Background:

Śamkaraśārya has commented upon the Brahmasūtras, in a manner quite different from that accepted by the previous commentators like Bodhāyana. He is the first known commentator, who systematically put forth the Advaita from the Brahmasūtras as well as from the Upaniṣads. The monistic concept of Ś. should necessarily be said to have been adumbrated in the Upaniṣads, if at all a logical and honest reconciliation of them is aimed at. But as it was, for the first time, pointed out in a systematic form by Ś., he has been honoured to be the founder of the Advaita system. As he gave relative validity to the world -- even to the scriptures, and posited the existence of Brahman as mere knowledge, he was criticised as a crypto-Buddhist by the orthodox philosophers; while the Buddhists tried to refute him as he was the staunch admirer of the Vedas and believed in the ultimate reality of Brahman. He lived a short life of thirty-two years and within this small period, he could not put his system in proper channels of logic, as to what is the substratum of Avidyā -- either the

1 Although there exists a difference of opinion as regards the date of Ś., scholars unanimously hold that he lived a life of thirty-two years. (हाष्टको चढ़न्त्रयापन्न -- quoted as being 'abhiyuktota' in the Dīndima commentary by Dhanapati-sūri on Vidyaraṇya's Śamkaradigvijaya, p.597.)
individual soul or Brahman etc. Perhaps, he might not have thought it necessary as the 'śuṣṭa tarka' was 'apratisthita' or unstable for him. But the later generation differed in taste, and an acute need was felt by his disciples and the disciples of the disciples to give a proper logical form to their master's system and to meet the charges levelled by the opponents against the Advaita. Hence they began to comment upon the works of Ś. And to-day, there are as many as ten commentaries on the B.S.Bhāṣya of Ś. Here, although it is not relevant to justify the necessity of all these commentaries to say something about the historical need of the Bhāmati of Vācaspatimīśra, would not be out of place.

(a) Padmapāda's Pañcapādikā was the first commentary on the B.S.Bhāṣya of Ś. But as it was incomplete, a full commentary was quite necessary.

(b) Moreover, Vācaspati thought in a way different from that of Padmapāda and wanted to criticise his views as regards the interpretation of the Bhāṣya.

2 B.S.Bhāṣya.II.i.11.
3 (i) Pañcapādikā of Padmapāda, (ii) Bhāmati of Vācaspati, (iii) Bhāṣyabhāṣavprakāśikā of Citsukhaśārya, (iv) Nyāyanirṇaya of Ānandagīri, (v) Ratnaprabhā of Rāmānanda, (vi) Brahmavidyābharanā of Advaitānanda, (vii) Bhāṣyavārtika of Nārāyaṇasarasvatī, (viii) Śārīrakāmśabhaśāṣṭyaśvārtika of Balakṛṣṇānandaśarasvatī, (ix) Prakāśārthavivarana by some unknown writer, who, according to Prof. T.R. Chintamani, is wrongly taken to be Śri Caraṇa by Professors Bodas and U. -- (Intro. to Prakāśārthavivarana, p.x), (x) Brahmāṣṭrābhāṣyavāyākhyā of Jñānottama Bhaṭṭāraka (Available in Ms. form, in the Adyar Library Madras).
(c) Bhāskarācārya had written a new commentary on the Brahma-sūtras, with a view to refuting the monistic concept held by Ś.; and established the Bhedabheda-vāda or the theory which admits both difference and non-difference, as real. Hence, it was incumbent upon the Advaitin like Vācaspati to contradict Bhāskara, by way of commenting upon the B.S.Bhāṣya of Ś.

(d) The last excuse seems to be that Vācaspati wanted to bring together, as far as possible, the views of the two great Advaitins Śaṅkarācārya and Maṇḍanamīśra -- the author of the Brahmasiddhi.

This, in short, is the historical background of Vācaspati's Bhāmatī. Other commentaries on the Bhāṣya of Ś., after Vācaspati, were more or less composed on the lines of the Pañcapādikā; and Vācaspati has to his credit only a small number of followers, although, a separate prasthāna is started under his name. The reason for this seems to be that Vācaspati, keeping high regard for Ś., has incorporated in his system some of the doctrines put forth by Maṇḍana, who, in his Brahmasiddhi, has taken special pains to refute Ś. on certain topics; and it was for the same reason that Vācaspati was severely criticised by the author of the Prakāṭārthāvivaraṇa.

It is more interesting to note that even after such scorching criticism, the Bhāmatī has been studied more widely

4 As regards Jīvanmukti etc. See Brahmasiddhi, pp.132-3.
5 See page 185 below.
than any other commentary on the B.S. Bhaṣya of Śāṅkarācārya; and to-day we are in a position to have good editions of this masterwork of Vācaspati. 6

As has been observed in the preface, some of the views of Vācaspati as interpreted by later writers are lacking in accuracy and clarity. Hence, it is intended to deal with them, first.

AVACCHEDAVĀDA:

The Avacchedavāda or the theory of delimitation is the salient feature of the so-called Bhāmatī school, supposed to have been founded by Vācaspatimisra. As regards the nature of the individual soul and its relation with Brahman, scholars of the Śāṅkara Vedānta have propounded different theories. A well-known and widely circulated stanza --

\[ ज्ञाताणीच केतुं भावाते वासिष्ठिकोऽर्थो भवं न। निपुणसारिः प्रियदिक्षात्मकेवेदेः॥ \]

6 Available good editions of the Bhāmatī:-
(i) The Nirñayasāgar Press edition of the Bhāmatī along with the Kalpataru by Amālānanda and the Parimala by Appaya Dīxita, is the best and most useful.
(ii) Sūryanārayaṇa Śāstrī's edition of the Cattussūtri Bhāmatī along with the English translation, notes and introduction is also a valuable assistance to the students of Bhāmatī.
(iii) The bare text with 'tippanis' in Sanskrit below has been edited by Pt. Dhunḍirāja Śāstrī and published in the Kāśi Sanskrit Series in two parts.
(iv) The Bhāmatī is included along with the Rāmaprabhā and the Nyāyaśīrṣya in the edition of the B.S. Bhaṣya of the Nirñaya Sāgar Press, Bombay.
(v) The same press has published one more edition of the B.S. Bhaṣya of Ś, with nine commentaries on it, and the Bhāmatī is also included therein.
has recorded some of the theories and their propounders. This stanza, although it has been regarded to be authoritative, neither includes all the sub-theories, nor is it correct to maintain that Vācaspati propounded any theory like the Avacchedavāda -- the fact which we are going to prove, for the first time, later on. But as it has been taken for granted that Vācaspati expounded the Avacchedavāda, as a rival theory of the Pratibimbavāda and others, all these and some more theories are discussed in brief, here. The following are the theories which are held by different scholars, in connection with the nature of God and the individual soul.

1. Avacchedavāda,
2. Ābhāsavāda,
3. Pratibimbavāda,
4. Bimbapratibimbavāda

and (5) a theory which uses both the Avacchedavāda and the Pratibimbavāda.

Of these, the first, as we noticed above, is said to have been set forth by VācaspatimisVa; the second by Suresvarācārya; the third by Sarvajnātman, the author of the Sāmkṣepa-śārīraka; and the fourth can be said to have been advocated by the author of the Vivaraṇa; while an attempt has been made by Vidyāraṇya in his Paṇcadasī, to form a theory of his own, using both the Avaccheda and Pratibimba theories.

According to the Avacchedavāda, the individual soul is the consciousness itself delimited by some adjuncts. According
to the remaining theories, the individual soul is the reflection of the Highest in the inner sense-organ. This reflection according to the Ābhāsavādins, is unreal in as much as the image is seen to be quite different from the original. They argue that the inner sense-organ has the capacity of fabricating a new thing in the form of reflection, just like the original. So, this new thing has no existence in reality. According to the Pratibimbavādins and the Bimbapratibimbavādins, this reflection is real in the sense that it has no separate existence from the original; in the reflection, the original itself is seen as being characterised by two qualities viz. (i) that of being different from its own nature and (ii) that of having entered into the adjunct. And as it is thus the original itself, it cannot be unreal. In this way, apparently, there is no vital difference between these theories. But, if we observe minutely, there are some points of technical difference. For instance, according to the Ābhāsavāda, the individual soul is unreal and hence liberation is not going to be attained by him. So, the case co-ordination in the sentences like 'सत्त्वमायाय' is to be resorted to, by suppressing altogether one of the two words (i.e. what is technically called आधारात्मात्माकिंक्रियय). While, according to the Pratibimba theories, the individual soul is real and does exist at the time of liberation which is to be attained by him; and the case-co-ordination in the sentences like 'अत्र अवस्थाय' is

7 Siddhāntabinduvyākhyā by Mm. Vāsudeva Sāstrī Abhyankara, p.25.
possible by the identity between the two (i.e., अनेदसामानाधिकरण). This in short, is the nature of the अभासवाद and the Pratibimbavāda.

Between the Pratibimbavāda and the Bimbapratibimbavāda, there is no difference in regard to the nature of the individual soul; as regards the nature of God only, they hold different views. The Pratibimbavāda of Sarvajñātman maintains that both -- God and the individual soul are the reflections; while according to the Bimbapratibimba theory of the Vivaraṇa school, God is type while the individual soul is proto-type.  

Vidyāraṇya, in the Citradīpa chapter of his Pañcadaśī, admits kūṭastha as limited consciousness, Brahman as unlimited consciousness and both God and the individual soul as reflections of consciousness. Thus, although he has made use of the Avaccheda theory, he is of the opinion that both God and the individual soul are reflections.

In this way, in connection with the nature of the individual soul, only two theories stand prominently. And for the same reason, it seems that Appaya Dīxita, in his

8 अभोनादपिइदि विन्दूसामाद्वांतिरिविष्किततः चैतं जीव भृतितिरिविष्करः। अशा-प्रतिविष्किततं चैतं जीव। । अशा-प्रतिविष्किततं चैतं जीव। । अशा-प्रतिविष्किततं चैतं जीव। । अशा-प्रतिविष्किततं चैतं जीव। । अशा-प्रतिविष्किततं चैतं जीव। ।

Siddhantabindu, p.46.
9 Pañcadaśī 6.18.
Kalpataru-parimala refers only to the Avaccheda and the Pratibimba theories, while discussing the theory intended by the Acarya -- the author of the Kalpataru.

Here, it is intended to observe minutely what exactly the Avacchedavada means and in what way it is adumbrated in the Bhamatika. It is simply noticed above that Vacaspati considers Jiva to be the Highest Itself, defined by mind, gross and subtle bodies, which are imagined by indescribable and beginningless Nescience. That is, the consciousness, when limited, turns into Jiva; and when unlimited it is Brahman Itself. This Avacchedavada does not seem to have been interpreted in one and the same terms by all. Appaya Dixa in his Siddhanta-lasamgraha explains it as धर्मवाचस्पति स्वरुपायसंवर्धनं चैतन्य जीवः। वैद्यतिष्ठनं चैत्यमयीक्ष्मः। That is, he accepts the inner sense-organ as the limiting adjunct of the individual soul. M.M. Vasdavedastra Abhyankara has taken for granted that according to Vacaspati, Avidya itself is the limiting condition of the individual soul. Appaya Dixa also further advocates that even the Avacchedavadins can assume Avidya as the defining adjunct of the individual soul, in order to avoid some fallacies in their theory of delimitation.

10 pp.155-159.
11 p.95
12 अथ तेविं मन्त्रित्ववादी संयुक्तं नेतृत्वम् जीवः। अथ तेविं असिद्धिस्तो शुभदितः प्रधारितिमिज्जो वा तेविः मो जीवापापायामिः नैवेक्ष्मम्। अथ वाचस्पतिभाष्यांमि मो नैवेक्ष्मम्। Advaitamoda p.10.
* See page 207 below.
The question here arises as to what exactly is accepted by Vācaspatimiśra, as the limiting condition of the individual soul. In the Bhamati, on some occasions, Vācaspati speaks of the individual soul as being delimited by the inner sense-organ, the product of Avidya; while there are other instances where Avidya itself is referred to as the defining adjunct of the individual soul. Sometimes, on the other hand, it has been merely stated that the individual soul is defined by an adjunct -- without mentioning anything particular. So, the question apparently seems to be unanswered whether Vācaspati admits Avidya or the antahkaraṇa as the limiting condition of the individual soul. But taking into consideration all the references to the Avaccheda in the Bhamati, we arrive at the conclusion that Avidya is regarded to be the ultimate adjunct but it does not involve any contradiction if the inner sense-organ and other things like subtle body etc. are considered to be the adjuncts of the individual soul, as these are the effects

14 वस्तुतः परमार्थार्थार्थमपर्यं विद्यानात्मा अन्तःविद्याभासादिकास्तत:-
कपिलोक्ष्योक्ष्येति विद्यानात्मशास्त्रादिकास्ततः।।। मामी। p.1014;
बहमित्व वर्मात्मकम्य अखिलशक्तिः किंचन्तु कुल्लां-
दुप्लितस्य अत्यत्नासाधारस्यैव अत्यत्नासाधारस्यैव अत्यत्नासाधारस्यैव अत्यत्नासाधारस्यैव।।
Ibid, p.617 etc. etc.

15 वस्तुतः विद्यामाल्य: अविद्योपाध्यायमः जीवाः तत्वधार: आलमा।
Ibid, p.82 बहमित्व निर्माणानि भावीयास्थानोद्योगादिकास्ततं जीवाः न वस्तुतः
परमात्मिन्निः।।
Ibid, p.705 etc.etc.

16 परमार्थार्थार्थार्थमपर्यं विद्यानात्मा अन्तःविद्याभासादिकास्तत:-
कपिलोक्ष्योक्ष्येति विद्यानात्मशास्त्रादिकास्ततः।।। मामी। p.703.
of Avidyā, and there is non-difference between cause and effect. This is quite clear from the following passage in the Kalpataru

"नू जीवव्यवस्थितिः नात्त्वृक्षाविष्ठिः नात्त्वृक्षाविष्ठिः च दृष्टिः स्वभावं व्यक्तिक्षेत्रः न्युपातानां कर्मणां अविभाजिताः।"

That Vācaspati treated नेर्चुन्द्र as the limiting condition of the individual soul, should necessarily be accepted, as, he maintains that Avidyā of every soul is different. There would have been no propriety, had Vācaspati not viewed Avidyā as the final defining adjunct of the individual soul. Thus, it can be said with full justification that Avidyā, along with the antahkaraṇa, is the limiting condition of the individual soul.

Madhusūdanārasārvatī, in his Siddhāntabindu, represents the Avacchedavadāda in different words. He says, "अध्यात्मिक्षे मूलं जीवन्यवंस्करं, अध्यात्मिक्षे मूलं जीवं विभाजितित्तिः। …… अनेकं चाक्षरेदाद्विं।" 19 That is to say, the object of Nescience is God; and the substratum of the same is the individual soul.

Now we are confronted with another problem as to whether अध्यात्मिक्षे मूलं जीवं; and अध्यात्मिक्षे मूलं जीवं; ----

-- these are two different definitions of the individual soul and if so, whether there is any contradiction between the two.

It is beyond doubt that Vācaspati was the strong adherent

17 p.379.
18 न कर्मै प्राणाचार्यो धर्मीये अध्यात्माचार्यो विभक्ते। भ. 377.
19 p.47; also Darśanodaya by Śrīnīvāsaśārya, p.128.
of the theory that the individual soul is the only possible substratum of Nescience, although, as a definition, he has nowhere said that the individual soul is that consciousness, which is the substratum of Nescience.

But there is no harm in accepting it, as it is in accordance with his own view. Moreover, there is no contradiction between these two definitions. Both can be accepted simultaneously. That is to say, the consciousness defined by Avidyā and its effects -- mind, subtle and gross body etc. can possibly be the substratum of Avidyā. The only possible objection against this theory would be that the individual soul, who has its very existence depending on Avidyā, is acknowledged as the substratum of Avidyā -- the fact which leads to the fallacy of mutual dependence -- Avidyā depending on the individual soul for its substratum and the individual soul depending on Avidyā for its adjunct. The answer to the objection raised is given by Vācaspati by admitting beginninglessness of both the individual soul and Nescience. That is to say, the ignorance or Nescience is the adjunct of the individual soul only when it is located in the individual soul i.e. it cannot be asked to point out which of them took its existence first, whether the individual soul or Nescience, as both of these are beginningless.20 It can be also noticed in this

20 All the Vedāntins hold that the six entities mentioned in the stanza -- जीव जीव जीवविकृतां जीव जीवविकृतिः।
विकृतिभिर्मिन्द्रियोऽभिमिदष्टः॥
are beginningless.
connection that this sort of mutual dependence wherein each of the two is necessary for the existence of other, is not a fallacy, just as the gunāśrayatva or the quality of being a substratum for the attributes and the dravyatva or the quality of being a substance -- these two are depending on each other but the case is accepted as unfallacious.\(^2\) Thus we arrive at the conclusion that ajñānaśrayībhūtam caitanyam and ajñānaavacchinnam caitanyam are two different definitions of the individual soul, which can be advanced from two different points of view, according to the avaccheda theory.

Now, one more important problem in the Avacchedavāda is to be dealt with here, and that is the nature of God. This point does not seem to have been discussed anywhere and no conclusion in regard to it has been drawn. Three questions can be raised in regard to this problem:— (i) Whether VācaspatimisVa admits that Isvara is also avacchīnā like the individual soul, (ii) if so, what is the limiting condition for Isvara?, (iii) in what way is it represented by later writers?

There are some interpreters who, even according to the Avacchedavāda, having assumed the difference between Māyā and Avidyā proclaim that just as the individual soul is delimited

\(^2\) Commentary on the S.L. samgraha by Kṛṣṇānandatīrtha, p.65.
by Avidyā, Iśvara is defined by Māyā. Kṛṣṇānanda, the author of the commentary on the Śiddhāntaleśasamgraha, represents the pūrvapakṣa which assumes that Iśvara is limited by Avidyā while the individual soul is conditioned by the antahkaraṇa. 22 Sadānanda, the author of the Pratyaktatvacintāmaṇi also remarks, in his own commentary, to the same effect. 23 Thus, according to this interpretation, Iśvara is also avacchinna or conditioned in the same way as the individual soul is. But this view is not found in the Bhāmatī of Vācaspati. Nor is it consistent with Vācaspati's treatment of Iśvara. According to Vācaspati, it is not necessary to accept Māyā as the adjunct of Iśvara either for limiting or for reflection. This Iśvara, if at all reflected in or limited by Māyā, is not to be attained by the liberated souls. Nor is it possible to have the knowledge of everything by the knowledge of Iśvara, who, according to this view, is qualified by Māyā. Also, it is not necessary to accept Māyā to conceal the substratum, for, it is not the universal rule that the substratum is to be concealed only by covering the object. It is just possible that the covering may be in connection with the subject only as in the case of the concealment of a thing by covering the eyes of the seer. Nor can it be objected that at the time of illusion, the

22 Ibid, p.69; also on page 103, he says, "नीचवत्याः न्युत्तसमयः अविभावविभिन्न: जीवंहि: " and here it is not the prima-facie view.

23 तत्र नायकचन्द्रेन परमेश्वरस्वपनविहारः अन्तःकरणचन्द्रेन श्रीकष्णविहारः ... त्वापिद्विभावस्मेति प्रत्यक्षक्ष्ट्रिक्ष्टाभावः -- p.273.
defect in the object is necessarily to be admitted like the
defect in the subject or the agent, because we do not come
across any real defect in the conch or in the rope when they
are misapprehended respectively as a yellow conch and a snake.
In this way, there is no use of Māyā as the condition of
Īśvara.\textsuperscript{24}

Nowhere in his Bhāmatī does he describe Īśvara as being
delimited by some limiting adjunct just as in the case of the
individual soul. So, Appaya Dīkṣita is quite reasonable when
he speaks of Īśvara as being not limited by mind.

Hence, as regards the first question, we would be
justified in saying that Īśvara cannot be said to be delimited
or avacchāna according to Vācaspati. So the other questions,
which are based on the first one, do not stand at all.

