The concept of dhvani or suggestion is one of the greatest contributions of Indian Poetics. Before the advent of the Dhvani theory, the aesthetic judgment was concerned with the artifice of external decorations and those theorists tried their best to discover the beauty in the meanings of words in sentence. They, no doubt, were aware of the aesthetic delight, but as they applied their minds exclusively to the artificial embellishments in standard language, they took the study of poetry as a discipline in artifice. These earlier aestheticians held no unanimous opinion about the sole standard of literary criticism. Some of them preferred artificial embellishment either to aesthetic experience of emotions or to the finding out of the suggested meaning. Others shifted their emphasis to the organic unity of literature and consequently laid emphasis upon aesthetic experience of emotion as an ideal standard of literary criticism. As for example, Bharata acknowledged a drama as the masterpiece of literary production. But he was unaware of the due importance of the great epics and lyrics and prose romances. As from time to time the emphasis on selection of critical standard changed according to the individual choice of a literary critic, the earlier age could not select any ideal standard for critical estimation. With the promulgation of the Dhvani theory as the sole standard of literary criticism, a revolutionary challenged came to the literary critic. Some proclaimed the discovery of dhvani as the sine qua non of
literary criticism. Others begged to differ from this school and chose the aesthetic experience of emotion as the most reliable standard of literary criticism. They certainly not minimise the efficacy of dhvani. Rather, they have pointed out that dhvani is only a means to an end but not an end itself. Thus they acknowledged dhvani, but subordinated it to the aesthetic experience.

According to the Dhvani school, the suggested sense is the most excellent of all literary beauties; it is the soul of poetry. All other rhetorical principles like alamkāra, guna etc. are subordinate to it. So with the advent of this school, poetry came to be viewed as a composite whole; other factors constitute the formal arrangement of it. The Dhvanikāra is the first literary critic who founded a school in which all earlier concepts were properly assimilated. Accepting the concept of dhvani as a central point, this theory brings a marked change in the concept of poetry which revolutionises all other standards of criticism in vogue.

The concept of dhvani is nothing but the implication of the latent import of the Bharata's rasa-sūtra as applied in poetical context. So what was implicit in Bharata becomes explicit in Ānandavardhana's Dhvanyāloka. Bharata maintained that in dramatic process, no meaning or sense could be had without rasa (na hi rasādṛte kaścidartho pravartate, Natyaśāstra, ch. IV). But he took into account the importance of rasa in connection with drama only. It was, however, the great Kasmirian scholar Ānandavardhana who built up a complete theory where he demonstrated the all important nature of rasa in poetry and its supremacy over all other forms of excellence. So MM. P. V. Kane rightly regards the
Dhvani-theory as an extension of the Rasa-theory and this theory took over the idea of rasa into the field of poetic artifice.  

Like Bharata, Ānandavardhana also accepted rasa as the most important element in poetry. He went a step further to establish rasa as the soul of poetry by referring to the Rāmāyana episode of Vālmīki about the origin of the epic. It was at the pathetic sight of the incident of the death of Kraunca at the hand of the cruel hunter that Vālmīki's poetic inspiration was roused and this ultimately resulted in the 'utterance in the well-formed metre'. Thus, according to Ānandavardhana, poetry proceeds from the heart of the poet when it is full of intense feeling of sentiment.

The basic implication of Bharata's rasa-formula is that the actor imitate the vibhāvas, anubhāvas and vyabhicāribhāvas and this imitation or representation by actors make them relishable to the spectators. Judged by this explanation, Bharata's concept of rasa was objective one signifying an aesthetic situation in drama. The dhvani theorists, however, maintain that the basic mental state is most important in poetry and as such in Dhvani theory, rasa becomes a subjective process. The poet does not transfer his own feeling to the reader. On the other hand, the reader relishes his own feelings. 'The lasting peem is not the result of pouring out personal emotion for the only way of expressing emotion in the form of art is finding an 'objective

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2. kāvyasyātma sa evārthastatha cādikaveḥ purā/
   krauncadvandvaviyogottah saḥ kālokavamāgataḥ/
   Dhvanyāloka, 1.5.
correlative; in other words, a set of objects, a situation, a chain of events which shall be the formula of that particular emotion; such that when external facts, which must terminate in sensoritory experience are given, the emotion is immediately evoked. Anandavardhana also holds the view that rasa is suggested and not communicated. To give an explanation of the process—how rasa is suggested, he propounds the theory of Dhvani in his Dhvanyālōka.

