The concept of alamkāra

We cannot trace precisely the origin and chronology of literary criticism. There are a number of ancient literary critics who exist only in name without any extant work to their credit. Among the extant works of early literary criticism we cannot fix a chronological order. Consequently we adopt a different device to arrange these works on literary criticism in a formal order. We assume the figure of speech to be its starting point as it has been discussed in one and all the works on literary criticism and this unbroken tradition is a proof of its being starting point and common denominator of Sanskrit literary criticism. In Sanskrit, the figure of speech is called alamkāra. It is a general term like any common noun. The question does arise whether all the figures of speech possess some common property. If it is so what is the exact nature of that common property and how does it affect the basic character of a literary expression. The etymological meaning of the term alamkāra is decoration or ornament. In poetry, it means those factors which enhance the beauty of poetry and as such these rhetorical devices like anuprāsa, upamā, etc. are commonly signified by the term alamkāra. In this sense the term alakāra stands as more or less a synonym of Rhetorics. But the term has a wider sense only. It covers the major part of what we call poetics and aesthetics today. It is in this wider sense that the expressions like Alamkāra-
śāstra or Kāvyālāmākāra are used. The wider meaning of the term is grace or beauty and Alamkāraśāstra is the 'science of beauty' in poetry. The ancient rhetoricians like Bhamaha, Rudrāta, etc. applied the term in this particular sense and named their works after this; of course, the term was limited to the entire assemblage of rhetorical ornaments as means of poetic expression. In other words, the term alamkāra has a double phase of meaning. In general sense it connotes the principle of beauty in poetry, but in particular sense it stands for the collective designation of all figures of speech. The concept of alamkāra from the modern standpoint will be discussed later on under the caption - Jagannātha's concept of alamkāra. First we shall discuss the development of the concept in the works of preceding authors.

Ancient rhetoricians like Bhāmaha and Dandin in their quest for poetic beauty discovered the principle of alamkāra and the study of poetry itself came to be named after this principle. Bhāmaha, in his Kāvyālāmākāra (1.13) applies the term alamkāra to mean the figures of speech like rūpaka, upama, etc. There he says that a poetic expression like a damsel's face, though beautiful does not shine if it be devoid of ornament. According to P. V. Nagasastry, this statement of Bhāmaha invites reference to the view of one school according to which the beauty of a Kāvyā consists in its rasa which results from the meanings of the words. So alamkāras that are related to meanings may bring beauty of rasa but those related to sound fail to do so. Bhāmaha, however,

1. Dr G. S. Tripathy, Principles of Literary Criticism in Sanskrit, p.29.
2. Dr De, Some Problems of Sanskrit Poetics, p.6.
uses the term 'vakrokti' as the collective designation of all alamkāras and according to him, this is the underlying principle of alamkāras which brings beauty to poetry.⁴ Dandin, however, defines it as the characteristic attributes producing beauty in poetry.⁵ Thus Dandin's conception of alamkāras is nothing but the poetic beauty which is called by Vāmāna saundarya. In its comprehensive connotation he also includes guṇas like ślesa etc. which are the life of Vādāryā rīti.⁶ Thus he makes the concept of alamkāra a wide one to accommodate other concepts in it.⁷

Vāmāna has thrown much light on the concept of alamkāra. He defines it thus - saundaryām alamkāraḥ (1.1.2). His conception of alamkāra has definitely a wider scope like that of Dandin. According to him it is the charm that makes a poem beautiful. So he says in his vṛttis - alamkṛtiralamkāraḥ/ karaṇabyutpatyā pūṇāralamkārasabdoyamupamādisu vartate (1.2.11). Thus he is using the term 'both as an abstract noun denoting embellishment and possessing a vast enough scope, and a noun signifying the means of embellishment.⁸ It is evident that alamkāra is the beautiful in poetry. It is a comprehensive term embracing all the elements of beauty of poetry within its scope. So he says that poetry is accepted for alamkāra and in his view both guṇas and alamkāras fall in the vast scope of beauty. But obviously there is a big gap of this idea of Vāmāna with his other statement - 'rītirātma kāvyasya'. Just as in ancient Greek Philosophy

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5. Kāvyādārsa, 2.1.
6. Kāvyādārsa, 2.3.
8. ibid., p.187.
a distinction has been drawn between the form and matter, so in Vāmana's work, a distinction separates alaṅkāras, gunas, etc. from riti. Riti is the very soul of poetry, that is, it imparts life to poetry. A dead body loses all its charms if the soul departs from it or is devoid of it. Similarly, a poem having all requisite elements which enhance its beauty, namely figures of speech, excellent properties known as gunas and so on, will be bereft of all its charm if it has no riti, that is, it is disproportionate. He means to say that an excess of figures of speech or excellent properties (gunaś) do not contribute to its worthy designation of a poetry. A proportionate use of them is the sole criterion of the inclusion of a particular piece of metrical composition in the class of poem. Hence we can assert firmly that Vāmana is both a critic of Dandin and Bhāmaha and a promulgator of the new norm of poetry.

