Chapter V

SĀMKHYATATTVAKAUMUDI

Vācaspati's Sāmkhyatattvakaumudi,\(^1\) a commentary on the Sāmkhyakārikā of Iśvarakṛṣṇa, is one of the standard works in the available literature of the Sāmkhya philosophy.

The S.T.K. is comparatively an easy and small work of Vācaspati. Still it gives full information regarding everything that is essential to understand the text, treats of the topics with quite logical argumentation and advocates the theory in simple but forceful and attractive language. The Sāmkhyakārikā is known to have been commented upon by five ancient commentators including Vācaspati. The other four commentaries are -- (i) the Māthara Vṛtti by Māthara, (ii) the Yuktīdīpikā by an unknown author, who, according to the manuscript evidence is some Vācaspatimisāra (referred to in the first chapter), (iii) the Gauḍapāda-Bhāṣya by Ācārya Gauḍapāda, (iv) the Jayamangalā by Śaṅkarācārya or some Śaṅkarācārya, who is not definitely known.

With a view to pointing out, along with the critical appreciation, the importance of Vācaspati’s commentary in

\(^1\) It was edited for the first time in 1848, by Babu Rasamaya Datta (Calcutta Sanskrit Press). There are about ten editions available, of which, Dr. Ganganātha Jñā's translation along with an historical introduction with critical notes by Dr. Har Dutt Sarmā, published by the Oriental Book Agency, Poona, is more helpful.
comparison with other commentaries, a general review of the Tattvakaumudi is given here in short.

Vācaspati very aptly commences his work by saluting Puruṣa and Prakṛti — the characteristic peculiarities of the Sāmkhya philosophy. In the very first benedictory stanza, Vācaspati has practically alluded to the whole philosophy of the Sāmkhyas. He salutes Prakṛti, which is described as 'ajā' i.e. unborn, 'lohitāsuklakṛṣṇā' i.e. which is constituted of the three modes — sattva, rajas and tamas, and which gives rise to innumerable products. Vācaspati refers to Puruṣas — some of whom are hankering after Prakṛti who serves them; and others, having enjoyed the Prakṛti, leave the same. In this way, the idea of one non-sentient cause of the world, the idea of many Puruṣas and the concept of liberation, according to the Sāmkhyas, are alluded to in the benedictory stanza.²

Vācaspati then introduces the text, having justified the enquiry into the doctrines of the Sāmkhya philosophy. As a characteristic mark of his style, here also he puts forth as many alternatives as possible. This enquiry is intended to remove the three-fold pain. So, the enquiry would have been

² It should be noted that the scriptural passage —

अनामकं ठाडिकर्ममक्षुर्म भूतः प्रमा: समानो लोपाः।

ब्रम्ह इम्येष ज्ञात्स्वेच् तु ज्ञात्स्विता शास्त्रुपकालोऽश्च:॥

upon which this benedictory stanza is based, refers to one more Sāmkhya doctrine viz. the satkāryavāda, which has not been indicated here by Vācaspati.
unnecessary (i) if there existed no pain in this world or
(ii) although it existed if its removal were not desired or
(iii) even though it is desired, if its removal were impossible
or (iv) granting the possibility of its being removed, if the
subject-matter of the science were not the adequate means of
the removal of pain or (v) if at all there exists the possi-
bility of some easier means. But, none of these alternatives
commends to reason and it has been indicated that the enquiry
into philosophy, which is intended for the complete removal
of pain is necessarily to be resorted to, as the popular and the
Vedic means are not absolute and final.

Vācaspati curiously points out that although the word
'dukkha' at the very beginning of the first kārikā of Ṣvāra-
kṛṣṇa, is in itself inauspicious, yet the mention of the
extirpatory means as leading to its removal is auspicious.
Hence, the commencement of the treatise with this word is not
inappropriate.

While showing that the result of the Vedic actions is
unequal and hence leading to pain, Vācaspati uses a short but
effective sentence — परम्यतः उपायोऽनि हि हृदयभर्त पुरुषं दुःखास्तोति। ¹
(The greatness of the magnificence of one man is a source of
pain to another of lesser magnificence.) Vācaspati here has
appropriately made it clear that in the phrase 'avishuddhis-
yātiśayayuktah'² used by Ṣvārakṛṣṇa, the properties —

3 S.T.K., 1.
5 SK. 2.
'decay' (kṣaya) and 'inequality' (atiśaya) are attributed to the means; but in reality they belong primarily to the effect viz. the heaven etc., and only secondarily they are to be taken in connection with the means. Here lies the depth and necessity of Vācaspati's commentary. No other commentator has indicated this.