In fact, Nescience has no direct relation with Brahma,
in the system of Vācaspati. He strongly opposes the view that
Avidyā is located in Brahman, the view which is propounded by
Suresvara in his Brhadāraṇyaka-śaṣya-Vārtika, by Sarvajnātma,
in his Sanksépaśārīraka\textsuperscript{25} and by the Vivaraṇa tradition.
His main argument is that Avidyā cannot be located in Brahman,
as Brahman is of the nature of Vidyā or knowledge.\textsuperscript{26} There is:

25 अभमत्विभच्छवामिनी निर्विभय विभिन्न वेदेऽ। I.319.
26 विद्यास्मनवे श्रवणि तदनुपपते। Bhāmatī, p.378.
no doubt that there are some passages in the B.S. Bhāṣya of Śrī, wherein Isvara has been spoken of as a substratum of Māyā. But, Vācaspati has very ingeniously commented upon these passages. He explains that Māyā is Isvarāśraya not in the sense that it resides in him but in the sense that it depends upon Isvara for its object or for its existence. Vācaspati is quite conscious of his theory going against the verdict of the Bhāṣya when he says:—

Whether Vācaspati is faithful to Śrī in this interpretation will be a matter of dispute. But, it cannot be said that this interpretation is an illogical one. Amalānanda, who does not lose any opportunity to refute the objections, raised by the opponents of Vācaspati against him, appropriately remarks that Vācaspati, in interpreting the Bhāṣya-phrase — paramēśvarāśraya — to mean that Avidyā depends upon Isvara and not that it resides in Brahman, has shown deep knowledge of the Bhāṣya. In fact, the word Āśraya, as he explains it in his Nyāyavartika-tātparyatikā, is to be taken in the sense of mere dependence and not necessarily in the sense of the location or residence.

27 अविवाचितमा द्वि-वैज्ञानिकः अप्र कतादिन्देश्य। परमेश्वराश्रया।

28 Bhāmatī, p.378.

29 तत्काद् वाचप्परिति मायाविवेकादिनिधि कौशिककूस्त्यकुलपूर्वकृष्ण—

अविवाचिताश्रयादिनिधिः परमेश्वराश्रयाः।

30 मयथा राजाप्रियि: परिणद्यं N.V.T.T. p.41.
as in the case of rajasraya -- depending on the king and not residing in the king. Here, Avidyā depends upon Brahman for its object. Amalānanda says -- श्रवणमात्रते विज्ञानप्रेमतिः जीवात्मास्य 
So, the interpretation given by Vācaspāti cannot be regarded as unfaithful to जी, but, on the other hand, as the Kalpataru has remarked, it must be said that Vācaspāti saved Brahman from the defect of being ignorant and being deluded. The point is referred to in the Kalpataruparimala also and Vācaspāti's case has been justified by Appayya Dīxita. He says that Vācaspāti, even accepting the individual soul as the location of Avidyā, can assume Isvara also as the location, from the point of view that the individual souls along with their Avidyās -- all these which are illusionary, have their abode in Brahman.32 Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, while explaining the Avacchedavāda in his Siddhāntabindu, says that Isvara is supposed to be the cause of the world only because He is the adhiśṭhāna of the souls and the Avidyā.33

In this connection, it should be taken into consideration that the adhāra and the adhiśṭhāna are two different things and according to Vācaspāti, Brahman cannot be the adhāra of Avidyā while It is its adhiśṭhāna. For example, the ignorance of shell has its adhāra in perceiver and

31 Kalpataru, p.258.
32 अविद्यार्थ विज्ञानाभास्वः इत्य जुकितवः 
33 अविद्यार्थ इत्य जीवाविज्ञानविद्याविद्याविद्यास्तिकारणमयकारणमयकारणमयकारणमयकारणमयकारणमयकारणमयकारणमयकारणमयकारणमयकारणमयकारणमयकारणमयकारणमयकारणमयकारणमयकारणमयकारणमयकारणमयकारणमयकारणमयकारणमयकारणमयकारणमयकारणमयकारणमयकारणमयकारणमयकारणमयकारणमयकारणमयकारणमयकारणमयकारणमयकारणमयकारणमयकारणमयकारणमयकारणमयकारणमयकारणमयकारणमयकारणमयकारणमयकारणमयकारणमयकारणमयकारणमयकारणमयकारणमयकारणमयकारणमयकारणमयकारणमयकारणमयकारणमयकारणमयk Parimala, p.404.
Siddhāntabindu, p.47.
adhiṣṭhāna in the shell itself, which is the object of that ignorance. Thus the word āśraya has got two meanings -- (i) ādhāra and (ii) adhiṣṭhāna. Hence Vācaspati is justified in taking the words of Ś -- 'IśvarāŚrayā Māyā' to mean that Ignorance has its adhiṣṭhāna in Iśvara.

So far we have seen that according to Vācaspati, Iśvara is not avacchinna or limited as jīva is, though some of the interpreters of the Avacchedavāda have interpreted it in that light. The reason for their assuming Māyā as the condition of Iśvara is to justify the apprehension of the common world to all, even according to the Avacchedavāda. But the apprehension of the common world to all can be explained as being due to the peculiarity caused by Avidyas residing in different individuals.34

34 See Kalpataru, p.379. This is the nature of Vācaspati's idealism. The term idealism conveys a variety of meanings and the meaning varies according to the context. To treat the problem in its entirety is not possible here. Still, it can be remarked that Vācaspati's concept of plurality of souls and a different world of each individual, due to separate Nescience of every individual, is much akin to that of Berkley and Leibnitz, as they both hold that as many worlds exist as there are individual spirits, their harmony being guaranteed, either by the consistency of God's working, or by his foresight. (History of Modern Philosophy by Richard Falkenberg, p.220. Also Sūrya-nārāyaṇaśāstrī's introduction to Bhāmatī, p.xxxi.) But
Here an attempt has been made to offer a new explanation or rather justification of the term Avacchedavāda when used in connection with Iśvara also. That is to say, both Iśvara and the Jīva can be said to be avacchinna. But the Avaccheda of Iśvara is not the same as that of the individual soul. The individual soul is limited by Avidyā just as the ether is limited by a jar. Iśvara, as we have already seen, cannot be said to have been limited in this fashion but He can be said

(f.n.34 contd.)

before we are attracted to the similarity of views, it should be necessarily taken into consideration that the comparison is not so much desirable; because, if we go deep into the problem, we will find that there is fundamental difference between Vācaspati on the one hand and this Western Idealism on the other hand. Vācaspati will never claim ultimate reality for these innumerable worlds -- because, they are, to any follower of the Śāmkara Vedānta, analogous to the snake that appears on the rope. In fact, they have no existence; through illusion only, they are apprehended. This sort of conception will not be admitted either by Berkley or by Leibnitz.
to be conditioned in the sense that He is the object of Avidyā, residing in the individual soul. 35 That is to say, viṣayatva and adhiṣṭhānatva or the qualities of being an object and the foundation, are attributed to Him. Thus Iśvara, who was originally Pure Consciousness, void of any kind of attribute, when He becomes, or to put it more scientifically, when He is apprehended as, the object of Nescience, can very well be designated as being limited, because a thing possessed of some attributes, in comparison with an attributeless thing, is no doubt limited. Thus, in this sense, Iśvara also can be said to be conditioned.

That is all what we can say about the exposition of the so-called Avaccheda theory of the Bhamati-Prasthāna.

Now, before entering into details as to whether Vācaspati really intended any vāda or theory like Avaccheda, or into the details as regards the origin of this Avacchedavāda and so on, we are going to consider the objections raised by the adherents of the Pratibimba theory against the Avaccheda theory and vice versa, to decide thereby the problem viz. which of these two theories is logical and is more faithful to the Śūtrakāra and the Bhaṣyakāra.

The only main point raised by the Pratibimbavādins is that according to the theory of delimitation, the consciousness

35 To this effect only, the Kalpataru remarks — ‘वाचस्पति अस्पष्टविवाक्ष, कल्पतरु दलितांकल्यानं’ p.258.
limited by antahkaraṇa or the inner sense-organ in this world would be quite different from the consciousness limited by the antahkaraṇa in the next world. That is to say, the individual soul in this world and in the next one would not be one and the same. Thus, there would be the contingency that the doer would be different from the enjoyer. The fallacies are technically called 'kṛtahāni' and 'akṛtābhyaṅgama', 'kṛtahāni' when the doer is not the enjoyer i.e. what is kṛta or achieved by him in the former birth, does not yield any fruit and hence lost; and 'akṛtābhyaṅgama' when the enjoyer is not the doer i.e. some fruit is allowed without any action in the previous life. This objection is answered by admitting Āvidyā as the limiting adjunct of the individual soul, admitting thereby the same limited consciousness (avacchinnā caitanya) in this world and in the next one. Moreover, the advocates of the avaccheda theory show the same fault against the Pratibimba theory, because, even in the Pratibimba theory, it is necessary to admit that the part of the consciousness which is outside and which is just near is reflected. So, the consciousness reflected in mind, in this world would be different from that reflected in the next, because the part of the consciousness which is near to the adjunct in this world must have been different from the part of the consciousness which is near to the adjunct in the next world. And this reflection is the individual soul according to the Pratibimba theory. Thus, the contingency that there would be difference in the

36 Siddhānta Leśa Samgraha, p.97.
individual soul in this world and in the next one, obtains even in the Pratibimbavāda. So, according to the maxim⁷ that the fault, which is common to both the sides, should not be raised against one by the other, the objection raised by the Pratibimbavādins against the Avaccheda theory is not a valid one.

The second objection raised by the Pratibimbavādins against the Avaccheda theory is that the Śruti-passage³⁸ wherein Īśvara is said to be the antaryāmin i.e. residing in each and every object (of course, including the individual souls) will not be intelligible, if the individual soul be regarded to be the limited consciousness and Īśvara to be unlimited consciousness, as the unlimited consciousness cannot reside in the limited consciousness. On the other hand, in the Pratibimba theory, the reflection of consciousness is seen where the prototype is already existing, admitting thereby the existence of Īśvara in individual souls. This objection against the avaccheda theory is answered by resorting to the same previous maxim, because, even in the Pratibimba theory, the prototype consciousness, which is already there cannot be said to be reflected and hence what is reflected is not the consciousness which is already there; but it is the consciousness which is outside. This consciousness, which is outside, is Īśvara and He is not thus residing in the reflections i.e.

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³⁷ योगर्न: लोम परिवारोपि वी सम्मः।
नैस्तगत्वायुः ऋष्यवत्तायुः नीर्गितम्।।

³⁸ Antaryāmi Brahmaṇa, Brhadāraṇyakaopanishad III.7.
individual souls.

In fact, according to the Avaccheda theory, the individual soul is not at all different from the Highest Soul in its essence, because the only difference between them is that the individual soul is as if affected by the adjunct, while the other is not, and hence it may be well said, although secondarily, that the Highest is the Antaryāmin of individual souls.

On the other hand, the objections raised by the Avacchedavādins against the reflection theory are as follows:—A formless thing like Brahman—pure Consciousness as It is, cannot be reflected. Moreover, it cannot be reflected because of the absence of any other thing as being outside of It. However, the Pratibimbavādins may argue that even the formless things like form (rūpa), number (sāmkhyā) etc. are seen to be reflected when their āśraya or substratum is reflected. Or, a thing like ether which is formless is seen to be reflected in water. This reflection of ether must be accepted as otherwise the apprehension of depth even in little water cannot be justified. Thus, on the strength of these analogous instances, the image of Pure Consciousness in the inner sense-organ, can also be accepted. These illustrations which are cited by the Pratibimbavādin may be refuted by the Avacchedavādin by declaring that it is only a misapprehension that form, number, ether and other formless things are seen as being reflected. But, this is mere quibbling on the words and the Avacchedavādins have no weighty argument to deny that even a formless thing
can have its image. But that does not mean that the theory of the image of Brahman can logically stand, because, in order to justify the reflection of Brahman, some adjunct which is necessarily different and outside of It is to be admitted and that is not possible. This objection is not satisfactorily answered by the advocates of the Pratibimba theory.

In fact, the same objection is raised by Ś. in his Bhāṣya on the Brhadāraṇyakopaniṣad, while commenting on the sentence -- औ जेब चिद प्रविष्टः ओ नत्वाद्विग्यः। 39 Entrance, says he, cannot be admitted to be of the nature of reflection but it is only the perception (upalabdhi) of Ātman in the body. In the Brahmasūtra -- 'वृद्धित्तथा भाक्तमन्दिबीमियादुमुखानमन्यात्वस्तः' 40 the illustration of reflection in connection with Brahman is

39 B.U.I.iv.7. p.111 (Āndandāśrama Edition); the bhāṣya of Ś. on it is like this -- (पु.) नत् परेण य्वाक् या कृ याण स्वदै यम्भो यादू मंदी नाम, ओ यथाप्रविष्टः परिवेष्यते। 40 B.S.III.ii.20; Ś. says, "... अथो न कत्वायात्भन्ति यवित्वभ चिद प्रविष्टः नुस्तः।"
modified. It remarks that the illustration in the case of Brahman is to be applied to some extent and not in its entirety, because the reflection of Atman is never possible as He is all-pervasive. The analogy only suggests that just as the reflection of the Sun is dependent for its growth and decrease on the growth and decrease of its adjunct viz. water etc., in the same way, the apparent growth and decrease of Atman is due to the growth and decrease of its adjunct viz. the intellect etc. Thus, the theory of Atman being reflected in the intellect is not completely subscribed by the Sutrakāra or by the Bhāṣyakāra, as they have directly modified it. Of course, they use the analogy of reflection but with certain limitations pointed out above. On the contrary, there is no refutation of the theory of Avaccheda either in the Sutra or in the Bhāṣya. Moreover, there are some passages in the Bhāṣya\textsuperscript{41} which seem to adumbrate the Avaccheda theory. In this way, it may be said with full justification, that the Avaccheda theory was more favourable than the theory of Pratibimba, to both the Sutrakāra and the Bhāṣyakāra.

\begin{itemize}
\item[(i)] अथैनेन्द्रियोपाधीष्णूऽस्बतः क्रियत् अवदेश:। क्षेत्रगतिपरिवार्थाधिकारस्य आयन:। भू.प. 172.
\item[(ii)] पर अवात्मा परिवार्थाधिकारस्य:। परिवार्थाधिकारस्य:। शारीरिक: जिल्लयुग्मार्थते। यथा शारीरिकाधिवृत्तादिपरिवार्थाधिकारस्य:। परिवार्थाधिकारस्यः। भू.प. 235.
\item[(iii)] च भवात्मात्मानेन शारीरिकाधिवृत्तादिपरिवार्थाधिकारस्य:। भू.प. 462 etc.
\end{itemize}
The antiquity of this Avaccheda theory can be seen in the Māṇḍukyā Kārīka of Gaudāpāda. The Kārikās —

अल्पमेव भ्रात्त्वांकोनीवेदाङ्गप्रेमिकानि,॥

प्रयादिकल्पे खपतेविनातीत्वेदालाविनिद्वारम्॥

प्रतादित्र प्रतीमेवै प्रत्याशाद्धो यथा।

आचार्ये सप्तमात्रंतो चौल्लोवा विशालभन्न।॥

are obviously the forerunner of the Avaccheda theory which is supposed to have been laid down in a systematic form by Vācaspati. The Adhyātma Rāmāyaṇa⁴³ and the Bhāgavata-purāṇa⁴⁴ also speak of the individual soul as the consciousness delimited by inner sense organ. Of course, nowhere it is represented as a theory; and only the analogy of 'ghatakāśa' and 'mahākāśa' is found to have been used with a view to pointing out the relation between and the nature of the individual soul and Paramātman.

Here a question arises whether Vācaspati also originally intended any theory like Avacchedavāda in regard to the individual soul -- the theory, which has been discussed so far, presupposing that Vācaspati did so. But, after a long contemplation over the problem, we have arrived at the conclusion that Vācaspati never intended a theory like the Avacchedavāda, a

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⁴² Gaudāpāda Kārīka III.3,4.
⁴³ बृहस्पतिर्यानंतर्पृथ्वीपूर्णस्यामः ... अधिकान्तम् पूर्णं भस्त्र्य प्रतिभाद्व।
लक्ष्मयादिविवेशं प्रभातस्यास्मादभव। अधिकान्तत-रामायण ।I.1.46,49.
⁴⁴ चै भिन्ने मधुक्रष्ण आचार्यं साधव्या पुराण।
भरते तदनं ज्ञेयं च त्रयं संपवलो पुनः॥ भागवत पुराण XII.v.5.
theory which has been regarded to be contradictory to that of reflection. No doubt, it is a shocking conclusion, because there are so many references to Vācaspati as being the propounder of the Avaccheda theory, in authoritative works like the Siddhāntaleśasamgraha, Siddhāntabindu - etc. Even, according to Prof. Sūryanārāyaṇa Śāstri, Appaya Dīxita has discussed the problem of pratibimba and avaccheda and has shown that Vācaspati favours the Avacchedavāda.

But this statement is altogether misleading. Firstly, in the Kalpataruparimala, Appaya Dīxita has justified both the views — pratibimba and avaccheda — as, it is clear from his concluding stanza at the end of the Gatusūtri, which runs as —

कल्पितं पर्यायमाध्यमात्मकम् पदमात्रः।
सर्वेण मयावाचिन्द्र कृतं प्रेसेन निपरिष्ठाप्तु॥

and no effort, on the part of Appaya Dīxita, is seen there to showing which of the two theories is favourable to Vācaspati. Moreover, the Professor is misled by the word Ācārya, used by Appaya Dīxita, in the Parimala, in the sentence: "... अनेकां: पदमेत्य: आचार्याणां क्योः परिच्छन्नवत्ति जितोः?" It should be carefully taken into consideration that Appaya Dīxita very often refers to Amalānanda only, by the word Ācārya and never to Vācaspati. He refers to Vācaspati by the term Tikākāra, more than once. Even in the passage under discussion, Appaya Dīxita refers to Vācaspati as — टिकाकारेरौप्ति सत्त्वनाधिकारिणे... चूर्णविविधारे:... प्रतिविन्दत्वान्तविविईस्मिष्ठिताः! तथा सास्त्यन्तत्ववद्य... जितोः।

On the other hand, the quotation from the Kalpataru — 'संस्कृति' सात्रि अभिधिमुखःस्तितीना नित्यादात्तितिः।

And this quotation is from the Bhāmatī, p.622.

Kalpataru, p.914.
Parimala as being spoken of by Ācārya -- the fact, which clearly shows that Appaya Dīxita refers to Amalānanda as Ācārya.\textsuperscript{44c}

So, Sūryanārāyaṇa Śāstrī can never be justified in saying that Appaya Dīxita has shown that Vācaspati favours the Avaccheda theory.

Moreover, if we take into consideration all the references in the Bhāmati, wherein the individual soul is described as the limited consciousness, it can be very well observed that although Vācaspati unhesitatingly declares the individual soul to be the consciousness conditioned by Avidyā - etc., he never intended to postulate any theory there. For, nowhere did he attempt to justify the Avaccheda theory taking any objection against it. Nor has he refuted the Pratibimba theory in connection with the individual soul. Once only in the whole Bhāmati,\textsuperscript{45} the Pratibimba of Ātman is refuted, but that is not in this connection. And that too is done by the Pūrvapākṣin. Moreover, it is all the more surprising to note that Vācaspati uses the analogy of reflection in regard to the individual soul.\textsuperscript{45a} Not only the analogy of reflection but the direct mention of the individual souls being the reflections of Brahman, is found in the Bhāmati. तत्समादृढ्येते मानिक्ष सिस्ते जीवभावः तस्य भ्रक्षणः अनाधितीर्थिमानिष्ठारिक्षार्थानेद्वितीयं अस्थविदेश प्राक्षेत्र सूक्ष्ममण्डलं यथाभावतदास्यादः \(...\) न च प्राप्तम् अन्तर्भूतवेत्रा। यतः प्रतिबिम्बानावैव श्याभावतापदास्यादः जीवानायेव नाना वेदान्ताभिमानम् भवेत।। भ्रक्षणम्भ्रक्षणम्।

\textsuperscript{44c} See also Parimala, p.878.

\textsuperscript{45} शब्दपन्नसानां च कीडूस्त्री प्रतिबिम्बाः। मामली p.8.