A closer study of these views of ancient critics would make it sufficiently clear that these critics forshadowed the underlying principle of beauty behind different figures of speech and it is this principle which distinguishes poetry from the science (śāstra) and ordinary speech. Poetry is not a discourse, it is a revelation. So the language of a poet is something different not only from common speech but also from scientific discourse. This distinguishing principle has been named as vakrokti or atisāyokti (striking expression or hyperbolic expression). Figurative speech is a kind of flowery or exaggerated expression for the sake of great effect of beauty in poetic expression. "Beauty is first vaguely felt by the appreciative reader; then he succeeds in characterising his feeling in terms of qualities like
sweetness or brilliance, after a more sustained intellectual efforts at explaining it, he will be led up to the perception of vakrokti which can be analysed in term of one figure or another. Taking this principle of beauty underlying all figures of speech, Kuntaka develops his peculiar theory of vakrokti which he considers to be soul of poetry. We have already discussed the very standpoint of Kuntaka. But as he is a misleading literary critic to an ordinary reader he deserves a special discussion. I hope the readers will excuse my repetition of ideas, if any, in view of the peculiar concept of vakrokti taught by him. Bhamaha, Dandin and Vāmana have not made any attempt at a wider generalisation of guṇa, rīti, alāmākāra, etc. Kuntaka is a gifted thinker having more powerful analytical mind. He discovers a common element which is shared by guṇa, rīti, alāmākāra, etc. This common element is only revealed to the mystic intuition (kavipratībhā) of a poet. When this common element is expressed in language, it is called vakrokti. It is just like a mould which shapes all thinking process of a poet. To say more exactly, it is the very frame of mind of a poet. All guṇas, rītis and alāmākāras are the invariable outcome of the poet's mind. This mind knows to select words and arrange them in definite orders which we call either guṇa or rīti or alāmākāra. Everything is done in the unconscious mind of the poet. This peculiar expression of the form of the poetic mind is called vakrokti. This vakrokti should not be confused with the figure of speech known as vakrokti of the other rhetoricians. In a nutshell, this vakrokti is the stamp with

which all creations of a poet are marked. His conception of alamkāra is based on this theory of vakratā and he uses the term vakrokti to comprehend in its scope the entire concept of alamkāra. His concept of alamkāra almost tallies with its definition given by Prof. Bain who defines it thus — 'A figure of speech is a deviation from the plain and ordinary mode of speaking for the shake of greater effect: it is an unusual form of speech.'¹⁰ Kuntaka, however, says that it is the vaicitra or strikingness, peculiar to each composition and resting on the imaginative faculty of the poet, makes up alamkāra. He does not consider the figures of speech to be something outward decoration, they are the intrinsic part and parcel of poetic expression.

Much before Kuntaka we have Ānandavardhana who visualised the concept of alamkāra as a beautifying principle to accommodate it in his novel theory of Dhvani. He also does not consider the figures as superfluous; in a good poetry, it is an integral part of the poetic thought itself. 'Effective expression is the epiphany of the poet's feeling and it is the figurative speech.'¹¹ So Ānandavardhana has given stress on two aspects of alamkāra — rasākṣiptatā and aprthakhyatnanirvartyatā. Figures of speech should suggest the feeling; it must be realised naturally and for them, the poet should not make a separate endevour for the effective realisation of it. In a good poetry, the sabda and artha which constitute the body of poetry become the essence of alamkāra and help in the realisation of rasa itself. So Ānandavardhana says

¹⁰ Quoted by Krisna Chaitanya in his Sanskrit Poetics, p. 79.
¹¹ Krisna Chaitanya, Sanskrit Poetics, p. 89.
Ik that alamkāras do not constitute outward limb of the body which is separate from the soul.¹² According to Dr R. C. Dwivedi, the true test of alamkāras is beauty only and then they become identical with dhvani itself.¹³

Some ancient writers like Visvanātha and Mammaṭa considered the poetic figures as mere ornaments to be added or removed at will. Dhvanikāra has established beyond doubt that they are the natural expression of emotion. External view of alamkāra has been substituted by Dhvanikāra as an integral part. The penetrating mind of Ānandavardhana has been able to discover that some figures of speech that were noticed in a good poem, have been woven into its very structure. They can never be detached from them without marring their beauty. Alamkāra is the vivid image of poetry and can be felt and explained in terms of common speech. Words come to the poets with all the colours and richness as felt by the poet in experience. As Dr P. S. Sastry puts it - 'They carry with them a profound depth and intensity of feeling and thought and thus couch themselves into the forms of epithet. Every epithet in poetry is an image or a figure by itself.'¹⁴ Understood in this sense, alamkāras become the natural language of the poet with the touch of poetic genius. It is through them that a poet makes his experience intelligible.

Jagannatha's conception of alamkāra

The Alamkāra school headed by Bhamaha, Rudrata etc. is the oldest of all groups of school in Sanskrit poetics. Before

¹². Vides, Vritti on Dhanyaloka. 2.16.
Jagannātha, this school was sufficiently debated and the New school headed by Ānandavardhana took up seriously the case of dhvani or vyājanā as the highest aesthetic principle and considered the rhetorical figures and excellences at accidental property in poetry. Standing on the theory of Dhvani of Ānandavardhana, Abhinavagupta carried the principle of Dhvani and had given the supreme position to Rasa as the life principle in poetry which was grounded on psychological basis. Thus the Dhvani school not only established the principle of suggestion but also worked up and rationalised it into a synthetic and comprehensive system all accumulated ideas of ālmākāra, rītī, gunā etc. of his predecessors.