Before introducing his novel theory of dhvani Anandavardhana states that the joy of poetry which consists in the meaning of words, is of two kinds—the expressed sense and the implied sense. The first sense is the superficial meaning of words and is conveyed by the power of. The second sense is a deeper one, conveyed by the power of suggestion. The function of suggestion is a unique feature typical to the poetic expression only. This is the secret of the composition of the great poets, which makes them charming. Anandavardhana compares the sense conveyed by the power of suggestion to the loveliness of a woman. Just as the loveliness of women is something over and above their limbs, so also in the words of great poets there is a peculiar charm which is over and above the words and their meanings, and this is called dhvani. It is the very secret of literature and can be grasped by very few gifted and responsive critics. So Anandavardhana says that the knowledge of words and their meanings will not be helpful in appreciating the suggested or the implied sense; it can be

4. yórtah sahṛdayaslāghyah kāvyātmeti vyavasthētah
vācyapratiyamāṇākhyau tasya bhedāvubhau smṛtau—Dhvanyālōka 1.4.
5. pratīyamānām punaranyadeva vastvasthi vāniṣu mahākaviṁ̄/ yattatprasiddhabayavatiriktam bibhāti lāvanyamivanganāsū/ Dhvanyālōka, 1.4.
appreciated by the critics of culture and taste who are recepti-
ve to the aesthetic sentiments. 6 Abercrombie has rightly re-
marked - 'Nevertheless, language in literature must be made to 
mean very much more than the logical or grammatical meaning which 
is given by its syntax - the orderly arrangement of its parts. 
In fact, literary language differs from ordinary language precisely 
by conscious and deliberate use in it of powers additional to 
the force of grammatical meaning: powers which are only casually 
employed in common speech.' 7

The upholders of the Dhvani theory declare that Dhvani or 
suggested sense is the soul of poetry. Ānandavardhana defines 
dhvani in the following kārikā -

\[
yatrārthaḥ śabdo vā tamarthamupasarjāṅkṛtastvarthau/
byaṅktah kāvyavisesah sa dhaniriti surībhiḥ kathitah//
\]

Dhvanyāloka 1.13. If, after the appearance of the expressed sense, either the sound 
(śabda) or the meaning (artha) completely subordinating themselves, 
gives rise to another sense, then, this is called dhvani. This 
statement of Dhvanikāra precludes samāsokti and other alāmkarās 
from the domain of dhvani. In the instances of samāsokti and other 
alāmkarās, the suggested meaning is less important to the poetic 
intention than the direct meaning. This meaning is subordinate to 
the expressed meaning; they are classified as a type of inferior 
poetry. This is not dhvani kavya (cf. 'vyāṇgāprādhānye hi dhvaniḥ/

6. śabdārthaśāsanajñānamatrenaiva na vedyate/
vedyate sa tu kāvyārthatattvajnaireva kevalām// Dhvanyāloka 1.7.
Before the enunciation of the doctrine of Dhvani, the rasa, rīti and alāmkāra theories were established by the supporters of these principles of criticism. These theorists gave emphasis on one of the aspects of literary criticism at the exclusion of others. Though they were not conversant with the Dhvani theory, the origin of the concept of dhvani is found in their treatment of principles of literary criticism. Dr Raghavan has pointed out how the origin of the concept of suggestion is to be found in some of the alāmkāras treated by Bhamaha and other rhetoricians. Anandavardhana also admits that these theorists, though ignorant of the Dhvani theory almost touched the fringes of suggestion. However, the word 'dhvani' is not the creation of the Sanskrit rhetoricians. It is coined by the grammarians and Anandavardhana has borrowed it from them. The main stream of the doctrine of Dhvani is shrouded in the Sphota or Sabda-Brahma theory of the grammarians. It was mainly propounded by the grammarian philosopher Bhatṛhari in his celebrated book, Vākyapadiya. The word 'dhvani' as used by the grammarians manifests the spota. Anandavardhana also holds that a word is capable of conveying more than one idea at the same time. The first verse of Bhatṛhari's Vākyapadiya supports this principle:

\[
anādinidhanam Brahma sabdatattvam yadaksarim
vivartate arthabhāvem prakriyā jagato yathā/
\]

According to Bhatṛhari sphaṭa is the ultimate principle of existence which has neither birth nor death like Brahman in the