While commenting upon the third Kārikā, he gives the etymology of the word Prakṛti as — प्राकृतिः बिदित प्रकृतिः 6 and says that there would occur regressus ad infinitum if some other cause is sought for Prakṛti also. An important point observed by Vācaspati is that he makes clear the undesirability of the regressus ad infinitum in general. He says — न प्राकृतिः प्रामाणपूर्वती नाव। 7 Thus, Prakṛti is productive only and not itself a product. Buddhi, Ahamkāra and the five subtle primary substances are both productive and products as they are produced and have the capacity to generate the Mahābhūtas - etc. The eleven sense-organs and the five gross elements are merely products and not productive, as nothing is produced by them. Here also, Vācaspati very aptly observes that the five gross elements -- earth etc., although they do give rise to so many things like the jar and the tree, are designated as mere products and not as productive, because the products here are not different from their cause in their essence, in as much as, they have the common properties of grossness and perceptibility; and the productiveness of something different in essence, is meant by the term Prakṛti, in

6 S.T.K., 3
7 Ibid,
the Kārikā. This difficulty in understanding the text exactly, is neither called nor solved by any other commentator.

Vācaspati, before explaining the definition of inference, justifies the existence of the same, which has been strongly denied by the Cārvākas. The arguments are the same as are found in his N.V.T.T. 8 The way in which he classifies inference and explains it, is note-worthy as it quite differs from other commentaries. According to Vācaspati, inference is two-fold:— (i) Vīta — that which functions through affirmation, and (ii) Avīta — that which functions through negation. This Avīta or negative inference is called 'ṣeṣavat', which is defined by the Nyāya Bhāṣya of Vātsyāyana as प्रस्तुतप्रतिक्रिये बन्धग्रस्तः यथायमणे सम्प्रत्ययः परिलोकः. 9 i.e. the Seṣavat type of inference is that in which, with regard to an object, some of the possible properties are denied and as there is no possibility of their belonging to some others — the cognition of that which remains is arisen.

Again the Vīta — i.e. affirmative inference is two-fold — (i) Purvavat and (ii) Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa. Of these, the Purvavat is explained as 'Drṣṭasvalakṣaṇasāmānyavīṣayā' i.e. that which has got for its object that universal of which a specific individual has been perceived, e.g. when, from smoke, we infer universal fire of which a specific individual in the form of a particular fire has been previously perceived. The Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa is one whose specific individual, has not been

8 See Chap.IV, p.103
9 Vātsyāyanabhāṣya, I+15
perceived before e.g. the inference in regard to sense-organs.

It should be noted here that other commentaries explain these three kinds of inference differently. According to the Jayamangala, in the Pūrvavat type of inference, the object of inference has not yet come into existence; while the Śesavat type of inference is one which proves the object in the past; and the object of the Sāmānyatodrṣṭa inference exists at the time of inference. This interpretation does not materially change from the first interpretation given by Vātsyāyana.

Gauḍapāda, although agrees with the first interpretation of Pūrvavat and Sāmānyatodrṣṭa, given by Vātsyāyana, explains the Śesavat type of inference in a quite different way. He says -- कैलवन्तां कथादेः कपृत्व व्यवनायाय कैलवन्तां व्यवनायाय 

11 i.e. one, having found that a pala of water from the sea to be saltish, infers that the rest of the water is also saltish. The explanation given by Māthara is also the same. Gauḍapāda does not explain further these divisions.

This inference, as Iśvarakṛṣṇa says, (tallingalingipurvakam) is preceded by the linga and the lingin. As regards the interpretation of the phrase 'tallingalingipurvakam', Vācaspati adds one lingin more, and understands the phrase as 'tallingalingilingipurvakam'. 13 By 'linga', he

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10 On the 5th sk.
11 Gauḍapādabhāṣya, p.7.
12 S.K. 5.
13 S.T.K., 5.
means vyāpya or less extensive and by the first 'lingin'
vyāpaka or more extensive is meant. By the second 'lingin'
he understands that in which the linga is present or which is
technically called pakṣadharmatā. Very accurately, he points
out that by the word 'lingalingi', we have to take 'linga-
lingipratyaya', and thereby shows that the cognition of the
linga and the lingin precedes the inference, and not the linga
and the lingin themselves. In this way, Vācaspati, although
reading between the lines of the Kārikā, concludes that infer­
ence is that cognition, which is the result of the cognition
of the invariable concomitance between the sādhyā (Major term)
and the hetu (Middle term) and by the cognition of the
presence of the hetu in the pakṣa (Minor term). And in this
way, he makes the definition of inference, quite logical,
probably as a result of his being influenced by the Nyāya
system. On the other hand, Gauḍapāda has explained the term
not so satisfactorily, from the logical point of view. He
says that inference is sometimes 'lingapūrvaka' and sometimes
lingipūrvaka. That is to say, some inferences are based on
the linga or mark and some are based on the lingin or the
mark-bearer. But this is a mere division and cannot be a
logical definition. 14

It is interesting to note that the author of the
Jayamangalā 15 also agrees with the explanation given by

14 From the illustrations given by Gauḍapāda, it does not
seem to be correct to translate the words linga and lingin,
as Middle-term and Major term respectively, as Mm.
Gangānātha Jhā has done.
15 P. on the fifth sk.
Gaudapāda. Paramārtha's translation as reconstructed in Sanskrit by N. Aiyāswāmi Śāstri also favours the meaning of the term linga, which is accepted by Vācaspati, although it does not notice the detailed and scholarly explanation of the whole term lingalingipūrvakam, given by Vācaspati.