While Jagannātha also recognised the supreme importance of rasa and dhvani and particularly of the rasa–dhvani, he did not minimise the general importance of ālmākāra, or poetic figures. It is true that ālmākāras are translated as mere figures of speech, but in reality something more essential belongs to them. It is the poetic genius which is at the root of the artful use of poetic figure and so poetic activity is a deliberate departure from the ordinary mode of expression. Viewed from this angle, ālmākāras are not mere rhetorical categories but they contribute to the very essence of poetic beauty. Paṇḍitarāja's appraisement gives a proper status to the figures of speech in their role of supplementing the beauty in a poem. 'He believes that gunas and

15. Āvāṁ paṇcātmakāṁ dhvānaḥ paramarāmaṁīyatayā rasadhvanestadhātmā rasastābadabhidyayate. (Rasagangādhara, p.25).
alamkāras, particularly arthālāmikāras, pertain to Kāvyā in their own right and directly contribute to aesthetic delectation and do often reinforce the suggestive function for ennobling poetry.16 Thus he recognises the definite role of alamkāras in supplementing aesthetic enjoyment which is arrived at by suggestion. Thus, rasa, dhvani and alamkāra are not contradictory concepts; they are inseparably intermingled with the very notion of poetry. In aesthetic expression, figures of speech are not superfluous; they are the limbs or organic members of a unity.

His conception of alamkāra is related to the very notion of poetry itself. According to him ramanīyata (poetic beauty) is the test or criterion of it. Unlike the Dhvani theorists, he does not hold the view that words and their meaning should always be suppressed or subordinated to anything. Poetry is an aesthetic expression where word and meaning are like the two sides of a paper inseparable from each other. Both form and content form one unifying whole. In fact, it is the charmingness in poetry that counts ultimately. Jagannātha has denoted this feature of alamkaaras by various terms like ramanīyatā, camatkāritva, hrdayatva etc. Behind the creation of alamkāra, it is the poetic fancy that works. Poetic imagination has a magic power which bestows upon common expression a kind of strikingness which ultimately brings aesthetic joy to the reader's mind. And it is for this noble feature that alamkāras used by poets. Panditarāja has stressed upon this aspect of alamkāra many times, though, he

cannot claim any originality for it. In the history of Sanskrit criticism, the concept of charmingness or beauty underlying all figurative modes of expression is not something new. Ruuyaka in his commentary on the Vyaktiviveka states that the charm or beauty of sound and sense is alamkāra.17 Traces of the same idea can be seen in some of the rhetoricians older than Ruuyaka himself. Dr De, in his introduction to the Vakroktijīvīta has dealt elaborately how the idea of beauty in figure of speech originated by Kuntaka was developed by later writers like Ruuyaka, Appaya Dīksita and Jagannātha. To avoid mere repetition we refrain from discussing this topic further.

Presumably, Paṇḍitarāja’s four-fold classification of poetry is based on the very conception of alamkāra itself. On the basis of the criterion applied in the case of alamkāra, he has classified poetry into four varieties. But the most striking feature of his conception of alamkāra is that he attaches a wider connotation to it and obviously goes to say that ancient rhetoricians like Bhamaha, Udbhata, etc., included the suggestion in paryāyokta (aparamā sarbopī vyangaprapanchaḥ paryayoktakau niksiptaḥ, RG, pp.554). However, this view of the ancient rhetoricians is quite contradictory to that of Anandavardhana who holds that Dhvani is a mahāvisaya (wide principle) and it cannot be included in paryāyokti; rather it can be included in Dhvani (cf. paryāyokte pi yadi prādhānyena vyangyatvat tadbhabatu nāma tasya dhvanavantrbhāvah/ na tu dhanestatrantarbhābah/ tasya mahāvisay-  

yatven ca pratipādayisyamānatvāt/ – Dhvanyāloka, p.118). Jagannātha’s indirect support to the view of the ancient ālamkārikas indicates the fact that he had a definite predilection for ālamkāras. But he insisted that they must be conducive to beauty (RG, 203). In his analysis, they are not confined to individual parts of a poem but are the life principle of the poem as a whole.

Dr De remarks that Jagannātha established the theory of ālamkāra beyond doubt which was originated and elaborated by Kuntaka and Ruyyaka.18 In fact, Panditarāja has stressed that vicātī or beauty is the test of poetic figures and it is on the basis of poetic beauty that figures of speech are distinguished in point of their individual characteristics. Aesthetic beauty underlying all figures of speech is a form of poetic imagination itself in relation to the poetic production (cf. sa hi janyatāsamsargena kavi-pratibhābīsah, RG, p.632). Viewed from this point of view, the figure of speech forms the integral part of aesthetic expression and cannot be rejected as unnecessary factor in making their way into poetry. On the other hand, they are the answers to the need felt by the artist in rendering his experience intelligible.

Number of ālamkāras

The number of ālamkāras treated by different rhetoricians has never been a fixed one. It is increasing in course of time. Generally, there is a steady growth of their number together with their subdivisions in the hands of successive writers on poetics.

While Bharata who treats them merely as a formal part of the poetic representation mentions only four alamkāras, the number grows enormously and in Appayadīksita's Kuvalayānanda, we get 115 alamkāras. This is quite natural, because poets in different times have created various new alamkāras by virtue of their creative imagination. Daṇḍin has rightly remarked that even to-day they are being speculated upon and so nobody can enumerate them in their entirety. Ruyyaka also stresses the same point when he declares that beauty is alamkāra and it is not possible to define beauty, as it is of infinite variety arising out of the boundlessness of poetic imagination. The philosophy and grammar schools have their influence in the formation of many alamkāras. Thus, the ālamkārikas display their skill in finding out new type of charmingness in the existing common term of expression and consequently their number increases in the hand of successive writers. Śrī Madhusudan Sastri has tried to give exact number of poetic figures treated by different writers in his introduction to his Rasagangādhara (pp.69-75). Ruyyaka has given a systematic classification of figures of speech and has treated them lucidly. Our Panditarāja follows the list of Ruyyaka in the serial arrangement of the poetic figures; but suddenly in the middle of the discussion on uttarālamkāra, he breaks away. However, Jagannātha's treatment of alamkāras is a crowning success of his glory as an aesthetician. MM. Giridhar Sharma Chaturvedi rightly says that without studying the Rasagangādhara, nobody can have a clear grasp of what is alamkāra.

