Chapter VI

TATTVAVAIŚARADI

The Tattvavaīśarādī of Vācaspatimiśra, a commentary on the scholium of Vyāsa on the Yogasūtras of Patañjali, is the first known commentary on the Vyāsabhāṣya. Because of its importance and invaluable help in understanding the Bhāṣya, scholars have given due attention to publish it. So today, we have at least seven good editions of the Tattvavaīśarādī.¹

¹ (i) The Tattvavaīśarādī along with the Sūtras and the Bhāṣya, was edited, for the first time, by Pandit Jībānanda Vidyāsāgara in 1874, (ii) In the same manner, it was published in the Bombay Sanskrit Series by Rājārām Śāstrī Bodas in 1892, which was revised by Vāsudeo Śāstrī Abhyankar, with the addition of the Pātañjala Sūtravṛtti of Nāgoji-bhaṭṭa, in 1917. (iii) In 1904, the Ānandāśrama at Poona brought forth an edition of the Yogasūtras along with the Bhāṣya of Vyāsa, the Tattvavaīśarādī of Vācaspati and the Rājāmārtanda of Bhoja. (iv) Dr. Gāganāth Jhā has published the English Translation of the Sūtras of Patañjali with the Vyāsabhāṣya, with notes from Vācaspati’s Tattva-vaiśarādī, Vijnānabhikṣu’s Yogavārtika and Bhoja’s Rājāmārtanda, in ‘Theosophical Publication Fund’ in 1907. (v) Major B.D. Basu has edited the Yogasūtras along with the Vyāsabhāṣya, with the translation of these two and the Tattvavaīśarādī into English by Rāma Prasād M.A. in 1910. (vi) J.H. Woods translated the Yogasūtras, the Vyāsabhāṣya thereon and the Tattvavaīśarādī in 1914 and this publication of the Harvard University is supposed to be the standard work of its kind. (vii) The Tattvavaīśarādī is also included in the Chaukhambā edition of the Pātañjalyogasūtra, edited by Goswāmī Dāmodaraśāstrī.
The Vyāsabhāṣya, which has been commented upon by Vācaspati, is really a masterpiece of composition, the language of which is sometimes very lucid and attractive but full of deep meaning, hidden in it. So, it was quite proper on the part of Vācaspati to explain it in his peculiar characteristic manner.

As regards the contents of the Tattvavaiśāradī, they are the same as those of the Bhāṣya of Vyāsa and the Sūtras of Patañjali. Here, some important points, raised and discussed by Vācaspati, are dealt with.

Vācaspati, at the beginning of the second chapter, has given a scholarly exposition of the 'nañ' compound, in connection with the nature of Avidyā. He puts forth three possibilities as follows: (i) Avidyā should be a compound wherein the first part of the compound is regarded as principal, just like the word amaksikam — the absence of bees. (ii) Or, the second part of the compound should be treated as principal, just as in the case of arājapuruṣa — not public servant. (iii) Or, lastly the compound can be treated as giving prominence to an altogether different word, not forming the part of the compound, as in the case of amaksiko deśah — beeless place. But, none of these alternatives would be useful in regard to Avidyā, if by that word, something as the cause of the afflictions is meant. For, in the first alternative, the word Avidyā would simply mean the absence of knowledge already existing. This is surely not the cause of the afflictions. According to the second alternative, the word would mean — a science qualified
by the absence of something -- the science of the negation. This science, however, can only come in the way of afflictions and is not certainly their cause. If the last alternative be resorted to, Avidyā would mean intellect with knowledge absent therefrom. This buddhi or the intellect, cannot be said to be the cause of the afflictions, simply because it is void of knowledge. In that case, the intellect of the yogins, who have curbed their mind from all its functioning and hence no knowledge therein, will have to be regarded as the cause of the afflictions. But that is also not admissible. In this way, none of these types of dissolving the compound is of any use in regard to Avidyā in order to point out its klesādi-kāraṇatva or the character as the cause of the afflictions. Vācaspati, having raised this difficulty explains the bhasya of Vyāsa as follows: the word Avidyā is neither the absence of knowledge nor a particular form of science, nor is it the intellect devoid of knowledge. It is a cognition, contrary to the real cognition. In short, it is the unreal cognition. Vācaspati advocates the position by pointing out that the relation of the word and its meaning depends upon how the word is understood in the worldly usage. In the worldly usage, it is often observed that the 'nañ' or the deprivative prefix, while denying the existence of the last word of the compound, points out (the existence of) something which is the contrary thereof. For instance, the word 'amitra' does not mean the absence of a friend nor does it mean a particular friend. On the contrary, it means the opposite of a friend i.e. an enemy. In the same way, the word Avidyā can very well
mean the unreal cognition.