Before explaining the Šabdāramāṇa, Vācaspati has put forth the reason for the priority of inference over the Šabdāramāṇa or valid testimony. This is one of the characteristic features of Vācaspati's commentaries. No other commentator has taken pains to show why inference is first dealt with in the Kārikā. Vācaspati says that valid testimony presupposes inference, because the cognition of the connection between the word and its meaning, which is essential for the meaning of the word, is based on the inference — that the action of the directed person (prayojyayāddha) to bring the cow was due to his cognition of the sense of the words - gāmānaya - uttered by the directing person. That is to say, for the Šabdārtha-sambandha or the connection between the word and its sense, inference is necessary. Hence it has been dealt with first.

The validity of verbal testimony is self-evident, as there is no possibility of any defect, which makes human words unreliable. Vācaspati here assumes the apauruṣeyatva of the Vedas and does not try to justify it, as it has already been done in the Nyāyakaṇṭikā.

16 Suvarṇasaptati, p.q
17 See Chapter II, p.53.
Here again Vācaspāti reads between the line and refutes those who hold that valid testimony can be included under inference. He says that the word 'tu' in 'āptaśrutirāptavacanam tu', in the Kārikā distinguishes Sabdapramāṇa from inference. He then includes in these three viz. pratyakṣa, anumāṇa and śabda, other means of knowledge viz. upamāṇa, arthāpatti, abhāva, sambhava and aitihya, which are held by other systems of philosophy as separate pramāṇas. The upamāṇa and the aitihya are included in śabda, arthāpatti and sambhava in inference, anupalabdhi or abhāva in pratyakṣa.

Here, the commentary is so scholarly, especially when compared to Gauḍapāda's commentary on the Sāmkhyakārikā, that it deserves special mention. The exact argumentation for the inclusion of the rest pramāṇas in the accepted three, is found only in Vācaspāti's commentary. In this connection, it should necessarily be noted that Gauḍapāda has made a glaring mistake while saying that the Mīmāṃsakas accept six pramāṇas viz. arthāpatti, sambhava, abhāva, pratibhā, aitihya and upamāṇa. Here, no justification can help Gauḍapāda to hold that any Mīmāṃsaka admits these six pramāṇas. It is out of place here to see how to account for such an incorrect statement, on the part of Gauḍapāda.

As regards the interpretation of the phrase -- 'sāmānyatastu drṣṭāt', Vācaspāti, Jayamangalā, Gauḍapāda, and the Chinese translation -- all agree in taking it to mean

18 Gauḍapādabhāṣya, p.6.
'सामान्यतास्तु दृष्टा' — a type of inference. But there is one more possible interpretation of the phrase as is given by Nārāyaṇa, the author of the Cāndrīkā, a commentary on the Sāmkhyakārikā. He explains the words — 'सामान्यतास्तु दृष्टा' as 'सामान्यताः - साध्वारङ्गस्या वास्तुजातस्या प्रतितिः दृष्टात्र प्रतयाक्षात भावति...' i.e. the gross objects are known by perception and those which are imperceptible to sense-organs are comprehended through inference - etc. Thus, he takes सामान्यताः as सामान्यस्या. And this interpretation may be said to have been intended by Iśvarakṛṣṇa for the following two reasons. (i) It is quite reasonable to mention the functioning of all the admitted means of valid knowledge, which have been defined in the previous Kārikā. But according to the popular interpretation, the functioning of inference and valid testimony alone are pointed out and that of perception is altogether neglected. (ii) Moreover, the word 'तु' in 'सामान्यतास्तु दृष्टा' has absolutely no meaning and no force, if it is interpreted according to Vācaspati and others. Further, to mean a particular type of inference, the words सामान्यताः दृष्टा should necessarily be used together, without any intervention of another word like 'तु'. It can be said that for the sake of metre, 'तु', might have been used between 'सामान्यताः और दृष्टा'. But this sort of solution should be resorted to, only if there is no other alternative. On the contrary, the other interpretation is more natural, as it has been pointed out above. Also, it is not perfectly right to say

19 See foot note given by Har Dutt Sharma, in his S.T.K.'s ed. p.17.
that 'sāmānyato drṣṭa' inference alone gives rise to the
cognition of imperceptible objects. Hence, Vācaspati had to
remark that the 'Seṣavat' type of inference is also to be
included therein, on the authority of the word 'ca' in 'समादेवे
चारिन्तः परथासामाताश्च चिन्द्रभुः'. Vācaspati need not have
resorted to this farfetched implication of the word 'ca', had
he accepted the other interpretation of 'sāmānyastu drṣṭāt'.
All this above discussion compels one to reject the inter­
prediction accepted by Vācaspati and almost all other commen­
tators.