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Vedanta philosophy. 'The sphota is like the fine air which pervades all concrete objects and like the same becomes perceptible when manifested by its own means.' On the analogy of the sphota theory of the grammarians, Ānandavardhana propounds the celebrated Dhvani theory and in doing so, he acknowledges his gratitude to the Vaiyākaraṇas in clear terms –

prathamo hi vidvāmsaḥ vaiyākāraṇāḥ,
vaiyākāraṇamulatvāt sarbavidyānām/ te ca
śrūyamaṇeṣu varṇeṣu dhvanifīti vyavahānti/
tathaivaṁyaiṣatammatāṇusārabhibhiḥ sūribhiḥ,
kā łatattvaṁthadarsābhibhīr vācyavācakasammiṣṭāḥ
sabdatmā kāvyamiti vyapadesā vyanaṅkatva-
samyād dhanirityuktaḥ/ Dhvanyāloka, pp.134-35.

Though Ānandavardhana has earned the distinction of establishing the Dhvani theory on a firm footing by his convincing and cogent reasoning, he does not claim himself to be its original innovator. He clearly states that dhvani as the soul of poetry was declared already by scholars (kāvyasyātmā dhvanirīti budhair-yah samāmnatapūrvaḥ). Abhinavagupta commenting on this Kārikā in his Locana states that this theory was stated in unbroken chain of traditions by the previous scholars, though, of course, it was not treated by them in any particular book. The dhvani theorists do not assume the role of irrefutable sāstrakāras; rather they claim that the principle of dhvani has it sanction at least in the practice from the great poets like Vyāsa, Vālmīki and others (cf. rāmāyanamahābhārataśabdenādīkaveḥ pavṛtisarvaiḥ sūrivirasya-

10. aviccinnana pravahena tairetaduktam vināpi viśīśṭapustakesu vinivesanadityaḥ abhiprayaḥ', Locana, p. 11.
With the establishment of the Dhvani theory, the suggestion of sentiment has been given the place of pride in poetry and it came to occupy the position of soul of poetry. With the emergence of this theory, alāmākāra, riti and guṇa, so long accepted by different schools as most essential elements in poetry came to be rejected as non-essential. The existence of guṇa, alāmākāra or riti in a Kāvyā is conditioned by exigencies or rasa only. MM. Kuppuswami Sastri aptly brings out the relative importance of dhvani and other principles of literary criticism in the following sentence — 'These may be regarded as constituting the byways of literary criticism and their existence or the excuse for their existence, chiefly consists in their being correlated to the suggested sense, or to the suggested elements in an appropriate manner.'

Thus, the Dhvani school gives not only the full importance to the old idea of rasa or aesthetic relish in the art of poetry as in the cognate art of drama, but also harmonises the other important elements in its comprehensive theory.

The theory of suggestion is an epoch-making contribution in the history of Sanskrit criticism. Having established a case of suggestion in poetry, this theory recognises the supreme importance of the imaginative faculty of the poet and the sense of

11. 'Highways and Byways of Literary Criticism in Sanskrit, p.53.
propriety. This theory is the meeting point of all concepts of Sanskrit criticism. It removes the misunderstanding regarding different concepts of the Alamkāra-Sāstra. Giving suggestion a supreme position in a Kāvyā, it tries to synthesise all other rhetorical concepts, in other words, it considers alamkāra, guṇa, rīti and dosa only in relation to rasa. These concepts have their claim in poetry provided they contribute to the aesthetic relish. So dhvani is a mahāvisaya and rasa, alamkāra and vastu are its constituents. The success of this school of criticism lies in the fact that here we meet for the first time an honest attempt to bring the old concept of rasa to its full importance in the art of poetry and to harmonise all other concepts into its comprehensive theory. Though the Dhvani school has leaning towards the rasa-dhvani, it has widened the scope of dhvani by admitting alamkāra dhvani and vastu-dhvani at par with it in poetry. The general rhetorical doctrines outlined by the Dhvani school were almost universally accepted by later writers on poetics. Even the formidable critics of Ānandavardhana - Bhattanāyaka and Vyaktivivekakāra - accepted the suggested sense, though they tried to explain it in a different way. The attempts of the later writers following the Dhvani school consisted only in working out the details of Dhvani theory and practically, they had nothing new to add to this standard principle of literary criticism. Thus the Dhvani school became a standard principle which holds good even today in different times and climes.


