we also know that there is no
absence of it. Thus, the perception of the padmarāga jewel is
related to both the padmarāga and its absence, which exist in
different space and time. Hence, it can be said with full
justification that recognition is the knowledge of one object,
which exists in the former and the latter moments. As
regards the objection that the difference in cause leads to
the difference in effects, Vacaspati has made the following
observations. When the effect is quite wellknown, the cause is necessarily to be admitted. To deny the effect itself on the score that the cause is not seen, would altogether be unreasonable. So, although the sense-organ alone or the impressions alone cannot give rise to recognition, it can reasonably be maintained that the sense-organ, accompanied by the former impressions, does produce recognition. In this way, Vācaspati\textsuperscript{17} points out that there is no kārapabheda or two different causes viz. impressions and the sense-organ, but there is only one cause viz. the sense-organ, accompanied by the previous impressions, and it produces recognition, which, for that reason, need not be said to be two different cognitions. Moreover, this recognition cannot be remarked as mere memory, because, it refers to the space and time in the past and the present, while the memory refers to the space and time in the past only. Nor can it be viewed that recognition is not authoritative as it is not of the nirvikalpa type, because, even the vikalpajñāna, which serves the purpose of practical usage, should necessarily be admitted as authoritative. Even the knowledge of the imagined thing, when there is nothing disproving it, is authoritative. The Bauddhas here point out that there does exist one inference\textsuperscript{18} which denies

\textsuperscript{17} This is not directly stated by him but he obviously means it.

\textsuperscript{18} यक्ष्यौ तत्स शरीरं समस्थां यथा भवति, अति त्वप्रकृतिः सदा मूलः अव्युत्तितः। The inference means 'whatever exists is momentary, just like the pot, and as all the objects in the world exist, they are momentary.'
recognition. In order to prove the invariable concomitance between the existence and the momentariness, the point of identify between the sattā or the existence and the artha-kriyākārita or the quality of serving the purpose is discussed at great length. We are going to tackle this problem in the chapter on the N.V.T.T., as, the same arguments are found therein. The only important point raised by Vācaspati is that if it be assumed with the Bauddhas that the momentary thing can possibly serve the purpose, there would be no necessity of any sahakārikāraṇa in order to produce the effect, and hence the seed, as soon as it is produced, would give rise to the shoot. But that is not seen. Vācaspati concludes the topic by remarking that the inference विक्रिया विकारिता विचिन्द्रिता .. etc. which was advocated by the Bauddhas to disprove recognition, is itself invalid. Hence, recognition should, on the basis of experience, be admitted as having a permanent object.

These are some of the important topics wherein Vācaspati has put forth new arguments with detailed discussion.

The language of the work is quite in conformity with that of his other works. It is always forceful and attractive. But sometimes it lacks the grace and standard when compared with Bhāmatī. The beginning of the commentary is worth-noting
in this connection. The only difference is that the language of the Bhamati is polished and much more attractive, while that of the Nyāyakaśikā is comparatively rough. It is also not sometimes easily understandable e.g. नूतनिच्छा बालसेतु
यागाध्यसः भिक्षुः। It strikes one especially when we see that the same point viz. the purpose of injunction is discussed, in the Tātparyatīkā of Bhaṭṭombeka on the Mīmāṃsā Ślokavārtika, in quite clear terms.

The whole commentary is embedded with elaborate and scholarly discussions. But, as Vācaspatti endeavoured to advocate the views elaborately, we expect that he, a thorough scholar of each and every system as he was, should have thrown more light on some problems. For instance, while dealing with the sarvajñātva theory, Jainas, who are supposed to be the strong adherents of this theory, should have been referred to. Even though the Buddhistic view is referred to in the kārikā — "कीर्तिलक्ष्यापरिश्रान्त्र लक्ष्यात्र तेजसुधार्ये। पुरुषार्थ ना वा तत्त्वमिंऽऽि सः परस्यविदः॥"
etc., while showing the possibility of the niyokta as being dharmaśānta, it is not made clear that the Bauddhas maintain this view in connection with the sarvajñātva. It may be