In the seventh kārikā, eight conditions, which are
responsible for the non-apprehension of existent things, are
enumerated. Vācaspati, on the authority of the particle 'ca'
includes one more cause of non-perception viz. non-manifesta­
tion. The curds, for instance, is not perceived in the milk
as the former has not become manifested. No other commen­
tator has suggested this.

Vācaspati, has, very ingeniously justified the use of
the matvarthīya termination in the word prasavadharma. He
says that instead of describing the pradhāna as prasava­
dharmā, the author of the kārikā describes it as prasavadharma
(i.e. with the matvarthīya termination), with a view to

20 S.T.K., 6.
21 बहिद्वदत्साहीम्माहार्दिन्यमाशामातान्मनोखत्सानात्।
त्यो सम्पादित्वानादिन्यमानाध्यात्मिरार्लः।
22 S.T.K., 11.
pointing out the constant character of the property of productiveness, as belonging to both the manifest and the unmanifest. If this sort of some special purpose is not understood, the use of the termination 'imnic' would be superfluous — the fact which would only suggest the slackness on the part of the author. Vācaspati alone has drawn attention to this.

As regards the interpretation of the line 'पुनःकालस
प्रातानसयं केवलार्य तथा प्राणानसयं', Vācaspati does not seem to be faithful to the author of the Kārikā. He construes it in this way — प्राणानसयं (कमीचि कटो) बतुतुत्तुत्तु दशंते दशंपुर। Obviously it looks far-fetched. Vācaspati seems to have resorted to this far-fetched construction, possibly because he thought it not wise to attribute kaivalya to the non-sentient pradhāna. But, in that, he seems to have overlooked the point that the author of the kārikā, himself, further declares without any hesitation that bondage and liberation belong to Prakṛti and not to Puruṣa. Whether it is logical or not, is altogether a different problem, which we have already dealt with. Gauḍapāda, on the other hand, attributes the darśana to Puruṣa and the Kaivalya to Pradhāna. This interpretation is more natural. Vācaspati, in order to be more logical, seems to have deviated from original. But, the force of the word 'tatha' in केवलार्य तथा प्राणानसयं, also indicates that Vācaspati's interpretation is an unnatural one.

23 Sk. 62
24 S.T.K., 62.
Vācaspati then simply elucidates the Kārikās without adding anything noteworthy. While explaining that the internal organ operates at all the three parts of time, Vācaspati refers\textsuperscript{25} to the Vaiśeṣika theory of time being one and hence admitting of no division like past, present and future. Vaiśeṣikas had to attribute these divisions to some adventitious conditions. But, Vācaspati points out that according to the Sāṅkhya-cāryas, there is no need of postulating any separate entity like time, as the purpose to be served by it can be very well served by the upādhis or accidents, which are to be accepted even by the Vaiśeṣikas.

While elucidating the more technical and non-philosophical topics like error, disability, contentment and perfection, with their sub-divisions, Vācaspati gives\textsuperscript{26} two interpretations of the five forms of perfection. These five siddhīs, in the order in which they are mentioned in the Kārikā, are as follows:— (i) Ōha (ii) Śabda (iii) Adhyayana (iv) Suhṛt-prāpti and (v) Dāna. Vācaspati first explains these in the following different order — (i) Adhyayana — This consists in reading philosophical texts with the teacher. This siddhi is also called 'Tāra'. (ii) Śabda — By Śabda, is implied the comprehension of the meaning of the texts studied. This is called 'Sutāra'. (iii) Ōha -- It means the reasoning, which is not inconsistent with scriptures, and which is employed for investigating the meaning of the Scriptures. This is nothing but the 'manana' or meditation which is otherwise

\textsuperscript{25} Ibid, 33.
\textsuperscript{26} Ibid, 51.
called 'Taratāra'. (iv) Suhrdprāpti or the acquisition of friends such as the proper teacher and fellow students, is essential to have confidence in our conclusions. This is called Ramyaka. (v) Dāna -- The last perfection 'dāna' means purity or discriminative knowledge and is designated as Sadāmuditā.

The other interpretation of these siddhis, pointed out by Vācaspati, as being held by some, is like this. (i) The Jha means the understanding of the ultimate principle without any instruction from others. (ii) to know the philosophical truth by listening to the texts of the Sāmkhya philosophy, read by another person, is called 'Śabda' as it follows solely from the verbal text. (iii) The success wherein the ultimate truth is obtained from the study of the words and the meaning of the Sāmkhya texts, from the teachers, is called adhyayana. (iv) When one attains knowledge from the contact with a friend, who has already achieved wisdom, the success is called 'Suhrdprāpti'. (v) And the last success viz. 'dāna' is not in itself the success or siddhi but only a means to it, as the jñānī, when propitiated by offering wealth etc. imparts knowledge.