Vijñānabhikṣu, although does not criticise in this connection, Vacaspati's treatment, points out that the idea of Avidyā in the Yoga system is quite different from that in the Vedānta and the Sāṁkhya systems.

The philosophical doctrines in the Yoga system are, more or less, the same as those of the Sāṁkhya system, which have been dealt with in the last chapter.

The most important topic which we feel, from the point of view of Sūryanārayaṇaśānti's criticism against Vacaspati, which we have already referred to, and which is a positive evidence to support our view in that connection, is the treatment of the Sphota theory by Vacaspati.

The Yogasūtras do not directly touch the Sphota doctrine. The Yogasūtra\(^2\) III.17 points out that a yogin can attain the knowledge of the sounds of all living beings, by the Samyama or concentration on the distinction of the word, the object and the idea — the fact that these appear as one is due to their coinciding with each other. The Vyāsabhāṣya, in order to point out the exact nature of the word, deals with, in short, the view that accepts the Varṇas or the letters themselves as the pada or the word, and refutes it. Vācaspati-miśra, in the Tattvavaiśāradī, opposes this view strongly and

\(^2\) सङ्करण्यानाशान्तिरसत्तत्त्वशास्त्रभविष्यंश्चयथापुत्रोपनिधिनम्
adduces additional arguments to refute this varṇavāda of the Mīmāṃsakas and the Vedāntins. His arguments can be summarised as follows: The letters cannot produce any sense singly, just like the pegs which give support to a basket hung therefrom, because in that case, one word would be sufficient to know the intended meaning and the remaining words would be useless. They cannot also make any sense wholly, just as several stones placed together (and made into a platform) support a stool. For, the letters, by no means, can come together unlike the stones. That is, because of the impossibility of pronouncing all the letters simultaneously, there cannot be any connection between all these letters and hence it cannot be held that all the letters together make sense. These letters, in fact, appear and disappear distinctly, like a rod of steel, without any direct contact with the pada or the word. Vācaspati, having commented upon some lines from the bhaṣya, further elaborates the problem as follows: Even, the fixed order of the letters in a word cannot be admitted, simply because they do not come into existence simultaneously. Moreover, it cannot be argued that the letters, although they are not in a fixed order, come together to manifest the sense, through mental impressions, just like the sub-sacrifices like āgneya - etc., in bringing about the highest apūrva or the heaven. This is not possible, because the sāmśkāra or the mental impression cannot be admitted to be of the apūrva type — i.e. different from the ordinary one, which gives rise to the smṛti or memory. For, in that case, this sāmśkāra is un-experienced and it cannot be produced by various letters, with a definite order. So many
samskāras would have to be assumed -- the fact which would lead to the argumentative fault viz. Gaurava. It may, however, be argued that this mental impression need not necessarily be known as it is the part of an inferential cause and not of the productive one. But it is not at all reasonable to accept that the sambandha or relation, without being understood, can lead to the sense of the word. Even if the samskāra, which gives rise to memory, be accepted as the means of bringing all the letters together, the difficulty cannot be solved. For, whatever is experienced can alone be the object of memory and nothing more. Otherwise, the knowledge of one thing would lead to the knowledge of all the things in the world. So in the present case, Vācaspati wants to point out that the letters alone are the objects of experience, generating the impression and hence this sort of impression cannot lead to the sense, which is not experienced. The view that all such impressions caused by different letters together give rise to memory, wherein all the letters are experienced simultaneously and they can possibly signify the sense, is also inadmissible, because, in that case, the words with the same letters but having no order or altogether reverse order, would make the same sense. That is to say, the words jarā, rājā, kapiḥ, pikah - etc. would give rise to one and the same sense, but that does not happen. Vācaspati rightly points out that the smaraṇajñāna or the memory has not the order of letters, as its object (but only the letters). So the order of these letters cannot be known even when they are known simultaneously. And hence the contingency, shown already, is inevitable.
For all these reasons, the sense cannot be produced by the letters either singly or wholly. We have to admit the experience of one word (which is technically called Sphoṭā) as the direct cause of the sense. Vācaspati then endeavours to show that the contingency pointed out against the theory that accepts the letters as producing the sense, cannot be raised against the Sphoṭa theory. The word or the Sphoṭa is expressed by sounds. These sounds, in reality, differ from each other, but they look as if similar, due to their common place of formation. So, they make up a word similar to others, in some respects, although dis-similar in reality. Thus, the word or the Sphoṭa, expressed by every group of letters is quite different. Hence, there does not arise the contingency of two words giving the same sense. For, the Sphoṭa of kapiḥ and pikaḥ would be different. The Sphoṭa is, really speaking, single and without parts; it appears as possessing different parts and composite natures. It is just as a face possessing a constant tinge of colour, fixed features and dimensions, which shows different reflections when it comes into contact with different things like jewel, dagger and mirror. Vācaspati points out how the Sphoṭa is different even though some of the letters are common. He says that the letter 'ga' of the Sphoṭa expressed by 'go' cannot be understood in connection with the Sphoṭa of 'gaura', simply because of the common letter. But it is to be understood in connection with 'o' only. This 'o', on its part, cannot also