19. te cādyāpi vikalpyante kāstān kāṭapena baksati
    Kāvyādarsa 2.1.
20. Dr De, History of Sanskrit Poetics, II, p.23.
21. Vide, his Introduction to the RG.
Poetic figures of Jagannātha

Jagannātha has dwelt with a large number of poetic figures in his Rasagangādhara. His treatment is very vast and it is impossible to discuss them within a chapter, because the scope of the subject demands a separate volume on it. Here we shall only try to give a rough idea of Jagannātha's conception of alamkāras thereby making an assessment of his contribution to this most important topic of Sanskrit poetics. Avoiding the minute details of each and every alamkāra we shall confine ourselves to a few only, to illustrate the broad principles of his technique. In his discussions of some alamkāras, Punditarāja has shown his constructive faculty and in some others he has shown his critical and sometimes iconoclastic acumen. We shall discuss here two or three examples of each of these and conclude the chapter.

Upama: Jagannātha first discusses this alamkāra. This alamkāra is very old and represents the oldest phase of growth of them in Sanskrit poetics. It is the basis of most of the alamkāras and so Rājasēkhara calls it as crest jewel and the essence of poetry. Appaya Dīksita says just at the beginning of his treatment of Upama -

\[
\text{upamaikā, sailusi samprāpta citrabhumikan/}
\text{ranjay, kavyarange nṛtyantī taḍvidām cetaḥ}/
\]

Kumari S. S. Janaki\textsuperscript{22} has shown that he had borrowed this idea from Vidyacakrāruvartin, the great commentator of Alamkāra Sarvasva. Jagannātha also accepts this figure as the basis of huge number of

\textsuperscript{22} Alamkāra Sarvasva of Ruyyaka, Introduction, p.58.
poetic figures and defines it thus -

'sādṛṣṭam' sundaram vākyārthopaskāram upamālamkṛtīm.'

'The beautiful resemblance which renders the sense of a sentence charming is upamā.' Panditārāja explains the definition by stating that the word 'saundarya' means camatkāra (charmingness) which is, again, a kind of aesthetic joy experienced by the connecssiers. The most important element in upamā is sādṛṣṭa which is charming. Thus, sādṛṣṭa which excites aesthetic joy and makes the sense of a sentence beautiful is called upamā. This characteristic of upamā precludes it from ananvaya where resemblance or sādṛṣṭa has its necessity only to show that the object compared has no other standard of comparison but itself and as such it is not a charming one. In Vyätireka, beauty lies in negation and though resemblance is shown with an object which is negated, it is secondary and is not charming at all. In abhedapradhāna alāmākāras like rūpaka, apahnuti, pariṇāma, bhrāntimāna and in bhedapradhāna alāmākāras like dṛṣṭānta, prativastūpamā dīpaka etc. there is resemblance at their root. But they do not possess any charmingness and so they cannot be equated with upamā. In pratīpa and upameyopamā, there is resemblance and it is charming also. But they are not fundamentally different from upamā. Their origin lies in upamā itself.

Upamālamkāra is illustrated by the verse -

guru janabhaya-madvilokanāṁtahsamudāyadūkālabhavāṁ
āvahantyāḥ/
daradaladaravinda sundaram hā harinādrśo nayanam na
vismarāmi//
Here the word 'lotus' with petals open is the standard of comparison and the word sundara signifying beauty is the common attribute. These two words have entered into a compound. Here love in separation is the main import of the sentence and reminiscence is a part of it. The beautiful resemblance of the eye with a lotus has rendered the sense of the sentence charming and so, it is an illustration of upamā. Criticizing the stand that smṛti is the main suggested sense, Pandītarāja says that it has been explicitly stated there is absence of smṛti and this has been expressed by 'na vismarāmi'. Nor can it be said that the sense of union of 'fear' and anxiousness is mainly suggested here. It is a qualifying adjunct of the heroine and also is a part of remembrance, and so bhāvasandhi cannot be the main import of the sentence. Thus both bhāvasandhi and upamālāmākāra have helped the vipralambhaśṛngāra and this is the main sense of the sentence.

Thus, establishing the faultlessness of his definition, Pandītarāja criticises the definition of his predecessors. Though his main target of attack is Appaya Diksita, he also criticises the definition of Vidyānātha, Mammata and others. Appaya gives two definitions of upamā in his Citraśīlsā:

1. Upamā is the description of similarity which culminates in comparison, and the description must be both free from any defect and different from any suggestion.

2. Upamā consists in the description of a similarity not resulting in its own negation.
Criticizing both the definitions, Panditarāja maintains that the description may be expressed through some particular words or it may be a kind of cognition. It cannot be expressed by words and so it cannot be an arthālāmākāra. Again, Panditarāja points out, description cannot be a suggested one and as such, the adjunct 'avyangyam' in the definition becomes meaningless. If the definition is modified to mean that similarity which becomes the object of description, then the sentence like 'yathā gaustathā gavayah' will have to be accepted as the instance of upamālāmākāra. Again it may be asserted that description means only those poetical descriptions which are charming and in the instance cited above though there is comparison, it is not charming and as such it does not come under the category of upamā. Jagannātha accepts this argument but raising his objection, he states that the adjunct in the definition namely, 'upamitikriyanispattimat' becomes superfluous, since camatkārakāritva is to be inserted in the definition. To be the source of camatkṛti, a similarity must be well-founded; a superficial similarity cannot arouse any camatkṛti in the mind of the hearer. Criticising the second definition of Appaya, Panditarāja states the epithet nisedhaparyavasāyi in the definition is superfluous. This is, however, is used to distinguish upamā from vyatireka and ananvaya. In vyatireka the description of similarity has its utility in the negation of some objects like lotus etc., and in ananvaya, it serves the purpose of negation of any similar objects. While similarity is the main source of charmingness in upamālāmākāra, the element of negation is considered as that in these two figures of speech. Again, Jagannatha points out that these two definitions are defective so
as to cover the instance like -

