Chapter IV

Jagannātha's Concept of Guna

History of the conception of guna

(The treatment of gunas or literary excellences forms an important part of Sanskrit poetics.) The tradition of Indian poetics connects the name of Bharata with this principle of literary criticism in Sanskrit. The sixteenth chapter of Bharata's Nātyaśāstra gives us for the first time a developed dogma, if not a theory, of poetics which mentions ten gunas together with four alamkaras, ten dosas and thirty six lakṣanas of poetic composition. The number and nomenclature of the gunas enumerated by Bharata and also the substance of some of them were adopted conventionally by later theorists, though, of course, there is a wide gulf of difference between Bharata and later writers, regarding the conception of gunas.

Bharata characterises gunas as the antonym of dosas and describes them in negative terms only. His conception of gunas is noteworthy from the standpoint of the fact that Vāmana, the propounder of the rīti school, regards gunas as positive elements. In the post-Dhavani period, all writers considered gunas generally as the negative of dosas. However, Bharata's treatment does not support the view that all the ten gunas enumerated by him are only negative characteristics. As for instance, the gunas like mādhurya

2. Dr Nagendra, Hindi Kāvyālāṃkāra-Sūtra, Introduction, p.58.
and audārya as defined by him, are not negation of anything in sense. However, he attaches equal importances to gunas as the alamkāras and takes them to be subservient to rasa, which is of primary importance in the drama. Although Bharata does not define gunas, it is evident that he treats them as elements heightening the acting in a drama or of the language and diction in poetry.3

After Bharata, Bhāmaha makes a meagre attempt at the doctrine of guna in the very beginning of the Chapter II of his Kāvyālāmākāra. He makes the exposition of guna in the three kārikās4 where he mentions only three gunas, viz., mādhurya, prasāda and ojas. From the standpoint of mentioning three gunas, Bhāmaha may be taken to be a precursor of Ānandavardhana. But this has no relation with Ānandavardhana's new theory which recognises only three gunas. As Dr Raghavan rightly remarks, 'This fact of Bhāmaha mentioning only three gunas has no relation to the later theory of Gunas being only three as a corollary of the theory of Guna as Rasa-dharma established by Ānandavardhana.'5

Dandin, however, makes an elaborate treatment of gunas in his Kāvyādarsa, though he does not define them. He enumerates then gunas (Kāvyādarsa, 1.41) and in his mārga scheme, he gives them a subordinate place. The ten gunas which he enumerates are considered to be the life of Vaidarbhi style and the opposite of these is largely seen in the style of Gaudas. Dandin is the first

4. Kāvyālāmākāra II, 1.2.3.
rhetorician who connected the gunas with the margas (diction). We can easily understand that Bharata was not aware of this peculiar relationship between the gunas and the margas. Though he does not define gunas, we can understand from his definition of alamkāras what he understood by the gunas in poetry. His conception of alamkāras covered the gunas as well, which were regarded by him as the essence of various margas. According to his scheme, gunas are also a kind of alamkāras; they add charm to poetry (cf. sovakaratvam hi alamkāralakṣanam tallaksanayogāt tēpi(sle-sādayo dosaguna api) alamkārāh, Tarunvāchaspati, quoted by Dr Nagendra, in his HKAS, Introduction, p60). One of the novel features of Dandin's treatment of the gunas is that he has not made them subordinate to rasa; rather they form an independent part and add charm to poetry. According to Dandin, Kāvya is a series of words expressive of charming idea and the charm of the series of words belongs to both word and sense. So the gunas also refer both to the word and sense.

After Dandin, Vāmana's contribution as a poet lies in his attempt to define guna in general for the first time. He also brings out the difference between gunas and alamkāras and tries to assign proper place to both the tenets in his scheme of literary judgment. He defines gunas as attributes enhancing the beauty of poetry. Actually, Vāmana's definition of guna is nothing but Dandin's definition of alamkāra. But his definition of alamkāra is a wide one to cover both gunas and alamkāras.

7. 'kāvyasovāyāh kartāro dharmā gunāḥ', Kāvyaalāmākāra-sūtra, 3.1.1.
Vāmana narrows its limit. Thus according to him, guṇas are the attributes which give sobha or beauty to a Kāvyā; but alāmkhāras add additional charm to it (Kāvyālāmkhāra-sūtravṛtiī 1,1-2). As a matter of fact, sobha or beauty for which a composition is accepted as Kāvyā and which is, therefore, its essential quality is caused by guṇas, and alāmkhāras bring additional beauty and so they have an optional and additional value in the texture of poetry. Consequently, guṇas are eternal (pūrve nityāh) and they are indispensable elements of a Kāvyā whereas alāmkhāras contribute in its heightening of additional beauty. To speak in other words, guṇas are related to poetry through samavāyasambandha and alāmkhāras rest in it through samyoga. In his conception of guṇa in relation to rasa, Vāmana is more akin to Dandin than to Bharata. Like Dandin, he does not consider guṇas as the essence of rasa, rather he relates them directly to word and sense and thus he regards them as the essence of poetic expression. Guṇas, according to him, are not subordinate to rasa, rather, defining kānti as the predominence of rasa, he subordinates it to guṇas. He defines them as an essential characteristic of riti which is the soul of poetry (rittiratma kavyasya). Here Vāmana applies the word 'riti' for Dandin's mārga. But while Dandin considers the ten guṇas as the life of Vaidarbha mārga, Vāmana regards them as the essential characteristics in general. He also accepts Dandin's ten guṇas, but he increases the number from ten to twenty pertaining to both word and sense. To suit his idea, he has changed the