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3 T.V., p.322.
be understood in connection with the word 'śoci' but only in
connection with 'ga' of 'go'. That is to say, the letters as
related to each other alone express the particular sphoṭa.
The relation of one letter with other, is that of -- that
which qualifies and that which is qualified. This relation
is possible even though the letters do not exist simultaneous­ly. For, their simultaneous existence can be admitted through
mental impressions. It cannot be said that these are two
impressions having two different objects and hence they cannot
posit the co-existence of different letters, because, these
samskāras, even though they are different, as pointed out
above, are themselves the object of one single pada or Sphoṭa.
Vācaspati makes clear the position of the Sphoṭavādins as
follows: The Sphoṭa is not manifested clearly by the percep­
tion of the parts alone, it is distinctly manifested only when
we are aware of the cognition of all the parts as constituting
one group. This clear manifestation is caused by preceded
unmanifed impressions. The case is analogous to the clear
cognition of a tree, from a long distance, which is caused by
indistinct notions of elephant etc. Vācaspati, quite conscious­
ly points out that this way of understanding the sense from
the word, cannot be justified if the letters themselves are
expected to signify the sense. He says that in the case of
the varṇas or letters, it cannot be accepted that each letter
gives rise to the unmanifest sense and at the end of the last
letter, the manifest sense is understood; because the point

4 T.V., p.323.
of manifest and unmanifest can be put forth only in the case of direct perception. The fact that the sense is produced by letters, is not directly perceived. So, if at all the letters are to produce the sense, it must be manifest and not unmanifest. On the other hand, the Sphota, which is manifested by sounds, is directly perceived and hence the point of manifest and unmanifest can very well be admitted in its case. Once more, Vācaspati brings to notice that the Sphota is prayatnaveśeṣavyāṅgya i.e. manifested through particular effort and this particular effort requires a definite order of words. If at all the order is changed, that particular prayatna would not be there, and hence the Sphota desired to express the particular meaning, cannot come into existence. Thus there is the necessity of the fixed order of letters in a word, according to the Sphota theory.

These are the new points which are raised by Vācaspati, in favour of the Sphota theory. Further, he merely elaborates the Vyāsabhāṣya, dealing with the nature of the Sphota.

(II) Vācaspati, while commenting on the Vyāsabhāṣya, which refutes the Vijnānavāda, has set forth some new arguments against the well-known reasons — sahopambhaniyama and vedyatva, adduced by the Bauddhas to prove non-difference between ideas and external objects. He points out that the two reasons sahopalambhanīyama i.e. invariable cognition of the object and its idea together and vedyatva i.e. knowability are

5 T.V., p.419.
sandigdhānaikānta or sandigdhavyabhicārī (i.e. the case wherein the reason is present but the predicate is not). Externality and grossness are perceived in external objects. But these objects, which, according to the Bauddhas, are of the nature of ideas, cannot possess these qualities. Externality means being confined to limited space and grossness implies that the thing occupies more than one part of space. In these circumstances, it is not possible for the 'idea' which is one, to exist in more places than one, and at the same time, in a limited space. Thus, the qualities nānādesāvyāpita and vicchinnadesātā, which are necessary for externality and grossness and which are found in external objects, are not possible in the case of knowledge, which is one and for the same reason, which exists at one place only. So, the objects and their knowledge cannot be said to be non-different from each other. Even if it is held that there are many ideas (vijñānabheda) and not only one, the cognition of a gross thing cannot be admitted. For, the ideas have the most subtle things as their objects and they do not know anything of one another except their own objects. This apprehension of a gross thing cannot be said to be experienced in the determinate perception, as there is no contact with it. Further, it gives rise to distinct perception, which is not possible, as the gross thing was not perceived in indeterminate perception, and hence it cannot be perceived in the determinate perception also. In this way, as a gross external object does not really exist i.e. as it is an illusory thing, it cannot be non-different from its idea, which is real. The reason, 'vedyatva' also, is not pervaded by
non-difference i.e. it cannot be said that wherever there is 'vedyatva', there is the non-difference between the cognition and the thing cognised. The fact that the idea and the object are cognised together, may be due to their very nature or something else, and cannot prove the non-difference between them, because, one of them is real, while the other is mere illusory, as has been shown above. Thus, these two reasons vedyatva and sahopalambhaniyama, which are not logical reasons but only fallacious, can give rise to mere conjecture, which cannot be authoritative, in denying external objects. Hence, the perceptual knowledge, which asserts the existence of external objects, cannot be sublated by mere conjectures.