This second interpretation is found in the Māthara-vṛtti, the Yuktidīpakā, the Gauḍapādabhāṣya and the Jayamangalā, while the first has not been recorded in any other commentary. So it seems that Vācaspati gave his own interpretation first and then just mentioned the other one, probably from the Jayamangalā, as has been pointed out by
Vācaspati, after noting down the second interpretation, remarks: 'भाष्य च नृक्तामुक्तल्लो पुर्रिमित्वं अबन्धल्लो, बिनि कृत परस्त्रास्मादायतने, न: विद्यायाध्यायायाः प्रगृहानाम् विनि।' 28 (i.e. the learned themselves should know which of these two is better and should be preferred to the other. We are not concerned with the pointing out of others' faults, as we intend only to elucidate the main tenets of the system). This remark of Vācaspati, which reveals his intention in commenting various texts, is further discussed in the concluding chapter.

After the technical discussion of the bhāvasarga (or the pratyayasarga) and the lingasarga (or the tanmātrasarga) Vācaspati has rightly shown, while commenting upon 'द्रुः प्राप्तेऽति केन् पुनः' 29 that pain - etc., although they belong to the Prakṛti, are said to be experienced by the sentient spirit, in as much as, the term Puruṣa literally means one, who lies in the subtle body, and the latter is connected with these qualities. The author of the Kārikā has not made this clear, and Vācaspati's explanation is quite essential, in order to be more logical and reasonable.

The creation of the world, according to the Sāṃkhya, is brought about by Prakṛti. But in the Sāṃkhya-Kārikā, rival views in this connection are neither referred to, nor are they refuted. Vācaspati, while commenting upon the

27 Sāṃkhya Darśana Kā Itihāsa, p.356
28 S.T.K.,51.
29 SK.55.
words -- 'प्रकटिक्षेत ......अरम्भः',

takes the opportunity to indicate some rival views and to refute them in brief. He says that evolution is not produced by God, as He is inactive and creation necessarily presupposes an active agent. Brahman also cannot be said to be responsible for creation of the world, as no modification is possible in the case of Brahman, which is pure Consciousness. Nor can the creation be without any cause, as in that case, there would never be any evolution at all, or there would be no cessation of such evolution, once started, for want of any agent to stop it.

Vācaspati has mentioned and refuted these rival views, without entering into further details. He seems to have deliberately avoided to deal with the Vivarta theory further, and simply asserted that the Parināma or transformation being not possible in the case of Brahman, it cannot be the cause of creation.

Then some objections against Prakṛti as the cause of the world are refuted by Vācaspati, on the lines of the Kārikā. It seems that Vācaspati alludes, without any direct reference, to the Bhāṣya of Śamkarācārya on the Brahma-sūtras. He controverts the objection that even the flow of the milk is due to the superintendence of God and hence its activity does not contradict the general proposition that the control of sentient beings is necessarily to be admitted for the

30 Ibid, 56.
31 S.T.K., 56.
32 Ibid, 57.
action of non-sentient things. Vācaspati argues as follows: The activity of every sentient being presupposes selfishness or benevolence. But, neither of these can be pointed out in the case of the creation of the world. God, who is āptakāma or who has fulfilled all his desires can possibly have no motive in this creation. He cannot also create the world out of compassion, for, before the creation, there were no bodies, and hence there was no problem of the removal of others' pains, the desire for which (removal) is necessary for compassion. Further, if at all the creation of the world were out of compassion, God would have created only happy mortals and not mortals with variegated experiences. If the diversity in regard to the experiences of men be attributed to their past deeds, then there is no necessity of admitting any sentient controller, of such deeds. For, the mere absence of such controller would lead to the absence of any activity and as a consequence to the absence of the whole creation; and due to the non-existence of the very creation, there would be no pain at all and possibly there would be no ground for God's compassion. This is an ingenious argument against the Iśvaravādins which has not been advanced by Vācaspati even in the Bhāmatī, on the Vaiśャmyanaighṛyaīdhikaraṇa, where it was expected. The argumentation in the Bhāmatī, in this connection, would have more value, had this argument been referred to there, as being held by the Pūrvapakṣin.

33 It has been argued thus in the Brahmasūtras and the Bhāṣya of Ś. on them. II.ii.
As regards the knowledge of Ātman and the nature of Salvation, both the Advaita Vedāntins and the Sāmkhyas hold the same view. Vācaspati has explained very clearly the nature of the highest knowledge. The Kārikā merely says that the knowledge is in the form of — नाहिम, न मे and नाहिम. But the exact difference between 'Nāsmi' -- I am not and 'Nāham' -- Not I -- is not quite clear. The Jayamāngalā takes 'Nāsmi' to mean मदेकल्य सूक्ष्मजीवां नेतिंि' च तस्मिन् क्षामिः i.e. 'I do not exist in the subtle or the gross body' and the words 'Nāham', according to the Jayamāngalā, mean that 'I am not Prakṛti'. Thus, according to this interpretation, some words are to be taken as understood. Gauḍapāda is also not clear as regards the interpretation of 'nāsmi' and he curiously takes the word 'apariśeṣam' with 'nāham' and interprets as -- 'ahamkararahitam apariśeṣam' 'I am exempt from ego'. This way of interpreting is also not natural. Vācaspati, on the other hand, takes the expression 'nāsmi' to mean that Puruṣa is destitute of actions in general. He quotes the authority of grammarians, who hold that the roots 'kr', 'bhū' and 'as' signify action in general. Thus 'nāsmi' means 'I am not related to any action'. And what follows from this is meant by the expression 'nāham'. That is to say, when all actions are precluded from the Self, it follows that the Self is not the active agent of any action i.e. the active agency is also denied of the Self. Thus from two different points of view, the same argument is presented. About 'na me' there is no