\textsuperscript{45a} Even in his T.V.(I.r;II.20;IV.23 etś.) Vācaspati speaks of the individual soul as the reflection.
These references to reflections can never be justified if Vācaspati is taken to be the founder of the Avaccheda theory. Even Amalananda, who is the powerful advocate of Vācaspati, at the very beginning of his commentary, remarks — "न केवल पूर्वोक्त श्रव्यक्षिप्ततया अय न जीवानामी च चाचलीयोपाधिकानां कल्पितिविद्वत्तेन लम्बर्कात।" On the contrary, Rangojibhāṣṭa, the son of Bhaṭṭoṣī Dīxīta, the author of the Advaita-cintāmaṇī, proclaims that Vācaspati propounded the theory of reflection in connection with the individual soul. He says "वाचपरिचिति सम्वृद्धिन 'विद्वान भाषामिव।' जिरिः कुल्सुनारिवर्तनेव भाषामिविषने।

46-1 Ibid, p.622.
46-2 Ibid, p.999.
47 Kalpataru, p.4.
This clearly shows that even at the time of Rangojībhaṭṭa, Vācaspati was not unanimously understood to be the exponent of the Avaccheda theory. Of course, the author of the Advaita Cintāmaṇi cannot be justified in referring to Vācaspati as being the advocate of the Pratibimba theory; because, at any rate, to Vācaspati the idea of Avaccheda was more favourable than that of Pratibimba -- the fact which is quite clear from the repeated reference to the individual soul as being the delimited Consciousness. In other words, Vācaspati's inclination towards the Avaccheda theory is certainly discernible but what is intended to observe here is that Vācaspati cannot be said to be the founder of the Avaccheda theory as such. In that case, ś. also in the Brahmasūtrabhāṣya, as has been noticed above, is favourable to the Avaccheda theory, as he uses both the analogies -- that of Avaccheda and that of Pratibimba and modifies the latter. After all, both the Avaccheda and the reflection are, according to the Advaitins not real and the justification for both from the ultimate point of view is utterly impossible. The only thing to be noticed is that from the empirical point of view, the theory of Avaccheda is more scientific. But at the same time, it should be noted that the reflection theory in regard to the individual soul, has been more popularly utilised in the later Advaitic literature. The only reason for this is that it is easier to understand the relation between the individual soul

48 Advaitacintāmaṇi, p.37.
and Brahman. And the controversy between these two theories is only suggestive of the pedantic scholarship of the later writers, who belong to the age of commentators, who did not offer much original contribution to the philosophical thought of India. Moreover, we fail to understand why nobody has ever made an attempt to reconcile these two apparently contradictory theories. In reality, it was not altogether impossible for the intellectual giants like Śrīhāra, Madhusūdanaśarasvatī and Appaya Dīxita, to endeavour in that direction. We, however, think that the ideas of limitation and reflection can be reconciled. For, when a thing is reflected, it can be very well said to be conditioned or limited — may be with some minor differences. And even according to the limitation theory, there should be no objection to admit that the consciousness, when it is delimited by mind, is seen as if reflected in it, because of its being a shining object (svaccha dravya). Of course, we are fully aware that there may arise some difficulties, in such reconciliation. But they can be avoided by resorting to some sort of queer logic, as the commentators generally do in defending their position. Sadānanda in the commentary of his own Pratyaktatvacintāmaṇi has, although without any intention of reconciling these two theories, explained the Pratibimba theory as follows.

"तत्रभाद्रविद्वतिलिप्त्वन्तु ज्ञता फरणविद्वतिलिप्त्वं जीवात्मकम् जीवावधानम् भवति, तदेव विन्युपत्ततत्त्वानि तदेव जीवात्मक जीवात्मकं जीवात्मकम् जीवात्मकम् जीवात्मकम् जीवात्मकम् जीवात्मकम् जीवात्मकम् जीवात्मकम् जीवात्मकम् जीवात्मकम् जीवात्मकम् जीवात्मकम् जीवात्मकम् जीवात्मकम् जीवात्मकम् जीवात्मकम् जीवात्मकम् जीवात्मकम् जीवात्मकम् जीवात्मकम् जीवात्मकम् जीवात्मकम् जीवात्मकम् जीवात्मकम् जीवात्मकम् जीवात्मकम् जीवात्मकम् जीवात्मकम् जीवात्मकम् जीवात्मकम् जीवात्मकम् जीवात्मकम् जीवात्मकम् जीवात्मकम् जीवात्मकम् जीवात्मकम् जीवात्मकम् जीवात्मकम् जीवात्मकम् जीवात्मकम् जीवात्मकम् जीवात्मक..."

* Commentary on the Pratyaktattvacintāmaṇi, pp.272-3.
That is, he speaks of the reflection as being avacchina or limited. Hence it can be held without any logical discrepancy, that these two theories -- Pratibimba and Avaccheda -- need not be taken to be so contradictory, especially when both the reflection and the delimitation are not real, from the ultimate point of view. The theory which has been referred to as being propounded by Vidyārāṇya in his Pañcadasī, also suggests that both the Avaccheda and the Pratibimba of the Consciousness can be accepted at one and the same time and there is no real contradiction between them. Of course, the main tenet of the Advaita that the individual soul is, in reality, not at all different from the Highest, is, by all these theories stabilized to a great extent as all of these theories have their purport in proclaiming the ultimate identity between the individual soul and the Highest One.

Having thus examined various theories in regard to the individual soul and especially the Avaccheda theory, which is wrongly supposed as being postulated by Vācaspati, it is intended to deal with the problem of the plurality of the individual souls, which is a controversial one among the later Advaitins and about which Vācaspati's view does not seem to have been interpreted properly.

From the ultimate point of view, there cannot be any controversy as regards the Unity or the Plurality of individual souls, as the individual soul is non-different from the
highest is, of course, one. But from the empi:
of view i.e. having assumed some sort of
difference, between the individual soul and the Supreme Soul,
it is discussed whether the individual soul is one or many.

The theory of the unity of Souls is very difficult to
understand as it goes against the experience of the common as
well as of the learned man. So the general tendency of the
majority of Advaitins is to propound the plurality of souls.
Vācaspati, while describing Avidyā and pointing out its
difference from the Pradhāna of the Sāmkhyas, makes it clear
that he admits a number of Avidyās and a number of individual
souls, Avidyā for every individual soul being different. He
says:- न कर्ष प्रधान-सद्विद्या सत्तैयै अत्यंत घटने --- किपु ज्ञिय प्राविन्यां
मिलते। तेन गम्य जीवन्य प्रकृतिपदिता विशेषाश्चिद्र अयन्तु, न जीवानात्मके। 49
This passage is so unambiguous that there should be no
controversy as regards the theory of the plurality of indivi-
dual souls as being shared by Vācaspati. Madhusūdana Sarasvati,
in his Siddhāntabindu, 50 has noted the same fact. Śrīnīvāsa
also, in his Dādanodaya, 51 refers to Vācaspati as the
propounder of the Jivanānātva theory. But Mm. Vāsudevaśāstri
Abhyāmkar, in his Advaitāmoda, a wellknown work written for
the special purpose of refuting the objections raised by
Rāmānuja against the Advaita, has ascribed the theory of

49 Bhaṭṭaṇi, p.377.
50 अंकिनश्च पदे अंकिनत-नागत्वाद जीवनानात्मके ... अयण्ये 47.
51 ...कर्ष अंकिनात्मकात्व जीवनात्मके। p.128.
Jīvaikatva or the unity of souls to Vācaspati. He says — अतः वाचस्पतिस्वामी भोज जीवकत्वम् .....। It should also be noticed that the view that Vācaspati was a follower of the Jīvaikatva theory is current among many a traditional Pandit. It is not of course very difficult to see why Vācaspati's view in this connection is misunderstood. Vācaspati, while refuting the doctrine of the plurality of souls, advocated by the Sāmkhyas and the Vaiśeṣikas, in order to justify the experience of joy and sorrow, remarks -- दर्शनादिनेत्राय सांक्यानित्यात्वाद व्यवस्थायार्थः तेऽत्पत्यप्रतिनीतिकल्पना, शैर्याली अंगविशेषार्थच। That is to say, the scriptures declare the unity of souls and the distribution of pleasure and pain can be justified, even accepting the unity of souls. So it is not proper to regard the individual souls as many. This statement of Vācaspati seems to have led to the view that Vācaspati shared the doctrine of Jīvaikatva or the unity of individual souls.

But this is not admissible, because, this passage only intends to contradict the view of the Sāmkhyas and the Vaiśeṣikas who maintain plurality of individual souls, from the ultimate point of view, as no true follower of the Advaita would be prepared to accept infinite real souls. But there is no refutation of the Jīvanānātva theory, from the empirical point of view, which, as has been observed above, should necessarily be said to have been subscribed by Vācaspati —

52 Advaitāmoda, p.10.
53 Bhāmatī, pp.627-8.
the fact which is also clear from many more passages\(^{54}\) where he uses the term like 'pratijivam' which clearly implies the acceptance of many individual souls, may be, from the empirical point of view. By 'यज्ञवादाद्वितीय भवतां प्रार्थितः', he wants to argue that even assuming the Supreme Soul as the One without second, the fact that certain Jīvas enjoy pleasure while certain have to undergo pain, can be justified, as being the result of the difference in regard to the adjuncts, in the form of bodies.

It is not out of place here to see in brief what exactly is meant by the theory of Jīvaikatva or the unity of souls. According to this theory, the individual soul is one. Consequently, only one body is possessed of sentient life. The rest are non-sentient like the bodies in the dream-state. The ignorance of this single individual soul is the cause of the whole world, i.e. of his bondage; and the annihilation of this ignorance is the cause of freedom. In reality, there are no other individual souls suffering from bondage and enjoying freedom. The description that the personalities like Śuka and Vāmadeva achieved salvation is mere arthavāda as the other individual souls have no existence in reality. The speculators of this theory do not admit even Isvara other than the single Jīva, who is the cause of the world. There are some others, who, even admitting one individual soul, maintain the existence of God over and above that single Jīva, known as Hiranyagarbha. They also do not altogether deny the existence of other

\(^{54}\) अधि प्रदिनीर्व्य चिन्ना गुहा जितिका भाष्करी, p.421.
individual souls. On the other hand, they maintain that the other individual souls are the reflections of the real soul i.e. Hiranyagarbha, and, as such, are mere semblances of that soul. In this way, there are some minor differences even among the propounders of the theory of the unity of Jīva.\(^5^5\) However logical this theory may be, the satisfactory explanation of individual bondage and freedom cannot be furnished by this Jīvaikatva theory, for an ordinary man. Hence, Vacaspati and other Advaitins hold a different view of the plurality of Jīva, based upon the multiplicity of Avidyā, mind -- etc. which are the limiting conditions of Jīvas.

The third characteristic of the Bhamatī Prasthāna is that it does not admit of the acquisition of the direct knowledge (sākṣātkāra) by the word itself. According to it, the mind, accompanied by meditation, is alone capable of giving rise to the direct knowledge, which has got sufficient power to dispel the delusion of the world.\(^5^6\) That is, the doctrine

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\(^5^5\) This point is fully discussed in the S.L. Samgraha, pp.105-9.

\(^5^6\) (i) धृतिभवालकर्षणां अन्तः वर्त्ततंदैवी, अवलोकनसाधनः प्रतिलोकायुक्ताबिंतक्षणाम् अवलोकनसाधनः प्रतिलोकायुक्ताबिंतक्षणाम् कार्यान् अन्तः वैदिकात्मकसाधनः साधनानाम् अवलोकनसाधनः प्रतिलोकायुक्ताबिंतक्षणाम् कार्यान् अन्तः वैदिकात्मकसाधनः साधनानाम्

(ii) .... नापिन्निदेशम्, वेदाधिकारिन्युक्ताबिंतक्षणाम् साधनानाम् अवलोकनसाधनः साधनानाम् अवलोकनसाधनः साधनानाम् अवलोकनसाधनः साधनानाम् अवलोकनसाधनः साधनानाम् अवलोकनसाधनः साधनानाम् अवलोकनसाधनः साधनानाम्

(iii) न च अवलोकनसाधनान्तः विवेकाधिकारिन्युक्ताबिंतक्षणाम् प्रवाहमेतः अवलोकनसाधनान्तः विवेकाधिकारिन्युक्ताबिंतक्षणाम् प्रवाहमेतः अवलोकनसाधनान्तः विवेकाधिकारिन्युक्ताबिंतक्षणाम् प्रवाहमेतः अवलोकनसाधनान्तः विवेकाधिकारिन्युक्ताबिंतक्षणाम् प्रवाहमेतः अवलोकनसाधनान्तः विवेकाधिकारिन्युक्ताबिंतक्षणाम् प्रवाहमेतः अवलोकनसाधनान्तः विवेकाधिकारिन्युक्ताबिंतक्षणाम् प्रवाहमेतः अ

(iv) The Sīkhāmpanī, a commentary on the Vedāntaparibhāṣā, remarks --
of the Sābdāparokṣatva or the theory which accepts the production of the direct knowledge from the word — the theory, which is held and propagated by the Vivaraṇa tradition, by Suresvara, Sarvajñatman and by the majority of the Advaitins, is not subscribed by Vācaspati. The main argument put forth by the followers of the Bhamati school is that knowledge is direct because of its being generated by sense-organ. That is to say, knowledge is direct only when it is produced by the sense-organ and it is indirect when it is produced by something other than the sense-organ. If this much be admitted, it can be justified that both directness and indirectness are possible even in regard to one and the same knowledge e.g. A man of an effective sense-organ can acquire the direct knowledge of a subtle thing while an old man of ineffective sense-organ cannot have the direct knowledge although the object is one and the same. So, for the knowledge of Brahman also, in order that it should be direct, a sense-organ — that of course mind, as its generater, should necessarily be resorted to. The possible objection against this view is that even the inferential knowledge would be perception as it is also produced by the aid of the internal organ. This objection is answered by pointing out that the inference etc. are not produced by the sense-organ alone while perception has got only the sense-
organ as its cause. Thus, they argue that knowledge which is produced by the sense-organ only is perception and no ativāśpti thereby.

Sometimes Vācaspati merely says that Sākṣātkāra is produced through meditation.\(^{57}\) Amalānanda, while defending Vācaspati, states his view that the direct knowledge arises from constant meditation.\(^{58}\) But as it has been often proclaimed by Vācaspati that Sākṣātkāra is Antāḥkaraṇa-vṛttibheda\(^{59}\) or a particular kind of the functioning of mind, it is quite necessary to reconcile the two statements by assuming that the mind, assisted by meditation, gives rise to the direct knowledge. In fact, there is no contradiction between mind and the dhyāna, as the dhyāna itself is not possible without the help of mind. Appaya Dīxita, however, in his Siddhāntalaśasamgraha,\(^{60}\) has quoted these two views as being held by different schools, without mentioning the founder or the followers of this dhyāna school. For the first view that mind is the cause of Sākṣātkāra, the authority

\(^{57}\) ...आन्तरिकवेदनात्मानस्मिताः स्स्त्रव साक्ष्यस्त्व: सुप्रायस्योऽयः। नामसी। p.502

\(^{58}\) आन्तरिकवेदनात्मानस्मितां मूर्तिर्मयार्यामन्तरधार्मविष्येन विद्यमानेऽविश्वम्। कर्खाने अधिकतमस्यान्तरधार्मविष्येन विद्यमानेऽविश्वम्। कल्कलं, p.218

\(^{59}\) अवधारितमितवेदनात्मानस्मितां मूर्तिर्मयाये अन्तरधार्मविष्येन विद्यमानेऽविश्वम्। कल्कलं, p.108.

\(^{60}\) pp.395-6.
of both the Vivaraṇa and the Bhāmatī is quoted.⁶¹

On the other hand, the majority of the Advaita Vedāntins are of the opinion that the direct perception of Brahman is produced only by the Scriptures i.e. by the Śabdapramāṇa or valid testimony. According to this view, knowledge is direct when the consciousness, conditioned by the object (of knowledge), becomes one with the consciousness delimited by the internal organ. Directness of knowledge does not depend upon the means of knowledge, but the object of knowledge is responsible for it. Of course, it is not possible for them not to admit meditation and internal organ as being helpful to Ātmasākṣātkāra. The only question then arises as to how much importance is to be given to them. Mind, they say, cannot be designated as the asādhāraṇa or the peculiar cause of Ātmasākṣātkāra, as it is necessary for every type of knowledge and not for Ātmasākṣātkāra only. Thus it is helpful but not the principal cause of Ātmasākṣātkāra. Meditation is also useful to make the person qualified for the knowledge of the Supreme being, by purifying his mind but it cannot be accepted as the direct cause of the knowledge of Brahman.

Citsukhācārya, the author of the Tattvapradīpikā,

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⁶¹ Maṇḍanamīśra has held this view in his Brahmasiddhi (p.134). Although the authority of the Vivaraṇa is given for this view, it cannot be held that the Vivaraṇa has shared that view, because the Vivaraṇa tradition strongly holds the Śābda aparokṣa doctrine. It only means that some of the followers of the theory which admits mind as the cause of Brahma-sākṣātkāra, quote from the Vivaraṇa also. And this quotation from the Vivaraṇa-view-point may mean that mind is the Sahakārā kāraṇa or the helping cause of the realisation of Brahman.
however, denies the assistance of mind in generating self-realisation. He argues that mind is nowhere admitted to be the cause of Sākṣātkarā, because happiness etc. are apprehended by Sākins or witness and Ātman is self-illuminating. Even the realisation which is not prama is of the nature of witness. Thus, mind is never the cause of any Sākṣātkarā.62

It should be noted that both the schools are in a position to quote authoritative passages from scriptures and from the Bṛṣya of Ś. 63 'तत्वप्राप्तिका प्राप्तिका' 64 'वैदिक वैदिक' 65 are the passages to which the followers of the Bhamati school take resort, while 'श्यामसान न मनुष्य' 66 'दृश्य ज्ञानिकंद तुल्य व्रद्धार्थि' 67 'तत्त्वात्म विज्ञान' 68 etc. are the favourable authoritative quotations cited by the rival school. Each school is prepared to interpret the passages seemingly favourable to the other school, in the light of its own theory e.g. The advocates of the Bhamati school interpret the passage 'श्यामसान न मनुष्य' etc. to mean that Brahman cannot be known by un-cultivated (asamskrta) mind. The passages, which directly proclaim the Brahman-realisation from the Mahāvākyas are taken by this school in the sense that this knowledge is

62 Tattvapradīpakā, p.344.
63 Bṛhadāraṇyakopanisād, 4.4.19.
64 Mūḍāka. 3.1.9.
66 Kena, 3.
68 Chāndogya, 6.7.6.
parokṣa or indirect; and to make it aparokṣa or direct, constant meditation is to be resorted to. Thus this school has to modify the sense of the passages favourable to the other school. On the other hand, according to the Śabda-parokṣa theory i.e. the theory, which admits of direct perception from the word or valid testimony, the passages like — "तत्त्वमात्राः प्रभुवः" etc. only suggest that the concentration of mind is quite necessary for the realisation of Brahman. The famous illustration on which this school takes its stand is द्वादशौर्यमिति wherein the sentence i.e. Śabdapramāṇa gives rise to parokṣa or the direct knowledge.⁶⁹

Taking into consideration the arguments put forth by both the schools, it can be remarked that meditation, internal organ and the Mahāvākyas — these three things are to be inevitably accepted by every school.⁷⁰ Controversy is only about the importance to be given to one of these as an efficient cause. Mind, as the material cause of the perception, is accepted by all. And when following Suresvarācārya, the word is accepted as having power to produce direct knowledge, no necessity should be felt to take any resort to meditation

⁶⁹ It is amusing to note here that even this knowledge is not accepted to be direct. The Kalpataru says, "यथायद्यु न लम्बर्योस्यमाहेत्, ...द्वादशोपितां तत्त्वमात्रां विद्याधिकाः प्रसूदेशं वाचत्वालिकाः, लम्बर्योस्य परेतवाचत्वालिकाः" pp.55-6. But this is a matter of difference in regard to the experience as such, and no argument would be useful.

⁷⁰ Except one view, represented in the Tattvapradīpikā, which is noticed just before.
to turn indirect knowledge into direct one. As has been already noticed, internal organ need not be admitted as the peculiar cause of the direct realisation of Brahman, as its presence is necessary for each and every knowledge. i.e. It is the sādхаraṇа cause and not the asādḥаraṇа one. Hence, it is better to assign the prominent place to the Mahāvākyas in the production of the direct realisation of Ātman. If we admit the maxim -- 'aparokṣa-vastuviṣayakām jñānam aparokṣam' i.e. the knowledge of a thing which is aparokṣa or direct, is necessarily aparokṣa when there is no obstruction like the incapability of mind etc., there would be nothing in the world, which can prevent the directness of Brahman-realisation, when it is generated by the word or valid testimony and when there is no incapability of internal organ etc., as Brahman, the object of knowledge, is Itself aparokṣa. The point raised by the followers of Vācaspati that both directness and indirectness would have to be accepted in regard to one and the same knowledge, can be answered by declaring that a person of ineffective sense-organ has no contact with the object and hence there is no direct perception, although the object is one and the same. For the same reason, there would be nothing illogical if somebody acquires direct knowledge of Brahman from the Mahāvākyas while the other does not.

Vācaspati, in this case, follows the view of Maṇḍāna as has been advocated in his Brahma-siddhi. He seems to have been influenced also by the Nyāya concept in disregarding the word as a means of perception, because, according to the
Naiyāyikas, to assign two qualities viz. (i) that of being Śābda or produced from the word and (ii) that of being pratyakṣa or perception, is a logical fault, popularly known as śāṅkara -- that of two means of right knowledge -- the word and the inner sense-organ. Thus, Vācaspati has endeavoured to put the Advaitic view in the established logical channels as laid down by the Nyāya school of philosophy; and has been successful in presenting the Advaita as not going against the established doctrines of the Naiyāyikas. This clearly indicates that Vācaspati was not a blind follower of the tradition. He had no hesitation to go out of the normal path, only to be more logical, may be, according to his concepts of logic.

Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, in his Advaitaratnarakṣaṇa,71 has represented and established the Śābda-aparokṣa theory, as being held by the tradition and has simply mentioned the other theory as being maintained by the Bhāmatīkāra.