8. Dr Nagendra, Hindi Kāvyālāmkhāra-Sūtra, 3.2.15.
9. Dr De, Some Problems of Sanskrit Poetics, p.10.
meanings of many gunas. But this change is neither fully convincing nor logical. Dr D. K. Gupta rightly observes, 'In order to accommodate this change, he has to alter some of the earlier definitions and introduce some new points, which, many of them, must be admitted as being far-fetched, and in this task, he cannot be held to have succeeded for one can clearly see that his gunas have stood afar from the concepts that their names imply.'

Dhvanikāra maintains that the gunas have no separate existence and for it, they depend upon rasa only. He defines gunas in the following kārikā:

\[
\text{tamarthamavalambate ye'nginam te gunah smṛtah/} \\
\text{angasāntāstvāmālāṁkāra mantabyāhkatākādivat} // (Dhv.2.6)
\]

Thus according to Dhvanikāra rasa is the predominant element in Kāvya and gunas pertain to that predominant element only. Just as the quality of heroism depends upon the soul, gunas also depend upon the rasa which is soul of Kāvya. Dhvanikāra was supported by theorists like Mammaṭa, Hemchandra, Vidyādharā and Viswānātha. Mammaṭa is more unequivocal in stating the gunas as the attribute of rasa. Like Dhvanikāra he accepts three varieties of guna - mādhurya, ojas and prasāda. The position of gunas in the Dhvani theory is clearly brought out by Dr M. M. Sharma in the following lines - 'From Ānanda's words, we learn that gunas as understood in their technical implication, belong to the words and the meanings suggestive of rasa (cf. kāvyamāṁśṛtyā mādhuryām pratīti-\[\text{thati;} \]sabdārthavāṁjo vyāvasthitam and prasādastu svacchatā

sadbārtthayoh). Druti, dipti and mental state of being overwhelmed are the effects of the rasas. Gunas always owe their occurrence to the corresponding presence of rasa. Viśvanātha and other later poeticians mostly subscribe to this view directly or indirectly. But Jagannātha Panditarāja strikes a note of dissent and does not accept gunas as an essence of rasa. We are going to examine his view in the following paragraphs.

Jagannātha's conception of guna

After the establishment of the Dhvami theory which regulated the poet thought as a standard literary principle of criticism in Sanskrit, there was little scope of offering new ideas; but Panditarāja, in his zeal of showing originality struck a different note and endorsed the views of the older writers which went against the accepted views of the neo-critics. In his treatment of guna, he followed Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta to a certain length; but he introduced some new ideas too, in his conception of guna and tried to discuss it by adopting Nyāya-nyāya method of argument and thus he treated gunas having accepted the some old ideas and clarified them in the light of his own rhetorical doctrines.

Mammata and other writers of the Dhvani school maintain that the gunas are attributes of rasa; but such statements like 'madhura racana', 'ajasvi gumpha' etc. which are found in practice are made in a figurative way. Just as heroism is an attribute of the soul, still we say that his appearance or physique is heroic, similarly such statements as 'madhura racana' etc. are in use by
lakṣāṇa only. Jagannātha does not support that the guṇas are the attributes of rasa and with a view to refuting the view of these navya alamkārikas, raises the question as to the criterion of accepting the guṇas as the attribute of rasa. Perceptual evidence here cannot establish the guṇas as the properties of rasa. Jagannātha maintains that in case of fire, it produces burning sensation as its effects and heat as its quality separately quite distinct from each other. But in relishing rasa, we do not feel any quality except its effects—druti and dipti, which are mere emotional states. Again, it is also a fact that heat and burning sensation of fire may not always be felt and so they are the qualities of fire and not essence of it. But on the contrary, we find that when Rasa emerges, it invariably produces only a mental modification and we do not perceive any other characteristics apart from it as we do in case of fire. So the criterion of quality, as distinct from essence, is not noticeable in the case of Rasa by perceptual intuition.¹²

Panditarāja anticipates that the opponent may say for the shake of argument, that the existence of the qualities like madhurya, ojas etc. as rasa-dharma, may not be established by perception, but can be proved by inference. Generally it is admitted that rasa cannot be said to be common for the effects like druti, dipti and vikāsa. Because, rasas in general are supposed to be the cause of druti and other effects and ēṛnagāra would also be the cause of druti and vīra (heroic sentiment) would also, in the like

¹² Dr N. N. Chaudhury, Kāvyatattvasamikṣā, p.74.
manner, would be the cause of druti. To obviate this difficulty, a specific causal relation must be admitted. Generally it is found that a specific cause has an specific effect. In other words, a cause is different from another cause because it has a distinct effect. The mental state caused by ūṛṅgāra is different from that of virā. So ūṛṅgāra has a distinctive characteristic from that of virā. This distinct character again is possible on account of the difference of qualities. So the idea of gunas as a distinctive characteristic of rasa is proved by inference.