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34 SK.64.
35 On 64th S.K.
difficulty, as it clearly means 'nothing belongs to me'. In this way, Vācaspati has explained more scientifically the expression 'nāsmi' and 'nāham' with subtle distinction.36

The last part of the section points out that this knowledge of the Self can possibly be secured in this life i.e. the body may exist due to former impressions, even after the attainment of perfect wisdom, which makes dharma and others, devoid of causal energy. In this connection is given the famous illustration of the potter's wheel, which, even after the cessation of the potter's action, continues for a while, on account of its previous speed. To support this view, Vācaspati has rightly quoted37 the authority of the Brahmāsūtras and the Chāndogyopaniṣat. The only point to be marked is that both -- the Brahmāsūtras and the Śruti, are quoted as if belonging to one category, with the remark -- 'tathā ca anuśrūyate'. Vācaspati, in the second Karikā, has explained the word ānuśravika etymologically to mean the Vedas. So, it is not justifiable to give two quotations -- one from the Brahmāsūtras and the other from the Upaniṣad, as if from one work.

The end of the work is quite in conformity with its beginning, as it was assumed in the beginning that the three-fold pain creates a desire for enquiry into the means of destroying the pain and the same has been called attention to

36 S.T.K., 64.
37 Ibid, 67.
As regards the Rajavartika referred to by Vacaspati in the concluding Karika, there is a good deal of controversy. As the topic has been dealt with in connection with the date-problem of Vacaspati, it is not discussed here.

The above discussion seems to be quite sufficient to have a general idea of Vacaspati's commentary and the evaluation of the same.

Here, some important doctrines in the Sāmkhya philosophy as expounded by Vacaspati, are summarised.

(I) The most important and fundamental doctrine of the Sāmkhya philosophy is the Satkāryavāda, which has been put forth by Vacaspati as follows.

Even before the operation of the cause, the effect does exist in the cause. The destruction of the cause which is a pure negation cannot be the cause of some existing entity. For, in that case, it would involve the absurd contingency of all things being produced at all places and at all times, as mere negation would be easily available everywhere. Further, it cannot be said with the Vedāntins, that the phenomenal world is only illusory, because we have no proof to deny its existence. Hence, the effect cannot be regarded as merely

38 S.K. 68
39 Chap.I, p.15
an illusory evolution. As regards the view of the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika viz. the non-existent effect is produced, it should be remembered that 'what is non-existent can never be the object of production.' A blue thing can never be made yellow by even a thousand artists. Even if it is accepted that existence and non-existence are only properties belonging to the jar, it cannot be denied that the object to which these properties belong, should necessarily be existent. So, the non-existence of the effect cannot be proved. Moreover, the fact that the cause produces the effect only when it is in relation with the latter, proves the existence of the effect even before the operation of the cause, because, there could be no such relation between the cause and the effect, if the latter were non-existent. If at all such a relation is not regarded necessary, then every effect would arise from every cause without any restriction. The objection that even though the cause and the effect are not related with each other, the cause will always produce that effect only for which it is efficient, and in this way there is no absence of restriction, does not stand to reason, because this efficiency is necessarily to be accepted as residing in the efficient cause, which operates upon that effect only, which is going to be produced from that cause. Otherwise, there would be the same confusion.

Lastly, because the effect is of the same essence as the cause, and as the cause is existent, the effect also must be existent, even before the operation of the cause.
Vācaspati has put forth some inferences to prove that the effect is non-different from the cause.

(1) The cloth is not different from the threads, because, it is of the same essence as the threads. An object which differs from another, is never of the same essence as the other. e.g. The cow and the horse -- as they are different from each other, none of them is of the same nature as of the other.

(2) The effect is not different from the cause, because, there exists the relation of upādāna and upādeya between them. Such relation does not exist between those things, which are quite different from each other. e.g. The jar and the cloth. And as this relation exists between the cause and the effect, they are not different.

(3) The cloth and threads are non-different from each other, because there is no connection and separation between them. Connection and separation are found only when two things are different.