stanābhoge patanbhati kapoātkuṭilo' lakah/
sasānpavimbato merau lambämāna evoragah/

where upamā is the chief concept (mukhya vākyārtha), but not an alāṃkāra. According to Jagannātha, an alāṃkāra always enhances the beauty of the chief concept. So this definition of Appaya is defective since it includes within its scope those instances which are not actually alāṃkāras. Further, Paṇḍitarāja maintains that the use of the word sādṛṣya in the definition is meaningless, since 'upamitikriyāniśpatimadvarnamamupamā' itself will serve the purpose.

Another noteworthy feature of Jagannātha's treatment of alāṃkāra is his discussion on verbal cognition in the alāṃkāra section of his Rasagangadhara. While dealing with this aspect of alāṃkāra, Paṇḍitarāja has shown his mastery over method of discrimination and critical judgment, which has its origin to his new mode of dialectical approach. Let us examine the process of verbal cognition of upamā -

A sentence containing such particles like 'iva' etc. denotive of resemblance or similar other relation has a special import. The import of the sentence has been expressed in the technical language of the modern Indian Logic. The import of the sentence has become very accurate but too difficult for the general readers. In other words, to present the niceties of such import before the general readers we shall try to express at a certain length the meanings of the words - their syntactical relation and relational structure of the meanings of the other
words contained in a sentence along with the meaning of the particular word. In this context we must point out that grammarians differ from the logicians with regard to the import of a sentence. The rhetoricians generally are subscribers to the views of the grammarians. So the standpoint of the grammarians will be our first concern. Now let us take an example - 'A face is beautiful like a lotus.' The corresponding Sanskrit sentence is 'arabindamiva sundaram mukham'. The particle 'iva' corresponding to English proposition 'like' denotes resemblance (sādṛśya). Resemblance is a relative term. It is like the relation of resemblance holding between two terms mentioned in the modern Western Mathematical Logic. In Indian Logic, resemblance behaves like relation though it has not been included in the class of relations. It proceeds from an object and moves towards another object in order to reside there. Here in the example mentioned above the resemblance proceeds from the lotus and moves towards the face in order to reside there. Now, why does this resemblance come into being in the world of facts? Beauty is the determinant of this resemblance. Thus the relation of the determinant and the determined holds good between beauty and resemblance. Thus the import of this sentence is this - the resemblance which proceeds from a lotus is caused (determined) by the beauty which finds its lotus in the face. In other words, the possessor of such beauty is identical with the face. The meaning of the particle 'iva' is resemblance. This meaning does never re-connect itself with the meaning of the case-ending. This meaning is connected with the meaning of a word directly by such relation which conveys difference of resemblance from the meaning of the word. Moreover, it should also be noted here that
the meaning of 'iva' viz., resemblance may be related to the meaning of a word as a qualifying adjective or as a substantive. A parallel case may be cited in this connection admitted in Sanskrit literature and grammar. The meaning of a negative particle 'na' is not directly related to the meaning of a case-ending but it is related to the meaning of a word directly both as an qualifying adjective and a substantive. Let us give an example - 'ghatah pato na' a jar is possessor of such a difference which proceeds from a piece of cloth. Now in Sanskrit language, it is put like this - 'patapratiyagikabhedabān ghatah', 'bheda' stands for difference. It is both a noun (substantive) and adjective. Pata qualifies 'bheda' by such a relation as holds between a negative fact and term negated. This difference (bheda) rests upon 'ghaṭa', therefore, qualifies it. So it is an adjective in relation to a jar but a substantive with regard to 'ghaṭa'. Similarly resemblance is adjective-cum-substantive. This double aspect of resemblance has been expressed in the import of a sentence 'aśabindamiva sundaram'.

Now let us take another sentence - 'arabindamiva bibhāti' - it shines like a lotus. In this sentence resemblance which proceeds from a lotus qualifies the meaning of the verb. Here the meaning of the verb plays an important role in the philosophy of the grammarians. The meaning of the verb is conveyed as a substantive and then resemblance qualifies such a substantive. Let us clearly state positions of the grammarians. When we grasp the import of the sentence 'arabindamiva bhāti', shining draws our first attention and flashes before our mind as the substantive element; that is the most important factor of the sentence.
The other terms hinge upon it as subordinate factors. This shinning which draws our first attention is the centre of our knowledge. They mean to say that the sentence is intended to convey shinning as the most important thing. Now we are to find out how this shinning has been so prominent. So in order to explain its prominence, 'resemblance' qualifies it and this resemblance is not an ordinary resemblance as it proceeds from lotus. Now if another word 'by beauty' (Saundaryena) is added to the sentence then the meaning of the third case-ending implies each determining character of the meaning of the word to which it is attached. Determination, which is meant by the third case-ending is syntactically related either to the shinning or to resemblance. Let us give the full import of the complete sentence - 'It shines like a lotus by virtue of its beauty'. The meaning of the phrase 'by virtue of' is equivalent to that of the 3rd-case ending. Beauty determines either shining or resemblance. 'It shines like a lotus because of its beauty or it is looking like a lotus because its beauty shines.' Any of these two imports have been suggested by Jagannatha. 'He goes like an elephant; 'the bird sings like a cuckoo' - such sentences communicate their import better if the standpoint of the logician is adopted. Here the resemblance denoted by the term 'iva' is not related to the meaning of the verb 'gain' or ru (rauti), but it is related to the agent of the root 'gain' or 'ru' (sing). The import of the sentence is this - He possesses such inner activity which leads to his external motion which resembles the slow and majestic gait of an elephant.
Rūpaka - The object compared if qualified only by its characteristic features and is identical with the standard of comparison and if this identification is well-determined by verbal expression, it is case of metaphor (rūpaka). The epithet 'upameyatāvacchedakapuraskārena' is very significant; on the strength of it, the figures of speech, such as apahnuti and nidarsanā are excluded from the field of metaphor. In case of apahnuti, the identity is denied by the very will of the speaker. In case of bhrāntimāt, identity is contradicted by the basic condition of illusion. In case of atisāyokti and nidarsanā, the object compared is swallowed up by the standard of comparison. Moreover, the characteristic feature is not taken into consideration at all. The exact verbal expression is also a condition of the figure of speech rūpaka, since it excludes the perceptual judgment, 'this face is moon.' Here the identification owes its origin to perception and deliberate illusion. That it is well-determined by the verbal expression is also significant. Another condition of rūpaka, namely, well-determined by verbal expression is also significant, since it excludes utpreksa which is based on probability.