Controverting the arguments of the opponents, Jagannātha says that nobody will object to admit that a specific cause has a specific effect and the distinctive nature of the cause is inferred from the distinctive nature of the effect. Thus ūṛṅgāra has the characteristic ūṛṅgāratvam which is quite distinct from other rasas. Ūṛṅgāra cannot be the cause of druti directly and so there is no causal connection between ūṛṅgāra and druti. But a particular rasa having the quality mādhurya may be the cause of druti and in this way it can be inferred that ūṛṅgāra has mādhurya. But it is futile to infer mādhurya and other gunas from ūṛṅgāra than to infer ūṛṅgāratva which is known directly to exist in ūṛṅgāra (cf. drutyādiniśṭhākāryatanirupitaya rasaniśṭhākāraṇatayā upapattaye yadi guṇāḥ kalpyante tahri gacchavām syādātō drutyaśim prati rasānām kāraṇatā pratisvikaṛūpena sampādaṇyā ... ... prakṛte ca pratyekapadartho raso 'tāḥ pratyekarasaḥ śṛṅgāradiḥ tadgatāsādharanadharām śṛṅgāratvam, karunatvam viratvam/ tadādirūpeneti bhāvāḥ/ Rasagangādhara, ed. by Madhusudhan Sastrī, pp.229-30).
The opponent may again raise the objection that instead of admitting the individual cause of each rasa, it will be a logical economy to admit a common cause (melting of the heart) of the three rasas, śṛṅgāra, karuṇa and sānta on account of their having mādhurya. Thus for instance for nine rasas, there would be nine causes. If druti is admitted to be the effect of śṛṅgāra, karuṇa and sānta which have the common quality mādhurya, there will be three causal connections (kāryakāranabhāva) instead of nine. This will not only establish the existence of gunas but also will be a logical economy. But Paṇḍitarāja does not consider this argument to be based on reasons. To meet the argument he states that Mammaṭa and other rhetoricians held that different rasas have different effects and as such he did not accept mādhurya as an indivisible object (akhaṇḍa vaṣṭu). Again in the effect of different gunas also, there is difference of degrees just like druti, drutitara and drutitama and so the very argument of establishing gunas as rasadharmas through the relationship of cause and effect instead of being a logical economy results in the admission of plurality of causes.

The Vedantic conception of Ātman as introduced by Jagannātha Paṇḍitarāja in his Rasa-theory is advanced to refute the argument of the opponents who hold that the gunas are the attributes of rasa. Accordingly, Paṇḍitarāja holds that Ātman is devoid of any quality and rasa is Ātman and so rasa is devoid of any quality.

Now it may be said that rasa is Ātman and it is Nirguna; still mādhurya and other gunas may belong not to rasa but to the
sthāyibhāvas like rati and others which are the upādhis (qualifying adjuncts) of rasa. But Jagannātha maintains that that is also a debatable question as there is no proof for this. Again, according to the dictum of Nyāya philosophy, a quality is not qualified by another quality. Rati and other sthāyibhāvas are qualifying adjuncts of rasa and as such, they themselves are gunas. If mādhurya is again admitted as the guna of them, then it will lead us to admit a quality of another quality which is improper. Such being the case, how we can use the expressions like 'srngārā-mādhurah'. Jagannātha replies that such expression is possible through prayojakata sambandha. It is an admitted fact srngāra has mādhurya and it is the prayojaka of druti which is a mental state (cittavṛtti). Or it may be said that through the relation of causality, druti and other mental states are called mādhurya. Although druti, dipti etc. are mental states, their prayojaka, viz., mādhurya exists in rasa. So through the relation of prayojakata druti may exist in rasa. Again, the prayojakata sambandha is also possible in analogy with the expression 'vājigandhā usnā'.

In Ayurveda it is said that vājigandhā (Physalis Flexuosa) produces heat in body if it is consumed. Hence vājigandhā itself is called warm in the manner of identifying a garm as warm on account of its capacity of producing heat. Thus Jagannātha justifies the predication of mādhurya on the ground of its being a condition (prayojakata) of the mental state of druti.