19 The Nyāya-kaṇikā begins as follows: विद्वानेकोत्सवः अध्यात्मक- विवेकं न दलोगाप्रज्ञाकोपाये। तथा भारद्वजप्रति। लक्ष्यात् बैलकोपाये। विद्वानेकोत्सवाकोपाये। विद्वानेकोत्सवाकोपाये। विद्वानेकोत्सवाकोपाये। विद्वानेकोत्सवाकोपाये। विद्वानेकोत्सवाकोपाये। विद्वानेकोत्सवाकोपाये। विद्वानेकोत्सवाकोपाये। विद्वानेकोत्सवाकोपाये। विद्वानेकोत्सवाकोपाये। विद्वानेकोत्सवाकोपाये। विद्वानेकोत्सवाकोपाये। विद्वानेकोत्सवाकोपाये। विद्वानेकोत्सवाकोपाये। विद्वानेकोत्सवाकोपाये। विद्वानेकोत्सवाकोपाये।

While the Bhamati begins as यद्यत्ततहस्मश्चिना न कल्पनायत्तितित्तवोपाये। कथा (सहस्राशिकोश्चिनां घट: कर्तव्यत्र वा। तथा चैदं श्रवण विद्वानेकोत्सवाकोपाये। विद्वानेकोत्सवाकोपाये। विद्वानेकोत्सवाकोपाये। विद्वानेकोत्सवाकोपाये। विद्वानेकोत्सवाकोपाये। विद्वानेकोत्सवाकोपाये। विद्वानेकोत्सवाकोपाये। विद्वानेकोत्सवाकोपाये। विद्वानेकोत्सवाकोपाये। विद्वानेकोत्सवाकोपाये। विद्वानेकोत्सवाकोपाये। विद्वानेकोत्सवाकोपाये। विद्वानेकोत्सवाकोपाये। विद्वानेकोत्सवाकोपाये। विद्वानेकोत्सवाकोपाये। विद्वानेकोत्सवाकोपाये।

19 The Nyāya-kaṇikā begins as follows: विद्वानेकोत्सवः अध्यात्मक-
perhaps due to the fact that the kārikās, which have been quoted by him, were, at his time, so famous that a mere mention of them was quite sufficient to know all about them. In this connection, it should just be noted that although the Bauddhas originally held this view of tattvajñā i.e. knower of the highest principle instead of sarvajñā, - knower of all the objects in the world, later Buddhistic writers expounded the same theory of sarvajñā as it is accepted by the Jainas and the Naiyāyikas.

It was also necessary on the part of Vācaspāti to quote some authority for the etymological meaning of the word 'bheda' as sphoṭa in 'भेदस्पोष्ठ, भेदस्पोष्ठ' from the bhāṣya of Śabara. The word in the Śabarabhaṣya, although, it is in connection with the refutation of the sphoṭa theory, does not mean the sphoṭa. It can be only remarked that this interpretation shows the erudition of Vācaspāti and nothing else. But still he cannot be said to be unfaithful in the treatment of Sphoṭa.

It would also not be out of place to note, in these concluding remarks, that Vācaspāti, in the treatment of the apauruṣeyatva theory, does not seem to be honest when he refutes the svatantrapuruṣapraṇītātva in the case of the Vedas, on the score that even the sentence 'mā niśāda' - etc. is not

written by an independent Vālmīki. What Vācaspati wants to argue is not quite evident. But, from the further discussion, it seems that he means that the sentence 'mā niṣāda' - etc., which is uttered by us is not svatantra-puruṣapraṇīta or produced independently. But, is it anything more than quibbling on words? Because, no one would possibly be expected to argue or to hold that there is svatantrapuruṣapraṇītatva in the sentences like 'mā niṣāda' etc. uttered by us.

But on the whole, notwithstanding such defects in the commentary, the Nyāyakaṇikā is a scholarly work in the Pūrvamāmasā system, which has not been given due attention by scholars.