(III) While dealing with the Buddhistic view that accepts mind as self-illuminating as well as the illuminater of objects, Vācaspīti has adduced weighty arguments to encounter it. 6 He says that as the mind is liable to be modified, it must be, like other objects, pervaded by perceptibility i.e. it must be the object of perception. And whatever is pervaded by perceptibility cannot illuminate itself, because modification in regard to oneself is not possible. In his characteristic way, he remarks — न हि तद्वा विद्या च कर्मं च कारकं च। न हि पापः पक्षते, चिदा वा चिदते। 7 i.e. one and the same thing cannot be the action, the object and the instrument also. Cooking is never cooked, nor is cutting cut. On the other hand, Puruṣa is not liable to any kind of change and hence, is not the object

6 T.V., p.428.
7 Ibid.
of any experience. So, He can be said to be self-illuminative. By the term self-illuminative, it is meant that Puruṣa is not illuminated by others. His illumination is not depended upon anything else. In fact, the objects of the modifications of mind are illuminated, only because the mind has got the reflection of Self in it.

It may be observed in this case that fire, although it is the object of perception, does not require any other fire for its illumination.

But, Vācaspati rightly shows that although fire is not brought to light by another fire, it is surely illuminated by consciousness and not by itself. Every action in the world is seen in relation with the subject, the object and the instrument. For instance, cooking is seen in relation with Caitra, rice and fire. So also, the act of illumination must be in relation with its subject, object and instrument. And when we say that it is in relation with these, we have to admit the difference between the action and these three factors (subject, object and instrument), as the relation is possible only between different things. For all these reasons, the Buddhistic view that mind is self-illuminative is not at all logical.

(IV) The only philosophical difference between the Sāṃkhya and the Yoga philosophy is that while the Sāṃkhyas do not admit any principle like God, the Yoga system does admit it.
The Yogasūtra clearly lays down a definition of God. The Vyāsabhāṣya explains what are the Kleśas, Karmās, Vipākas and āśayas. Vācaspāti says that Avidyā and others are called Kleśas or afflictions, because they afflict Puruṣa by various painful blows. Kuśala and akuśala i.e. virtue and vice are called karmās or actions only metaphorically, as they are produced by them. Vipākas mean birth, life and enjoyment. And the vāsanās or impressions are designated as āśaya, as they are embedded as potencies in the mind. All these -- afflictions, actions, fruition and vehicles are the characteristics of mind and not of Puruṣa.

But they are attributed to Puruṣa, as He is the enjoyer of their fruit. But God, even though He is Puruṣaviśeṣa, is not touched by these affliction etc. (which reside in mind). He is not only the object of meditation, but is also said to help the realisation of the goal, by the removal of obstacles. Vācaspāti, while bringing to notice the authority of the Vedas and God's universal supremacy of Spiritual and Mental Essence, has advanced very effective argument as follows. The mantras and the Śāyurveda, are proved to be authoritative, in as much as, they speak of actions which never fail or which are never found to be otherwise. It is not possible for a man, who has only ordinary means of knowledge to note the agreements and differences of various medical herbs and of the mantras. Hence, the mantras and the Ayurveda must have been composed by omniscient God, who must be possessed of the Universal Essence

I.24.
of the will-to-be (buddhisatva). Similarly, the remaining part of the Vedas must also be a divine production, simply because of the Universal supremacy of His Spiritual and Mental Essence. Thus, Vacaspati proves that the authority of the sacred teaching lies in the divinity of the Universal Essence (prakṛṣṭa sattva).