IV The next cardinal point, which is to be dealt with, is the definition of Brahman. According to the Śāṅkara Vedāntins, Brahman, from the ultimate point of view, is void of all qualities -- good or bad. So apparently, it is quite impossible to have any definition of Brahman, in as much as, some qualities or actions are inevitable for every definition. To begin with, the definition itself should necessarily possess

three qualities, viz.: (i) that it should not be too wide, (ii) that it should not be too narrow and (iii) that the definition should have some scope at least. So the definition of Brahman is an important problem in the Advaita system.

Vācaspatimisra, while introducing the Sūtra 'janmādyasya yataḥ', represents this as a prima facie view. He puts it as follows. Whatever is experienced is limited, impure, non-intelligent and non-eternal and hence by the knowledge of such things, it is not possible to define an unlimited, pure, intelligent and eternal thing like Brahman. Nor is it possible to define Brahman by its qualities like eternity and others, as they are unknown; and the definition must be quite well-known and not absolutely unknown. Moreover, Brahman being absolutely unknown, even the verbal testimony is of no avail. In this way, Brahman cannot be defined. To this objection, Vācaspati replies that although the world or things in the world cannot form the definition of Brahman, either as its quality or through identity, it (the world) can be the definition of Brahman as being originated by Brahman. 73 From the analogy — i.e. just as the attainment of different regions is a definition of the motion of the Sun, it seems that Vācaspati intended to say that jagatkāraṇatva or the quality of being the cause of the world, as the taṭasthalalakṣaṇa, is quite possible in the case of

72 B.S.I.i.2.
73 Bhāmatī, pp.84-5.
Brahman. Amalānanda, while commenting on the last portion of the Bhāmatī on this Sūtra, says that the Bhāṣya passage —

क च निर्विकालं अनन्ताद्वैतलक्षणाः सूतानि जोयदे ...... etc. 74

indicates that the purport of the Sūtra lies in declaring the svarūpalakṣaṇa. The Parimala of Appaya Dīxita, at the very outset, observes that the svarūpalakṣaṇa should necessarily be said to be intended by the Sūtrakāra as the mere taṭasthalalakṣaṇa is not sufficient to understand a thing as differentiated from all other things. Anyway, Vācaspati does not refer to the taṭasthalalakṣaṇa and the svarūpalakṣaṇa. But, it should be well noticed that he interpretes the Śruti passages यथा वा जिन्धवानि सूतानिन् जोयदे  and अनन्ताद्वैतलक्षणाः सूतानि जोयदे  and concludes the topic unambiguously. He says: 

वर्त्तमानसविश्वायामानान् धार रम्यो अल्पानाणि, रक्ष्यानवं श्रीदेवे, 

कैलाशविशेषलोपायाधारणं कालं अम्मेन्ताणि, लालिते देवी विदिलिक्ष्यतु 75

Unlike later Advaitins, e.g. the author of the Vedānta Kaumudī, Vācaspati does not discuss the point whether the origination, existence and dissolution of the world constitute three different definitions of Brahman. The author of the Kaumudī accepts these as three different definitions on the authority of the Bhāṣya of S. on the Sūtra — अतः चरं प्रभाणात् 76

wherein the sarvasamhārtṛtvā and other two qualities are referred to as being distinct characteristic marks of Brahman. The possible reason why Vācaspati did not describe these three

74 B.S.Śāmkara-bhāṣya, p.92.
75 Bhāmatī, p.95.
76 B.S. I.ii.9.
as different definitions, seems to be that he wanted to bring
to notice that even the efficient cause has to its credit
as in the case of a potter, in regard to the origina-
tion of a jar, and sthitikāraṇatva as in the case of a king,
who is responsible for the stability of the kingdom; but the
laya or dissolution can be traced only in the material cause.
So in order that Brahman should be 'abhinnanimittopādāna and
not merely nimitta or upādāna, all these three -- utpatti,
sthiti and laya are treated as constituting only one definition.

Vācaspati, in the same passage, puts forth his view as
regards the exact nature of the cause of the world. According
to him, Pure Brahman is not the material cause of the world
but Brahman as being associated with Avidyā (avidyāsaḥita
Brahmopādānāṁ jagat); because, to be a creator is also a
degradation of Pure Brahman which is, in reality, not connected
with any attribute. The followers of the Vivaraṇa tradition
also ascribe the creatorship to Iśvara or impure Brahman and
not to Pure Brahman. It should also be remembered that Brahman
as the object of Avidyā is meant by the term -- Brahman
associated with Avidyā -- in Vācaspati's system. Appaya
Dīxita represents Vācaspati's view in this connection as
follows: "वाचस्पतिकारणजीवाणि वैज्ञानिकांतः विवरणां खण्ड २२५
कालाधिभूतकाला विकीर्ण तथा ज्ञानिर्भीति न ज्ञेयं उपलब्ध
तां नागार्जुनः " 77 That is, Brahman is the cause of the
world only when It is the object of Nescience located in

77 S.L.Samgraha, p.65.
individual souls. On the other hand, the followers of the Śamkṣepa-Śārīraka admit Pure Brahman Itself as the creator of the world. They argue that in the Sūtra 'jāmādyasya yataḥ', we have the definition of jñeya Brahman or Brahman which is to be known i.e. Pure Brahman. So the creatorship should necessarily be ascribed to Pure Brahman and not to Śabala Brahman or Iśvara. According to Vācaspati, the pratijñāsūtra or the sūtra -- 'āthāto Brahmatijñāsā'78 -- deals with avidyopādhika Brahman and not Pure Brahman. He makes it clear while commenting on the Sūtra:

Here, the point, which can be raised against Vācaspati, is that according to him, the object of jijnāsā is not suddha or Pure Brahman, but avidyopadhiyā or associated with Nescience. So, the knowledge of this degraded Brahman would not be competent enough to dispel Avidyā, and hence it would not lead to Salvation as the direct cognition of Pure Brahman is unanimously regarded as quite essential for Salvation. But, so far as Vācaspati is concerned, he has no difficulty in admitting that the object of desire to know is impure Brahman, because, to him, impurity of Brahman lies only in its being the object of Nescience that resides in Jīva. As long as Jīvatva is there, Brahman is the object of Avidyā, and

78 B.S.I.i.1.
79 Ibid, II.i.14.
80 Bhāmatī, p.462.
jijnāsa is possible only when there is jīvatva. Further, as soon as knowledge is attained, the same Brahman turns into Pure One. So this is not a difficult problem to Vācaspati.

It should also be noted in this connection that in the Advaita Vedānta, Māyā is also frequently designated as the cause of the world. So the author of the Siddhānta Muktāvalī admits Māyā only as the material cause of the world and remarks that the usage that Brahman is the cause of the world, is secondary (gauṇa) as Brahman is the substratum of Māyā, which is the real cause of the world. The author of the Padārthatatvanirñaya assumes that both Brahman and Māyā are the material cause of the world -- Māyā being the parināmakāraṇa and Brahman being the vivartakāraṇa. Sarvajñātman, having found it difficult to ascribe the creatorship to immutable Brahman, assumes that Brahman is the cause only through Māyā. In this way, Māyā is resorted to by all the Advaitins in ascribing the creatorship to Brahman, which is Immutable and All-pervading. The only difference of view between Vācaspati and other Advaita Vedāntins, who directly associate Māyā with Brahman is that according to Vācaspati, even Immutable and Attributeless Brahman is the material cause of the appearances of the world i.e. 'Vivartamanatayā upādānam', Māyā being only the assistant in-as-much as it obstructs the real knowledge of Brahman. This is quite consistent with his main doctrine that

81 Different opinions in this connection are noted in the S.L.Samgraha, pp.48-65.
Brahman is not directly connected with Nescience. The only relation of Brahman with Nescience is that It is the object of the latter. It is to be carefully understood that wherever Vācaspati uses the expression like -- avidyāsahākṛtam Brahma --, he means that Brahman as the object of Avidyā, residing in individual souls, unlike the other Advaita Vedāntins, who assume direct connection of Brahman with Māyā.

Now, the view that the world, the effect of Immutable Brahman, gives rise to the concept of Adhyāśa or superimposition which is the fundamental characteristic peculiarity of the Advaita Vedānta. Vācaspati has dealt with this Adhyāśa as follows.

Adhyāśa or the superimposition is put in logical terms as pervaded by the non-apprehension of the difference between two things. So, as a prima facie view, it has been argued that there is no possibility of the mutual superimposition of Ātman and the anātman, because these two are cognised quite distinctly. -- Ātman being known in the experience 'I' or 'aham' as quite different from the anātma things like body etc. Thus, as the non-distinction, which is invariably present in the superimposition, is not found in the case of Ātman and the anātman, none of these two can be said to be superimposed upon the other. Vācaspati has refuted this view by pointing out that in the experience 'I', pure Ātman is not at all cognised.

82 सत्त्व संप्रकाशी तत्त्वेः, सत्यं तत्वं निरुपितं नाहि।

Thus, the use of the expression is explained. See p.8.
It is the cognition of Ātman, as being characterised by pain and sorrow, and as limited in the body, while pure Ātman is admitted to be all-pervading and full of bliss only. So, as Pure Ātman is not understood in the experience of 'aham', one cannot say that Ātman and the anātman are distinctly cognised and hence there cannot be the superimposition of one upon the other. In order to give the authenticity to the experience of 'aham', if one admits the limited nature of Ātman, it would not stand to reason, because, in that case, Ātman would be either of an atomic size or of the size of the body. In the first case, the universal experience -- I am stout or I am tall, cannot be explained. In the second case, like the body, Ātman would be made up of parts and would be consequently non-eternal; and that is not desirable.

In this way, as there is no distinct apprehension of Ātman and the anātman, there is every possibility of the superimposition of one upon the other. This superimposition, as Vācaspati remarks, while explaining the word mithunīkṛtya in the bhāṣya of Śankarācārya, is not real in as much as the commingling of two things, one of which is real and the other unreal, cannot be real. Hence, the word mithunīkṛtya has been employed to draw attention to the unreality of the superimposition of Ātman and the anātman, of course, from the ultimate point of view.

Still, an objection is raised that the apprehension of the anātma things like the body etc., which is indispensable
for the superimposition, is not possible, as these anātma things, just like the flower in the sky, are absolutely unreal and the unreal things are never cognised. It has been further argued that the reality of a thing consists only in its manifestation, and if the body etc. are taken to be manifested, they must be accepted as real and there would be no satyānṛtamithunīkaraṇa -- both being real. If the anātma things are held to be unreal, they cannot be manifest. And as the manifestation is necessary for the imposition, the imposition of one over the other would not be explained.

Vācaspati has controverted this objection, by showing that the reality does not consist merely of the manifestation of the object, because, the ropes etc., even though they are manifested as snakes - etc., do not become one with them. That is to say, mere manifestation of a thing is of no use in ascribing reality to it. So, the body and the organs etc. would not be real simply because they are manifested. If mere manifestation of a thing would confer the reality upon it, the Ganges imagined in the mirage, manifested as it is, would be real and one should be able to quench one’s thirst by drinking the water in it. So, it should necessarily be admitted that the superimposed things, even though they are manifest, are not real. It may be urged that the mirage, in its own nature, is absolutely real, even though the water in the mirage is unreal; but the body etc. are unreal even in their own nature, and hence cannot be experienced at all, so they
cannot possibly be superimposed. But this is not admissible, because even the unreal object can be experienced. If not so, how are the mirage etc., which are unreal, experienced as water etc.? Even though they are real in their own nature, they are not real as water etc. In this way, Vācaspati tries, again and again, to bring to notice that the anatma things like the body etc. are not wholly unreal, i.e. devoid of all existence. That is to say, they are not like a horn of the hare, in which case, they could not be experienced at all. But they are like the snake that appears on the rope -- not wholly unreal and not absolutely real. Vācaspati touches the main point of issue by remarking that the reality is constituted of unsublated (abādhita) self manifestation and not of mere manifestation. And this sort of unsublated manifestation is not found in the case of the anatma things like the body etc. as they are seen to be sublated. In this way, Ātman being real and the anātman being anṛta or anivrācyā -- neither absolutely real nor wholly unreal, there can be the superimposition of one over the other.

Vācaspati has treated the bhāṣya line 'सङ्करात्रलोकसिद्धान्त' as the definition of the adhyāsa. He has endeavoured to show that this definition of the adhyāsa is void of the two possible defects of the definition -- viz. ativyāpti and avyāpti. He explains that the word 'ṛṣṭirūpah' is used to avoid the ativyāpti. That is to say, if the definition would be merely 'सङ्करात्रलोकसिद्धान्त', or the appearance of something already seen on something else, then the definition
would overlap and can be applied to the pratyabhijñā as for instance Devadatta, already seen in Pātaliputra, is seen in Māhiśmatī. Thus, there is 'paratra pūrvadrṣṭāvabhāsa' in the case of the pratyabhijñā. But it is not the superimposition. The word 'smṛtirūpaḥ' i.e. having the form of memory, limits the scope of the definition and does not allow itself to be applied to the pratyabhijñā, as it is not smṛtirūpa, because, in memory, the object is not present there, while in the pratyabhijñā or the recognition, the object is present then and there.

The definition is also not too narrow as it covers all the types of superimpositions. He explains that in the knowledge in the dream state, the object is not present there and the sāmnihitadeśakālatva is superimposed thereon. In this way, he has explained some other superimpositions.

Now, before entering into details of the different views in connection with this Adhyāṣa, it would be more pertinent to deal with the remaining treatment of adhyāṣa. Adhyāṣa has been objected to on the following important points.

Ātman, who is necessarily to be understood as self-luminous and partless, is not the object of any concept. If he were the object of some concept like 'I', the subject or the 'viṣayI' would be other than Him. And He would cease to be Ātman, as Ātman is the viṣayI, and not viṣaya. So, Ātman should necessarily be considered to be the subject and not the object. All these characteristics of Ātman go against
the possibility of any superimposition on Him. Vacaspati has explained this in the following way. Whatever is dependent on other for its manifestation (parādhiṇaprakāśaṁ) and is possessed of parts, can alone be the substratum of the superimposition, because, in that case, it can be said that the general nature of it is apprehended and not the specific one. Ātman, not being dependent on other for His manifestation, and also not being possessed of parts, cannot be the substratum of the superimposition. That is to say, body etc. cannot be superimposed on Ātman. Vacaspati, in brief, concludes the topic thus -- तयादेत् यस्याः अत्यन्ताः त नात्माः। विद्विन्दुः ॥

i.e. No superimposition is possible when the object is completely apprehended and when it is totally not apprehended. And there is no third possibility (partly apprehended and partly not) in the case of Ātman, as He is partless.

These objections are answered by Vacaspati very ingeniously. The bhāṣya merely says that Ātman is not invariably a non-object but He is the object of the concept 'I', implying thereby the possibility of adhyāśa. But, Vacaspati has already raised an objection against this 'asmatpratyayaviśayatva' of Ātman. The most fundamental and logical answer to this objection is that it is quite true from the ultimate point of view that Ātman is partless and is not the object of any concept, but through beginningless

83 Bhāmatī, p.37.
84 न तत्त्वदेयादेत्त अविक्रमः, असमत्तज्ञविक्रमादिः B.S.S.Bhāṣya, p.38.
Nescience, He attains to the state of Jīva and appears as if limited, as if possessed of parts and as if an object of the concept 'I'. So, partly apprehension and partly non-apprehension, which is necessary for adhyāsa, is possible, in this way, even in the case of Ātman. So, the superimposition of the anātman on Ātman is quite justifiable.

As this adhyāsa is beginningless, the fallacy of interdependence — viṣayatva of Ātman depending on the adhyāsa and the adhyāsa depending on His being an object, cannot be raised. This superimposition of the anātman upon Ātman, is the root-cause of all other superimpositions. All the means of valid knowledge — even the Scriptures have scope only when there is this superimposition of the anātman upon Ātman, because, only then, Ātman turns into the individual soul and becomes the cogniser, doer etc. Before that, He is not at all pramātā or the cogniser and hence no pramāṇa or means of valid knowledge would have any reference to Him. It is all right that the scriptural injunctions like 'jyotiṣṭoma svargakāmo yajeta' — presuppose the knowledge of the individual soul as being quite different from the body, organs etc. But there also, knowledge of Pure Ātman is neither essential nor possible. And the superimposition of varṇa, ādharma and other things is inevitable for observing the injunctions in the Scriptures.

It should also be minutely noticed that this superimposition also, from the ultimate point of view, is not real, because, it depends upon the conditions, which are not real.
Some people raise objections against the adhyāsa and the philosophy of the Advaita, presupposing that the adhyāsa is a real phenomenon. But, when we understand that the Advaita Vedāntins have resorted to this indescribable superimposition only as a means of explaining the phenomenon of creation, from the Immutable Pure Consciousness, as the creation is well-nigh impossible if the superimposition is not resorted to.

In this connection, it is worth mentioning how Vācaspati has most logically shown that the introductory part of the Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣya of Śaṅkarācārya, which is popularly known as the adhyāsa-bhāṣya is quite consistent with the Brahma-sūtra 'athato Brahmacijñāsā'. He simply says that by the word 'bijñāsā' (desire to know), doubt and purpose in regard to the object of that knowledge, are suggested, because, in the very first sentence he observes quite scientifically that the thing, which is not doubtful and which has got no purpose of its own, can never be the object of any enquiry. So, in order to justify the enquiry of Ātman, it is quite necessary to show that there does exist doubt as to the exact nature of Ātman and that there is some purpose of the correct knowledge of Ātman. Moreover, it may be argued that there is no doubt at all as regards Ātman, as we know Him when we say 'I'. And as there is no doubt, any enquiry in regard to Him would be nonsense. So, to meet this objection,

\[85\] B.S. I.i.1.
it was necessary to show that Ātman, known in the cognition 'I', is really speaking the superimposed Ātman, and not pure One. Now, in order to prove this, the treatment of superimposition was quite essential, without which, we cannot proceed to the jijnāsā or the enquiry, advocated in the first śūtra. And that is done in the adhyāśabhāṣya. For these reasons, it is quite illogical to remark that the adhyāśabhāṣya is an utsūtrabhāṣya, the bhāṣya, not connected with the śūtras.

After this treatment of the superimposition, it is intended here to review different views about the superimposition, represented by Vācaspati, as being held by different schools of philosophy.

Following the bhāṣya of Śamkarācārya, Vācaspati elucidates different views in regard to the adhyāśa -- the views, which are generally known as Khyātis. There are three sentences in the bhāṣya, which illustrate three different views as regards the superimposition. The first view "कैसी विद्वानोद्वितीय जिति अद्वितीयोऽ" is regarded by Vācaspati as being advocated by Sautrāntika and Yogācāra Bauddhas, who hold the theory of the Ātmakhyāti, meaning thereby that knowledge, which resides inside, transforms itself in the form of outward things. In the cognition -- 'nedam rajatam' -- this is not silver, silver is denied outside, and is understood to be inside. According to this theory, the denial of silver

86 B.S.Bhāṣya, p.18.
means the denial of 'idamtvā', and not of silver itself, which is the substratum of the attribute 'idamtvā'. Thus, Vācaspati interprets the first sentence, quoted above, in the following way:- "\[\text{केचित्र अत्मक्षयिनिहृतिः, अयत्र - बहुमूळे, अन्य्यक्षय रक्षाय स्वहृतं विदिः बद्विति.}\]

Vācaspati then comments upon the second line — "\[\text{केचिद् सत सद्वभासः पारिव्यथापि निबद्धतः भविष्यति.}\]

and explains the Akhyātivāda of the Mīmāṃsakas therein. He refutes the Ātmakhyāti and establishes the Akhyāti as follows: The cognition of silver cannot possibly be in favour of the Ātmakhyāti, because, in this cognition, silver is evidently known as residing outside and not inside. Its substratum is 'idam' — this and not what is within. If silver would really be inside, the cogniser and the cognition would be identical and hence there would arise the contingency that the cognition would be 'aham rajatam' (I am silver) and not 'idam rajatam' (This is silver). In fact, there is no reason why the illusory object should be admitted as residing inside. Even though it is denied outside, it need not present itself inside. On the other hand, it cannot be inside for the same reason that it is denied outside. That is to say, when the proximity of something is denied, that thing would be far from the cogniser, what to speak of the extreme proximity in the form of his own self. Moreover, if we enter into details, we find that the denial in the statement — this is

87 B.S.Bhāṣya, p.19.

88 अत्मसाक्ष्याय कवर्तिनिहृतिः, अत्मक्षयिनिहृतिः स्ववीर्य प्रक्षेपणमित्वां कुटल्यमाणं भाषितं, p.26.
not silver, is neither of silver nor of idamtvā — thisness. But, what is really denied is the usage of silver, which is due to the non-apprehension of the distinctness of the two things — this and silver. The Akhyātivādins further argue that the cognition of silver cannot be said to be responsible for the presentation of silver. The shell cannot be the proper substratum for silver, as it goes against the common experience. Further, the sense-organs have got the capacity of generating valid knowledge only and not illusory cognition, and hence the illusory cognition cannot be said to be produced from sense-organs. Defective sense-organs would be able to stand in the way of the capacity to produce the normal effect (here, the right cognition) and would never be able to give rise to some abnormal effect like illusory cognition. Otherwise, the banyan shoot would have been produced from the fried Kuṭaja seed. 89 If cognitions fail to be faithful to their proper spheres, nobody would believe in any cognition because of its deceptive character. So, to avoid this, every cognition should necessarily be recognised as valid. Apparent invalidity can be explained as follows. There are two cognitions — one of silver and the other of this (idam). The first of these is memory, while the other is direct perception. The word 'idam' denotes the knowledge of the mere object in front of us. Owing to some defect in the eye, suktila or the generality of the shell is not recognised. And the similarity of that

89 अन्यथा दुःखादभि कुटलोजास ब्यक्तीत्विपिरसाश्च मानक्षी p.27.
object with the silver creates the memory of silver. Although, memory is the cognition of something what has been apprehended before, it stands as mere cognition (and not of the experienced object). But the difference between the memory of silver and the apprehension of the bare object, is not understood and we take the object of memory for the object of perception. Thus, the non-difference between memory and perception brings about the empirical usage -- this is silver.