Jagannātha's position in the Dhvani School

Panditarāja Jagannātha was a last giant writer on Sanskrit poetics. He flourished in a period when already the various theories of Sanskrit poetics were standardised and systematised on a firm basis. The theory of dhvani (suggestion) of the Kasmirian school headed by Ānandavardhana not only established the concept of Dhvani in poetry, but also worked up and rationalised into a synthetic and comprehensive systems - all other concepts of Alamkāra Sastra. Another later Kasmirian rhetorician Mammata established the Dhvani-theory for all time to come. His magnum opus, the Kāvya Prakāśa became a standard text-book and dominated the thoughts of generations of theorists who came after him.15

The writers of this new school of Sanskrit poetics of the post-dhvani period accepted the general principles of literary criticism laid down in the Dhvani-theory; but in practice, they were not totally free from the influence of the writers of the old schools.16 These writers were not lacking in originality; they were gifted writers. But rightly or wrongly, they brought the old ideas of Sanskrit criticism into the elaboration of their new theory of poetry.

(In the post-dhvani period, Jagannātha is the last upholder of the doctrine of Dhvani.) His Rasagangādhara helped a great deal in establishing the authority of Dhvani school of Ānandavardhana finally.) Although he adheres mainly to the principles of Dhvani school and accepts Rasa as the most essential element in poetry,

15. Dr De, Some Problems of Sanskrit Poetics, p.117.
Ike did not follow it blindly. He went a step further than Abhinavagupta and Mammata to give a new colour to the doctrine of Dhvani. His treatment of the doctrine is a novel one wherein lies his originality as a learned critic. Although he does not refer to dhvani as the soul of poetry, his four-fold division of poetry is based on this theory itself. According to MM. Kuppuswami Sastri, the recognition of four classes of poetry by Panditaraja, viz., uttamottama, uttama, madhyama and adhama is a sort of amendment to Ānandavardhana’s classification of dhvani. The same learned scholar holds that this amendment of Jagannātha is not an improvement upon the original classification; it simply brings out what Ānandavardhana sought to explain towards the end of his Dhvanyālīka.17 Another novel feature of Jagannātha’s conception of dhvani is that unlike Ānandavardhana and other supporters of the Dhvani school, he does not bring rasa-dhvani, bhāvadhvani and others under the asamlak-śakramadhvani, but puts them under samlak-śakrama dhvani. This deviation may appear something absurd in case of a staunch supporter of the Dhvani school like Panditaraja. But this makes him a true critic in the history of the division of dhvani. Thus, though he remains faithful to the recognised standard, his outlook is a progressive one. This aspect of a critic has been aptly emphasised by F. E. Sparshott – ‘The best criticism of anything, then, will be such an analysis or description of it as determines a reliable estimate of its value in accordance with recognised or recognizable standards.’18

Another striking feature of Jagannatha's treatment of dhvani is that he does not recognise innumerable varieties of suggestion as admitted by other advocates of the school, like Mammata, Viswanatha, Vidyānatha and others. His non-recognition of some varieties of dhvani is more practical rather than theoretical.

According to Jagannatha, ramaniyatā is the criterion of a Kāvyā and accordingly he divides it on the basis of the degree of this sort of charm. As a champion of the Dhvani theory, however, he considers rasa and bhāva Kāvyas as Kāvyā per excellence. But unlike the supporters of the Dhvani school, he also recognises that variety of poetry as the second variety which contains nice specimen poetic figures, though the suggested sense therein is rendered secondary. Following the tradition of Dhvani school he recognises suggestion as the soul of poetry and regards the poetics figures (alamkāras) as ramaṇiyatāprayojaka (cf. athasyaprāgabhiihitatalaksanasya kāvyātmano vyāngasya ramaṇiyataprayojaka alamkāra nirūpyante, Rasagangādhara, p.203). He also criticises the neo-critics who hold the view that ancient no rhetoricians like Bhamaha, Udbhata, etc. other than Dhvanikāra had not mentioned dhvani or gunibhūtavyangya and as such they did not recognise dhvani. He maintains that these rhetoricians recognised some varieties of gunibhūtavyangya by recognising the figures like vyājastuti, aprastutaprasamsā and samāsokti etc., and all varieties of suggested sense were included by them in the fold of paryayokti (dhvanikārat prācinaibhāmahodbhataprabhṛtibhiḥ svagranthesu kutrāpi dhvaniguṇi bhūtavyangyādisābā da prajuktā ityēvataivas tairdhvanyādayo na svikriyante ityādhnikānām vācojuktirajuktaiva/ yatah samāsokti-
vyājastutyapraṣṭutapraśamsādyalamkāranirūpaṇena kiyantopi guṇi-bhūtavyangyabhedastairapi nirūpitāḥ/ aparasaśca sarvepi vyangprapan-cāḥ paryayoktakuk/sau niksiptāḥ – Rasagangādhara, p554). His contention is that in figures like dipaka and others, there is guṇi-bhūta vyangya, and so they are examples of guṇibhutavyangya Kāvyas. But in those ornate expressions having paryayokti and aprastuta-praśamsā based on similarity, the suggested sense is prominent.