Here, the necessity of Vacaspati's Yoga Tattvavaisāradī, in order to understand the Vyāsabhāṣya correctly and to grasp the underlined ideas therein; is to be pointed out. These points, although they are small in themselves, are important from the viewpoint of evaluating the commentary.

(1) The Vyāsabhāṣya introduces the Sūtra — अन्य: किंचित्: अकिंचित्:; 9 as 'ता: पुनरिविभाजया कहूँ विधि किंचित्: i.e. the modifications of mind which are to be checked, although they are innumerable, are (classified). Here the word 'citta' in the Vyāsabhāṣya is in the singular. But Vacaspati remarks — किंचित् विधिः कैवल्यं सबिज्ञ नात्मः भिन्नः भिन्नानान्तिति i.e. the singular is to be understood as being intended to denote the class; or the word mind should be understood to mean minds.

(2) While commenting on the word 'eva' in the Sūtra ता: कैवल्यं समाधिः: 10 Vacaspati says कैवल्यं भिन्नः: सबिज्ञ विभाज्यान्ति इत्यद्यः: i.e. the word 'eva' there, is to be taken after the word sabījaḥ i.e. as qualifying the word

9 Y.S. I.5.
10 Ibid, I.46.
Thus the new Sūtra would be तत्त्वं केवल समाधिः, meaning thereby, the four types of trance - savitarka, nir-vitarka, savicāra and nirvicāra are sabīja (possessing the seed) only. What is intended by Vācaspati is that the quality of being sabīja, is not restricted to these four types only. But the types of trance in regard to the knower and knowledge can also be included under the sabīja samādhi. Thus, according to Vācaspati, this 'sabījasamādhi' is eight-fold; and this is not possible unless we adopt his way of construing the word 'eva'.

(3) Patanjali explains the 'asmitā' or egoism as दृढ़दंसात्मसंस्ते। ज्ञात्सौभारस्वित्ता। i.e. Egoism is the blending together, as it were, of the power of consciousness with the instrumental power of seeing. Vācaspati, with his unique critical insight, points out that Patanjali uses the word dṛgdarśanaśaktyoh instead of dṛgdarśanayoh i.e. the word sakti is added by him, only with a view to bringing out their mutual relation of fitness as the enjoyer and being enjoyed.

On various occasions, Vācaspati has condensed the long discussion, in short syllogistic forms, which are very useful to get the exact gist of the discussion. In order to prove the existence of the former birth, Vācaspati, after explaining the Bhāṣya, has put forth the whole explanation in the following syllogistic form.

11 Y.S. II.6.
As Vācaspati commented upon almost all the orthodox systems of Indian Philosophy and hence, was well-versed with arguments and counter arguments of all the systems, he has made in his commentary possible allusions to the objections and fundamental principles, at appropriate places. So it is very important to note that of all the commentaries on the Yogasūtrabhāṣya, the objection raised by Maṇḍanamiśra, in his Vidyaviveka, against the possibility of an omniscient personality, is noticed and answered in Vācaspati's Tattvāvaiśāradī only.

The position is like this. The followers of the Yoga system argue that where knowledge reaches its ultimate limit, it is the omniscient being. The invariable concomitance viz. whatever is sātiśaya,\(^{13}\) reaches its ultimate limit in something, proves that knowledge, being sātiśaya reaches its ultimate limit in some one who is none but sarvajñā, on the analogy of 'mahattva' which is sātiśaya and reaches its ultimate limit in ether. Maṇḍanamiśra has shown that the vyāpti is fallacious in as much as the qualities like the gariman, even though they are sātiśaya, do not reach their limit in anything, as there is no object which contains the highest gurutva. Vācaspati

\(^{12}\) T.V., p. 405.

\(^{13}\) That which admits some excess.
just refers to this objection and refutes it by pointing out that the gurutva of one thing is not different from the gurutva of the parts of that thing. That is to say, in reality, there is no 'atiśaya' or excess, in regard to gurutva. That it is apprehended to be so is merely an illusion. So, the point of gurutva cannot be raised against the general concomitance establishing something niratiśaya. And the case of knowledge is quite different. It is not complete, unlike the gurutva, in each object. Hence it can admit sātiśayatva. Thus there is no exception to the general rule -- whatever is sātiśaya reaches its ultimate limit in something.

It would not be out of place here to note that Vācaspati has not taken into consideration all the objections, raised by Maṇḍana in his Vidhiviveka and which are explained by him in his Nyāyakārikā. It must be admitted that the Nyāyakārikā was written before the Tattvavaiśāradī, as the former is mentioned by name in the latter. So, the only explanation for not referring to other objections in the Vidhiviveka, can be that Vācaspati did not give any importance to them.