Now let us clarify the definition of rūpaka -

The identity of the object compared with the standard of comparison is rūpaka. The subject of comparison and the object of comparison are adjectives to the identity of the two. The object compared and the standard of comparison are invariably connected with resemblance. No term is called standard of comparison or the object of comparison unless they bear resemblance. Thus these
two adjectives of tādātmya convey that the identity of the
standard of comparison with the object compared based on resemblance is determined by the exact verbal expression and then it is called the figure of rūpaka. Thus 'a beautiful lady is happiness' does not come under the purview of rūpaka. The attribution of identity is not based upon resemblance but upon causal relation. So the figure of speech rūpaka takes into consideration only such cases of identity of upamāna and upameya which are based upon resemblance.

Ratnākara holds the view that all sorts of identification of two objects, whether they are based on similarity or on any relation, are rūpaka. He also maintains that the basis of all identification is sāropalaksanā and this can be seen in all cases of identification and, as such the contention of the ancients that the identification of upamāna and the upameya is the case of rūpaka and not that of cause and effect is not just.

Criticising this stand of Ratnākara, Jagannātha states that his view is not tenable. In apahnuti also, there is identification of two objects and so his definition will include apahnuti within its scope. Pointing out his definition of smarana where he asserts that smarana based on similarity is smaranālāmākāra and not that based on 'cintā', Jagannātha further adds that if a rūpaka based on cause and effect is also accepted, then a smaranālāmākāra having its basis on 'cintā' should have been accepted. It cannot be said that a smarana based on thought is a bhāva only. According to Paṇḍitarāja, vācya smarana (reminiscence) whether arising from the comprehension of similarity
or caused due to cintā (thought) are the instances of alamkāras; if it is suggested, it is a bhāva only.

Rejecting the definition of Appaya Dīksita, Panditarāja says that there is bimbapratibimbabhāva even in rūpaka and so the epithet bimbavisīste in the definition to differentiate it from nidarsanā is not proper. Again, if the word nirdiṣṭe is taken in the sense of being expressed by any word with the determinant of upameyata, then, this part will distinguish rūpaka from atisāyokti and apahnuti, since in the first, the object of comparison is suppressed and in the second, it is negated and is not expressed by any word with the determinant of the upameyata being kept in view. So the word 'nihnute' in the definition is superfluous.

Further, Jagannātha takes up the definition of Mammaṭa and examines it. According to him, Mammaṭa's definition is untenable on the ground that in apahnuti, there is identification of the upamāna with the upameya and so Mammaṭa's definition embraces apahnuti too. Again, some body may say that there is no clear comprehension of the attribute of the object of comparison; rather there is clear denial and so Mammaṭa's definition will not embrace apahnuti within its fold. But Jagannātha maintains that even then, the definition will not be free from defect; it will include the instance of utpreksā like 'nīnām mukham chandraḥ'.

23. bimbavisīste nirdiṣṭe viśaye yadyanīhnute/
   uparanjakatam'eti viṣayi rūpakam īdā//
   RG,' p.297.
24. 'tadrūpakamabheda ya upamānopameyahoh' - RG, p.303.
Citing Mammata's definitions of apahnuti and rūpaka, Jagannātha further adds that these two definitions are defective because they may include other instances which actually do not come under their purview. Pointing to the definitions of rūpaka and utprekṣā, Paṇḍitarāja maintains that according to Mammata, rūpaka consists in identification and utprekṣā occurs when an object is imagined under the character of another. But in definition of rūpaka, no specific mention is made about the special characteristic of identification, and so even a possible identification may be a cause of rūpaka and then the definition of utprekṣā will cover rūpaka too. Thus, Jagannātha asserts, there will be two alamkāras in a single one. If, however, abheda is said to be qualified by certainty, no scope will be left for criticism.

Parināma - When the visayin (upamāna) serves the purpose in hand as being identified with the subject of superimposition but not on its own account, then the alamkāra is parināma.