According to Prof. Siva Prasad Bhattacharyya, this contention of Jagannātha does not go against Ānandavardhana, it can rather be supported by the statement from the Dhvanyalāka itself.  

In spite of his admission of some alaṃkāra-kāvyas in the fold of the best type of poetry, Jagannātha recognised the importance of suggestion in poetry. His definition of poetry as 'words conveying beautiful sense' is a comprehensive one which includes in its scope, all aspects of dhvani, though he expressly recognised rasa-dhvani as the most charming one (evasaṃ panaśātmake dhvanau paramaramāṇiyatāyā rasadhvanestodātmā rasastāvadabhidhiyate – Rasa-gangādhara, p.25). Indeed, it is significant to note that though Paṇḍitarāja indulges in the elaborate treatment of the alaṃkāras, he does not minimise the all important nature of dhvani. To him alaṃkāras are mere vāg-vikalpas, but they may result in charming expression. His ramaṇiyatā has a broader connotation which includes all kinds of charmingness and so he tries to show the role of alaṃkāras as adding aesthetic beauty in poetry.  

does not go against the tradition of the Dhvani school, it is rather in accordance with the statement of Anandavardhana himself — 'vyangyatve'pyalamkārānāṃ prādhānyavivakṣayāmesva satyāṃ dhvānavantahpātaḥ (Dhvanyāloka Vṛtti on Kārikā II, 29). Thus Panditaraṇāja Jagannātha succeeds in giving dhvani a honourable position by bringing the beauty of form and of content on the same level. In his treatment of doctrine of dhvani, he gives it a supreme position which betrays his aesthetic experience of a critic mixed with the creative vision of a poet.

Jagannātha's classification of Dhvani

Dhvani has been primarily divided by Jagannātha into two divisions — Abhidhāmūlā and Lākṣaṇāmūlā. Of them, the first is based on the primary meaning of the expression and the second is based on the indicated sense. The former again is of three varieties based on rasa, vastu and alāmākāra. In rasa-dhvani, the order of sequence of time between the cognition of the expressed sense and indicated sense is not perceptible. The expressed sense would immediately lead to the realisation of rasa. So this is called asaṃlaksakramavyangyadhvani. In this classification are included rasadhvani, bhāvadhvani, rasabhāsadhvani, bhāvabhāsadhvani, bhāvasāntidhvani, bhāvodayadhvani, bhāvasandhidhvani and bhāvasabalata-dhvani. The Abhidhāmūladhvani and Lākṣaṇāmūladhvani are again popularly called vivakṣitānyapara-vācyadhvani and āvivakṣita-vācyadhvani respectively. Lākṣaṇāmūladhvani is again of two varieties — Ārthāṇtara-samkramita and Ātyantatirakṛta-dhvani.
Classification of Sāmlakṣakramavyangya-dhvani — In this class of dhvani, where the expressed sense conveys the suggested sense, the order of sequence is perceptible. So it is called Sāmlakṣakramavyangya. It is of two types — Sābdasaktimūla and arthasaktimūla. In Sābdasaktimūla type, the suggested meaning is based on the force of the word, while in the arthasaktimūla type, the suggestion proceeds from the meaning. The criterion of determining whether suggestion proceeds from the word or from its expressed sense depends upon the power of retention of effect in the synonymous diction. If in a certain case, the suggestion remains in tact even after the substitution of a word by other synonyms of the word, it is regarded as arthasaktiyuddhava; if, on the other hand, the change of the word vitiates the suggestion, it is regarded as Sābdasaktyuddhava (based on word). The suggested sense in the Sāmlakṣakrama-vyanga is always represented either by a figure of speech or by a bare matter of fact (vastu). Vastu, here, should be understood in the sense of simple statement of a fact without any ornamental figure of speech. So suggestion based upon the force of word is of two kinds — representing vastu and alamkāra. The second variety, viz., suggestion based on sense is of eight varieties. Because as stated above, the suggested sense primarily is either in the form of vastu or of alamkāra. In poetry, these two again are found to be natural (having a real existence in the world) and created by the imaginative faculty of the poet. In Sanskrit Alamkaraśāstra these two are known respectively 'svataḥ sambhavi' (self existent) and 'kavi-praadaktisiddha' (all accepted assumption of the poet). These four varieties suggesting vastu and alamkāra separately come to eight in total. Thus
arthāsāktimuladhvani is subdivided into eight varieties and as such according to our Panditarāja, Saṃlaksākramavyangya comes to be ten in total.