13. 'gunādinarūpakriyaḥ' - quoted by Dr Sandhya Bhaduri in the Rasagangādhara, p.246; vide, Bhasapariccheda (ed. by P. Sastry) - 'atha dravyaśruta jneya nirguna niskriya gunāḥ' (p.396).
Having established mādhurya as the causality of drutī, Jagannātha removes the possibility of the general causes like adṛśta as being one of them. A general is the cause of all effects. They are Isvara, isvara, desa, kāla, ākāśa, dharma, adharma, prāgbhāva and pratibandakabhāva. They are the general antecedents of all sorts of activity. So they may be the causality of drutī also. But actually such statements as madhura adṛśta, etc. are not in vogue and so mādhurya etc. should be understood not belonging to the general causes but to the particular causes like sabda, artha, rasa and racana. Thus the causality of mādhurya and other gunas to produce drutī and other mental states being established, the necessity of postulating laksanā for explaining gunas in connection with sabda and artha does not arise.

Number of gunas

There is divergence of opinion among the rhetoricians regarding the number of gunas. Broadly two opposite views regarding the number of gunas are found to exist – one of the ancient alamkārikas and the other of the navyas. According to the first view, the number of gunas is not fixed while the other have fixed it for all time to come. Bharata enumerates ten gunas and following him Dandin also accepts ten gunas which according to him, go to make up good poetry. After him, there is a tendency among the writers to increase the number of gunas. Bhāmaha, one of the

15. Dr Sandhya Bhaduri, Rasagangādhara, pp.47-48 (foot-notes).
earliest alamkārikas, reduced them to three but Vāmana multiplied
the number into twenty.\footnote{17} This tendency to increase the number
of gunas is best exhibited by Bhoja who multiplies their number
into twenty four. It is interesting to note that he admits three
varieties of guna - external, internal and vaiseśika and each
being twenty four, the total number of gunas in his scheme comes
to seventy two.\footnote{18} The Agnipurāṇa enumerates eighteen gunas, six
each belonging to word and to sense and the rest six belonging to
both of them. But this number given by the Agnipurāṇa is not
authoritative; rather it is very confusing.\footnote{19} Vāmana, following
Bharata and Dandin, enumerates ten gunas and this was more or less
a standard number. But he doubles it by bringing them under two
classifications - sabda-guna and artha-guna. It must, however,
be admitted that Vāmana made some development on Dandin's scheme;
but he was not successful. His classification of guna has been
subject to criticism and later theorists have reduced the number
into three only.

In the second group of rhetoricians in whom there is a
tendency to reduce the number of gunas, may be included generally
the Dhvani theorists and some other writers like Mammata, Hemchandra,
Vidyādhara and Viswanātha. They restrict the number
of gunas into three and treat the rest either as included within
these three or as mere negation of flaws. Ānandavardhana accepts
for the first-time, gunas as rasa-dharma and also accepts only

\footnote{17. Dr D. K. Gupta, A Critical Study of Dandin and His Works,p.147.}
\footnote{18. Dr D. K. Gupta, A Critical Study of Dandin and His Works,p.147.}
\footnote{19. Hindi Rasagangādhara, Introduction, p.44.}
three gunas - mādhurya, ojas and prasāda. Mammaṭa also accepts these three gunas and includes the rest in them. He says in his Kāvyaprakāśa (VIII, Kārika 72) that of these ten gunas some are included in these three; others are resolved into mere negation of certain defects and the rests are dosas only. Viswanātha exactly follows Mammaṭa in minimising their number into three. It is to be noted here that Mammaṭa and his followers admit gunas as the characteristics of rasa and in the realisation of rasa, which is a psychological process, the attitude of the mind changes into three states - druti (fluidity), dīpti (glaringness) and vyāpti (expansion). Corresponding to these three attitudes of mind these rhetoricians admit only three gunas - mādhurya, ojas and prasāda. Thus it is clear that the later writers tried to minimize the number of gunas into three instead of increasing it. Mammaṭa's refutation of the ten gunas of the older writers and his exposition of the three gunas are very convincing and there is little scope to controvert it.

Jagannātha's view on the number of gunas

Like Mammaṭa and other followers of the Dhvani theorists, Jagannātha accepts three gunas and accordingly he also dismisses the other gunas except mādhurya, ojas and prasāda as included in these three gunas or in certain dosābhāvas or in some alamkāras and a few of them as mere beautifying agents and others as dosas only. Thus, slesa, udārata, prasāda and samādhi are included in

20. Dr Nagendra, Hindi Kāvyālamkārasūtravṛtti, Introduction, p. 73.
compositions having ojas. Now ślesa and udārata may be included in writings characterised by compactness of word-structure. But prasāda and samādhi are partly compact and partly loose. How can they be brought under ojas? Jagannātha removes the doubt by stating that they can be included either in compositions suggestive of mādhurya or of prasāda. Mādhurya as admitted by Vāmana is nothing but those compositions by which mādhurya is suggested. In this way, the word vyāṅga is sufficient to cover those writings suggestive of those guṇas. So far as samatā is concerned, it cannot be a guṇa in a composition. For, in a metrical composition, different styles should be adopted to bring out the evenness or unevenness of the composition. Among other guṇas, kānti and saṃkūmārya have lost their very existence by the rejection of the doṣas—grāmyatva and kāṣṭatva. Arthavyakti has been included in prasāda.