Thus is explained the Akhyātivāda of the Mīmāṃsakas by Vācaspati. He then proceeds to elaborate the Anyathākhyātivāda of the Nyāyānikas, which, according to him, has been referred to in the third line in the bhāṣya, in this connection, viz.:–

First, the Akhyātivāda is refuted from the Nyāya point of view. The view of the Mīmāṃsakas that a man, regarding shell to be silver, tries to have it, simply because he is not aware of the difference between memory and perception, is quite ridiculous. Because, the pravṛtti or the activity of a sentient being takes place only when something is known positively and not after the mere non-apprehension of something. If at all, silver is not apprehended as the substrate of idaṅtva -- thisness, nobody with the desire of silver in his mind, would try to have it. To say that as he does not know that it is not silver, he proceeds there, is also unjustifiable. For, in that case, he would possibly be indifferent, as he equally

90 B.S.Bhāṣya, p.27.
does not know that silver is there. Thus, mere non-apprehension of the difference would not do. It should necessarily be admitted that this non-apprehension of the difference gives rise to the superimposition of silver on shell. That is, anyhow, silver must be apprehended as the object in the cognition -- this is silver. When the silver, although through some defect is cognised there, activity in regard to it is possible. For, this silver also belongs to the class of silver and thereby one infers the advantageousness of the superimposed silver also. Of course, at that time, one is not aware of the superimposed nature of that silver. Mere memory of silver would not help to infer that the substratum of thisness -- idamūtva -- is worth possessing, as rajatatva or the quality of being silver, which is the logical reason (hetu) there, is not present in the pakṣa or the minor term. And the cognition of the pakṣa and the hetu in one and the same place, is quite necessary for the inference. On the other hand, when silver is superimposed on shell, we perceive the pakṣa (idam) and the hetu (rajatatva) in one and the same place. Vācaspati then puts forth an inference which establishes that the object of the cognition of the superimposed silver is the thing in front of us i.e. the shell, as it invariably creates activity in one, who is desirous of it. Although, śuktikātva cannot be the substratum of the cognition -- 'this is silver' --, it is just possible to maintain that śuktikā as mere bright substance lying in front (i.e. without understanding its generality) is the substratum of that
cognition. Otherwise, the cogniser would not point out to the substance in front of him, with his fingers, while he cognises silver. As regards the contention of the Mīmāṁsakas, that owing to the defects, the capacity of the cause to produce the normal effect would be destroyed, and that the cause would not be able to generate some abnormal effect, the Anyātīkhyātivādins argue that the seeds of the cane, parched by the forest-fire, produce plantains; and a large quantity of food can be digested by the digestive fire of a man whose stomach is affected by the bhasmaka disease. That is to say, the defective cause can give rise to some abnormal effect. In the same way, defective sense-organs may very well produce wrong cognition instead of a real one. As regards the objections of the Mīmāṁsakas, that none would believe in any sort of cognition, if illusory cognitions be regarded as not being faithful to their contents, the Anyātīkhyātis hold quite a different position. They argue as follows. The cognition is self-valid not in the sense that invariably it is constant to its contents but in as much as it conveys knowledge. So even if some cognitions are inconstant to their contents, the self-validity of cognitions is not lost. Vācaspati has not discussed the topic further as he has made it fully clear in his Nyāyaśāstra. For all these reasons, the Anyātīkhyātis explain the superimposition as the apprehension of something (where some other thing is superimposed) as possessed of opposite qualities.

Now, as regards Vācaspati's treatment of these khyātis, based on three lines of the bhāṣya, we have to make the
following observations. These three lines of the bhāṣya are like the Śutras and are interpreted in more than one way.

Advaitānanda, the author of the Brahmavidyābhāṣṭraṇa interprets the first line in the same way as Vācaspati does. Bālakṛṣṇānanda Sarasvatī, the author of the Śārīraka-Mīmāṃsā-Bhāṣya-Vārtika, understands in the first sentence a reference to the Anyathākhyāti. Ānandagiri and Govindānanda, on the other hand, maintain that both the Ātmakhyāti and the Anyathākhyāti are suggested in the first sentence. But the Anyathākhyāti, represented by Ānandagiri and Govindānanda is different from that represented in the Śārīrakamīmāṃsābhāṣyavārtika. In the Nyāyaniṁṇaya of Ānandagiri and the Ṛatnaprabhā of Govindānanda, the 'anyadharma' is taken to mean 'rajata', while in the said Vārtika, 'rajatatva' is understood by the anyadharma. Now, although, both the views -- (i) the superimposition of 'rajata' and (ii) 'rajatatva' -- are maintained by different Naiyāyikas, we do not agree with Ānandagiri and Govindānanda, when they understand a 'dharmī', i.e. 'rajata', from the word 'dharma', in a far-fetched way.

The second sentence is interpreted by all in one and the same way. The only difference in the interpretation of Bālakṛṣṇānanda Sarasvatī is that this akhyātivāda is ascribed

94 Ibid.
95 Śārīrakamīmāṃsābhāṣyavārtika, Part I, p.149.
by him to the Śāmkhyas. While others ascribe it to the Mīmāṃsakas only. Although, the Śāmkhyasūtras designate their khyāti as 'sadasatkhyāti', Bālakṛṣṇānanda Sarasvatī has interpreted it in the same way as the Mīmāṃsakas do. Anyway he should have referred to the Mīmāṃsakas also as holding the same theory.

Now, in regard to the third sentence, Govindānanda holds that the Mādhyamika Bauddhas who advocate the Asatkhyāti, are referred to there. Ānandagiri, here again, holds that both the Anyathākhyāti and the Asatkhyāti are alluded to in this line. But he has not made it clear why he understands a reference to the Anyathākhyāti in the two -- first and the third -- sentences. While, quite contrary to it, Bālakṛṣṇānanda understands here a reference to the 'sat-khyāti'. But this interpretation does not seem to be natural, although grammatically correct, as he resolves the compound 'viparitadharma' as a 'bahuvrihi' -- 'vīparītāḥ dharmah yasya tat' -- and thereby means a 'dharmī' viz. 'rajata', from the 'dharma'. We cannot altogether discard this interpretation as unintended or incorrect. We simply remark that it is an unnatural one. It should be noted that the author of the Brahmavidyābharana puts forth his view that Śāmkaraśārya has

\[96\] V.56

\[97\] अनाते यज्ञ शक्या: तस्यैव विवरीक्षत्खस्त्वायम् आच्छद्ये

\[98\] p.27.

\[99\] p.15.

referred to his own theory viz. anirvacanīyakhyāti in this sentence. The Brahmavidyābharana, quite consciously, points out that it is not unusual to refer to one’s own view by the word anye. The analogous example is shown from the bhasya itself where Śaṅkarācārya mentions his own view by the word ‘apare’.

As we have already remarked that these sentences in the bhasya are sutra-like, it is not unexpected that they are interpreted in various ways. And we cannot remark that one of these interpretations is quite an impossible one. But, we are confronted with an important problem as to what exactly is the theory which Vācaspati understood in the third line. It is generally regarded to be the Anyathākhyātivāda of the Naiyāyikas. And presupposing this general notion only, we have dealt with the point. But, the fact that Vācaspati, having accepted the self-authoritativeness of knowledge, in one way or the other, has refuted the objection of the Akhyātivādins, goes against the popular view, because, this refutation cannot be said to be from the Nyāya point of view, as the Naiyayikas do not admit ‘svatahprāmāṇya’ or the self-authoritativeness of knowledge.

So Vācaspati cannot be said to have represented the

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100 अनि रवैं क्यों दुर्विदायोः चिन्मतीर्थज्ञातस्मातु अनिर्वक्तिवात्माः अन्वः
— Brahmavidyābharana p. 31. kumbhakonam ed.

101 स्वाभाविक्यांसि अपि द्विभाष्यो तथा व्यवहारो दुःध्यो, ’अत्मा स’
भावानुतिक्यपुरो जित्वावदुः
Ibid.
Nyāya view about the adhyāśa, when he explained the third sentence — अन्ये दुः सर मात्मा विष्णु द्वितीयत्वमकानाचन्ते। of the bhāṣya. Here, a question arises, whether Vācaspati intends to refute the Akhyātivāda from the point of view of the Anirvacanīya theory, because, this refutation of the Akhyāti is desirable to the Vedāntins also, to the same extent. Moreover, what is established therein, is that in the case of illusory cognition, there exists one knowledge, the object of which is the thing lying down before us. And this does not go against the Anirvacanīya theory, as therein also, one knowledge is admitted. The only difference is that according to the Anirvacanīya theory, the illusory object is newly created by our ignorance, while according to the Anyathākhyāti, the object in other places is apprehended there. So, when we accept that the Anirvacanīya-Khyāti of the Advaita Vedāntins is propounded by Vācaspati, while explaining the third line in the bhāṣya, the acceptance of the self-authoritativeness of knowledge is quite intelligible.

But, this view also is not correct, because, in the whole treatment of this theory, Vācaspati does not say that the 'rajata' is 'anirvacanīya' — neither sat nor asat — which is the main characteristic of the Anirvacanīya theory. Further, in this treatment, it is said by Vācaspati that the attribute 'rajatatva' is superimposed on shell, and this goes against the Anirvacanīya theory. The 'dhamī' -- substrate -- and not merely its attribute, is superimposed, according to
the Anirvacanīyakhyātivādins. Of course, it is not very
difficult to understand the 'dharmi' silver from the attribute
'rajatatva*, because they are identical. But this way of
interpretation, however ingenious it may be, is not convincing.
Moreover, Vācaspati has proved already the anirvacanīya
character of the illusory objects when he examined the
definition of adhyāsa. The most important point, the mis-
understanding of which has led to all these difficulties and
discussion, is the general notion that the Anyathākhyāti is
admitted by the Naiyāyikas only, and that the Pūrvamīmāṃsakas
(in general) advocate the Akhyāti. This is altogether wrong.
The Akhyāti is propounded by the Prabhākaramīmāṃsakas only
and not by the followers of Kumārilabhaṭṭā. The Bhāṭṭas, on
the other hand, maintain the Anyathākhyāti, which is generally
designated by them as the Viparītakhyāti. The nature of this
Viparītakhyāti, as it is clear from the Śāstradīpikā,102 is
that the attribute of some thing e.g. 'dvitva' is superimposed
on something else i.e. 'candra'. That is, it is quite
consistent with Vācaspati's treatment of the Anyathākhyāti.
Thus, when we know that the Anyathākhyāti is accepted by the
Bhāṭṭamīmāṃsakas also, the reference to the Nyāyakaṇṭikā and
the refutation of the Akhyāti, having accepted the self-
authoritativeness of knowledge, are not unintelligible, as the

102 देशमूर्य नेवण प्राप्तं च दर्शन, ऋग्रेश कल्पी द्वाययक्षत्वमस्य, देशमूर्य च दर्शन
प्रशीत्य देवकाण्डो द्वाययक्षत्वचतुर्यो अयाक्षतिः। शास्त्रदीपिका, प.५९.
Nyāyakaṇḍikā is a Mīmāṃsā work and the Bhāṭṭas have shared the 'svataḥprāmāṇya' theory of knowledge. Of course, the Naiyāyikas have accepted the same Anyathākhyāti, but what is intended here to notice for the first time, is that Vācaspati refuted the Akhyāti from the Bhāṭṭa point of view and not from the Naiyāyika point of view, although both of them hold the same view.

In this connection, it should be observed that Vācaspati was charged of being partial to the Anyathākhyāti. It is quite clear from the remark in the Kalpataru:— "क्षयुपेण मरीच्यमेऽनुसा नायस्यायत्तिरिमिरिता स्पौतस्यायत्तिरिमिरिता स्पौतस्यायत्तिरिपुर्वानः।"¹⁰³ But by whom exactly was Vācaspati misunderstood in this way, is not made clear. It is not the Prakāṣṭārtha-vivaraṇa, which has raised strong opposition to Vācaspati's views, in other respects. Anyway, that was the criticism, which, as has been appropriately remarked by Amalānanda, holds no water, because Vācaspati has definitely established the indescribable character of illusory objects. It is just possible to see why at all Vācaspati was criticised in this way. It may be due to the fact that while treating different views in regard to the adhyāśa, he represented the Ātmakhyāti, Akhyāti and the Anyathākhyāti, out of which only the Ātmakhyāti and the Akhyāti are refuted and there is no refutation of the Anyathākhyāti. But, it should be taken into consideration that while commenting upon the next line in the Bhāṣya — 'अन्यथात्मक्षमथान्तःक्षमवाचवाचवाचन्तः॥'

¹⁰³ p.24.
Vācaspati purposely remarks — अन्याय धार्मिकता अनूक्ति, च भोजितिन्यया, वित्तूप्राधारितस्या — i.e. the assumption of the attributes of one thing in the case of another is untruth; and it has been explained above that it is indeterminability. Thus, Vācaspati has specifically noted the indescribable nature of illusory Objects. Amalānanda also has carefully called attention to the fact that Vācaspati has made this clear in order to avoid the possible misunderstanding that the Anyathākhyātī is admissible to the Bhāṣyakāra.

This is all what we can say about Vācaspati's treatment of different khyātis and something in connection with it. We were dealing with the definition of Brahman, and there; the creation of the world had to be referred to. And then, in connection with the creation of the world, as a logical necessity, adhyāsa and different views in regard to it have been discussed.

The next characteristic of the Bhāmatī-prasthāna, to be dealt with here, is in regard to the nature of the injunction in the scriptural passage -- जत्मा यात्रे दृष्टयः क्षेत्रयो मनः निदिष्टायास्याः — a problem about which there is a good deal of controversy among the Advaitins themselves. The meaning of the 'tavya' in śrotavyaḥ - etc. is the bone of contention. Even from an outward examination, it seems that some sort of injunction is laid down by the affix tavya. Of

\[ \text{104 p.32.} \]
\[ \text{105 Ibid.} \]
\[ \text{106 Bṛhadāraṇyaka, II.iv.5.} \]
course, this injunction is different according to different authorities.

The author of the Prakāṭartha-vivaraṇa holds that in śrotavyaḥ etc., there is the apūrvavidhi as the śravaṇa is not already known as an invariable means of the direct perception of Ātman. According to Prakāśātman, the expounder of the Vivaraṇa tradition, the injunction in this Scriptural passage is not the apūrva, because the Śravaṇa is not, for the first time, known from the Scriptures, as the means of the direct perception. It is universally known as the means of the direct perception, when the object of the perception is direct. So, the injunction in śrotavyaḥ etc. is the niyamavidhi, which orders that the knowledge of Ātman should be obtained only through the Vedāntaśravaṇa and no other means, which may present themselves partially, are to be resorted to.

Some of the followers of Suresvara maintain that there is the parisamkhyāvidhi in the sentence śrotavyaḥ etc. The parisamkhyāvidhi, according to them, excludes the possibility of any other activity which may not be favourable to the knowledge of Ātman.

There are in all three kinds of injunctions and every one of them is advocated as being present in the sentence śrotavyaḥ etc. Now, Vācaspati holds that there is no injunction at all in śrotavyaḥ etc. According to him, the śravaṇa is nothing but the knowledge of Ātman as revealed by Scriptures
and preceptors. Vācaspati has the authority of the Bhāṣya of Śāṅkarācārya, in propounding this view. On the sūtra 'tattu samanvayāt', S. has remarked that the sentences like "Ātman should be seen, heard" etc., which are shadows of injunctions, are really meant for the purpose of turning one away from the objects of natural activity. It is also quite clear from the bhāṣya of S. that he embraced the view that no slightest possible connection of Ātman, with any sort of injunction could be shown. He admits that there do occur some imperatives in respect of Ātman, but they become blunt like the edge of a razor applied to a stone, because, these imperatives have for their content Brahmāṇ, which can neither be rejected nor accepted. Further, while commenting on the concluding part of the 'Udbhayalingādhikaraṇa', S. has remarked —

wherein, it is certainly implied that there is no vidhi in connection with dāsana, śravaṇa, manana and nididhyāsana. So, if Vācaspati adopts a view that there is no injunction in the sentence 'आत्मा वाहे द्वैतव्याः' etc., he must be said to be quite faithful to S. On the other hand, others, who accept some sort of injunction in connection with Ātman, although, they are in a position to quote authoritative passage from the Bhāṣya to

107 B.S.I.1.4.
108 तार्किक विषयम्: श्रमणाः कोष अन्विता बिशिष्टार्थवाक्यसंकल्पमन्त्रि कुमारादिपि भ्र.स.भ.भ. p.129.
109 B.S.III.ii.21.
110 B.S.Bhāṣya, pp.713-714.
substantiate their views, are not strictly following him. It is interesting to note, in this connection, the adverse criticism put forward by the Prakāṭārthakaṭāra against Vācaspati for his self-contradictory statements. The Prakāṭārthakaṭāra has remarked that Vācaspati is the blind follower of Maṇḍana and he does not know the exact meaning of the sūtras as well as of the bhāṣya. He has shown that Vācaspati, while commenting on the samanvayasūtraghaṇṭa, has refuted the injunction in connection with the śravaṇa, and while commenting on the bhāṣya on the sūtra - 'सङ्कर्य-विसर्जनितो हस्तप्रेरितं चिन्तन्त्विति' the same Vācaspati has embraced the injunction in regard to the śravaṇa of Ātman. The Prakāṭārthakaṭāra has gone a step further and accused Vācaspati of being an opponent of the sāṁyāsa. His argument is like this. The śravaṇa etc. belong to the sāṁyāsāśrama and as Vācaspati hated the sāṁyāsāśrama, he rejected the idea of the injunction in regard to the śravaṇa of Ātman. According to the Prakāṭārthakaṭāra, in the absence of any injunction of the śravaṇa, one cannot admit that the results of śravaṇa, manana etc. can be obtained in the next birth. He (the Prakāṭārthakaṭāra) concludes that the śravaṇa etc. should be practised as being enjoyed by injunction, up to the ultimate realisation, without paying any heed to Vācaspati's rambling. It is now necessary to examine this criticism of the Prakāṭārthakaṭāra against Vācaspati. No doubt, there is apparent contradiction in Vācaspati's holding and refuting the injunction in regard to the śravaṇa. But if we

111 B.S.III.iv.47.
do not remove the contradiction, the same charge will have to be raised against the Bhāṣyakāra, because, he has also refuted the injunction of the śravaṇa while commenting on the sūtra 'tat tu samanvayāt',\textsuperscript{112} and accepted the same while commenting on the sūtra 'saḥakāryantaravidhi',\textsuperscript{113} etc. So, to blame Vācaspati is to blame Śaṃkarācārya also. The Prakāśārthakāra has not taken into consideration this side of the problem. Moreover, it is quite possible to reconcile these two statements of Vācaspati, as Amalānanda has rightly done. He argues that on the Samanvayasūtra, the injunction in regard to the śravaṇa is denied, because, it is established by invariable concomitance, as the cause of the direct knowledge of a thing, and on the sūtra 'saḥakāryantaravidhiḥ' etc., having conceived that some may not take to the nididhyāsana or meditation, with a view that mere śabdajñāna or the knowledge as produced from the words, is quite sufficient for them, meditation which is 'aprāpta' is enjoined. That is to say, that there is no injunction, means that there is no injunction of the apūrva type; while on the sūtra 'saḥakāryantaravidhiḥ', the niyamavidhi is admitted. So, there is no contradiction. But \textsuperscript{114}, as Appāya Dīkṣita has rightly observed, the phrase 'vidhicchāyāni vacanāni' in the bhāṣya on the 'Samanvaya sūtra' and Vācaspati’s commentary thereon, are not happily

\textsuperscript{112} Ibid, I.1.4.
\textsuperscript{113} Ibid, III.4.47.
\textsuperscript{114} Kalpataru, p.919.
interpreted, according to this reconciliation. So, Amalānanda has given a better explanation, having maintained that there is no vidhi at all. The apparent form of injunction serves to encourage the practice of constant meditation in the case of one who is indifferent to it.