(4) The fourth inference is that the cloth and threads are not different, because, the cloth does not contain any product, which makes its weight different from the weight of the threads constituting it i.e. because the weight of the cloth and the threads together is exactly the same. That is to say, if at all the threads and the cloth were entirely
different things, there should be double weight -- that of the cloth and of the threads. For instance, if two different things like pot and cloth are weighed together, the combined weight will be the weight of the pot plus the weight of the cloth. But that is not the case with the threads and the cloth. So, the cloth is non-different from the threads.

Vācaspati, after establishing the non-difference between the cause and the effect, points out that the effect is the cause itself arranged in a particular shape. He has rightly brought to notice that the difference in the purpose served by the cause and the effect, does not lead to the difference between the cause and the effect; because, one and the same thing can serve several purposes e.g. the fire serves the purpose of burning, cooking, and lighting. The fact that the particular purpose is served by the cause and the particular by the effect, does not establish the difference between them, because, the functions of the same things differ when they operate collectively and separately e.g. the sticks individually perform the function of indicating the path, and not that of carrying the palanquin, while collectively they carry the palanquin.

In this way, Vācaspati has very strongly refuted the possible objections against the Satkāryavāda of the Sāmkhyas.

(II) The Cause of the world:

Every effect in the world receives its qualities from its cause, e.g. the qualities of the cloth owe to the qualities
of the threads. For the same reason, the qualities viz. pleasure, pain and delusion belonging to the effect Mahat etc., must be originally belonging to their cause. Thus, the cause of all things, which is constituted of the above-mentioned three qualities and which is designated as Pradhāna or Avyakta, is necessarily to be admitted. Now, the logicians maintain that the cause of the world, accordingly proved, need not necessarily be the Avyakta, as the atoms, which are vyakta, can very well be treated as the cause of the world. But that is not admissible, as, according to the Satkārya theory, which has been explained above, the effect resides in the cause. Just as the limbs of a tortoise, which already exist in its body, come outside — become distinct; and when again they enter into its body, they become indistinct; in the same way, the effects reside in their indistinct form, in the cause. And the highest cause itself is not dissolved in anything else, because it would lead to the regressus ad infinitum. In other words, the effect, while entering into the cause, makes the latter indistinct. And for the same reason, the highest cause is nothing but Avyakta.

(III) Puruṣa:

Puruṣa or the Self as a sentient being is to be admitted as being different from the Avyakta and others, because, every collection is meant for something else. Avyakta and others are surely Sanghātas or Collections, as they are constituted of pleasure, pain and infatuation. And Puruṣa is not a Sanghāta or collection as He is destitute of
three modes. Moreover, in order to avoid the regressus ad infinitum, Puruṣa is necessarily not to be regarded as a Sāṅghāta or collection. The reason 'adhiṣṭhānāt' in the Kārikā to prove the existence of Puruṣa is explained\textsuperscript{41} by Vācaspati in a regular syllogistic form. -- Whatever is constituted of pleasure, pain and infatuation, is seen to be superintended by something else. e.g. Chariot etc. are superintended by the charioteer. This intellect etc. are also constituted of the above three modes and hence some adhiṣṭhātā should necessarily be admitted in their case. Further, there are things of enjoyment, which, quite logically presuppose the existence of some enjoyer, who is none but Puruṣa of the Sāṁkhya. Moreover, because the scriptures describe the Kaivalya or emancipation and the revered sages are inclined to attain that Kaivalya, there must be somebody -- the characteristic of which can be the Kaivalya, and as the state of Kaivalya cannot belong to the Buddhi etc. as they are never destitute of Sattva, Rajas and Tamas, He must be Puruṣa, who is, in reality, not related to the three modes.

We have to accept these Puruṣas as many in order to explain different births and deaths of different Puruṣas. Vācaspati very appropriately comments that the birth means the contact of Puruṣa with particular body, sense-organs etc. and no transformation of Puruṣa is meant there, as Puruṣa is not liable to any kind of transformation. For the same reason, the death means the abandoning of the body etc. and

\textsuperscript{41} Ibid, 17.
not the destruction of Puruṣa. If this plurality of Puruṣas is not admitted, when one Puruṣa is born, all would be born and births and deaths of different Puruṣas at different times cannot be reasonably justified. Different activities in different bodies also cannot be justified, in the absence of many Puruṣas.

This is, of course, a controversial point, whether the Sāmkhyas originally postulated the unity or the plurality of Souls. Gauḍapāda, while commenting on "tadviparītaḥ tathā ca pumān," says without any further comment that Puruṣa is one. The Sāmkhya Sūtras adopt plurality of Souls but justify the usage of skatva as referring to the generality of Souls.

The Mahābhārata clearly points out that according to the Sāmkhyas there are indefinite Puruṣas. Anyway, Isvara-kṛṣṇa, without any ambiguity, propounded the doctrine of plurality of Souls. Vijnānabhikṣu wants to reconcile both the views -- Puruṣaikatva and Puruṣabahutva. According to him, skatva or oneness lies in the non-different nature of Puruṣas. That is to say, all Puruṣas are of the same nature.