After defining parināma, Jagannātha distinguishes it from rūpaka. In parināma, the vācyārtha does not fit in the context, if the upamāna is not completely identified with the upamēya. But in rūpaka, it is not so; there is only the superimposition of the upamāna upon the upamēya. MM. P. V. Kane clearly brings out this distinction in the following sentences - 'In Rūpaka, upamāna tinges or colours the upamēya simply, but the upamāna is not necessarily of any use for the matter in hand as in 'mukhacandram paśyāmi' where the moon subserves no purpose in
the act of seeing. In Parināma, on the other hand, the upamāna is completely identified with the upameya and subserves the purpose in hand by being so identified ... ... ... In Rūpaka, the upamāna is superimposed upon the upameya, which is the subject of discussion; while in Parināma the upamāna passes over entirely into the nature of the upameya and subserves the purpose in hand. So it is prakṛtopoyogitva that distinguishes this figure from Rūpaka.25 Appaya Dīksita26 also holds the same view when he says in his Citramīmamsā that in rūpaka, the prakṛta (the object described) assumes the form of the aprakṛta (i.e., upameya); but in parināma, aprakṛta assumes the form of the prakṛta. This figure is illustrated by the following verse:

apāre samsāre visamavisyāranyasaranau
mama bhrāmām bhrāmām bigalitabirāmām jādamateh/
parisrāntasyayam taranitanayatiranilayaḥ
samantātsantapām harinavatamalastirayatu//

Here Panditarāja remarks that the tree 'tamāla' on its on account cannot be said to remove the worry of this life; it has been stated here as being capable of being so, as it has been identified with the Deity (Hari). The Tamāla tree is the bīṣayin here on account of its capacity to remove the fatigue of people and for its being possessed of beauty. This is an illustration of appositional parināma (samānādhikarana parināma).

Vyadhikarana (non-appositional) Parināma is illustrated by Jagannātha by the verse -

where Pāṇḍitarāja remarks that a lady like a night with clear moon light pleases all and so she can please her lover as well. A night with clear moon light which is superimposed upon a lady is obstructed in its form, that is, it cannot satisfy all. But when it is considered as a lady, then the relation becomes clear. So this is an instance of Parināma.

Criticising the verse 'tārānāyakāśekharāya etc.' cited by Appaya Dīkaśita as an example of non-appositional parināma, Jagan-nātha says that in this verse, the poet salutes Lord Siva who is accustomed to dally with Pārvati. Siva's dalliance is related to His ornaments like mark of tilaka on the forehead. The upameyas like river, eye have their utility in the form of their upamāna, not on their own account. So, according to Pāṇḍitarāja, it is an illustration of rūpakā and not of parināma. It may be objected that in parināma, the visaya (upameya) is thoroughly identified with the visayin (upamāna) and in the above example also, the words rivers and others are connected with śekhara etc. through third case-ending and so they are thoroughly identified with upamānas like śekhara etc., so these are the instances of parināma. But Pāṇḍitarāja asserts that, though upamāna is identified with the upameya, it does not subserve the purpose in hand in that very form, and as such this is an illustration of rūpakā and not of parināma.

While rejecting Ruuyaka's definition of parināma, Pāṇḍitarāja discusses the meaning of prakṛtopayogitva. He first finds
out two alternative meanings - whether the object superimposed serves the purpose in hand or it gains utility by identifying itself with the object described. The first alternative is not tenable on the ground that in that case the verse 'dāse kṛtāgasya' etc., cited by Ruyyaka as an illustration of rupaka will be an instance of parinama. 'Here the prakṛta (pulakankura) is identified with the aprakṛta (kaṇṭaka) so that it can be connected with the sense of padakhedana, pricking the delicate foot of the heroine. Here we have the utility of the object superimposed for a contextual purpose.' The second alternative also is untenable, for, then the verse 'atha pavitrameti' etc. cited by Ruyyaka as illustrating of Vyādhikarana parināma cannot be supported as such. While approaching a king, the gift (upayana) which is superimposed in this concept, has its utility for the contextual purpose, but not in the form of word which is the upameya here. If on the other hand, the words which are visaya here, are supposed to serve the contextual purpose in the form of gift then Ruyyaka's example becomes quite contradictory. Kumari S. S. Janaki defends Ruyyaka against the criticism of Panditaraja. But she herself has remarked that Ruyyaka is not very clear about this figure and his definition can be interpreted in various ways.

Udāharana - Jagannātha accepted a kind of strikingness or beauty in the twist or turn of expression as the criterion of a poetic figure and thus accorded recognition to some figures of

28. ibid., p.81.
speech which were either rejected or were included in some other traditional figures by his predecessors. Among them, udāharana is one and Pāṇḍītaraṇāja has established it as a separate one on the basis of its peculiar charm by his cogent and constructive arguments.

He defines Udāharana thus - 'When for the easy understanding of a general proposition laid down, a particular case of that proposition is mentioned and the relation of the two as particular and general is expressly stated, it is udāharana'. The word 'expressedly stated' in the sutra distinguishes udāharana from arthāntaranyāsa. Again in udāharana some words such as 'iva', 'yathā', 'nīdarśana' which convey relation of 'avayava' and 'avayavin' are present and in arthāntaranyāsa, they are not present. They convey the sense of avayava and avayavin by laksanā.

Jagannātha illustrates this figure by the verse:

\[
\text{amitagundopi padārtho dosonaikena nindito bhavati/}
\text{nikhilarasāyanorājø gondhenogrena lasūna eva/}
\]

which means that though an object possess many good qualities, it becomes neglected for a single defect like lasūna, the best of elixirs, for its excessive smell. Here in this verse, the word 'iva' does not convey the idea of similarity between the padārtha (object) and laśūna. It brings the sense of general and particular. Similarly the word sadrśa and others are also found in the figure udāharana.