Among the artha-guṇas, ślesa and first four varieties of ojas are mere flourish of style. So they do not deserve too be included in guṇas. Otherwise, Jagannātha holds, every sloka will have to be counted as an instance of guṇas on account of their variations in strikingness of expression. Other guṇas like prasāda consisting in the clearness of meaning, mādhurya which is nothing but a fanciful expression, saṃkūmārya consisting of freedom from ruggedness, udārata which consists in the absence of vulgarity, samatā characterised by the absence of difference the fifth variety of ojas indicative of some purpose in view, arthavyakti consisting in the distinctness of meaning and kānti consisting in the brilliance of sentiment, have been rendered futile by
the negation of the dosas like by adhikapadatva, anavikrtatva, aslila, agrāmya, bhangaprakrama and apusthārtha and also by the admission of svabhābokti alamkāra, rasadhvani and rasavadalām-kāra. Samādhi is nothing but the original idea of a poet; it is the source of poetry and is a guna. If, however, it is accepted as a guna, pratibhā (poetic genius) too should be counted as a guna. So Jagannātha Pāṇḍitarāja, following Mammata and other dhvani-theoriest accepts three gunas only.

Next we propose to discuss the ten guṇas of the ancients as elucidated by Pāṇḍitarāja with a reference to slight change brought about in them by him.

Slesa is the use of homogeneous letters in different words to create an impression of oneness among the words. This is also known as compactness. The example given by Jagannātha is this — anabarata vidvadrumadrohi dāridryamādyaddvipoddāma darpaṅgḥabidrā-banaprauḍapancānanah, where the heterogeneous words patched up together give the impression that they are 'abhinna' (homogeneous).

According to Dāndin, slesa consists in the quality of being well-knit, the opposite of which is looseness due to the abundant use of alpaprāṇa (unaspirated) letters.21 Vāmana’s slesa is again coalescence of words resulting in smoothness.22 It will be seen that Dāndin’s definition differs from that of Vāmana. Both the alamkārikas, however, emphasise the sound aspect in slesa. But

22. Hindi Kāvyālāmākāra Sūtra 3.1.11.
the definitions of Jagannātha and Dandin correspond to the ojas of Vāmana and not of ślesa.

The alternative use of laxity and compactness of word-structure in an expression is prasāda, e.g.,

kim brūmastava vīratāṁ vayamamī yawmamī dharāmandal
krīdākunditabhūsonanayane dormandapasyati/
māṇikyāvalikāntidanturaterairbhusasahasrotkarai-
vindhyāranyaguhāgrhabaniruhāstakālumullāsit
(Rasaṅgādhara, p.69).

'O Indra, what should we speak of your heroism on the earth? Wherever you cast your glance on your pair of arms making your red eyes circular together with your eye-brows, the trees in the cave of Vindhya mountain become more beautiful by the lustre of ornaments dazzled by emeralds.' Here the words from 'kim' to 'yasmin' are loose, from 'dha ra etc.' to 'bruhi' are compact and again there is laxity upto 'nayana'.

Dandin's definition23 of prasāda is substantially the same with that of the author of Kāvyaprakāśa who describes prasāda as comprehension of meanings of words just being heard.24 Vāmana's prasāda, however, deviates from the usual track. He defines it as the laxity of structure.25 It is merely a negation of ojas. But he adds that it is an excellence only when it combines with ojas. Jagannātha takes this aspect of Vāmana's interpretation in his conception of guna.

23. Kāvyādarsā, 1.45.
24. Kāvyaprakāśa, VIII.76.
Samata or evenness is the homogeneity of style of composition from the beginning to the end. The example cited above as that of mādhurya is of samata also. Here in this verse, upanāgarika vṛtti has been followed from the beginning to the end.

Dandin's samata is evenness in the grouping of word-sounds which are either soft, harsh or middling arising respectively by the combination of soft, harsh or mixed letters. Vāmana describes it as non-avoidance of a particular marga in an expression. This definition of Vāmana has close similarity with that of Panditarāja. Abhinavagupta rightly compares Bharata's guṇa to Vāmana's verbal excellence which bears close affinity with Dandin's conception of samata.26

Mādhurya occurs in a composition due to the juxtaposition of distinct words where short vowels are made long by subsequent conjunct consonants. Jagannātha's example of mādhurya is:

nitarām paruṣā sarojamālā na mṛṇālani vicārāpeśalāni/
yadi kamalata tavāṅgakānāmatha kā nāma kathāpi pallavānām//

(Rasagangādhara, p.150)

'The garland of lotuses is very rough; lotus-fibres do not appear worthy of choice. If you speak of the delicacy of your limbs, then what is the use of mentioning the twigs?'

In the Dandin's view, mādhurya or sweetness is the elegance caused by alliteration, technically called srutyanuprasa and absence of vulgarity. According to Bhāmaha, that Kāvya is sweet

which is agreeable to the ear and does not contain long compounds. Vāmana defines it as distinctness of words due to absence of long compounds and by defining so, he borrows the second aspect of Bharata's mādhurya. 'In rasadhvani theorists, it is the source of pleasure caused by the fluidity of heart, arising from absence or rarity of compounds.'