The Sūtra 'प्रकृतिकल्याणाय गृहाण्या प्राप्तम्' (optionally, by the expulsion and retention of breath) does not directly lay down what to do by these - expulsion and retention. The Vyāsabhāṣya understands the Sūtra as वा तत्र विपर्य संबंधितं i.e. Mental steadiness should be optionally cultivated by these - expulsion and retention. But,
the Bhāṣya does not inform us of anything more as to how this meaning is obtained from the Sūtra. Vācaspati, even though he is hyper-critical here, undoubtedly comes to the point and makes the position clear by remarking — \textit{नात्मकतां स्थितिनिदिव्यस्वरूपम् संप्रादेश} स्नानविधिउपासोन स्नाननिनिञ्जम्} 

16 i.e. the word ‘sthiti’ should be taken back from the word ‘sthitinibandhanī’ in the following sūtra, and should be connected with the word ‘sāmpādayet’, which is obtained through context.

But, it should be noted that the preceding sūtra\textsuperscript{17} contains the word ‘cittaprasādanam’, which is interpreted by Vyāsa as … That is, the ‘prasāda’ or the purity of mind is understood in the Bhāṣya as the steadiness of mind. Thus, although, as Vācaspati has pointed out, the word ‘vā’ optionally does not refer to the ‘means’, mentioned in the previous sūtra, the word ‘prasāda’ from the preceding sūtra, in the sense of steadiness, as the Vyāsabhāṣya expressly understands it, can very well be understood in the present sūtra, and the sense — \textit{स्नानविधिउपासोन} — ‘steadiness should be attained’ can be had without taking the word from the following sūtra — the case which is generally not observed.

His casual remark — \textit{न वै कैत्यां चिराग्याज्ञानम् वद्यायिन्द्रियिन्द्रियबिच्छिन्नम् व्यायाम:} \textsuperscript{18} i.e. the Baudhāyas do not or rather cannot admit

\textsuperscript{16} T.V.139

\textsuperscript{17} पैदीवान्तमुद्यायतन: सुधाच्छुऽग्याक्यप्यविक्षप्ताचः नावनस्तितिविद्यात् स्नानार्थित्यस्वरूपम् \textsuperscript{18} T.V., p.450.
any operation other than the creation itself, is very important from the point of understanding the exact gist of the argumentation in the Sūtra and the Bhāṣya.

In this way, Vācaspati's Tattvavaiśāradī is really valuable in understanding the Vyāsabhāṣya. But at the same time, it is necessary to remark that we do not come across scholarly discussions to that extent as they are found in his other commentaries like the Nyāyakaṇṭikā, the Tātparyatikā and the Bhāmatī. There are some detailed discussions which we have already referred to. But, there are also some points which could have been elaborated by Vācaspati on the line of his other commentaries. The treatment of the sarvajñatva theory, vaiśamyānairghṛṇyā of Īśvara etc. are the points in this connection. After a careful perusal, it seems that the commentary is specially meant for the students and not for the scholars. This is also clear from the fact that at the end of each section, Vācaspati has composed one stanza, giving the summary of the whole section.19 Further, he seems to be more systematic in the Tattvavaiśāradī. He comments even on the word 'ācāryadesīyat':—

The etymological meanings of various words like linga, pradhāna, apavarga - etc., noted in the last chapter, are also conducive to the same conclusion. The whole discussion, which is put into logical syllogisms, at several places, also appears to be written with a special view that students should avail

19 This is not generally found in his other commentaries.
20 T.V., p. 134.
themselves of the ready material to learn by heart the exact
gist of the long philosophical discussion. This does not
mean that his other commentaries are not meant for students.
The only difference is that they are meant for scholars also.
Thus the Tattvavaiśāradī is a good commentary for students,
being as Vacaspati himself speaks of it, in the introductory stanza.21

Two more points (i) Vacaspati and Vijñānabhiṣkṛśu and
(ii) Rāghavānanda's Commentary on Vacaspati's Tattvavaiśāradī,
are to be discussed in the concluding part of this chapter.

(I) Vācaspati and Vijñānabhiṣkṛśu:

Vijñānabhiṣkṛśu's commentary on the Vyāsabhāṣya, styled
as 'Vārtika' has been composed after Vācaspati's Tattvavaiśāradī,
and an attempt has been made by him to controvert the views
of the latter on some occasions. Some of them are discussed
below.