Ancient rhetoricians do not accept udāharana as a separate figure. They include it under upamā since the words like 'iva'
etc. express similarity between two objects, though the relation of particular and general is understood in the beginning. Rejecting this view Jagannātha maintains that in udāharaṇa the words like iva and others do not signify similarity; they express the sense of general and particular unlike in the examples of upamā. So udāharaṇa should be recognised as a separate alamkāra.

Dīpaka - When a thing which is the subject in hand (prakṛta) and another which is not the subject in hand are connected with a common property, there is dīpaka.

In this figure resemblance is understood (gamya). The reason why this figure is called dīpaka is that the property which is applicable to the prakṛta, serves the purpose of lending beauty to another which is aprakṛta. Explaining the significance of the name of the figure, Jagannātha says that, like a lamp which, when employed for illuminating one object, also illuminates another, this figure also illuminates both the prakṛta and aprakṛta.

This figure is distinguished from tulyoyogitā by the fact that in a dīpaka, one object must be prakṛta and others are aprakṛta. If all the objects are either prakṛta or aprakṛta, this may be the case of a tulyayogitā. So our author remarks that when there are many kartākārakas or karmakārakas and they are connected with a verb which becomes the common property, they will be tulyayogitā or dīpaka as the case may be. Thus in the verse -

sujanāḥ paropakāram sūrāḥ śastraṁ dhanaṁ kṛpanāḥ/
kulavatyo mandāksam prāṇātyaya eva muncati//
where good persons, heroes etc. are connected with the action of laying down their lives. If all the kartākārakas are either prakṛta or aprakṛta, this will be a tulyayogītā; if one of them is prakṛta and others are aprakṛta, it becomes a dīpaka. Thus, when many verbs are connected with a substantive, it is called kāraka dīpaka. Jagannātha does not recognise kāraka dīpaka as a separate variety. Criticising Mammāta's definition of kāraka dīpaka, our author says that the first part of the definition covers the kāraka dīpaka also and so the second part of the definition is unnecessary. In case of a guna or a kāraka, a mere mention of a common property in the form of guna or action results in dīpaka. Similarly, when there are many verbs and they are connected with a substantive (kartākāraka), there will be a dīpaka. Rejecting Mammaṭa's illustration of kāraka dīpaka, Panditarāja states that in the example, all the verbs are prakṛta. Moreover, all rhetoricians hold the view that the resemblance is the essence of dīpaka. But in the above example, there is no resemblance and so this is an example of samuccaya alāmkāra.

Jagannātha does not regard dīpaka and tulyayogītā as two separate alāmkāras. He holds that what constitutes the strikingness of both the alāmkāras, is the possession of a common property by all prakṛtas and aprakṛtas. The possession of this common property only by prakṛta or aprakṛta cannot constitute the basis of another variety of alāmkāra. There is no universal rule that the prakṛta should be upameya and the aprakṛta should be upamāna.

29. sakṛdvrttistu dharmasya prakṛtaprakṛtātmanām/
    saiva kriyāsu vahīsu kārakasyeti dīpakām//

(226)
The exception to this rule is illustrated by upameyopamā and pratīpa. In the first case, once the prakṛta is upameya but in the other part the aprakṛta is the upameya. In the second case too, aprakṛta is upameya and prakṛta is upamāna. Therefore the ground for distinction between tulyayogitā and dīpaka is very insecure. So this distinction topples down.

Aprastutaprasāmsā - When the description of a non-contextual object leads to the idea of the contextual object through similarity and others, the figure would be aprastutaprasāmsā. This has five varieties - (1) that the description of the non-contextual leads to the knowledge of the contextual through similarity; (2) that the description of the effect leads to the idea of the cause; (3) the opposite of the second variety; (4) that the description of the general aspect in an object leads to the knowledge of its particular aspect; (5) the opposite of the fourth.

Jagannātha illustrates all these varieties of aprastutaprasāmsā with suitable illustrations. He remarks in this connection that the first variety of aprastutaprasāmsā again can be sub-divided into various types. Thus in some instances, both the descriptions may be contextual and the conception of one leads to that of another. As an instance, he cites the following verse:

malinēpi rāgapūrṇāṁ vikasitavadanamanalpajalpepi/ tvayi capalēpi cāsa sarasām bhramara katham va sarojānim tyajasi/

Here the nāyaka who is devoted to his wife is the main object of
description and the bee is the aprastuta. The description of 
this non-contextual bee leads to the idea of the nāyaka. Again,
the bee is the contextual object, since it is there when such an
address has been made by the friend of the nāyikā. Thus it is
seen that both the descriptions are prastuta or contextual and
the description of one leads to the knowledge of the other.

Panditarāja Jagannātha criticises Appaya Diksita for ex-
tending recognition to a new figure named prastutaṅkura. Thus
according to Appaya, when the description of the contextual leads
to the idea of the contextual itself, the figure is called prastu-
tāṅkura. Jagannātha does not regard it as a separate variety and
includes it in aprastutapraśamsa. He remarks that there are dif-
ferent terms of expression and if these are regarded as separate
alamkarās, one will have to recognise endless number of alamkāras
since there are endless modes of expression.

Jagannātha, thus makes a deviation from the tradition in
evolving a new principle underlying all poetic figures and accor-
dingly he examines the definition of various figures given by an-
cient rhetoricians which are difficult to controvert. He rejects
many alamkāras recognised by Appaya and others as mere turns of
expression evolved from the existing poetic figures. But the suc-
cess of Panditarāja as a critic lies in his method of discrimina-
tion applied in his treatment of alamkāras, which brings out the
constructive faculty of his searching intellect in devising new
alamkāras as well as the critical and iconoclastic acumen in the
rejecting some of the alamkāras accepted by his predecessors.