Sukumāratā or softness is an excellence of a passage, the diction of which is free from harshness. The illustrative verse cited by Jagannātha is -

svedāmbusāndraKānasālikapolañaa

dolāyitaśrastavānakundalabhandaniyā/

ānandamākurañāyati smaranena kāpi

ramyā dasā manasi me madireksanāyāh/

'My mind becomes delighted by mere remembrance of the beautiful condition of my beloved having tremulous eyes and decorated with ear rings that hang on her cheeks wet with dense drops of perpiration.'

According to Dandin, sukumāratā consists in the absence of harshness due to the use of soft vocables. In Vāmana, it is ajātharthatvam, i.e., freedom from harshness. But this guna should never be confounded with the dosa saithilya which is brought about by the preponderance of weak and non-aspirated letters. Anticipating such a confusion Dandin said - 'bandhasaithilyadose'pi

dārsitā sarbakomale (Kāvyādārsa, 1.69). According to Dr Gupta Vāmana follows Dandin in his conception of this guṇa and the latter again partially follows Bharata. Jagannātha Panditarāja, here, follows what Vāmana had said and he had nothing new to add in the development of the conception of this excellence.

Arthavyakti is the easy apprehension of relationship of the words in a sentence. As the illustrative verse, Jagannātha refers to the verse 'nitarām paruṣā' etc. as cited already to illustrate mādhurya.

Dandin defines it as the absence of ambiguity (Kāvyādārsa, 1.73). 'When a sentence is self-sufficient containing all necessary explanations within itself, when there is no need for 'adhyāhāra' and the like, the sentence is said to be characterised by arthavyakti.'29 Vidyānātha who follows Bhoja in mentioning twenty four excellences, defines arthavyakti as clearness of sense caused by the completion of sense due to the completion of a sentence in all its parts.30 According to some rhetoricians, however, arthavyakti is not different from prasāda and Visvānātha holds this view when he says:

arthavyakteh prasādayagunenaiva parigrah/
arthavyaktih padānām hi satītyarthaḥ samarpanam/

(Sāhityadarpāna 9.11)

Udarāta consists in the fanciful grouping of words which are characterised as harsh. The typical example of this guṇa is

30. Dr De, History of Sanskrit Poetics, II, p.234.
the following verse:

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pramodabharatundilapramathadattatatala\udit
vinodini vinayake damarudindmadhvanini/
lalatatabisfutannavakrp\itayonicchato
hathoddhata-jatodhato gatapate nato \ntyati//
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'Binayaka, who takes much delight in talas of the poets of Pramathas who were extremely glad, having sounded his ‘damaru’, Nataraaja Siva with radiance of fire emitted from his forehead and looking ugly with dishevelled matted look of hair, began to dance."

Dandin describes udarata (1) as possessed of eminence striking the mind and (ii) the employment of abundance of elegant adjectives (Kavyadarśa 1.76-79). Vāmana defines it as loveliness in which words seem to dance (Hindi Kavyalāmākārasūtra VIII, 1.2.3). According to C. S. Rama Sastrī, the second description of udarata follows Agnipurāṇa which describes it thus - 'uttanapadatāndāryam yuṭam slāghyavi\iśas\asana\i\'. Dr Gupta on the other hand, holds the view that the Agnipurāṇa unsuccessfully tries to combine the misconceived idea of verbal guna with Dandin’s second interpretation. Jagannātha defining udarata as the dancing of words for the use of harsh letters, partially follows Vāmana with the introduction of slight improvement.

Ojas is the compactness of word-structure which abounds in short letters followed by conjunct ones, e.g., :

'O thou the ornament of the earth, your fame which can humble down the pride of beauty of waves of the ocean, tossed against the Malaya mountain which is being dragged in churning by the hands of gods and demons and noticed by the host of anchorites eagerly and delightfully, decorates the boundary of the world.'

Dandin defines ojas as the preponderance of compounds. This, according to him, is the chief characteristic of prose compositions following both the Vaidarbha and Ganda patterns. Bhāmahä, of course, does not define it but he states that some, wishing to show force, compound many words into one (kecidojobhidhitsantah samasyanti bahüngapi/ yathā mandārakusumarenupinjaripatālaṁ Kāvyālaṁkāra 2.2). Vāmana considers it to be the compactness of word-structure which actually corresponds to Dandin's ślesa. Mammata and Viswanātha conceive ojas as the glaringness (dīptatva) which causes expansion of the heart and which consists in abundant use of compounds and verbosity. Jagannātha's conception of ojas corresponds to the definition of Vāmana though he tries to improve upon Vāmana by clearly stating the cause of gadhatva (compactness).

Kānti is the brilliance in the form of supermundane sōbhā or beauty in the words employed in a composition with the exclusion

of those disagreeable words worthy of use only in the Vedas. As a typical example of this guna, Jagannātha mentions the same verse 'nitarām' etc. cited already to illustrate mādhurya.