Moreover, no injunction is possible in regard to the śravaṇa and others, because they are a peculiar kind of knowledge and knowledge is never the object of any injunction. The fact — that S. on the sūtra 'Avṛttirasakṛt Upadeśāt' remarks that repetition (of śravaṇa, manana etc.) is to be performed because of the repeated instruction in scriptures; for, the repeated instruction contained in passages such as 'श्रोत्रयों मन्वयों निदिक्षासिद्धियोः' intimates the repetition of required mental acts — clearly suggests that S. understood śravaṇa, manana etc. to be of the nature of knowledge. So Vācaspati is correct to the point, when he does not admit any injunction in regard to hearing, reflecting etc.

Appaya Dīxita also has endeavoured to point out that there is no injunction from the ultimate point of view. According to him, it is mere arthavāda or an eulogistic sentence. Amalānanda, in order to give answer to the Prakāṭārthakāra, argues in a single verse that as the śravaṇa, manana etc. are not known for the first time (in the sentence अत्या वाज्रे द्रवयम् etc.) there is no apūrvavidhi, and the niyamavidhi and the

115 Parimala, p.919.
116 Kalpataru, p.919.
117 B.S.IV.i.1.
118 B.S.Bhāṣya, ॥.॥
parisamkhya-vidhi also cannot be admitted as there is no possibility of anything which can be recognised as the means of the realisation of Brahman, which is partially and simultaneously present in the niyama-vidhi and the parisamkhya-vidhi respectively. He concludes the topic by remarking that Vācaspati has neither made any contradictory statement nor has he been ignorant of the purport of the sutras and the bhaṣya. Thus, he alludes to the criticism of the Prakṛṭātha-kāra, without mentioning his name.

As the question is not of much importance from the philosophical point of view, it does not seem to be reasonable to examine the view in more details. It should be only said that the scathing criticism on the part of the Prakṛṭārthakāra does not stand to reason. If at all, as he assumes, Vācaspati had a grudge against renunciation, in rejecting the śravaṇa-vidhi, he could not have shown the highest regard for Śaṃkarācārya, who was not only the staunch Śaṃnyāsa but also the propagandist of Śaṃnyāsa as being possible even immediately after brahmacarya. So, it would have been reasonable on the part of the Prakṛṭārthakāra, had he sought some other reason for his rejecting the injunction of the śravaṇa and others. There may be and should be doctrinal differences but they should not lead to such rash and nonsense criticism which does not lessen opponent's importance but does the same in one's own case. That is why perhaps, even after such mischievous criticism, the Bhāmati is so widely studied and has preserved
its tradition with ample respect; while even the name of the Prakāṭārthakāra is not certainly known. The most interesting point to note is that both Vācaspati and the Prakāṭārthakāra belong to one and the same system of Advaita philosophy preached by Śaṅkarācārya.

VI Another important point of difference of Vācaspati's prasthāna is in regard to the use of actions, prescribed in the scriptures. The Vedic passage वेदानुसरण भविष्यति विद्वेदानुसारेण तस्मादस्त्राध्याये 119 unambiguously declares that the actions like sacrifices are useful to attain the knowledge of Brahman. The only point of difference is in regard to the exact place of actions in producing this knowledge i.e. whether the sacrifices etc. are directly useful or are only indirect means to attain the knowledge of Brahman. Vācaspatimisra strongly holds that actions are useful for the attainment of knowledge, only indirectly. That is to say, actions directly produce the desire to know. And this desire on its part is the direct cause of the knowledge of Brahman. The technical point shown by the followers of Vācaspati, as being favourable to Vācaspati's interpretation, is that according to the general maxim — प्राध्यान्तम्: प्राध्यान्तम्: — i.e. the meaning of the affix is principal to the meaning of the base, the sacrifices and other actions are to be taken as the means of the desire to know, and not the means

119 Brhadāraṇyaka, IV.iv.22.
of knowledge, as the desire is the meaning of the affix 'San' while knowledge is the meaning of the base 'Vid'. Thus, विद्वन (and not विद्वन विदमित) is the correct meaning of the sentence under discussion.

Vācaspati in interpreting the above scriptural passage in this way, has the authority of the bhāṣya, which concludes the sarvāpekṣādhikaraṇa with the remarks:- 

According to the Vivaraṇa tradition, Vedic actions like sacrifices are the direct means of the knowledge of Brahman. They argue that although it is a general rule that the meaning of the affix is principal to that of the base, there are some instances which are necessarily to be regarded as the exception to that rule. The instances which they point out are 'अस्वेच विषमिति', 'श्रजिता विषणिति'.... 'he desires to go on horse; he desires to kill by a sword -- wherein the horse and the sword are not construed with the desire, which is the meaning of the affix, but with going and killing, which are the meanings of the bases 'gam' and 'han'. In the same way, विषणिति मण्डरेतc should also be understood as an exception to the general maxim -- 'प्रकृतिप्रत्ययो: प्रत्यपार्थर्थ: प्राक्रिययम्' and thereby it should be admitted that sacrifices etc. produce knowledge directly and not through desire.

120 B.S.Bhāṣya, p.900.
In this case also, there is not, in reality, a good deal of difference in these two views. For, even the Vivaraṇa tradition has to admit the samnyāsa -- which involves the abandoning of the actions, as the means of the knowledge of Self. So, according to the Vivaraṇa tradition also, actions cannot be said to be the ultimate cause of the knowledge of Brahman. Parting with actions is inevitably admitted for the knowledge of Brahman, by all the Śāmkaravedantins. So, that the Vedic actions directly produce the knowledge of Atman, cannot mean that they are to be practised up to the attainment of knowledge, because, these actions are to be stopped when mind is purified and strong desire to know is generated. That is to say, the direct result of these actions is the purification of mind and giving rise to strong desire. Up to this limit, both the schools practically hold the same view. The Vivaraṇa tradition, while holding that actions are directly useful for the attainment of the knowledge, suggests, as Appaya Dīxita, in his Siddhāntaleśa-samgraha has observed, that actions, though not to be continued after the purification of mind, find out the proper preceptor for the performer of actions and they help to practise meditation etc. In this way, actions, according to this view, guarantee the knowledge of Brahman, while the view, according to which these actions serve only the purpose of creating desire, does not assure of the desired knowledge.

But this sort of distinction, to our mind, does not appear to be justifiable, because, the followers of the
Bhimati school can argue that these actions produce such a strong desire, the sure result of which is the attainment of the desired knowledge. That is, they also can guarantee the attainment of the knowledge of Brahman.

This will be mere jumbling of words and no theoretical difference as such can be pointed out, as the status of actions is one and the same in both the schools.

VII. The nature of a liberated soul is also a controversial point among the Advaitins. Of course, the well-known scriptural passage, 'Brahmaveda Brahmaiva bhavati',\textsuperscript{121} one who knows Brahman becomes Brahman, declares in the clearest possible terms that the nature of a freed soul is nothing but that of Brahman. But the enthusiastic followers of Śamkarācārya have not kept the problem so simple. They discussed whether this liberated soul becomes one with the Highest Brahman or the Saguna Brahman, which serves the purpose of Iśvara or God. According to those, who are inclined to accept the theory of ekajīvavāda, there would naturally result the absence of the world, including God or the so-called Saguna Brahman, when that single individual soul becomes free from the bondage of Nescience. So, in this view, the problem of mukta's becoming one with God does not arise at all. The only possibility is his becoming one with Absolute Brahman.

\textsuperscript{121} Mundakopaniṣad III.2.9; also 'अन्तः तत्त्वं तत्त्वं मिन्निविदि:\' Kauṭitakī, I.4.
Now, those who have for the sake of the arrangement of bondage and freedom, posited the theory of the plurality of souls will have to argue that the liberated soul attains the lower Brahman and not the Highest One. Because, although from the point of view of the liberated soul, there is no Nescience in connection with Brahman, there is still the existence of Nescience as long as there are other individual souls, as unliberated. When all the individual souls would achieve salvation then alone the liberated souls would become one with Pure Brahman.

Vācaspatimisra, however, does not raise the question directly. But, we can understand his view in this connection. As has been already noticed, Vācaspati postulates as many Avidyās as many individual souls there are, and justifies the existence of Avidyās of unliberated souls, even when one individual soul gets out of the clutches of Avidyā. According to Vācaspati, Brahman becomes (or to speak more logically, is considered to be) God or Saguna Brahman, only when It is the object of Avidyā. Thus, even when Nescience of one individual soul is dispelled, Brahman does not cease to be the object of Avidyā of other unliberated souls. So, Brahman, attained by the liberated soul, even though It is originally pure, is the object of Avidyā of other souls and hence Saguna. So, if we want, we can say that according to Vācaspati, the liberated soul attains Saguna Brahman. Of course, it depends upon how we take our stand. Because, the same Brahman is pure and the
Highest from the ultimate point of view and from the viewpoint of the liberated soul.

Appaya Dīkṣita maintains in his Siddhāntaśāsana, that the view which admits that the liberated soul attains oneness with the lower Brahman is only consistent with the scriptures as well as with the Brahma Sūtras and the Bhāṣya of Ś. thereon. He has adduced from all the four chapters of the Brahma Sūtras and the Bhāṣya of Ś., authoritative passages to support this view.

But, in reality, the liberated soul need not become one with the Saguna Brahman. Ś. while using the phrase 'आक्षेपितारहीनाक्ष्यात्माप्रतिलिंगाय', clearly suggests that Brahman which is to be attained or rather, as if to be attained, is beyond all the usages, including that of Īśvaratva.

There would also be no difference between the sagunopāsakas and the nirgunopāsakas, if both attain the same Saguna Brahman. Thus, if we do not give undue importance to unliberated souls, as it is not quite reasonable to do so, all the Advaitins would agree in holding that the liberated soul becomes one with the Highest One.

VIII. Trivṛtkarana:

Vācaspati is generally regarded to have rejected

122 p. 453 (Kumbhakonam edition).
123 p. 477 (Kalpataru edition).
Pančikaraṇa and admitted Trivṛtkaṇa only. It is very difficult to notice, if we go through the Bhamati only, where exactly Vācaspati viewed that Pančikaraṇa should not be recognised as authoritative. In the absence of the Kalpataru, Vācaspati would not have been understood to have refuted Pančikaraṇa. While commenting on Vācaspati’s simple words: "मयापि आकाशायुक्तिः: अयापि तेजोवनानामेव त्रिवृक्षरणये विचारितवात्" 125, Amalananda remarks that Pančikaraṇa, although it is traditionally acknowledged, is not admitted by Vācaspati. And Vācaspati’s view is more reasonable. He argues: "If at all ether and wind were of the nature of earth, water and fire, they (ether and wind) would have possessed form and Mahat-parimāṇa and consequently would be perceived by eyes. It may be argued that the properties of earth etc. are not seen in ether and wind because they contain more portions of themselves than that of earth water and fire. But in that case, Pančikaraṇa, can very well be remarked to be unnecessary. 126

Amalananda’s main argument seems to be that Pančikaraṇa is not directly mentioned in the scriptures and that it is of no use for further creation. The Brahmaṣūtras पंचारथविकृतिः:

124 See Advaitasabha Diamond Jubilee Souvenir, p.19 (published at Kanchi, 1956). See Dasyat’s History of Indian Philosophy, p.9
125 Bhāmati, p.168.
126 त्यज्ञारथवा प्राप्तं मुखा पंचीकृतिमिति कल्पतरू p.168.
and the Bhāṣya thereon, clearly seem to be favourable for Trivṛt-
karaṇa, and no reference to Pāṇcīkaraṇa is made therein.

But, it can be observed that the purpose of Trivṛt-
karaṇa is to enable the subtle elements for their vyavahāra
or usage. And the same is the case with ether and wind,
because, they are also the objects of various usages like
'ether is great', 'wind is great'. It cannot be said that
Trivṛtkaraṇa is admitted not for the sake of the justification
of the usage of great elements, but simply because it is
stated in the scriptures. For, in that case, as there is no
mention of the direct fruit of Trivṛtkaraṇa, the realisation
of Ātman is to be admitted as its fruit and for that purpose,
even Pāṇcīkaraṇa is necessarily to be resorted to. 129

So, although, Pāṇcīkaraṇa is not directly spoken of
in the scriptures, as, it does not go against the Trivṛt-
karaṇa - śruti, there should be no grudge against it. More-
over, Pāṇcīkaraṇa is admitted by the Śiṣṭas and there is no
point in rejecting it.

Now, after the treatment of some salient points of
Vācaspati's prasthāna is over, it is intended here to give in

127 B.S.II.iv.20.
128 Ibid III.i.2.
129 See Vidvanmanorāṇjanī on the Vedānta-sāra of Sadānanda,
   pp.108-9 (Printed as an appendix to Jacob’s edition of
   the Vedānta-sāra, in the Mirñaya Sāgar Press, Bombay).
brief his views in regard to some other important concepts in
the Advaita-Vedānta. Thereby, it will be easy for us to observe
his independent argumentative power and the contribution to
the system of the Advaita.

The treatment of the doctrine of the apauruṣeyatva is
the most glaring instance of the importance of Vācaspati's
commentary. According to the first interpretation of the topic
'sāstrayonitvāt',[130] Brahman is the author of the Vedas.
This statement, which presupposes that the Vedas are 'sakartṛka',
is more or less a challenge to the PūrvaMīmāṁsakas, who
strongly maintain that the Vedas are 'akartṛka' or not created
by anybody -- even by God. According to the Mīmāṁsakas, the
fact that the letters are eternal and that the author of the
Vedas is not known even when an unbroken tradition of the
preceptor and the disciple is still in existence, logically
leads to the concept of the 'apaureṣeyatva' and 'anādītva'.
The Naiyāyikas, on the other hand, hold that the Vedas are
originated by God, who is not even slightly contaminated by
human defects. Now, the question arises as to what theory
exactly is admissible to the Advaitins. Because, it is
generally known that the Advaitins maintain that the Vedas
are 'apauruṣeya', while the 'sāstrayonitvādhikaraṇa' declares
that the Vedas are created by Brahman. Vācaspati adopts a
middle position, which reconciles both the views.[131] He

[130] B.S. I.1.3.
calls attention to the fact that even the Mīmāṃsakas, who hold the eternality of letters must accept the non-eternality of words and sentences as they are respectively created from letters and words; and what is created is never eternal. Further, letters and words are differentiated by the sequence, which is non-eternal. Thus, there should be no difference of opinion as to the creation of words and sentences -- both ordinary and scriptural, even though the eternality of letters is accepted by the Mīmāṃsakas. The only point of difference is whether the author has independence in composing the Vedas. That is to say, the apauruṣeyatva lies in the absence of independence on the part of the composer. Thus, according to Vācaspati, unlike the Mīmāṃsakas, God is the creator of the Vedas, but at the same time He is not independent in creating them. He has to create them in accordance with the Vedas in the previous yuga. This is the apauruṣeyatva theory as propounded by Vācaspati in the Bhamati. Of course, he has not dealt with, in details, the theory as such, as, from the Mīmāṃsa point of view, it had been already noticed by him in the Nyāyaṇāṇī. Here he wants only to reconcile the views of the Mīmāṃsakas and the Naiyāyikas, partly accepting the both. His peculiar remark "कर्तव अन्वयेन समाप्त, अन्यत्र अभिप्रेतंत्वः" 132 i.e."we also agree with it (the Mīmāṃsaka view) except their overemphasis," speaks volumes of his way of reconciling the two views.

The doctrine of Adhyāsa which has been discussed before, necessarily gives rise to the concept of Vivarta, the fundamental points of which can be stated in brief as follows. Brahman, which is absolutely differenceless, changeless, attributeless, self-luminous, self-existent Reality, and which may be called pure Consciousness or pure Existence, is the only real thing. There is no other thing equally real like or unlike It, whether within or outside Itself. The world, as it is experienced by us, cannot be said to be identical with Brahman, because of its possessing impurity, limitedness, non-sentiency and destructibility -- the qualities, which are contradictory to the nature of Brahman. Inference and Scriptures point out the world as being produced from Brahman, the ultimate Reality. Now, the question arises as to what sort of creation is this. In our normal experience, we meet with effects, which are real transformations of causes e.g. the pot from the clay. This pariṇāmavāda or the theory that admits real transformation of cause into effect cannot be accepted in the case of Brahman, firstly because It is Immutable -- not liable to any kind of change --; and real transformation is well-nigh impossible, without absolutely disturbing the nature of the Cause. Moreover, Brahman is all-pervasive and hence no action as such will have any scope in Its case. By the scriptures:-
and by the Brahmasutras — 'साहार्थसमान्यानात्' 135
'प्रकृतिरस्त्र प्रतिविद्युतान-तानुपरेशानात्', 136 it has been asserted that Brahman is both the material and the efficient cause of the world. But, as has been observed above, when the effect is a real transformation of the cause, there must be some sort of change in the material cause and action in the efficient cause. And, as they are not possible in the case of Brahman, the cause of the world, the necessary conclusion is that real transformation from Brahman is not possible. In other words, the effect viz. the world, cannot be said to be absolutely real. That is to say, the world is wrongly superimposed upon Brahman. At the same time, the world cannot be absolutely unreal like a sky-flower, as it is actually experienced. Hence, it should be carefully understood that the word 'mithyā', when the Advaitins use it in regard to the world, does not merely mean unreal. It implies that it is neither real like Brahman nor unreal like a sky-flower. That is what is said by Vācaspati, when he remarks — 'अपि कै पारमार्थिकी पूर्विक्यानुगुण्येत प्रमाणान्' 137 'अविवृत्तमः तू पृत्तिरिति न प्रमाणसात्' 138

The analogous example is the appearance of the snake on the rope. This process of creation is called 'Vivarta'.

133 Taitiriya II.6.1.
134 Chândogya VI.3.2.
135 B.S. I.iv.23.
136 Ibid, I.iv.25.
137 Bhāmatī, p.482.
Dr. Paul Hacker\textsuperscript{139} has observed that the term Vivarta has been made popular in the Advaita Vedānta by Vācaspati, while Ś., Sureśvarācārya and Toṭaka have not used the term and Vimuktātman hesitated to use it. But, the concept of Vivarta is there, even in the B.S.Bhāṣya of Ś., as the 'adhyāsa', with the peculiar illustration of the appearance of silver on shell, is explicitly dealt with. So, there is no point in saying that the word is not there but the concept is there. There must be, of course, some historical reason why the term Vivarta was purposely used in the later Vedānta, as Dr. Paul Hacker has noticed.\textsuperscript{140} The first reason, he observed, is that -- with the help of this term, it was possible to describe, with one simple catch-word, the ontological or causal relation between Brahman and the world. Even the words Avidyā and Māyā give some sort of duality, although of an illusionistic character. Secondly, the word 'Vivarta' can be used with advantage at the time of the Ṣāstrārtha. In the debate, the word Vivarta, as being contradictory to the Pariṇāma, was effectively used. Lastly, in the theory of knowledge, the word 'Vivarta' became the perfect expression for the idea of the appearance.

The term Vivarta, as it is clear from the discussion so far, is to be used in connection with creation. That is to say, it gives, at least, some importance to creation. If we altogether discard the creation of the world, the concept

\textsuperscript{139}Vivarta\textsuperscript{139} (Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur, Mainz, Germany)

\textsuperscript{140}Ibid.
of Vivarta would be out of question. In other words, if the world is to be denied altogether, or even the appearance of the world is not going to be admitted, the conception of Vivarta would have no scope at all. And, as Vācaspatī has elaborated the Vivarta doctrine, on several occasions, obviously it follows that he gave the necessary importance to the world. Vācaspatī, while commenting upon the Bhāṣya on 'लक्षणात्मकम्यून्निखिलादिदिः', 141 explains the word ananyatva as — न लक्षणात्मकम्यून्निखिलादिदिः किन्तु वेदः व्याख्याम्। 142 i.e. He says that the word 'ananyatva' does not imply non-difference or identity between the world and Brahman, but it means that there is no difference between them. There is subtle distinction between the two views, although not from the ultimate point of view. In the first view, the existence of the world itself is denied and it is assumed that everything is Brahman, while, in the second interpretation, the existence of the world is recognised and the only thing that is denied is the difference of the world from its cause. Īśakaścārya there understands the word 'ananyatva' in the sense — 'व्यतिरेकः ज्ञातः' (no existence apart from the cause), i.e. the first interpretation which is not adopted by Vācaspatī. Thus, in short, it can be said that Vācaspatī gave more importance to the world than what Ś. has given. This is what is meant by Śrīnivasācārya when he remarks:- श्रीमताचार्यवंश परिणामस्वदः.