This Puruṣa, by nature, is not at all different from the all-pervading and nirguṇa Ātman of the Advaita Vedāntins.

42 SK.11
43 I.149; VI.45
44 अद्वैत प्रवचनासुप्रदेशः १२५६.२.
45 Sāmkhya-pravacanabhaṣya, p.124. [Sundara's 1st edition]
He is mere witness and not an agent. The fact that He is known as a Kartā or an agent, is mere illusion, which is caused by the juxtaposition of the sentient and the non-sentient. And, this juxtaposition of Puruṣa and Prakṛti is alone responsible for the creation of the world. Puruṣa is in no way related to bondage or emancipation. These and other qualities really belong to Prakṛti and are only secondarily used in regard to Puruṣa. Vācaspati makes this specifically clear as there is an apparent contradiction in the Sānkhyā-kārikā. In the fiftieth Kārikā, by the term 'Purusasya vimoksārtham' it is obviously meant that the mokṣa or emancipation belongs to Puruṣa; while in the sixtysecond Kārikā, qualities like bondage and emancipation are unambiguously denied of Puruṣa and are attributed to Prakṛti.

It may be pointed out here, that the idea of mokṣa and bandha was not logically thought over by the Sāmkhyas. It is all right that these bandha and mokṣa etc. cannot belong to Puruṣa as He is ever untransformable. But, that does not logically prove that these belong to Prakṛti, in reality. On the contrary, as Prakṛti is non-sentient, bandha and mokṣa cannot be attributed to Prakṛti. So, the only logical corollary in such circumstances, is to accept the Adhyāsa theory of the Advaita Vedāntins. That is to say, bandha and mokṣa, from the ultimate point of view, do not belong to either Puruṣa or Prakṛti. But, Puruṣa is wrongly understood to be baddha and mukta, due to beginningless Nescience.

It would have been better, had Vācaspati brought to
notice this fact which requires a comparative study. But, as Vācaspati's aim was only to elucidate the original texts from their own point of view, it seems that he did not enter into such problems of comparative study.

Finally before we conclude the chapter, a reference to Vijnānabhaṅga's difference from Vācaspati will not be out of place.

Prof. Dasgupta and Dr. Rādhākrṣan have shown that Vijnānabhaṅga in his interpretation of Sāmkhya, differed on many points from those of Vācaspati. According to them, Vijnānabhaṅga alone explained the guṇas or constituents definitely, while Vācaspati and other commentators on the Sāmkhya remained silent on the topic. Vijnānabhaṅga described the guṇas as reals or super-subtle substances — the description which fits in well with all that is known of the guṇas.

Another difference between Vācaspati and Vijnānabhaṅga is that according to the latter, the sense-organs can directly perceive the determinate qualities of things without any intervention, whereas Vācaspati ascribes to mind the power of arranging the sense data, in a definite order and making the indeterminate sense determinate. Prof. Dasgupta has observed that the first stage of cognition, according to Vācaspati, is the stage when indeterminate sense-materials are presented;

46 History of Indian Philosophy, Vol.I, p.223
at the second stage there is assimilation, differentiation and association by which the indeterminate materials are ordered and classified by the activity of mind, called samkalpa which co-ordinates into determinate perceptual and conceptual forms as class notions with particular characteristics. Vijnānabхику has assigned a subordinate position to mind as only the faculty of desire, doubt and imagination.

One more point of difference between Vācaspati and Vijnānabхику has been suggested by Prof. Dasgupta, and it is difficult to agree with the learned professor. According to the professor, there is a difference of view between Vācaspati and Vijnānabхику as regards the evolution of the 'tanmātrās' from 'mahat'. He observes that Vācaspati holds that from mahat, there was ahamkāra and from ahamkāra, tanmātras are produced; while Vijnānabхику maintains that both the separation of ahamkāra and the evolution of the tanmātras take place in mahat.

But to our great surprise, Vijnānabхиku in his Sāmkhyapravacanabhāṣya has clearly put forth his view as follows. प्रकृतिः कार्योऽमहवा, महत्त्वम् अहमकारस्य कार्ये... विज्ञानभिक्षु also shares the view that admits the evolution of the tanmātras from ahamkāra and that of ahamkāra from mahat. There is

49 "And this view," says Professor Dasgupta, "has been followed by him." Ibid, p.
absolutely no doubt as regards this; and thus this process is the same as has been held by Vācaspati and there is no difference of opinion between Vācaspati and Vijnānabhiṣkṣu in regard to the evolution of the tanmātras.

Vijnānabhiṣkṣu's differences with Vācaspati, wherever they are of vital importance, are only due to the fact that the former in all his commentaries intended to have reconciliation of different orthodox systems like the Vedānta, Sāṃkhya and Yoga. Any way, the importance of Vācaspati's Tattvakaumudī, in understanding the Sāṃkhya philosophy, especially the Sāṃkhya-kārikā of Isvarakṛṣṇa cannot be denied after a careful perusal of it.

51 e.g. Puruṣaikatva.