Vācaspati reads the Sūtra 1.17 as -- विचारान्वे दार्शिन्स्ता-
त्यपानुगमत ध्ययति। and explains it as: समुपातात्मानं विचारान्वेदार्शित्तर्ताम् दृष्ट्य: स्वाप्यः अनुगमत। प्रक्षिप्तम् 22 i.e. The
general nature of cognitive Trance, is to be understood in the
accompaniment of the natures in the forms of philosophical
curiosity, meditation, elation and egoism. Vijñānabhiṣkṛśu
has made the following observation in this connection. He
says that the reading -- 'rūpānugamāt' --, accepted by

Vācaspati, is wrong and hence should be discarded. He argues that the Bhāṣya on that sūtra does nowhere use the word 'rūpa'. Further, the bhāṣya on the very first sūtra uses the terms विकृत्तत्व, विचारानुपत्त, आन्द्रानुपत्त, विहितानुपत्त i.e. the bhāṣya is not in favour of the reading rūpanugata. So, Vācaspati's explanation of the word rūpa is not at all necessary. Here, we think that the word rūpa in the sense of svarūpa, as Vācaspati takes it, does not change the meaning of the Sūtra. And as Vijnānabhaṅkṣu has rightly pointed out that the Vyāsa-bhāṣya seems to be completely ignorant of the reading rūpanugamāt, there is no point in resorting to it.

Vācaspati explains the word bhavaprātyaya from the Vyāsa-bhāṣya under the sūtra: भवेत्प्रत्ययः विदेहप्रकृतिशयावाच. 23 as the samādhi that is caused due to Avidyā. That is, the word bhava is taken in the sense of Avidyā. He says:- क्षणिन्यासां जगतां हस्य चन्द्रिन्यासां । 24 Vijnānabhaṅkṣu, in his Vārtika, takes the word bhava in the sense of birth. That is, according to him, the samādhi of Gods and of those merged in Prakṛti, is brought about by birth itself. But, according to this explanation, however simple it may be, one pertinent objection can be raised. If Gods and Prakṛtilayas obtain asamprajñātāsamaṅdhi merely by birth, they would be liberated in the same birth and need not be reborn. But the rebirth of the prakṛtilayas is spoken of in the Vyāsa-bhāṣya. The editor of the Sāṃgīyogadārśana has tried to get out of the difficulty

23 Y.S. 1.19.
24 T.V., p. 56
by pointing out that even accepting the ultra-cognitive trance (asamprajñātasaṃmādhi) as being caused by birth in the case of the Prakṛtilayas, it can very well be admitted as being originated through Avidyā, as it involves no contradiction. Salvation also is not regarded to be obtained in that birth. Even though the 'asamprajñātasaṃmādhi' is caused due to the birth, it can possibly admit rebirths. Hence, Vijnānabhikṣu's explanation need not be stamped as being merely due to jealousy with Vācaspati.

We, however, think that the explanation given by Vācaspati, even though it is apparently awkward, is much more scientific. Although Vijnānabhikṣu's position can be justified logically as pointed out above, one cannot but think that Bhikṣu's attempt was to improve upon Vācaspati.

The Patañjalaśāstra —

lays down that concentration on one principle is necessary to get rid of the 'vikṣepas' or the obstacles. Vācaspati understands Īśvara by the word ekatātva, as He is 'prakṛta' or relevant there. Vijnānabhikṣu strongly opposes this view of Vācaspati. He says that the obstacles are to be destroyed by 'abhyāsa' and 'vairāgya' in general and not through concentration on God only. He further advocates as follows:— Had the Sūtrakāra intended the Īśvarapraṇidhāna alone, as the cause of overcoming the antarāyas or obstacles, the Sūtra would have been — and not — in general.

25 Y.S. I.32.
It is not reasonable to take the word ekatatva to mean God. For, in the absence of any difficulty, the sense of the word cannot be modified. So according to him, 'ekavastu' here means any gross thing -- केस अवादि किविचत।

Vijnanabhiṣku's criticism against Vacaspati is really of no great importance. For, instead of taking any gross thing as the object of meditation, it is positively better to accept Iśvara as the object of abhyāsa to annihilate the obstacles. Moreover, the sūtra भीष्मप्रतिधानां दिसे definitely lays down concentration on God. Further, it should be taken into consideration that it would be far from truth to assume that concentration on any gross thing -- as Bhikṣu has pointed out -- would successfully lead to the destruction of the obstacles.