According to Dandin, Kānti is the quality of agreeableness liked by all people by reason of its conformity to popular ideas, and it is seen in conversations and also in description. Vāmana defining it as the brilliance or refinement of words, clarifies in vṛtti that kānti is nothing but richness of words, without which a composition appears to be a mere copy only. According to Dr D. K. Gupta, Dandin's kānti is the atisāyokti figure with the difference that while the latter transgresses the worldly usage, the former conforms to it. Jagannātha, however, brings out a total change in the conception of this guna over Vāmana's definition and improves upon it by giving a new explanation to it.

Samādhi consists in the mixture of laxity and looseness in a composition in an orderly way (RG, p.72). Vāmana describes it as symmetry due to orderly ascent and descent, that is, when the heightening effect is toned down by softening effect and vice versa (Kāvyālāmkārasūtra III.1.19). Jagannātha remarks that this mixture of compactness and looseness is nothing but orderly ascent and descent. The order of these distinguishes samādhi from prasāda. In prasāda, laxity and compactness are mixed in opposite way.

Samādhi is illustrated by the following verse:

\[\text{Verse 33, Kavyadarsa, 1.85.}\]

\[\text{Verse 34, Kavyalamkarasutra 3.1.25 and Vrtti on it.}\]

\[\text{Verse 35, A Critical Study of Dandin and His Works, pp.158-59.}\]
Whose lotus-like face is the dancing hall of words showering embrosia and the friend of high waves of the Ganges which emerges from heaven and has no obstacle in her course.

In the verse quoted above, there is ascent in the first half of the sloka, and in the third foot there is descent. Though there are letters suggestive of mādhurya in portion of the verse beginning with 'Gangā' etc., these letters entering into long compound, have not given rise to mādhurya. So this is an illustration of samādhi.

Jagannātha's treatment of arthagunas

Having elucidated the ten sabda-gunas, Jagannātha deals with ten arthagunas of Vāmana and other older writers. The nomenclature of them is same as that of the sabda-gunas. But in his expositions, Jagannātha has tried to offer new definitions of some of them with improvement upon Vāmana.

1. Ślesa - When the actions of the clever, their concealment and their argument in support of it are described in one place so that their mutual relationship is not cut off, then such arthaghatana is ślesa. Vāmana defines it as coalescence or co-mingling of many ideas (Kāvyālāmākārasūtra, 3.2.4). In vṛtti, Vāmana says that this ghatana is nothing but krama, Kantilya, amulvānatva and upattiyoga. Vāmanās conception of arthaślesa is identical with that of Bhoja.
Jagannath has not cited any illustration of artha ślesa, but Nāgasa has referred to the following verse from Amarasataka as an example:

`drstvaikasansamsthite priyatame pascdupetyāˈdara-
dekasyā nayane nimilaya vihitakridamubandhacchalah
 śasadvakritakandharah sapulaka-premocchasamānasā-
 mantarhāsalasatkapolaphalakām dhūrtoparam cumbatih`

'Having seen two beloved ladies, the wicked lover, having advanced further, closed the eyes of one of them under the pretext of fun and then turning his neck slightly, he kissed the other who was horripilated due to excessive love with her cheeks swelling up.'

2. Prasāda, according to Jagannatha is the clearness of meaning due to the employment of those padas which are absolutely necessary to convey the meaning. Pandit Mathuranath Sastri clearly brings out the purport in his Sarala - yāvān arthastānyevapadāni, arthapeksayā na nyunani na cādhikāni padānī yatra' (Rasagangādhara, p.73, footnote). For example - 'kamalānukari vadānāmi kila tasyāh (Her face imitates lotuses). The counter example is 'kamalachānukāri vaktraṁ' (Her face imitates the beauty of a lotus). Here the word 'kānti' is redundant.

3. Samatā - This is the evenness of ideas due to the non-relinquishment of its proper order. This exactly follows Vāmana. It is illustrated by the following verse:
'Hari is my father, Hari is my mother, Hari is my brother, Hari is my friend. I see Hari everywhere; except Him, nothing appears to me.'

If however 'Visnurbhrata' is used in place Harirbhrata, the natural order would be broken and this will lead to the dosa, prakrama-bhanga.

4. Madhurya - It is the strikingness of expression resulting from the statement of an expression in different styles. This strikingness of utterance is not vakrokti of Bhāmaha or of Dandin. Vakrokti, according to Dandin, is the fundamental principle underlying all figurative examples. Jagannātha's conception of madhurya as strikingness of utterance is his own creation. It results from statements made in an impressive periphrastic manner for special charm, e.g., 'Vidhattam nihsankam ... ... jāgarti bhavatī' (Rasagangādhara, p.74).

'Let the creator be engaged in his contemplation, let Hari enjoy sleep on the sesamaga, let Hara dance incessantly. But if you remain awake fulfilling my desire, what is the use of purification or of penance, charity or sacrifice?'