After this classification, Jagannātha rejects the twelve-fold classification of asaṃlaksākramavyangya of Kavyaprakāsakāra who admits another four varieties of arthāsāktimuladhvani whose existence depends upon the bold assertion of some character portrayed by the poet (kavinibaddhavaktrpraudhoktinīpanna). Panḍitarāja's contention is that as in one type of this dhvani, suggested object is admitted to be created by the imagination of a poet, there is no cogent reason to recognise another class of suggested object created by the imagination of a speaker portrayed by the poet. There is no difference between the suggested meaning whether it is created by imagination of a poet or by the imagination of a speaker portrayed by the poet. In both cases, it is the imaginative faculty of the poet that is responsible for creation in literature. So, according to Panditarāja, no variety of dhvani like 'kavinibaddhavaktrpraudhokti' other than kavipraudhoktisiddha should be recognised.

Rasa as Saṃlaksākramavyangya

After illustrating the various kinds of traditional classification of dhvanis, Jagannātha concludes his discussion of dhvani having established rasa-dhvani as Saṃlaksākramavyangya which bears the stamp of his originality. Ancient rhetoricians like Mammata and others regard rasa, bhāva, rasābhāsa, bhāvābhāsa etc. as asaṃlaksākramavyangya (whose order of sequence of is not
perceptible). Accordingly, Panditarāja also maintains that in a clear context, when vibhava, anubhava and vyabhicāribhāvas are easily understood by a cultured gahrdaya, he immediately realises rasa or aesthetic pleasure. To speak in other words, he first understands the expressed meanings of the words and this understanding of the expressed meanings leads him to realise rasa which becomes asamlaksavyayana. This is called because in the blissful realisation of this variety of suggestion, the order of sequence from the expressed meaning to the suggested sense. If, on the other hand, the context is not clear but is found out after due consideration of many facts, or if the vibhavas are to be inferred, then the apprehension of these vibhavas, anubhavas etc. is delayed, and the suggestion of the idea from these are also naturally delayed. Then the suggestion of rasa becomes sāmlaksavyayanga. As an instance of this, Jagannātha cites the verse 'talpaga-tāpi ca sutād' etc. quoted as an uttomottama variety of poetry (Rasagangādhara, p.14). Here in this verse, the meaning of the word 'samprati' is understood late after the investigation of the context only. Formerly, the behaviours of the nāyikā as a newly married lady was different, but on the previous night of the departure of her husband to a distant place, her slow removal of the hand of her husband suggests a different attitude of her mind. The understanding of this idea becomes possible only after a long time when the context becomes clear, and so this is an instance of asamlaksavyangya.

In support of his argument, Panditarāja quotes the statements of Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta in connection with the
verse quoted from Kālidāsa's Kumārsambhava -

 evokepituradhomukhi/
līlākamalapatrāṇi ganayāmāsa pārvatī//

This is an instance of samālakṣakramavyāngya. Here Pārvatī's modesty has been suggested and this is understood only when the context is known fully. Pārvatī's counting of the petals of the lotus at her hand with her downcast head is not due to her natural shyness; it is due to her modesty at the moment when sage Angirāsas began to talk about her marriage to her father Himāvān. So this is an instance of samālakṣakramavyāngya. Abhinavagupta also remarks that, though rasas, bhāvas etc., are always suggested and are not described they are not always samālakṣavyāngya. When rasa is suggested from vibhāvas amubhāvas or from vyabhicāribhāvas, it becomes samālakṣakramavyāngya.