141 B.S. II.i.14.
142 Bhāmatī, p.454.
Vācaspati seems to have deliberately resorted to this sort of explanation of the word 'ananyatva', in order that the objections, against the Brahmakāraṇatāvāda, based upon the Advaitic concept of 'identity' between the cause and the effect, should have no scope at all. And for this reason only i.e. to avoid the defects and to point out, in clear terms, the relation between the world and Brahman -- the illusory effect and its cause -- Vācaspati embraced the concept of Vivarta and made it popular.

But it should be carefully understood here, that even ŚāmkaraČārya recognised empirical reality of the world. He could not have treated the topics like 'Vaiśamyanairghṛtya', purpose of the creation etc., in the manner in which he did. The Bhāṣya line -- केशविन्यासपरिवर्तल्लोलितमसत्यमप्रकरणम् अनेकाचारा शृङ्खलविविषयाति. 144 clearly indicates that the concept of Vivarta was before the mind of the Ācārya and that he also gave some importance to the world, and did not altogether deny the world itself -- as has been done in the celebrated

143 Darśanodaya, p.106.
144 B.S.Bhāṣya of Ś. on II.1.28 (p.477 Bhāmatī ed.)
Ajātivāda, propounded in the Gaudapādāṣṭaka. The fact that Ś., leaving the Ajātivāda for the highly qualified persons, elucidated the Māyāvāda, clearly implies that he gave some importance to the creation and propounded the illusionistic character of the world -- the concept of Vivarta. So, it must be admitted that, from the ultimate point of view only, Ś. held that there is identity between the world and Brahman, and that he did recognise empirical reality of the world. And it must also be confessed that even Vācaspati did not attribute absolute reality to the world. On several occasions, he remarked that the creation is not real from the ultimate point of view. So, there is no substantial difference between Ś. and Vācaspati, as both of them recognise the empirical reality of the world, which is denied from the ultimate point of view. What is different -- and that too, while commenting upon the 'Ārambhāpādāḥikaraṇa' -- is the mode of explanation, which has been resorted to by Vācaspati, for the specific purpose, as has been noticed above. Hence, it cannot be remarked on the whole, that Vācaspati's attitude was different from that of Ś.

III. Avidyā

The conception of Vivarta or Illusory Causation, which is the only logically admissible view with regard to the nature of the causal relation between Brahman -- the Absolute Reality -- and the phenomenal world of our objective experience,
necessarily presupposes many factors, among which is the cause for the veiling of the true character of the substratum and its appearance as something other than what it is. This cause, as it is dispelled by 'knowledge' is designated as Avidyā — contradictory to Vidyā. This Avidyā, as has been observed in details before, resides according to Vācaspati, in the individual soul, while Brahman is its object.

Vācaspati describes Avidyā as two-fold. In the very first stanza to his Bhāmatī, he refers to Avidyā as inexplicable and two-fold. It is inexplicable in the sense that it can neither be said to be real nor unreal. It is not real as it can be sublated by knowledge. And what is sublated is never real, nevertheless, that which is sublated by knowledge. It is also not unreal, because, otherwise no effect would have been produced from it. Avidyā is two-fold — one being beginningless and positive, and the other being in the form of impressions of previous illusions. The acceptance of this two-fold nature of Avidyā on the part of Vācaspati needs some explanation. Mañḍanamīśra has also referred to the two-fold nature of Avidyā. And it apparently seems that Vācaspati, in this case also, followed in the foot-steps of Mañḍanamīśra. But, if Kalpataru's interpretation of the term 'Avidyādvitaya' is admitted, Vācaspati cannot be said to have

145 cp. न त्यं धर्मं क्षणं स्विद्धं स्विभावं वा चाननेऽ।
Siddhāntabindu, p.27.

146 तैसा हि विषया अनादिमीच्छूः या ।
Kalpataru, p.3.
derived the idea of the two-fold Avidyā from Maṇḍana, obviously because of his interpretation being different from that of Maṇḍana. Maṇḍana, in this connection says -- 'तत्त्वाद्भुगण-विपर्ययाग्रहणे हि अविद्ये कार्यकारणभावन असिस्वते।' 

These 'agrahaṇa' and 'viparyayagrahaṇa' are rather two powers of Avidyā, which are necessarily admitted by all who resort to it, for one reason or the other, because, in the creation of an illusory thing, the process is: (i) that the substratum is to be concealed and then (ii) the new thing is to be superimposed on it; and the first is the cause of the second, because, the latter is not possible without the former i.e. without concealing the object, the superimposition is not possible.

Vācaspati, on the other hand, seems to have accepted the above-mentioned two-fold nature of Avidyā for the following reason. If it is simply said that Avidyā is the cause of all sorts of superimpositions, then it would not be possible to justify different kinds of superimpositions like 'अहे पुली' 'अहे पट' etc. That is to say, if everything is superimposed on Pure Brahman (and that too through one uniform Avidyā), there should be uniformity of superimpositions. So, it obtains that instead of 'अहे पट,', the superimposition should be 'अहे पट' just like 'अहे पुली'. Thus, in order to explain both kinds of superimpositions 'अहे पुली' and 'अहे पट',

147 Brahmasiddhi, p.149. This is also clear from what Maṇḍana says against the Akhyātivādins. (क्योंकि क्षेत्रपदस्य न स्त्राद्भुगणः) Ibid)
Vācaspati has resorted to the second type of Avidyā. The simple way to solve the difficulty, mentioned above, is to maintain that the superimpositions take place in accordance with their former impressions — i.e. as they took place formerly and not in the new form. So, the reason why such and such superimposition is in this form and in another form, cannot be asked. And this impression of former illusion is nothing but the second type of Avidyā. This, of course, takes for granted the beginningless character of the world. Whether this beginninglessness of the world is justifiable or not, need not be discussed here.

The purpose of Vācaspati's keeping this Cosmic Power — Nescience, as directly un-connected with Pure Brahman ... etc., has been discussed before. Here, it is only intended to bring to notice that the treatment of Avidyā as being two-fold by Vācaspati cannot lead us to assume that Vācaspati has deviated from Śāmkaraśācārya in this treatment. This is merely out of the logical necessity in explaining the process of creation. It is, of course, quite reasonable to say that Śāmkaraśācārya did not intend to go into details as regards the further treatment of Avidyā for the obvious reason that it is ridiculous to press for the explanation of Avidyā, which is admitted simply because of the inability to explain the creation of the world from Immutable Brahman. So, in reality, it is unjustifiable to enter into details as regards the treatment of Avidyā. But, as the opponents began to cross-
examine Avidyā, the necessity was felt by the latter commentators to justify Avidyā and the creation of the world through Avidyā, from the logical point of view. Of course, it could be only to some extent, and at last, they have also to remark that if any thing is inexplicable in regard to Avidyā, it is not a blemish but an ornament to it. Still we need not blame these commentators for discussing the nature of Avidyā - etc., if at all that is meant for clearer understanding or if it is done with the natural desire of man to resort to logic as far as possible.

In the remaining part of this chapter, it is mainly intended to take into consideration, the important points in the refutation of Bhāskara by Vācaspati, and also the refutation of Vācaspati by some ancient as well as modern writers.

Vācaspati's one of the aims in writing the Bhāmatī was to refute the objections, raised by Bhāskara, against the Bhāṣya of Śamkarācārya. Although he does not directly mention his name, if we go carefully through the Bhāṣya of Bhāskara, and the Bhāmatī, it is evidently known that Vācaspati has taken special pains to refute Bhāskara. The Kalpataru, also, on some occasions, notices that the view, refuted by Vācaspati, was held by Bhāskara. The following are the instances where Vācaspati has controverted Bhāskara.

(1) While commenting upon the Bhāṣya on the Sūtra
'अथातः श्रुतिनिवारया', 148 Vācaspati criticises the view that the actions like sacrifices and others are directly enjoined to attain the knowledge of Brahman. And there, he points out the exact position of the actions in attaining the knowledge of Brahman, taking into full consideration -- the Śruti passage -- तत्कां वेदानुव्यन्ते दलिति - etc. 149 He observes there that although, knowledge is, in fact, more important than its desire, it must be treated as subsidiary, because of its being the meaning of the root. While, the meaning of the suffix viz. 'desire' is to be regarded as principal. And the sacrifices .... etc. are to be related to what is principal viz. desire and not knowledge. The view has been already dealt with. Here, we want to show that Vācaspati, when he criticised this view, seems to have before him the Bhāskara-bhāṣya on the Sūtra 'Sarvāpekṣā ca yajñādiśruteraśvavat', 150 which runs as follows: - तत्कां वेदानुव्यन्ते श्रवणा विविधदिवक्ति गणेन दानेन लघुत्तारामृति भुविशोषनं प्रथमप्रतिष्ठितं यथार्थसुखुत्तत्वं विवक्त्वा अर्थात् अन्त्यमण्डितिविश्वासः। ..... सन्तोत्यायारेश्चत्ताया प्रकुल्पत्व प्रत्युत्तारायेन अनावरणभींविश्वासः। 151

(2) Bhāskara from the very beginning has tried his best to controvert the interpretations and the views put forth by Ś. Thus, the reasons, which are advocated by Ś. for not necessarily admitting actions as being prior to

148 B.S. I.1.1.
149 Brhadāraṇyaka IV.iv.22.
151 B.S. Bhāskarabhāṣya, III.iv.26
'Brahmajijnasā', are refuted, one by one by Bhāskara. Vācaspāti has not answered each and every objection of Bhāskara. After pointing out that the actions cannot be directly related to the attainment of the Brahmān-realisation, but only indirectly i.e. through the purification of mind, he emphatically concludes as an answer to the objections of Bhāskara as follows: 

\begin{equation}
\text{a} = f \text{ } 1
\end{equation}

All other objections of Bhāskara, in regard to the meaning of the word 'atha' and 'atah' in 'अथातो अत्रभ्रजिः', are based on the assumption that knowledge and actions can go together. So, instead of refuting each and every objection, Vācaspāti thought it more important to repudiate the fundamental conception of 'jñānakarmasamuccaya', which has been propounded by Bhāskara, while commenting upon the Sūtra -- Sarvāpekṣā ca yajnādiśruteraśvavat. Vācaspāti there directly contradicts the 'jñānakarmasamuccaya' as propagated by Bhāskara. Vācaspāti argues -- न च निर्देशितव्यं तत्वस्वतिः वाचार्यकथाअवद्यस्ति। येन भानवयो वा भावनाकर्मो वा धाराकारे कर्माद्यायं। येन वृत्तमयांविकारायं अयस्मै कर्माद्यायोऽग्नी

dūtrīnirrheta वेदि<स्त।\text{153} He clearly remarks that it is an unwise statement, which urges the necessity of performing the āśramakarmans as long as one breathes, just like the śama, dama

\begin{itemize}
  \item [152] Bhāmati, p.49.
  \item [153] Ibid, p.899.
\end{itemize}
This remark of Vācaspati, directly controverts the Bhāskarabhaṅga, which runs as:-

\[
\text{तस्मानैव सम्दानः स यावज्जीवमुक्तीन्ते निदुमामामामाश्च, त्याः समर्थमज्जीवीति नान्तराः परिष्यानं।}
\]

Bhāskara has raised one more objection that if at all every action is to be abandoned by a Jñānin, how his activity in regard to the purification of the body, and in the form of begging and wandering etc. can be justified.\(^\text{156}\) As the Kalpataru observes, Vācaspati has rejoined this objection when he says:

\[
\text{श्रावणेषु तु केवलं प्रतिशिष्टः व्यवहारस्वतं स्वारसिकः प्रृवत्तिकण्ठः केवलं।}
\]

That is, in regard to the actions, whose results are visible, inclination of unattached person, even though he is not entitled (to perform them) is justified, except in the case of forbidden actions, because, there is no necessity of any injunction about the action, whose result is known invariably.\(^\text{157}\)

Vācaspati there, wants to indicate by the same argument, that the objection of Bhāskara, contained in the stanza —

\[
\text{प्रांत्यं गैजलुकां कर्म वैदिकं च विवेच्यु।}
\]

\(^\text{i.e. if daily actions are performed due to illusion (impression of illusion), even the Vedic actions should, for the same reason, be continued.}\)
(3) As regards the objection of Bhāskara against 'nityānityavastuviveka' or the discrimination (between eternal and non-eternal things), as being prior to the desire of the knowledge of Brahman, Vācaspati remarks that the word Brahman in 'अपातो ब्रह्मनित्यः' alludes to the Vedas which are Its source. But only that portion of the Vedas, which points out the non-eternal nature of actions, is referred to by the word 'atah' -- which serves the purpose of a pronoun. Vācaspati means that as the ablative in 'atah' denotes reason, it is implied that the non-eternal character of actions, naturally gives rise to 'nityānityavastuviveka' - etc., which are the cause of the desire of the knowledge of Brahman. As Kalpataru has rightly noticed, these nityānityavastuviveka - etc., as they were in the mind of the Sutrakāra, and in that way quite relevant, it is quite justifiable to take the word 'atha' to mean after the discrimination between eternal and non-eternal things.

(4) Bhāskara, while commenting on the Sūtra - 'Tattu Samanvayat', has raised an objection, which is apparently very sound. He says that there is no contradiction between Brahman and the world, as the latter is created by, sustained

158 नित्यानित्यवस्तुविवेकाय: अन्तःस्थितिः अथ प्रकृतिः स्वस्वादेन वा अनिश्चितः कथमिच स्वाकारः स्वखलिता भिति प्रसिद्धशु नाक्यते।

भारसम्बन्धम p.4.

159 p.74.
by and dissolved in the former. Had there been any contradic-
tion between them, this relation of one with the other can
never be justified. Thus, he wants to refute the Advaitic
view that the world is not real from the ultimate point of
view, like Brahman. Vācaspati's remark -- मथा रत्नवान्तः सहित-
रत्नपदार्थानां द्वारा रत्नसत्यात्मासि, रत्नाभासा व तीयते, अनमकिरसहित-
भ्रांगमार्यायेन नागूः भ्रांगमार्यायेत तलैव च तीयते -- seems to have
directed towards the above view of Bhāskara, because, a
line (džārā) is shown as being created by, maintained by and
dissolved in a rope, which is contradictory to it, and the
case of Brahman is quite analogous to it.

(5) Bhāskara has refuted the purely Advaitic concept
that the non-difference between Brahman and the world is real
from the ultimate point of view, and the difference is only
upādhi or due to some limitations. And he has propounded
in details, his thesis of the Bhedabheda or the doctrine,
which assumes both difference and non-difference as real from
the ultimate point of view, while commenting on the Sūtra --
'Tattu Samanvāyāt'. Vācaspati has examined this Bhedabheda-
vāda thoroughly, after having represented it in the clearest
possible manner. Here, we think it necessary only to point
out the arguments, set forth by Vācaspati, against the
Bhedabheda theory of Bhāskara.

160 कार्यकारणम: भ्रांगमार्यम: नासिक विवेध।। तदुपपत्तिस्वैव
अस्पिद्वै तौव प्रवाहोऽविवेध हि स्यंकानव्ययन्ते।।

पांडुराज्य p.17.
First of all, the fundamental question as to the nature of difference, which, according to Bhāskarācārya, is not contradictory to non-difference is examined. It may be accepted as mere reciprocal non-existence (parasparābhāvah). In that case, if it exists between cause and effect e.g. bracelet and gold, there is difference alone and not non-difference. If it (i.e. the difference in the sense 'reciprocal non-existence) does not exist between cause and effect, then there is identity only and not difference between them. In fact, there is contradiction between existence and non-existence, as their co-existence is impossible. Now, if co-existence of existence and non-existence be admitted, there would be no difference between two different ornaments of gold, difference being not opposed to non-difference.161

Vācaspati, with the aid of invariable concomitance proves that things, which are variable when something is recurring, are different from that, just as the different flowers, which are variable, when the string is recurrent, are different from the string. Moreover, from a distance, a particular thing is understood to be gold. Now, if the ornament be not at all different from gold, the ornament is also as good as understood and there would be no desire for the knowledge of the particular ornament, because it is non-different from gold, which is already understood.

161 सम्मदे वा कल्याणकम्योरिष तद्वैतं भेज्दात्, भेदस्य अस्तदाविरोधात्।

Bhāmatī, p.118.
It may be said that just as the ornament is not different from gold, it is at the same time, different from gold and for that reason, the particular ornament is not understood even when gold is cognised. But that is also not logical. Without being sympathetic to the Bhedabheda-vadin, it can be urged that because, the non-difference between gold and ornament is also admitted, the latter should necessarily be cognised when the former is known. Vācaspati is very critical when he observes that the general rule viz. when there is no cause, there is no effect, is set aside by the existence of the cause and hence as the cause viz. non-difference does exist there, the effect viz. the knowledge (of the particular ornament) should also be there.

The only basic point of Bhāskarācārya is that the oppositional cognition — 'This ear-ring is gold' -- certainly points out both difference and non-difference. He further continues that in the above cognition, if non-difference were absolute, one thing would be apprehended twice and if difference were absolute, there would be no possibility of case-coordination, any more than between cow and horse. Even when there is a relation of support and supported or of having the same substratum, there is no case-coordination. Vācaspati, very ingeniously, without answering the question directly, calls attention to the difficulty of explaining the fact of anuvṛtti and vyāvṛtti or recurrence and variability and the desire to know ear-ring etc. even when gold is apprehended.
This cannot be justified, if there be non-difference absolute or non-absolute. So, either difference or non-difference is to be abandoned totally. In such circumstances, it is more reasonable to admit that non-difference is real and difference is superimposed on it. Vācaspati, while making it clear why non-difference cannot be regarded as being superimposed on difference, argues as follows. Difference is dependent on what is differentiated. The differentiated things are individually one. So, if one is not there, difference, which is based on one, would not be possible. On the other hand, unity is not dependent upon difference. Further, the apprehension of difference in the form -- It is not this -- depends upon the cognition of the counter-co-relate, while the apprehension of unity does not require anything else. For all these reasons, difference should be treated as being posited on non-difference. That is, non-difference between cause and effect alone is real and indeterminable difference is superimposed on it.

Although, Maṇḍana, in his Brahmasiddhi, has refuted the Bhedabheda doctrine, Vācaspati must be given due credit for controverting the objections, raised by Bhāskara and for pointing out in quite logical terms the necessity of accepting 'difference' as being posited on non-difference.

162 तस्माते भेदाभेदम्: अन्वदर्शितमन्वस्य, अनेदापादाने केदक्ष्यना, न मेदापादाना अमेदक्ष्यना विशिष्टि मुक्तम्। इभिद, प.119.
There are many more instances where Vācaspati has controverted the views adopted by Bhāskara. But, as they are not of much philosophical importance, they are not discussed.

Vācaspati, on two occasions, particularly rejects the interpretation, put forth by the Pañcapādikā:-

(1) While commenting on the Śūtra - Śabdādibhyontahpratitiṣṭhānāt - etc., Vācaspati refutes Padmapāda when the latter considers that in the sentence — MT 5.159, Puruṣa is 'uddēṣyā' and Vaiśvānara is 'vidhēya'. The main objection of Vācaspati is that in that case, the Bhāṣya passage — परमेश्वरप्रसिद्धिः जाते वैश्वानर विद्ययिति, goes against the explanation of the Pañcapādikā, as it declares uddeṣya-vidheya relation, in quite an opposite way. Vācaspati quotes another Śruti passage, wherein the idea of Puruṣa is to be made on Vaiśvānara and shows that the same idea is here understood. The technical difficulty in interpreting the word 'yat'; in the above passage, according to Bhāmatī's interpretation, is solved by taking the word 'yat' not in connection with the preceding clause.

The point, of course, is not of philosophical importance. But it should be necessarily noticed, as the
Kalpataru has observed, that even Padmapāda’s first interpretation is the same as it is desired by Vācaspati. And the second interpretation is noted just to indicate that the root-meaning of the words Agni and Vaiśvānara, can be applied to God also. Hence, Vācaspati’s refutation holds no water in this connection.

(2) In the Daharādhikaraṇa, we know from the Kalpataru, that Vācaspati controverts the Pañcapādikā-explanation of the word ‘ākāśa’. According to the Pañcapādikā, the word ‘ākāśa’ directly conveys Brahman, just as it conveys the sky. Vācaspati remarks that this acceptance of one word to mean two things directly, completely rules out two Mīmāṃsā maxims of interpretation viz. ‘अन्यायशःचानेका-धर्मम्’ and ‘अन्यायलयः स्वदार्थः’. And, in fact, the word ‘ākāśa’ can possibly indicate Brahman - i.e. it can mean Brahman secondarily because of the qualities ‘vibhutva’ - etc. common to both -- the sky and Brahman.

Thus, Vācaspati resorts to lakṣaṇa or indication, the objections to which are quite reasonably refuted by him.