Here the intended meaning of the verse is - 'While you are there to fulfill my desire, what is the use of the Creator, Hari etc.?' But this very idea has been conveyed by different modes of expression like 'sleeping happily,' etc. Otherwise it
would have been a faulty statement (anavikṛtavatva).

5. Sukumarata - This is freedom from harshness on account of the absence of inauspicious ideas like, sudden grief etc., e.g., 'tvarayā yānti pānthoyām priyābirahakātaraḥ.'

'This traveller, who is suffering from the pang of separation from his beloved goes swiftly.' Here the replacement of 'viraha' by 'marana' would lead to disagreeable or inauspicious ideas.

6. Arthavyakti - It is the peculiar description of the action (kriyā) and nature of a thing. In Vāmana, it is the explicitness of ideas which makes the nature of things clear. Vāmanas arthavyakti can be included in the svabhāvokti alamkāra of Dandin and other later writers. Bhoja defines it as the vivid portrayal of the nature of an object. According to Dr Raghavan, Bhoja borrows the phrase 'sākṣātkathana' from Dandin's definition of svabhābokti. But anticipating that the recognition of arthavyakti will remove the necessity of svabhābokti alamkāra, Bhoja brings out the difference by stating that arthavyakti is the portrayal of the essential nature of things while svabhābokti is that of the temporary nature.

Panditarāja illustrates this guṇa by the verse -

\[
gurumadhe kamalāksi kamalāksena prahartakāmam mām/ 
radayantritarasanāgraṃ taralitanayanām nivarayām-oakre/
\]

36. Kāvyālambhārasūtra, 3.2.4 and Vṛtti on it.
'The lotus-eyed one, in company with her elders, being desirous of hurting me with her lotus-eye, prohibited me controlling her tip of tongue with teeth.'

7. Udarāta - In his conception of this arthaguna, Panditaratā follows Vāmana mostly. To him, it is the avoidance of vulgar meaning, e.g., cumbanaṁ dehi me bhārye kāmacandālatṛiptaye (O my wife, kiss me for my satisfaction; I am a kama candala).

8. Ojas - (1) The expression of the meaning of a word by many sentences, (2) the expression of the meaning of many sentences by the use of a single word, (3) the use of many sentences for the expression of what can be expressed by one sentence or (4) vice-versa and (5) the effectiveness of epithet - these are the five varieties of ojas. Vāmana describes ojas as the maturity of conception and he enumerates five varieties of praudhī - padarthe vakya-vacanaṁ, vakyārthe padabhidḥaṇ-vyāsa, samāsa svā-bhiprayatva. It is devident Jagannātha, here, follows Vāmana and as such, the criticism levelled against Vāmana is applicable to him also. Actually there is no justification of bringing all these under the head of praudhī. As Dr Raghavan rightly observes - 'There is no logic in putting all these together under same name called praudhī and identifying that as ojas. Praudhī in general is a feature of the poet's genius and expression, and is of various kinds. Hemchandra offers the proper criticism of this

39. Kāvyālaṁkārasūtra, 3.2.2.
40. Jagannātha calls it pratipadanavaicitarī (RG, p.75).
ojas of Vāmana when he says - 'iti ya praudhih ojas, tadvaic-tramātram' (p. 195). 41

9. Kānti - Jagannātha defines kānti as the prominence of rasa (dīptarasatvam kāntih). This is exactly the same as that of Vāmana. 42 Viswanātha does not recognise kānti as a guṇa. He includes it in rasadhvani and gunībhūtabhyangā - 'rasadhvaniguṇi-bhūtabvyangābhīyām kāntināmakah' (Sāhityadarpana VIII.5). However, from the standpoint of the rasa-theory, this guṇa is very important, for here in this guṇa, Vāmana brings in the idea of rasa giving an essential place in poetry, while on the other hand, Dāndin gives a lower position by bringing it in one of the alamkāras.

10. Samādhi is the treatment of a topic by a poet which is not treated by other poets or which is a mere shadow of what have been said by others (RG, p. 77). Now the treatment of a topic by a particular is the knowledge of that poet concerned; it is the property of his antahkāraṇa. How can that be an arthaguna? Jagannātha says that though knowledge is the property of soul the idea (meaning) itself is the subject of knowledge and as such knowledge and idea are related through the relation of bisayata. So it is an arthagunā (ideal guṇa).

To Vāmana, samādhi is nothing but the apprehension of the original meaning arising from the concentration of the mind (Kāvyā-lamkārasūtra, 3.2.7). But this is hardly an excellence. Vāmana

41. Bhoja's Srngāra Prakāśa, p. 287.
42. Kāvyālambkārasūtra, 3.2.25.
says that meaning is two-fold — original and borrowed from others. Jaganātha borrows this idea from Vāmana and introduces in his definition. Dandin, however, rightly remarks that samādhi is the richest treasure of poetry which all poets seek after. 43

43. Kāvyādarsā, 1.100.