In support of his contention, Jagannātha states that when a bhāva is suggested as samālakṣakramavyāngya, then it becomes an instance of vastudhvani and not of rasadhvani. Sthāyibhāvas like rati and others, transform into rasa by the causes - vibhāvas, amubhāvas and vyabhicāribhāvas directly, and so the sequence of order from the expressed meaning to the suggested sense is not perceptible. Actually, rasa-experience is a kind of super-mundane delight realised from the sthāyibhāvas directly and immediately. But the suggestion of bhāvas like rati and others as instances of samālakṣakramavyāngya are explained by Jagannātha as the cases of vastudhvani only.

After giving the various classifications of dhvani, Jagannatha proceeds to discuss the process of comprehension of the non-contextual sense of a homonym. He enumerates three views of the ancient rhetoricians and examines them thoroughly and, then he tries to give his own view.

(1) According to the first view, Jagannatha points out, in those cases where nanartha sabdas are used, the hearer will understand all the meanings — the contextual and non-contextual, since there is sanketa in all of them. Then a doubt arises in the mind of the hearer as to the exact nature of sense to be conveyed by the term. He will ascertain the intention of the speaker through context and others and then, there will be recollection of the contextual sense which will be comprehended by them. Anticipating the objection why the second recollection does not cover both the contextual and non-contextual senses like the first recollection, the upholders of this theory hold that the knowledge of the context or the ascertainment of the intention of the speaker itself stands on the way of recollecting the non-contextual sense. In other words, these theorists maintain that to explain the process of cognition of the contextual meaning of a homonym, the knowledge of the context or the tātparyajnāna must be accepted as an obstruction in the recollection of the non-contextual sense. So these theorists refer to the famous lines of Bhatṛhari —

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\text{saṃyogyo viprayogaśca sāhacaryam virodhitē}
\]
\[
\text{arthāḥ prakaranam liṅgāṁ sabdasyanyasya sannidhiḥ/}
\]
and explain the expressions 'anavacchede' in the sense of 'doubt as to the intention of the speaker' and 'viśeṣasmitihetavah' as signifying the idea of recollecting one sense only. And in the sentence 'surabhimāmsaṁ bhakṣayati', the restrictive factor of the denotation obstructs the recollection of the sense of beef. So the power of denotation cannot bring that idea, and for its comprehension, one must take the help of vyanjanā. In reply to the argument that as the first recollection presents both the contextual and non-contextual, so the second recollection also should present the both, these theorists state that the knowledge of context and other restrictive factors standing on the way of remembrance of the non-contextual exists and as a result of this, the recollection of the non-contextual sense is obstructed. It also cannot be said that the knowledge of the context and other factors is capable of giving obstruction on the path of cognition caused through the power of suggestion. For, the knowledge of context: ... and other factors can impede the cognition of sense in case of multimeaninged words, but vyanjanā itself is an exciting factor of giving obstruction to the restrictive factors to delimit the connotation of homonyms to a particular sense. In support of their theory, these theorists cite the following Kārikā from the Kāvyaka Prakāśa -

anekārthasya sabdasya vācakatve niyanti
dsamyogadyairavacyarthadikrtvyāprtyāpān  
which means that when samyoga and others restrict the function of denotation of a homonym, the non-primary sense is comprehended by the power of suggestion.
Another school does not support the view of these theorists. It presents a different explanation of the process of cognition of the non-contextual meaning of a homonym. But it appears that this view has a very little difference from the former. Let us examine this view.

According to the first explanation, the theorists of this school point out, in case of verbal cognition of multi-meaningd term, the intention of the speaker is an essential factor without which there cannot be any comprehension of sense of it. So, due to the ascertainment of the intention of the speaker by conjunction, disjunction etc., only that meaning of the homonym enter into association with the concepts of the other words in the sentence, though of course both the contextual and non-contextual senses arise in the beginning. Other senses, however, are not taken into consideration to associate with the concepts of other terms. According to this school, the assumption of this process leaves no scope for postulating the recollection of one idea only. It also dispenses with the necessity of postulating restrictive factors of contexts and others in the process of verbal cognition of the non-contextual sense. Thus, in case of homonym, though the contextual and non-contextual senses are presented alike due to the intention of the speaker through context and others, it generates the verbal cognition of the contextual sense, and the comprehension of the non-contextual sense presented by the same term is not possible by any power other than vyanjana. In other words, these theorists maintain that though a homonym presents both the contextual and non-contextual senses, it gives rise to the verbal cognition presenting the contextual sense only and the
non-contextual sense is comprehended only by vyanjana.