It should also be noted that Bhikṣu has also modified the sense of the word ekatatva when he says -- केसत्वं स्वादि किविचत। So Vacaspati alone need not be taken to task for modifying the sense of the word 'ekatatva'. As regards the point raised by Bhikṣu that there would arise the fault of 'dvirūkta' or repetition, if Iśvara is meant by 'ekatatva', as there is one sūtra, already employed to announce Iśvara-pranidhāna. This is really no weighty argument, because there exist two points of view in these two sūtras. The first sūtra optionally lays down Iśvara-pranidhāna as the means of samādhi, while the latter lays down it as the means of destroying the obstacle of samādhi. In this way, Vacaspati's position does not go against logic and Vijnanabhiṣku's criticism is not convincing.

26 Vārtika, p.91.
It is a different thing and that we would discuss later on, whether the claim of Raghavānanda of Vācaśpati's Tattvavaiśāradī, can be substantiated or not; but the most striking feature of it is that it does not seem to be a regular commentary on the Tattvavaiśāradī. At the outset of his commentary, he comments upon the first stanza -- which is supposed to be an interpolated one, of the Vāyāsbhāṣya. So, on many occasions, he comments upon the Bhāṣya and not on the Tattvavaiśāradī. Sometimes, one feels that it is not at all a commentary on the Tattvavaiśāradī. For instance, the Tattvavaiśāradī, under II.23 explains, in detail, in more than forty lines, the Kārikā which is given and simplified in the Bhāṣya, while the Pāṇājālārahasya is quite silent about the explanation given by Vācaśpati, and comments upon the Bhāṣya, in less than ten lines. So, it is very difficult to speak of the exact nature of the Pāṇājālārahasya. That Raghavānanda intended to comment upon the Tattvavaiśāradī, is quite evident from the fact that the introductory stanzas of the Tattvavaiśāradī and also the beginning portion of the Tattvavaiśāradī have been commented upon in the Pāṇājālārahasya. Moreover, the colophon of the P.R. at the end of

27 Pāṇājālārahasya in the Sāmgayogadarśana, p. 1
28 वस्त्ववृत्ति दूपपार्थ प्रमाणित नन्देसा केशाधारुणीय etc.
Each chapter unambiguously reads -- ग्रंथाववैवासरादित्य वै शास्त्राय: क्वात्मानाम् काणापृष्ठेपात: कलह्ये....

Further, at the beginning of the fourth chapter, P.R. seems to be a regular commentary on the Tattvavaisārādi. But in that chapter also, it often comments upon the Vyāsabhāṣya and many a time, it merely gives the gist of the Sūtra in one or two lines, without commenting either on the Vyāsabhāṣya or on the Tattvavaisārādi. Such is the varied nature of this P.R. which would be perhaps unique for this reason, in the range of commentaries in the Sanskrit literature. As regards the claim made in 'वाचस्पतिभाष्यामाणिः' we certainly agree with Pandit Goswāmi Dāmodarādāstrī -- the learned editor of the Sāṃgīyogadādana, in remarking that the claim has been made by Rāghavānanda, not knowing his own capacity. No doubt, it is useful on some occasions to know the proper implication of the Tattvavaisārādi. For instance, the Tattvavaisārādi -- कार्य भारता॒नुप्रविष्टे न कार्यानुप्रविष्टा 31 has been simplified clearly in the P.R. as -- कुमाराक{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}

But it cannot possibly be justified as the 'न्यूनसम्बन्ध' or improvement on Vācaspati. On the contrary, while commenting on the Vyāsabhāṣya -- समाना हि त्वो: कुमाराक{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{}क{} kilometres. 29 Māyākṣerasta in the Sāṃgīyogadādana, P.P. 136, 280, 391, 478.

30 P. 2

31 P. 54.
Rāghavānanda remarked that the Bhāṣya of Ś. was before him. But that is also not possible, because Vacaspati himself has commented upon the line ‘samānā hīti’. He says there .... 

obviously this sentence must have been supposed by Rāghavānanda also, as contained in the Vyāsabhāṣya. In these circumstances, to say that the bhāṣya of Ś. was before Vyāsa when he wrote the sentence ‘samānā hī’ etc., is only due to the unscientific nature of the commentary of Rāghavānanda. In this way, the ‘nyūnasamarpaṇa’ of Vacaspati is nowhere seen in the Pātañjalarahasya, and the importance of Vacaspati’s Tattvavaisāradi, at least as student’s guide to the Yogabhāṣya, cannot be denied.