165 पंचपादिकाः दुं जाते वैश्वेन्द्रप्रवृत्तिकृत्य वेदादिन्द्रिन्द्रवानानां वहनोऽवः। श्रीर्वेदैव कृतिः श्रीति पशान्तरं कहुऽपि आलोचनाय विवेचनाय अभिति। श्रीति चिन्त्यायमिदं द्वयम्। Kalpataru, p.265.

166 B.S.I.iii.14-21.

167 पंचपादिकाः द् रुविष्टहस्ति तो दृष्टिः। Kalpataru, p.298.

168 श्रीनासवेदेन विष्णुप्राप्ति गुणः कृत्व नमावशिष्यत्। तस्य अन्यायवशः अन्यायपरक्ति। श्रीति च अन्यायलयः स्वदार्थः। श्रीति च नीपिस्कानो मुद्रामेदः कृतः। Bhāmatī, p.298.
These are the two places where Vācaspati refers to and refutes Padmapāda's interpretations. It should be noted in this connection that the only source to know that the reference is made to the Pañcapādikā, is the authoritative commentary of Amalānanda on the Bhāmatī, as the Pañcapādikā itself is now available, only upto the first four sūtras.

Having thus seen what authorities are specially refuted by Vācaspati, it is intended to take into consideration some authorities — modern as well as ancient, who have tried to controvert Vācaspati in certain aspects. We have already mentioned that the Prakāśārthakāra has denounced Vācaspati in not admitting the injunction in regard to the śravaṇa, manana - etc. In this connection, at other place, he speaks of Vācaspati as being shameless in admitting the fruit of śravaṇa, manana - etc. in the next world, having resorted to the injunction thereof. It seems that the Prakāśārthakāra wanted to say that without resorting to the injunction, the fruit of actions cannot be had in the next birth — the fact, which has been wrongly accepted by Vācaspati. The problem has been made already clear. Here, it is to be only noticed that the position of Vācaspati is quite unambiguous when he says:

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That is to say, the fruit of the śravaṇa,

169 Bhāmatī, pp.924-5.
manana etc. is justifiable even in the next birth or world, because of some other actions, coming in the way. Vācaspati concludes the topic by indicating that some may, according to their ability, desire to have the fruit of their action, even in the next world. This is also clear from the Bhāṣya of Śamkarācārya. And it is needless to deal with this problem, when it has once been logically proved that according to the Bhāṣya, no injunction in regard to śravana, manana - etc. can be allowed from the ultimate point of view.

The Prakāṭarthaṅkāra, at the end of his commentary, has raised a serious objection against Vācaspati's philosophy. According to Vācaspati, as we have discussed before, individual souls, through their Nesciences, which reside in them, are responsible for the world or (to say in other words) for the duality caused in Brahman. So, as long as all the individual souls are not liberated i.e. as long as there does exist a number of Nesciences, Brahman will not be able to comprehend Its monistic character. And this goes against the scriptural passages like यथ नाममत्तवति ..... यथ त्वरो सर्वात्मानामिनीत् - etc. The Prakāṭarthaṅkāra further continues that unliberated souls imagine Brahman as the creator of the world - etc. Hence, the liberated soul, as he becomes one with the highest Self, will have to be regarded as being born again. And this is contradictory to the Śrutī passages that declare non-returning to this world after the liberation is attained. If it be

170 न स पुनःस्वरूपः Kālāg. 2.
urged from Vācaspati's point of view that in the case of the liberated soul, the concept of his being born again is not real from the ultimate point of view and hence there is no defect in the system, the Prakāṭārthakāra rightly observes that even the idea of unliberated souls being born again and again is not true from the ultimate point of view. Moreover, as Brahman, even after some individual souls are liberated, continues to be the object of Nesciences, residing in the unliberated souls. So the quality of being an object of Nescience, which is alone responsible for the creatorship of Brahman, does exist there and the liberated soul being identified with this sort of Brahman, cannot be, in reality, liberated from affliction and duality. Thus, the Prakāṭārthakāra concludes that the only way to get out of these difficulties, is to admit that the liberated soul becomes one with Pure Brahman only, and not with sāguna Brahman or Iśvara.

Still, it may be maintained from Vācaspati's point of view that the only difference then is that the liberated soul is aware of the fact that the notion of bondage etc. is not at all real and hence, no affliction to him, while the unliberated souls are not aware of this and hence they undergo pain etc.

After all, this is not an important problem for a real Advaitin, because, if we observe minutely, it can be seen that these are only two sides of one shield. That Brahman from the liberated soul's point of view is Nīrguṇa, while the same
is Saguna, from the point of view of unliberated souls. So, there is no radical difference in them. And for the same reason, the Prakāṭārthakāra’s objection, even though it may be sound, need not require further consideration.

The most serious attempt to refute the Bhāmatī has been made by Vyāsatīrtha in his Tātparyacandrikā, a commentary on Jayatīrtha’s commentary on the B.S. Bhāṣya of Madhvācārya. Vyāsatīrtha, on several occasions, has taken into consideration the passages in the Bhāmatī. And according to Rāghavendrayati, who has commented upon the Tātparyacandrikā, Vyāsatīrtha referred to the Bhāmatī, because, the points are not made so explicit in the Bhāṣya of Ś. It is quite impossible, in the scope of the present thesis, to represent and examine each and every point of refutation. And it is not necessary also. Hence, to have a general idea, a few instances are fully discussed here.

(1) According to Vācaspati, in the first sūtra - अथातो ज्ञाननिद्रासा, the word jijnāsa - desire to know, presupposes that there is some doubt in regard to Brahman and thus it points out Brahman as the object of enquiry. And the same word suggests that knowledge, as it is the object of desire, is the prayojana.

Vyāsatīrtha has raised the following objections. The
treatment of Vācaspati assumes that the purvapakṣa in the first sūtra accepts the desire to know Brahman. But, in fact, the objector wants to show the impossibility of the desire to know Brahman, as there is no object of that desire. So it is not reasonable to prove the existence of the object of the desire, when one is not prepared to admit the desire itself. 172

This refutation of the Bhāmatī-view is really not so much effective. Because, whether Vācaspati's objector is prepared to admit the desire to know Brahman, or not, cannot be decided by Vyāsatīrtha. In fact, nobody would be reluctant to admit the desire to know Brahman, as, Brahman is nothing but the highest pleasure and the pleasure is desired by everybody. So, to assume the desire to know Brahman on the part of the objector, is not unreasonable.

(2) The very first objection against the Bhāmatī in the Tātparyacandrikā, is the general objection, raised against the Kevalādvaita philosophy of Śamkarācārya. Vyāsatīrtha says: 'कृद्वै न मातीयिं भवाय'। 173 That is, he is not prepared to admit the self-effulgent thing like Ātman as not shining at some time. He observes that if Ātman is not shining due to Avidyā, there is nothing according to the Advaitin, as being responsible for the manifestation of Avidyā itself, and the pain etc., which are due to Avidyā, would not be experienced.

172 Tātparyacandrikā, p.88.
And so on and so forth. So many alternatives have been put forth and refuted one after another. But, only one thing should be ever remembered that all these and other charges are levelled, having assumed that the concealment of Ātman by Avidyā or, in short, the reciprocal superimposition of Ātman and Anātman is real from the ultimate point of view. So these objections have really no value, when we take into account the fact that Pure Ātman becomes impure on account of Its being overpowered by Nescience, is true only from the empirical point of view. From the absolute point of view, Ātman has not at all undergone any kind of change, nor has it attained any impurity. But to those, who, due to some reason or another, are experiencing some change in regard to Ātman or Its connection with the body, sense-organs etc., some explanation is necessarily to be given. And that is given by resorting to superimposition. And the Advaitin is not really expected to answer these objections seriously. He may, however, answer for the sake of answer, on the lines shown in the Advaitasiddhi.

(3) Vyāsatīrtha,\(^{174}\) while expounding the Sūtra -- Tattu Samanvayāt, has strongly objected to the interpretation of this Sūtra by Vacaspati. According to him the prima facie view represented in the Bhāmatī viz. that the Upaniṣadic sentences declaring accomplished thing like Brahman would be

\(^{174}\) Ibid, pp.200-203.
unauthoritative, as there would be no fruit of such thing and also because these sentences, in this case (i.e. if they speak of some 'siddha vastu'), would be dependent on other means of valid knowledge -- is quite irrelevant. He says that according to the Bhāmatī, this objection viz. the absence of any fruit of the knowledge of Brahman, has been taken and refuted in the very first sūtra, on the strength of the word 'jijnāsa' -- desire to know. Hence, it was unjustifiable to raise the same objection again. The second objection also does not stand to reason, because, even in the Vedas, there are other sentences which speak of accomplished things e.g. sentences like 'क्षण काली', which obviously depend upon other means of valid knowledge. But these sentences are never treated as unauthoritative. They must be, in addition, 'pauruṣeya' sentences -- those which are produced from the intellect of a man. And this pauruṣeyatva, cannot be shown in regard to the Upaniṣadic sentences proclaiming Brahman. And hence, even though they are 'sāpeksa', there is no possibility of Vedic sentences being apramāṇa. Thus, the second Pūrvapakṣa is also not reasonable. The Siddhānta of the Bhāmatī also, is according to Vyāsatīrtha, far from being satisfactory. He observes that in regard to Brahman, there cannot be any doubt as It is self-illuminating, and for the doubt, the thing should be known in general and unknown in its particulars. Whatever is doubtful, is alone the subject of any topic. So, Brahman cannot be the subject of the adhikaraṇa - Pūrvapakṣa,
Siddhānta - etc. being not possible, for the reason mentioned above. Moreover, Brahman, as It is 'Avācya' -- Indescribable -- cannot be spoken of in the scriptures even. So, the Sūtra 'Tattu Samanvayāt' cannot prove that the purport of all the Vedāntas lies in attributeless Brahman.

Vyāsatīrtha, further refutes the justification given by Vācaspati in regard to the possibility of achieving a thing, which is already attained and abandoning of a thing, which is already abandoned. Very minutely of course, he notices that in the example given by Vācaspati -- the attainment of the necklace which is already there on the neck -- the fruit of the sentence which points out to the necklace (already worn) is not the attainment of the necklace, already attained, but it is the attainment of pleasure due to the knowledge that the thing is achieved. And this pleasure is not already attained. Thus, there is no प्राप्तिः प्राप्तिः but प्राप्तिः प्राप्तिः. In the same way, abandonment of something, which is already abandoned is also refuted.

This is the way of refutation of the Bhāmatī in connection with the Samanvayāsūtra, by Vyāsatīrtha.

As regards this refutation, the following observation can be made.

(1) The first point, raised by Vyāsatīrtha viz. that whether there is any purpose of the knowledge of Brahman or not, has been already examined in the first sūtra and it is not
logical to raise the same question again in the fourth Sūtra, does not stand to reason, because, in the first sūtra, the purpose of the knowledge of Brahman was proved in general, and here, in the Samanvaya-sūtra, the objection in particular viz. that Brahman being an accomplished thing, Its knowledge would not serve any purpose, has been raised and refuted. So, it is not the same question.

(ii) The second objection of Vyāsatīrtha -- that as there are so many passages in the Vedas, which speak of accomplished things, but which are not treated as unauthoritative, it is not proper to raise the objection that the sentences, propounding accomplished Brahman, would be unauthoritative -- is also far from being reasonable. Because, it should be clearly borne in mind, that even though there are Vedic sentences, which refer to accomplished things like 'dadhi', these sentences are authoritative because they are related in one way or the other, to injunction; but Brahman, if It is not taken to have any connection with injunction, Vedic sentences, which proclaim such Brahman, cannot be authoritative. This is the purport of Vācaspati's prima-facie-view. To answer Vyāsatīrtha imitating Vācaspati's forceful language would be like this -- न कर्म कर्मोपतितादेव सिद्धान्तप्रतिपादकान्ति वेदान्तानामप्रामाण्य इति, किन्तु किमसंवचनित्वे सति सापेक्षत्वादेव केवल सापेक्षिते किमसंवचनित्वमादिदिक्षुप्रिविश-पास्य स्वभावकान्ति नाप्रामाण्येन वेदान्तानाम सुनिश्चितमादिस्मेत्वादेव किमसंवचनितप्रिविश्ये स कर्मकर्मोपतितादेव प्रामाण्यमेवति पूर्वे पाति.
(iii) Vyāsatīrtha’s objection against the Siddhānta in the Bhāmatī, viz. that Brahman being Self-illuminating, there cannot be doubt in regard to It - etc., is nothing new for the Advaitavedāntins. It is obviously unjustifiable because, the Advaitins do not hold that doubt in regard to Brahman, adhikaraṇa etc. are real from the ultimate point of view and hence, these objections have no value at all. Only after the superimposition of some imaginary difference in Brahman, these concepts are resorted to. In reality, Brahman, self-effulgent as It is, cannot be concealed, as Vyāsatīrtha says. And we also hold that it is not at all concealed, for the very same reason. But for those, who feel that It is veiled — Its pure nature is not, for some reason, understood — adhikaraṇa, discussion - etc. are necessary. So, without taking into consideration, the fundamental position of the opponent, there is no point in refuting him.

(iv) The fourth point, raised by Vyāsatīrtha against Vācaspati in regard to 'प्राप्ताः प्राधिक' and 'निन्दतअ निदुरितुः' is also more ingenious than convincing, because, the former while saying — प्राप्ताः प्राधिक नवक्षत्रः प्रागप्राप्ताः प्राधिक् — has also obviously admitted प्राप्ताः प्राधिक, which clearly presupposes प्राप्ताः प्राधिक or the attainment of the thing already achieved. Otherwise, the प्राप्ताः प्राधिक which Vyāsatīrtha speaks of, will itself will not be possible.

The same point can be put forth in regard to the
abandonment of the thing abandoned. The only point to be carefully understood is that in the examples given by Vācaspati, प्राप्तिः प्राप्तिः and निन्दिः निन्दिः may not be the 'phala', but the thing itself cannot be denied. And when it is once admitted that the attainment of the thing achieved is possible, that can be accepted in regard to the knowledge of Brahmān and there being no possibility of any other 'phala', that itself should necessarily be regarded as the 'phala'.

(4) Vyāsātīrtha has emphatically refuted the Bhāmatī when it shows the possibility of the definition of Brahmān from the view-point of an Advaitin. Having represented the Bhāmatī, almost word by word, Vyāsātīrtha has observed that the definition in general must exclude all things other than that which is defined. So, the prima facie view should hold that in the 'laksāna-sūtra' — 'Janmadyasya yataḥ' — the exclusion of Jīva, Pradhāna etc. i.e. those other than Brahmān, is not possible. That is to say, instead of arguing that the definition is not possible, as Vācaspati does, it would have been more pertinent to argue that the normal purpose of the definition viz. the exclusion of other things is not served by the definition of Brahmān, as Vyāsātīrtha himself has done. Moreover, according to Vyāsātīrtha, Vācaspati is wrong when he makes his Purvapakṣin hold that an

175 Ibid, p.126.
eternal thing like Brahman cannot be defined by a non-eternal thing like the world. For, we see that a non-eternal thing like 'śabda' is unhesitatingly accepted as the definition of ether, which is eternal. Further, Vyāsatīrtha continues that 'jagatkāraṇatva', which has been admitted by Vācaspati as the definition of Brahman, is also contradictory to Brahman, because it is anātma. Lastly, the analogy of the attainment of different regions being the definition of Sun's movement, given by Vācaspati, is also incorrect, because, 'deśāntara-prāptiḥ cannot be the definition of Brahman. It can only be 'anumāpaka' or logical reason.

These are the important points in the refutation of Vācaspati by Vyāsatīrtha, in connection with the definition of Brahman. In short, they can be answered as follows: The first point is obviously ridiculous. It cannot imperatively be asked to hold that the purvapakṣa should be that the definition does not exclude other things, and not that the definition is not possible. Both objections are equally possible and there is no point in pressing for one or the other. As regards the second point, it can be said that the analogous example given by Vyāsatīrtha - non-eternal word being the definition of eternal ether -- is not approved by the Advaitins, as ether is not recognised as eternal by them; Or, with the Mīmāṁsakas, śabda can be held as eternal. Thus, in any way, there is no case of non-eternal being the definition of eternal. As regards the third point -- that there is contradiction between
'jagatkāraṇatva' and Nirguṇa Brahman -- it can be remarked that jagatkāraṇatva also, being not real from the ultimate point of view, there is no contradiction between the rope and the imagined snake, although, there is contradiction between the rope and the real snake. The fourth argument of Vyāsatīrtha is comparatively more weighty. He has rightly called attention to the fact that the attainment of different region cannot be the logical definition of the movement of Sun; and no answer can be given honestly from Vācaspati's point of view.

These four instances are sufficient to understand the general nature of Vācaspati's refutation by Vyāsatīrtha.

Bhāmatī -- the type of commentary

Lastly, we are concluding this chapter by the discussion of the type of commentary, to which the Bhāmatī belongs. The problem has become rather important because of a peculiar reference to it in the Kalpataru. The Kalpataru, while explaining the difference of opinion between Vācaspati and Śamkarācārya, on the topic -- 'न गितिन्त्रामि तुधर्मदेवात् जन्मत्र ब्रह्मात्', 176 has raised a question whether it was proper on the part of Vācaspati to criticise the interpretation given in the Bhaṣya. Because, the Bhāmatī is a mere Tīkā and it is

\[\text{176 B.S. II.iv.17; this point is further referred to, on}\]

\[\text{p. 347}\]
the job of a Vārtika to criticise the views in the original work. Amalānanda there remarkably says -- "ति किल्लमस्तु, न किल्लमस्त बृहसपितिः" 177 i.e. if so, the Bhāmati should unhesitatingly be accepted as the Vārtika, there being no special feature of the Vārtika (lit. Vārtika has no horns). Thus, it seems that according to Amalānanda, there is no harm in accepting the Bhāmati as the Vārtika.

For the clear understanding of the problem, it is necessary to discuss these two types of commentaries -- Tīkā and Vārtika. A Vārtika is defined as तिकत्वमस्तु, न च विन्द्वविन्द्वाना चिन्तता वत्र प्रकटी । धर्म वातिका प्रायीवातिका मनीहिणः। i.e. a commentary wherein we find the discussion about the subject (topic), which is dealt with in the text, also which is not treated there or which is wrongly understood. Strictly speaking, 'uktacintā' and 'anuktacintā', as they are found in any commentary as such, are not the peculiarities of the Vārtika. So, 'duruktacintā' or so to say, finding fault with the original text, or to challenge the veracity of the statements in the text, can be said to be the peculiarity of the Vārtika, according to the definition given above. But certainly, disappointing results would follow if we go through all the Vārtikas in the Sanskrit literature and some other commentaries, which do not belong to the type of the Vārtika. That is to say, all the Vārtikas do not possess

177 Kalpataru, p.649.
this so-called special attribute of the Vārtika-type of commentary. For instance, the Bṛhadāraṇyaka bhaṣya-Vārtika of Sureśvara never challenges the authority of the Bhaṣya and no views, contradictory to the Bhaṣya, are found there. In addition to this, the Mīmāṃsāśloka Vārtika of Kumārilabhaṭṭa, the Nyāyavārtika of Udyotakara, Vijnānabhikṣu's Vārtika on the Pātañjalayogasūtrabhāṣya, the Tatvārthaśloka-vārtika of Vidyānanda, can be pointed out as instances where no 'duruktacintā' or the discussion of the wrong views in the text commented upon, is discerned. On the other hand, in some commentaries, which are not known as Vārtikas, we do find this characteristic of improving upon the original text. For instance, the renowned Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali for many a time, refutes the sūtras of Pāṇini and brings to notice the uselessness of some sūtras. This may be perhaps due to the view -- 'कृत्वस्ता पुनिन्ना प्रामाण्यम्' in grammarians' tradition. But any way, if the above definition of the Vārtikas is to be strictly applied, the Mahābhāṣya will have to be regarded as the Vārtika. There is also a commentary by Nāgojībhaṭṭa on the Rasagamgādhara of Jagannātha, which occasionally criticises the view in the text, commented upon.

From all this, we come to the conclusion that there cannot be any special type of commentary, known as the 'Vārtika'. The so-called definition of the Vārtika, cited above, can be applied to the Vārtika of Kātyāyana alone, as no other Vārtika possesses the characteristic of 'duruktacintā'.
or discussing the topics wrongly treated in the original. It is more striking that the Pramâna Vârtika of Dhamakîrti, is not at all a commentary but an original text itself. So, the remark of the Kalpataru that the Bhâmatî can be called a Vârtika is to be understood in the sense that the 'durukticintā' is not a special characteristic of the Vârtika and no commentary is forbidden to discuss wrong views, if any, in the text, it elucidated.

So far we have discussed in details several important points in connection with the Bhâmatî, which showered upon Vâcaspatî immense success as a first-rate commentator.