(3) The third school holds that both the contextual and non-contextual senses of a multi-meaning word can be conveyed by abhidhā. It rejects the contention of the ancient rhetoricians that the comprehension of the sense of a homonym is based on hearer's knowledge of the context and the intention of the speaker. It also discards the view that the knowledge of speaker's intention is an obstruction on the path of recollecting the non-contextual sense when other working agents are present. When a statement 'payah ramaniyam' is made referring to milk only, an experienced man will understand both the contextual and non-contextual senses and will tell a man who does not know the context that the word 'payah' in that particular statement means 'milk' and not water, though the word denotes both milk and water by the abhidhasakti. Again, this school rejects the contention of the second school that one comprehends the contextual meaning with the help of tātparyajñāna and the non-contextual sense is conveyed by the power of vyanjana. Panditarāja Jagannātha raises two alternatives favouring the use of vyanjana - whether vyanjana is to be accepted in all cases of homonyms or in certain cases only. The first alternative is untenable on the ground that, when a homonym presents both the contextual and non-contextual senses, the contextual sense being brought by abhidhā and the non-contextual one by vyanjana, then it is futile to consider the tātparyanirnaya as factor for the comprehension of sense. Again, tātparyajñāna will have to be accepted as an obstruction in the comprehension of non-contextual sense. The second alternative also
does not stand on the ground that tatparyajñāna is not an invariable condition of vyanjanā. It can suggest those meanings of words where there is no tatparyajñāna.

Again, it can be objected that the hearer possesses an extra-ordinary power which is the cause of giving rise to the power of vyanjanā in him and it is through this power that he can comprehend the charming sense of a homonym. Against this objection, Jagannātha points out, it can be said that the same power should revive the abhidhā sakti in the hearer which would enable him to understand the non-contextual sense as well. Thus with strong argument, Jagannātha refutes the view that in a homonym, the non-contextual sense is brought by vyanjanā.

Controverting the contention of those champions of vyanjanā, Paṇḍitarāja tries to come to a conclusive view. He maintains that in a homonym, the cognition of the non-contextual meaning is possible through the power of abhidhā. If, however, the non-contextual sense of a homonym is contradicted by our valid instrument of cognition, then abhidhā cannot signify it, but in such cases the help of vyanjanā is not sought. As a matter of fact, it is found that in most of the poetic figures like apahnuti, atisyayokti etc., where the primary meaning is contradicted by the instrument of cognition, vyanjanā is not taken recourse to. Similarly in case of a homonym where the non-contextual sense is contradicted by the valid instrument of cognition, verbal cognition is possible through abhidhā and not through vyanjanā. Jagannātha, however, says that there is definite scope for vyanjanā for verbal cognition in a homonym if there is similarity between the contextual and non-contextual senses.
Jagannatha further argues that vyanjanā has a definite field for operation in yogarudha words when they are used in their derivative senses. In case of yogarudha words, abhidhā conveys the derivative sense which is restricted to convention only; purely derivative sense cannot be conveyed by laksanā also. For all the conditions of laksanā are absent there. So the derivative sense of a yogarudha word is cognised by vyanjanā. As an illustration, Panditarāja cites the verse -

abalanāṃ sriyaṁ hitva vārivāhaḥ sahanīsam
tisthaṇti capalā yatra sa kālaḥ samupasthitah/

which suggests that some women of easy virtue who have stolen the property of the weak persons, roam with the water carriers. Here the words 'abalā', 'vārivāha' and 'capalā' are yogarudha words. They cannot convey the above meaning by the power of abhidhā. This is, however, presented by vyanjanā. Thus, Jagannatha observes, in case of yogarudha words, the derivative sense is cognised through vyanjanā.

Jagannatha, thus, has discussed the scope of vyanjanā in the process of comprehension of non-contextual sense and has controverted the thesis of the ancient writers that in a homonym, vyanjanā presents the non-contextual sense. He, however, makes a departure to state that vyanjanā does not cause the cognition of the non-contextual sense and that it conveyed by abhidhā sakti. He also establishes his contention that there is definite scope of vyanjanā in a yogarudha word in suggesting the derivative sense which cannot be conveyed by abhidhā. This viewpoint of Jagannatha is an improvement upon that of the ancients and for this he will always claim originality as a critic.